ML20235A708
| ML20235A708 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001193 |
| Issue date: | 05/11/1976 |
| From: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Allan J, Fisher W, Hind J NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20234F575 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-86-410 NUDOCS 8707080515 | |
| Download: ML20235A708 (6) | |
Text
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UNITED ST ATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Fl[GION lli 799 34oOLLVE LT ftO AD CLEN ELLYN, (LLINOIS 60137 May 11, 1976 l
Note to:
J. M. Allan
- A. Hind W. L. Fisher G. A. Phillip C. C. Peck K. R. Ridgway
{
i SUPPLEMENTAL PREPARED TESTIMONY - DINGELL COMMITTEE HEARINGS Enclosed for your information is a copy of Mr. Cossick's opening statement for the Kerr-McGee/Dingell Hearings and the supplemental testimony prepared in response to issues raised in testimony before I
the Committee on April 26, 1976.
I would like to meet with you on Friday, May 14, at 3:00 p.m.
to discuss this material as well as other major issues developed at the April 26 session.
I James G. Keppler Regional Director l
Enclosures-As stated cc w/ enclosures:
R. J. Strasma
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8707080515 870701 PDR FDIA SKINNER 86-410 PDR l
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r At the outset, I believe it is necessary to delineate the areas of responsibility for the investigation of. incidents involving special nuc-lear material such as occurred at the Kerr-ficGee facility in Crescent, Oklahoma.
To the extent that these incidents related to safeguarding or protecting the public health and safety, the Commission investigated and took appropriate enforcement action.
To the extent that such incidents involved alleged or suspected criminal activity, the Department of Justice was notified and the FBI investigated.
The Commission contacted agencies with appropriate expertise such as the FBI and itLRB in the case of employee discrimination ch;rg: to provide assurance that the rights of the employees and the company were properly safeguarded to the extent that overriding health and safety considerations would permit.
With specific reference to the material accountability aspects of the
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Kerr-McGee matter it should be noted that none of the investigations' and l
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~1nspections at the Cimarron facility produced evidence of diversion of significant quantities of special nuclear material.
These NRC inspections
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did, however, reveal areas where improved compliance with Commission regu'la-tions was required.
In addition the facility has been required to meet the increasingly higher security requirements as they have been imposed by the AEC and NRC.
The NRC is mindful of the emphasis the Reorganization Act of 1974 places on Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
The Commission takes its respon-sibility for assuring adequate safeguards most seriously.
Since its incep-7
"The results of any investigation of the possibility 6-of diversion of special nuclear material from the nuclear fuel services plant in Irwin, Tennessee, and from NUMEC plant in Apollo."
gesponse:
On February 20, 1976, in response to broadcast allegations about intentional wrong-doing in connection with inventory discrepancies at the NFS-Erwin facility, a special NRC investigation team was dispatched to the site by chartered aircraft. While the team uncovered no information to support allegations of intentional wrong-doing, the investigative material developed as a result of this inquiry will be turned over to the FBI.
Following FBI review and evaluation of the investigative material, a report of this investigation will be released to the public by the NRC.
The NRC has conducted no investigations into the possi-ble diversion of licensed special nuclear material at the plants in Erwin, Tennessee, and Apollo, Pennsylvania.
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t Question 4 "The Commission's conclusion and the reasons and evidenco thereof:
i (c) Whether special nuclear material was ever diverted from any other facility, and if so, by whom."
Response
The Commission has no direct evidence that there has '
been any diversion of significant quantities of special
}
nuclear materal from licensed operations.
- However, I
there have been a few cases where unauthorized entry j
was gained to protected areas.
In those cases, the entries were promptly detected and the intruders did not attempt to penetrate interior protective barriers.
l These conclusions are based upon physical security and material control records and reports prepared by licensees, l
and upon announced and unannounced inspections and audits i
performed by the NRC.
The effectiveness and performance i
of licensecs' physical security and meterial control systems are monitored and tested by NRC inspection teams.
Unusual incidents are investigated by the NRC staff.
Inventory g[
listings ace verified by independent measurements performed by NRC inspectors and accounting records are periodically audited.
In addition, licensees are required to conduct annual internal audits of their security and accounting programs.
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b
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d s in Question 1 "The effective. ness of past and existing proce ur l
i f such materials and the results of any investigat on o possibility."
])l The detection of the possibility of theft ordiversion l
g L
Response
d alarms, provided by physical security searches ancontrols,. process controls, d checks access and containment and seal checks, shipper-receiver checks, an f
ithin and balances provided by separation of duties wThe k
F y of physical with the timeliness defined by the frequencinvento a plant.
t extent L
by measurement uncertainties.
d by the Continuing safeguards improvements have be Commissiot rocedures, during the past nine years. regulations were promulgated to l control programs annual physical inventories, reporting, and the establishment of materia5000 grams for licensees authorized to possess greater than ombination.
of contained U-235, U-233 or plutonium, in any c s could Thereaf ter, in recognition that accounting system ontrol of not be depended on exclusively for adequate c Commission cpecial nuclear material, the Atomic Energyissue i
ium and requirements for protecting high enriched uran it (1969) plutonium against thef t and sabotage in-transThe new regulation and subsequently at fixed sites (1970). a protected area required use and storage of SNM within d access (surrounded by a protective barrier) and controlle d
r unarmed by employment of a security force of armed guar s o watchmen.
tities of Physical protection regulations for strategic quanplants and l
plutonium and high enriched uranium at nuc fall of 1973 and implemented in early 1974.
paration and ments at nuclear installations included the p f armed guards, establishment of improved access an ents for communica--
use of perimeter intrusion alarms, arrangem f response plans.
tion with response forces and establishment o reduce New transportation requirements included prep and risks in transit,for continual communication with a control poin
1
$f Question 4 "The Commission's conclusion and the reasons and evidence therefore of:
L How special nuclear material was divgrted (b) from the Cimarron plant and by whom:
}
The only evidence the Special Nuclear Material was possibly removed from the Cimarron plant was
Response
the contamination of Mics Silkwood's body, body waste samples and apartment and objects therein 070-1197/74-09).
By (Investigation Report No.
a copy of which memorandum dated Jan2ary 16, 1975, is attached, the FBI was requested to investigate this unauthorized possession of special nucicarInquiries an investigation should be referred to the Department material.
L.
of Justice.
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