ML20236F892
| ML20236F892 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/21/1987 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
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| ML20236F881 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8708040061 | |
| Download: ML20236F892 (145) | |
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C N C C5 N .<L UN11ED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- IN THE MATTER OF: DOCKET NO:
MEETING WITH LONG ISLAND
- LIGHTING COMPANY SHOREHAM PLANT 1 SUPPLEMENTAL CONTAINMENT SYSTEM l
l LOCATION: BETHESDA, MARYLAND PAGES: 1- 107 DATE: TUESDAY, JULY 21, 1987 t
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
OfficialReporters 444 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20001 (202)347-3700 ,
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UNITED S,TATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
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SHOREHAM PLANT SUPPLEMENTAL CONTAINMENT SYSTEM 4
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5 Nuclear Regulatory Commission
) Room P-ll4
- 6 7920 Norfok Avenue Bethesda, Maryland Tuesday, July 21, 1987 8 The meeting convened at 10:00 a.m.
9 PRESENT: q 10 l RONNIE LO NRC DPI-2 a GOUTAM BAGCHI NRC-NRR/ DEST l
. GREGORY MINOR MHB/Suffolk County I
[l l JACK KUDRICK NRC/NRR/ DEST /P5B BOB PALLA NRC/NRR/PRAB ;
12 LARRY PHILLIPS NRC/NRR/ DEST /SRXB l DAVID BJORKBOM SERCH Licensing - Bechtel l; 13 ! SCOTT NEWBERRY OEDO-NRC i ! RICHARD BARRETT NRR/DREP/RAB l 14 y FAROUK ELTAWILA RES/DRPS I WALTER BUTLER NRR/PDI-2 I ED BORELLA EBASCO Services, Inc. l 15 ll MARK BEAUMONT Westinghouse, Bethesda I i! ROBERT E. SWEENEY EBASCO 16 ' DAVID SHUM NRC/NRR/ DEST /PSB WILLIAM TROSKOSKI NRC/EDO .
37 , C. COWGILL NRC RI Chief RPS ID l ANTHONY EARLEY LILCO i 18 BRUCE GERMANO LILCO l LAWRENCE F. BRITT LILCO 19 EDWARD J. YOUNGLING LILCO
, JOHN LEONARD LILCO !
l JAMES METCALF Stone and Webster ;
20 ROBERT KASCSAK LILCO i CRAIG K. SEAMAN LILCO '
21 CHRISTOPHER D. COLE LILCO ;
l ,
MARK EUBIN NRC/NRR/ DEST
) 22 .ASHOK THADANI NRR/ DEST -j
! . TOM MURLEY NRR i 23
- l 24 -
25 l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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31776.0 ree 2 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 MR. LO: Good morning. This is a meeting i
3 requested by LILC0; the purpose.of the meeting is to allow I i
l 4 them to describe to the Staff their plans for the 5
q supplemental containment system and to have a discussion with 6 the Staff. As you can ,see, the meeting is being 7 transcribed. If you have any questions, before you raise the l
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8 question, we would appreciate if you identify yourself so 9 that she can take down the name.
10 We have here Greg Minor from MHB representing the 11 state of New York and Suffolk County. He is here as an j f
12 observer and his questions, if any, will be limited to 13 clarifications. l i
14 MR. MINOR: I am representing Suffolk County,.not '!
l 15 the state of New York. They may have separate interests. j 16 MR. LO: The state of New York has been notified 17 separately about this meeting also.
18 I would like to go around the room and introduce I
l 19 ourselves, and then I will turn the meeting'over to John 20 Leonard, vice president of LILCO.
21 (Discussion off the record.)
22 MR. MURLEY: We are not aimed at discussing today 23 anything that is under litigation. It is mainly to hear what 4
24 your plans are for the containment. I don't limit my staff i
25 from asking any questions, though, so we may touch on any ;
1 ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS. INC.
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31776.0 ree 3
- 1. questions we want. The thrust is mainly for the 2 containment.
3 MR. LO: Yes. This meeting is unrelated to the 4 full power license proceedings or any other power level !
5 applications.. l 6 I will give you the floor.
7 MR. L5) NARD: Thank you. I am pleased we have a i
8 chance to address you on this. I think it is very impor' ant. !,
9 that we have tne opportunity to' provide you and the Staff 10 with an understanding of what LILCO is doing with respect to 11 the supplemental containment system. Before I get into a few 12 brief statements of what we hope this meeting will 13 accomplish, let me make sure that there is no l 14 misunderstanding about this work that we are doing on the 15 supplemental containment system.
16 We at LILCO are committed to have the safest plant 3
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17 in the country in any way we can. We believe the plant is 18 safe now. I can specifically cite two examples: our 19 electrical system, I think people who have visited the plant 20 said we don't have a nuclear plant, we have a diesel park.
21 But we do have seven incoming power lines to the switchyard, 22 three lines from the switchyard coming into the plant, one of 23 which is a ypass line. We have three installed emergency 24 diesels. We have four temporary emergency diesels that I 25 have committed to your staff. We will keep them there until ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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. 1 our diesels are installed. And two gas turbines.
I 2 We have an ATWS mitigation system that I think is 3 outstanding. We have or MSIV closure set points, as you all 4 know. We have an augmented ARI -- excuse me, for those who 5 don't know what that is, alternate rod injection system. We 6 have the enriched boron system, any one of the two redundant l
7 pumps can shut the plant down in seven minutes.
8 We have adopted all the latest procedural 9 guidelines on ATWS. We have an interim SBDES system. We 10 have the corium ring. We try to stay in tha forefront of 11 safety.
12 Because of all this litigation, we want our l l
13 license. But that doesn't mean we will not continue to try 14 and achieve making this plant the safest in the country. j 15 One of the real reasons we are interested in the s
16 supplemental containment system, using the Swedish filter, is l
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17 that it answers the "what if" questions. In other words, 16 what if your boron injection doesn't work? What if this 19 happens? We meet all the NRC recognized safety goals, to the 20 best of my knowledge, far above the required goals, both in 21 core melt and societal risk and everything else, but this 22 answers the "wnat if" question.
23 What we hope is that we can obtain your general 24 agreement on the approach that we are taking, that the SCS 25 does not degrade the design basis of the plant. We would ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1 hope sometime after this meeting to obtain your agreement on .I I
2 the classification of these systems. I will give you a very
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3 quick example. That is, everything inside the plant we are i 4 building completely to Category I. We are not building 5 everything outside the plant to that. And I think they will 6 get into the reasons for that and what we are attempting to 7 do.
8 We would also like to get your feedback on any of 9 these things we are doing, answer any questions, any of your 10 concerns.
11 I know this is an important meeting. It is 12 important for us and it is important for you. We are 13 probably the first utility that is.really going to take this 14 step in this country.
15 We feel in our particular case it serves a 16 purpose. I realize it doesn't serve a purpose in every other 17 utilities' cases, nor is it really necessary in many cases.
18 For us we feel that it will serve a good purpose. So we want 19 to make this the best project we can and we solicit your 20 input on it.
21 With that I would like to turn it over to Ed 22 Youngling. I will hand out some Swedish material; they are 23 not ours. I think you will find them very interesting. I t
24 hope there is enough to go around.
25 It comes from a brochure where they talk about the ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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.1 filter system. They talk about the fact that Copenhagen, i +
q 2 which is 18 kilometers away, roughly 10 miles, which j j 3 certainly translates to our emergency preparedness zone, with
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I 4 extremely unfavorable weather would receive a radiation dose 5 from the passing cloud of 600 million rems. This is their
. 6 worst case accident. They claim a filtration of particulate ,
7 of greater than 99.1 percent.
8 MR. MURLEY: I just have to say, until we go 9 through and do our own scrubbing of these numbers, as far as 10 I am concerned, these are just propaganda.
11 MR. LEONARD: I thought you would find it 12 interesting, and this is how we got involved in it. We are 13 also doing our own scrubbing of the numbers with our own 14' analysts. !
15 MR. MURLEY: Clearly they have their reasons for 16 doing what they are doing, and but we have not reviewed it.
17 MR. LEONARD: I unde rstand. That is one of the 18 reasons for the meeting, to get your input on this. t l
19 MR. MURLEY: Good.
20 MR. YOUNGLING: Good morning. I have copies of 21 the presentation that we are going to use. I don't know if j 22 we have enough for the entire room. I would ask that the '
.l' 23 appropriate people from the Staff take a copy. I think you 24 'can use it to jot down some notes as we go along. As you are 25 aware, last week we sent Ronnie Lo a brief description of our i
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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i 31776.0 ree 7 1 work regarding the supplemental containment system, and it is i t i 2 contained in this write-up. I hope that you have had an 3 opportunity to glance through it. I think it will serve as a 4 good basis for our discussions this morning. t 5 We are going to use overheads today and we also j l
6 have some slide photographs of the filter structure in Sweden !
7 that we would like to share with you also. Can everyone se'e !
l 8 this all right?
9 This morning, we would like to discuss with you !
l-10 the background of Shoreham's investigation into the filtered 11 vent concept, which has been named the supplemental 12 containment system. We will discuss the decision, process 13 that we went through in order to reach our final goals. In 14 addition, Bob Kascsak from nuclear engineering, who was very 15 much involved in this conceptual study'and feasibility study, 16 will provide for you an overview of the supplemental 17 containment system and describe the general working of the 18 entire system and in particular the filter structure, 19 We will also provide for you as part of the 20 description the general design criteria and codes and j
- 21 standards that we will use to construct the-project and 22 design the project.
23 In addition, Jim Metcalf, who is the lead engineer q
24 for the Stone & Webster organization will provide a 1 i
25 description of the functional design basis, the transients ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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31776.0 ree 8 1 which this supplemental containment system has been designed .
I i 2 to handle.
3 We will also provide for you a very brief.
4 description of our project organization, which has been put 5 in place to control the supplemental containment project.
6 That will be accomplished by Mr. Cole, who is the manager of 7 the project's organization within LILCO.
8 MR. LEONARD: One of the problems I have with 1
9 Chris' title, it really does not explain what he does. Chris 10 is in charge of building all the new capital facilities for 1 ?
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11 LILCO, as far as gas turbine installations. He was also the !
12 project manager for that new coke / diesel installation we i l i
13 have. So he is very familiar with nuclear. construction. l 1 i
1 l
l 14 MR. YOUNGLING: Finally, we will go into a brief 15 review of the construction methods to be used and we will !
16 show you some slides of the work that was done in Sweden in i
17 the construction of.this structure. We will describe the 18 quality assurance program. That will be accomplished by 19 Mr. Seaman from our quality assurance organization at the 20 site. And lastly, Mr. Leonard will summarize the meeting for 21 us.
22 Since our initial work on our PRAs, which began in 23 1981-1982, and throughout the years following, our PRA work 4
24 has shown us that venting of the containment is certainly a 25 very beneficial process in coping with the severe accident.
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31776.0 ree j 9 1 Following those investigations and essentially 6 i 2 into early 1986, Long Island Lighting Company was very 3 concerned about developing a wetwell airspace vent concept.
i 4 This concept would be put in place to provide a mechanism to 5 handle low-probability /high-consequence severe accidents i I
6 which could occur at the power station. Most importantly, j 7 however, this class of accidents is beyond the design basis 8 of the plant. These accidents are the type which could }
l 9 threaten the integrity of the primary containment. l
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10 It was felt that a wetwell airspace vent provides !
I 11 a mechanism to insure that during a severe accident the 12 containment integrity is not jeopardized and we provide a 13 relief path so that we do not exceed the structural integrity 14 of the containment.
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15 MR. LEONARD: May I interrupt again. I want to 1 l
l 16 say this: We have containment vents now. They are installed 17 and they are in our procedures. What we are talking about 18 here was a more sophisticated method of venting the 19 containment from the wetwell.
20 MR. YOUNGLING: In brief review, the Shoreham I
21 containment design pressure is 48 psi.
22 MR. THADANI: On that vent issue, the two key 23 questions -- one relates to design, the second one to i'
24 decisionmaking that one might have to go through to activate 25 such a system. Let's focus on the design. Are you today AcnFEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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31776.0 ree 10 1 going to talk about potential downsides from implementation
.f 2 of such a system?
3 < MR. LEONARD: No. This would be follow-on l l
I 4 technical review.
l 5 MR. YOUNGLING: Our analysis has shown ultimate
- 6 containment pressure of approximately 130 psig.
7 FROM THE FLOOR: Can I ask a question. Where-is 8 the failure location of the containment?
l l
9 MR. YOUNGLING: The failure location is in the l
10 upper part of the pressure chamber.
l 11 FROM THE FLOOR: So why do you need a venting that l 12 won't accomplish the same purpose like venting.
13 MR. YOUNGLING: That would provide a venting 14 path. However, it would be an uncontrolled venting path with
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l 15 a release in the secondary. I think as the presentation 16 evolves, you will see why we chose not to provide a' vent path 17 into the secondary. That would be an uncontrolled release, l
18 We would really not want to move in that fashion.
, 19 FROM THE FLOOR: Have you looked at the l
l l 20 possibility of the dry wellhead remaining intact at 130 psig, 1
l 21 your ultimate capacity?
22 MR. YOUNGLING: Yes. That is beyond that
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l 23 capability. But it is --
l t 24 FROM THE FLOOR: It is higher than the 130 psig.
25 MR. YOUNGLING: It is slightly higher, but it is a ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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h 1 point of potential failure, yes.
2 MR. LEONARD: If I remember correctly, Brookhaven I l
3 National Laboratories reviewed our containment analysis, did ,
4 they not? !
O 5 MR. YOUNGLING: Yes.
6 FROM THE FLOOR: Thank you.
7 MR. YOUNGLING: I thought I would put this slide 8 up of the Shoreham containment just to review our containment 9 for you so that as we work our way through the presentation 10 you would have this picture in mind. Again, an over and li under containment reactor vessel on a pedestal. There are 12 several unique features to the Shoreham containment. We have 13 eight downcomers into our suppression pool, which consists of 14 approximately 600,000 gallons of water. We also have in the 15 pedestal region four downcomers, 24 inches in diameter each; l
1 16 and, of course, as you are aware, we have installed a corium ]
17 ring, which is a concrete structure in this region which 18 enhances the movement of any corium during a severe accident j 1
19 down to the downcomers into the pool.
l 20 I think NRC analysis and industry analysis has 21 shown that the suppression pool itself does provide a 22 filtering capability, so within the present design, we.have 23 filtering capability to cope with a severe accident. And the i
24 entire system of the corium ring, the downcomers all help to 25 enhance Shoreham's capability to respond.
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC, 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
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ree 12 1 We chose the wetwell airspace vent for obvious 2 reasons, to gain not only the first line filtering through 3 the pool but then we would come out the wetwell airspace vent 1
4 and go out.
5 Any questions?
6 FROM THE FLOOR: Are you planning to use the 7 existing ductwork for the vent system or is it going to be 8 separate?
9 MR. YOUNGLING: This is a separate system, totally 10 independent of the installed wetwell -- of the convenient )
l 11 capacity of the plant. Our emergency procedures now call for i
12 venting in accordance with the BWR owners group throigh our l l'
13 six- and four-inch vent lines. These will be separate lines, 14 24 inches in diameter, extending out to the filter structure I
15 through a 30-inch diameter pipe. ,
16 FROM THE FLOOR: You have an omega seal that is i 17 connected the drywell floor with the containment wall. That 18 is -- have you analyzed it for failure at high temperature?
19 MR. YOUNGLING: Yes. The reason, as Mr. Metcalf i
20 and Mr. Kascsak will get to, the reason we have chosen our l I
21 relief capacity at 60-pounds is to insure the continued )
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22 integrity of that seal. And we feel that integrity is in i
23 place through the 60 pound relief point. Perhaps we can ]
l 24 answer that question in a little more detail when we get to i 1
25 that point. l ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC, 1 202 4 47 4 700 Nationwide Coverage 8004 36 6646
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31776.0 ree 13 1 As I mentioned, our PRA work had shown that a i
2 venting capability was certainly beneficial. I just wanted 3 to briefly review with you some regulatory background on the 4 matter. During WASH-1400 work, there was certainly work to >
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5 show that the containment's role in reduction of risk was 6 quite important, and those studies were followed on by work 7 by NRC after TMI and the IDCOR group which looked at 8 containment venting capability. Talking about large !-
9 containment venting capabilities, it should be pointed out 10 that the IDCOR initial construction conclusions were that the 11 implementation of a filtered vent arrangement was not 12 necessarily warranted at this time based on cost and 13 benefits.
14 In parallel with this, these efforts, the boiling 15 water reactor owners group was performing studies which 16 eventually resulted in the emergency guidelines which 17 provided venting capabilities through installed systems at 18 the power stations.
19 In mid-1986, the NRC mentioned, proposed five 20 modifications which were aimed at the boiling water reactor 21 units, the MARK-I containments in particular. We looked at )
I' 22 those initiatives or those suggestions in light of their i
23 applicability to Shoreham. And let me skip the first one,
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24 which is to provide a large-diameter wetwell vent. Hydrogen 25 control, of course we already have hydrogen control in place ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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31776.0 ree 14 1 through our recombiners. Backup containment sprays, as I
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2 explained earlier with our corium ring concept and so forth, 3 the need for the backup sprays becomes just not applicable to 4 Shoreham.
5 ER. LEONARD: We do have containment sprays poured 6 by the emergency buses, which is the high --
7 MR. YOUNGLING: Right. The core debris control, 8 as I mentioned earlier, our corium ring, our central four 9 downcomers provide an excellent response to this concern, and 10 we are adopting the later emergency procedure guidelines 11 promulgated by the BWR owners group and they will be in place 12 at Shoreham.
13 MR. LEONARD: Hydrogen control, again, Shoreham 14 has an inerted containment and the recombiners.
l 15 MR. TRADANI: Let me make sure the previous item I 16 understand, in terms of the backup containment sprays. You j 17 have so many diverse ways of providing electric power. Is ,
18 that what this is supposed to mean, that you already have i i
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19 that capability in place? ]
i 20 MR. LEONARD: That plus the fact that the concept j l
- 1 21 was, when Bernarro originally put it out, was a less volume 22 spray. We have -- we don't have to worry about quenching on jj<
s 23 the floor because we have raised the floor underneath the 1 0
1 24 reactor so the downcomers are flush and put in this concrete 25 funnel. So the only thing we have to worry about really
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I I would be control of containment pressure using the sprays, i
2 and we can do that without much problem.
3 MR. THADANI: Okay. Thank you.
4 FROM THE FLOOR: I would like --
. i 5 MR. BARRETT: Regarding number 4, to insure 6 drywell to wetwell integrity. There is the issue of the the f 7 loss of integrity of the downcomers such that you would have 8 a path, release path from the drywell atmosphere directly to l
9 the wetwell atmosphere without going through the pool in a 10 case like that. I think in your 25 percent license you ;
11 analyzed a lot of cases in which you admitted that as a 12 possibility. It seems to me that that would be one of the 13 major incentives for having a backup filtering system like 14 , this.
l .i l
15 MR. YOUNGLING: Well, in fact, as part of our 16 analysis, we have made the conservative assumption that the i i
17 drywell, that these four downcomers would fail and, l 18 therefore, the filter structure would come into play. -But 19 that is a very conservative analysis, as we mentioned in our 20 25 percent work. We do have some studies to show that we 21 feel that those downcomers, the integrity of those downcomers 22 will be maintained during a severe accident.
23 MR. LEONARD: I am glad you asked that, because it i
24 proved what I was trying to say they have beginning when I 25 said the "what if." We do have studies showing that the
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I 2 transfer of corium coming down and then later on steam coming 3 up, as near as we can tell, they will remain intact. "What 4 if?" Then this supplemental containment system does answer j l
5 that question. ;
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6 MR. BARRETT: Thank you.
7 MR. YOUNGLING: In October of 1986, the company :
8 made a decision to perform a conceptual study to finalize the ;
9 work that we had done on our wetwell airspace vent. And we 10 established several goals for that study shown here on this 1
11 slide.
12 Mr. Leonard has touched on several of those in his i 13 opening remarks. Just to briefly review, again, to enhance 14 public acceptance of Shoreham, to answer the "what if" 15 questions. To reduce the risk of, from Shoreham by 16 addressing the high-consequence / low-probability severe 17 accident sequences.
18 To reduce the potential for protective action 19 requirements to the public following a severe accident, to 20 reduce the potential for land contamination, thus preventing
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21 land usage restrictions following a severe a lent. And 22 lastly, these deal with performance criteria, to reduce the 23 core inventory of nuclides that could be released by a severe 24 accident and insure that whatever system we put in place i !
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25 would have a high level of reliability.
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31776.0 ree 17 1 Our primary goal is to have a passive system in i 1
s 2 operation. I think as we'go on with this presentation, you will see that we were able to achieve that goal. !
3 4 We began the study in my department with the 5 support of Stone, Webster. And we performed certain 6 feasibility. studies and we bounded our study into four major 7 options, actually three major options, the third having two ,
8 alternatives. The first option dealt with providing a 9 wetwell vent out-to an elevated release point, unfiltered.
10 Size around 24-inch range on up.
l 11 Second option was to simply provide a venting 12 capability and end the vent right in che secondary f
containment.
13 l 14 The third option dealt with a process similar to 15 the first, that is providing a vent path, but instead of just 16 releasing it into atmosphere, to provide some sort of 17 filtering capability at the end of that vent.
18 In following through on the third option, we 19 looked at the filtering work that was being done not only in 20 the United States but around the world, and we made the 21 decision, based on after our review, that the best progress 22 seemed to have been made within the Swedish program. We will 23 get to that a little later. So we decided to look at the 24 , Swedish filter design, which is a gravel bed design, 25 presently installed and operational at the Barseback nuclear ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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31776.0 I
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2 investigated the second-generation Swedish filter design, !
3 which is called filter MVSS, which is a pool scrubber design 4 which will be installed by the Swedish people on the 5 remainder of their reactors, the 10 additional plants that 6 they have.
7 Let me just briefly go back. Early on in the 8 study, we looked at, concentrated on option two and we l 9 dismissed option two. That was to provide a vent which ended 10 in the secondary containment. Although it did have some l 11 advantages relative to the secondary containment providing ,
l 12 some measure of holdup for the rerelease, this advantage was ;
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l 13 clearly outweighed by the environmental impact and long-term l I
I 14 recovery as a result of the release. We dismissed that '
l 15 option such that we then ended up concentrating on option 1, 16 3A and 3B. We selected the Swedish initiatives as our I
17 primary source for the filter to be placed at the end of the 1 18 vent line. What I would like to do is just briefly describe l
1 :
19 some of the work that has gone on in Sweden. !
20 FROM THE FLOOR: One second, how do you visualize 21 the filter vent being used in conjunction with your 22 unfiltered vents that are normally addressed by your EOP?
23 MR. YOUNGLING: We have not made our final i
24 decisions yet on how they will interrelate, but we will have 25 to.come up with a scheme as to'how they will. That will be #
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s 31776.0 ree 19 1 covered by the proceedings. ,
, 1 2 FROM THE FLOOR: Okay.
l 3 The Swedes performed a PRA analysis by the, their j
4 government committees, which led them to the conclusion that 5 they needed to take some measures to reduce the risk for land , .
I i !
6 contamination as a result of severe accident failures. This l j
l 7 study ended in a decision in the '79 to 198 -- 1979-1980' time ,
1 8 frame in which they made an initial selection that a gravel 9 bed design could provide the measures which, adequate 10 measures to deal with the recommendations from this study.
11 They then launched into an R&D effort which was I 12 initiated in 1980 in which they investigated the l
13 decontamination captbility, the condensing capability, the 14 hydrogen detonation capability of a gravel bed-type structure 15 to meet their established goals. {
l 16 In 1982, after their initial testing, they made a 1 17 selection that, which resulted in the selection of the gravel 18 bed design for application at the Barseback plant which was 19 the first plant that they wanted to apply this vent to. As 1 20 John mentioned, the reason for the selection of that plant i
. 1 21 was the proximity of the Danish city of Copenhagen to the l
1 22 plant. l 23 They began their engineering in 1962 for the, for 1 4 1 24 their FILTRA project and commenced construction in '84 and i l
1 25 established the system in an operational status in October of ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC, 'I 202-347 3X0 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646 b
3]776.0 ree 20 1 1985. .
I 2 After looking at all of the options, our 3 conceptual study was issued in February of 1987 and we 4 concluded that -- I am going to go right down these pretty 5 much verbatim. I think we should. That design modifications . '
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6 to Shoreham could be made to accommodate not only the gravel i
7 bed-type arrangement but a direct release out with an j j -l 8 elevated release without a filter at the end. i 9 We were able to conclude that a wetwell airspace !
10 vent will reduce the public risk from Shoreham in respon e to j 11 high-consequence / low-probability severe accidents.
12 We were able to conclude that option 1, an 13 unfiltered vent and a filtered vent, would fulfill our 14 objectives, and we also felt, in looking at tas proposed 15 modifications from NRC, that it would meet those objectives i 16 also.
17 The gravel bed filter is compatible with our {
18 design requirements and our design goals, we were able to l
l 19 establish that quite early on, and could be installed at the ;
20 Shoreham plant. {
21 We have a location, we have a vent path. We were 22 able to fit the structure onto our property.
l 23 We recommended to management that the company move l t 1 l
24 forward with option 3A. That is, the wetwell airspace vent 25 coupled with a filter at the end. In this case a-gravel. bed :
1 ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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31776.0 ree 21 1 filter. Again, to improve risk reduction and our overall I i
i 2 licensability of benefits to the Shoreham plant.
3 We were also able to conclude that the l I
4 second-generation Swedish design was not appropriate for 5 Shoreham; not that it isn't a good design, but it just isn't !
I 6 far enough along at this stage. As a matter of fact, in June :
7 of this year, they just completed some of their very last 8 test runs on the design and they are moving forward at this 9 time. It just wasn't as far along. The fact that the filter )
l 10 structure.has been put in place, has been designed, has been 11 put into operation was a very important point for us. l l
12 Before we go on, what I would like to do is if we I 13 could flip this -- flip this on.
14 There we go. Just to get everyone acclimated, 15 before we begin the remainder of the discussion, this is the 16 Barseback nuclear power station in the southern part of 17 Sweden. It is in the town of Malmo. It is about 13 miles 18 from Copenhagen.
19 Copenhagen is down over in this direction, over 20 here. (Indicating.)
21 These are two boiling water reactors over and
, 22 under containments. They are approximately 600 megawatts I
I 23 each. Over here is the FILTRA structure. This structure is i
24 approximately 120 feet tall, approximately 70 feet in 25 diameter, and it contains a quartzite-type gravel,.
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31776.0 ree 22 1 approximately one inch each piece,.about, approximately one i
2 inch, and the volume of the structure is 10,000 cubic meters, 3 which equates to approximately 350,000 cubic feet.
4 There is -- there are lines running from each l
5 plant over to the filter structure, and entrance is made into 6 an auxiliary building, which Mr. Kascsak will explain to you, t
7 and then into the FILTRA structure. And then a release path l 8 through a 10-meter stack at this point. l 9 Again, the purpose of this slide is just to get ,
I 10 you acclimated so that when we begin the discussion jou will
.11 have some idea of what the structure looks like.
12 If I could have the lights. Thank you, i
13 j I brought with me this morning a piece of the ;
I 14 rock, if you will. We went to visit the Barseback plant in 15 January and it was a heck of a lot cooler than it is today, 16 it was 26 below zero over there. And this is a piece of the 17 quartzite rock which is placed in the structure. And 18 Mr. Cole will show you how the rock is dammed down and 19 condensed to derive the filtering capability. What we will 20 do now is we will move on with the presentation to ,
i 21 Mr. Kascsak, who will -- !
22 MR. MURLEY: I have some questions on what you 23 have presented so far, your decisionmaking.
i 24 Are you going to contract with some Swedish )
j 25 company to do this or are you going to buy the rights.to this ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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2 ER. YOUNGLING: We are in contract negotiations 3 right now with Swedepower, who is a sponsoring arm for the i
4 total Swedish technology, and they will provide us not only 5 the Swedish technology but also the design documents to build }
}
6 this structure.
7 MR. MURLEY: So you will get the designs, the 8 calculations that went into it?
i 9 KR. LEONARD: Including the research. We' knew you {'
10 all would be interested in that.
11 MR. MURLEY: Yes.
12 MR ., YOUNGLING: Let me just do one thing for you, 13 br'iefly. This is the location here. This total system 14 consisting of the pipe, the auxiliary building, and the i
)
15 gravel bed filter is called the Shoreham supplemental 16 containment system. The auxiliary building and the gravel 17 bed filter at the end is called the Shoreham filter unit, j I
18 just to give you some terms so that when the presentation l
19 continues -- and it will be this structure and the auxiliary ]
20 building that the Swedish will be providing for us. ]
21 MR. MURLEY: Okay. Then I presume you will have 22 an American company or some engineering company help you in 23 certain architectural aspects? l 24 MR. LEONARD: Yes, sir.
25 KR. MURLEY: Do you.-- you make a statement here i
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31776.0 l ree l 24 1 that this will reduce the public risk from certain 2 sequences. Do you have the calculations'and analyses that 3 can quantify that?
4 MR. LEONARD: Not yet we don't.
i 5 MR. YOUNGLING: Not at this time. Those 6 calculations are under way. And they will be available in a 7 short term. i i
8 MR. LEONARD: Short. term.
9 MR. MURLEY: So we will then -- if we ask at some I .
l l 10 time in the near future we will able to know how many man-rem l l
11 per year or something like that, some figure of merit on how !
I 12 the risk is reduced?
13 MR. LEONARD: Yes, sir. l
. l 14 MR. YOUNGLING: Yes.
15 MR. MURLEY: Then you didn't do a cost-benefit l 16 analysis to do your justification?
17 MR. LEONARD: That is correct. Because Shoreham 18 is in a unique situation, I think as we all know. And as I 19 say, if this was any other plant, anyplace in the country, 20 the plant would be licensed like that. It is without a doubt 21 far safer than the plant I managed for the New York State 22 Power Authority. 'The Fitzpatrick plant, as far as its 23 inherent, built-in capabilities. But we are in a situation 24 where we have to go not only the last mile and the next to 25 the last mile but a mile plus 100. That is what we intend to ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1 do. So I would certainly -- I am on the IDCOR steering .1 i I 2 committee. I would never invoke this on the large dry 3 containment. It just wouldn't make any sense to me, ,
t i !
4 However, in this geographical and political situation that.
5 Shoreham exists in, this makes a lot of sense.
6 MR. MURLEY: Okay.
l 7, MR. YOUNGLING: Okay.
I
.8 MR. BARRETT: Do you have any idea of the cost?
r 9 MR. YOUNGLING: Mr. Cole will discuss tht- during l
10 his presentation; we will get to that point.
l l
11 MR. LEONARD: We really haven't settled on that. '
\
12 It is still bouncing back and forth. We can give you some i
13 very general ideas. ,
l 14 MR. COLE: You might want to present an order of j 15 magnitude, John. 1 I
16 MR. LEONARD: Yes. I will give you an example.
17 We can do this in series as you will see. When we get the 18 engineering we then have to go to-an AE and go out to bid. I 1
l 19 So very, very -- I certainly wouldn't want to give the AEs 20 any good ideas.
- l 21 (Laughter.)
22 MR. MURLEY: One comment, I guess, when you are 23 doing your risk analyses, one of the things that we are going 24 to be looking at is, does it introduce new sequences.
25 Anytime you put a 24-inch diameter hole in your containment, ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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l 1 you are at least introducing that failure mode for bypassing
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2 containment? )
3 MR. COLE: I will be getting into some of that in.
4 4 this segment. l
. u l
5 MR. LEONARD: Luckily we already have the hole. ]
- I 6 FROM THE FLOOR: You must have some kind of guess j 7 on what your release reduction factor is, your benefit.
i 8 Don't you have some sort of a guess on what you would get?
9 MR. LEONARD: The only thing is that very l 10 preliminary data, very preliminary data shows that we are :
1 11 running around 1 rem max. This is before we have even )
,- 12 finalized this. 1 rem max cut of the five , seven-mile l
13 area. So when you compare that and life-threatening doses to !
I i
14 10 miles, 30 percent chance. l l l
15 FROM THE FLOOR: How about the --
16 MR. LEONARD: This is based probably, primarily, 17 on that. We will try to get into that as the thing 18 progresses.
19 MR. THADANI Do you have any sequences that you 20 know today from your own risk assessment, for example, 21 high-consequence / low-probability events where this this vent 22 will not be affected?
23 MR. YOUNGLING: Our preliminary work shows that i
24 there is a very, very small level of residual risk that this 25 structure will not be effective. It is extremely small. It ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS,1NC. l 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646 i
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1 is in the 4 percent range. These are our preliminary i
1 2 numbers.
l-3 MR. THADANI: Okay. That is good. i l
i i 4 MR. YOUNGLING: I would like to just show you this j 1
5 slide. It will just take a moment. You mentioned how we l 6 were working with the Swedes. I wasn't going to show you-7 this, but I think I need to because it took us three months ,
8 to figure out the same situation.
9 I am really being facetious.
10 MR. LEONARD: No, you are not. I am still not f
11 exactly sure of it. Their regulatory people are involved in 12 some of this, too.
13 i MR. YOUNGLING: Swedepower is a very small group j 14 and acts as a marketing arm, if you will. They do'not i 15 provide the engineering details. They are more or less a 1
16 project management-type organization. Their primary goal is i 17 to sell Swedish technology outside of Sweden. This group is I 18 sponsored by several organizations in the Swedish engineering l
19 and operational areas. What we have over here is the Swedish .
1 20 state power board. This is Sydkraft, this is one of the !
21 utilities within Sweden, in fact this is the utility that I 22 owns and operates the Barseback plant. They have l
23 responsibility for the southern part of Sweden. We have 24 another -- OKA is another operational company. And then also ;
i, 25 tied up into speed power we have BECO, Limited, which is an j
. J ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. ;
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1 31776.0 ree 28 1 electrical engineering firm, followed by VBB. I won't even 1
( 1 2 begin to try to pronounce what the initials stand for, but j 3 that is a civil engineering concern. VBB is a very well 4 known civil engineering concern. They have done a tremendous
. j 5 amount of work worldwide. I am sure you are very familiar i 1
- 6 with it. So this total organization will be the pool that ;
l i 1 L
7 will be drawn upon by Swedepower to provide us the !
i
)
8 engineering and technical resources to give us the design. l I .
9 Most of that will come out of Sydkraft, VBB. , i 10 MR. MURLEY: You have piqued my curiosity again.
11 There is not a company that is building it under license, for 12 example?
13 MR. LEONARD: Sydkraft did build that under 14 license. But the other thing, if I the not mistaken, in the 15 Swedish thing, didn't they show SKI outfit on there.
16 MR. YOUNGLING: SKI is a regulatory body.
l 17 MR. LEONARD: But wasn't it on that Swedepower, i
18 connected with a dotted line?
19 MR. YOUNGLING: No.
20 MR. COLE: It is a regulatory agency that Sydkraft 21 was responsible to for the structure. j 2
22 MR. LEONARD: I know they said they were involved ;
. 1 23 in the research, and in fact one of the things I was going to I 4 i i I 24 say is that we would encourage your international arm, if 25 they could, to work on this over there. It would help us 1
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1 significantly, I think. j j i
- 3. MR. MURLEY: Yes. Okay. I guess I was yust {
l l4 3 wondering if some other utility decided they wanted to do it, i 1' 4 would they have to plow all new ground like you are doing.. I l 5 guess let's leave that as speculation for now.
~
I I 6 Pa. YOUNGLING: Mr. Kascsak will now continue with 7 the design.
8 MR. KASCSAK: Good morning, everyone. You have heard a lot about what we have done in terms of I 9l- '
10 [ decisionmaking. What I will try to do is pull that together I
11 and give you an overview of the specific arrangement that we 12 will be pursuing as far as implementing this design at 13 Shoreham. In addition to that, I am going to be getting into 14 some of the relationships between this system and the 15 existing design basis of the plant, and give you some l
16 insights as to what we have looked at relative to concluding l
17 that we don't feel that this system in any way compromises )J 18 the existing design basis requirements of the plant. In 19 fact, that was an essential design criteria for the system, l
20 was to insure that in no way would we be compromising any of 21 the existing regulatory design bases of the plant.
22 I will then go over the major design criteria that 23 ,
we have established, and as we get into design criteria, we j
! ~ I 24 wul transition all this to Mr. Metcalf, who will go into a ;
25 discussion on the functional design basis of the system.
?
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31776.0 ree 30 1 Lastly, I will give briefly, a general discussion 4
2 of the design basis criteria that is being employed in the 3 various disciplines, engineering disciplines for both the, 4 what we call the BOP scope and the FILTRA building scope, 5 which is supplied by Swedepower.
6 The first slide will give you a general overview 7 of the system. As has been stated before -- maybe what 8 hasn't been stated -- there are two main purposes of system, l
l 9 one purpose is to provide a vent path to protect the primary l
10 containment structure from overpressurization. The second 11 purpose of the system is to provide a filter medium to reduce ,
i l
12 the release of radionuclides material from this vent path in a 1 ,
l f 13 situation where they would become available during a severe 14 accident.
15 The system is basically broken down into segments 16 where we have the existing reactor building, depicted here, a 17 new vent pipe that will be installed in the secondary 18 ,
containment basically at ground elevation, within the i 19 secondary containment. We will be capping off an existing 20 personnel hatch, 30-inch personal hatch, extending that 21 hatch, with a new 24-inch diameter line with two containment 22 isolation valves and a rupture disc within the secondary 23 containment. That ruptured disc will be set at 60 psig, and 24 I will get into the selection of that number later.
25 It is just downetream of that rupture disc that we ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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31776.0 ree ll 31 1 have made the class break for the system. The rupture disc 2 will provide the primary containment isolation barrier.to 3 afford containment isolation boundary requirements as far as-4 meeting design basis criteria for the plant.
5 Dcwnstream of.that system, cince the system is !
i 6 beyond design basis and is is not required to mitigate any of 7 the existing design basis criteria, it will be classified as 8 a nonsafety OA Category II system. l t
9 As we continue down the system, the system will 10 transition out the reactor building through a new pipe ,
1 11 penetration in the secondary containment wall, it will enter 12 a pipe tunnel which will be sloped to the FILTRA building 13 going below grade. That pipe tunnel will be approximately 14 380 feet long. It will also contain some of the auxiliary 15 piping supporting the FILTRA building, nitrogen, water, air 16 systems. They will all be contained in the trench that will
]
17 exist between the reactor building and the FILTRA building.
18 It is the - .this portion of the system, what we 19 call the FILTRA building, and it is kind of a support ;
I 20 building we are calling an auxiliary building that will be. J 21 supplied, will be the responsibility of Swedepower to design.
22 This is the portion of the system that we are ;
23 . essentially replicating what has been installed at i'
24 Barseback. And what we have here is a cylindrical steel line 25 post tension concrete structure. As Ed had mentioned, it is ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS. INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6 4 6 j
i 31776.0 ree 32 1 120 feet high, 70 feet in diameter, the walls are j 2 approximately three feet in thickness.
3 It has a volume of 10,000 cubic meters, which 4 translates to 350,000 cubic feet. It will contain 15 tons of 5 quartzite stone material which will be the filter medium. As I
6 you saw that sample of that, it was passed around. l 7 What I would like to do now is --
- l i
8 MR. MURLEY: Could you leave that up? I 9 MR. THADANI: Yes. You said this is identical to ;.
I 10 the one that the Swedes have. The reactor is a somewhat 3 1
11 different size there. Does that -- in terms of piping sizes I i
12 and so on, does that make a big difference or have you looked l I 13 at -- 1
! I 14 0 MR. KASCSAK: We have evaluated the ability to 3 l ;
15 I replicate the Barseback design to meet our design 16 requirements, and that is part of the discussions we have had 17 with Swedepower, to relate their design to our design 18 criteria. Even though the Barseback plant is a slightly 19 smaller megawatt thermal plant, we feel that the capability 20 of the Barseback FILTRA system satisfies our design
~
21 requirements.
22 MR. THADANI: You have analyzed it and you are 23 satisfied.
24 FROM THE FLOOR: What is your peak containment 25 design pressure for the various severe a:cidents that you ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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.i 1 have looked at? f 4 3 2 MR. KASCSAK: Are you talking about severe 3 accidents? I think Ed had mentioned to you that the ultimate 4 1
4 pressure of our containment as analyzed in a previous 5 analysis is 130 psig. We are designing this rupture disc to .
6 release pressure at 60 psig.
7 MR. LEONARD: The think the question was in our 8 analysis of accidents, what were the peak pressures reached; ;
l 9 do you remember? :
1 1
10 MR. METCALF: With the FILTRA installed. That is !
11 the work that is presently ongoing that was described. That 12 is being factored into the 100 percent power FRA. In other 13 words, the operation of this system is now being factored ,
l 14 into the 100 percent power PRA for Shoreham. And there is 15 obviously a spectrum of events that is being analyzed. We 16 expect that some of those events will result in pressures 17 above 60 psi even with the filter installed. So should any 18 of those events proceed to fail containment with the filter 19 in operation, that would be faccored into the impact of the 20 system, as reflected by the PRA.
21 FROM THE FI.OOR: So you haven't -- you haven't i
22 used that information to size your piping? ;
- 4 l
23 MR. METCALF: I will get into what we -- the e J 24 events that we chose to size the system were based upon -- ] 1 1
25 MR. LEONARD: Some of my criteria. I said, look, 1 ,
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I 4 31776.0 l l ree 34 !
I i 1
1 here is how we got to a lot of that. I said, there are two :
i 2 things you really have to worry about in the BWR. One is a 3 blackout that is really a blackout. I told you about the , I l
4 reasons. The other is an ATWS. One of the reasons we have
=
l .
1 5 the enriched boron injection and all of these other things is !
i i 6 because I was worried about ATWS, and we have taken these 7 measures. i i
8 Maybe I can give you a rough answer on your l 9 question. If you "what if" me and say, what if my mainstream 10 isolation valves shut, what if my ARI doesn't work, what if 11 the operator doesn't turn on one injection pump, what if he 12 doesn't turn on the other. What if he doesn't manage the i 13 water level. And we have about 20 to 30 percent power being ,'
l 14 I generated with nowhere to go, you will reach 130 pounds, I l
15 think, in about 32 minutes. Okay? Now, with boron 16 injection, we shut it off in seven minutes. So you could i
17 say, if my new configuration works, maybe linearly, whatever j 18 that would give you. 40 pounds, 30 pounds. Sonething like i 19 that.
20 MR. SHUM: David Shum. How is a flow path j 21 supported through the vent?
1 22 MR. COLE: I was going to get to that. Let me get 1 23 to that. I will get to that later when we go through an J
24 actual sequence of how the filter would actuate and perform 25 its function.
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1 FROM THE ELOOR: Can I ask a question? How do you / ,
.(-
2 consider the rupture disc extension to the containment bond, 3 is it designed to the same criteria like the containment at i
4 Shoreham.
4 5 lui. YOUNGLING: The answer to your question is .
I
~
6 yes, it is.
-7 MR. MURLEY: The design pressure of the FILTRA 8 building, are you going to get to that, too, or you did you l 9 mention that?
I l 10 MR. YOUNGLING: We will get to that, the design 11 pressure.
l ,
12 MR. YOUNGLING: The design pressure of FILTRA is 4 c
l 13 bars, which if you do the calculation is about 58.4, I think, 14 psig.
l 15 MR. KASCSAK: Any other questions?
1 i
16 MR. MURLEY: The vent at the top, the exhaust pipe l
\
l 17 at the top, I guess, is that also 58 psi? Is that when noble i
18 gases would go out of FILTRA? j 19 MR. KASCSAK: They have a rupture disc in this 20 design that would blow and reduce the pressure at the exit. l o
21 MR. MURLEY: I gather the intention is that noble 22 gases are about the only thing that they want to get out of 23 there; is that right?
l l l 24 MR. KASCSAK: Right.
25 MR. MURLEY: Did you say that that is also 58 ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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( i 2 MR. YOUNGLING: There are two rupture discs at the 3 top. There is a small flow line which goes at about 4 pounds 4 and there is a larger line which goes at approximately 35 j i
5 pounds. And we really should let Bob go through and he will 6l explain the different operations. f 7 MR. KASCSAK: I will do that next after I get _ :.
t 8 through just -- this is a cross-sectional view of the FILTRA 9 i building and the auxiliary building. You saw previously the I
10 ! Barseback slide of the existing structure. This gives you a l .
11 l little bit better feel for physically what the internals of 12 this buildina look like.
13 ! The vent pipe is coming in in this direction, l
14 ( passing through an auxiliary building, three-story structure 15
~
with primarily the two stories below grade and top story ,
16 above grade. The bottom elevation contains condensate 17 storage tanks which will accumulate the condensate that is 18 condensed in the line and condensed, mostly the condensate in 19 the line.
20 The center pipe will contain the vent pipe itself, 21 the 30-inch pipe for Shoreham. And the upper elevations t,
, 22 contain the equipment rooms, various equipment rooms, 23 sampling room. There will be battery room's for backup power r
24 to the various equipment. There will be a pump room that l
25 ' will enable us to pump water from the condensate storage ,
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i 1 tanks to another medium to -- in the recovery process, to _;
i 2 take care of that condensate. There is also an electrical 3 equipment, electrical room with switch gear and other things 4 like that. So that is all contained in this area, which !
' l
}
5 I would be available to the operator to enter that room. l i
- i 6 FROM THE FLOOR: Is that sealed from the lower 1
7 j levels?
8 j MR. KASCSAK: Yes. .The path would be up -- I will 9 flip back to the next elide so you can see this now.
10 (Slide.) i 11 MR. KASCSAK: We talked about the activation of 12 the system. As an overpressurization condition would develop 13 in the primary containment, we would -- again a situation i
14 beyond design basis causing a challenge to the rupture disc, 15 l the rupture disc would fail and release the environment, I
16 noncondensible steam environment from the reactor primary 17 containment.
18 FROM THE FLOOR: Those isolation valves are 19 normally closed?
20 MR. KASCSAK: These valves are normally open. It 21 is a passive system requiring no operator action. The 22 material contained in the containment would be then vented-23 through this piping in the secondary containment, out through t' .
24 the transition into the. pipe tunnel to the input into the 25 FILTRA building itself. ,
l '
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, 1 FROM THE FLOOR: What is the time response of the i l
i 2 ruptured diaphragm for a short duration pulse, a flame where l 3 you wouldn't probably compromise containment but you might f 4 see a peak approaching that?
5 MR. KASCSAK: There was an extensive study 6 performed by the Swedes on selecting these rupture discs. We 7 have not been privy to all of that information at this ,
8 particular point in time, but that is something we will be 9 getting into. It is intended to be a very reliable rupture 10 disc with fairly high sensitivity in terms of its rupture 11 failure pressure.
12 MR. MURLEY: Is the point of your question whether i
13 a hydrogen burn would challenge it?
14 FROM THE FLOOR: A short duration.
15 MR. METCALF: It is an inerted containment. Until 16 you open the containment up, you can't get a hydrogen burn in 17 this containment. The specific concern you have I don't 18 think we have so much because of the inerted condition.
19 MR. LEONARD: And again, that is why we put two 20 fully qualified containment isolation valves on the line to 21 answer the "what if" question, what if something happens that
, 22 should cause your rupture, so we can then shut both qualified 23 containment isolation valves.
(
24 FROM THE FLOOR: Qualified at what delta P? The 25 60 psi or ultimate pressure?
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J 31776.0 ree 39 1 MR. KASCSAK: Ultimate pressure.
2 Just to point out, this entire system from this ;
I l
J 3 rupture disc through this entire FILTRA building will be l 4 inerted with nitrogen at a slight overpressure to insure 5 again that there is no concern about hydrogen detonation 6 within that system as we approach the containment.
7 So the release path is through this line up 8 through an arrangement, spider-type arrangement on top of the 9 building where the medium is forced down through the gravel 10 bed. And this is a cylindrical building with a center column 11 where the piping systems are arranged. The outer cylinder I 12 j has the gravel stacked in this area on both sides. The gases t
13 and steam are forced down through the stone medium at fairly 14 low velocities, high residence times. And initially the 15 FILTRA system acts as a condenser.and a filter. So it is 16 condensing using the heat capacities of the stones, it is 17 condensing the steam passing through the system and an actual 18 condensate front is being created. That continues to move 19 down through the filter as the saturation of the stone is 20 used up, as the event continues.
1 21 Eventually the noncondensibles would pass down 22 through the filter with high, very high decontamination
~
23 factors. The system design decontamination factor is a
! i 24 factor of 1000.
25 Just to get into it, we have a little slight ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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l 1
31776.0 '
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2 our configuration for Shoreham, as compared to the 3 configuration that is currently being used at Barseback. ]
4 There are two flow paths out to a filter. One is a low flow 5 path, is a 12-inch line; the other path is a 30-inch high l 6 flow path. In the Barseback design, this is their normal ,
7 path through the low vent line, with a rupture disc set at a l 8 fairly low pressure of, I believe it is, 4 psig for that l i
9 particular rupture disc.
10 On the Shoreham design, we have decided that 11 because of a higher concentration on our part of ATWS 12 sequences, that we would have the normal flow path be the 13 large diameter line, wit's the ability to handle the higher 14 mass flows associated with ATWS.
15 We have in addition so the normal flow path, the 16 normal -- the smaller line would normally be closed to 17 Shoreham and all of the exiting gases would come up through 18 the high flow line and out through the top of the FILTRA l
19 building. I 20 For the Shoreham design we have predicated going 21 to a high pressure rupture disc with relief valves set at 1
22 pretty much near the design pressure of the FILTRA building, )
23 the 48 psia or 48 psig value. The relief valves afford us l
24 the added benefit of providing some additional holdup time i 25 for the noble gases and will give us a better velocity ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1 profile exiting the FILTRA building.to get, to insure -
I i ,
2 ourselves of a better elevated release for any materials that 3 would be coming out. j 4 I want to point out, this is an enhancement that ,
- l 5 we have been discussing which is not necessarily somethir.; ;
6 that we have finalized at this particular point in time. But 7 it is the conceptualization of the configuration that we are 8 at least proposing at this particular point in time 9 MR. MURLEY: I have a series of questions. It is-10 not clear to me why you need the larger flow rates for ATWS.
11 MR. YOUNGLING: Basically the way the Swedes have 12 their FILTRA lined up, it is lined up in a fashion that t
13 basically handles a low flow rate. Our system will be 14 basically lined up to handle the hig'er h flow rate ATWS 15 events. The operator does not have to take any actions in 16 order to recognize the ATWS event. The way the Swedes do it, 17 they shut that valve there, the big valve. They recognize 18 the ATWS event. Then they go and open that valve and pass it ;
1 19 through. So we have chosen to line our system up in a more j i
20 passive manner, with the ATWS as the primary source.
21 MR. KASCSAK: I think it is also the consideration l
22 for longer term'ATWSs, where we would have sustained steam 23 production. The operators would do their thing and we would
( ,
24 be, in fact, in a -- you know, lining up to the condensate 25 storage tank, putting a lot of water into the vessel, and we ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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31776.0 ree 42 1 would basically be able to stay in that mode for quite an 2 extended period of time and even possibly get to the point 3 where you have completely saturated the heat capacity of the 4 stones and we would be essentially passing the steam through 4
5 the FILTRA building up the vent. It is important that we 6 point out that the actual condensation feature of the FILTRA 7 system is not that essential to its filtering capability.
1 8 The impingement and residence time in the structure is what 9 provides that decontamination.
10 MR. MURLEY: Isn't it true that once the mere fact ,
f 11 that this rupture valve opens means you are into a core, l
l , 12 severe core damage accident?
l 13 MR. METCALF: No.
14 MR. MURLEY: There are some accidents that -- .
I 15 MR. KASCSAK: A long-term ATWS that we would' 16 recover from, let's say we would be in a situation where the, i
l 17 we would be producing that steam for an extended period of 18 time, saturate the filter and then come back and recover from 19 that without a core melt', let's say a degraded core-20 situation, we could reestablish control within the normal 21 plant systems and then we could shut this filter down using 22 these high selection valves.
23 MR. MURLEY: Do you have an estimate of what
/
24 fraction of the times, then, that vent or that rupture disc 25 is burst you would get fission products, at least noble ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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I 31776.0 ree 43 1 gases, out into the FILTRA building?
i 2 MR. KASCSAK: I don't believe we have quantified 3 that. I think that is again-part of some of the PRA.
4 MR. METCALF: That is being reflected.in the PRA. j
. l 5 You can get the gap release even fairly early. So it is --
6 when you start talking about release of fission products, it i 7 gets to be kind of a fuzzy thing, because there is a whole 8 spectrum of core damage or release of fission products that 9 you can get as well. l 10 MR. MURLEY: I am getting at something, so let me .
11 go on.
12 If that rupture disc opens at 60 psi, what are the 13 chances that the 48 psi, if I have heard you right, will open 14 also to release the gases?
15 MR. KASCSAK: You have -- in terms of steam, you 16 have a lot of capability in terms of condensation capability 17 in *:he filter, so you would not be building up the pressure 18 in that building very quickly. It would only be the 19 noncondensibles and the initial hydrogen, nitrogen available 20 that would cause the pressurization of tnat building. And 21 that is also the advantage of the relief valve,.is to maybe 22 release some of that initial nitrogen that would be 23 available, and then we would.close them and allow the 1
24 building to provide significantly higher residence times for 25 the noble gases that would come to follow.
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! l" 1 FROM THE PLOOR: What is your free space volume in i
2 that FILTRA vent? ,
l 3 MR. METCALF: It is comparable to the volume of 4 either the drywell or'the wetwell. It is about 40 percent of i-I 'j the gross volume is free volume.
5 ,
. 6 FROM THE FLOOR: Okay.
7 MR. KASCSAK: We used a number of 38 percent void ;
i 8 fractions in the design of that structure.
9 FROM THE FLOOR: In certain accident, ATWS 10 sequences, when you vent the containment, you cause a pump I '
11 ccvitation on the ellipses system and it gets into a core i 12 ' melt and that you would melt the core at the time the l 13 containment is vented. Have you looked at the, how many ATWS ,
i ,
14 a sequences that you can recover containment but you lead into j
{
15 core damage, you save the containment but you damage the core l 16 eventually? y 17 MR. METCALF: I can address that as part of my 18 presentation. .
19 FROM THE FLOOR: Okay.
20 MR. KASCSAK: Let me go on here.
21 FROM THE FLOOR: To me this doesn't look like a 22 new concept. I think it looks like it was originally 23 invented by B&W in the early '70s, '71, '70. Has anybody
{ 24 looked into that?
25 MR. KASCSAZ: You mean -- as we had said before, ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1 l the fact that the Swedes have licensed and implemented this i l 2 design made it very attractive to us.
]
3 FROM THE FLOOR: That is one thing, to understand )
I 4 why would it be. licensed by Sweden, because this concept was 5 invented by B&W in the '70s, i
6 MR. LEONARDs I can't answer that --
i 1
7 FROM THE FLOOR: '70, '71. !
8 MR. MURLEY: That is entirely irrelevant because 9 they are not proposing it. So it is interesting to know but 10 I don't see the relevance, 11 '
FROM THE FLOOR: On the quality or category that 12 you show here in the picture, could you identify for us, 13 please, what the size design category is? -
l 14 MR. COLE: Yes. The next slide is intended to get 15 into a discussion of the relationship between this system and I 1
16 the design basis. The portion of this system that is safety 17 related or not safety related. But the entire system will be 10 seismically designed; even the nonsafety related portion will 19 be analyzed for a seismic event.
1 20 FROM'THE FLOOR: Are you going to get into more --
~
21 MR. KASCSAK: We will get into some more details 22 of that a little bit later when we get into the details for 23 the various components.
t 24 One thing I just meant to mention, you are going 25 to hear the terminology "Swedepower scope" and " BOP scope."
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l 1 Just to make sure that that is clear, the FILTRA Swedepower l 2 scope is essentially at the interface between the FILTRA !
3 building and the auxiliary building. So they will be 4 providing the design. If I were to say that this included 5 the auxiliary building, at the interface between the I
6 auxiliary building going on in through the auxiliary building 7 and the FILTRA building. It is the design responsibility of i
8 Swedepower.
1 9 Everything upstream of that, including the pipe j 10 trench, entering the reactor building, the work within the 11 reactor building is what we are calling the BOP scope.
12 And we are preparing design specifications to deal i
13 with those two areas in separate specifications that will be 14 used. One is being used currently to negotiate a contract i
15 with Swedepower. The other will be used to contract with an ,
i i
16 AE for the BOP design. l l
)
17 FROM THE FLOOR: You have introduced a concept of l 18 safety and nonsafety. Maybe at some point you are going to j i
19 discuss inspection and testing requirements? l ;
I I 20 MR. LEONARD: Yes, we are going to discuss that.
~
21 MR. KASCSAK: Getting back to this slide, to get l l
22 into the relationship between this system and its impact on i 23 design basis, the primary concern that this system introduces.
24 is the fac't that we have added a vent pipe. Another 25 containment penetration or extension of an existing 14CE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. ;
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l 1 containment penetration has the potential for challenging the t t
2 integrity of the primarily containment pressure boundary. So 3 it is important that we establish a clear-cut barrier and 4 design requirements for this portion of the system that will !
.. l insure that the containment pressure boundary is not I 5
I I
6 compromised.
7 And what we are proposing is a concept where we 8 will be providing a new line with two' containment isolation 9 valves and a rupture disc, all designed to ASME-III Class 2 10 requirements, which will provide the containment isolation 11 barrier to insure that for normal or the design basis event 12 scenarios that we are designed for, that we will not be t
13 introducing any new potential problems beyond what have 14 already been addressed in the design basis sequences.
15 Just to go through the slide. The rupture disc 16 provides the primarily containment pressure barrier; it will 17 be designed for 60 psig, which is 20 percent higher than the i 18 existing design containment of 48 psig.
19 It is a passive device, highly reliable; and as I 20 said before, there has been an extensive amount of testing 21 performed on these types of rupture discs by Swedepower. And 22 we will be getting into discussions with them on the 23 reliability and the design features of those components.
(
24 The containment isolation valves, normally'open, 25 will provide compliance with GDC-56. In the situation where l
l ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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31776.0 ree 48 1 there is a remote possibility of a malfunction of the rupture l i
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2 disc, the control logic will require that the valves close.
3 And that is for accidents where we are within the design 4 basis of the permanent plant design. So for events.where we l 5 would sense a failure of the rupture disc within the design l i
6 pressure of the containment, the valves will get an autoclose 7 signal.
8 If we were to go into a scenario where we would be 9 going beyond the design basis, the pressure logic would seal 10 in, and if the rupture disc failed at e. later. point in time, 11 the valves would not close.
12 The control logic -- and as I said, all of these 13 components will be designed to Class lE safety-related 14 standards.
j 15 MR. THADANI: Excuse me. Should the primary or 16 the containment pressure get to above 60 pounds, the rupture j 1
17 disc fails. The valves are normally open.
18 MR. KASCSAK: Yes.
19 MR. THADANI: But those valves could be closed by 20 the operators, couldn't they, if necessary?
21 MR. KASCSAK: They will be available.to the 22 operator for remote manual control in the control room. So 23 his procedures will control his ability to open or close 24 those valves.
25 MR. THADANI: So you would, for certain scenarios, ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1 you might develop procedures at a later time to tell the l-2 operators to -- l I
3 MR. LEONARD: Definitely will . f 1
4 MR. THADANI: -- to close the valves. l l>
5 MR. LEONARD: At the tail end of an accident, (
6 where you want to maintain the pressure is dropping off, you 7 say, you want to maintain most of it inside the containment 8 and let this relief valve we are proposing on top hold i
]
I 9 whatever is in the FILTRA, then the operator would have l
10 procedures which would tell him to shut those valves. And 11 later on if he wanted to open them --
12 MR. TRADANI: Because I can think of many i l 13 scenarios where the pressure would be 60 pounds but I can j li i f I 14 I recover.
15 MR. LEONARD: You are correct. i 16 FROM THE FLOOR: What is at the power source to 17 these two valves, 18 MR. KASCSAK: It will be AC Class 1E power.
19 FROM THE FLOOR: So in station blackout you will 20 not be able to close these valves.
21 MR. KASCSAK: We will also be providing to these 22 valves as part of this system a backup power supply from a 23 battery through an inverter that will give.the operator the 24 ability to operate these valves at blackout.
25 MR. MURLEY: John, the point that we were getting ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1 at is one that has been bothering me for some time. We have
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2 been looking at filtered vents ever since I have been in the 3 agency. There is a class of accidents whose pressure, peak <
l 4 pressure would be between 60 and 130 that is going to actuate 4
5 this whole system but which you could recover from.
, 6 MR. LEONARD: Yes.
7 MR. MURLEY: And you could recover either by the i
8 operator figures out what is wrong and does something like at J
l 9 TMI or you get some power back or you get some water back or 10 something like that. But in the meantime, what you have done 11 is released to the atmosphere perhaps some fission products !
! l 12 that you wouldn't have done otherwise. What this system does l J l ! i 13 is take care of what I call the doomsday thing where '
j 14 everything goes to hell and nothing happens?
l i i
15 i MR. LEONARD: Exactly. ,
i 16 MR. MURLEY: No question that this is going to fix 1
17 that. But if that is such a low probability relative to some 18 of these other sequences, you may in fact have made public i l 19 risk worse. And we really have to settle that, it seems to 1
20 me, before you spend all these hundreds or tens or whatever 21 millions and NRC comes in and says, hey, you have made things 22 worse.
23 MR. LEONARD: That is one of the reasons we are 24 starting this meeting. We don't want to go down that path 25 and you say, hey, you guys did a wonderful job, however, you ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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31776.0 ree 51 '
1 can't use it. You have spent a lot of bucks. We have tried !
j 6
)
2 to do that. I don't expect you to say you agree. I know )
3 that, that you can't do that. We have tried to do it. '
l I
4 The philosophy behind this system, the 1 5 supplemental that I insisted on, because of!the environment r 6 we operate Shoreham in, is I wanted to have it as near as I [
7 can operator-free, a passive system, and if you look at the ,
8 philosophy behind this, you will find that the operator can I 9l i take action later to change things. For instance, let's say 1
10 he gets a pressure that you are talking about, the rupture l 11 disc ruptures. He wants to shut the valves. He shuts the i
12 valves. One of the reasons we have put that relief valve on 13 top of this is we wanted to bottle up anything in that filter 14 until it had to relieve itself.
15 i FROM THE FLOOR: But if you have a reliable AC l j l
16 power system, why don't you keep the containment isolation
)
17 valve closed and you can open them in instead of having them 18 open on the rupture disc? )
19 MR. LEONARD: We would prefer -- I would prefer as i
20 the vice president of nuclear operations and having been a i 1
~
21 manager of one of these plants, I would prefer seeing'the 22 environment Shoreham is in a passive system. Tnat was my 23 guidance. If you all say, hey, absolutely wrong, John t
24 Leonard, you are full of it, we want those valves shut and 25 that is the NRC's decision, we would accept that decision.
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31776.0 rce 52 1 That is one of the things we are going to have to iterate. 1 i
?
2 MR. MURLEY: That certainly relieves the operator 3 of a lot of tough decisions.
4 MR. LEONARD: He has a lot more time to think 5 about it and shut the valves even than he does to open.them.
6 FROM THE FLOOR: But in that consequence it is l
7 that you can get the core damage by cavitating the pump if j i
8 you vent and you start reducing core damage rather than just l l
9 having an accident, f-l 10 MR. LEONARD: The other thing that we have tried l 11 to do is put in so many systems to prevent us to even get to 12 a point where that rupture disc operates. I frankly believe, i
I 13 4 and I will swear to this on any stack of Bibles they can l
I 14 bring in, I frankly believe that with all the ATWS i 15 mitigation, station blackout problems and so on, that you l l
16 will never see this thing rupture and operate. It might j 17 rupture in a failure mode where you have to shut the valves 18 because something malfunctioned in the disc. But I don't 19 think you will ever see that kind of accident. I this I this i 20 plant really is a safe plant. But I can't prove that to the 21 people. So that is why we are looking at this.
. 22 MR. METCALF: There are tradeoffs there. I want 23 to point out a couple of them. Number one, there is really a
?
24 real advantage in keeping the containment pressure below 60 l First of all, it allows you to operate the relief j 25 psig.
l 1 ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1 valves, allows it to depressurize the reactor vessel, which s
2 is helpful in a number of ways. It also enables you to ,
i 3 reopen the MSIVs, if possible, which certainly is the best f
I 4 way of dealing with an ATWS. So on the upside, there are !
. l 5 real advantages of limiting the containment pressure to 60 6 psig.
7 The other thing is that for these ATWS events, in i
8 many cases the containment pressure is increasing so rapidly, !
9 the vapor pressure curve is so vertical, once you get above !
l 10 60 psig that there is not a whole lot of time between the 11 time you get to 60 pounds and the time you get to 130 12 pounds. So I think that the decision, the choice that you 13 have is losing the containment integrity in a controlled way 14 and in a way that it can be restored or losing the 15 containment integrity in a way that is perhaps uncertain. So 16 on balance, I think there are advantages to venting the I
17 containment at 60 psig and to having the system operate.
i 18 FROM THE FLOOR: But the problem now, you take the I i
3 19 other end that you have a station blackout sequence, you 20 reach the 60 psig at exactly the same time you start venting 21 the core, so you are releasing all the noble gases ;
i 22 immediately. And the containment will not fail after that. 1 23 The containment station blackout progresses so slowly that 24 the containment pressure will not increase that rapidly for 25 it to go to the failure pressure. So what you have now is an
~ l ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. l 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6 4 6 j
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l 31776.0 ree 54 1 open containment and a melted core.
( l 2 MR. METCALF: But the thing that characterizes a 3 station blackout event in general is a very slow progression l l
4 of the accident. And I think under those conditions, there 5 is far more opportunity for the operator to take control of ;
< 6 this system. The system does not operate passively in such a f
7 way that the operator intervention is prevented. But it j i
i 8 operates passively so that for those situations where things J i (
9 are happening very rapidly the system will actuate by itself. j\ q l
'i 4 i
10 MR. THADANI: You have, as I understand, seven 11 diesel generators, two gas turbines, different manufacturer 12 of diesel generators and you have backstart capability on one i i
I 13 gas turbine, in spite of what I would call a fantastic source i
14 of AC power. You decided'to provide two inverters in the {
1 1
15 event you lose all AC power, be able to control these valves j 16 through AC. What is the DC system? Do you have a four 1
17 batteries? I mean, I am beginning -- I am wondering if now 18 you are loading up the batteries, or would you use tr.am -- l l
19 what is the real benefit --
20 MR. YOUNGLING: These will be a separate set of 21 batteries with 48-hour capability. Also, I want to'just 22 correct for the record your characterization of the on-eite 23 AC power source. You said there were seven diesels. There 24 are six. There will be six diesels. And then we have four 25 GM diesels. Actually, we have 10 diesels.
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31776.0 ree 55 1 FROM THE I'LOOR: .If you really want me to give an i
2 ATWS sequence, it is best to try to change the logic on the 3 MSIV to open them, rather than to try to-build a containment 4 venting system.
5 MR. KASCSAK: We have recently implemented that 4 6 change to change the set point for the closure of the MSIV to 7 the lower level.
8 FROM THE FLOOR: How about opening them, changing i
9 the signal or the logic to reopen them in ATWS sequences? It 10 is more of a change in engineering but from a. standpoint of 11 reducing the risk from ATWS is much more beneficial than the 12 venting system.
13 MR. METCALF: That presumes you have the-14 minicondenser available. If the transient that put you.into 15 ATWS in the first place is one that denies you the use of the 16 main condensers, then it doesn't --
17 MR. THADANI: If you have situations.of loss of 18 circulating water.
19 MR. KASCSAK: .I think there is no doubt that we ;
i 20 have a lot of multiple failures.that we have taken even to 21 get into the severe accidents. Clearly the operator is well j 22 trained to make use of all his existing -- both 23 safety-related.and nonsafety-related -- systems that.are.
i~
24 already there for him to use. And he has been well trained 4
25 to make use of that full capability before we would even try ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. i l 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646 1
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2 ,
MR. LEONARD: Yes, he is trained right now to open l
3 those MSIVs.
4 MR. BARRETT: I think that installing a system 5 like this would allow you to completely rethink your entire 6 philosophy toward the procedures in an ATWS. One of the l
l 7 procedures that has always bothered me is the need to control 8 water level. Under the circumstances of an ATWS, it seems to 9 me that that has a good bit of potential for controlling 10 ! water level too low, to coin a phrase 11 If you had a system like this installed, could you 12 rethink the entire procedure for ATWS such that that -- you l l
13 I might actually be able to eliminate that entire step from the 14 l procedures?
l 15 l' MR. LEONARD: That is one of the things we would l
16 look at. I myself think that I would agree with the ;
i 17 gentleman that said open the MSIVs first. Our operaters are l 18 trained to do that. Open the MSIVs as soon as you can. But l
19 the second thing that I t.hink would preclude us from worrying !
20 too much about water level is the enriched boron injection.
21 We can shut dowm the plant with one pump in seven minutes.
22 That is 200 percent more than your criteria. So we would do 23 that.
t 24 MR. THADANI: Does that mean that you really don't 25 have to go through this, what seems like an anomalous kind of ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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31776.0 ree 57 1 i guidance to the operators to reduce the level in the i
2 reactor?
3 MR. LEONARD: That would be one of our final 4 choices, but we don't want to eliminate that because we l
- 5. should be able to open the MSIVs, as that gentleman says. i i
- i
- 6. That is one of the first things the operators will try to do, l
7 get the condenser back. If_that doesn't work, they are going ,
\
l 8 to be almost simultaneously getting boron injection, i 9 If that doesn't work, the recirc pumps have 10 tripped. They will be trying to maintain water level with a 1
11 high-pressure coolant injection or the reactor core isolation 12 cooling system, both steam-driven pumps, to the lowest l
13 level. So I would agree that is not something you want to l 14 run right to do. It is something you wouldn't want to 1
15 eliminate completely because I think the GE transient 16 analysis has shown that that will' reduce power. But it is a 17 backup situation.
18 MR. KASCSAK: This gentleman has been patiently l 1
l 19 waiting for a question over here. j l
20 FROM THE FLOOR: The design pressure for.the !
21 containment is 48 psig and your release pressure is 60, and
, 22 the test, containment test is performed at 15 percent over l l
23 the design. That is still lower than 60. I would expect 24 some nonlinear behavior of the containment structure. How do l 25 you accommodate the radial displacement of the containment at i ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS. INC.
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i 31776.0 l i ree 58 i 1 60 psig? Do you have a connection or something?
i 2 MR. KASCSAK: As we have said before.-- you are 3 right, the design pressure was 48 psig. We have a structural i
4 acceptance test pressure of to 55 psig. The ultimate-l l 5 structural pressure for the containment and its components is j a 6 '$0 psig.
. So we have looked at the response of thoso, of the 7 structure and its components to higher pressures, and we ha've i
8 concluded that we will not have a failure below 130 psig.
i
(
9 The 50 psig is obviously between design basis l i
10 pressure requirements of the system and the ultimate, beyond I 11 design basis. ,
12 FROM THE FLOOR: I fully understand that. The l
13 containment structure is not going to fail. You have to pay ,
i I i
14 attention to the connection, the piping, so that the pipe can ! !
15 accommodate the radial displacement of the containment 16 structure. This is just a feedback to you.
17 MR. YOUNGLING; We will consider that as part of ;
l 18 the analysis, and I think we already had thought about that. I i
19 FROM THE FLOOR: Because you may go into nonlinear j l
20 response and you want repeatability from 60 psig down to some 21 other pressure.
22 MR. KASCSAK: Okay. I understand.
23 MR.'IOUNGLING: That would be done as part of the t
24 design. review on that penetration as n' result of the new 25 conditions, yes.
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31776.0 ree 59 1 MR. KASCSAK: Let me quickly move on to just a 2 general review of the major design criteria that went;into I
3 this system.
4 This criteria was developed, and-some of it, 5 Mr. Leonard has previously mentioned, and there were in fact .
I
< 6 criteria that he had provided to us when we' initiated the !
l 7 I initial conceptual design studies and feasibility studies.
8 And these design criteria have been basically carried out 9 through the completion of the conceptual design stages and 10 basically represents what we feel sti.1 to be the criteria 11 that we wanted the system to comply with.
12 Number one, that the process conditions 1
13 established by consideration of ATWS and station blackout, i
14 leading to long-term decay heat removal problems. Those are 15 the bounding sequences, and Jim Metcalf will get into those 16 in terms of how we have selected them as the boundir.g 17 sequences for the system.
1 18 As Mr. Leonard has stated, we initially said that l I
19 the system should be passive, that there should be at least j I
20 no initial operator intervention required to provide the two 21 functions we mentioned, pressure relief and filtration.
22 That we should provide containment isolation to j
. ,i 23 insure that we have not compromised any of the design basis
(
24 events or sequencer features of the plant. That beyond the i
25 containment isolation barrier the system will be categorized ACE. FEDERAL REPORTER.C., INC.
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t 2 But that it will be highly reliable, and we will 3 be employing good engineering , industrial-type practices 4 during the design, construction and testing of the system.
5 We will design the system to selective d
6 safety-related standards for the primary system, which means 7 .
the primary vent path, and a little bit later we will get t
8 into some of those codes and standards.
9 The entire system will be designed to seismic ,
10 methods to insure that it will sustain a design basis 11 earthquake for the plant. !
i 12 It will not be single-failure proof but again it
^
l 13 will be highly reliable. And that the vent will be operable ;
i 14 i from the control room. I 15 l FROM THE FLOOR: For the seismic design, I would I 16 just like to offer some remarks.
17 This ir a beyond design basis event that you are 18 trying to accommodate through this kind of a system. And 19 when the beyond design basis event is initiated by seismic 20 occurrence, you might want to consider the seismic design 21 basis that is different from your safe shutdown earthquake 22 design. And you want to accommodate reasonable displacement 23 within the long pipeline that you have from the containment 24 structure going to the auxiliary building.
25 MR. YOUNGLING: Okay.
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1 MR. KASCSAK: Similar to what we have performed )
6 2 for the primary containment, although there is a design basis 3 3 pressure requirement and seismic loading for the building, I
i i 4 there will be some ultimate capability, some structural 1
- 5 integrity capability that the building and the system will be d That will be factored into the PRA.
6 able to accommodate. i l 7 FROM THE FLOOR: I am talking about slightly 8 higher seismic loadi: g, when the seismic itself has been --
9 MR. LEONARD: Yes, I understand what you are 10 saying.
l 11 FROM THE FLOOR: Just so I understand the system, j l
12 is there any way to activate the system or bypass that i i
13 rupture disc by the operator?
l 14 KR. KASCSAK: No. ;
1 15 FROM THE FLOOR: So -- so the only way it can 16 activate is by rupturing that disc?
17 MR. METCALF: From the vetwell.
18 MR. YOUNGLING: There is a path up from the 19 drywell that can be operated by the operator.
20 MR. LEONARD: You should be aware we have right 21 now two large valves that could be operated by the operator.
22 FROM THE FLOOR: I understand that. I &m just 23 talking about this particular system.
i' 24 MR. KASCSAK: I didn't quite get to this part of 25 the system that we had already also included in our design
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31776.0 ree 62 1 criteria. We are going to provide a drywell vent path, which f 2 is primarily there as a recovery mechanism, so that in terms 3 of long-term recovery, the operator can flood the entire 4 containment to the top of active fuel and vent out through 5 this drywell vent path, small, four-inch line. These valves :
. 6 which will also be ASME-III classed valves will be normally 7 closed and will not be available, procedurally not be 8 available to the operator, initially, to open.
9 FROM THE FLOOR: Locked closed or just closed?
10 MR. KASCSAK: I don't think we have made those 11 final decisions yet. We need to study that in terms of the 12 existing operating procedures and see how that would fit in.
13 MR. PALLA: Could you clarify what the valves are 14 that within the filter building. It looks like you have a 15 large and a small.
16 MR. KASCSAK: We have a low flow path for the 17 12-inch line, which is in the Shoreham configuration, a valve 18 that is normally closed. And then we have a valve in the 19 high fl .3 vent path that would be normally open. Both of 20 those valves would be operable by the operator so that he
- 21 could switch those flow paths at some point in time later on 22 in the recovery process. But the normal open path i;:through 23 the rupture disc, up through the filter. You cannot bypass f 24 the filter. That is the point that we are trying to make, ,
25 out through this path out to the environment.
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1 MR. PALLA: Why would you actually need the 1 k '!
I 2 valves, if you already -- you have them on the exit already; 3 right?
4 MR. KASCSAK: Well, we have -- these are rupture
+
5 discs. These are'there primarily to provide a seal for the l
6 nitrogen overpressure that would be contained in the entire ;
7 system.
8 MR. YOUNGLING: And they are for recovery to --
9 about the whole thing in the long term. j I
MR. METCALF:
10 You may want to depressurize the l 11 primary containment, and if you have a relief valve on the i 1
i 12 l high flow path you can't do that. So there is a low flow --
,i j
13 the rupture disc on a low flow path has a low set point; it j
~
i 14 is primarily there just to maintain the nitrogen blanket so i
15 ff you want t; pressurize in the long term, you open the i I
i 16 small flow paths and depressurize.
17 MR. KASCSAK: As we mentioned before, we would f
1 16 have a dedicated 48-hour power supply to both the in-plant ) !
19 and FILTRA biailding equipment. That has to do with a 24-hour i
20 capability of a blackout, plus a 24-hour activation time 21 period that we would basically say the system should be able j 22 to handle without any additional power being made available. l I'
23 We will be designing the system to accommodate '
\
24 combustible gas mixtures. We are dealing with that on the 25 design. We selected an operational pressure for the system ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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ree ! 64 1 l to basically insure that we would have two things available 6 ,
2 j within the plant. One would be that the SRVs would remain
. 3 operable and their capability is up to 70 psig. And that we 4 would maintain the integrity of the drywell floor seals in 5 order to also make as much use as we can of the scrubbing 6 capability of the pool. We don't want to impede the 7 l integrity of those floor seals if we don't have to. So those 8l seals are maintained with a nitrogen overpressure of 60 psig.
~
9 ll This is the other point, is that the system shall l l
10 provide drywell venting to allow for primary containment l l
- 1. flooding for long-term recovery. That is the poinu we just l l
12 talked about. And finally that we would have an elevated, !
13 monitored release of the releases coming out the top. I 14 What I would like to do now is turn it over to Jim 15 Metcalf, who will go into the fuctional design.
16 FROM THE FLOOR: Did you mention anything about 17 the flow element that you have for normal-type operation? A 18 flow element on the system to check it during normal 19 operation?
20 MR. KASCSAK: There will be flow elements in the 21 design but there will be normally no flow. The system will 22 be bottled up, as we have said. There will be rupture discs !
l 23 on both ends and they will be inerted with no flow, 24 basically. But when activated, there will be flow elements 25 to monitor that flow, and that information will be available ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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i 1 to the operator.
l
( i 2 FROM THE FLOOR: And I think it is connected to a i 3 logic for an inverted opening of-the system without having a 4 specific design pressure, it will close the isolation valve?
5 MR. KASCSAK: Yes. That is also part of the
- 6 logic.
7 MR. LO: We will take a 15-minute recess at this' i 8 point.
9 (Recess.)
10 MR. LO: We can continue with the meeting.
11 MR. METCALF: For those of you who forgot. I am 12 Jim Metcalf from Stone & Webster.
13 I want to be talking about the functional design 14 basis for the Shoreham SCS. I think in order to put it into 15 context I ought to first spend just a few minutes talking i
16 about the design basis for the system as it is installed at 17 Barseback because there are some differences. i I
18 For Barseback there were two events that were j i
19 considered as part of the explicit design basis. One was a l 20 large LOCA with failure of vapor suppression followed by loss 21 of injection. What this then results in is a very rapid 22 pressure increase in the primary containment leading to an L
23 almost immediate containment failure, and/or a vent i
24 actuation, I should say. Then followed by core degradation.
25 The second design basis event for Barseback was a ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1 station blackout. Of course within the character of station j 4
2 blackout is that the core degrades first and then containment 3 pressure increases to that required for vent actuation 4 following core degradation. j t
5 The maximum capacity of the system was established 6 by the first event. For the particular magnitude of the loss ,
t <
l i 7 of integrity between the drywell and the wetwell that they i 1
1 8 used in their analysis, the flow rate to the FILTRA ended up !
l 9 being about 90 kilograms a second, which then established the l l i 10 size of the flow path and was also used subsequently in the f
I 4 11 test programs that were conducted to qualify the thermal I 12 hydraulic and fission product removal characteristics of the !
I j ,
13 system. t i
! l 14 Now, these were the events that were used, I say f l
15 explicitly, as the design basis. They were the events that I 16 were agreed upon with SKI, the Swedish inspectorate, as the 17 basis for the FILTRA design and installation. However, what l l
18 Sydkraft discovered after the system design was already under 19 way was that with a relatively minor modification, the system l
20 could also accommodate ATWS. And the modification that was !
f 21 required was a high flow bypass of the normally restricted 22 exit from the FILTRA.
23 The reason the exit is, or normal exit is 24 restricted is because that tends to maximize the residence 25 time in the filter itself for the flow.
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1 1 So that if the -- if you use a restricted exit, it 1
( l 2 allows the pressure to rise within the filter and thereby j l
3 maximize the residence time.
l However, that restricted exit was not capable of i 4
f' 5 passing the high steam flow that one'could get for a system
- 6 ATWS; in other words, where steam production continued at a 7 relatively high level to the point where the filter bed was' ,
8 saturated. And therefore it became necessary to pass that 9' high flow through the exit device. So what Sydkraft 10 installed was the high flow bypass around this normally 11 restricted exit. :
i 12 FROM THE FLOOR: What is the steam capacity of the l 13 vent?
14 MR. METCALF: The nominal capacity is 90 kilograms I
15 a second. i i
16 FROM THE FLOOR: .That is the rate of 17 condensation. When does it saturate?
18 MR. METCALF: It is something in the neighborhood 19 of about 1.3 million pounds of water. In other words, 1.3 20 million pounds of water having condensed will exhaust the 1
21 heat capacity of the rocks. l 22 MR. ELTAWILA: Do you have something in place when 23 you vent makeup water to the suppression pool, because you 1
24 are removing a lot of the steam in ATWS sequences and you 25 have to make up the pool? Is that written in the procedure?
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1 MR. METCALF: Not per se. There is about 5 .
2 million pounds of water in the suppression pool and you have ]
3 roughly half million in the reactor. You have roughly about 4 another 4- or 5 million, as I recall, in the condensate I
5 storage tank; so depending on the source of water, you are 6 talking about significantly larger quantities of water than i I
7 the FILTRA can itself condense. And you are talking about l l
8 ' many, many, many hours of continued steam production before 9j you really make a dent in that water inventory.
10 When it came time to look at the implementation of 11 the Barseback system at Shoreham, we looked at it in general, !
i 12 as events which tended to dominate risk for domestic BWRs.
{
13 And these I have listed here: ATWS, transients with loss of l 14 containment heat removal, the station blackout events and 15 those which involve loss of makeup to the reactor.
16 The events that we selected were chosen to achieve 17 a reasonable risk reduction. And the two events that were 18 used to provide input to the design and engineering process 19 for the implementation of FILTRA at Shoreham include the 20 station blackout, and it is a particular station blackout in 21 which the operator uses the steam condensing mode of the RHR 22 heat exchanger under manual control, uses the fire protection 23 system to provide a cooling water supply for the RHR heat 24 exchanger and steam condensing level. It is a station 25 blackout which becomes very prolonged because of certain
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31776.0 ree 69 1 operator actions to extend the survivability of the i 2 containment and the core.
3 This particular event was then used to establish i
4 the DC power supply requirements for the SCS. i !
5 The second event that was used as a basis for- .
s 6 input to the design and engineering process is an ATWS with ,
i 1 7 operator action to reduce power level by water level control l i i 8 and by reducing reactor pressure.
9 And also exercising control to switch the 10 high-pressure coolant injection suction back to the 11 condensate storage tank after it has already' automatically !
12 transferred to the suppression. This event was used to size i t
13 the vent line itself.
14 We are, as indicated earlier at this point -- I ,
15 should say, we, LILCO at this point is presently folding the ,
16 Shoreham SCS system or Shoreham SCS into the 100 percent 17 power PRA. So the system will be tested against the full 18 range of the kinds of severe accidents that can be postulated i
19 to occur. l l
4 20 And we don't yet have the final and reviewed 21 results of that assessment to offer you. But they will be ;
i 22 forthecming in the not too distant future. That really then )
23 remains -- that is the test of how well the system really i~
24 contributes to the risk reduction.
I 25 I indicated that for the ATWS event, that we used I ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. !
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1 1 I 31776.0 l )
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1 an ATWS event for purposes of sizing the vent line, it was an.. i 4- 1 2 ATWS event with operator action to limit power, and the power ]
3 level that can be achieved with the water 2.evel at the top of' active fuel is 8 percent. And that is the power level that' 4 f i
5 was used to size the vent line.
l 6 MR. ELTAWILA: I have two questions. First of 7 all, before you reach the set pressure'for the activation cf 8 the rupture disc, the oterator wi21 be instructed to initiate 9 the spray system; so having the spray system as you 10 incorporated in this size of line,.because when you have a Il mixture of water and steam going through the vent, the vent i
12 capacity is going to be much lower than when you have pure j
13 steam.
']
)
14 The second question is, what about ATWS sequences !
l 15 i above 8 percent, especially 20 percent power level? .j . . )
i 16 MR. METCALF: I will get to that in a moment. j 17 With regard to the question on spray operation, we I i 18 have not explicitly included a second phase, liquid phase in I 19 the flow.
20 MR. LEONARD: We haven't done any operator ;
21 procedures on that. We haven't done any operator 22 procedures. - ,
23 MR. ELTAWILA: I am talking from experience about 24 all the operating procedures. There are set pressures at ,
'25 which the operator is instructed to initiate the spray.
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31776.0i ree 71 1 MR. LEONARD: We might. change that with_a filtered ;
2 vent. For instance, if your comment is a very valid comment 3 on that, we may say, hey, do not initiate --
4 MR. ELTAWILA: Okay. But I think it is something 5 that if you are going to study the effectiveness of that 6 size, you have to consider the other things that can reduce. ,
7 the flow through these lines.
t I i 8j MR. METCALF: You have to remember, too, that this ,
I 9 system is from the wetwell airspace and not from the 10 drywell. The wetwell airspace sprays are very modest !
i 11 capacity. Like a 500 gallons per minute system. So it is l
6 12 not like we are going to have anywhere near the suspended f!
j i 13 1:1guld in the wetwell airspace that we will have in the h
14 ll drywell.
0 15!l FROM THE FLOOR: That 8 percent, at what pressure 16 is that? Is that 60 pounds 7' l 17 MR. METCALF We have specified the 8 percent at 18 70 psi. AE it has turned out as a practical matter, Jack, 19 the vent line is a little bit bigger than that. We have 1
+
20 actually, nc,w that we actually have configured the system, we 21 have gone back, and in the PRA we will be using the actual 22 capability of-the system. It is somewhat higher than the 8 23 percent.
1 i 24 (Slide.)
25 MR. METCALF: The DC power supply is designed to ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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l operate the SCS for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after a -- this is a typo here, 2 thic should be a 24-hour in-core degradation and vent 1
actuation. So we have a 48-hour power supply requirement for 3
]
4 the SCS. That is to say, it is designed to monitor the l
5 situation for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> while the station blackout is leading I
6 to core degradation and vent operation, and then it is ,
fl I
7 designed to function an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in the time where I
8 that event requires mitigation. So there is a total of 48 9 hours capability. l
-l i 10 Now, in addition to using the two events that I ;
11 have just described, which provided the design, or provided 12 input to the design and engineering process, we also have )
13 used a third event to characterize the fission product 14 release to the FILTRA. And this event is an ATWS without 15 operator action. And the purpose of using this event is as a 16 design basis for the fission product release is that it 17 results in a larger and earlier fission product release to ;
18 the FILTRA than the other two events that we used as a basis 19 for providing design input.
20 So this is the event that we are analyzing for i l
21 purposes of assessing the fission product retention
)
22 capability of the FILTRA.
23 In this particular event we are assuming that the 1
24 reactor is isolated at 100 percent power. We get RPT but no 25 poison injection. The HPCI suction transfers to the ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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l l
31776.0 J ree l 73 !
I suppression pool automatically, but if it is not transferred j k
2 back to the condensate storage tank by operator action, pool 3 cooling is lost when the RHR NPSH falls below design values 4 so that we lose the cooling capability of the RHR' heat j .
5 exchangers, once again tending to accelerate the event. l i
- 6 We take no credit for depressurization of water l l
7 level control to limit power. We assume that the HPCI fails- i I
8 when the vent actuates. The vent actuates at about 1800 9 seconds into the event. So it is a very, very fast event.
10 very, very faut in terms of the time between, beginning of 11 .
the event and the time at which the vent opens.
12 For this event the core degrades while the i
1 13 containment is in the process of depressurizing. We assume 14 that at the time of vessel failure, that the pedestal i
15 downcomers fail because this then provides the means for 16 getting fission products from the reactor. vessel and the ;
17
)
drywell into the wetwell airspace and then the release, 18 subsequent release to the FILTRA.
19 If tha pedestal downcomers did not fail, we would 20 be taking credit for the full scrubbing capability of the 21 suppression.
22 MR. ELTAWILA: To what extent did you use the MAAP 23 3.07 s
The MAAP 3.0 code is an analysis 24 MR. METCALF:
25 after you complete everything. I am going to get into a ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS,' INC.
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,1 discussion of the characteristics, the thermal hydraulic and 1 i f
( l 2 fission product release characteristics of this event.
3 MR. ELTAWILA: You know that MAAP is not an ]
! l 4 approved code right now, so it is still under review by NRC. l 5 MR. METCALF: I understand that.
i
. 6 MR. ELTAWILA: Okay.
7 MR. METCALF: This is once again the configuration ,
8 that we showed you earlier. But this is the configuration 1 9 after the system has gone into operation. We have, of 10 course, a failed reactor vessel; we have failed downcomers 11 and we have core debris in the suppression pool, which is 12 providing a source of steam to the wetwell airspace. So when 13 we vent the wetwell airspace, we are not cnly handling the 14 steam that is steam and noncondensibles that are stored in 15 the primary containment at high pressure, but we are also 16 adding to that inventory by continuous steam from core debris 17 which are deposited in the suppression pool.
18 MR. ELTAWILA: Do you have a communication between 19 the airspace region?
20 MR. METCALF: Both above and below the water level j
. 21 there are fairly large openings. I used to know that number 1
22 but it is like 10 or 15 square feet both above and below. So 23 there is the opportunity to exchange within and outside the :
1 1 .,
24 pedestal, both the submerged at the unsubmerged portions of.
l 1
25 the wetwell. l l
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1i This is the wetwell pressure transient for the , ,
r 4
(
2 event that I have just described. As you can see, we have 3 the vent actuating at about 75 or so psig. This has been 4 chopped off a little bit because of the number of points that 5 we select for plotting, but the pressure increases to the set
- l
. 6 point for the system which is, as I said, about 60 psig, 75 7 psia. The system then begins -- the containment then begins .
8 to depressurize. At about two hours into the event we get j 9 vessel failure, resulting in a slight pressure increase at 10 the time of vessel failure.
11 The containment continues to depressurize until it 12 reaches ambient pressure. I should note the fact that this i
\
13 particular analysis was done without incorporating the i
14 backpressure effect of the FILTRA relief valves. As we i
15 indicated earlier, we are still negotiating with the Swedes i 16 as to exactly what the configuration will be.
17 We have done an analysis. I did not bring the 18 plots, however, where the filter backpressure is i
19 incorporated, and in fact, as you might expect, at some point 20 after the, or actually just before vessel failure, we see the 21 pressure turn around and start to come back up to the relief 22 valve set points of the FILTRA. And then we see about the 23 same magnitude pressure increase at the time of vessel i'
24 failure for the case where the relief valves are installed on 25 the FILTRA.
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I' 31776.0 ree 76 q 1 But the -- once again, es you might expect, we are I
( ,
2 using this as the design basis for establishing the thermal i l 3 hydraulic and the fission product release characteristics to {
i l 4 the FILTRA, and those are increased when we don't take credit !
i 5 for the backpressure of the relief valves. We send more )
6 stuff through the FILTRA when we do not take credit for the ,
1 7 relief valves along the FILTRA. So given that, that was -- !
8 that that issue was still somewhat up in the air, we chose to i
9 use these, this set of conditions as the design basis. j 10 MR. ELTAWILA: The second peak that occurs at --
11 that seems to be very modest pressure increase compared to j i
12 what we see in some other analyses? j i l 13 MR. METCALF: Of course you have to remember that 14 the vent is open at that time. So it is -- you don't see 15 just the pressure increase due to the --
16 MR. ELTAWILA: It does not act that continuously, I 17 anyway. The effectiveness of the vent rystem, there should {
l 18 be some time delays. j l
19 Oh, that is in hours. I am sorry. )
20 FROM THE FLOOR: Do you have any rule of thumb 21 that would determine when the relief valves would lift in ]
22 your FILTRA vent as a function of the amount of steam j 23 condensed in your bed?
24 MR. METCALF: That is a real good question, Jack.
1 25 In general we do. Obviously it is a complex picture', As a ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1: matter of fact, let me get into the steam flow and nitrogen ;
I i
2 flow from the primary containment, but that is really the 3 kind of question you are asking. The amount of steam that 4 the system can accommodate is dependent on the amount of 5 nitrogen that is already there. And so it is a question of 6 the superposition of the seem 21ow rate and the nitrogen ficw ,
f i
7 rate that determines whether the relief valves finally lift. ,
l 8 For the particular case that we are looking at, by ,
i l 9, the time you get the vessel failure a very large fraction of ;
! i 10 the nitrogen is already in the FILTRA. So that the amount cf ;
i 11 steam that the system can accommodate, the fraction of the 12 total volume that is saturated, is of necessity fairly small,;
i 13 because you have already put so much nitrogen into the ;
14 system. But it is a combination of those two contributors.
15 So there really is not a rule of thumb, per se.
16 MR. LEONARD: One thing I might mention, when you 17 start getting steam, you get a condensation wave in the 18 gravel that proceeds down. So what you have is you have 19 relatively clean nitrogen bleeding out of the vent. With 20 this condensation wave going, with any contaminated material 21 ,
behind it, in the early days when we were talking to the l 22 Swedes, they mentioned something like about a six-hour holdup 23 time between that condensation wave, as things like noble i
24 gases and particulate filled the interstitial spe.ces of the 25 gravel. We are trying to pin them down.
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I l
31776.0 ree 78 1 So I didn't know whether you were driving at ! l t
[
2 whether you are going to get a radiological release l
3 immediately, but I'had sort of the same question. And as 4 l
4 near as I can tell, you do get this wave that sort of presses ;
I 5 the nitrogen out before you get the other stuff.
6 FROM THE FLOOR: I just wanted to have some idea l I
7 of what are the chances of activating the system and not
-l' 8 activating the vents on the system. l 9 MR. METCALF: I could tell you this, for the case (
10 that wo studied with the relief valves installed, at the time ,
11 of vessel failure, we got a release of noble gases, the thing 12 we were really interested in was noble gas release. We got a I ,
13 I release of noble gases roughly 30 percent of the inventory of i 14 ' noble gases, because by the time you get to vessel failure, 15 the noble gases are nearly all already in the FILTRA. You 16 have delivered a very large fraction of the noble gases that 17 are going to be released eventually from the containment. f 18 You have already deli'.ered that to the FILTRA.
19 You have also delivered a very large fraction of 20 the nitrogen that is in the primary containment. So the 21 FILTRA, as I indicated, has a volume roughly comparable to 22 either the drywell or the wetwell, so if you transfer it all i J
4 23 to the system, not even accounting for any temperature 24 increase, you are already roughly two atmospheres gauge or !
25 three atmospheres absolute in the filter just.due to the l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC, 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646 l E
l 31776.0 L' ree 79 1 nitrogen.
2 So that at the time of vessel failure, there will 3 be a lift of the relief valve and some of that noncondensible 4 gas and some of the noble gases that are contained within, 5 mixed with that noncondensible gas will be released.
6 Beyond that point in time, the release is very 7 small. In other words, it is very slow. Once you get by 8 vessel failure, we have found that the rest of the noble gas 9 release occurs roughly over a period of tens of hours, 30, 40.
i 10 hours, because you, once you get through that transient, once :
11 the noncondensibles are all in the FILTRA, it is a pretty 12 good situation from that point on.
l 13 If that is of any help to you, that is what we l l
14 found for the particular case that we analyzed with the i ,
j l <
15 relief valves in place. l i
16 This is a steam flow, the transient steam flow 17 from the wetwell vent to the FILTRA. You can see that the --
18 it is the same kind of timing. We get -- we start the flow 19 at about 1800 seconds. "We reach a maximum flow of roughly 20 230 pounds per second which is a little bit higher than the 21 slightly higher than the design flow rate of the system, the
]
, 22 8 percent power translates into about 200 pounds per second.
i 1
23 of course, that is continuous. !
( 24 And we see once again a slight increase in the 1 25 steam flow at the time of vessel failure.
1 ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. l 702 347 3700 Nanonwide Coverage 800-336-6646
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l 31776.0) !
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1 The thing that is really interesting is the j I 2 nitrogen flow. This really represents the history of the gas 3
! that is initially in the primary containment. And as you can i I 4 see, initially when the vent opens, we do get a release of !
. l, ,
5 nitrogen and this represents the residual nitrogen that was i i .!
+ 6 in the wetwell airspace. l {
i j 7 The characteristic of an ATWS event is that you ! j 8 are adding steam from the suppression pool to the wetwell i) i 1 9 airspace and you are forcing the -- but can have the f l 10 noncondensibles that were there to begin with into the j l
11 drywell. So the nitrogen partial pressure'in the wetwell )
l i
12 airspace at the time the vent accuates is fairly modest. So ),
13 you don't really start getting very, very large flow rates of 14 nitrogen until the system begins to depressurize. And then 15 we, then you see nitrogen from the drywell coming over into l l
16 the wetwell airspace and then down the vent.
17 Finally, at the time of vessel failure, you can I l
18 see that there is not very much nitrogen left in the system l 19 and vessel failure essentially forces almost all of the 20 remaining nitrogen out of the system and then we have a very 21 small residue of nitrogen flow beyond that point.
22 One of the the benefits of putting the relief 23 valve on the system is that it tends to not only increase the i
24 capacitance of the system by using the full pressure 25 capability of the FILTRA, but it also tends to increase the ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1 back pressure effect and leave more of this nitrogen behind
(,
2 in the primary containment. So you really get two benefits J
3 from having installed the relief valves on the system in l 4 terms of its overall capacity. l 5 MR. ELTAWILA: Can you put the containment 6 pressurization curve up again?
I i
7 MR. METCALF: Do you want them overlaid? i i
I ,
8 MR. ELTAWILA: No. Just the -- it (.oesn't matter. ,
I i
9 If you look at the same case now vith the drywell ; j i
10 spray operating, okay? And you don't have any noncondensible 11 at the time your pressure is going down, how long does it 12 take to reach a vacuum condition in the containment? And how 13 fast the operator will be able to close these vent lines, ,
l 14 have you looked at that? i 15 MR. METCALF: Could you just repeat that question i
16 again? I understand the premise. You have drywell sprays )
17 operating.
18 MR. ELTAWILA: And you are very close here now, 19 drywell spray is very high flow capacity, okay? And you j l
20 don't have any noncondensible in the containment already. So i 21 if activation of the spray would bring the containment l 1
22 pressure to negative value very quickly, I don't know how I'
23 quick it is going to be. Have you looked at that effect 24 versus the operator action either terminating the spray or i
-I 25 closing the vent lines? !
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31776.0 ree 82 1 MR. LEONARD: I don't think we have done anything 2 in operational procedure.
l 3 MR. METCALF: We have not done that particular l study. I think that if the drywell sprays are operating and, 4l 5 of course, the amount of heat that can be removed from the l 6 containment is really limited by the amount of heat that the !
'I' I
7 RHR heat exchangers can reject. The amount of steam you can 8 condense is limited to the amount of energy. RHR heat 9 exchangers are rejected. So as long as you are producing !l !
t 10 more steam than the -- l 11 MR. ELTAWILA: Not at this time you are not 12 producing too much steam when you reach atmospheric !
13 condition. j l
14 MR. METCALF: When you reach this condition here? :
l l 15 MR. ELTAWILA: Yes.
16 MR. METCALF: It is roughly 10 pounds per second 1
3 17 or so, well it is actually a little bit more than that. You !
18 mean from the core debris. j i
19 MR. ELTAWILA: Yes, from the core debris. i 1
J 20 MR. METCALF: The RHR heat exchangers would be j j
i 21 able to reject more heat than that, that is true. The system 22 of course is, you still have noncondensibles in the FILTRA l
23 and you also have e large source of hot water in the FILTRA. l 1
24 So you have a steam scurce as you try to depressurize the 25 containment further, you have a lot of sources of hot water ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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31776.0 ree 83 1 that will flush the steam. ;
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2 MR. KASCSAK: I think we do understand that there 1
3 is a concern about approaching negative pressure in.the 4 containment if the sprays were to be turned on as this system 5 was in operation for some period of time. And we need-to i 6 deal with that in the procedures. !
I
. I 7 MR. METCALF: I have a couple'of -- I have three ,
8 more plots. Let me go through them fairly quickly. This is the noble gas release from the containment to the FILTRA for I t 9
i 10 the case once again where there is no back pressure from the l 11 FILTRA. And as you can see, the release starts somewhat^
12 before vessel failure, because the noble gases, of course, 13 will pass through the. suppression pool and are not affected 14 by any scrubbing in the suppression pool. So, therefore, 15l they are not dependent on having the downcomers fail in order 16 to get to the wetwell airspace. And the release of noble 17 gases to the FILTRA is all done by roughly four hours into 18 - the event. ;
19 MR. LEONARD: Do you have anything that shows the 20 residence time in the filter with a normal condensation wave 21 progression? I J
l 22 MR. METCALF: No. l 23 MR. LEONARD: No.
+ l 24 MR. METCALF: I don't have it with me.
.1 25 Cesium iodide release, which is typical of the l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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il Il 31776.0 i ree 84 1 i particulate release, we are getting roughly 60 percent of the I
( !
2 cesium iodide inventory and a comparable percentage of the 3 cesium hydroxide inventory released to the FILTRA. ,
l 4 Once again, it does not begin, the particulate j 5 release does not begin to the FILTRA until after vessel ;
6 failure and assumed failure of the pedestal downcomers at 7 that time. But once again the release is pretty much done by 8 about four hours. So the duration of the release to the l
9 FILTRA is a period of roughly over two hours. )
i 10 l Lastly, we also have used the MAAP code to i
11 characterize the particle size distribution. This is a l
12 representative distribution for the particles that are going 13 to the FILTRA. As you can see the dominant fraction is right 14 , around 2 microns, a little bit more, a little bit less. It i
15 ( is interesting to -- or it is important I think to note that 16 the test program that was conducted by the studsvik to 17 characterize or to provide a data base for the qualification 18 of the analytical models used to predict the particulate 19 retention characteristics of the gravel bed particle size was 20 approximately 2 microns.
21 ,
So we are in the range of the particle sizes that I
22 were used to qualify the analytical models used to predict 23 the retention characteristics, but, of course, this actual
( '
24 distribution will be used in the calculations of the 25 retention characteristics. )
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l' That concludes.my part of the presentation. I 2 will turn it back to Bob, who is going to complete the l 3 description of the design basis. .
4 MR. KASCSAK: I just want to concentrate on a few 5 final points as far as the design basis goes and some of the l I
6 codes and standards we will be applying to the system. j l
7 As we have stated previously, the FILTRA auxiliary l 8 building scope will be that of Swedepower and it is cur goal l
9I to, essentially, replicate the design that has been installed :
I I 10l at Barseback. This system, as we have stated, is classified 11 as nonsafety-related system. It is not required to mitigate 12 even design basis accidents at the plant. But as a practical 13; matter we have decided that we will be imposing as a guide 14 someofthesafety-related'designstandardsforthestructurel ;
15 and the primary mechanical venting piping system.
16 The Swedes have used in their design the ASME III 17 code as their design st.ndard, again as a guide and we will 18 be applying that same approach here for Shoreham. So that 19 for the structural area of this building, we will be applying 20 the ASME III, Division II code and for the auxiliary building 21 ,
we will be supplying the ACI-349 code. We will be designing l
22 the systems to seismic requirements conforming to the SSE 23 level for the plant, t
24 Similarly in the mechanical system, the primary 25 system will be -- we will be using the ASME III, Class 3 code ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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31776.0 :
ree ! 86 I as a design to perform the design analysis and calculations 2 for the mechanical systems.
3 . All of the support systems in'the mechanical area, !
4 the ventilation systems, et cetera, will be to 4
5 nonsafety-related standards of high industrial quality type o
6 codes. -
7 l In the electrical area, none of the electrical l 8 equipment is required per se to be available to support the .
t l
9 functioning of the' system. The system is completely passive ;
I 1
10 and there are no active components to insure its !
11 operability. So the system'has been classified again even in ! l 12 as far as any of the codes that Swedepower as used as a 13 nonsafety system and we will be using the traditional j 14 industrial standards for that system as well.
15 !
But it will be highly reliable and we will be 16 providing redundancy in its design to insure that the 4 l
17 circuitry and the power supplies will be of high 4 l
i 18 reliability. j I
19 MR. ELTAWILA: Can I ask a question? The flow 20 element that I mentioned before the break has the logic that 21 when you sense a pressure in the containment less than the 22 certain value, it will close the valve. Let's assume that 23 you have a steam spike that produced a pressure above 60 t
24 psig, opened the vent line, and the logic starts sensing.
25 You know the spike will drop rather quickly after that, and .
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1 then you hit the logic starts reading a different value, so k i 2 they close this valve and now you are progressing that you l 1
3 are going to have a vent system opening.
4 MR. KASCSAK: You are talking about the valves l l l inside the secondary containment? j !
l 5 l l l 6 MR. ELTAWILA: The two valves'that normally open.
?R. KASCSAK: That is not this scope, but to I 4 7
i f 8 answer your question, we will need to deal with that logic. l l
9 That will be safety-related. logic and that will, we will be l l
10 looking at the accuracy and response time of that logic to ,
11 see if we can handle those types of situations. Maybe there f j 1
l 12 are some time delays that will have to be added, but that has s
13 not yet been finalized.
l 14 FROM THE FLOOR: How about all the controls on the 15 valves on the two valves that you have inside?
16 MR. KASCSAK: Inside the FILTRA building?
17 FROM THE FLOOR: Yes.
18 MR. LEONARD: Why don't you go to your nJxt 19 slide.
20 MR. KASCSAK: Well, I am still on -- in the FILTRA l
21 building scope itself, that is not built to class 1E 22 standards, but it will be a highly reliable system with 23 redundant capability. Many of the instruments will be
/
I 24 provided with dual indication so that we will have that 25 capability of providing that information to the operator.
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1 In the BOP area, I will touch on this in a second,
(
2 some of the information that will be available to the 3 operator, to reiterate, the distinction here being the 4 pressure boundary requirements and beyond the pressure ,
5 boundary, Class 1, Category I upstream of the primary
. 6 pressure boundary and all of the equipment and the control 7 logic associated with that power supply will be 8 safety-related. ;
9' Beyond the containment isolation boundary, we will ;
l 10 be, as a practical matter, providing similar design standards l l l
11 as a guide as we are using for the FILTRA building. The 12 structural area we will be using the ACI codes for the pipe 13 trench and we will be imposing tornado wind and PMH loads on l-14 that structure.
i 15 ! In the mechanical area, in the primary system, in 16 the safety-related portions, we will be complying with ASME ,
i 17 III, Class 2 and for the piping system beyond the containment i
18 isolation barrier, we will be using the ASME III, Class 3 1
19 code, j 20 Some of the, again, support systems which are 21 really not required as a matter of having the system 22 function, will be built -- be designed to the traditional-23 industrial standards. j
- i
's 24 As far as the electrical area, for the containment 'l 1
1 25 isolation valves an its logic, it with be fully j ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1 safely-related class 1E. The remainder of the system will be l '
( I 2 high quality industrial standards. DC power for the both 3 systems will be supplied with DC-pcwer through inverters to )
l 4 provide backup capability, j 5 In the instrumentation area, the instrumentation j )
1
- 6 is not required to have the system function, but we will be l l l l 7 providing highly reliable system for the operator. We will l j I l 8 be providing signals to the ERF computer and we will be j j i !
i 1 9 providing a new panel in the control room that will give the i j l t \
l 10 operator certain information, pressure, temperature, i
11 radiation and flow, that will make that information available i l 12 for him to use in his operating procedures that will be 13 ! developed as this design progresses. .
14:t MR. ELTAWILA: What does the ERF --
15 MR. KASCSAK: Emergency response facility. .
1 I 16 FROM THE FLOOR: Are you going to touch on the '
i 17 testability of the FILTRA system? Valves? Structural l 18' tests?
19 MR. KASCSAK: We hadn't really planned on getting 20 into that in any specific point.
21 ,
MR. YOUNGLING: You mean the preoperational 22 commissioning tests?
23 FROM THE FLOOR: And any level of surveillance i
t 24 testing?
25 MR. YOUNGLING: We did not intend to touch upon ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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that. We haven't really resolved that yet. That will have j
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2 I to come later. That will come later.
3 MR. KASCSAK: That concludes my portion of the 4 presentation. I would like to now turn it over to Chris Cole 5 who will present some of the project management aspects of ,
6 the project and where we stand right now. l l
7 MR. COLE: Thanks, Bob. Good afternoon. This l y I
8 will be rather nontechnical portion of the presentation. 1 9 LILCO project management organization in concert.
10 with the Office of Nuclear Operation has the overall 11 responsibility for the successful completion of this 12 project. To demonstrate our company's commitment and to J
13 reinforce what John mentioned earlier, I would like to 14 briefly discuss the project organization, the overall project 15 schedule., the current status of the project, and some of the
'1 16 construction controls that we have planned on implementing. )
i 17 I would also like to show a few slides that were )
18 taken during the actual construction'of the Barseback plant 19 in Sweden.
20 Due to the significance of this project relative 21 to the overall scope, the cost, and the importance to our 22 company, it was determined that we would establish a 23 dedicated organization under the direction of a project (s ,
24 manager to assure timely and cost effective completion. This '
25 is the organizational structure that is currently in place.
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o 1 31776.0 ree 91 1 (Slide.) ..
2 MR. COLE: Most of the key positions have been l
3 filled with full-time LILCO personnel who were selected based 4 on their unique qualifications tc support the specific
. I.
5 requirements of the project. !
i 6 This organizational structure will serve as the 7 nucleus for a matrix management approach which will be 8 supported by the balance.of the functional organizations in ;
i 9 LILCO. f i
10 Very briefly, the project manager, obviously, has l l
11 the overall responsibility for meeting all of the objectives l l
12 ; of the project. Briefly reporting ~to him will be the project '
E ! ! !'
13 ' engineer, construction superintendent will be responsible for !
14 all construction aspects, the contract manager, product ;
I L
15 0 administrator, planning, scheduling and cost control i i
16 , supervisors. j i
17 Also reporting to the project manager will be an 18 assistant project manager, also designated as the manager of i j
i 19 nuclear servi-ac. It will be his responsibility to assure 20 that all nuclear requirements associated with this project 21 are met. Reporting to the assistant project manager will be j 22 the nuclear project engineer, the nuclear procurement 23 supervisor, the plant modifications engineer and the 24 licensing engineer. I don't really think it'is necessary to j 25 go into any more detail on the organization unless you have ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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ree 92 1 specific questions. j i
4 2 Okay. A critical path schedule has been developed 3 for the completion of the project, based on the actual 4 activity durations that were experienced by Sydkraft during 5 their installation at Barseback.
- 6 (Slide.)
7 MR. COLE: As you can see, the overall project 8 schedule is 36 months. This would include the initial 10 i 1
9 months for the engineering aspect of the project, 10 months 10 for the FILTRA engineering as Bob mentioned earlier, this we I
11 are currently in the process of negotiating with Swedepower i
12 to provide the engineering and design for the FILTRA l I
~
\ >
13 structure and the auxiliary building. !l l 14 The BOP engineering which represents the scope of l
l 15 the work from the auxiliary building back to the plant to the l 16 primary containment will be competitively bid to a U.S.
17 architect-engineering firm.
18 In parallel with that activity, we will take 19 whatever action is necessary on site to relocate some of the j 20 temporary facilities that are currently in a location where 21 the structure will be built. Relocate the personnel and 22 perform the other site preparation activities. If you want l 23 to take a look at this later, you can see there are two
(
24 temporary buildings that have to be removed. The' people that 25 are currently residing in these offices will have to be l ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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- 1. relocated.
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2 Following the 10-month engineering effort, we have 3 allowed four months for construction, contract and 4 procurement cycle. We have developed an overall construction ,
I !
J 5 schedule based on single shift minimal overtime of 20 l
s a 6 months. And allocated two months for the final testing !
7 associated with the installation.
l' 8 The current status of the project, if I may, we 9 are in a process of finalizing the engineering and the design 10 specifications. During May we took soil borings and that 11 information has been incorporated in these specifications. ,
1 12 We developed or we are in the process now of putting the 13 organization in place on site. We have a project office that 14 has been established. The personnel in the organization are 15 developing their resource requirements and cash flow 16 requirements to support the overall project.
17 With regard to the controle over the construction 18 process, I would just like to make one statement. All work j 19 on site will be performed in accordance with the station 20 modification program and the appropriate plant procedures.
21 We will develop a specific construction inspection program in 22 concert with the quality assurance organization and I think 23 Mr. Seaman will go into a little more detail on the quality
(
1 24 assurance program during his presentation.
25 MR. PALLA: Could you describe when in this i
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317 7 6 . 0 J ree 94 1 process you load the stone into this filter? l 2 MR. COLE: Yes. Sometime in here. It would 3- probably be during the latter phases of the construction 4 program. I think you will see when we go through the slides ,
5 that the sequence of operations includes building the FILTRA .l 6 structure and then loading the stones in after the structure l i i
I I 7 is completed. ; j f
So the testing is done with the stones '
8 MR. PALLA:
l 9 already in place?
10 MR. YOUNGLING: Yes.
11 MR. PALLA: Is it like a pressure test, at full 12 design pressure, that kind of a test?
13 MR. COLE: The specific test programs for the 14 construction phase have not really been developed yet.
15 ! MR. PALLA: But it would include things like i
I '
16 pressure tests, I presume?
l 17 MR. YOUNGLING: Appropriate tests would be done.
i 18 MR. COLE: On appropriate tests, yes.
19 MR. YOUNGLING: On appropriate pressure tests, air I I
20 tests, whatever we have to do. We haven't worked those 21 detailt out with the Swedes yet.
22 MR. COLE: I think what we are going to'do is we 23 are going to look at the test programs that were implemented
(
24 by Sydkraft and we will evaluate the -- whether or not they i j
25 are appropriate to be applied in this case. I i
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31776.0 g ree ji . 95 FROM THE FLOOR: Just to get an understanding of
, 1l j i
2 where your zero point is --
3 MR. COLE: That is where we are right now.
4 FROM THE FLOOR: Well, are you really there? Is 5 that assuming now that you have your contract in place? .i i
6 MR. COLE: The zero point would be, award a ;
i' 7 contract to Swedepower to begin the FILTRA engineering.
i i
8 FROM THE FLOOR: So that really is today? l l
9 MR. COLE: That is within the next month or two, ;
t !
10 yes. We are currently in the process of negotiating with 11 Swedepower. We have initiated some preliminary design 12 activities which will support this schedule.
t 13 li FROM THE FLOOR: And you are allowing 2-1/2 months ,
t 14 for accepting bids on the A&E? I 15 MR. COLE: That is correct. We are currently in >
16 the process of finalizing that specification, so I would say 1
17 within the next one to two months or even earlier would we l 18 would be prepared to go out to bid for that organization of 19 the work.
20 MR. ELTAWILA: When you perform your ILRT, are the 21 valves, containment isolation valves going to be open or 22 closed? t l
i 23 MR. YOUNGLING: Fresently, our plans are to keep 24 them open and the test would be done against the rupture 25 discs.
]
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l 8
31776.0 ree 96 1 MR. ELTAWILA: Okay.
t 1 2 MR. METCALF: Type B testing would include the j l
3 valves.
4 MR. YOUNGLING: On type C, not type C. .
, 1 5 MR. METCALF: That is it. Sorry. Correction.
6 MR. COLE: Any further questions?
7 What I would like to do is move into the slide 8 presentation. I know everyone is in a hurry, so we will run ;
9 through it fairly quickly. This is a slide you saw before ,
10 and-just to put things in perspective, this is the location 11 of the FILTRA structure at Barseback. This is the finished l 12 product, again as mentioned earlier, the gravel bed filter i
l 13 structure is approximately 70 foot in diameter and 120 foot I
14 high. This is the three-story auxiliary building, I guess !
I l ,
15 one story is above grade. The other two are down below. j l
i 16 (Slide.) j i
17 NR. COLE: This is a shot taken during preliminary I 18 construction. It shows the excavation for the FILTRA mat, 19 FILTRA structure mat and the pipe tunnel or I guess where the 20 a xiliary building will be built an adjacent to the~FILTRA 21 structure.
22 (Slide.)
23 MR. COLE: This shows the concrete mat for the j
(
24 FILTRA structure and the form work associated with the-lower 25 elevation of the auxiliary building. I believe there is ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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l 31776.0 l ree ! 97 about t thousand cubic yards of concrete in this parti.cular I
1] i 2
l Installation.
3 (Slide.)
4 MR. COLE: This shows the reinforcing steel at the 5 base of the FILTRA structure. Again, this is a reinforced 6 concrete post tension concrete structure.
7 (Slide.) ,
I 8 MR. COLE: This is the slide showing, I guess, the I
9 completion of the steel liner and the beginnings of setting 10 up the slip forms for the outside concrete shell.
11 (Slide.)
12 MR. COLE: This shows the slip forming operation l
~ i 13 approximately half complete. The rate of slip forming that b, l 14 they experienced was about 10 inches per hour which I believe 15 l we will employ the same type of technique for installing this ,
i 16 portion, the installation.
l 17 (Slide.)
There is rebar in the concrete, l
l 18 MR. PALLA:
l l i 19 right? )
l l
20 MR. COLE: Can you go back one. Yes, you can see 21 the reinforcing steel coming up this way. During a slip l l
22 forming operation, the wire lathers are working ahead of the i
23 masons placing the concrete. l t
24 Under this type of approach, you can stop the ,
1 1 25 operation if you run into a problem. Okay? We intend on ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 1 202 347 3700 Naiionwide Coverage 800 336-6M6
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31776.0 l ree 98 1 l performing the work using a continuous slip form operation. ,
2 Another approach is jump forming where you would make a pour ;
3 and then you would strip the forms and move them up. I think 4 this, you end up with a better finished product using this j 5 approach.
i Do you have personnel hatchways I
6 FROM THE FLOOR:
7 to enter into that system?
8 MR. YOUNGLING: The way you enter is you can enter 9 through the tunnel and you go into the central region or you 10 can climb up the ladders on the outside and go in from the 11 top. But you do not go into the rock. That is sealed up.
12 FROM THE FLOOR: I was more interested in those i
13 i valves. ;
)
l 14 MR. YOUNGLING: You can go in that central tunnel I
15 region.
16 MR. METCALF: There is access through the shaft.
i 17 MR. YOUNGLING: Jim was over at Barseback and an 18 engineer from my organization also went over.
19 (Slide.)
20 MR. COLE: This shot simply shows the completion 21 of the slip forming operation and the form work associated 22 with the top level of the auxiliary building.
23 (Slide.)
24 MR. COLE: How many rocks did you say were in 25 here?
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MR. METCALF: There is 16,000 metric tons. .
I 2 MR. COLE: This shows the placement of the 3 quartzite aggregate which, as we said before, is compacted to 4 a 35 percent void ratio. lj d
5 (Slide.) ,
I
- 6 MR. COLE: This shows the reinforcing steel j 7 associated with the roof slab on top of this structure. This i l
8 is the piece of the form work for the vent pipe.
I 9 (Slide.)
10 MR. COLE: This is the prefabricated spreader i
j 11 assembly that would be tied into the vertical vent pipe 12 coming up the center of the structure.
4 13 l (Slide.)
14 MR. COLE: And this shows that spreader pipe in 15 place prior to the concrete bore for the roof. slab.
I 16 (Slide.)
)
17 MR. COLE: This is a temporary dryer or heater l
! I 18 unit that is used to dry out the aggregate once it is placed, )
1 19 (Slide.)
20 MR. COLE: This is a shot showing the, I guess it 21 is the lower level of the auxiliary building, the vent line 22 would come in this way, through this pipe and then up. This 23 would be lower level. This is the condensate drip tank, i
(Slide.)
24 25 MR. COLE: Condensate storage tank. I ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1 This shows the roof slab or actually the floor i
2 i
slab for the second level which would -- and this is the l
3 entrance way where the 30-inch, or 24-inch in this 4 application -- Shoreham's application a 30-inch pipe could 5 comply here and would come through here.
- 6 (Slide.) ,
7 MR. COLE: This will be the final -- well, this is !
8 the roof slab on the pipe tunnel.
I l
9 (Slide.) !
10 MR. COLE: This is a shot showing the inside of !
11 the pipe tunnel. And this is your 24-inch vent line.
12 I think that is the last slide.
13 I told you it would be brief. If there are no I
14 i further questions, I would like to introduce Mr. Seaman who I
15 will discuss the quality assurance program associated wi.th 16 this project.
l'7 MR. SEAMAN: Good afterncon. I am going to take le really just a few brief moments to describe the nuclear 19 quality assurance department's involvement in the 20 supplemental containment project.
21 As you have heard, earlier, the project is divided 22 into two scopes, BOP scope which contains both safely-related 23 and nonsafety-related work, and the FILTRA scope. Which is 24 the nonsafety-related portion of the project. And after I go 25 through that, I will spend a couple of moments describing the ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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J' 1 QA organization that we will put in place for this project. l 1
2 The BOP scope, again to reiterate, that is the 3 portion of the project that goes from primary containment up
, 1 4 to but not including the auxiliary building, will be done 5 under the Shoreham station modification program which is a !
t d 6 program that we used for all mod work out at the plant. Of 7 course, for the safety-related portion of that effort, the i
8 full LILCO quality assurance program will be put in place, l 9 including obviously engineering, design procurement, 10 installation and testing et cetera.
11 In the nonsafety-related portion of this work, the 12 QA involvement will be as specified in the engineer, the 13 LILCO engineering specs. And again, that will be coincident 14 with the significance to the system of the particular J 15 i component or subsystem that we are looking at.
16 The FILTRA scope, which includes the auxiliary 17 building and the FILTRA building itself, basically the 18 portion of the project that will be furnished to us by ,
l 1
19 Swedepower, again will be conducted under the Shoreham 20 station modification program. The primary train of the vent
- 21 path, including the filter itself, will have an appropriate 22 QA program applied to it, even though it is not 23 safety-related.
i 24 As an example, as Bob mentioned earlier, in this 25 nonsafety-related portion ASME III code, Class 3 will be ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
l 31776.0 h ree 102 1 applied. In terms of quality assurance, we intend to apply 1
2 ASME III code, Class 3 inspection, NDE and testing 3 requirements'which will be implemented by the' quality 4 assurance organization.
e 5 Under'this portion of the scope, under the FILTRA 6 portion of the scope for supporting systems such as the HVAC 7 system within the FILTRA building,_again, we will be applying 8 a QA program as defined in LILCO engineering specifications, i
9 Are there any questions on this portion?
l t
10 Okay. !
11 In terms of organization, we will basically be 12 utilizing our existing nuclear quality assurance 13 organization. Under the nuclear quality assurance department 14 manager, he will be receiving support for all of the 15 h inspection work on the construction project itself from the l '
i 16 quality control manager. Again, what we intend to do is !
17 establish a project lead which will be a LILCO person, 18 supported oy probably some contract persons and inspection i i
19 personnel to support the construction effort. Under the 20 quality systems manager will be the procurement, audit and 21 engineering functions. Those of you who are familiar with 4
'l 22 the Shoreham QA program, that is basically the way our
]
-i 23 organization is for the entire plant.
I
- l 24 In terms of QA, that is really all I had planned 25 to discuss unless there are any further questions or any i ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. l l
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 I
i a
i ll l 1 l
31776.0 i ree 103 1 questions? If not, I would like to reintroduce Mr. Leonard .
)
( f 2 who has a few closing remarks. j 3 MR. LEONARD: Well, in closing, I would like to 4 summarize a few key points: First, I do want to say again j 5- and again that Shoreham is safe in its present configuration ;
4 6 and we are ready for our license now. Supplemental ;
l l 7 containment system answers both the what-if questions and I l
8 reduces certain radiological concerns for us. Project l 9 organization is established right now, contracts are being 7 10 finalized, some work is progressing. As Chris mentioned, we l 1
11 have taken soil borings, we are dealing right now with the 12 people in Sweden, we have had come small subcontracts to find li 13l out some analytical questions, i, I.
~
14 j. One of the key purposes of this meeting, because l 15' it is very important to us and I know it is a new thing in 1
I 16 this country, is to insure that you all are satisfied, the l I I
17 NRC Staff, with our actions. We don't want to go charging 18 off into the wild blue yonder and find, we are all the way 19 down the road and all of a sudden, we are at loggerheads on i
20 some issues. We really solicit your comments and we will 21 take that input and try to do what we can.
'l
. 22 We need your agreement on our basic concept of the i
23 designing and building the supplemental containment system. j
( b 24 We think we are doing it in a sensible manner, a cost i 1
l 25 effective manner, but we need -- we are again -- I want to ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. ;
202-3C-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 l l
11 il 31776.0lj ree !. 104 1 reiterate this -- we want your feedback, solicit your j i,
2 cooperation and we are committed to have the safest plant in 3 this country, which I honestly think we have now. And when 4 this is put in, it will take care of some of-the concerns and 3 5 "what-ifs" that other people may ask.
i !
6 I have nothing else to say. If you have any j 7 questions, I would be glad --
I .
8 FROM THE FLOOR: Just one. You indicated that you 9 would like to get feedback from the NRC relative to this 10 particular design. Based on the schedule that was put on 11 there, where do you foresee having that tentative NRC 12 approval on that schedule?
13 l MR. LEONARD: Well, I am not so much worried about l
14 the schedule. I. see what you mean, on the schedule for you hl a
15 all?
16 FROM THE FLOOR: Right.
17 MR. LEONARD: We would like somehow and I guess we 18 will have to work it out through our licensing people and 19 Mr. Lo, somehow get this reasonably quick because we are 20 proceeding into a contractual relationship with Sydkraft, 21 part of the Swedepower consortium. And we have had extensive 22 meetings here with them in this country to iron out things.
23 I guess we will just.have to deal with Mr. Lo and
('
24 see what we can work out. That would be the best way to do 25 it. We certainly don't want to get too far down the line.
I ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
200 347,3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
-1 31776.0 ree 105 1 Conversely, we had to do as much as we could to get some. idea i
2 ourselves and start our own analytical work so we could just 3 have this meeting with you. We don't want to be coming in l 4 with no information at all.
l i
5 I think we feel, wouldn't you say Ed, that we are !
l I* 6 comfortable with the engineering background.
l l
l 7 MR. YOUNGLING: Yes, we are.
l 8 MR. LEONARD: And we are comfortable with what the 9 Swedish power organization will do and the quality control 10 that we will maintain on that.
I 11 It is such a new thing, you know, where you are ;
1 i l
12 dealing with a foreign design that is in place and as far as l 13 their regulatory commission is concerned, it is an effective 14 method of implementation of risk reduction, that I guess we !
15 are both on new paths. We would certainly solicit any
! l 16 comments that you might have on how to get started on this. l 17 FROM THE FLOOR: Yes.
18 MR. LO: I will address that when I close the l 19 meeting.
20 MR. LEONARD: That is really all I had to say.
- 21 FROM THE FLOOR: Thank you.
22 MR. LO: Thank you, John, I want to thank you for 23 a very informative meeting. I think we asked you many i
24 questions. We interrupted the meeting with many questions 25 and that is the reason that some of us couldn't be here ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
31776.0 ree 106 1 during the latter part of the meeting. And the meeting is
(
2 being transcribed so that you can obtain the questions and I 3 think that most of the people who left have left with the 4 questions asked already, so their concerns are in the 5 transcript and you can respond to that.
, 6 I think that maybe you can -- I suggest'that you 7 go through the transcript and read the NRC concerns and maybe 8 respond by writing those concerns. And in that response, 9 feel free to ask us what remaining questions we would have.
I 10 I think that with the background from you today and also the 11 response from you, we may be able to come up with some , j 12 answers for you. t l
13 MR. LEONARD: Very good, i
14 MR. LC: So I want to thank you for the very i ,
i 15 informative meeting. I think it was very well prepared and I i t l 16 think that the concept of the supplemental containment system I ]
~l 17 is very important, especially for Shoreham. It may not be as
{
18 applicable to other plants, but because of the unique license 19 situation for Shoreham --
20 Also, Greg Minor, if you have questions after
]
. 21 looking at the transcript, it should be available in a few 22 days. And I will see to it that you get a copy. And if you 23 have points of clarification that you want to make, feel free 1
(
( 24 to call me up and I will channel thosc questions to LILCO and- ]j l
25 see if they can be answernd.
Ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. ,
202 3 4 -3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
31776.0
- i ree 107 I i
. 1 MR. LEONARD: Thank you.
k.
2 MR. YOUNGLING: Thank you, Rob.
d 3 (Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the hearing was 4 concluded.)
5 l i' !
- 6 7
8 9
10 11
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21 22 23
{*
24 25 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
l 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER
.f This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the matter of:
NAME OF PROCEEDING: MEETING WITH LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY SHOREHAM PLANT SUPPLEMENTAL CONTAINMENT SYSTEM DOCKET NO.:
PLACE: WASHINGTON, D. C. i
' TUESDAY, JULY 21, 1987 I DATE:
were held as herein appears, and that this is the cricinal !
transcrr.pt thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatcry Com.ission.
l l
l 1
(sigt) A (cf ,
M ,
(TYPED)
REBECCA E. EYSTER Official Reporter
. ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
Reporter's Affiliation l'
4 i
l i
(b) u
( SUPPLEMENTAL CONTAINMENT SYSTEM (SCS)
AGENDA J FOR NRC DISCUSSION l l
-1 A. Opening Remarks (J.'D. Leonard)
B. Background on the SCS (E.J. Youngling)
- 1. LILCO Decision to Implement
- 2. Swedish Support Documentation l
C. General Overview (R. M. Kascsak) .
- 1. SNPS SCS Arrangement
- 2. Major Design Criteria
- 3. Impact on Plant Design Basis D. SCS Design (R. M. Kascsak)
- 1. Functional Design Basis (J. Metcalf)
- 2. Design of the System Mechanical Electrical Structural E. Project Overview (C.D. Cole) j
- 1. Project Control
- 2. Preliminary Schedule l 1
- 3. Status I i
F. SCS/ BOP Construction (C.D. Cole)
- 1. Construction Methods
- 2. Construction Standards )
a G. QA Program (C.K. Seaman) I
. H. Sumary of Presentation (J. D. Leonard) t
'i i
i i
1
')
l l
( OPENING REMARKS q
l THE OBJECTIVES OF THIS MEETING ARE T0:
- 1. PROVIDE NRC WITH AN UNDERSTANDING.0F WHAT l LILC0 IS DOING IN REGARDS TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL l CONTAINMENT SYSTEM (SCS) l l _
- 2. OBTAIN AGREEMENT ON LILCO'S APPROACH THAT THE SCS l DOES NOT DEGRADE THE DESIGN BASIS OF THE PLANT s
- 3. OBTAIN AGREEMENT, To THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SYSTEM
- 4. OBTAIN FEEDBACK ON ANY QUESTIONS / CONCERNS 1
1 i
I i
u___----___--------. - - - _ - - - - - . - . - _ - . - - - . _ 1
( BACKGROUND ON THE SCS
- 1. WETWELL AIRSPACE VENT (WAV) CONCEPT C
- 2. REGULATORY BACKGROUND
- 3. GOALS OF WAV l
l
- 4. OPTIONS EVALUATED
- 5. SWEDISH INITIATIVES l l
- 6. CONCLUSIONS l
F U_______________________
- k. WETWELL AIRSPACE VENT'(WAV) CONCEPT CERTAIN LOW PROBABILITY HIGH CONSEQUENCE ACCIDENTS, BEYOND DESIGN BASIS, CAN THREATEN' INTEGRITY OF CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE WAV REDUCES PRESSURE IN CONTAINMENT PRIOR'TO POTENTIAL FOR CONTAINMENT FAILURES CONTAINMENT DESIGN PRESSURE -
48 PSIG ULTIMATE CONTAINMENT PRESSURE -
130 PSIG PRESSURE PROTECTION CAN BE ACHIEVED BY FILTERED OR UNFILTERED VENTS - FILTERED VENTS CAN PROVIDE ADDITIONAL RADIOLOGICAL BENEFITS
.s a
e l'
- u y { REGULATORY BACKGROUND ON
! FILTERED, VENTED CONTAINMENTS l
~
WASH-1400 DISCUSSED ROLE OF CONTAINMENT IN REDUCTION l
OF RISK DUE TO CORE MELT ACCIDENTS (OCTOBER 1975)
STUDIED BY IDCOR AND NRC AFTER TMI l
l IDCOR STUDIES CONCLUDED THAT IMPLEMENTATION WAS NOT WARRANTED AT THAT TIME BASED UPON COSTS AND BENEFITS BWROG ESTABLISHED GUIDELINES FOR VENTING CONTAINMENTS
(
1 NRC HAS PROPOSED FIVE (5) MODIFICATIONS POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE TO SHOREHAM:
- 1. LARGE DIAMETER WETWELL VENT, OPERABLE REMOTELY DURING STATION BLACKOUT l 2. HYDROGEN CONTROL, IF REQUIRED, WHEN AIR REFILLS CONTAINMENT'AFTER VENTING 1
i 3. BACKUP CONTAINMENT SPRAYS, REMOTELY OPERABLE DURING STATION BLACKOUT
- 4. CORE DEBRIS CONTROL TO ENSURE DRYWELL TO WETWELL INTEGRITY
{ 5. PROCEDybESTOENSUREPROPERUSEOFTHESEFEATURES l
4
- ~ .
4 GOALS OF WETWELL AIRSPACE VENT ENHANCE PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF SHOREHAM REDUCE RELATIVE RISK FROM SHOREHAM PLANT BY ADDRESSING DOMlNANT HIGH CONSEQUENCE LOW PROBABILITY SEVERE ACCIDENT SEQUENCES REDUCE POTENTIAL FOR PROTECTIVE ACTION REQUIREMENTS TO
.. IHE PUBLIC FOLLOWING A SEVERE ACCIDENT 1
l \
REDUCE F0TENTIAL FOR LAND CONTAMINATION, THUS PREVENT LAND USAGE RESTRICTIONS FOLLOWING A SEVERE ACCIDENT REDUCE CORE INVENTORY OF NUCLIDES THAT COULD BE RELEASED GIVEN A SEVERE ACCIDENT SYSTEM SHALL HAVE HIGH RELIABILITY l 1
I
( OPTIONS EVALUATED i
OPTION 1
. WETWELL VENT WHICH TERMINATES IN AN ELEVATED RELEASE OUTSIDE THE REACTOR BUILDING (NO EXTERNAL FILTER)
OPTION 2 WETWELL VENT WHICH TERMINATES WITHIN SECONDARY
_ CONTAINMENT (NO EXTERNAL FILTER)
'l 0PTION 3A WETWELL VENT WHICH TERMINATES IN AN EXTERNAL FILTER i OUTSIDE REACTOR BUILDING (SWEDISH FILTRA DESIGN)
OPTION 3B SAME AS 3A - USE 2ND GENERATION'SWEDISH POOL SCRUBBER DESIGN l
}
( i i
SWEDISH INITIATIVES
(,
THE SWEDtSH GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFETY
, CARRIED OUT AN ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR POWER SAFETY
~
COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED MEASURES BE TAKEN TO REDUCE RISK OF LAND CONTAMINATION FROM CONTAINMENT FAILURE EVENTS FIlTRA RESEARCH PROJECT INITIATED -
FEBRUARY 1980 FILTRA FINAL REPORT ISSUES -
NOVEMBER 1982 INITIAL SELECTION -
GRAVEL BED DESIGN w
FILTRA DESIGN ENGINEERING COMMENCED -
JULY 1982 FILTRA INSTALLATION COMMENCED AT BARSEBACK -
FEBRUARY 1984 FILTRA OPERATIONAL AT BARSEBACK -
OCTOBER 1985 0
(
1 1
)
k CONCLUSIONS q l
[
- 2. WAV WILL REDUCE PUBLIC RISK FROM SHOREHAM DOMINANT HIGH CONSEQUENCE LOW PROBABILITY ACCIDENT SEQUENCES
- 3. OPTION 1 OR OPTION 3A WILL FULFILL OBJECTIVES FOR WETWELL VENT PROPOSED BY NRC l
- 4. THE GRAVEL BED FILTER DESIGN (OPTION 3A) IS COMPATIBLE
\
WITH SHOREHAM DESIGN REQUIREMENTS AND COULD BE INSTALLED AT SHOREHAM
- 5. OPTION 3A IS RECOMMENDED OVER OPTION 1 DUE TO IMPROVED RISK REDUCTION AND OVERALL l!CENSABILITY BENEFITS To SHOREHAM
- 6. THE GRAVEL BED DESIGN IS RECOMMENDED RATHER THAN THE WATER POOL SCRUBBER DESIGN IF AN EXTERNAL FILTER IS CHOSEN 9
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PROVIDES CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY PRESSURE BARRIER t
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- 2. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 1
PROVIDE COMPLIANCE WITH GDC 56 REMOTE POSSIBILITY OF MALFUNCTION OF RUPTURE DISC, VALVES WITH AUTO CLOSE
- l CONTROL LOGIC DESIGNED To CLASS IE STANDARDS i
- 3. SAFETY ANALYSIS No NEW ACCIDENT INITIATORS l DESIGN PRESSURE MARGIN HAS NOT BEEN REDUCED
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PROCESS CONDITIONS ESTABLISHED BY CONSIDERATION OF ATWS AND STATION BLACKOUT q l
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HIGHLY. RELIABLE, GOOD ENGINEERING / CONSTRUCTION PRACTICES DES!GNED TO SELECTIVE SAFETY RELATED STANDARDS FOR PRIMARY SYSTEM (1.E., PRESSURE RELIEF FUNCTION) ie DESIGNED SEISMIC I
NOT SINGLE FAILURE PROOF, BUT HIGHLY RELIABLE VENT OPERABLE FROM CONTROL ROOM f
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DESIGN FOR COMBUSTIBLE GAS MIXTURES t
, OPERATIONAL PRESSURE OF SYSTEM SHALL:
ENSURE OPERABILITY OF SRV'S MAINTAIN INTEGRITY OF DRYWELL FLOOR SEALS r
SYSTEM SHALL PROVIDE DRYWELL VENTING TO ALLOW FOR PRIMARY CONTAINMENT FLOODING FOR LONG TERM RECOVERY-ELEVATED, MONITORED RELEASE I
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ADB/ADE - LARGE LOCA WITH LOSS OF PRESSURE SUPPRESSION AND AC POWER / INJECTION
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.i FP RELEASE CHARACTERIZED BY MAAP 3.0 ANALYSIS OF TC WITH OPERATOR ACTION: .
REACTOR ISOLATED AT 100% POWER RPT BUT NO SLC INJECTION HPCI SUCTION TRANSFERRED To SUPPRESSION POOL ]
g ON HIGH POOL LEVEL
NO DEPRESSURIZATION OR WATER LEVEL CONTROL-HPCI FAILS WHEN VENT ACTUATES (LOSS OF NPSH)
CORE DEGRADES WHILE CONTAINMENT DEPRESSURIZES
- l PEDESTAL DOWNCOMERS ASSUMED TO FAIL AT VESSEL FAILURE !
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1 SEISMIC ANALYTICAL METHODS 4
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BATTERY DC POWER FOR FORTY-EIGHT HOURS
- - 4. INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS DESIGNED TO HIGH QUALITY INDUSTRIAL STANDARDS HIGHLY RELIABLE.
SEISMIC DESIGN FOR PRESSURE BOUNDARY PROTECTION 1
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CLASSIFICATION QA CATEGORY I TO CONTAINMENT PRESSURE BOUNDARY
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- 1. STRUCTURAL SUPPORT STRUCTURES WITHIN CONTAINMENT PRESSURE BOUNDARY - QA CATEGORY I (SEISMIC)
PIPE TRENCH - SEISMIC ANALYTICAL METHODS -
{ ACI-349-85 l
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HVAC - CATEGORY ll NOT OPERATING DURING ACTIVATION OF FILTRA r 1 i
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SIGNALS PROVIDED TO ERF COMPUTER NEW CONTROL PANEL IN CONTROL ROOM PRESSURE TEMPERATURE RADIATION FLOW l
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' I I I I I I I I I I n I.... ...
OA INVOLVEMENT IN SCS PROJECT t
- BOP SCOPE (SAFETY RELATED 8
. NON-SAFETY RELATED)
FILTRA SCOPE (NON-SAFETY RELATED) t QA ORGANIZATION 1
i I
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. _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ _ - _ _ ~
e B0P SCOPE t
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ALL WORK.UNDER SHOREHAM STATION' MODIFICATION PROGRAM
~
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FULL LILCO QA PROGRAM (ENGINEERING / DESIGN, PROCUREMENT, INSTALLATION, ETC.)
i NON-SAFETY RELATED (ENGINEER'S INSTRUCTION /
REQUEST) 1 1
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- _ - _ _ _ -- - - .)
l FILTRA SCOPE
(
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'i. ALL WORK UNDER'SHOREHAM STATION MODIFICATION PROGRAM y I l
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- PRIMARY TRAIN THROUGH AND' INCLUDING FILTER l APPLY APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS OF QA PROGRAM (ENGINEER / DESIGN, i
PROCUREMENT AND INSTALLATION) i l
SUPPORTING SYSTEMS i ENGINEER'S INSTRUCTION / REQUEST l
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SUMMARY
OF PRESENTATION l 1. SHOREHAM IS SAFE IN ITS PRESENT CONFIGURATION AND WE ARE READY FOR OUR LICENSE NOW e
- 2. THE SCS ANSWERS BOTH THE "WHAT IF7" QUESTIONS AND REDUCES RADIOLOGICAL PROBLEMS -
- 3. A PROJECT ORGANIZATION IS ESTABLISHED, CONTRACTS ARE BEING FINAllZED, SOME WORK IS PROGRESSING
- 4. WE WANT TO ENSURE YOU ARE SATISFIED WITH OUR ACTIONS
- 5. WE NEED YOUR AGREEMENT ON OUR BASIC CONCEPT OF DESIGNING AND BUILDING THIS SCS
. 7. WE ARE COMMITTED TO HAVE THE SAFEST PLANT IN THIS COUNTRY f
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