ML20236D067
| ML20236D067 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 07/24/1987 |
| From: | Trevors G NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| TAC-66723, TAC-667233, NUDOCS 8707300288 | |
| Download: ML20236D067 (28) | |
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GENERAL OFFICE N
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NLS8700358 July 24, 1987 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attentions Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
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o Subjects Safety System Functional Inspection at Cooper Nuclear Station, Brownville, Nebraska
Reference:
A.
Docket 50-298 B.
NRC Region IV Division of Reactor Safety and Projects letter dated July 9, 1987 At the meeting held on June 30, 1987, at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Region IV office at Arlington, Texas, Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) outlined the various action plans as a response'to the major issues emanating from the recent Safety System Functional Inspection at the Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS).
Reference B requested that NPPD document the completed actions and future plans in regard to thecispics listed below on or before July 24, 1987.
AC Voltage Studies / Sufficiency DC Voltage Studies /Sufficledry Seismic Concerns Ventilation / Temperature Problems Service Water System Flows The District's plan is summarized in the subsequent paragraphs and in greater detail on the attachments to this letter.
A.
AC and DC Voltage Studies / Sufficiency 1.
The AC Voltage Drop Analysis has been performed using Burns and Roe's Computer Program ELO110.
The final results have not yet been received from the consultant performing the work.
The delay was due, in part, to time required,to write, implement and evaluate the Special Test Procedure to measure the station electrical load.
Additionally, the complexities assbefated with the performance of, and the verification of the results of, this analysis have taken more time than originally anticipated.
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The DC Voltage Drop Analysis is still being undertaken - and will l-not be' ready for NPPD review before July 31, 1987.
The primary cause for the delay has been the time required to assemble the various operating data for the pertinent DC equipment.
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'NPPD intends to complete its re91ew of these two items on or before August 14, 1987, B.
Seismic Concerns All the. specific : concerns identified during the inspection have been resolved by analyses and modifications.
Attachment A
gives a
detailed account of the individual seismic g
resolutions and describes NPPD's criteria for investigating possible seismic deficiencies.
C.
Ventilation and Temperature Problems L
The delay and problems associated with the DC and AC voltage drop and load-studies have prevented the HVAC investigation from being completed.
-The preliminary study is complete but it cannot be finalized until the AC and DC studies have been completed and reviewed by NPPD.
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The studies relating to the HVAC System in the Control Building will be forwardedton or before August 14, 1987.
-D.
Service Water' System Flow i
The SSFI team. questioned the capability of one Service Water - System Pump to supply. post LOCA flows.
Concerns were also expressed with regard to the essential heat exchanger capacities during normal and accident scenarios.
The post-LOCA mode of the Service Water System Design Basis, the most restrictive mode of operation, has been reevaluated with input provided from General Electric.
The evaluation of this design basis, together with the preoperational test data, indicate that the Service Water System can achieve its design basis function following a LOCA with one pump operating.
A. Special Test. Procedure (STP 87-011) has been written to verify that the Service Water System is capable of meeting the post-LOCA flow rates.
The - STP will be performed during any unscheduled outage of greater than five day's duration, or before startup from the next scheduled outage, April 1988.
j Operating Procedure 2.4.8.3.1 has been revised to specify operator actions associated with the Service Water System after a LOCA concurrent with a LOOP.
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i A Surveillance Procedure which will periodically verify that the Service l
Water System can maintain the post-LOCA flow requirements will be written following,the completion of STP 87-011.
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A USAR charge to up,rlate and ref? ct the post LOCA design basis and flow rates is'cuid,ently under review.
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s Attachment B describes 'the Service Water System Design Basis following a LOCA.
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NPPD will continge to pursue all outstanding iscues and ques <..L 'ns ?ur.til 2
satisfactory res61ution to all issues are Jachieved.
Evalth. ions and calculations on rhe' aforementioned issues will be ' ferwarded tQ the SSFI review, grotip,as.
soon as NPPD completes its revi(Q, but no lat.er than by the dates specified herein.
Additionally, a meeting has been proposed gith 9
on these issuci ~ and.
the S.SFI Team Lead r to provide clarifying fg ormation toreviewthecurreat,statusoftheremain?.pgfo{ sued.
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s ATTACHMENT A'TO LETTER.FROM NPPD T0 NRC DATED JULY'24, 1987 NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT ~
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. RESPONSE TO SEISMIC CONCERNS 7sd 7-2.7-87 Written byL Russ Wenzl r
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'SSFI SEISMIC CONCERNS During the recent System Safety Functional Inspection-(SSFI) audit, there were
'several seismic-related ; items questioned by the audit team.
This paper provides the status of each item:
Item l':
. No seismic calculations were available for the tube ' trays in.the Service Water Pump Room which support the flexible line leading from the service water tap to the discharge pressure gage.
Calculation NEDC 87-070 was performed showing the tray was not required and.was subsequently removed under MWR 87-2024.
Item 2:
Lights over the emergency batteries are supported by malleable iron conduit clamps which have no published load allowables.
' Calculation NEDC 87-073 was performed to show the support would be adequate. with ' the addition, of new steel pipe clamps.
The clamps were installed under MWR 87-2025.
Item 3:
The 2-inch drain lines off the gland water strainers in the Service Water Pump Room were disconnected from the strainers ~ and left unsupported.
The piping is no longer required and has been removed under DC 86-105.
Item 4:
A rod hanger supporting the 1-inch diesel generator jacket water demineralized water fill line was loose.
The support was reattached under MWR 87-1835.
Item 5:
No. seismic calculations were available. for the 4-inch cast iron sewer pipes running through Emergency Battery Rooms 1A and 1B.
Calculation NEDC 87-071 was performed to show that with additional supports, the pipe could not separate at the joints and fall on the emergency batteries.
These supports were subsequently installed under MWR 87-2025.
Item 6:
No seismic calculations were available for a 3-inch REC line passing through Battery Room 1A.
Calculation NEDC 87-076 was performed showing the' pipe would be adequate with the addition of two new supp' orts.
The supports were subsequently installed under MWR 87-2026.
Item 7:
No seismic calculations for the anchor ' bolts supporting Fan Coil FC-C-1A in the basement of the Control Building.
Calculation NEDC 87-084 was performed showing the existing anchors will be adequate with the addition of two braces and two new anchors.
These modifications were subsequently installed under MWR 87-2140.
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r Item 8:
Lack of a station procedure covering the installation of and the design requirements for concrete expansion anchors.
The design requirements including factors of safety are included in NPPD Document NEDB 85-01.
NPPD's factors of safety are equal to or more conservative than those suggested by the manufacturer.
The installation procedure and torque values used are in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations.
Item 9:
The original seismic calculation for the anchorage of Bench Board BD-C in the Control Room assumed a bolted connection.
Pull-out loads for the bolts were not checked in the calculation.
The bench board is welded down, not bolted.
The anchorage will be analyzed as part of the Control Room Design Review (CRDR) project by March 1, 1988.
Item 10: No seismic calculations were available for the instrument tube trays traveling around the diesel generators.
Calculation NEDC 87-092 was performed showing the existing trays are adequate with the addition of several supports installed under Temporary Design Change TDC 87-013.
The lines will be rerouted in the 1988/89 outages.
A review of these items indicates that all, except Items 8, 9, and 10, deal with seismic interaction.
Many older plants were issued licenses before the application of the Standard Review Plan and Reg. Guide 1.29 which addressed seismic interaction.
These plants, including Cooper, will be reviewed for seismic systems interaction as part of the required implementation of Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46.
Generic Letter 87-02 describes the use of seismic experience data and walkdown procedures developed by the Seismic Qualification Utility. Group (SQUG) in resolving A-46.
The A-46 reviews will l
provide assurance that in the event of an SSE, the plant can be brought to a safe shutdown condition.
The reviews specifically include consideration of thi failure or displacement of non-seismically designed items causing physical interaction with the systems and components necessary for safe shutdown.
A letter from R. J. Bosnak of the Division of Safety Review and Oversight to B. D. Liaw of the Division of BWR Licensing has previously recommended that no specific corrective actions be required at Cooper Station pending implementation of A-46.
In previous instances where NPPD has discovered seismic inadequacies, we have performed calculations and modifications in an expeditious manner.
Recent examples of this are anchorage of MCCs and structural adequacy of local instrument racks.
During the last refueling outage, these itsms were
- determined by analysis to be structurally deficient and were modified to meet Class IS seismic criteria before the plant was placed back on line.
Conduit and cable tray supports are another area of recent concern.
Even though these supports will be addressed under USI A-46, NPPD is proceeding with an exhaustive as-building program to identify areas which may fall outside the envelope of USI A-46 resolution criteria.
In addition NPPD has engaged one of the principle SQUG consultants, EQE Inc.,
to deterrsine whether Cooper is enveloped by the A-46 criteria in areas where visual inspection and as-building has caused some uncertainty.,
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If there are items which do not have supporting calculations showing the item is restrained to Seismic Class -IS criteria and if these items are in close proximity to a safety system, they will be reviewed for seismic adequacy under implementation of USI A-46.
An extensive review of the effects of earthquakes on power and ' industrial facilities was made by the Seismic - Qualification Utilities Group in support of A-46.
This earthquake experience data forms the basis for resolution of A-46.
Items at Cooper which do not have supporting seismic calculations; do not fall within the SQUG database, and are in close proximity to essential systems, will be analyzed and modified, if necessary,
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to ensure they are restrained to withstand a SSE event and not damage any essential component.
A trial walkdown using the generic procedures developed by SQUG was recently
. completed at Zion, Illinois. Both the NRC and SQUG concluded that the Generic Implementation Procedure is a workable procedure and only needs minor.
modifications. The Senior Seismic Review and Advisory. Panel (SSRAP) concluded that the questionable areas found during the walkdown are relatively minor.
Since Cooper Station was constructed at approximately the same time as Zion,.
it is considered that Cooper will be of a comparable standard with similar conclusions emanating from the walkdown process.
In the past four years, NPPD has developed and formed a technical group to deal with structural and seismic concerns.
As shown by the examples previously mentioned, if analysis is deemed necessary, it is performed and modifications are implemented as soon as possible. The SQUG Walkdown Generic Implementation Procedures, when finalized and reviewed, will form the seismic qualification method for future modifications and reviews.
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' Attachment B to NPPD Letter to NRC Dated July 24, 1987 NEBRAF'A PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT CL.'ER NUCLEAR STATICN DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT SERVICE WATER SYSTDi*
REV. O JULY 6, 1987 CLASS - ESSENTIAL This document reflects the design basis for the Service Water System for post-LOCA conditions only (most restrictive case).
Additional informa-tion will be added when it is developed.
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Instrument And Control Supervisors Radiological Mansger:
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Plant Services Managert 7/.fJ /J'7 Maintenance Managert kk rk.
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Date 7-23-97 Operations Manager:
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Datet 7-& R7 Q.A. Manager:
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Dates Station Operations Review Committee (SORC) re iew and approval of this proposed activity indicates that the individual members of SORC concur that this activity
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does not present a safety problem nor create an unreviewed safety question based out De proposed s.ctivity does not involve a change to the Technical Specifications.
1.
The probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of 2.
safety related equipment previously evaluated in the USAR is not increased.
3.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR is not created.
'4.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.
Approvals further indicate that the responsible department heads acknowledge, and will imp 1went the associated activities within their areas of respon-
- accept, sibility as delineated in approved procedures, policy statements, and position description.
- A minimum of four members plus the Division Manager of Nuclear Operations required.
l The. Q.A. Manager is a non-voting member of 50RC and shall not be considered in meetin6 the quorum requirement.
e REVISION NUMBER 4
PAGE 7
0F 7
PROCEDURE NUMBER 0.3'
I l.0 DOCUMENT BASIS i
1.1 PURPOSE s
This document. provides design basis and technical descriptive information for the systems, structures, and components related to service water, 1
1.2 SCOPE
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This document describes the functions, requirements, modes of operation, arrangement, performance characteristics, and limitations of service water systems, structures, and components as they relate l
to normal operation, startup, shutdown, emergency shutdown, loss of offsite power, and loss of coolant accidents.
Compliance with the design basis, including exceptions to design criteria, where i
applicable, is also described.
J For the purposes of this document, service water is considered to include the components from the service water pump suction to the return to the river.
Details of heat exchanger functions are included in the documents l
related to the systems that they serve.
This document describes the j
heat exchanger functions only as they relate to heat absorption in the Service Water System.
Details of the RHR service water system, service water and RHR service water gland seal and lubricating systems, the screen wash system, and filling of the circulating water system are included in the documents related to those systems.
This document only describes the functional requirements of the service water system as it relates to the required supplies to those systems.
2.0 INTRODUCTION
During normal plant operation, the Service Water System removes heat directly from the Reactor Equipment Cooling Heat Exchanger (RECHX),. the Turbine Equipment Cooling Heat Exchanger (TECHX), the two large Diesel Generator Room fan coil units (DGFCU), and RHR SW booster pump gland water system cyclone separators (normally lined up to wear ring inj ection).
The Service Water System is also the normal supply to the screen wash pumps and the RHR SW booster pump gland water system cyclone separators.
During normal shutdown /cooldown plant operation, the Service Water System removes heat from the RECHX, the TECHX, the large DGFCU, and the Residual Heat Removal Service Water System (RHR SWS).
The Service Water System also supplies the screen wash pumps and the RHR SW booster pump gland water system cyclone separators.
I During emergency shutdown operation with loss of offsite power or during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), the Service Water System to the TECHX and screen wash pumps is automatically isolated on low system pressure to assure that heat is removed from the RECHX, the large DG FCU, the RHR SWS, and the Diesel Generator Heat Exchangers (DGHX).
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Additionally, the ' SW System can be aligned to-remove heat from the Control Room' air conditioning condenser (normally cooled.by TEC) and the
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. Control' Building basement and.small DG room fan coil units. (normally.
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cooled by cooling towers)..The SW System'can also provide emergency
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backup. water to the SW' gland water system.
i The " Service Water System consists of four service water pumps, functionally divided into two' trains which take suction from the E Bay of the intake structure. A/C and B/D pump pairs discharge through parallel paths,. each of which can be isolated from the other path,' although the -
paths are. operated cross-connected during normal plant operation and =
during normal shutdown /cooldown operation..Each. parallel path consists I
of a discharge strainer and the necessary. piping,. valves, and accessories to supply,the served components.
4 The Service Water System can be used to provide 4000 gpm to the RHR System for emergency core flooding if all emergency core cooling systems fail.
. The Service Water System can also be ' lined up to supply the critical loops of'the REC System in the event of REC system failure.
3.0 CODES AND STANDARDS (Later)-
4.0 DESIGN' BASIS AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 4.1 DESIGN BASIS 4.1.1
-Normal Operation.
(Later) 4.1.2 Normal Shutdown /Cooldown Operation.
(Later) 4.1.3 Emergency Shutdown /Cooldown Operation with Loss of offsite Power.
(Later) 4.1.4 Loss of Coolant Accident.
A Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA),is divided into two time periods, as follows:
1.
Zero to ten minutes from.the initiating event, during which the required components automatically load on the Diesel. Generators for the initial Low Pressure 4
Coolant Injection mode of operation, i
l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ -
2.
After ten minutes from the initiating event, during which manual actions are performed to align system components for long term suppression I.aol cooling.
4.2 REQUIRED OPERATION MATRIX Plant modes of operation and the required Service Water System supplies are delineated in the following matrix:
l-l NORMAL LOSS OF OFFSITE SHUTDOWN /
POWER - EMERCENCY STARTUP POWER COOLDOWN SHUTDOWN Reactor Equipment Cooling Heat Exchanger X
X X
X Turbine EqtApment Cooling Heat Exchanger X
X X
(1)
- Diesel Generator X (2)
X Diesel Generator Large FCU X
X X
X Diesel Generator Small FCU X (3)
X (3)
X (3)
X (3)
X (6)
X X
Control Building Basement FCU X (3)
X (3)
X (3)
X (3)
Control Building Air Conditioning Condenser X (4)
SWP Gland Seal / Lubricating System X (5)
RHR SWBP Gland Seal / Wearing Ring Flushing System X
X X
X Screen Wash X
X X
(1)
SW Strainer Blowdown X
X X
X (1) Automatically isolate. W low "arvice Water System pressure.
(2) When diesel generator is operating.
(3) When manually aligned when cooling tower cooling is not available, (4) When manually aligned when TEC is not available.
i (5) Automatically aligned on low supply tank level.
(6) When suppression pool cooling required. L
D.
,.1 4.3 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 4.3.1
-General.
- The.. Service. Water System is required.during all modes of plant. operation,to remove heat from directly served heat exchangers and to supply a water source.to other served systems.
The largest demand is.during normal plant
' operations when three of the four service water pumps are tequired.
During emergency. shutdown and Loss of Coolant Accident operation when a loss of offsite power is assumed. the system is required to operate as the ultimate-heat sink:for reactor decay heat or as the~ source o^ water for emergency core-flooding.
Maximum design river temperature is 85'F.
4.3.1.1 Normal Plant Operations.
(Later)
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4.3.1.1.1' Startup.
(Later) 4.3.1.1.2 Power Operation.
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(Later) 4.3.1.1.3 Normal Shutdown /Cooldown.
(Later) 4.3.1.2-Emergency Shutdown with Loss of Offsite Power.
(Later) 4.3.1.3 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).
A LOCA with -the most limiting single active failure (failure of one diesel generator.to start and/or load) results in one service water pump being automatically loaded on the operating diesel generator.
Therefore, automatic system functions must assure that minimum service water is maintained to essential components during the succeeding ten minutes.
The essential components which are auto.natically aligned to receive service water are one REC heat.
exchanger, two diesel generator heat exchangers (assuming the other diesel is running unloaded with cooling water), four diesel generator fan coil units (assuming the cooling towers for the 6-si tlbs d iufinrH i i(
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service._ water.' gland. water 1 system L cyclone separators, four RHR service water booster gland 1
water : system cyclone separators, : one : Control
- Building basement'.-fan: coil unit (assuming the p
associated cooling'. towerf was initially inoperable), - and the blowdown from two service water. strainers.
Low ' Service Water -System pressure at SW-PS-364A 'or SW-PS-364B will-automatically. initiate isolation of; service water to'the TEC heat exchanger and screen wash pumps.
'4.3.2 Mechanical Requirements.
4.3.2.1-Service Water Pump.
The operation-of the Service Water. System is
. evaluated for adequate pump NPSH down down to a minimum river level of 965'0".
Each pump is designed for 8000 gpm at 125'-TDH.
Each pump is allowed to degrade to 6000 gpm'at 125' TDH-before maintenance,is required. 'Since-river level affects the discharge. pressure of each pump, each pump 'must be capable of providing the requied post-IACA system flows
. required during concurrent conditions of minimum river level and minimum performance (6000Lgpm at 125' TDH).
The pump / system operating curve (Drawing M178, Sheet 1) is attached.
Post-LOCA service water pump operation after 10-minutes will result in pump operation above rated flow, but below rated TDH.
Maximum' pump flow is controlled by system resistance or maximum pump amps.
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4.3.2.2 REC Heat Exchanger.
Details of the REC heat exchanger are included in the REC System Design Criteria.
Character-istics for evaluating Service Water System performance are:
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Overall~ Heat Transfer 8"
Coefficient:
Clean 516 hr-SF-F*
l Fouled
- 282
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BW hr-SF-F'
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F' Allowable Fouling:
SW - 0.0011 S
-F' REC - 0.0005 Design Heat Transfer Rate - 33,000,000 Effective Heat Transfer Surface - 8716 SF Corrected MTD - 13.4 F' Design SW @P - 4 psi e t 3,300,000 #/hr 4.3.2.2.1 Normal Plant Operation.
(Later) 4.3.2.2.2 Startup.
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(Later)
I 4.3.2.2.3 Normal Shutdown /Cooldown.
(Later) 4.3.2.2.4 Emergency Shutdown With Loss of Offsite Power.
(Later) 4.3.2.2.5 LOCA.
Following a LOCA, the Service Water System is required to remove 6
0.971 x 10 BTU /hr from the REC heat exchanger with 400 gpm of flow.
This results in a temperature rise i
cf 4.5*F from a design maximum inlet j
temperature of 85'F.
j 4.3.2.3 RHR Service Water System.
Details of the RHR Service " 'er Booster System requirements are included zu its Design Criteria.
Performance characteristics for i
evaluating Service Water System performance are:
Number of Pumps - 4
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1 IDesign Flow Per Pump after Manual Starting -
-4000 gpm
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k Design Suction Pressure
- 28'psig Required Minimum NPSH - 47 ft.
4.3.2.3.1 Normal Plant Operation.
The RHR SW System may be required'.to
. operate- 'during normal -plant:
operation. if suppression-pool cooling is required.
.4.3.2.3.2-Startup.
The RHR SW System may.be required to L
operate' during startup if suppres-sion pool cooling is required.
~4.3.2.3.3 Normal Shutdown /Cooldown.
(Later) 4.3.2.3.4 Emergency Shutdown with Loss of Offsite Power.
(Later)
I 4.3.2.3.5 LOCA.
Following a LOCA, the Service Water System is required to. provide a minimum of 4000 gpm to one operating RHR service water booster pump which' is manually loaded on'the operating diesel ' generator 10 ~ minutes after the start of the initiating event for long term suppression pool q
cooling (USAR Section XIV.6.3).
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The Service Water System can also be l
used to provide 4000 gpm to the RHR system for. emergency core flooding through the RHR system if the.
-o emergency core cooling systems fail.
The Service Water System is not tested in this configuration to prevent contamination of the primary coolant with river water.
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l 4.3.2.4 TEC Heat Exchanger.
Details of'the TEC heat exchanger are included in the TEC System Design Criteria.
Character-istics for evaluating Service Water System performance are:
4.3.2.4.1 Normal Plant Operation.
(Later) 4.3.2.4.2 Startup.
(Later) 4.3.2.4.3 Normal Shutdown /Cooldown.
(Later) 4.3.2.4.4 Emergency Shutdown with Loss of l
Offsite Power.
l (Later) 4.3.2.4.5 LOCA.
The TEC heat exchanger is automatically isolated from the Service Water System on low service water pressure.
However, long term Control Room air conditioning condenser requirements which are normally provided by TEC would be provided by service water.
(See Control Room Air Condi tioning Condenser.)
4.3.2.5 Screen Wash System.
Details of the Screen Wash System are included in its Design Criteria.
Performance character-istics for evaluating Service Water System performance are:
4.3.2.5.1 Normal Operation.
(Later) 4.3.2.5.2 Startup.
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(Later) 4.3.2.5.3-Normal Shutdown /Cooldown.
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(Later) i 4.3.2.5.4 Emergency Shutdown with Loss of Offsite Power.
(Later) 4.3.2.5.5 LOCA.
The Screen Wash System is automatically isolated from the Service Water System on low service water pressure.
4.3.2.6 Diesel Generator Heat Exchangers.
Details of the diesel generator heat exchangers are included in the DG Design Criteria.
Two diesel generators are provided.
Each diesel generator has identical-requirements.
Characteristics for evaluating Service Water System performance for each are:
JACKET WATER LUBE OIL INTERCOOLERS COOLER COOLER (2) (EACH)
Overall Heat Transfer Coef.
(BTU /hr-SF-F*):
Clean 685 83 Later Fouled 295 69.7 Later Allowable Fouling hr-SF-F*
SW 0.001 0.0023 Later Design Heat Transfer Rate (BTU /hr) 6.36 x 10 2.68 x 10 1.45 x 10 6
6 6
Effective Heat Transfer Surface (SF) 321 600 1955 r
SW Temperature 4
Difference (*F) 15.9 4.5 29 l
Design SW @P *
(psi at gpm) 5.3 at 800 2.5 at 1200 3.7 at 100 Those are parallel flows; flow from the LO cooler is directed to the inlet of the JW cooler and the JW cooler bypass.
1 I
____ a
4.3.2.6.1 Normal Operation.
(Later) 4.3.2.6.2 Startup.
(Later) 4.3.2.6.3 Normal Shutdown /Cooldown.
(Later) 4 3.2.6.4 Emergency Shutdown with Loss of Offsite Power.
(Later) 4.3.2.6.5 LOCA.
Following a LOCA, the Service Water System is required to remove the design heat loads for the ' heat exchangers, as given above.
Two diesel generators will attempt to start and load which will auto-matically initiate service water flow to both.
Ten minutes after the initiating event with the most limiting single active failure (one diesel does not start and/or load),
the flow to the diesel generator which did not load can be terminated before additional Service Water System loads are started. The total service water flow requirements for one diesel generator is 1400 gpm.
4.3.2.7 Diesel Generator Building Ventilation.
i Details of the Diesel Generator Building
)
Ventilation System are includcd in its Design I
Criteria.
Characteristics for evaluating Service Water System performance are (for each of two DG rooms):
SMALL FCU LARCE FCU 4
HV-DG-1A & 1B HV-DG-lC & 1D (Each)
(Each)
Overall Heat Transfer Coef.
Later Later (BTU /hr-SF-F')
Allowable Fouling Later Later _ __ _ _-_
.. +.
SMALL FCU LARGE FCU HV-DG-1A & 1B HV-DG-lC & 1D (Each)
(Each)
"jU
- SW Later Later Design Heat Transfer Rate (BTU /hr) 86,000 196,000 Effective Heat Transfer Surface (SF)
Later Later SW Temperature Difference (F*)
6.5 5
Design SW @P (psi at gpm) at 28 at 172
- To be determined later.
4.3.2.7.1 Normal Operation.
(Later) 4.3.2.7.2 Startup.
(Later) 4.3.2.7.3 Normal Shutdown /Cooldown.
(Later) 4.3.2.7.4 Emergency Shutdown with Loss of Offsite Power.
(Later) 4.3.2.7.5 LOCA.
Following a LocA, the Service Water System is required to remove the design heat loads frem the one large and one small (assaning that the normal cooling towers were not available prior to the LOCA) ventilating units in each DG room.
4.3.2.8 Service Water Pump Gland Water System (SWPGW).
Details of the SWPGW System are included in its Design Criteria.
Characteristics for evaluating
I the Servico Water System performance are (two of two cyclone separators normally aligned for each j
of two subsystems):
j SWP Required Gland Flow (Total Design for Two Pumps) - 12 gpm i
Cyclone Separator Inlet Flow j
(Each of Four Aligned at Inlet Pressure) - 40 gpm at 22 psig SWP Required Gland Pressure (Minimum) - 65 psig Maximum Allowable Particle Size - 50 Microns 4.3.2.8.1 Normal Operation.
(Later) 4.3.2.8.2 Startup.
(Later) 4.3.2.8.3 Normal Shutdown /Cooldown.
(Later) 4.3.2.8.4 Emergency Shutdown with Loss of Offsite Power.
(Later) 4.3,2.8.5 LOCA.
Following a LOCA, the Service Water
]
System is required to provide 20 gpm 4
as makeup to each (of two) SWGW System tanks.
This flow is auto-matica11y initiated through two cyclone separators for each tank on a low level in the tank.
Total i
required service water flow is I
160 gpm.
4.3.2.9 RHR Service Water Booster Pump Gland Water (RHR SWBP GW) System.
Details of the RHR SWPB GW System are included in its Design Criteria.
Characteristics for evaluating the Service Water System performance are (two of three cyclone separators normally aligned for each of two subsystems):
i RHR SWBP Required Gland / Wearing Ring Flow (Total Design for Two Pumps) - 68 gpm (Riverwell)
Cyclone Separator Inlet Flow (Each of Four Aligned) at Inlet Pressure) - 55 gpm at 22 psig RHR SWBP Required Gland / Wearing Ring Pressure
'(Minimum) - 65 psig Maximum Allowable Particle Size - 50 Microns 4.3.2.9.1 Normal Operation.
(Later) 4.3.2.9.2 Startup.
(Later) 4.3.2.9.3 Normal Shutdown /Cooldown.
(Later) 4.3.2.9.4 Emergency Shutdown with Loss of Offsite Power.
(Later) 4.3.2.9.5 IOCA.
Following a LOCA, the Service Water System is required to provide 68 gpm as makeup to each RHR SWBP GW System.
This -flow is normally aligned through two cyclore separators for each subsystem.
]
Total required service water flow is 1
220 gpm.
4.3.2.10 Main Service Water System Strainers.
The Service Water System strainers............
4.3.2.10.1 Normal Operation, j
(Later) 4.3.2.10.2 Startup.
(Later) i.-. _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
V G{
4 '. 3. 2.10'. 3 Normal Shutdown /Cooldown.
(Later) 1 I
4.3.2.10.4 Emergency Shutdown with Loss of o
Offsite Power.
(Later)-
4.3,2.10.5 LOCA.
Following a LOCA,:each servi'ce water strainer is-assumed,to be continuously blowing'. down at its-maximum design rate of 370 gpm. The strainer is designed to continuously.
operate if its associated service -
water train is energized.
4.3.2.11 Control Building' basement Fan Coil Unit.
Details of the Control Building basement fan.
coil-unit are included'in-its-Design Criteria.
~
Characteristics for evaluating the' Service Water System performance are:
Overall Heat Transfer Coef.
~(BTU /hr-SF-F') - (See Coil Capacity Curve)
.j Allowable Fouling
(
) : SW Later Design Heat Transfer Rate (BTU /hr) - 730,000 Effective Heat Transfer Surface (SF) - 57.2 (Face Area)
SW Temperature Difference (F') - 10 i
Design SW @P (Ft. at gpm) - 6 at 146 1
4.3.2.11.1 Normal Operation.
(Later) 4.3.2.11.2 Startup.
l (Later) j 16-
i I
l i
4.3.2.11.3 Normal Shutdown /Cooldown.
1 (Later) 4.3.2.11.4 Emergency Shutdown with Loss of Offsite Power.
(Later) i 1
4.3.2.11.5 LOCA.
1' Following a LOCA, the Service Water System is required to remove the design heat load from the Control Building basement FCU (assuming that i
the normal cooling towers were not available prior to the LOCA).
4.3.2.12 Control Room Air Conditioning Condenser.
Details of the Control Building air conditioning condenser are included in the Control Room Ventilation Design Criteria.
Characteristics for evaluating the Service Water System performance are:
Overall Heat Transfer Coef. (BTU /hr-SF-F'):
Clean Later Fouled Later Allowable Fouling
~
(
) : SW
.0005 BTU I
Design Heat Transfer Rate (BTU /hr) - 470,360 I
Effective Heat Transfer Surface (SI')
SW Temperature Difference (F') - 10 Design SW @P (psi at gpm) - 4 at 89 4.3.2.12.1 Normal Operation.
(Later) _
t
'4.3.2.12.2 Startup.
(Later) 4'.3.2.12.3 Normal Shutdown /Cooldown.
(Later)
.4.3.2.12.4 Emergency Shutdown with Loss of Offsite Power.
(Later) 4.3.2.12.5 LOCA.
LOC'A Ten minutes, following a initiating event, service water is required to be manually aligned to replace TEC to remove Lthe design.
heat load from the Control Room air
. conditioning unit at 89 gpm.
4.3.2.13 Piping.
.(Later) 4.3.2.14 Miscellaneous Strainers.
(Later) 4.3.2.15. Valves.
'(Later) '
4.3.2.16 SW Bay.
(Later) 4.3.3
-Electrical Requirements.
(Later) 4.3.4' Instrumentation and Control Requirements.
(Later) 4.3.5 Structural / Seismic Requirements.
(later) 4.3.6 Summary of Design Basis Requirements.
The Service Water System is required to provide the following flow rates (gpm) for the operating modes indicated. - _ _ _ - _.
NORMAL EMERCENCY LOCA SHUTDOWN AFTER OPERATING STARTUP S_HUTDOWN WITH LOP 0-10' MIN. 10 MIN.
(Later)
(Later).
4000 0
0 TEC Screen Wash 0
0 2800 1400
-DG DG Ventilation 400 200 160 160 SWPGW i
220 220 RHR SWBP GW SW Strainers 740 740 Control Bldg. FCU 146 146
' Control Room AC 0
89' TOTAL:
4866 7355 5.0 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND OPERATION i
5.1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION (Later) 5.2 MODES OF OPERATION (Later) 1 5.3 SYSTEM PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS (Later) 6.0 I_N_STRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS DESCRIPTION (Later) 7.0 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION I
(Later) ---______-___a
I
..g
- 8.0 ' INTERFACE TO OTHER SYSTEMS (Later) 9.0 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION (Later)
10.0 REFERENCES
)
i USAR
-(Later)-
j Technical Specifications - (Later)
Calculations - (Later)
' Drawings - (Later)
~
Purchase 0rders/ Specifications - (Later)
Design Basis Documents - (Later)
- Instrumentation and Control Lists - (Later) i l
l 1
1 1
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