ML20235J216

Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating All Amends to OL Through Amend 108

ML20235J216
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	07/09/1987
From:	NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:
Shared Package
ML20235J196	List: ML20235J216 NLS8700330, Application for Amend to License DPR-46,consisting of Proposed Change 42,incorporating All Amends to OL Through Amend 108 Issued on 870420.Fee Paid
References
NUDOCS 8707150447
Download: ML20235J216 (2)

Text

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LIMITfNG' CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION  : SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ~ l 3.7.A (Cont'd) 4.7.A.2.f.(cont'd).

4. Main steam line and feedwater line expansion bellows-as specified in Table 3.7.3 shall be tested by.

pressurizing between the laminations of the bellows at a pressure of 5 psig.

This-is an exemption to Appendix J of 10CFR50.

5. The personnel airlock shall be tested at 58.psig at intervals no longer than six months. This testing may be extended to the next refueling outage (not to exceed 24 months) provided that there have been no' airlock opdnings since the.last successful test at 58 psig.. In the event the personnel airlock is not opened between refueling outages, it

- shall be leak checked at 3 psig at intervals no longer than six months.

Within three days of opening (or every three' days during periods of H frequent opening) when containment I integrity is required, test the personnel airlock at 3 psig. This is an exemption to Appendix J of' l 10CFR50. i The maximum allowable leakage at a l test pressure of 58 psig is 6.3 scfh. i Leakage measured at test' pressure.less

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than 58 psig is adjusted to the equivalent value at 58 psig,

g. Deleted

h. Drywe11' Surfaces The interior surfaces of the drywell and torus shall be visually inspected each operating cycle for evidence of torus corrosion or leakage.

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3.7.A & 4.7.A BASES (cont'd.)

trends. Whenever a bolted double-gasketed penetration is broken and remade, the space between the gaskets is pressurized to determine that the seals are perform-ing properly. It is expected that the majority of the leakage f'om r valves, pene-trations and seals would be into the reactor building. However, it is possible that leakage into other parts of the facility could occur. Such leakage paths that may affect significantly the consequences of accidents are to be minimized.

Table 3.7.4 identifies certain isolation valves that are tested by pressurizing the volume between the inboard and outboard isolation valves. This results in conservative test results since the inboard valve, if a globe valve, will be tested such that the test pressure is tending to lift the globe off its seat.

Additionally, the measured leak rate for such a test is conservatively assigned to both of the valves equally and not divided between the two.

The main steam and feedwater testable penetrations consist of a double layered  ;

metal bellows. The inboard high pressure side of the bellows is subjected to drywell pressure. Therefore, the bellows is tested in its entirety when the ,

drywell is tested. The bellows layers are tested for the integrity of both layers by pressurizing the void between the layers to 5 psig. Any higher pressure could cause permanent deformation, damage and possible ruptures of l

the bellows.

Surveillance requirements for integrity of the personnel air lock are specified j in Enclosure 1 (Exemption) to the letter, D. G. Eisenhut to J. M. Pilant, l September 3, 1982. When the Personnel Air Lock Leakage Test is performed at a l test pressure less than 58 psig, the measured leakage must be adjusted to reflect '

the expected leakage at 58 psig. Equation A-3 of Enclosure 3 (Franklin Researh Center Technical Evaluation Report) to the letter, D. G. Eisenhut to J. M. P11 ant, September 3,1982, defines the method of adjustment.

! The primary containment pre-operational test pressures are based upon the l

calculated primary containment pressure response in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident. The peak drywell pressure would be about 58 psig which would rapidly reduce to 29 psig following the pipe break. Following the pipe break, the suppression chamber pressure rises to 27 psig, equalizes with drywell pressure and therefore rapidly decays with the drywell pressure decay.

The design pressure of the drywell and suppression chamber is 56 psig. Based on the calculated containment pressure response discussed abovet the primary

containment preoperational test pressure was chosen. Also, based on the primary containment pressure response and the fact that the drywell and suppression chamber function as a unit, the primary containment will be tested as a unit rather than the individual components separately.

The design basis loss-of-coolant accident was evaluated at the primary con-tainment maximum allowable accident leak rate of 0.635%/ day at 58 psig.

Calculations made by the NRC staff with leak rate and a standby gas treat-ment system filter efficiency of 90% for halogens and assuming the fission product release fractions stated in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.3, show that the maximum total whole body passing cloud dose is about 1.0 REM and the maximum total thyroid dose is about 12 REM at 1100 meters from the stack over an exposure duration of two hours. The resultant doses reported are the maximum

, that would be expected in the unlikely event of a design basis loss-of-coolant l accident. These doses are also based on the assumption of no holdup in the secondary containment resulting in a direct release of fission products from the primary containment through the filters and stack to the environs.

l Therefore, the specified primary containment leak rate and filter efficiency are conservative and provide margin between expected off-site doses and 10 CFR 100 guidelines.

The water in the suppression chamber is u ad for cooling in the event of an accident; 1.e., it 'is not used for normal operation; therefore, a daily

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