ML20235A251
| ML20235A251 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Framatome ANP Richland |
| Issue date: | 11/08/1976 |
| From: | Schuster M NRC |
| To: | NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20234F575 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-86-410 NUDOCS 8707080372 | |
| Download: ML20235A251 (5) | |
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l NOV8 IMS Memo to security file -
Trip Report - October 17-19, 1976 EXXON NUCLEAR COMPANY, DOCKET NO. 70-1257, NRC RE-ASSESSMENT VISIT Scope of Assessment i
An entrance briefing was conducted at 8:30 a.m. October 18, 1976.
i Attendees were:
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Exxon L. Hansen, Security Specialist
~j L. Merker, Mgr.. Aux. Systems R. Collings, Chief Plant Security '
D. Schnider, Sr. Safeguards Speciafist NRC
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B. Minilli, Licensing
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- 0. Smith, Licensing E. Richard, Licensing
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C. South, Test and Evaluation W. Martin IE:I (Representing IE:HQ) i M. Schuster, IE:V 1
- 0. Shackleton'. IE:V
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There-assessmentscopewasdescribedbiSmith:
1.
Threats to be considered include 3' dedicated, militarily trained outsiders armed with legal weapons.with or without the help of one insider, and one insider working alone to systematically remove a strategic quantity of SNM over a p6rtod of time.
2.
Scope of visit included the overall security program.
See Appendix A l
for detailed scope.
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Findings, if contrary to current requirements will not, as a result of this visit, be identified as items of noncompliance.
Findings of Assessment Team An exit briefing was held at 1:30 p.m., October 19, 1976. Attendees were:
Exxon L. Hansen, Security Spet.ialist I
L. Merker, Manager, Aux. Opers.
j R. Collings, Chief Plant Security B. Berst, Acting Manager, Mixed 0xide 1
flRC Same as for entrance briefing..
Appendix 8 sets forth the findings of the assessment team, a copy of which was given to the licensee.
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It was the considered opinion of the team, that Exxon could meet the design threat.
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- 0. Shackleton
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APPEN01X A
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GROUP I
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Security Organization Guard Force size Equipment Training
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Orders Patrols On/0ff-Site Response Clearances Use of Force LLEA Agreement Perimeter Barriers Illumination Guard Force Turnover Evacuation Procedures PA Searches Yehicles Personnel Articles GROUP II Operation of PCAS & SAS Hardening Visibility Control of Access On/Off-Site Communications Alarm Systems & Devices Testing & Records Motion Alarms & Tests Local Alarms Criticality Alarms Duress Alarms Search Devices Testing & Calibration GROUP III MAA Barriers MAA Er.try/ Exit Searches MAA Emergency Exits Access to Sf1M Storage Area Search / Screening of Waste, laundry & other materials leaving the fiAA Use & Control of Seals Doors SNM Containers Surveillance within MAAs Incoming / Outgoing Shipments 14ovement.',f SfiM between MAAs
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I APPENDIX B N_RC_psessmentTeamVisit I
October 18, 1976 Following is an outline of findings, recommendations and comments of an NRC Assessment Team Visit to the Exxon Nuclear Company Inc. on October 18 i
and 19,1976.
Findings are categorized in the following manner, as appropriate:
License Condition
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Proposed License Condition X
Management Attention Item General Comment: The team concluded that the facility.(Exxon Nuclear i
Company) is capable of withstanding both the external (overt theft)'and internal (covert diversion) threats, as defined by the NRC Team Chief.
during the entrance briefing.
.a Specific Findings:
a.
The intrusion alarm signal transmitted by radio to an off-site monitored location (Centrifuge Test Facility - CTF) was not significantly distinct to unquestionably alert the person monitoring the system, and clearly distinguish an alarm from l
some other radio signal. Recommendation: Expedite procure-
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ment and installation of equipment that will render a distinct..
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alarm signal. Meanwhile, require strict adherence to the A
policy to conduct communication checks every 15 minutes.
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Clarification is required on the use of force issue, as con -
tained in guard instructions, as understood by security' supervisors and as required by the generic license condition' on this subject (and pending NRC rule change).
Recommendation:
I Discuss any misunderstandings with the NRC Licensing Staff and align guard instructions with the agreed upon license condition.
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c.
The Secondary Alarm Station is only ma.rginally effective in I
that if it is not manned by a dedicated, Company employee and does not receive or monitor all alanns received in the Primary Central Alarm Station.
Recommendation: That the minimum essential communications and alarm equipment be installed within an onsite location or within the CTF to perfonn the minimum functions of the Secondary Alarm Station, as discussed.
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Appendix B '
Established controls for access to the Central Alarm Station X
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were not always strictly adhered to.
Both doors were open on l
two occasions as NRC team members and maintenance personnel went in and out. Recommendation: Require strict compliance j
with the established procedure, without respect to the status of personnel desiring to enter.
Security communications and alarm equipment were not always X
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inspected by a technically knowledgeable individual following installation of worn parts or "out of sight" maintenance.
That following any such maintenance or Recommendatina:
installation of new parts on security communications or alarm equipment, the affected equipment / system be inspected by the Electrical Specialist Maintenance Engineer, in addition to the required check by a member of the security organization.
The Log Book and Type "E" fingerprint seals for the vault door, X
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were maintained in the same container, controlled by the same The same was,
person, in the Shipping & Receiving Warehouse.
found to be true with the logbook for the Type "E" and paper ej seals for SHi4 containers (maintained in file drawer, Room 221,.
Pu Facility).
Recommendation: Separate the seals from thG.
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log books, as dTscussed.
Odell Smith
-I Plant Security Licensing Branch NMSS HRC 3 y i
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