ML20235A708

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Forwards Gossick Opening Statement for 760426 Kerr-McGee/ Dingell Hearings & Supplemental Testimony Prepared in Response to Issues Raised.Meeting Requested for 760514 to Discuss Encls & Other Major Issues
ML20235A708
Person / Time
Site: 07001193
Issue date: 05/11/1976
From: James Keppler
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To: Allan J, Fisher W, Hind J
NRC
Shared Package
ML20234F575 List:
References
FOIA-86-410 NUDOCS 8707080515
Download: ML20235A708 (6)
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D UNITED ST ATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Fl[GION lli 799 34oOLLVE LT ftO AD CLEN ELLYN, (LLINOIS 60137 May 11, 1976 l

Note to: J. M. Allan

  1. A. Hind W. L. Fisher G. A. Phillip C. C. Peck K. R. Ridgway

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i SUPPLEMENTAL PREPARED TESTIMONY - DINGELL COMMITTEE HEARINGS Enclosed for your information is a copy of Mr. Cossick's opening statement for the Kerr-McGee/Dingell Hearings and the supplemental testimony prepared in response to issues raised in testimony before the Committee on April 26, 1976. I I would like to meet with you on Friday, May 14, at 3:00 p.m. to discuss this material as well as other major issues developed at the April 26 session.

I James G. Keppler '

Regional Director l

Enclosures-As stated cc w/ enclosures:

R. J. Strasma

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At the outset, I believe it is necessary to delineate the areas of responsibility for the investigation of. incidents involving special nuc-lear material such as occurred at the Kerr-ficGee facility in Crescent, Oklahoma. To the extent that these incidents related to safeguarding or protecting the public health and safety, the Commission investigated and took appropriate enforcement action. To the extent that such incidents .

involved alleged or suspected criminal activity, the Department of Justice was notified and the FBI investigated. The Commission contacted agencies with appropriate expertise such as the FBI and itLRB in the case of employee discrimination ch;rg: to provide assurance that the rights of the employees and the company were properly safeguarded to the extent that overriding health and safety considerations would permit.

With specific reference to the material accountability aspects of the Kerr-McGee matter it should be noted that none of the investigations' and

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~; ~1nspections at the Cimarron facility produced evidence of diversion of significant quantities of special nuclear material. These NRC inspections did, however, reveal areas where improved compliance with Commission regu'la-

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tions was required. In addition the facility has been required to meet the increasingly higher security requirements as they have been imposed by the AEC and NRC. '.

The NRC is mindful of the emphasis the Reorganization Act of 1974 places on Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. The Commission takes its respon-sibility for assuring adequate safeguards most seriously.

Since its incep-7

6- "The results of any investigation of the possibility of diversion of special nuclear material from the nuclear fuel services plant in Irwin, Tennessee, and from NUMEC plant in Apollo."

gesponse: On February 20, 1976, in response to broadcast allegations about intentional wrong-doing in connection with inventory discrepancies at the NFS-Erwin facility, a special NRC investigation team was dispatched to the site by chartered aircraft. While the team uncovered no information to support allegations of intentional wrong-doing, the investigative material developed as a result of this inquiry will be turned over to the FBI. Following FBI review and evaluation of the investigative material, a report of this investigation will be released to the public by the NRC.

The NRC has conducted no investigations into the possi-ble diversion of licensed special nuclear material at the plants in Erwin, Tennessee, and Apollo, Pennsylvania.

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t Question 4 "The Commission's conclusion and the reasons and evidenco thereof:

i (c) Whether special nuclear material was ever diverted from any other facility, and if so, by whom."

  • Response:  %

The Commission has no direct evidence that there has '

been any diversion of significant quantities of special nuclear materal from licensed operations. However, }

I there have been a few cases where unauthorized entry ,

j was gained to protected areas. In those cases, the entries were promptly detected and the intruders did ,

not attempt to penetrate interior protective barriers. l These conclusions are based upon physical security and material control records and reports prepared by licensees, l and upon announced and unannounced inspections and audits i performed by the NRC. The effectiveness and performance i

of licensecs' physical security and meterial control systems ' -

are monitored and tested by NRC inspection teams. Unusual

  • incidents are investigated by the NRC staff. Inventory g[

listings ace verified by independent measurements performed by NRC inspectors and accounting records are periodically audited. In addition, licensees are required to conduct ,

annual internal audits of their security and accounting programs.

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"The effective. ness of past and existing proce ur Question 1 i f such materials and the results of any investigat on o possibility."

g Response: The detection of the possibility d alarms, l

of theftL ])l ordiversion provided by physical security searches ancontrols,. process controls, i d checks access and containment and seal checks, shipper-receiver checks, an ithin k f and balances provided by separation y of physicalof duties wThe F

a plant. t extent with the timeliness defined by the frequencinvento L by measurement uncertainties. d by the Commissiot Continuing safeguards improvements rocedures, have be during the past nine years. regulations were promulgated to l control programs annual physical inventories, reporting, and the establishment of materia5000 grams for licensees authorized to possess greater ombination.

than of contained U-235, U-233 or plutonium, in any c s could Thereaf ter, in recognition that accounting ontrol system of not be depended on exclusively for adequate c Commission i

cpecial nuclear material, the Atomic ium and Energyissue requirements for protecting high enriched it (1969) uran plutonium against thef t and sabotage in-transThe new regulation and subsequently at fixed sites (1970). a protected area required use and storage of SNM within d access (surrounded by a protective barrier) and d r unarmed controlle by employment of a security force of armed guar s o watchmen. tities of Physical protection regulations for lstrategic fallquanplants of and plutonium and high enriched paration uranium and at nuc 1973 and implemented in early 1974.

f armed ments at nuclear installations included the p guards, establishment of improved access ents for an communica--

use of perimeter intrusion alarms, arrangem f response plans.

reduce tion with response forces and establishment o New transportation requirementsandincluded prep risks in transit,for continual communication with a control poin

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Question 4 "The Commission's conclusion and the reasons and _

L evidence therefore of:

How special nuclear material was divgrted (b) from the Cimarron plant and by whom: }

The only evidence the Special Nuclear Material Response: was possibly removed from the Cimarron plant was the contamination of Mics Silkwood's body, body waste samples and apartment and objects therein 070-1197/74-09). By (Investigation Report No. a copy of which memorandum dated Jan2ary 16, 1975, is attached, the FBI was requested to investigate this unauthorized possession of special nucicarInquiries material.

an investigation should be referred to the Department L. , _

of Justice.

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