ML20235A251

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Trip Rept of 761017-19 Reassessment Visit to Exxon Nuclear Co.Outline of Findings,Recommendations & Comments of Assessment Team Encl
ML20235A251
Person / Time
Site: Framatome ANP Richland
Issue date: 11/08/1976
From: Schuster M
NRC
To:
NRC
Shared Package
ML20234F575 List:
References
FOIA-86-410 NUDOCS 8707080372
Download: ML20235A251 (5)
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l NOV8 IMS Memo to security file -

Trip Report - October 17-19, 1976 .

EXXON NUCLEAR COMPANY, DOCKET NO. 70-1257, NRC RE-ASSESSMENT VISIT Scope of Assessment i

An entrance briefing was conducted at 8:30 a.m. October 18, 1976.

i Attendees were: ,

i i Exxon L. Hansen, Security Specialist ~j

! L. Merker, Mgr.. Aux. Systems . . . .

! R. Collings, Chief Plant Security '

D. Schnider, Sr. Safeguards Speciafist NRC

0. Smith, Licensing

[ - B. Minilli, Licensing ---- a - . c. .

E. Richard, Licensing *r l C. South, Test and Evaluation .

i W. Martin IE:I (Representing IE:HQ)

M. Schuster, IE:V 1~
0. Shackleton'. IE:V There-assessmentscopewasdescribedbiSmith:
1. Threats to be considered include 3' dedicated, militarily trained outsiders armed with legal weapons.with or without the help of one

! insider, and one insider working alone to systematically remove a strategic quantity of SNM over a p6rtod of time.

2. Scope of visit included the overall security program. See Appendix A l for detailed scope.

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3. Findings, if contrary to current requirements will not, as a result of this visit, be identified as items of noncompliance.

Findings of Assessment Team An exit briefing was held at 1:30 p.m., October 19, 1976. Attendees were:

Exxon , , ,

.! L. Hansen, Security Spet.ialist I

L. Merker, Manager, Aux. Opers.

j R. Collings, Chief Plant Security 1

B. Berst, Acting Manager, Mixed 0xide

, flRC Same as for entrance briefing..

Appendix 8 sets forth the findings of the assessment team, a copy of which was given to the licensee. -

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It was the considered opinion of the team, that Exxon could meet the design threat. ,

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Ms D. Schuster

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. APPEN01X A

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- GROUP I + fr.

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Security Organization Guard Force size Equipment ~

Training Orders Patrols On/0ff-Site Response Clearances -

Use of Force LLEA Agreement Perimeter Barriers Illumination -

Guard Force Turnover Evacuation Procedures PA Searches Yehicles Personnel ,

Articles GROUP II Operation of PCAS & SAS '

Hardening Visibility Control of Access On/Off-Site Communications Alarm Systems & Devices Testing & Records Motion Alarms & Tests Local Alarms Criticality Alarms Duress Alarms Search Devices Testing & Calibration GROUP III MAA Barriers MAA Er.try/ Exit Searches MAA Emergency Exits Access to Sf1M Storage Area Search / Screening of Waste, laundry & other materials leaving the fiAA Use & Control of Seals Doors SNM Containers Surveillance within MAAs Incoming / Outgoing Shipments 14ovement .',f SfiM between MAAs

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I APPENDIX B N_RC_psessmentTeamVisit ,

I October 18, 1976 Following is an outline of findings, recommendations and comments of an NRC Assessment Team Visit to the Exxon Nuclear Company Inc. on October 18 and 19,1976.

i Findings are categorized in the following manner, as appropriate:

  • License Condition

+ Proposed License Condition X Management Attention Item i

General Comment: The team concluded that the facility .(Exxon Nuclear Company) is capable of withstanding both the external (overt theft)'and internal (covert diversion) threats, as defined by the NRC Team Chief.

during the entrance briefing. .a ,#.

Specific Findings:

  • a. The intrusion alarm signal transmitted by radio to an off-site

- monitored location (Centrifuge Test Facility - CTF) was not significantly distinct to unquestionably alert the person monitoring the system, and clearly distinguish an alarm from l some other radio signal. Recommendation: Expedite procure-4

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ment and installation of equipment that will render a distinct..

l alarm signal. Meanwhile, require strict adherence to the

' policy to conduct communication checks every 15 minutes. -

A l

Clarification is required on the use of force issue, as con -

+ b.

tained in guard instructions, as understood by security' supervisors and as required by the generic license condition' I

on this subject (and pending NRC rule change). Recommendation:

Discuss any misunderstandings with the NRC Licensing Staff and align guard instructions with the agreed upon license condition.

+ c. The Secondary Alarm Station is only ma.rginally effective in I that if it is not manned by a dedicated, Company employee and does not receive or monitor all alanns received in the Primary Central Alarm Station. Recommendation: That the minimum essential communications and alarm equipment be installed within an onsite location or within the CTF to perfonn the minimum functions of the Secondary Alarm Station, as discussed.

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d. Established controls for access to the Central Alarm Station  ;

were not always strictly adhered to. Both doors were open on X

l two occasions as NRC team members and maintenance personnel j

went in and out. Recommendation: Require strict compliance with the established procedure, without respect to the status of personnel desiring to enter.

X e. Security communications and alarm equipment were not always inspected by a technically knowledgeable individual following installation of worn parts or "out of sight" maintenance.

Recommendatina: That following any such maintenance or installation of new parts on security communications or alarm equipment, the affected equipment / system be inspected by the Electrical Specialist Maintenance Engineer, in addition to the required check by a member of the security organization.

X f. The Log Book and Type "E" fingerprint seals for the vault door, were maintained in the same container, controlled by the same The same was ,

person, in the Shipping & Receiving Warehouse.

found to be true with the logbook for the Type "E" and paper ej seals for SHi4 containers (maintained in file drawer, Room 221,.

Pu Facility). Recommendation: Separate the seals from thG.

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log books, as dTscussed.

Odell Smith -I Plant Security ,

Licensing Branch NMSS HRC 3 y i

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