ML20238A325
| ML20238A325 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/07/1987 |
| From: | Petrone F Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL-5-I-SC-071, OL-5-I-SC-71, NUDOCS 8708310026 | |
| Download: ML20238A325 (80) | |
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=c POST EXERCISE e' .; ASSESSMENT D'aC ^ t '
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June 22, 1983, Exercise of the Radiological l Emergency Preparedness Plans of New York State, Wayne County, and Monroe County for the ROBERT E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER STATION <1 i
October 12, 1983 (Revised October 25, 1983) l Federal Emergency Management Agency Region II 5
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.. CONTENTS I
ABBREVIATIONS............................................................. v P
SUMMARY
................................................................... vii k
INTRODUCTION........................................................... I 1.1 Ex erc is e Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 1.3 Federal Observers.................................................
Evaluation Criteria............................... ................................. 2 I
1.0 4 Ex e r c i s e Ob j ec t iv e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.5 Ex e rc i s e Sc e na r i o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................
................ . 10 1.5.1 Maj or Sequenc e of Events on . Si t e. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
- 1. 5 . 2 ' Sc e na r i o S u mma r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... ......... 10 1.5.3 Desc ription of Stat e and Local Resourc es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 t
2 EXERCISE EVALUATION: DEFICIENCIES AND REC 0KMEND ATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1 State of New York, Lake District, and Wes t ern Dis tric t . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.1.1 Emerg ency Operations Facilities ' and . Resou rc es . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-2.1.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials a nd Staf f. . . . . . . . . . 22-2.1.3 Eme rg e nc y Op e ra t io ns Ma nag ement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 2.1.4 Public Ale r ti ng a nd No ti fica tio n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
) 2.1.5 M ed ia a nd Pub lic Rela t io ns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
24 2.1.6 ...... 24
' 2.1.7 Accident As s e s s m e n t . . . . . . . .
Actions to Protect the Public............................. 26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 2.1 8 Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures. . . . . . . . .
2.1.9 Recov ery a nd Re ent ry Opera tio ns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 28 27 2.1.10 Rel eva nc e o f t he Ex p e rienc e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2 Emergency. Operations Facility.................................. .. 28 2.3 Joint Emergency News Center and Public Information. .. 28 2.4 t 'a y n e Co u n t y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 2.4.1 ..............- 31 2.4.2 Emergency Operations Facilities and Resourc es . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 2.4.3 Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staf f.. . . . .. . . . 32 Emerg e nc y O p e ra t io ns Ma na g eme nt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.4.4 Public Al er t i ng a nd No t i fic a t io n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 2.4.5 34 2.4.6 Pub Ac c idlicent a nd M edia Rela t i o ns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 ...
2.4.7 Ac: ions to AsProtec:
s e s s mthe e n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . . . . .35.
2.4.8 Public......................... ... 36 2.4.9 Healt h, Medical, and Exposu re Cont rol Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . 37 2.4.10 R ec o v e ry a nd R e e n t ry . O p e r a t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 .....
Relevanc e of the Exercise Experienc e. . . .
2.5 Monroe County................................... ................. 37 2.5.1 ................ 38 2.5.2 Eser c en:y Opera t ions Facili ti es and Resourc es. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 2.5.3 Aler:ing and Mobili:a: ion of Of ficials and Staf f. . . . . . . . . . 39 2.5.4 Em e r g e nc y Op e ra : i o n s Ma na g em e n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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2.5.5 Pub l ic Al e r t i ng a nd So t i f ic a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '
' 41 2.5.6 Pub Acc idlic enta nd Med ia Rela t io ns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 2.5.7 Ac: ions :o Assessmen:.......................................
Protec: :he .. 42 2.5.3 Publie..........................
Heal:h. Medical., a nd Exposure Cont rol Measures. . . . . . . . . . .
. 43 2.5.9 45 2.5.10 Rec ov ery a nd Re en:ry 0oers tio ns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 ..
Rel eva nc e of :he Exerc is e Expe r enc e. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46 ..
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! CONTENTS (Cont'd) 3
SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCIES THAT WOULD LEAD TO NEGATIVE FINDINGS .......... 47 ,, ;
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SUMMARY
OF OTHER DEFICIENCIES..........................................
l 48 4.1 State of New York, Lake District, and We s te rn Dis t rict . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 4.1.1 Emergency Doe rations Fa cilities and Re s ources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 4.1.2 Eme rgency Ope ra tions Managemen t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4.1.3 Accident As s e s s me n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4.1.4 Actions to Protect the Public.............................. 49 4.1.5 Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4.2 Eme rgency O pe rat ions Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 4.2.1 Emergency Operations Management.... .
4...................... 50 i 4.3 Joint Eme rgency News Cent er and Public Inf o rmation. . . . . . . . . . . 50 4.4 Wayne County.................................................
i 4.4.1 .... 51 Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources.............. 51 4.4.2 Public and Media Relations.................................
4.4.3 Accident 52 4.4.4 Assessment........................................ 52 !
4.4.5 Actions to Protect t he Pu b l i c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measur 4.5 Monroe 4.5.1 County......................................es............. ...............
52 53 Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources..............
4.5.2 Emergency Operations Management....................... 53 4.5.3 Public and Media Relations................................. 53.
4.5.4 . 53 4.5.5 Actions to Protect t h e Pu b l i c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. '. .. 54 Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures............. 54 5
SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTION OF DEFICIENCIES................................ 55 l
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e AB BRSVI ATIONS ANL Argonne National Laboratory
,. DOC U.S. Depar:sent of Commerce v
DOE U.S. Department of Energy DOR Department of Health (New York S ate)
DOT U.S. Depar: ment of Transpor:ation EBS Emergency Broadcast System EOC emergency operacions center EOF emergency operacions facili:y EPA U.S Environmental Pro:ec:1on Agency EPZ emergency planning zone ERPA emergency response planning area FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency HMS U.S. Depar: ment of Health and Human Services INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory JENC Join: Emergency News Center KI potassium iodide LDEOC Lake District Emergency Operations Center (Newark)
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ODP Of fice of Disaster Preparedness (Wayne Coun:y)
OEP Office of Emergency Preparedness (Monroe County)
PIO public information officer RAC Regional Assistance Cocmit:ee RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service REOS Radiological Emergency Co munications System REPP Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan SECC Sta:e Emergency Operations Cen:er ( Albany)
TLD thermoluminescent dosime:er USDA U.S. Depar: men: of Agricul:ure VCT volume con:rol :ank VDEOC Wes:ern Dis:ric: Emerzency Coerations Center (Batavia) i i
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. SLMMARY v
a The State of New York, Lake District, and Western District The State of New York demonstrated the capability to direct and control the emergency response activities. Management of the operation was profes-sional, and control and leadership were maintained throughout the exercise.
However, coordination of the protective action recommendations between the state and counties should be improved. The various state facilities at the emergency operation centers (EOCs) in Albany, the Western District in Batavia, and the Lake District in Newark were excellent.
Working space and displays indicating site data, weather conditions, and radiological conditions were generally good and were promptly updated with changed conditions at all three EOCs. However, the message and the status boards were not updated in the accident assessment room at the state EOC (SEOC) after about 1 p.m. and the eme rgenc y classification level at the Western District EOC (WDEOC) was not always displayed. In addition, maps of crop distribution should be available at the SEOC and maps of population by e=ergency response planning area (ERPA) should be available for workers at the VDEOC.
\ The separation of command and control from operations, accident assessment, and communications enhanced the decision-making capability at the SEOC in Albany. However, coordination between command and accident assessment should be improved by more fully integrating input from the accident assess-
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ment staff into protective action decisions at the SEOC. Internal communica-tions were pro:pt and flowed continuously, a marked improvement over last year's exercise.
Delays were observed at other ECCs in receiving infor-ation and answers to ' questions Communications System (RECS) line.
from the state over the Radiological Emergency Noise handled at the levels were high when many s1=ultaneous connunications were being Lake District ECC (LDEOC). At the WDEOC, there was inter-ference between the RECS line and the local government radio. The single telefax eachine was overloaded and incompatible with the telefax used by the state accident assess =ent team.
Public in f o r-a c ion was coordinated during the exercise through rezular contact by the public infor:ation officer (PIO) stationed at the Joint E=ergency News Center
(,' ENC) and co nand and control at the state EOC.
With regard to accident assess:ent, the state used the utility data.
However, assess:ent not all county field tonitoring data were fully utilized in the dose process. continuing a deficiency noted durint last year's exercise.
In addition. all the sa:e locational radiological data should be disolayed chronologically and by regardless of the county destinations of ori::in. for field saepling points at the SEOC
, but could be 1: proved bv : ore Actions to protect the public were good reaching protective action decisions. fully utili:ing county field-conitoring data in vit
( With regard to exposure control measures, the state should more fully utilize county data in determining whether to authorize excess exposures and the use of potassium iodide (KI) by emergency workers.
A.i t houg h the recovery a nd reentry were simulated, the state demon-s t ra t ed a good capa sility to identify requirements and assess the situation governing damage assessment and recovery.
input was evaluated from radiological int elligA enc task force was established and e, the Department of Agri-culture and Markets, and other relevant agencies. Ingestion pathway sampling teams were deployed from the district EOCs.
Members of these teams should have protective clo t hing, pa rticularly hand a nd foot coverings, available.
Based on input rec eived , appropriate recommenda tio ns were issued to the counties and a message was prepared for dissemination to the public.
Emergenev Ooerations Faciliev ~
State and county officials dispatched to the emergenc y orerations facility (EOF) arrived in a timely fashion a nd performed their assigned functions in a professional and competent manner. Communications between state ard county officials in the EOF were adequate. Facilities and resources were used effectively.
Al ert ing and mobilization of sesff and emerg enc y operations management were also adequate, as were dose assessment and recor sendations for actions :o protect the pub lic . (However, coordination with the off-site agencies could be improved .) Delays were observed in obtaining infor=ation and receiving answers to questions from the utility over the RECS line by other jurisdictions, a nd some utility field-conitoring data transmi:ted via che RECS line were in error. In addition, the format fo r transmitting radiological i nf o rma tion from the nuclear facili:y operator to other jurisdictions should agree with the standard state format.
Joint Esercenev News Center timely Overall, e=ergency and accurate manner.information was provided to the general public in a The soundirg of the sirens was well coordinated with the airing messages were of the firs:
wri::en and emergency is su ed from broadcast sys:em (E35) message. EBS the JENC by sta:e and county ?!Os based on info rma: ion rec eived from : heir ressective EOCs. Coordination ot public information was achieved through regular contac: between the PIOS located at
the E3S messages a nd the news releases The content of both screened prior to release; however, was accurate in most respects ard was some discrepancies were identified. Some ESS messages c o nt ai ned the statement, "This is a messages contained :he s:a:e Jent , "This is not a test."test," while other ESS In addition, some EBS messagesinf addi:ional referred ormation.to celephone books and public information brochures for (Complete information was not available in the latest
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^ . Rochester telephone . book and was very difficult to find in - the 1983-34 telephone book'for Wayne County.)
Several problems were identified with the facilities at the JENC. The
( state and county PIO work area was too small. This overcrowding impeded the timely preparation and issuance of EBS messages. It appears that additional space can easily be provided for the state 'and county PI0s because there is a-great deal of underutilized space adjacent to the government PIO work area.
The copying machine malfunctioned but was quickly repaired. In addition, this machine was too slow to permit a timely distribution process.
l Staff memb ers responsible for rumor control were able to accurately. {
answer questions called in by observers during the exercise.
l l Wavne County 1
i Emergency operations facilities and resources in Wayne County were j good, although the EOC has limit ed working space and was poorly ventilated.
The command, communications, and dose assessment areas were partitioned of f from the EOC operations room, which corrects a deficiency noted at the 1982 exercis e. The designation of sampling point s on maps in the dose assessment
) room should follow the scheme in NUREC-0654. However, a different scheme is .
used in the Wayne County plan and the plan should be revised to reflect the
. sc heme actually used. The RECS line should be inspected to' identify and
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eliminate the interf erenc e t ha t wa s enc ount ered at this ' year's ex erc is e. J Staff should also receive additional training in message handling.
The Chairman of the Wayne County Board of Supervisors and the Director of the County Office of Disaster Preparedness (ODP) d emo ns t ra t ed effective leadership and manag ement of the EOC.
Ac tiviti es of the EOC staff were ef f ectively coordinated through f requent briefings. Inadequacies in internal message handling identified during last year's exercise have been corrected.
County PIO staff at the EOC and joint media center coordinated all aspects of emergency public information operations ef f ectively. _
Public education brochures, pam phl e t s , a nd calendars prepared by Roc he s t e r Ca s a nd El ec t ric 'Co . , Wayne and Monroe Counties, and New York State for residents in the 10-mile emergency pla nni ng zone (EP2) were outstanding .
However, based on limited spot checks, some EP )
residents believe that the j sirens are a signal to evacuate the EPZ rather than a signal to tune'to the '
local E3S station for additional information. This indicates that additional public education should be considered.
Dose assess:ent capability was acceptable. However, . the radiological officer in Wayne County had just rec ently been appointed. During the exercise, Roc he s t e r Cas a nd Electric and state liaison of ficers ' actively suppo rt ed the Vayne County radiological of ficer. ' Additional training should j
be provided for the vayne County radiological of ficer and additions to the '
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r dose assessment staf f should be considered to reduce the county's reliance on
- outside support. .
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The field monitoring teams were well trained and, for the most pa r t ,
- able to accomplish their mission in a prof essional manner. However, one of '
the field monitoring teams was unable to measure radioiodine in the plume due to an equipment failure.
Members of the Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES) accompanied the field monitoring teams and transmitted data to the EOC in a timely manner.
exercise.
This is a significant improvement over last year's With regard to actions necessary to protect the public, the Chairman of the Board of Supervisors, the Director of Disaster Preparedness, and the dose assessment staff effectively coordinated actions on the basis of r ecommenda tio ns for pro t ec tiv .-
antici pat ed meteo rological a nd radiological conditions, evacuation times, and protective action guidelines. However, delays in state approvals to evacuate ERPAs W3 and W4 and to administer KI to emergency workers led to the conclusion that preventable radiation exposures to both the public and emergency workers would have occurred if the simulation had been a real event.
Emergenc y workers were all equipped with exposure control kits con-taining low- and high-range self-reading dosimeters, thermoluminescent dosi-meter badges, exposure record legs, and KI; the availability of both law- and high-range However, notdosimeters corrects a deficiency noted during last year's exercise.
{ all bus drivers and police officers were familiar with the worker exposure limits in the plan or with the procedure for requesting authorization l 1 to receive exposures in excess of that limit. Although the personnel monitor-l ing center director was f amiliar with the criteria for requiring decontami na-tion of personnel, equipment, and vehicles, no one' at the personnel monitoring cent er was aware of proc edures to be followed if contamination could not be r educ ed below 01 mR/ hr or if an emergency worker was both inj ured and contaminated.
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also noted duringLack the of knowledge 1982 exercise. conc erning d econtamina tion proc edures was i Monroe Countv O d
l i Working Monroe County EOC. spacaSeand eme rg enc y operations facilities were good .at the pa ra t e rooms assessment for command and control and for accident I
room. functions were located on opposite sides of the central operations catives The operations rooc provid ed adequate space to acco=modate represen~
from all of the agencies with emergency response roles, but the dose assessment room had limited working space and it the staff re ;uired to carry out t his func tio n. was difficult to accommodate the RICS telephone line has been moved from Sinc e last year's exercise, the dose assessment room. This improvement the central operation room into operations room. has lowered the noise level in the However, delays were observed in obtaining information f rom k ..
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- the utility on plant conditions and from the state on protec tive : action l recommenda tions.
Monroe County demonstrated a good ca pability to mobilize emergency
- ] response personnel quickly. The county EOC was- fully staffed by all agencies i within 45 minutes of their initial notification. ]
i 1.ead ers hip of the overall emergency ' response was ef f ectively demon- i strated at the Monroe County EOC. The County Manager was in-direct contact-with the Wayne County Executive, and decision making was coordinated between the two counties and the state. The status board was updated as soon as new information was received and staff briefings were frequent 'and ef fective. The
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coordination of information and the - working relationship between agencies j having- primary and support functions were good. However, decisions concerning the need and timing of evacuacion recom:nendations could be improved. The {
l projections of radiological exposure risks developed. by' the county's accident assessment team and technical information on plant conditions were available -
and need to be f ac to red into the protective action decision-making at the )
county management level to a greater extent. The county management appeared to rely heavily on Wayne County and state data rather than on their own ')
staff's assessment capabilities in developing protective action decisions.
l As specified in the Monroe County procedures, information to be released to ESS and the press was coordinated through the Monroe County PIO
' stationed at the JENC, correcting a deficiency noted during the 1982 exercise.
Press releases were carefully and efficiently developed at the Monroe County EOC and then comtnunicated by celephone to the media -center in a timely manner.
However, the telecopier that would be used to transmit backup hard copy to the media center was not operating properly during the exercise.
The public education materials observed at the EOC were informative and could be easily understood.
However, based on limited spot-check interviews, most of the people questioned on the day of the ex erc is e did not remember having r ec eived the public _ information calendar or did not know t ha t they should turn to the ESS stations to obtain emergency information. Although the public inf ormation posters were posted in the municipal buildings visited on the day of the exercise, managers at one hotel and a realtor's of fice did not remember having received the posters.
Dose assessment dose assessment staff at capabilities were out s t a nding in Monroe County. The of radiological dose proj the EOC demonstrated exceptional technical knowledge ection procedures.
The staf f was well equipped and proj ec tions of potential quickly and accurately. exposures to the general population were performed 1
l The field mo r.i t o ri ng teams performed exc eptio nally well. Proper mo ni t o ri r.g proc ed u res vere d emons t rat ed and both primary and backup instru-t
' ments were readily available for use.
recently calib rated, each instrument Although some instruments had not been was operationally checked before. it was i
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I used during the exercise. This is a significant improvement over last year's . ;
exercise. Also, co=munica tio ns between the Monroe County field monitoring C teams and the accident assessment staf f at the EOC were excellent and hav e
.j been significantly improved since last year's exercise. Data were accurately *I .
transmitted in the proper units and could be readily used by the accident '
assessment staff at the EOC.
l Ac tio ns to pro t ec t the public were acc epteble. The capability to identify, locate, and evacuate noninstitutionalized, mobility-impaired persons ;
and the demonstration of the capability to evacuate transit-dependent persons !
in the general population using county transportation resourc es were good.
The pic k-u ps were completed in a timely manner. However, the rec eptio n/
congregate care center designated in the plan for the general populac' ion bus j route was no t reached in a timely manner. The written instructions covering l the route from the last pick-up point to the . reception / congregate care' center I for t his bus evacuation route were difficult for the driver to follow. The driver was guided to the. reception / congregate care center by radio communica- )
cion with the bus compa ny dispatcher. Another rec eptio n/co ng rega t e care l center at Sperry High School was activated promptly and the facilities at this l
center were outstanding. The polic e officer a t t e ndi ng one of the Monroe (
County traf fic control points did not know where he was to be positioned or !
how access was to be controlled. The of ficer also reported that he had been unable to confirm where the traf fic control point should be positioned when he had radioed in to the Sheriff's of fice for clarification.
{ The capability to monitor and control the radiological exposure to emergency workers was good in Monroe County. Self-reading dosimeters and permanent record devices were issued to all emerg ency workers. The self-reading dosimeters were periodically read and individual exposure records were kept as specified by proc edu res in the county plan. However, it was noted t ha t the low-ra ng e dosimeters used during the exercise were not sensitive 3 enough to detect the low levels of exposure which, according to procedures in the plan, require workers to contact their supervisors. {
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L IE RODUCTION !
g 1.1 EXERCISE BACKCR0lTND -
a On Decembe r 7, 1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEM A) to ass ume lead responsibility for all - of f-site nuclear planning-and response.
FEMA's responsibilities 'in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:
- e. Taking the lead in .of f-site emergency. planning and' in the~
review and evaluation of radiological emergen'cy response plans developed by state and local governments.
e- De t e rmining whether such plans can be. implemented, on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans conducted by state and local governments.
e Coordinating the activities of federal agencies with re--
,, -sponsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:
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U.S. De partment of Commerce (DOC)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) !
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
U.m . De partment of Health and Human Services (HMS)
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) .
i U.S.. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
Representatives of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Coe=ittee (RAC). which is chaired by ? cia.
Radiological emerzency preparedness plans (REPPs) for the. Robert E.
Cinna Nuclear Power Station, which .is located in Ontario. New York, were formally submitted to the RAC by the state and involved local jurisdictions.
This submission was followed closely by the criticuing and evaluation of these plans.
An exercise was then held on January 21, 1982. and a public meeting was held on May 5, 1982, to acquaint the public vich. the plan contents, answer cuestions, and receive suggestions on the plans.
A radiological emergency exercise was conducted on' June 22, 1983, between the hours of 6: 30 a.m. and 4: 30 p.m. , to assess the capability of the state and local emergency preparedness organizations to implement their radio-logical emergency. plans and procedures and protect the public in a radiologi-cal e=ergency involving the Robert E. Cinna Nuclear Power Station.
2
- FEiA's An observer team consisting of personnel from FCiA Region II, the RAC,
- C contractors, and federal and state agencies evaluated the June 22 exercise.
Twenty-five observers were assigned to evaluate activities of state and local jurisdictions.
Team leaders coordinated team operations. *
/
Following the exercise, the federal observers met to compile their evaluations.
the teams of Observers presented observations specific to their assignments, observers developed preliminary assessments for each juris-diction, and team leaders consolidated the evaluations of individual team members. This final exercise report critique of the exercise for evercise is based on these assessments. A public held at participants and the general public was in Lyons, 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, June 24, 1983, at the Wayne County Courthouse New York.
federalThe findings observers, whichpresented in this report are based on evaluations of wet. reviewed by FCiA Region II.
state and local jurisdictions submit FE4A requests that recting the deficiencies discussed in athis schedule of remedial actions for cor-report. The Regional Director of FDtA is responsible for certifying to the FE1A Associate Director of State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that all negative findings observed during the exercise have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into state and local plans, as appropriate.
1.2 FEDERAL OBSERVIRS Twenty-five functions. federal observers evaluated off-site emergency response These individuals, ments are given below. their affiliations, and their exercise assign-OBSERVER ACENCY EXERCISE LOCATION / FUNCTION P. McIntire FDiA FDiA Coomand Center /Overviev Observation R. Kowieski FCiA Oversight Observation / Region II RAC Chairman R. Garelik F D'. A State Emergency Operations Center (EOC)/ Team Leader H. Fish 00E State tions EOC/?ublic Information Officer; Communica-L. Olmer EPA State ECC/ Accident Assessment E. Wojnas NRC Cinna Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)/ Liaison M. Jackson FDtA Joint Media Center /Public Information Office M. Colvin F Dt A Joint Media Center /Public Information Office i
1
. 1 J
l l 3 OBSERVER ACENCY EXERCISE LOCATION / FUNCTION
- R. Conley USDA Lake District EOC; State Personnel Monitoring .
Center; Field / Team Leader; Radiological Monitoring;
- ] Ingestion Pathway Sampling A. Smith /RE Western District EOC/ Team Leader S. McIntosh FDiA Wayne Co. EOC/ Team Leader R.'Ficke INEL Wayne Co./ Radiological Field Monitoring; Reception ,
Center l A. Foltman l ANL- Wayne Co./ Evacuation. Access Control Points and
{
Bus Route; Alert and Notification B. Houston FDiA Wayne Co./ Evacuation of Mobility Impaired Persons: :
Reception and Congregate Care Center Y. Klein ANL Wayne Co. EOC/Public Information Of ficer:
Communications J. Keller INEL Wa yn e Co . EOC/ Accident Assessment f
J. Opelka ANL Wayne Co./ Radiological Field Monitoring; Personnel Monitoring P. Weberg FDiA Wayne Co./ Evacuation: Access Control Points and !
Bus Route; Alert and Notification I i
T. Baldwin ANL Monroe Co. EOC/ Team Leader
~
R. Bernacki FDA Monroe Co./ Evacuation Route Access Control Point; Medical Drill; Alert and Notification F. Fishman FC4A Monroe Co. EOC/ Communications; Public Information Officer P. Ciardino EPA Monroe Co./ECC Accident Assessment R. Boye; INEL Monroe Co./ Radiological Field Monitoring; Personnel Monitorint Alert and Notification R. Monkus INEL Monroe Co./ Radiological Field Monitoring; Evacuee Monitoring: Alert and Notification R. Rodrigue: FCiA Monroe Co./ Evacuation of Mobility Impaired Persons:
Evacuation Bus Route
,e
4 1.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA Radiological emergency response activities were evaluated by . federal' observers in accordance with the following scheme .
e Capability outstanding: no improvements necessary.
- Capability coed: only minor improvements needed.
e - Capability acceotable: some improvements' needed :o insure ef f ective performances.
e Capability weak: deficiencies noted that could impair ef f ee:ive performance.
e Ca pability lackine: response called for but not demon '
straced.
1.4 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES The obj ectives of state. and local jurisdictions in :his exercise were to d emons t ra:e che adequacy of radiological emergency res ponse plans. :Le capabill:y :o mobilize needed personnel and equipmen:, and familiarity with procedures required to cope with an emergency a: he . Rochester Gas and
(
Electric Company's Rober: E. Ginna Nuclear Generacing Station. The exercise was
- o involve ac:iva:1on and participa:Lon of staff and response facilities of Ginna as well as emergency..organiza: ions and facilities of New York State j ar] :he counties of Monroe and Wayne. Federal- agencies were to be notified
?
during :he exercise according :o exiscing protocols. Federalf agencies wi h l
radiological emergency preparedness responsibili:y were not . to par:icipace ac:ively in the play of :his exercise. ~ Federal .represen:acives , however, were to ac: as exercise evaluators. The scope .of this exercise, with some'excep-t tions, was to endeavor to demons:ca:e by ac:ual perf ormanc e a numb er of primary em e rgenc y prepa red ness 'une: ions.
interfere with :he safe opera: ions of Cinna.At no ' ime was :he exercise :o .
The S:a:e of New York Radio-logical Emergency Croup developed :he following objec:ives for :his exercise.
- 1. Radiological Emereenev ?recaredness Plan i
l
- a. Evalua:e :he adequacy and capabill:y. of implemen:a: ion of l j
radiological emerge ncy plans for New York State, the coun:les of *4ayne and Monroe, and :he R.E. Cinna Suelear Power S:a:1on.
b.
Demons:ra:e :he ene rge ncy res po ns e ca pabili:les of state au:hori:les, local suppor: agencies, Ci nna , and appro-priate federal agencies. !
i5
- c. Demons t rate the capability of. the counties of Wayne' and 1 Monroe, New York State, and Cinna to implement their re-spective radiological emergency plans in a manner satis-
,. f ying FEM A/NRC acceptance criteria. .
e
- 2. Notification Procedures l
- a. Demonstrate .the- ability of Cinna staff to classify actual l or potential' -emergencies in accordance with on-site '
emergency procedures for:
e Alert, e Site area emergency, and e General emergency.
- b. Demonstrate the capability of Cinna to notify th'e state - 1 local, and federal governments in accordance with federal ;
guidance and established protocols. !
a.
- c. Demonstrate the capability to communicate technical infor-i mation among Cinna, the state, and Wa yne and Monroe counties. Demonstrate the ability of Cinna to communicate technical information with the NRC .via che NRC hotlines.
d.
Demonstrate the capability of the state, the two counties, and Cinna to notify and activate emergency resoonse personnel in accordance with established protocols.
- e. Demonstrate the capability of the counties and the state to alert and notify the affected permanent and transient public within the plume exposure. pathway ~
emergency-planning zone (EP2) of an incident at the Cinna site and to provide follow-up information as recuired.- This demonstration- should include activation of the prompt notification system (sirens) and the Emergency 3roadcast System.
f.
Demons t ra t e as appropriate the notification . and request for assistance of federal agencies, such as radiological assistance from 00E.
- g. Demon s t ra t e as appropriate the notification of counties
- within the ingestion pathway EP: and the notification of agencies such as railroads by- the state and the appro-priate county.
i
6
- 3. Emerzenev Communications a.
Demonstrate the the Cinna~ communications capabilities among control room, technical support center, EOF,
- operationsand Center, support center, and the Joint Emergency News '
demonstrate the ability communications with the federsi government, to . maintain
- b. Demonstrate the emergency communications capability among Wayne and Monroe counties, the state, and Cinna, including the Radiological Emergency Communications Systems (RECS) hotline. .
l i
- c. !
Demons trate tha adequacy of Cinna, local, and state emergency communications to:
- Transmit instructions to activate essential staff, j
e Disseminate essential information i agencies, and to assisting e Operate a 24-hour per-day system.
alert and notification
( d.
Demonstrate the ability of Cinna, and Monroe and Wayne counties to coordinate, control, and deploy radiological monitoring teams via their respective system.. field communications 4
Emereenev Reseense Facilities
- a. Demonstrate the adequacy of staffing, timeliness in setting up emergency response facilities, and adequacy of space andat:habitability for management of- a radiological emergency e
Cinna control room o
Cinna technical support center e
Cinna operational support center o Cinna EOF e State ECC e
State k'estern District EOC
,. l I
7
- e State L.ake District EOC
{
e Wayne County EOC i b
- e Monroe County EOC i e Joint Emergency News Center.
li
- b. Demonstrate the -activation o f. EOCs in host (support) counties, as appropriate.
- c. Demonstrate the tadequacy of internal communications in the state and county EOCs, including the use of status boards, charts, maps, diagrams, and other displays.
- d. Evaluate the adequacy and competency of e state, Wayne .{
County,; Monroe County, and Cinna staff to operate the emergency response f acilities.
- e. Evaluate the adequacy of access control and security for e emergency response,, facilities. '
I
- 5. Direction and Control
- a. Demonstrate t he- ability of key emergency personnel at Ginna and ,all. levelse of government to initiate. i coo rdina to ,' and hintain - timely and effective decisiono throughoul f a . rsdiologichl emeriency. Demonstrate that a y
. particular .i' ndividual is cleafiy in charge. Demonstrate
' shift changes in command andlmssqcsment personne1. i
, y c j ",
u . b ., Demonstrate eff ective organiraciohal diecction and icontrol and integrated rad iological ' eme gency response, including 3 deployment of field , men'i:drin g teams: acquisition.
l ,
k' receipt, and analysis of field. data: and af fective sharing l .of field data among the licensee. state, and counties-for l ,
~
r ' evaluation and verification. / ,
l l l l c. Demonstrate the caeability ?of . federal, . state and county'
-emergency response agencies to identify and provide for resource require?ents. Anh tequired federal response Qecivity may be simula:ed.
t p ;\
i
- d. Demonstrate the capability to coordinate (internally- and exde'enally) actions am6ct organizations in order to obtain
! suoport and make appropriate decisions.
>S .. ,
I l,
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[ t t f f[ P Qf c i _3'-\- s q -
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8 *
- e. Demonstrate the
( capability of elected and appointed officials to implement appropriate radiological emergency response actions.
41
- 6. Public Information a.
Demonstrate the adequacy of interactions ' among the state.-
Ginna, and county public information systems. i b.
Demonstrate the activation and staffing of the joint ! '
emergency news center by licensee, state, and local public information personnel and the provisions for periodic public information releases and rumor control.
l
- c. I Demonstrate. that the off-site authorities and the licensee can work ef fectively with the media - in the event of an accident.
- 7. Accident Assessment and Evaluation a.
Demonstrate the activation, operations, and reporting pro-cedures of Ginna and county field-monitoring teams. Ginna
( teams were to be dispatched within and ' beyond the site boundary. Field monitoring teams were to be provided with simulated data by referees consistent with the simulated release from the plant. In addition, demonstrate ingestion pathway and surface contamination sampling.
b.
Demonstrate the ability of Ginna, the . counties, and the state to receive, assess, and share radiological data from ;
both county and licensee field teams in _ accordance with I their respective radiological emergency plans.
l c.
Demonstrate the ability of Ginna, the state, and counties to calculate and compare dose projections and to determine appropriate protective actions based on the protective action guides.
- 8. Protective Roseonse i
- a. Demonstrate the capability of the state and' Wayne and Monroe courty emergency response organizations to make i decisions and imp:t eme nt appropriate protective actints.
The protective action options included:
y ( ..
1 Swys
- J f
[N$________________________________ ._ _ _ _____ _______ _ _ _
9 Sheltering and evacuation (simulated) of on-site and off-site areas:
e Informing the public of the ' development of the accident and of any required protective actions:
e Activation of reception and congregate care centers and provision for monitoring evacuees for contamination; e Identification and provision for special populations, including identification, notification, and evacuation of noninstitutionalized mobility-impaired persons; e
Analysis of ingestion-exposure-pathway monitoring data and determination of associated exposure levels; and e Provision for removal of impediments from evacuation routes.
- 9. Radiological Exposure Control
., a.
Demonstrate the decision process for limiting exnosure of e=ergency workers.
- b. Demonstrate processing of workers through personnel state and local emergency monitoring centers, and a working knowledge of action levels, c.
Evaluate the capability of off-site emergency response personnel to 10plement access control procedures.
d.
Demonstrate methods and resources for distributing dost-eeters and thyroid blocking agents to emergency workers.
e.
Demonstrate the record keeping for, and use of, dosimeters and t hyroid blocking agents for the protection of e=ergency workers.
f.
De:ons t rat e emergency workers' knowl e d ge of dositet ry and thyroid blocking acents usage and of the individual who can authorize w rker exposures above permissible limits.
- 10. Medical Sureort a.
Demonstrate the initial treat:ent of contaminated injured persons and st=ulated transport to and s ubs e c uer.t treat-ment at a hospital.
person injured off-site.The medical drill should involve a
- 10. ,
- 11. Reentrv and Recoverv a
- a. Demonstrate the capability of emergency personnel to
. identify requirements, assess the situation, and identify . .
procedures for reentry. *
- b. Demonstrate the capability of emergency . personnel to identify requirements, programs, and policies governing.
i damage assessment and recovery.
1.5 EXERCISE SCENARIO 1.5.1 Maior Secuence of' Events on ' Site Aceroximate Time Event 0630 Start of Exercise --
'The 1A emergency . diesel generator' j fails. '
.i 0745 Declaration of alert. 1 y
0900 Indications of loss offa safety system. Escalation to site
(- area emereenev.
1100 Escalation to eeneral emereenev conditions. Major airborne release begins with no projection of - duration. of- the release.
1315 Wind shift begins in the direction of Wayne County.
1430 Break in exercise play.
1500 i Date advance of one (1) day for consideration of reentry and recovery _ planning and ingestion pathway . exposure '
problems. (
Releases to environment terminated. De-escalation to site area emer7enev classification.
1 1630 Secure from exercise.
1.5.2 Scenario Su= arv 100* fullThe scenario.beran power condition. with the Cinna Nuclear Unit operating at a stable, The Cinna Nuclear Unit had been operating at this ]'
power level in excess of 100 days. This operating time was used because, as a
- k. - ,
a
.____m__-u-m-A=
g
11
> general rule, af ter a power reactor has been operating a: full power in excess of 100 days , the fission product inventory is at its maximum. The auxiliary building ventilation sys:em was out with all charcoal and high efficiency particulate absolu:e filters removed and doors open :o ensure an open release
'. oath for radioactive gases and iodines to the a:mosphere later in the scenario. Reaccor coolant system ac:ivity was initially high enough to indicate some leaky fuel rods and a large inventory of fission produe: in :he coolant.
The scenario con:inued with the 1A emergency diesel genera or failing to star: for 1:s mon:hly surveillance ces* due to a broken fuel-oil pump.
This was the first step in a sequence of esanta for an eventual loss of all A.C. power to the sta:1on. The IB emergency diesel generator was started per technical specifications.
l The next even: was the failure of the #1 seal on the coolant pump.
"B" re ac to r This was done to force the ramp-down of power on the reactor which further degraded the fuel cladding, thus increasing the reac:or coolant activi:y and making available a large source of activity for later release :o the auxiliary building.
Shortly af ter the above ramp-down, R-9, the letdown radia: ion monitor alarm, indicated a sufficien increase in activi:y for the declaration of an aler: and the technical command cen:er was s:affed. The R-9 moni:or then continued to increase to off-scale high as the scenario progressed. The fission product inven:ory in the reactor coolan: system buil: up, thus increasing the radioac:ive release :o :he a:mosobere later in :he scenario.
As the scenario continued, the running emergency diesel generator
- ricoed out due to a fire in the generator sec: ion. This was in:roduced to escalate :he emergency class :o a si:e area emerrencv, forcing mandatory shutdown of the reac:or and ac:ivation of :he EOF. The si:e emergency is due
- o a fire that caused loss of a safe:y sys:em. Only the generation section of the 13 emergency diesel genera:or was damaged, ho we ve r, to allow swapping of 1:s fuel oil pump wi:h :he fuel oil pumo of :he lA emergency diesel generator la:er in the scenario. The fire was put out and :he unit was brough: to hot shu:down.
The con:inued degrada: ion of :he fuel cladding (indicated by :he R-9 le : dot. t moni:or off-scale high and :he lates: reac:or coolant sample results of '00 )C1/gs) increased :he fission produe: inven:ory in the reactor coolant system enough :ha:, wi:h a release path, a major release to :he environment could take place. This release pa:h was es:ablished as follows:
(1) Off-si:e poeer was lost, thus comple:ing :he loss of all A.C. powe r a: the s:stion.
98'
12 -
(2) Insttument air was lost with the loss of A.C. power. o C This allowed the 13 reactor coolant pump #1 seal leakoff isolation valve (which was closed when the pump #1 seal failed) to open and approximately 50 gal / min to flow to the volume control tank (VCT) via the seal return line. ,
This 50-gal / min leak rate was indicated by the change in pressurizer level between the 0915 reading and the 1015 reading.
(3) .The 50 gal / min flowing to the VCT frem the IB reactor coolant pump #1 seal lif ted the VCT relief valve because the water was now approaching reac to r coolant system temperature (540*F) due to loss of component cooling water and flashing.
(4) The VCT relief valve relieved to the containment vessel cooling system hold up tank header, which in turn was relieving to the auxiliary building vent system and thus to the outside environment and the auxiliary building.
This was indicated by the rapidly increasing auxiliary building radiation monitors. All plant vent particulate, gas, and iodine radiation mo nito rs would have been inoperable at this time due to, loss of A.C. power. The above auxiliary building mo ni to rs were fed from the battery inverters.
A general em ert enc y was d at abcut this tioe for a numoer or reasons (e.g.,eclared plant conditions that could lead to a large radioactive release, loss of fission product barriers to the outside, co nditions that
- exist that deem it necessary). Due to the potential release of t his material to off-site areas a general emert enev was declared.
The reactor was in hot shutdown but there was a potential for insufficient cooling water to keep the fuel covered. '
3ecause plant personnel were following Emergency Proc edu re E-a.3 (Loss of All A.C. Power), they sent a survey team into the auxiliary buildir.g to close MOV-313 (seal return line C.V. isolation valve) to stop the leak.
However, the team was not able to enter due to the high radiation levels throughout the building. This left them with only one other alternative to close the valve: to restore A.C.
the valve operator. power to the MCC bus supplying This was done after sufficient radioactive materials had been rel ea s ed to allow the state and counties to test public protection functions.
4 13 j'
+ After enough radioac:1vity had been released to the atmosphere to assure that required scenario condi-tions were achieved, the 1A emergency diesel was made
' operable by replacing the fuel pump with the one from the 1B emergency diesel and A.C. emergency power was restored to the station. Mov-313 was then closed electrically, thus securing the release of radioac:ive gases and iodines to the atmosphere and oringing the radioac:ive release part of :he emergency under control. However, the auxiliary building was still full of radioactive gases. A decision to purge the building required evacuees to remain outside of Wayne and Monroe county emergency response planning areas (ERPAs) until the nex:
day. A time advance of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> was then inj ec ted into the scenario to allow participants to demonstrate recovery and reen:ry. During this time advance, many opera: ions and events took place such as the following:
- 1. All electrical power was restored to :he sta: ion and plant conditions were s:abilized.
., 2. The auxiliary building ven:lla: ion was started to clear the auxiliary building for entry and cleanup.
6
- 3. The plan was cooled down to a cold shutdown condi-tion.
Af:er the time advance, all par:icipa :s demon-stra:ed recovery and reen:ry opera:lons, and, af:er :hese ac:ivi:les had been demonstrated, the exercise was terminated.
l.5.3 Descrio: ion of s:3:e and 1.ocal oesources All emergency response agencies were to be responsible for ensuring
- ha: : heir resources were ac:ually deployed in adecua:e numbers :o reasonably tes: : heir no:i f '.c a: ion , mobili:a: ion, command, coordina: ion, and communica-
- 1ons capabill:ies.
have Exces: as noted below, s:s:e and coun:y agencies were to of total authori:y in de:er91ning :he . degree of mobilization and deplovmen;
- heir resources in a radiological emergency at the Cinna Nuclear Power S:a:1on.
Consir:en: vi:h this inten:, the decision to demonstrate or to at:ually deploy resources was :o be made at the tire of the exercise.
The following personnel and resources wre
- o be deployed by the staie and local governmen:s :o de:ons:ra:e the capabilities of their emergency resources.
i j 14 ,
Public Notification
( During the exercise an actual test of the strens and the accompanyir.g 1
Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) announcement was to be demonstrated. Addi- -
tional exercise EB S messages were to be prepared. Actual transmission n'
- these messages t o WHAM /FM , the primary insert station (CPCS-1) and 1r adest l by the EBS network was to be simulated. {
{
l Radiological Field Monitorine Teams In addition to off-site monitoring teams dispatched by Cinna, the following county radiological monitoring field teams were to be demonstrated.
No. of Countv _ Teams
?
Wayne 2 Monroe 2 Each team was to be supplied with a controller.
The controllers were to have simulated field data, which they were to provide to the teams to determine local dose rate readings consistent sich the scenario. Each team was to have the equipment necessary to determine both gamma dose rates and airborne radio-iodine concentrations. Emphasis was to be on the rapid deployment of the
{ teams, rapid gathering of data, communication of data to the EOC, and prompt sharing of the field data with the state, the EOF, and the other county.
The c:eni t o ring tea =s clothing.
were not to be suited up in anticontamination Radiolecie31 Exeosure Control permanent All emergency workers in the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ were to have and and self-reading dosimeters, access to thyroid blocking agents (KI),
exposure record cards. They were to be familiar with procedures for exposure control, e.g.,
at what exposure levels to contact supervisors, and with procedures for obtaining clearance for excess exposures.
l l
1 1
- 4
15 Comolecion of Eus Routes for Evacuees Each of the two plume exposure EFZ counties was to activate a limited
- nu:tber of evacuee bus routes as follows:
No. of County Routes Wayne 2 Monroe 1 Bus routes were not to be preassigned. The federal evaluators were to indi-cate which bus routes were to be demonstrated on the exercise day. The federal evaluators, in concert with the assigned state controller and appro-priate ccunty staff, were to ensure that the selected bus routes did not af fect nor=al public transportation.
The bus drivers were to essemble at their normal dispatch location and be assigned appropriate routes, briefed, and deployed in accordance with the appropriate procedures. The buses were to complete their assigned routes but they were not to pick up any evacuees. Upon completion of the general popula-
- ' tion route, the buses were to report to appropriate reception / congregate care centers. The buses and drivers were then to be secured. There were to be no time 'instraints on running the evacuation bus route.
Evacuation of Noninstitutionalited, Mobiliev-Teoaired persons Each county was to. demonstrate procedures for identif ying, notifying, and deter tining the availability of appropriate transportation for evacuation of noninstitutionalized, mobility-i= paired persons.
In addition, federal evaluators were to select two addresses for c:obility-i= paired persons in both Wayne and Monroe counties. Vehicles for transportation of the handicapped were to be dispatched to these addresses for si=ulated evacuation. No handicapped evacuees were to be picked up.
Traffic Control ?oints Local agencies supplemented by state resources were to deploy personnel to de=onstrate activation of a suitable sample of traffic control points for major evacuation routes in each county:
No. of Traffic Control County points Wayne 5
Monroe 2 E
M
________--_n-------
16 '
( Traffic control points were not to be preassigned or repositioned. To provide a greater test of the capability to respond to an actual incident and to allow more free play in tha exercise, the federal evaluators were to provide the state controller at their respective county EOCs with information on the locations exercise. of traffic control points to be demonstrated during the course of The state controller was then to request the county EOC to demonstrate the activation of traffic control points.
Once traffic control points .had been established and observed by federal evaluators, local officials were to release personnel to normal duties and to simulate continuation of control points where required. The relieved personnel were not to be used for any other exercise functions. Rotation of traffic control personnel was to be simulated from perscnnel that would have
'been available from off-duty sections. For training purposes, selected traffic control personnel were to report to personnel monitoring centers after they had been secured from their exercise assignment.
Impediments to Evacuation Federal evaluators were to introduce free play events to test pro-cedures for removing impediments from evacuation routes. A problem was to be given to the decision maker in the county EOC stating 'that there was an impediment at a given location.- The demonstration was to include the actual
( dispatch the scene of a police or other emersency vehicle to the scene, a report from to the EOC requesting appropriate resources, identification of the availability of the required resources (e.g., a tow truck or public works equipment), evaluation of the problem, and as appropriate, arrangements for an alternate evacuation route or dispatch of the required resources. If an alternate evacuation route was required, the decision maker was to inform the public via an E3S message. If the impedi=ent was to be cleared, the time of arrival at the scene and the time fur clearing, the impediment were to be estimated.
No. of
_Co un t v Imeed3 ents Wavne 1 location Monroe 1 location Personnel Monitorine Centers Each county was to set for local emergency workers. up and demonstrate a personnel monitoring center During the exercise, the processing of selected ecergency demonstrated. workers who had completed their exercise participation was to be Decontamination actions were to be simulated.
k ..
17
~ At the personnel moni:oring center, anything tha: could potentially damage property (such as parking vehicles on grass) was to be simulated. All necessary equipment was :o be assembled at the personnel monitoring center;
, however, its use could be simulated. Detailed simulation actions were to be l
implemented by the leader of the personnel moni:oring center. In addition, the state was to demonstrate the ac:ivation of a personnel monitoring center for emergency workers.
l 1
Relocation Centers 2 I
A least one reception / congregate care center was to be opened and staffed for evacuees from each of the two counties in accordance with their respeci! q local emergency retoonse plans. Supplies required for long-term mass care (e.g., cots, blankets, food) need not have been acquired or brought to the centers. However, the center personnel were to obtain estimates on how many evacuees would be arriving had the exeref.se been a real emergency. The center personnel were then to estimate the supplies required for the potential evacuees. Sources of the required supplies were then to be located and the means for transp'orting the supplies was to be determined. A few volunteers were to be processed through the registration procedure. Procedures for monitoring and decontamina:ing evacuees were to be demonstrated at reception centers. Federal evaluators were to introduce free play problems to require the processing of evacuees arriving at a congregate care center vithout i
appropriate documents from :he referral reception center.
Because of logistics and the need to make prior arrangements for access to reloca:lon een:ers during an exercise, such centers were selec:ed before the day of the exercise.
No. of Coun v Centers Activated Uayne {
I recep: ion / congregate care center I w onroe I receo:1on/congrees:e care center vediesl Drills There was :o be a medical drill demons:ca:Ing :he handling and treating of contamina:ed injuries a: a hospi:al.
The si:e of :he injury and :he point !
l of deplovment of :he ambulance wre :o be off-si:e. The hospital was to be I Park Ridge Hospi:al, loca:e3 outside the EP2. I i
Coun:v Tvme of Drill u.onroe Of f-si:e contamina:ed injury I _ - - - - - - - - _ - - -
18 -
Ingestion oa.thway Saeeline
( and The state was to demonstrate the. decision making process for selecting analyzing ingestion exposure 4
pathway samples consistent with the
- hypothetical problem posed by the exercise parameters. The state was to
- e demonstrate collection of ingestion pathway samples, primarily samples from open sources of vegetation, milk, and fruit as appropriate. Analysis of the samples was to be simulated.
Volunteer creanizations Response organizations identified in the plans were to participate in the exerc22e. Members of volunteer organizations such as volunteer fire departments, ambulance squads, amateur radio clubs, and Red Cross have other res pc nsibilities , including earning a livelihood, that take precedence over their participation in an exercise. Therefore, the staffing of these volunteer basis. organizations for exercise purposes was to be on an as-available l Closecut of the Exercise I exerciseThe federal observers were not to release any participants from the play. That was to be a responsibility of the local EOCs.
p The EOCs
% were to have been staffed appropriately for the recovery phase, which included planning for reentry, deciding when to relax protective measures for reentry, determining recovery. the need for ingestion pathway control, and planning for long-term The EOCs were to operate until the media center completed the exercise closecut E3S/ media message.
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. 2 EXERCISE . EVALUATION: DEFICIENCIES AND REC 01MENDATIONS
, 2.1 STATE OF NEW YORK, LAKE DISTRICT, AND WESTERN DISTRICT 2.1.1 _Emer7ency Ooerations Facilities and Resources Facilities and resources at the state EOC in Albany (SEOC) were good.
Working space was good and status boards indicating site data, weather. and
~
i radiological conditions were promptly updated. Separation of the command and control process.
area from other functional areas enhanced the decision-making Internal communications were good; staff briefings were frequent, prompt, and infor ative, 'a marked improvement over last year. SEOC security was good and there was no overcrowding.
Working space and equipment - at the SEOC were good; ventilation was adequate. I Separate rooms were used for each major function. A large, opera-tions room had facL11c16s for each of the participating agencies. Decision
! makers occupied an executive office where they could confer .and be briefed by staff members. Communications equipment operators and accident _ assessment staff had their omi roo s. The two PIDs also nad a private office. There was ,
no overcrowding even though over 50 people were sometimes present. The displays and maps uere good. Status boards were available in each operational area listing the current emergency classification level and ' actions taken. -
Separate status boards were available for weather infor=ation. Status boards and displays were generally. updated promptly. . However, af ter 12: 50 p.m. , the i messagecurrent although and status doseboards in the accident assessment room were not updated projection data and weather information were maintained there. Good maps were available
.adio!7gical monitoring points showing evacuacion routes, evacuation areas, except for Wayne County which does not use preselected .nonitoring points -
relocation areas, shelter areas, and '
population distribution by evacuation area. Most. maps were dated March i 1983.
Co=munication facilities at the SEOC were good E=ergency Communications Sys tem (RECS),
Radiological a dedicated telephone line backed up by commercial telcohone and radio. linked the SEOC, the. district EOCs, and the county EOCs. Infer ation was received f rom these organi:ations without delay and all messages were understood and transcribed correctly. However, delays were observed by Monroe County in obtaining in f o r=a tion f rom the state over the RECS line.
The state and county should review the cause for these problems and undertake appropriate training of staf f to 1 prove the ti=eliness of information transmitted to the counties via RECS. No difficulties were en-countered with cor:Lnications between the SEOC and federal agencies. Commer-cial telephone was available and provided a i
vided a link with FDtA. A link with DOE; CDX-teletype pro-telephone hotline connected the SEOC and the EOF.
As noted in Se c . 2. 2, the format of the initial data transmissions from the 1
l
20 nuclear facility was incompatible with the state's format. This problem was .
C corrected by telefaxing a copy of the state's data forms to the nuclear f acility operator for use during the remainder of the exercise. Data from county radiological monitoring teams was received in the state accident
- assessment room by telefax from the local EOCs. '
Liaison personnel provided internal communications between the operations room, command center, and radiological assessment. Communications and coordination between the command and control room and the operations room, which were deficient at the last exercise, have been greatly improved.
Security was good; access was well controlled. Security personnel were posted at the main entrance and in the various functional areas. Identifica-tion badges were required for admission to the SEOC and were checked by security.
observer.
One media representative was allowed access to the SEOC as an The control of media access to the SEOC was an improvement over last year's exercise.
The primary function of the district EOCs was to coordinate and deploy state resources in their respective districts if county resources were exhausted.
i Overall, the Lake Di s trict EOC (LDEOC) in Newark had good facilities and resources.
The physical plant was outstanding; it had excellent la yo u t ,
working space, ventilation, and sanitary facilities. A kitchen, do rmi to ry, and small medical of fice were available to support extended operations.
Equipment and displays were good. All necessary charts, maps, status boards, and bulletin boards were displayed and kept current at the LDEOC. A largeevents.
key blackboard was used to post the emergency classification level and other Current ma ps showing population distribution by sector, evacuation routes, evacuation areas, shelter areas, and congregate care centers were available at the LDEOC.
Communications were good at the LDEOC. The PICS line provided the pri=ary EOCs.
link with the SECC, the Western District EOC (kT>EOC), and the local available.
Telephones and Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES) were also Representatives All svstems worked very well and message traf fic flowed smoothly.
from the state police, fire department, De pa rtment of Transportation, and Department of Environmental Conservation at the LDEOC had their own two-way radios for contacting their agencies. At times, however, the noise level co=munications. was high, with many simultaneous radio and telephone Security was improved over last year.
.tnd egress. State police controlled ingre s l A sign-in identification badges. and sign-out procedure was used and all personnel had l A. ,
21
' Emergency operations facilities and resources at the WDEOC were accept-able. The space and amenities were outstanding. Traffic flow between communications was clear and not disruptive. Noise was low' and all :elephones
. and radios in the operations room could be used without interference.
, Ventilation was adequate. l Overall, maps and dis plays were good. All necessary maps and sta:us i' boards were available at :he WDEOC. However, some workers found the emergency classification status board difficult to read. In . addi:1on, after the site area emergency, the status board was covered by a projection screen used :o display other information. The display of emergency classification was moved to another projec:lon screen but af ter :he genera 1 ' emergency this display of j emergency classifica: ion was eventually replaced by other status informa- 1 tion.
The emergency classification status should be displayed continuously. I Cood wall maps we re available showing evacuation routes, evacuation areas, j reloca: ion centers, radiological monitoring points, and traffic control j
points. A wall map of the plume exposure pa:hway EPZ vith labeled sectors was also available. Packets at each agency's desk had similar maps but lacked. ~
maps of the plume exposure pathway EPZ and traffic control points. Although population by ERPA was given along with each announcement of an evacuation, maps of population by ERPAs were not available for WDEOC workers s 4 Communica: ions systems at the WDEOC were essentially ~ identical to those at the LDEOC. However, at the WDEOC :here was interference between the local
,, government radio and the RECS dedicated land line. This. interference meant that messages being sent to the SEOC had to be relayed via RACES through the LDEOCa This si:ua: ion resulted in no significant problems but should be l ree:Afted. The folloving problems were no:ed with the communications at the "
l WDEOC: ,
e Radiological info rmation was not relayed rapidly to the WDEOC from :he SEOC.
e There were delays of up to one and one-half hours in send-ing and receiving cooles on :he single :elefax machine. An addi:ional :elef ax machine would be desirable.
r I
e The UDEOC telef ax is incomea:ible wi:h :he state acciden:
assessmen: :elefax; copies of plume isople:hs canno: be t received a: WDEOC. ,
' I l e
' Du ring the exercise, it was learned that seven of the :en telephone lines a: :he WDEOC were :o be removed. The ) '
agency represen:a:ives indica:ed : hey would not be able to perform : heir func: ions effec:ively
- elephone lines.
with only three e
$5 g
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- e Radiological information from Ginna was not transmitted to .
C the kTEOC in the standard state format as discussed in Sec.
2.2. This caused problems for_the message taker.
Despite these prable=s, communications were handled well; all messages '
were understood and transferred correctly.
Security measures at the WDEOC were good. Two state police troopers were stationed at the entrance and were instructed not to allow media representatives inside. A log of ingress and egress was kept and all personnel had identification badges. The improvements in security correct deficiencies noted during last year's exercise.
2.1.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staf f The alerting and mobilization of of ficials and staf f at the SEOC were timely. The inicial notification of an unusual event was received at approxi-mately 7: 30 a.m. over the RECS line. The SEOC was partially activated within l 20 minutes of the alert notification and fully staffed by about 9:05 a.m.,
I within 30 minutes of rocification that a site area emergency had been declared. Notification calls from the SEOC to agency representatives noted the e=ergency classification level and indicated that an exercise was in l progress. A representative from the SEOC was positioned at the EOF in advance. The capability for continuous 24-hour operations was indicated by l ( having alternate callout lists and rosters available in the command and accident assessment rooms. A shift change was demonstrated for the chief executive officer, correcting a deficiency noted at the last exercise.
Alerting and notification were good at the LDEOC. However, the initial notification of an unusual event over the RECS line was received by a maintenance worker. After some minimal delay, the notification was verified l by the Director of the LDEOC. With one exception, all agencies reported in a timely fashion and the LDEOC was fully staffed and operating by 10: 30 a.m.
Alerting and notification of personnel were accomplished within 45 minutes; the first calls were made by the Deputy Director and the call up was completed by the secretary. Calls noted the emargency classification level and that an exer:ise was in progress. The LDEOC is staffed to receive notification during normal working hours and the director is available for notification on a 24-hour basis. The LDE00 staf f was notified to report for duty by coc:mercial
- telephones. A shift change was not demonstrated but a roster was kept at the LDEOC to show the 2/.-hour staf fing capability of each agency; this corrects a deficiency noted during the 1982 exercise.
Alerting and notification of staff were good at the k'DE OC . The Director and Deputy Director are available during nonworking hours to receive initial notification calls; one of the two is always available. During working hours, they are both available on site along with a secretary.
\
Commercial telephones are currently the only system available for notifying x ..
23
- staf f and agencies. WDEOC received initial notification over the RECS line at about 7: 40 a.m. Fan-out telephone calls were used to notify oersonnel to report for duty and the WDEOC was mobilized in a timely manner. All agencies i
- were represented at the exercise and were double-staf f ed for training. The Deputy Director requested schedules and names of backup staff as a means of simulating 24-hour operations; t his corrects a d efici enc y no t ed d uring the last ex e rcis e. Fo r mos t agencies at the WDEOC, continuous staf fing would have been accomplished by going on 12-hour shif ts.
2.1.3 Emertenev Coerations Management Emergency operations management was good at the state and both district EOCs.
Managemeur at the SEOC was professional; control and leadership were maintained throughout the exercise. Representatives of all the required state agencies participa t ed throughout the ex e rc is e. A shift c hange was d emo n-s t ra t ed for the comma nd a nd control function. The state and volunteer agencies at the SEOC covered all nec essa ry f unc tio nc. areas. FE'4A was contac t ed d u ring the initial callout.
If the need arose, s pecific state officials were available and designated to request assis ta nc e from f ed eral
'l agencies.
The eme rg ency classification level was clearly displayed in the SECC, mentioned in initial notifications of emerg enc y personnel, and communicated to the res pons e o rga niza tions when they were contacted. These organizations were also informed promptly of c hang es in the emerg enc y classification level. Checklists were utiliced by personnel at the SEOC.
Staff briefings were given regularly in the command room. There was dif ficulty with ef fective coordination when the decision to evacuate ERPAs W3 a nd W4 was reached without fully integrating input from radiological int ellig enc e. Representatives from the Governor's office and from the Secretary of Health supported the exercise through their presence in the SEOC.
The management, l ead ers hi p, and control at the LDEOC were good.
All organi:stions listed in the county REPP were present; they were experienced a nd a wa re of their responsibilities.
Appropriate emergency classification levels were used and, posted on a large status t.os e d . A verbal briefin; was given each time the classification level c ha n g ed . Each agency had written procedures available at its desk.
procedures.
LDECC personnel also had their own written All c hec klis ts were good a nd were used in a timely f as hio n.
Coordination at the LDEOC was ac hi eved through hourly briefings. Additional b riefings were given as needed.
These briefings were given over a public address system and eac h ag enc y was given an opportunity to describe the actions it va s taking.
Management of emergency operations vas good at the WDE0C. All organic-ations listed in the plan had representatives present who actively partici-paced in the exercise.
All players were aware of their support and coordina-tion roles; t h e.v knew they were not to be actively involved in making policy
1 i
24 -
l a nd were reminded of their roles during briefings. The Deputy Director was -
{ ef f ectively in control at the WDE0C and was on site within 15 minutes of his -
j initial notification. As the information became available, he gave frequent, informative briefings on emergency classification level, plant status, protec-
- y tive actions implemented, meteorology, and proj ected doses. Each agency gave short briefings on its actions during regular, hourly briefings. Each agency f esk had its written procedures; however , the Department of Health should have l naps of reservoirs included in its materials to f acilitate determination of which reservoirs lie in the plume pathway and thus might need to be topped off or sam pl ed . American Red Cross personnel indicated a need for a better d efi nition of the breakdown of responsibilities between them and the Department of Social Services.
2.1.4 Public Alerting and Notification The SEOC has no direct func tio n in pub lic alerting and no ti fica tio n.
Sectica 2.3 discusses the coordination between the joint emergency news center (JENC) and the SEOC.
Strens were activated to alert the public at approximately 8:30 a.m.
The licensee re po rt ed that 92 of the 96 sirens sou nd ed . Activation of the sirens was timely, and the airing of the EBS test message was well coordinated with their sounding. The timely activation of EBS corrects a deficiency from After the Governor's decla ra tio n of emerg ency, state public
( last year.
information of ficers (Pios) prepared and simulat ed issuance of a timely and accurate EBS message.
The district EOCs did not hav e a f unc tio n in public alerting and notification. They did, however, receive hard copies of the EBS bulletins and press releases via the celefax link with the joint emerg ency news center (JENC).
2.1.5 Media and Dublic Relations
, State PIOS at the JENC demonstrated a prof essional ability to deal with all aspects of press relations. Two state Pios were present at the SECC e nroug hout the exercise and attended briefings in the co= mand room. There was constant communication with the JENC. To insure accuracy, EBS messages and press releases were reviewed by the PIDs and persons in com=and at the SEOC before being approved for release to the press at the JENC; this corrected a deficiency noted at last year's exercise.
Media and public relations are not functions of the district EOCs. The Deputy Director at the WDEOC indicated t hat media representatives would be denied access to the EOC at the security check poi nt . The district EOCs do '
rec eive informational telefaxes of EBS bulletins and press releases from the JENC.
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25 l
!* 2.1.6 Accident As se s smen t Accident assessment was acceptable at the SEOC. State personnel demonstrated the technical capability to carry out accident assessment,
,. However, failure to coordinate and discuss dose ' assessment data with the counties on a regular basis and failure to use all significant field data ]
l hindered timely decision making.
s Radiological field monitoring was performed by the utility and four l county tea ms , two frou Wayne County and two from Monroe County. The state !
exchanged data with the EOF by telephone throughout the exercise, thus j correcting a deficiency noted last year. All radiological information was received in the radiological intelligence room at the SEOC via che RECS line and/or telefax. The field monitoring teams used different designations for 4 i i sampling locations. However, the locations of all radiological field sampling I points should be displayed using a uniform method (e.g., by sector and miles t
from the plant) to facilitate the state's analysis and coordination of field monitoring activities.
Field data should also be listed in chronological o rd e r, with the distance from the plume centerline indicated. Posted field data were not consistently labeled with radiological units and parameters (q, ,
q/b, or iodine). '{
Sufficient staff were present at the SEOC for accident assessment. j Based on the calculations actually performed, the accident assess =ent staff j o
showed an acceptable capability to rapidly assess radiological hazards without j using programmable calculators, which were recommended after the last exercise. Current meteorological data were available and the state acsessment team worked rapidly to estimate doses based on plant conditions prior to the receipt of field monitoring data. The assessment was fully coordinated by the Cinna technical staff at the EOF. Howevar, the state did not use .all
{
significant field data in its estimates of dose races, nor did it coordinate and discuss dose assessment data with the county EOCs on a regular basis .
Such coordination and com=unication were also deficient in last year's j l exercise.
Full utili:stion of county data would have been useful in leading '
l
' state accident asses sment personnel to an earlier appreciation of the fact that whole body dose was a controlling consideration in this exercise.
Th e potential consequences of this underatili:ation of county field monitoring data were evident when Wayne County recommended evacuation of ER?As W3 and Wa. At this time, the county had developed accurate dose rates, particularly whole-body dose races, from field :easure:ents in the p l u= e .
available thyroid data, Based on the state did not concur with Wayne County's I recommendations to evacuate (a state e=ergency had already been declared by the Covernor). At this juncture, it would have been prudent for the state radiological officer to have contacted the Wayne County dose assessment staff to discuss the complete set of available dose estimates. Centerline q-dose readings were posted by 12:45 p.m. (2 R/hr at 2 mile s) and per=ission was l
given 1:00 by the representative of the State Commissioner of Health to evacuate by p.m.,
contrary to a sheltering suggestion from the state radiological t
I
- _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ ~
26
- officer.
This avoidable delay meant that unnecessary doses would have been
- C received by people evacuating through the plume if the simulation had been a '
real event. In another instance, according to postings at the SEOC, the field measurement of 100 mR/hr at 3 SW f rom Wayne County was received 45 minutes
- after the release. If the state had utilized the county data promptly, there ,-
would have been sufficient time to calculate the whole body dose at plume centerline and thereby avoid the undue exposure to field workers that would have occurred had the simul ation been a real event. Additional training in the use of all field data should be undertaken to improve the state's capability to comprehensively assess the situation. Other technical calculations were good and the state demonstrated the oscimation of doses from raw counts-per-minute data and concentration data in uCi as reported from the plant.
It appears that the deficiency for not using county field data noted in last year's exercise has not been fully rectified.
The capability to locate and track the pluae and define its boundaries on the basis of the data utilized was good. On the basis of the dose rates i
actually calculated, the state radiological assessment team members showed a l
good working knowledge of protective action guides. State laboratory f acilities were good and should be capable of handling the volu=es and types of samples expected. During the exercise FaiA was kept informed of the l
situation.
l 2.1.7 A_etions to Protect the Public ,
The state showed a good capability to provide protective actions in the ingestion pathway EPZ.
However, as noted in the discussion of Wayne County's request to evacuate ERPAs W3 and W4 in Sec. 2.1.6, the state does not fully utilize county field-monitoring data in reaching its protective action decisions for the plume exposure pathway EPZ. This had also been noted during the 1982 exercise.
At food the SEOC, infor=ation was available on the locations of dairy f arms, processing plants, and water-supply intake points. However, crop information was not available at SEOC and should be available for reference.
Similar information for the western district. including crop information, was available at the WDEOC. Se asonal crop in fo rma tion is needed to determine where efforts.
ingestion pathway field-monitoring teams should concentrate their Reservoirs in the plume path up to 50 utiles out were toid by Health Depart =ent personnel at the WDEOC to top off so that a maximu:: supply of uncontaminated water would be available.
The field response was good when the SEOC ordered ingesuton pathway sampling during the recovery and reentry phase of the exercise. repart:ent of Agriculture and 'darke ts personnel at both the 1.DEOC and the VTEOC promptly dispatched field sampling teams to collect samples of fruits, vegetables, N .
i 5
l
. , i 27 soils, milk , and foliage. The teams were knowledgeable and . collected the samples ' in a timely manne r. All samples were labeled, the appropriate forms were filled out, the location of each sample was noted on a chart, and the samples were given to the New York state police for . express delivery to the
.{ state's laboratory at Albany.
2.1.8 Heslth, Medical, and Excesure Contro1' Measures Currently, the state permits potassium iodide (KI) to be distributed only to emergency workers.
After the Governor has declared a state of emergency, the commissioner of the State Department of Health or a designee of the commissioner can authorize exposures in excess of the protective action guides for emergency field workers. However, deficiencies were noted in the application of the current KI policy at the SEOC. In this exerc1=e, the radiciodine release was relatively low, so the use of KI was not authorized by DOM for emergency wo rkers in generci.
However, the state DOH should have authori:ed precautionary KI use ' sooner for the one Wa yne County field monitoring team that received a 5-Ren whole-body dose. . Wayne County followed procedures to request authorization from.DOH for exposures to emergency workers in excess of EPA protective action guides. On the basis of data available at the state at the time of the request, the authorization was
- l denied. Upon receipt of the original request for authorization to exceed protective action guides, the state should have contacted Wa yne Co unty to ascertain worker doses, worker ti me spent in the plume, and other relevant information to support a reco==endation to the decision maker about the need j for authori:ing excess worker doses.
The inclusion of captive populations (e.g., prisoners) under the state KI policy is under consideration; the decision to include or exclude them should be made.
l The de=onstration of health, =edical, and exposure control measures at the state personnel monitoring center in Newark was good. The center was well managed and equipment was available for monitoring wo rke rs and vehicles.
Showers and wash basins were available for decontae.inating people, hoses were in place for decontaminating vehicles, and containers lined with plastic were available for contaminated wastes.
and knowledgeable. Personnel at the center were well trained They de:enstrated decontaminate people and venicles in a a good ability to monitor and cedures specified in the plan. timely manner and e= ployed the pro-Appropriate state personnel had been trained in the use of dosimeters as suggested after last year's exercise. )
The members of the ingestion pathway l
sampling team were equipped with desi eters, had received dosimeter training, '
and properly demonstrated desi:eter use during the exercise. The state police and fire prevention and control personnel at the VDEOC had recently been l trained in the use of dosi:eters and, according to personnel, dosimeters were available for distribution if workers had to go out into the field. Members
- .. )
28
- i i
I of the ingestion pa thway sampling team did not have protective clothing
{ available. Hand and foot coverings would be particularly desirable. . .;
The WDEOC is not in the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ. However, at the security check point, persons entering the f acility were asked where they had
- l been. Had they been '..
- contamination. in the plume, they would ;have been monitored for j Decontamination showers, separate from dormitory showers, and '
clean clothes were available for use by contaminated' individuals.
2.1.9 I Recoverv and Reentrv Ooerations l
{
1 In response to a recommendation based ca last year's exercise, recovery and reentry procedures were demonstrated by the state and a earked' improvement in capability was observed. ;
Both district EOCs dispatched ingestion pathway sampling teams when so requested by- the SEOC. The planning and . control functions exercised at the SEOC for recovery and reentry operations were good.
4 A recovery and reentry task force was established at the SEOC. In reaching its decisions, the task force considered input fract Radiological Intelligence, the Department of Agriculture and Markets, and other agencies. ]j On the basis of this input, appropriate recommendations were issued to the
- counties and a message for the public was drafted and approved.
2.1.10 Rclevance of the Exercise Exoerience '[
The exercise was beneficial to almost all participants. Participants at 1 the SEOC, the LDEOC, and the WDEOC mobilized and carried out their required functions. Backup decision making and recovery and reentry , procedures were demonstrated at the SEOC; this is an improvement over last year's exercise. ,
{
2.2 DiERGENCY OPEFATIONS FACILITY The size of the facility and number of resources at the EOF adequately provided a continuous flow of information. )
The RECS dedicated telephone lina, backed up by commercial telephone and state police radios, was available to contact the state and Wa yne and Monroe counties. However, delays were observed in obtaining information and receiving answers to cuestions from the utility over the RECS line . by county jurisdictions. Some utility field-conitoring data transmitted via the . RECS line were in error and data concerning ground deposition and iodine release.were not ,
manner. received in a timely The cause of these problens should be reviewed and action taken to improve the accuracy and timeliness of utility -information transmitted over l the RECS line. RACES was available to contact the county monitoring teams.
The state and the two counties had adecuate ' space and resources. All necessary status boards and maps were displayed; they were visible to all +
personnel and status infor=ation was kept current. The EOF was slightly k crouded with observers, controllers, and visitors present. Security at the 4
1
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29
^ EOF was adequate, in : hat securi:y personnel required EOF staff to sign in and i sign out, iden:ification badges werc issued, and personnel logs were j maintained.
(
Al erti ng and mobilization of officials and staff at the EOF were accomplished in accordance with es:ablished procedures. Repositioning of two 1 s: ate personnel, one controller, and one player was required due to distances i
and travel times involved. Roches:er and Syracuse Regional Health Office ;
personnel, state personnel, and Mo nroe a nd Wayne coun:y personnel ha d all {
arrived in a :i=ely fashion by 10:20 a.m. A1: hough no shif: c ha nge was i
demonstrated, a sys:em is in place :o provide for it and for con:inuous operations at the EOF. No:ification of sta:e and county personnel was accomplished wi:hin 15 minutes; no:1 fica:1on messages gave the curren: ,
I emerg ency classifica: ion level and instrue: ions, and noced tha: an exercise i was in progress. 1 Emer g enc y operations management was ou:s:anding and :imely. The recovery manager was clearly in charge of :he EOF as specified in the plan.
Changes in the emerge ncy classification level were clearly displayed and i promp:ly passed on to other emergency response organizations. Procedures and i
' checklis:s were available and were used in :he EOF by sca:e a nd county pe rs o nnel .
Ef fec:ive coordina: ion was main:sined through periodic briefings for s:ste and coun:y personnel on a regular basis.
, The EOF scaf f demons: rated an outs:anding capability :o rapidly assess !
radiological ha za rd s . Curren meteorological information was available and f
dose assessment was coordina:ed with :he technical staff. However, the first I
- wo messages :ransmi::ed :o the EOF via :he hotline by :he nuc l ea r facili:y i were difficult for the state a nd dis:ric: EOCs :o handle because they i con:ained forma:.
technical da:a tha: vere no: Oracsmi::ed in :he s:andard state l Thus i: was difficul: to record the da:a being verbally transmitted over :Se :elephone. This problem was solved by celefaxing a hard copy of the state's standard da:a form f rom :he SECC via the :elef ax.
Implemen:a: ion of protec:ive ac: ions and exposure control for emergency workers is not a fune: ion of sta:e and coun:y personnel in :he EOF.
Par:icipan:s at :he EOF indicated tha: the scenario was acceptable as a lea rni ng experience :ha: identified areas needi ng improvemen:. The sta:e and coun:y players par:icipa:ed actively in :he ex e rc i s e , thereby :esting their basic response capabili:les.
2.3 JOINT EMERCENCY SUS CENTER AND PL'St.IC INF0F#.ATION Overall, media and public relations a: the JENC were good al: hough some d ef icie nc i es were no:ed. The s:a:e and coun:y PIO s:affs at the JENC d et.o ns::a: ed a professional capabili:y to issue EBS messages and news releases, brief :he press and answer ques: ions, and control overall news t
L-_________----- - - - -
30
- operations.
Particularly no tab le were the im proved communication and a coordination among all PIOS at the utility, state, and local levels since last year's exercise. ]
y A JENC has been established by Rochester Cas and Electric in Rochester, N.Y., near the utility headquarters. On the day of the exercise, the facility was highly utilized by the press, who were provided with adequate working space, equipment, and telephones. Charts and diagrams in the press conference 1 room were large, easily readable, and comprehensive.
! The PIO staffs at both the Wayne and Monroe county EOCs and the state PIO staff had backup capability to maintain operations on a 24-hour basis.
Facilities provid ed for the state and local Pios at the JENC showed some inad equacies .
The PIO working area was small; there were no t enough desks and chairs to accommodate the PIO personnel. Overcrowding impeded the timely preparation of EBS messages and press releases which took as long as 10 minutes to prepare. Reorganization and reallocation of available space in the l
JENC should be considered to alleviate the crowded conditions. PIO telephone communications from about 9:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. were delayed due to over-loading.
There were no radios or televisions available to permic Pios to monitor EBS broadcasts and general press coverage. Copyirig facilities were cramped and the equipment was too slow for the workload but one copier that f ailed was quickly repaired. Faster copying machines are needed.
( test.
Airing of the first EBS message vas well coordinated with the siren In accordance with the plans established for the exercise, subsequent EBS messages were EBS bulletins transmitted were generally to the EBS insert station but were not aired.
acceptable. However, EBS messages numbered I, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 contained the statements, "This is not a test," while EBS messages nu=b e r ed 2 a nd 3 contained the statement, "This is a test." EBS messages should be reviewed and made consistent through the choice of the statement required by the PIPPo (see, for example, p. 8 of Appendix B of the Monroe County REPP).
In addition, some EBS messages referred listeners to telephone books for information. However, complete information was not available in the latest Roc hes t er telephone book and was very dif ficult to find in t he 1983-3a telephone book for Wayne County.
books in EBS messages should be reviewed. Ref erences to telephone Information was provided promptly to a federal observer who called the telephone r.umb er provid ed in the EBS messages as a source of information on transportation assistance.
S pok es persons at the JE5C had been d es ig na t ed for each county, the state, and Rochester Cas and El ec t ric .
They were well inf ormed and , in the few instances in which they lacked full information to res pond to questions from the press, the required information was obtained and a response was given in a timely manner.
Press releases were developed jointly by the PIOS at the JESC.
In addition, press releases were coordinated between utility, state, and county FIos by requiring all Pios to sign off on each release.
l 1
- A rumor control center was established at the Roc hes t e r Gas and Electric building in Roches ter, N.Y.; this corrected a deficiency noted in last year's exercise.
The rumor control staff was able to accurately answer
' questions called in by observers during the exercise and were informed of press briefings over a public address system. However, the rumor control number had a 716 area code, necessitating a long-distance call from Wayne County.
Cas a nd Materials intended for public distribution were outstanding. Roc hes t er Electric meter readers had dis t rib ut ed a b roc hu re to householders within the 10-mile EPZ since the last year. The ' brochure contained informa-tion on essential terminology, alerting devices, EBS, ERPAs, radiation, emergency classification levels, sheltering, evacuation routes, and reception centers.
Review of the materials targeted for permanent and transient popula-tions indicated that their content was complete and clearly written with good visual impact and logical organization. The distribution of the brochures is i discussed tiv ely.
in Sees. 2.3.5 and 2.4.5 for Wayne and Monroe counties, r es pec--
Plos at tSe county EOCs do not hav e direc t contact with the media.
They perform liaison functions between the county EOC, the PIO at the SEOC, i
.. and the JESC, where direct media contacts take place.
,, 2.4 WAYNE COUNTY 2.4.1 Emertenev Ooerations Facilities and Resourc es Emergency operations facilities and resou rc es in Wayne County were good, given the limited size of the EOC. EOC working space and a:renities were acceptable.
The com=and, communications, and dose assessment areas were partitioned off from the EOC operations room. The command and dose assessment areas wereofatthe lo ng wall opposite ends of operations the EOC; the communications area was along one room. This corrects a deficiency no t ed at the 1982 exercise. 3 1
l Although emergency response staf f were able to function adequately in the present EOC, the operations and dose assessment roots were crowded, even taking into account the pr es enc e of observers and controllers. Ventilation i was poor; the existin.g system uncomf o rtable working conditions.
was noisy a nd could not be used, producing f acility s hould be improved.
Therefore, ventilation in the existing s
Internal communications in the EOC were good. !
As recommended after !
! last year's ex e rc is e , a small public address system was available. A comprehensive status board was maintained in the operations reos. Current 1
l information was po s t ed on the eme rg ency classification, actions taken to I notify the public, protective actions taken, and whether the reception and
7 e
32 congregate care centers were operational.
Maps of evacuation routes.
- relocation c ent ers , and population by ERPA were pos t ed on the wall of the '
operations room.
Map displays were improved sinc e the last ex erc is e ,
Additional copies of maps were posted by the desks of agency representatives. ,
Maps and displays in the dose assessment room were good. Radiological field monitorirg points were designated according to the scheme followed in NUREC-0654.
However, the new Wayne County REPP follows an alternate system. The plan should be revised to conform to whichever system for designating sampling points is actually used.
EOC communications with the Ginna plant and its near-site 'E OF were teceptable.
The pti=ary system us ed was the RECS dedicated telephone line, with extensions at the county sheriff's wa rning point and the EOC dose assessment room. This system was used by well-trained operators, who recei.ved and transmitted messages in a timely f as hio n. However, minor problems occurred in the use of the RECS line. The RECS speaker disrupted communica-tions on the RECS line; this problem was resolved by net using the RECS speaker.
A s eco nd problem, int er f e renc e on the RECS line, occurred when another telephone in the dose assessment room was used during RECS transmis-sions.
Additional telephones for agency use and additional RACES operators were available as recommended based on the 1982 exercise. The dose assessment staff also communicated with the county liaison officer at the EOF via comme rcial telephone line. Personnel using this telephone need additional training in message handling; although message content was correctly copied,
( the time of and the name of the contact for messages wert frequently omitted, making the verification of data dif ficult.
good.
EOC communications with the Monroe County and New York State EOCs were The executive hotline was used as the primary system, co rr ec ting a d ef ic ienc y noted during the 1982 ex e rc is e . RACES and comoercial telephone were available as backups. National Warnir4 System was available for com=unication with f ederal emergency response organizations, although no such communication was observed.
Security at the Wayne County EOC was outstanding. Sherif f's deputies established access control before the EOC was activated. Identifications were c hec ked against a list of ex pec t ed players and observers. Security was main't ained throughout the exercise.
- ,4.2 d ertine and Mobili
- stion of of ficials and Staf f Alerting and mobilization of ef ficials and staf f were acceptable. The sherif f's wa rnir4 point covers the RECS line on a 24-hour basis; this assures a good capabilitv f or initial emergency response.
Co =unica tions equi ment and proc ed u res for alerting, notifying, and mobiliting a=ergency res ponse personnel were acceptable. Using the call-out list inc lud ed in the p10 n.
L personne.1 at the county warning point called key 4
1 33 l
' : staf f when notified of an unusual event . and support staf f when notified of' an alert.
! Commercial telephones were used;- che county warning point a nd the
- county response EOC had home and wo rk telephone ' numb ers available for eme rg e nc y .
personnel.
'. In addition, telephone numbers' for key -staff alternates were also available. However, che initial callout did not reach a number of
- ~
staff me=bers who were en route to work when the . alere call was received. At
-present, the Of fice of Def ense Preparedness (ODP) -director is the only staf f member with a beeper. Full activation of the EOC took one hour.
l l
j
{ 1 The county demonstrated a good capability for 24-hour continuous -
l emergency response operations.
l Backups for the Chairman of the County Board j of Supervisors and EOC' staff demonstrated their capability ~ co operate ef f ec tiv ely. j Wayne County used the exercise as - an opportunity to train additional field-monitoring team staff. Such training should' be continued to j
augment the county's current field-monitoring capability.
]
2.4.3 Emereenev Ooerations Management !
i Emergency operacions management at the Wayne County EOC was good. The Chairman of the County Board of Supervisors was clearly in charge of decision l l
c maki ng . The ODP director implemented the plan under the Chairman's direction.
The ODP - director gave frequent briefings for EOC . sta f f. These ' briefings l included update status d
. reports by the agency coordinators, . who described the >
emergency response actions their respective agencies were taking. At the EOC, county of ficials, county staf f, and agency coordinators participated actively, {
as called for in the plan.
The dose assessment room ..was staffed by l representatives of the state Radiological Emergenc y Preparedness Group, the $
Department of Health (D,0H), a nd Rochester Cas and Electric, as well as the councy radiological officer.
It is not clear that these state and utility backup personnel vill be available to assist the county radiological of ficer in an actual emergency.
The county should consider adding additional members to its own radiological assessment staff in case such assistance is not available.
the AmericanOrgani:ations observed in the field - volunteer fire departments, the New York State Red Cross, Polic ethe
, Wayne County hig hway a nd sheriff's departments, a nd ef fectively participated and Wayne Area Transportation Service -- actively in the exercise. Pri=ary and support functions and responsibilities were clearly assigned participated in the exercise.
to the organi:ations t ha t The standard emergency classification was properly used and posted on '
status boards in the operations and dose assessment rooms. '
The dose assessment protective actions based on gesup demonstrated radiological and a good capability to reco= mend meteorological conditions. The Chairman of the County 3oard of Supervisors and the CDP director - carefully d elib group. era t ed over protective actions recommended by the dose assessment The factors considered includ ed ex pec.t ed evacuation times a nd I
34 projee:ed radiological exposure to the populacion during the evacua: ion .
period. '
-2.4.4 Public Alertine and Notification '
Overall, the public information sys:em provided accura:e emergency informa:1on to the general public in a timely manner. Sounding of. the siren sys:em was well coordinated with the airing of the EBS tes: message.'
The siren sys:em,was activa:ed at about'8:20 a.m. Thirty of thir:y-one people interviewed in spot checks of the general population on :he day of 'the' exercise had heard the siren sounding. The EBS system was ac:ivated a little la:er at about 8:25 a.m. for the first EBS message. 1.acer~ EBS. b'ulle: ins were -
transmitted to the EBS primary insert station, although they' were not aired.
These observations indicate that deficiencies noted during ,the 1982 ' exercise rela:ed to the timely ac:ivacion of' EBS have been ' corrected. EBS messages were good, containing necessary information. However, EBS messages ref erred -
to public education brochures for'information on reception centers.~ Some EBS messages also referred the public to telephone books; for information. The referenced insert is dif ficult to. locate in' the. Wayne County telephone bock.
The names of recep: ion centers should be provided in EBS messages and the loca: ion of :he telephone book information should be described .well enough so
- ha: it can be located quickly. Inclusion of emergency informa: ion in telephone books is a very convenient method of providingL informa: ion.' The .'
( -
informa: ion itself was complete and clear; locating it in the telephone book was the problem.
The ESS messages provided telephone numbers to be used by. individuals ne edi ng cranspor:ation assis:ance. These numbers were called by a federal observer during the exercise.
provided.
The requested 'information was promptly Backup rou:e alerting using mobile public address systems was .not an objec:ive of :he 1983 exercise.
2.4.5 Public and Media Rela: tons '
Public and cedia rela: ions in Vayne Coun:y were accep able ' with some deficiencies no: ed. .A pla nning calenda r/informa:ional brochure had' been dis:ribu:ed':o the residen:s 'of :he 10-mi plume exposure ' pa:hway EPZ. The calendar / brochure con:ained informa: ion on emergency terminology, :he promp:
aler:ing and no:ificacion sys:es, ESS, the four ERPAs wi:hin Wayne Coun:y, radia: ion, :he emergency classifica:1on sys:em, sheltering, evacua: ion routes, and recep: ion cen:ers.
Th e - . i nf o r=atio n included in this brochure was cocr-plete, clearly wri::en, and well organi:ed. However, limi:ed spo: checks of.
- he general popula: ion on the day of :he exercise ' indicated :ha: some EPZ residen:s believe :ha: the sirens are a signal :o evacuate the EPZ ra:her than
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a 'sigtul ,to tune to the local EBS station for additional inf o rma tio n.
Add (tional "o rochures on evacuation routes and pickup points wit hin Wayne County and emergency brochures for businesses have ' been mailed out. Posters on evacuation proc edures had been distributed to businesses wit hin the EPZ.
The few businesses visited in s po t checks on the day of the exercise did not j c'have it posted. 4
! t i i
Wayne County had public information staf f at the joint media center in '
Rochester and backup staff were on standby. Press releases were developed jointly with P10s from the state, Monroe County, and Rochester Ca s a nd Electric.
Exchanges of information were good among spokespersons at the joint media center and between PI0s at the media center and the Wayne County .EOC.
This coordination corrects deficiencies noted during last year's exercise.
A radio was available in the Wa yne County EOC to permit the PIO to monitor EBS messages; this corrects a d e ficiency no t ed d uring the 1982
! exercise.
2.4.6 Ac cid ent As s essment a
' Wayne ' County field-monitoring teams and the dose assessment group at the county EOC d emons t ra t ed an acceptable dose-assessment espability. The {
field conito ring teams were well trained and used correct proc edu res to
{
measure gamma radiation a nd radiciodine in the plume; the deficiency in training noted during the 1982 ex erc is e has been c o r r ec t ed , Tec hnically, j adequate radiological moni to ri ng equipment was available, had been r ec e ntly d calib ra t ed , and was sourc e-c hec k ed before use. However, one of the field !
moni to ri ng teams' was unable to take radiciodine measurements, due to the failure of its RM.-l4 monitor. Wayne County should identify backups for its radiological monitoring equipment. RACES operators with the field monitoring teams promptly transmitted field monitoring data to the dose assessment room I in .the Wayne County EOC. This corrects a deficiency noted at the 1982 exercise.
During the ex e rc i s e, personnel frem Roc hes t e r Cas and Electric, Radiological Emergency Pre pa red ness Group, a nd DOH assisted the county radiological officer.
This level of support in an actual emer g enc y would assure a good capaoility for dose assessment in Wayne County. Nevertheless, the county radiological officer should be given additional training to ensure a dose a s s es sment capability in Wayne County in the initial hours of a radiological accident, whil e personnel from outside Wayne County are in i , transit. it is further recommended t ha t Wayne County consider expanding its own dose assessment i
staf f to redu:e its reliance on outside support.
Dose assess:ent personnel in Wayne County made accurste dose projec-1 tions and formulated appropriate recommendations for protective action.
a e
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18
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.A.c- t io ns to P ro t ec t the Public s .. .s ,
y' 5 ~h s .
pro t ec~t iv'e The ' dose assessment groco in the county action reco':urcuda tions , cotaistent EOC formulated appropriate with proj ec t ed radiation '
et.pqsu res \co the po pula t io n.
The do s e.1s s es sment staff and OOP di rec tor tremamended to tne Chairman of the County Esard. of Supervisors that ERPAs W3 and Wi b e 'eva r.ua t ed'.~ 1 The Chairman concurredrec ' and j^
ERFAs W,3 a nd W e co the state on three separate occasions over the folicwing ommend ed evacuation of s hou r .'
Tne s+ ate delaved
\
s in concurring with the county's recommendation to evace.t.te ERPAs W3 Ond $4. At the atatec the wind had ' shif tedthe time th- evacdztion was firally approved by i s
! suc h that have been in transit daring the passare of the plume.- residents of ERPAs 4 and Wa would l
(
l ,
Wayne County demo'hhtrated an acceptable capability to implement reloca-( \ tion of the ttansit depen'denn The Wayne Aru Transportation Service ran i population.~ However, deficiencies were noted.
( evacuation routes W2 ' and WS. The I bus driver assigned to route V2 'was w.sll trained a nd followed the . SOPS prephly ' Howeveh, the bus past ed through the plume in going to'the first pick m Oints dNpaUched. and took 54 minets, to reacn that point after having been
' It is rscosraended - 9at Wayne Ciunty review its SOPS for the y ,
avacuation of t ra nsit-c hehdent , parsons and modify them, if possible, to
\.- >Lnsure that evacuation vehicles dg ' t.ot pass chtough the plume unnseessarily.
Alternative routes based on the dWection of , plume travel may be nec es sa ry.
\
n ..Pote.nSCal population 'e:tposure dur',ar; bd evesuation was also a problem during
(
t the '1932 exercise. '
s '
\
s s i The Wayba arna Transportardon evacuating mobility-impaired persons. Service ;degnstrated proc eduttes for A wheelchair
- vrn was dispatched to two i addresses . in MaWq.
( The drivet fw nd both decacidas, and then proceeded to
,1
, thereceptioni[^tdarat the 1,yons Eldentary School in a cisely manner.
4
' N%
, s
' 1
' . e At public the ECC, representative.Qof the Cour.cil (or the Aging and the county health nurse mainiained , li's tn o f mobility-icpaired persons by ERPA.
' L The list ieentifiedmany s pecial gneeds of each . person.
i
( recommended pr eva?uation.' inf orhation on dei needs of mobility-imoaired 2
As eac h ERPA was i persoes was geparted inn use 59 r.ne transportation ind ambulance coordinators.
IlI
- Wayne banty establish 'a cWr gate c4re hnter at
- .i .
\ $c hoo l, more t ha n '5 :lles !.o Yhe Cinna plant. 1,yo ns Elementary
- ' 5 6 Piscessing of evacuees t e Ne apeton/ congregate care center was acceptacle. at S well trained. In :er,sonnel :onttore.z. Staff at the center were recorc keepi% vas 2oxcelleit.. Registratitd was well . organized, and Voluncects at the etnter said' that the 1,yons
, High School voojd 5? used U an act341 usergency.
h '
-h area 3 for vehicle secre2atton ar.! decoi.t amination a r.
Facilities for parking and
[N ' 'M school were tradecuate for the anticipated 2000 evacuees.t he. 1,yo ns Ele 9entary This facility would
)y de adeouate JCceDC3o1e.
for kW0 evacuees.
Sd:Mrit? Def80Nn*1 **fC "Ot
!taffing at the congregate care center was 1 prf8ent ps req ui r,$d by the;Uay5e q County REPP, bu nx che center dire: tor said the ECC Jould provide additional personnel as *.eededs \ s Y,
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_. i 37 2.4.3 9ealth, Medical, and Exoosure control Measures Emerg e nc y workers observed within the EPZ - field monitoring teams, bus drivers, and police of ficers - were all equipped with exposure control kits, containing low-range (0-5 R) and hig h-ra ng e (0-200 R) self-reading dosimeters, thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) badges, exposure record logs, j a nd KI; the availability of both low- and high-range dosimeters corrects a '
deficiency noted during last year's exercise. Emergency workers' use of their dosimeters had improved since the 1982 ex erci s e. They read their dosimeters j
at 15- to 30-minute intervals, recorded the rescits, and called in dosimeter !
readings to the EOC. However, not all bus drivers and police of ficers were l familiar with the worker exposure limits in the plan or with the procedure for f requesting authorization to receive exposures in excess- of that limit.
{
Trai ning of emergency workers should emphasize radi,ation exposure 11mics; a card should be ins er t ed in the exposure control kit as a reminder. KI was available for use by emergency workers when authorized by 003.
I Sheriff's deputies and state troopers were effective in controlling j acc ess to evacuated areas. Of fic ers had a list of personnel aut ho riz ed to i enter evacuated areas.
Capabilities at the personnel monitoring center were barely acceptable.
The staff at this center were not familiar with the criteria for requiring decontamination of personnel, equipment, and vehicles, al: hough the director was familiar wi:h these criteria. No one at the personnel monitoring center was aware of procedures to be followed if contamination could not be reduced below 0.1 mR/ hr or if an emerg ency worker was both injured and contaminated. Lack of knowledge aoout decontamination proc ed u r es was also not ed during the 1982 exercise.
The personnel monitoring center director i ndic a t ed t ha t he would contact the county EOC for direc: ion concerning the criteria and procedures for decontamination.
4 2.4.9 Recoverv and Reentrv Oeerations reen:ry Ac the 'Jayne County EOC, the operations officer gave a good briefing on a nd recovery planning. and coordinator from eac h agency reported on ac:ivi:ies recovery operations.
planned by : heir agencies to prepare for reentry and lo ng-t e rm The dose assessment group proposed reentry ac: ions to
- he Chai man of the Cou nty Boa rd of Supervisors for use in consultation with s:a:e of ficials and draf:ed :he final E35 message.
2.4.10 Relev3"ee of :he Exercise Ex:erience Par:icipants in the ex e rc i s e saw i: as a useful learning ex pe ri e nc e.
! The majori:y of par:icipan:s thougn: :ne exercise poi nt ed out the need for l
addi:ional training.
I
38 '
2.5 MONROE COUNTY 2.5.1 Emerrenev Ooerations Facilities and Resources Working Monroe County s pac EOC. e and emergenc y opera tio ns facilities were good at the There were separate rooms for the functions of command and control, dose assessment, public information, and RACES.
The comma nd and control room and the PIO room were located on one side of the EOC.
assessment The dose room was located on the opposite side of the EOC and was separated from the comstand and control and PIO rooms by the central operations rocci.
Emergency decision making was carried out by the County Manager; the county director of the Of fice of Emergency Preparedness; and several county officials room. who were seated around a conference table in the command and con An executive botline telephone had been installnd in the command and control room since last year's exercise. The County Manag er used this executive hotline to receive information from and transmit information to the state and Wayne County.
A telef ax machine was available outside the command a nd control room to provide hard copies of essential emergency information.
Some minor difficulty was encountered in using this telefax machine to receive a copy of the11:00 approximately Governor's a.m.
declaration of a radiological emergency at rec eived shortly af ter 11:00 A legible copy of the Governor's declaration was a.m.
from Albany. af ter a second transmittal was requested The dose assessment scoreroom. function was performed in a room normally used as a This room has limi t ed working space and it was difficult to ac r escpoo= modtia es t e the up to 13 staff memb ers who carried out dose assessment nsibili at the Monroe County EOC. The county's emergency preparedness officials are aware that a larger working area is needed for the dose assess =ent function. Since last year's exercise, the RECS telephone line has been moved from the central operations room into the dose assessment room. This move has lowered the noise level in the operations improved the ability of room and has the county radiological officer to hear a nd c o==u nica t e t ec hnical information over the RECS line. However, delays were observed in obtaining information and receiving answers to questions from the state and utility over the RECS line.
verifying c ha ng es in plant c ondi tio ns Specific problems were encountered in radiological releases. and the type and duration of RECS line were in errorSome utility field monitoring data transmitted via the and data co nc e rni ng ground deposition and iodine release were not rec eived in a timely manner. The Monroe County dose assessment staff was confused about and answers to requests for clarification whether there had been an iodine Telease were not timely. The lack of a timely d eci sio n to reco mend KI for Monroe County eme rge nc y workers was affected by the late r ec ei pt of information via the RECS .ine.
The cause for these problems should be reviewed by the state and county and the appropriate
=
l l
39 d training ot staff should be accomplished to improve the accuracy and timeliness of information transmitted to the counties via the RECS line.
The PIO rocca consisted of an of fic e equipped with a desk and a telephone. The county PIO officer at the EOC developed ESS messages and pr ess releases in this office and consulted frequently with the County Manager and the county director of the Of fice of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) in preparing their content. These EBS messages and press releases were communicated to the Monroe Cout.ty P10 at the JENC by the telephone located in the PIO rocm.
The RACES room was located directly across the hall from the central operations room, close to the dose assessment room. This physical arrangement isolated nois e from the RACES equipment yet allowed information communicated from the county field-monitoring teams to be transferred to the dose assessment room in a timely manner.
The operations room had adequate space to accommodate representatives f rom all of the 22 agencies with emergency response roles. Each agency had a s e pa ra t e work table with space for two staff peo pl e. Most ag enc ies had a separate telephone.
Internal commu nic a t io ns , including visual displays and mess ag e-ha ndling proccdtres, were good.
density and evacuation routes had beenThe wall ma ps showing po pula tio n
- modified in response to a rec ommenda t io n from last year's ex e rc is e. These ma ps were equipped wit h movable sectors that eculd be rotated to show the location of the plume. Maps and status boards were clearly visible to the EOC staff. Periodic briefings were held.
At several of these briefings, the county director of OEP or the director's designee went through a roll call of agencies whose representatives announced ac: ions eney had taken in response to the eme rg enc y . The emergen:y classification was shown on a master status board which also showed wi nd speed, wind dir ection, tempe:nure, and :he time and date : hat each emerzency classification had become ef f ective. A separate status board was used to show curren; weather information.
These status boards were updated as new infor a: ion became available.
A s ec u rity officer was on duty at the door of the operations room to control ac:ess to :he ECC.
Iden::iica: ion was recuired for entrance and a log was '<ept of all persons entering and leaving the EOC.
2.3.2 Al e r:i ng and Mobili:a: ion of Sfficials ud S:aff response Monroe County personnel. demons::a:ed a good capability to :obili:e e_m e r g e nc y The 20un:y was int:ial?? notified by the state of an unusual event at approximately 7: 33 a.m.
point. via the Monroe County wa rni ng Inis warning poin: is con:tnuously s:sf f ed on a 24-hour basis. The county ac:1va:ed dire::or of CEP na t7:-J at soproximately u i ed the permanent OEP staff and the EOC was a.m.
resoonse agencies were no:1fied oy telepnene Representatives and of the various emergency by :he OE? staff using : heir call lists. initially placed on standby Agency representatives were notified
40 '
to reoort to the EOC at approximately 7:55 a.m.
at the alert classification. *
( All arencies notification weretosthe to repore tafEOC.
f ed at the EOC within 45 minutes of their in The county commissioner of public safety '{
1 was dispatched Manager throughoutto most the EOF of theand remained there for communication with the Coun exercise. .d All primary functions at control, dose assessment and the the EOC, including communications, command and PIO, were personnel. staf fed with primary and backup The capability for 24-hour continuous emergenc y res po ns e wa s demonstrated at the Eoc at approximately 2:00 p.m.
most ag enci es . with a shift change for depth and und ers This shift cof tanding hange provided the opportunity to inc rea s e the the Monroe County radiological preparedness plan and procedures. emerg ency The mobilization of staff and tion / congregate care center a nd activation of the Monroe County rec e p-efficient. personnel monitoring center were timely and personnel hadItbee.' wastrained evident to that sinc e last year's exercis e , sufficient provide 24-hour staffing of the monitoring and decontamination functions at these facilities.
2.5.3 _Emerrencv coerations Management The overall management County. Leadership of the of emergency operations was acceptable in Monroe
( demonstrated at county's emerg ency response was effectively charge of county emergency operations.the Monroe County EOC where the services and human services were present The county commissioners of physical most of the exercise. or represented at the EOC throughout to the EOF and was The county commissioner of public safety was dispatched oc c a s io ns . in communication with the County Ma nager on several a nd the state via the executive hotline.The County Manager coordinated has been improved since last year's exercise. Management of operations at the EOC All county agencies plan participated in the exercise.with emergency responsibilities identified in the ing relationships between agencies with primary and supportThe coor good at the Monroe County EOC. functions was very director of OEP or the director's designee. Staff briefings were conducted by the county frecuent a nd informative. These staff briefings were roll-call of agencies; actions At several of the briefings the director used a stati. taken by each agency were explained to the EOC could be The coordination improved. The of information relating to protective action deci s ons i by the county's dose assessment proj ections of radiological excosure risks developed tions were compiled at team and technical inf ormat.*n on plant condi-Director of the Office the ECC by the county radiological health of ficer . The of Emer g e nc y Prepa red nes s was no;tfied by the
( radiological officer of each change in proj ec tions of radiological expo 1
41 l ' risks developed by the county's accident assessment team and of technical (
information on plant cordicions as a standard operating proceduye. the director and the radiological officer immediately briefed the coun;y manager l
on the changing status and the radiological officer then briefed all agencies
, in the EOC. As a result , the precautionary evacuation of pregnant women and {
3
! children in ERPAs M2, M3, and M4 was initiated at approximately 10: 30 a.m.
during the site area emergency with no radiological release following the Wayne Ccunty evacuation of ERPAs W1 and W2. At the county level, the county's own dose assessment information should be factored into the protective action decision-making to a greater extent.
2.5.4 Public Alertine and Notification The public alerting sirens and tone alert radios used to alert schools within the 10-sile plume exposure EPZ were activated at the alert classifica-tion level at approximately 8:25 a.m. Activation of this system was coordi-l nated with Wayne County and was monitored at the Monroe County EOC using a tone alert radio.
All of the people interviewed in spot checks of the general population on the day of the exercise indicated that they had heard the sirens. Officials of the Bay Road School and the 1.ittle Windmill Day Nursery indicated that the.ir tone alert radios had sounded. Both the tone alert radio and siren tone were heard at the Windmill Day Nursery.
p The EBS was activated and the airing of the test notification message {
was well coordinated with activation of the public alerting sirens. Airing of !
the EBS message was monitored by radio at the Monroe County EOC and in the field by federal observers.
with EBS noted last year have These observations indicated that deficiencies been corrected. EBS messages were good and contained necessary information.
However, EBS messages referred to public education brochures for information on reception centers. Some ESS messages also referred the public to telephone books for emergency information and EPSA caps.
The ref erenced insert available in the latest Rochester telephone book vas ince=plete because it did not include a map showing ERPA locations.
Backup route alerting of the public using mobile public address units was not ttsted as an objective of this year's exercise.
2.5.5 Public and wedia telations Public and cedia relations were acceptable in Monroe County. The calenda rs and public information brochures observed at the county ECC were infor=ative and could be easily understood.
These materials contained inf or-cation on e:ergency terminology. public alerting and notification devices and p ocedures, ERFAs, sheltering, evacuation routes, and bus pick-up points. On the basis of spot checks of the general population in Monroe County, no one int e rviewe d on the day of the exer:ise remembered receiving a public information brochure or knew that they should turn to the EBS station for
42 ,
emergency inf ormation, Managers of-one hotel / restau tat and one real es ta t e
- C of fice also did not remember receiving posters to be cisplayed in their places '
of business. There was however, some evidence that public information bas been distributed in Monroe County:
- e Information no tic es were posted in the entranc e to the Webster Town Hall, l
e Officials at two schools that were visited were well informed about radiological emergency procedures, and e Staff at the real estate office remembered that Xerox i Corporation had distributed public information calendars to local Parent Teachers Association groups.
On the basis of these field observations, continuing public education efforts are recommended.
EBS messages and news releases were developed oy county PIO staff stationed at the EOC. The PIO conferred with the County Manager and the county director of OEP in order to obtain the information that would be transmitted to the joint media center. As specified in the Monroe County pro-cedures, information for release to the press was coordinated through the Monroe County PIO stationed at the JENC, correcting a deficiency noted. during
( the 1982 exercis e. The EBS messages and press releases were carefully and ef ficiently developed at the Monroe County EOC. They were then communicated to the media center by telephone in a timely manner.
i The telecopier that would be used to transmit backup hard copies was not operating properly during the exercise. and should be repaired.
~
2.5.6 Accident Assessment Accident assessment capabilities were outstanding in Monroe County.
The dose assessment staff at the EOC demonstrated exceptionally. good. technical knowledge of radiological dose proj ec tion procedures. The staff was well equipped and projections of the potential for exposure to the general popula-tion were perf or:ed quickly and accurately. The new on-line computer , whic h is ready for installation in the accident assessment room, should further enhance these already outstanding capabilities.
Two county radiological field-monitoring teams were dispatched from the Culver Road Armory in Rochester. {
Both of these field teams performed excep-tionally well. Sinc e last year's exereise, sufficient personnel had been trained to provide for 24-hour field-monitoring capability. The two field-monitoring tea =s were staffed with both primary and backup personnel for purposes of the ex e rc i s e . Air sampling for noble gases and radioiodine was efficient and was completed in a timely manner. Both teaos were well trained k ..
43
' in the use of their equipment, although observer that one team mentioned to the federal s
iodine sampling.
they would like to have a written procedure to follow for radio-Each team was equipped with both low- and 'high-range instru-
- monts Most and ecch team had several backup instruments readily available for use.
year. of these field monitoring instruments had been calibrated ed thin the last Although the labels on rose instruments indicated that they had not been calibrated within the last year, instruments were operationally checked before the teams left for the field and they were found to be in good working order.
j dose assessment Com=unications between the Monroe County field-monitoring teams and the l improved since last staff at the year's exeEOC were exc ellent a nd had been significantly rcis e.
Field data were promptly transmitted to the EOC from each monitoring location through RACES radio operators. The data were accurately transmitted in the the dose assessment staff at the EOC. Direction of the #ield monitoring teams proper units and could be readily used by q
from the EOC could be improved however.
Several times during the ex e rc i s e ,
the monitoring teams took readings, called the data in to the EOC, and then v iced up to one hour before receiving further instructions. Dose assessment o
results should be co=municated back to the field teams as soon as they are available.
County's already This coo rdi nadose-assessment outstanding tion of information would further enha nc e Monroe ca pabili ti es .
2.5.7 Ac tions to Prot ect the Public Actions to protect the public were acceptable in Monroe County. The bus used to demonstrate the evacuation of transit-dependent persons in the general po pula tion was dispatched from the garage a pp rox t:ta t ely 15 mi nut es af ter EOC. the initiating message was dispatched to tne bus company from the county The bus driver knew the route to the first pic k-u p poi nt and approxi-mately 20 minutes were requi red to drive the eight miles to this location.
The in approxi=ately pic k-u p route, consisting of six stops, was completed in a timely manner 30 minutes.
the last pick-up point to theThe written instructions coverir4 the route from reception / congregate care center for this bus evacuation route were dif ficult for the driver to follow. Problens with the ins exercise. t ruc tions for evacuation routes were also noted during last year's The bus driver was guided to the reception / congregate care center by radio communication ith the bus company dispatcher. Approximately one and one-quart er hours were required to drive f rom the final pick-up point on the evacuation route to the assigned rec eot io n/co ng r ega t e care facility at the Martha Brown Junior Migh School in Pairport, New York.
the written directions from the bus pic k-u p routes It is recommended that congregate care centers be reviewed, revised to the assigned reception /
macs. if necessary, and augmented with Co nsid era tion should also be given to the traintn; of bus drivers regardirg the primary and alternate routes to these facilities.
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44 The capability to identify, locute, and evacuate noninstitutionalized.
C mobility-impaired persons using county transportation resources was good. The bus observec on the day of the exercise arrived at the preselected address approximately 50 minutes af ter the initiating message had been dispatched to the bus company from tne county EOC.
mately 12 miles from the bus depot. The This preselected address was approxi-driver was knowledgeable about the -
procedures to be used in transporting the mobility-impaired individuals at that address care center. and was f amiliar with the location of the reception / congregate The driver also knew the predesignated ruute to the reception routes / congregate care center and had the instructions for two alternate in writing.
vehicles Sheriff's at police units were deployed to control the movement of points were two trafficatcontrol points in Monroe County. These traffic control activated e
The northbound exit onto Bay Road from U.S. Route 104, and e
The intersection of U.S. Route 104 and Holt Road.
The officer who was interviewed at the Bay Road exit en U.S. Route 104 did not know that the exit from Route 104 onto northbound Bay Road wasto be closed County Monroe and was not aware that this traffic control point was designated in the procedures.
to confirm where the The officer also reported that he had been unable
( traf fic control point should be positioned when he had radioed into the sheriff's office for clarification. The description of traffic control points contained in the Monroe Cour. :y 1,av enforce =ent and traffic that insure control procedures the location should be reviewed and revised if necessary to and ' requirements for rerouting traf fic can be easily understood by the responsible law enforcement agencies. Distribution of the Monroe Count y law enforcement and traf fic control procedures should also be reviewed to insure that various of fices of the law enforcement agencies with these responsibilities have copies of the procedures readily available for re fe rence.
The sheriff's representative at the Monroe County EOC pro =ptly dispatched a police unit to the location of the si=ulated impedi=ent to evacuation at the intersection of Rou t e s 250 a r.d 441. Confi rmat ion was received at the ECC that the of ficer who arrived at the scene knew that the appropriate action to deal with the 2-car accident was to call for a cow truck.
vated forThe thereceotion/cengregate exercise. care center at Sperry Figh School was acti-This was an outstanding facility which had sufficient space at arrive and thefacilities center.to acco::odate cany more than the 375 persons expected to congregate care center andThe the manager assistant directed activities at the reception / :
exercise, is trained to manace the center. =anager, who also participated in the
( Support staff at the reception /
45 congregate care centet were well trained. They could ef fectively handle the radiological monitoring, registration, and sheltering of evacuees who arrive at the facility.
effectively. The personnel and resources of the Red Cross were used Two aids that have been developed to facilitate the implementation of protective actions in Monroe County are worthy of mention. The county, in cooperation with the State Depart =ent of Transportation, has developed a method for monitoring the level of traffic along evacuation routes. This system was tested and considered effective on the day of the exercise. It provides early warning of traffic congestion and allows decision makers to consider restricted.the use of alternative routes before the movement of craffic becomes Also, the county Department of Social Services has developed a computeri:ed system for locating evacuees who regis te r at the reception /
congregate care centers.
Rosters of registrants at the centers are forwarded to the Depart =ent's county affice, which is located in the same building that houses the EOC. Here the information is compiled and merged into an alpha-beti:ed data base for quickly locating evacuees and reuniting relatives.
2.5.8 Health, Medical, and Excesure Control Measures Monroe The capability to monitor and control radiological exposure was good in County.
Nearly all emergency workers observed in the field were wear-ing both low-range (0-5 R) and high-range (0-200 R) dosimeters as well as permanent record devices; this corrects a deficiency noted during the 1982 exercise.
desi:eters were Also showing improvement since last year, the self-reading specified in theread f requently county plan. and individual exposure records were kept as dosi:eters used during the exerciseHowever, it was noted that the low-range were not sensitive enougn to detect a 100-mR exposure.
According to procedures in the plan, workers who have received an exposure of 100 =A are required to contact their supervisor. Consideration should be given to raising the mini =um reporting level to at least 500 mR, which can be more readily read on the existing low-range dosimeters.
The ceasures for deconta:1 nation of people and equipeent at the county receotion/ congregate care center and the county personnel monitoring center were outstanding.
procedures. Personnel were f amiliar with the proper decontamination A medical drill was conducted in conjunction with the exercise to assess the county's capability to handle a radiologically contaminated injury resulting from a si=ulated auto:obile accident at the intersection of Salt Road and Route 404, which is inside the 10 mile plu:e exposure pathway EPZ.
The '*ebster Volunteer Fire Department Union Hill A=bulance Service transported the provided com:unications support and the Hospital in Rochester. injured person to the Park Ridge
. Backup resources were not utilized for this drill.
Both the a=bulance eersonnel and the hospital staff were knowledgeable and well equipped to handle the emergency situation. The hospital staff used
46 i
their standard operating procedure for. handling radiologically contaminated .
patients and a copy of this procedure was readily available for reference. ."
Contaminated areas of the hospital were roped off and secured. The hospital radiological safety officer and a nuclear medicine technician monitored the
- injured person and the treatment area. A New York State radiological health
- specialist monitored the ambulance personnel and the vehicle.
2.5.9 Recovery and Reentrv In accordance with the objectives established for the exercise, Monroe County demonstrated a good capability to identify reentry procedures. During this phase of the exercise, the county director of OEP conducted a final roll-call of agencies whose representatives described actions they would be take !
during the re cove ry and reentry phases of a radiological emergency at the Ginna plant. The Health Department representative reviewed the need for field surveys to insure that contamination levels are below the guidelines that have been established for allowing the general population to reenter an evacuated area within the county. In a closing statement to the EOC staff, the County Manager mentioned the recovery committee and the subcommittees (i.e., public h.!alth ef fects, economy and social effects) that would continue to evaluate
, the impact of the incident on the county. As mentioned above, a shif t change of personnel was demonstrated at the EOC during the earlier phases of the exercise. Given the short period of time for recovery and reent ry in this ,1 year's exercise, a second shift change to increase the depth of understanding l.
of reentry procedures could not be accomplished in response to a eco==enda-tion from last year's exercise.
2.5.10 Relevance of the Exercise Exeerience The exercise was seen as a good training experience for all of the l j
Monroe County emergency response personnel who participated. The scenario '
provided a good test of capabilities to coordinate the response to a radiological emergency and there was extensive participation by both paid and volunteer workers. Monroe Coun ty 's commitment of personnel and resources to the exercise is to be applauded.
i
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l 47 3
i St. dot 3Y OF DEFICIENCIES THAT 'a'0CLD LEAD TO NEGATIVE FINDINGS No deficiencies were observed at the state, county, or municipal level that would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness .w as not adequate to prov' e reasonable assurance that appropriate protective =easures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency.
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4-SLHMARY OF OTHER DEFICIENCIES '
41 STATE OF NEW YORK, LAKE DISTRICT, AND WESTERN DISTRICT Other deficiencies observed at the SEOC, LDEOC, and kTEOC have led to the f ollowing recommendations. -
4.1.1 Emertenev Ocerations Facilities and Resources
- a. The message / status board was not updated in the accident assessment room at the SEOC af ter 12:50 . p.m. This board l should be updated throughout 'the exercise.
- b. Delays were observed in Monroe County in obtaining info rmatio n and . receiving answers . to questions from the state over the RECS line. The cause for these problems should be reviewed by the state and county and appropriate t rainin6 of staff should be undertaken to improve the timeliness of information transmitted to the counties via RECS.
l
- c. When many simultaneous communica tions were being handled
( at the LDEOC, noise levels were high. This problem should -
be studied and noise control measures instituted if feasible.
- d. The display of the emergency classification level at t r.e WDECC was difficult for some. players to read and was nut s
shown continuously throughout the exercise. Consideration should be given to improving the visibility of the display. At a minimum, the emergency classification level must be displayed at all times.
I
- e. Maps of population by ERPA should be available fer workers at the kTEOC.
- f. There was int erf erence between the local government radio and RECS dedicated land line at the WDEOC. . The source of interf erence needs to be located and eliminated.
- g. The telef ax nachine at the WDEOC ran up to one and one-half hours late. An additional machine to provide for timely telefax messages is desirable. Also, the LTE0C telefax As not compatible wit h the state accident assess-ment telefax; copies . of plume isopleths could not be rec eiv ed . If possible, the %TEOC should be provided with
( compatible equipment.
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49 4.1.2 _Emerzenev Doerstions Management 2 -
a.
The decision to evacuate ERPAs W3 and W4 was reac hed without fully integrating the input from radiological in t elligenc e into the dec isio n. Coordination between commanJ and accident assessment should be improved by fully integrating input from the accident assessment staff {
(both state and county) into protective action decisions.
4.1.3 Ac cid ent As sessmen t
- a. All radiological data should be displayed by uniform locational d esigna tions at the SEOC regardless of the county of origin. Da ta should also be listed chronologi-cally. Distance from the plume centerline should be indicated and labeled consistently with proper radiological units and parameters.
b.
The state accident assessment team should coordinate better with county field teams so that county data are used by the state in its assessment activities.
Additional training in making timely use of all field data l 1s recommended.
4.1.4 Actions to protect t he Dub lic i
i
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a.
The state should more fully utilize county field monitor-ing dita in reaching its protective action decisions, b.
Maps of crop distribution should be available at the SEOC. l a.1.3 Health. Medical, and Exoosure Control Measures a.
The decision to inc lud e or exc lud e caotive populations under the state's K1 policy snould be made.
- b. Wayne County followed procedures to request authori:stion f rom DOM for ex posu re for emergency workers in excess of EPA protective action guides. Based on data available to
! the state at t ha t time. the authori:stion was denied.
l Upon receipt of the original reauest for authorization to exceed pro t ec t iv e action guides. the state should have contacted Wayne County for the infor:ation and data needed to support a recommendation for au t ho ri:i ng the excess
( ..
50 .
doses. The s: ate should fully utilize che coun:y field-
- moni:oring da:a.
C .
- c. Members of the ingestion pathway sampling team should have *!-
procee:ive clothing, particularly hand arid foot coverings, available.
l 4.2 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY i
J Deficiencies with EOF procedures nochd by observers at the Monroe ;
County EOC, :he SEOC, and the WDEOC have led to the following recomenda: ions.
4.2.1 Emereenev Ooerations Management
{
1
- a. Delays were observed in obtaining informa: ion and rec eiving answers to questions from the utility over the I RECS line by other jurisdictions. Some utility field-mo nitoring data transmi::ed via the RECS line were in error and data conc erning ground deposition and iodine release were no: received in a timely manner. ,The cause of these problems should be reviewed and action taken to improve :he accuracy and timeliness of utility information transmi::ed over the RECS line.
- b. The forma: for Oransmit:ing radiological informa: ion from the nuclear facility opera to r to other jurisdictions should agree w1:h the forma: of the standard sta:e forms.
Some confusion resulted at the SEOC and the WDEOC when da:a transmi::ed over the RECS line from 'the nuclear l f acility operator did not conform to the standard format.
a.3 JOINT EMERCENCY NEWS CENTER AND PUBLIC INFORMATION Deficiencies observed at :he JENC have led :o the following recom- l i
menda: ions.
l a.
PIO work s pac e in the JESC was too small, leading :o overcrowding, and :here were no: enough desks and chairs for PIO personnel. i These conditions impeded the timely prepara: ion of press releases, Reorganiza: ion and real-loca: ion of space should be considered to alleviate over-crowding.
b.
The copying e.s c hi ne at the JENC was too slow to keep up wi:h the workload. A second or a fas:er machine should be considered.
1
a 51 c.
The statement, "This is no: a tes:," in EBS messages \
numb e red I, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 conflic:s wi:h the statement, "This is a tes:" in messages numbered 2 and 3.
- The messages should be reviewed and a single sta:emen:
consisten: with the requirements of the sta:e REPP, should be chosen for all messages.
- d. Some EBS messages referred lis:eners :o celephone books for addi:ional information. Comple:e infor=a: ion was not available in :he lates: Roches:er :elephone book and was very dif ficul: :o find in :he 1983-94 celephone book for Wa yn e Coun:y. Re f erenc es to telephone books in EBS messages should be reviewed The EBS messages should !
describe the loca: ion of :he informa: ton in :he :elephone 1 book well enough cha: it can be found quickly.
4.4 WAYST. COUNTY l
Deficiencies observed in Wayne County led :o the followi ng recommenda: ions.
4.4.1 Emertenev Ooerations Facilities and Resources e
~
- a. The operations and dose assessmen: rooms of the Wayne Coun:y EOC were crowded a nd l vantila:Lon was poor.
Ven:ila: ion in :he existing facili:y should be improved.
- b. Designa: ions for sam pli ng poin:s on ma ps in the dose assessmen: roe- followed :he sys;em indicated in NUREG-0654; the neo
- oun
- y >lan follows an al:erna:e scheme. The plan should se revised to conf orm :o whichever sys:em for )
designa:ing sampling poin:s is ac ually in use.
c.
The RECS speaker di s ru:::ed communications on :he RECS line.
In:erference on the RECS - line also occurred when ano:her telephone in :he dose assessment room was used du ri ng RECS ::ansmissions.
RECS should be reviewee :o iden:if y and eliminate sour:es of in:erf erence.
- d. A1: hough dose assessmen: s:aff communica:ing wi:5 the coun:y liaison of ficer a: :he EOF by commercial telephone copied message con:en: correctly, :he :ime and source of messages were frecuen:ly omi::ed.
S:aff should receive additional training in message-handling procedures, t
4 52 .
4.4.2 Public and Media Relations .c
(
a.
Limited spot checks of the general population on the day of the exercise indicated t hat some EPZ residents believe that the sirens are a signal to evacuate the EPZ rather t han a sig nal to tune to the local EBS station for additional inf ormation. There may be need for additicnal public education.
4.4.3 Accid ent As s es sment
- a. One of the field monitoring teams was unable to measure radioiodine in the plume due to an equipment failure.
Wayne County should identify sourc es of backup radiological monitoring equipment.
- b. The newly appointed county radiological officer needs additional training to assure a dose assessment capability in Wayne County in the initial hours of a radiological accident while backup personnel from outside Wayne County are in transit. In addition, Wayne County should consider expanding its own dose assessment staf f and thereby reduce their reliance on outside assistance.
C 4.4.4 Ac tio ns to Prot ect the Public j i
- a. The evacuation bus assigned to route W2 passed through the plume on its way to the first pickup point. Standard l
~ operating proc edures should be reviewed and - codified if po s s ib le to insure that buses do not pass through the plume unnec es sa rily. Al t e rnative routes may be necessary based on the direction of plu=e travel.
l 4.a.5 Mesich. Medical, and Exoosure control Measures i
- a. Not all bus drivers and police of ficers were familiar with the exposure limits specified in the plan or with procedures to r equ es t authorization to rec eive exc es s ex po su r e.
Training of emergency workers should emphasite radiation ex po su re limics; a card should be inserted in the exposure control kit as a reminder.
- b. Personnel monitoring center staff were unfamiliar wi t h criteria for decontamination of personnel, equipment, a nd v e hic l es ; procedures to be followed if contamination could
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,, not be reduced below 0.1 mrem /hr; and procedures- for handling an inj ured , con:aminated patient. Additional training in decontamination procedures is recommended. '
4.5 MONROE COUNTY Deficiencies observed in Monroe County during the exercise have led :o the following recommendations. .
4.5.1 Emereenev OoeraEions Facilities and Resources
- a. The dose assessment room at the Monroe County EOC had limited working space and it was difficult to accommodate the staff required to carry out this f u nc tio n. _ County emergency prepa red nes s officials should be encouraged to implement one of the space improvement alternatives that they have already considered.
,. 4.5.2' Emereenev Ooerations Management
- a. The coordination of i nf o rma: ion relating to protective action decisions at the Monroe County EOC could be improved. The Monroe Cou n:y decision makers appeared :o rely more heavily on sta:e and Wayne County data chan on Monroe County's own dose assessment capabilities, whic h were outstanding. The county's own dose assessment info:ma: ion should be f ae:ored into the protective action decision-making to a greater extent at the county level.
4.5.3 Public and Media Rela: tons l
- a. Bas ed on spo: checks of :he general popula: ion in Monroe Coun:y, no one who was in:erviewed on the day of :he exercise remembered receiving a pub lic inf o rma: ion brochure or knew : hey should : urn :o :he E3S s:a: ion for e=ergency informa: ion. Based on these field observa: ions, con:inuing public educa: ion ef f or:s are recommended.
- b. The :elecooier tha: vould be used to transmit .- backup hard copies of ESS messages and news releases was not o pera:1.mg 3 procerly on :he day of the exer:i s e. This .:elecopier should be repaired.
______._.m___m-__..- - _ - -
54 4.5.4 Actions to Preteer the Publie
( a.
The written directions cove ring the route from the last C
pick up point to the reception / congregate care center for
- m the Monroe County bus evacuation route were difficult for the bus driver to follow. These written directions should be reviewed and revised if necessary, and they should be augmented with maps of the primary and alternate routes.
Bus drivers should also be trained regarding the pri=ary and alte rnate routes to the reception / congregate care centers.
b.
The police officer attending one of the Monroe County traffic control points did not know where he was to be positioned or how access was to be controlled. The l sheriff's office was unable to provide clarification when l the field officer radioed in for information. The descriptions of traffic control points that are contained in the honroe County law enforcement and traffic control j
procedures should be reviewed and verified to insure that .
A che responsible law enforcement agencies have copies of the procedures readily available for reference. ,
4.5.5 Heair.h, Medical, and Exoosure control Measures a.
The low-range dosimeters (0-5 R) used during the exercise were not sensitive enough to detect a 100 mR exposure.
According to procedures in the Monroe County plan,
! emergency workers are required to contact their supervisor when they have received an exposure of 100 mR. Considera-tion should be given to raising the minimum reporting level to at least 500 mR, which can be more easily read on the existing low-range dosimeters.
l 55 5 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTION OF DEFICIENCIES
- e i
- Sections 3 and 4 of this report list deficiencies based on the findings I and rec ommenda tions of federal observers at the radiological emett ency preparedness exercise for the Robert E.
June 22, 1983.
Ginna Nuclear Power Station held on These evalua tio ns are based on the applicable planning I standards and evaluatio.n criteria set foret in NUREC-0634-FE>tA-1, Rev. 1 (Nov. !
1980) and obj ectives for the exercise agreed upon by the state, FEMA, and the RAC. The accompanying table summarizes recommendations to correct deficiencies identified as requiring c o rrec tive actions based on t his exercise. For purposes of verification, the table compa res these recommenda tions with the recommendations based upon the previous exercise of January 21, 1982.
indicated.
The current status for all recommendations is also The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FU.A Associate Director, State a nd Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C.,
t ha t any deficiencies that require corrective actions have been corrected and t ha t such corrections have been incorporated into the plans as appropriate.
l FEMA requests that both the state and local jurisdictions submit the measures they have taken or intend to take to correct these deficiencies.
- e, FEP.A recommends that a detailed pla n , including dates of completion for scheduling and implementing recommendations, be provided if remedial actions
- cannot be instituted immediately. j J
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Table 5.1 Recoccnendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Radiological E:sergency
- C Response Preparedness at Enercise for the Robert E. Cinna Nuclear Power Station on January 21, 1982, and June 22, 1983 ci Deficiency I i
identifted '!
NUR204634 !
No.
F EM A-RE F-1 Esercise Esercise Fresend Reccamended Remedial Action Rev. 1. Reference" 1/21/82 6/22/83 Jurisdiction b Status %
I. Esertenew coerstiene Fact 11ttes ena essources -f 1 The sessage/ status board was not NR 1 State I upda t ed in the accideot assessment roce .
I at the st0c af ter 12:50 p.m. This l board should be updated throughout the I esercise.
2 Delays were observed in obtatoing ina F. lid I state I formation and receiving ar.swe re to X State-EOF !
questtoos from the state dnd utility c'.or the RECS line. which was located in the dose assessment roce at the Henroe County t0C. Some utility field-sonitoring data tranasitted via the RECS line were in error and data con-cerning ground de po sition and todine release information were not received-in a timely manner. The cause for these problema should be reviewed by
(
the state and counties and the appro-priate training of staff s hould be accomplished to improve the accuracy and timeliness of infotaation trans-sitted to the counties via the R.t:5 line.
3 Dif ficulty was observed in maintaining F.1.d X $ tate ,C rapid co=munica tion between internal grouse, e s pecially in the Albany ECC be t we en the radiological intelligence room and the operatione staf f. The use of 11stson officers tes2(. s peed the flow of 1rforu tloo b4 tween these groups. for testance, the operations staff could be astiated by a listson person assitnad to monitor infor=ation 1 cosing into the radiological intelli-gence room, l i
I
!sorovesent in internal communications F.1.d I State C ,
should be possibla based on the results of the exertises for esasole, r a pid c oatnunica t t an between the radiological .!
intelltrence reos and the .operatione staf f should be ensured.
$ Securtte sessures should ensure that NR X State C the sovemen:o of sedia representatives can te sonttored.
E State-LD C X State-C C 6 Wen aa n, etsultaneous communt:stions F.1.d were betag handled at the L;COC. noise 1 State-LD 1 levels wre high. This probles should be studied ' and notee control se s s ure s
( instituted if feasible.
i J
l
- - s
r a l
I
. 1 57
- - Table 5.1 (Cont'd) e De ficie nc y i
- tdenettled i rAEO-0654 j F Dt A-R E F = 1 Exercise Exercise Present 1 No. Receasended Remedial Action Rev. 1, Reference
- 1/21/82 6/22/83 Jurisdiction D Statust I
7 The display of the energency classi- D.3 x state-VD 1 fication level at the WE0C was difft-cult for some energency workers to read and was not shown continuously through-out the exercise. Consideration should be given to Laproving the visibility of the display. At a ainlauen. the eser=
gency classification level eust be dis-played at all times.
8 Maps of population by DFA should be J.10.b % state-W I available for VDEOC workers, a
9 There was interference between the F.1.d I State-W I lj local government radio and RECS dedi-cated land line at the VDE0C. The source of interference needs to be located and eliminated. ,
y 10 The telefaz aschine at the VotoC ran up F.I.d 1 State-VD I to 1-1/2 hours late. An additional machine to provide for timely telefax messages is desirable. Also. the WECC s
telefax is not compatible with the state accident assessment telefax; ccpies of p1ime isepteths could not be received. If poskible, the WEOC l should be provided with compatible equipoent.
11 Displays of important site data should J.10.a b.c I State-Ecr C be available in the EOF.
12 The for=at for transsisting radio- F.1.d K State-tcr 1 logical in to rn.a tion from the nuclear l* facility ope ra tor to other jurisdic-tions s hould agree with the f orsa t of the standard state f o rms . Some confusion resulted at the SEDC and the l V10C een data being transmitted over
! the RECS line f rom the nuclear f acilit y i
operator did not coeform to the ,
standard forset.
l 13 tese of the effects on o pe r e t t oe s R.3 I w Y"8 C prod uced by the very 11 sited floor
! space in the CDC may be matiested by l
assigning sosesne the ressensibility for preventing pe r s ons (visitors. op-servers. worsers) free standteg or sitting so that t he y interfere or ha n-der operations and by declattes certain
' active aress in EOC of f-limit s to non-essential personnel.
14 The o pe r 6 t i on s sad dose assessment R.3 g v. ,' g f
- rooms of the W a vn e county ECC were crowded and wenttistion was poor.
Ventilation in t he existing f actitty should be improved.
I
l 58 .
Table 5.1 (Conc'd)
Q
( De ficiency 4 I
1denetfled *l NURIC-06 54 !
FM A-REP *1 Exercise Exercise Present !
No. Recommended Resedial Action Rev. 1. Reference a 1/21/82 6/22/83 Jurisdiction StatueE j J
15 A small public-address systes within H X warne C the 20C would facilitate briefings.
16 Although the Wayne County EOC proved R.3 I wayne C aJequate during the exercise, a better j floor plan is needed that will pe rmit j side-by-side displays of evacuation l routes, sesoling points, relocation l centers and shelter 6, population dis - I tribution by evacuation area, and current status.
17 Designations for esspling points on J.10.a X Wayne I 1 maps in the dose assessment roca fol- )
loved the syntes indicated in NL"AE C-0654: the new county plan follows an alternate schew. The plan should be revised to conform to the system for designating sampling points actually in I use. l 1
l 18 The RICS s peake r disrupted consunica- F.1.d X Wa yn e I )
l tions on the LICS line. Interference I I
on the REC 5 line also occurred when i another telephone in the dose assess-I sent roce vos used during RICS trans.
missions. RICS should be reviewed to j identify and eliminate sources of in-terference.
l 1 19 Additional telephones should be pro- F X Verne C vided in the 10C for each agency or .i group official.
20 Additional operators for the communica- N X Va yne C tions e q ui pment should be trained to provide additional bac'up.a l 21 Although dose assessment staff coesun- F.1.d X Ware I l icatteg with the county liaison of ficer at the ICT by commercial telephone copied sessate content correttly. the tise and source of messates were fre-quent;y os.itted. Staff should receive additional training in messate ha n d lin g procedures.
22 A dedicated (het line) teleonone F.l.b K Warne c be t we e n t he v s .a e Cact, EOC and the X Monroe C Monroe County 10C is recommended.
23 the dose e s s e s s me nt rose et t'* Monroe R.3 K Monroe 1 Ca.rnty ICC had limi t ed terates space and it vo s dt!ficult to accozzodate the staff reewired to carr, out this funt*
tion. Count, coe r g ese r preparedness officials s hould be encourated to t o-plesent one of t*w space improvement ,
alter?stives which t he y have already considsted.
O
59 i
I
. Table 5.1 (Co nc ' d) ,
Deficiency identified o hvAIC-06 $4 F Dt A-R E P-! Exercise. Esercist No. Present :
Recossmanded Remedial Action Rev. 1,' Reference
- I/21/62 6/22/83 Jurtadictionb .Statusc a 24 Displays of popula tion density and J.9.10 X Monroe C evacuation routes should be provided near the display of pluse' location so )
that comparisons and decisione needed
'for esertsney responses may be made
- easily.
U T'ne display space should be modified so J.9.10 X Monroe C that plume radiation contours can be overlaid on one of the well displays making the plume location readily )
apparent. This should be upd a t ed as seeded. I
- 11. Alertine and Mob (11eation of Offtetals ana $taff 1 The scenario used could not demonstrate A.4 I State C !
the decision-aning capabilities of the X State-1.D C back.s tese that would provide 24-hour X $tste-WD
] '
s upport. Future esercises could be de-
- C
, signed to demonstrate the transfer of res ponsibilitie s more effectively.
This could be built into the exercise
, by stealating the passage of time between events. . .
2 Additional personnel should be treined A.4 X Monroe C l to provide 24-hour ca pa bilit y for the decontamination center and for field l sampling.
!!1. Enerreae* Seerse tens M aa s eesent 1 The state's decision to evacuate ERfAs 1.10 K State t V3 and W4 was reached without f u.11 r J.9 K Monroe 1 j integrating the input free radiologics!
I intelligence into the decision. In Monroe County, decision makers appested
( to rely less heavily en the count,'e own dose assessment capabilities, which were outstanding. than on state and Ware Count y data. Coordination be- ,
tween cor:nand and accident /dsse sesess- )
sent should be 1Aproved tre more f ully l integrating the arput of the accident /
dose asseessent staff into pro t e ct ive action decisions.
2 Drills are recoissended to give the W.3 1 County cossissioner and the De put y Monroe C l
l Director espertence in asesging the IDC I operations so that in-dept a management
. e sperience is developed.
i l
l' '
l 4
i l
i u.______________--_____. ..- . - - - - - - -
4 60 .
Table 5.1 (Cont'd) {
De ficiency go identified c Nt1t1C-06 $4 No.
FtMA-REP-1 Esercise Esercise Present Recossended Resedial Action Rev. 1. Reference s 1/21/82 6/22/83 Jurisdiction Statust a
IV. Public Alerting and Notifiestion
! . Some DS eresages referred to telephone E.7 books additional 1 State I for information. J.10.e Complete information was not available in the latest Rochester telephone book and was very difficult to find in the 1983-84 telephone book for' Wa yne .
County. Re f e rences to telephone books and public information brochures in OS messages should . be reviewed. The D$
eessages should describe the location of the taf orza tion in the telephone book well enough t ha t it can be found ,
quickly.
2 The statement. "This is not a test." in E.7 I State 1 2 5 eesseges nsebered 1. 4 S. 6. 7. 8, J.10.c and 9 conflicts with the statement.
"This is a test.* in messages nebered 2 and 3. The messages should be re-
- viewed and a single statement consis-tent with the requirement of the state REFF should be chosen for all eessages.
( 3 Tests of the completed stren systes should include sound level sessurements made throughout the EF?. to establish J.10.c 1
1 Wayne Monroe w/0 N/Obj
~1 the adequacy of the warning. .
4 Prepared sample messages should be dis. E.$ 1 Wavne C tributed to the DS along with instruc- 1 Monroe C tions on loforsation to be supplied at the time of the emergency.
$ A more secure code for activating the E.$ 1 Wayne j D S should be esployed. E.6 1 C
Monroe C 6 The length of time needed to alert the E.$ 1 Vame D5 to standby and to activate the DS C 1 Monroe should be shortened to deal with a C fast-sovteg sequence of events.
7 *essages should be presated for. use- E.6 1 l wi t h sne sob 11e pus 11e-address eits in Vavne N/Obj '
1 Monroe the event that th.ts becaup la needed. N/Obf ! !
V. P;*>tte saf asetta tetatts9s i
i State and counties should ensure that. E.$ 1 siger a state of emergency is dettared. State C the effected public is provided wi t h i timelv and complete information about actions betae carried out bf bo t i state and county re s ponse r s e i
L
- i l
i l
61 l
l s Table 5.1 (Conc'd) l l
4 l
'. Deficiegey Ydentifted y.yg 34 N o. Bacommended Ranedial Action FEMA-RIP-1 Exercise Exercise Present Rev. 1. References 1/21/82 6/22/83 Jurisdiction StatusC F10 work space in the JENC wee too C.3.a 1 small. leading to ov ercr owdin g, and State-JENC I there were tosufficient desks and chairs for FIO personnel. These conditions impeded the timely prepara-tion of press releases. Reorganization and reallocation of space shou.1d be considered to allevtate overcrowding.
3 Televisions and radios should be E.5.6 K State-JENC C provid ed to enable FIDS to soottor 185 '
Wayne C broadcaste and general press coverage.
4 The copying machine at the JENC was too C.3.a K S t a te-JE NC slow to keep up with 'the workload. A I second or a faster machine should be considered.
5 Coordinated procedure s for rumor c orr- C.4.c %
! ( trol should be developed jointly by the Monroe C utility, state, and county F10s.
6 Future areecises should demonstrate'
, C.4.c 1 State C means for tusor control. Runor control l officials should have the capabilfty to l socitor local television and new s I
broadcasts to deter ise whe the r me s-sages and a s se s eme nt s are t,ein g per-ceived correctly.
7 Additional educatice of the public is C.1.2 1 x v p. g needed concerning notification me t hod s g g go,,,
l and rerponses such as turning on the g radio sod /or talertsien to get the ESS l sessages when the stress are s ound ed.
Based on spot che c.s e of the general ,
peculation, sost pecole who were inter-viewed on the day of the esercise, eitrer did not resenter receiving a public intornation brochure or believed that the stress were a signal to L
l l
I A
1
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _. ]
4 62 '
Table 5.1 (Cont'd) .
(
Deficiency
- Tdentified -
NJRIC-0654 No.
TEMA-R.Z P-1 Exercise Exercise frecent Recommended Remedial Ac".lon Ba y . 1. References 1/21/82 6/22/83 Jurisdiction Status' evacuate the EF: rather than a signal to tune to the local E85 station.
Based on these fiel.1 obserysticos, continuing public educarico eff orts are recommended.
8 The county press relopees should sup- C.4.s 1 Wayne C i
plesent the state releases during the patted of time that a state of emer=
gency exists. The county FIO should
- continue to release approp riate inf or-mation on county functions antil the emergency is over and recovery and reentry have been completed.
9 Coordtestion and inf orma tion exchange C.4.b 1 soong the FIDS at the county EOC, the Verne C FIos at the JENC. and the P!0s at the state should be strengthened.
10 Di s semina tion of educational material C.1 1 Monroe C to the public should be completed p r oup tly .
11 Botel and notel operators shculd C.2 1 pe riodically recelee. or have eve 11-Monroe C able. instruction material f or alerting transiests.
12 l
Fress releases asst be coordinated C.4.a.b 1 Monr oe C between ut.111ty, state, and county FIce so that releases by each cover all activities and do not conflict.
13 Th e telecester that would be used to C.4.b 1 Mawree I tren esit ba ckup hard copie s of EBS 9essnes and news rolesses was not operating p r op erly on the day of the e n e r zi s e. This telecopier should be repaired.
VI. seet teer usee esest 1 All radic1cgical data should be die- 8.12 pla?ed ty unif ers locational desigsa- 1 State I tions at the SECC regardless of the c ount y of origin. Data sho21d also be listed chronological 1r with distance I fees the pime centerline itticated.
Cata s hesi d be l a beled consistently wi t h pr ev e r radiological units and paraseters, i
i I
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ J
.r qS sy <
l 63 S
. Table 5.1 (Cont'd)
- Deficiency O tdentified NtitEC-0654 FDt A-R EP-1 gzercise Exercise Present
- No. Recommended Resedial Action Rev. 1. References 1/21/82 6/22/83 Jurisdiction Status "
( 2 The Atate accident assessment team M.12 1 K State 1 should coordinate better with count y J.10.s field teams so that all county date are !.10 used by . t he state in its assesenent activities. Additional training in making timely use of 411 field data is recommended. The role of each entity (utility, count y, state, and federal) in providing monitoring data should be t more clearly defined, and procedures for obtaining and using the data should be f ully toplemented. ,
3 Progreemable calculators with printing 1.10 K State capabilities would fee 111 tate prompt C I M .4 estimation of population dose rates and all other dose calculations. Such calculators seuld also improve the traceability and reproducibility of " d results.
(* '
4 Catry through of T!M4 contact with F.1.c K State N/Obj other federal support agencies should be more effectively demonstrated in 4- future esercises.
$ The Verne County radiological assess- A.4 1 veme d C
sent capability s hould be improved by X Wa me i d
additions! training and by providing additional personnel es that a 24-hour l capability is schieved. (See item VI.8
[
for 6/22/83 recommendation on dose ,
! assesesent capability.) I 4 One of the field monitoring teams wa s R.7 I Vayne g unatie to me a s ur e r adia leidine in the ;
plume due to an equipment failure.
l Wayne County should identify sources of l ,
backup radiological sonitoring equip =
eent.
7 Procedures should be modified so that F.1.d K Vavne initial readings of contar.ination Monroe C
levels are transmitted to the 10C aoon C i af ter the team naams sea s ur e men t s at a new location.
8 The new1v soscinted Waee Couste radio- 1.8 2 ve m, logical officer needs additional train- 7 i ing to assure a dose assesesent cass-t bility in Wame Cowntf in t he toitial l hourn of a radiological accident w%11e i
bachus pe r sonne l fro'4 outside Wa me County are in transit. Va re Countr r s ho u.1d also consider expending its own I
dose assesssent sta f f. ther e$' reducing
', g their reliance on outside assistance.
i
)
6
. 3 L___________________________ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _
3- s .m - - - - - - - - .
w_'V ' ,' % .
",' h. ,.3\ 5_ -h";) n 4 . Q<
Q, .
r
';Q x. .
3 (,
L' }W ,.
v' 64
\: 1 s , t s3
\. . i 8
,\ "
) %
qy\
4 N -
libin5.1 2 (Cont'd) 4
.= _ . ,. . -- .-a. -
.n t ( Y . 6 i C-i ' teficiency
'h '
\s -- ,(i; s s . ';
s k-
'.1 '
identified 5 { , h ' - s.
nftl"1E C=C 634 , s 4 ia s FFA4EF-!; '<tzerditS 'Exeteise Present i s
. , No. N 3 Ret hs sendrM, RenE41ah A? tion tag.: lA lefeaance - 1/21/81 6/22/83 JurisdicNnb StatusC 4 '
. e.~ -
('y 9- The Monroe Covev'r, ram,iegical assess- A.4
^
2 3. Henroe C (i eent should be a oroved R additional
- training and brdproviding' additional I
personnel so thw a 24-hout_. capability ,(
is achieved. , , ,,
, ,. LI, jg s5 VII. Actions to. ?8 Meet the Publie " ,
.- , i. '
D.
'k I The ' state should 1sprove its means of access to datt- collected by the county N.I y ,_ 1 7 . State I
! and utilite the couuty data e.tre fully
-' ' in reaching , protective ac t 1N, ,
, decisions.
'\ N 3 1 2 Ma ps of crop distriS, 3s tion should Nl k J.ll '
1x state I
.. avs11able at the Stoc.t ,1 ~
') N 3 ave >:ustion toutes should be designed tri < J.10.g X R wa rne I ainta.ize exposure of the evacuees. tbs evacuplan bus assi,gned to route *(2 passed Lerougg the Mwe on its way to ,
the first rt . rn 'sola d .
i Standard' s operattag "protiv.rMr should be reviewed s and s.odified if possibles to insure that s Wses,dU not pass through the pline w ,
\ anneceuartly. Alte s'or,tive routes ad y ? a
( l '
be necessery based on the direct 16n ef travel of the plume.
tw <.
M e t hod s' ' f or 41spoed of the contas-I s
h & J.9 .
I Vavne N/Obj insted wastes cellet.*d at the decon- 1 tastnation centera send to be pro- t vided. l 4 *
'\ *\
Addtsonal s'isf f and raff.olorical eur- NR s3 Way",
s
. N/0 vey g pi ptnt sh011d g be cotis t d e red for
,3' ht <M sN g 6 na.ber of evacueen era s 3 pected at tte r*locstion centers in a l '
real amargency.
' 6 The written dt.etticins covering the J.10.g Ex, X Monroe , I route from the 1*et pick-up point to the r aception/ congregate care center for t he *coroe Countc bus evacuation route were 41!!!cdt ter the bue driver to follow. TVoi ' v-itten directicos '
s s
should be reviewed and revised if '
i necessary. ans Oey abould be a ugment ee s with s.a ps of *he primarv sad alternte fkoutes 'nat shou'd ise taaen. Sus dat*= ,_4 des should also 4e trained regstding .
'uSe prisere and alternate routes to the
!- raceptian/congro.ist a cars centera. .
4 t_ }
% 1
\.
~
1 s
'\ V h
(
n . g V
.) i
~
1 s <
s
..3
'...._. _ _ _._]
+
65 f
=
Table 5 1 (Cont'd) 9 De ficiency Iden.ttted
,S NUREC-0654 No.
FtMA-REP-1 Exercise Exercise Present Recommended Remedial Action Re v. 1. Reference
- 1/21/82 6/22/83 Jurisdiction statuet-7 The police officer attending one of the J.10 3 K Monroe Monroe County traffic control pointe '1 did not krw where he was to be post-tioned or how access was to be con-trolled. The sheriff's office was unable to provide clarification when the field officer radioed in for information. The descriptions of '
traffic tontrol points that are contained In the Monroe County law enforcement and traffic control procedures should also be reviewed and verified tr. Insure that various offices of the las enforcement agencies with these resp.insibilities have copies of the procedvres readily available for reference.
8 Frecedures for the disp 7 sal of contas- J.9 insted wastes (e.g.. clothing) col-I Monroe Hfobj l 1ected into plastic begs at the decon-i f tamination centers should be devel-
- oped.
- VIII. Health, Medf ea t, and troosure S. Con t rol = e a sure e l
1 The decision to inclu(e or exclude J.10.e I state 1 captive po pula tion s under the state's El policy should be nede.
2 Wayne County followed procedures to J.10.e K State 1 reauest authoriutten free DON for K.6 4xposures to emergency workers in i excess of ETA protective action guides. Sased on data ave 11able to the atste at t ha t time. the authorization was denied. Upon rete 1pt of the original request for a ut ho r13.a tion to exceed protective action guidee. the state should have contacted Wayne County for the information and data needed to support a recossendation for authorizing the excess doses. and it s hou.14 have soved more quicaly to authorize the precautionary we of K1 for the one Wayne Comty field montter-ing team that received a $ Rae wnole body dose. The state should f ully utt11:e the county field monitoring data and coordinate more closely wi t h the counties in deciding whether to authortte the use of K1 and wor k e r
. esposores in encese of protective action guides.
G e
-.__...._-.--__u__-._-
66 '
Table 5.1 (Cont'd) ,.
~
De ficiency Identifled #
WREC-06!4 No. Recommended Resedial Action F EM A-R EFa! Exercise Esercise Present Rev. 1. References 1/21/82 6/22/83 Jurisdiction StatusC 3 Additional traic' s and procedures for K.3.b 1 State the use of dosimeters is recommended. C I vayne C 1 Monroe C
& Members of the ingestion pathway K.S.b sampling team should have protective I State I clothing. particularly hand and foot coverings. available.
3 It is rectamended that a permanent K.3.a 1 Wayne
( record type of dosteeter and a sen- C attive range, direct-reading dosimeter Monroe C be supplied to emergency workers in addition to the S-200 R thig h-r ange instruments.
6 Not all bus drivers and police officers E.4 I Va yne were certain of the esposure limit s I s pecified in the plan or with proce-dures for requesting a ut ho ri za tion to .
~
receive excess exposure. Training of energency workers should emphasise radiation esposure limits; a card should be inserted in the esposure con-trol Lit as a reminder.
7 Staff at the personnel monitoring K.5.s.b 1 X Verne center were unf amiliar with criteria 1 for decontamination of pe r so on el .
e qui pment and vehicles, procedures to be followed if contaatnation could not be reduced below 0.1 mRes/hr. or proce-dures for handling an injured. centse-insted patient. Additional training in deconta=1 nation procedures is recoe=
sended.
8 The low-range destseters (0-$ 1) used K.S.a X during t he esercise were not senettive Monroe 1 enough to detect the low levels of es msure which. according to procedures in the Monroe Co unt y plan. require energency workers to contact their s upe rvi s o r when they have received an esposure of 100 mA. Cons 1 aeration should be given to raising the minimum reporttea level to at least 500 m2 which can be oore eas119 read on the e sis ting Icw-range des teet ers.
1%. teeswetv sad seear?* Coeretteae i Future esercisee s hould allow addi- N.8 1 State tional t ime to demonst rate ratMer than g staulate an y reentry ar.d recovery pro-cedures.
2 Fisw of inforw tton back to field F.1.4 1 worners will be necessary to involve Ve en e gjo 1 Monroe tres effectively in the eserstse. N/0
67 e
Table 5.1 (Cont'd)
.1 Deficiency J
, Identified "I NURIC-0634 PEMA-R.!P-1 Exercise Exercise Present
- f. No. Recommended Sesedial Action Rev. 1. Esference" 1/21/82 6/22/83 Jutiadiction b statusC j I. Televance of the Exeret ee ,
Exee rt ence 1 Consideration should be giet.? to having M.1 I State C the exercise simulate a longer time $
I Wayne C span to increase involvement of backup 1 Monroe N/O staff and to allow demonstration of procedures that would be. used during the post-accident period to protect the public.
shlt s No NL1t!C-0634 reference.
bStates Primarily or wholly related to state or Albany EOC functions.
State-LD: Primarily or wholly reisted to 1.DEOC in Newark.
S t at e-VD s Primarily or wholly related to WDEOC in Batavia.
State-ECT: Primarily or wholly relssed to the EOF or NFO functions.
Vavnet Primarily or wholly related to the Wayne County functions.
Monroes Primat11y or wholly related to the Monroe County functions.
( 'C: Resedial action complete.
,.. Is Resedial action incomplete.
N/0 Not observed during the 1983 exercise.
N/Obj Not an ebjective of the 1983 exercise.
d Complete for field monitoring capability only. Dose assessment capability is still only acceptable.
See Iten VI.3 for recoseendation regarding dose asseossent capability in Wayne County.
9 L
a 4 j i
l 4
l I
,