ML20057B382
| ML20057B382 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Framatome ANP Richland |
| Issue date: | 09/15/1993 |
| From: | Adams M NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Pierson R NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19311B165 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9309210280 | |
| Download: ML20057B382 (20) | |
Text
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DOCKET:
70-1237 SEP 151933
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
Robert C. Pierson, Chief Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety d
and Safeguards, NMSS THRU:
Michael Tokar, Section Leader Licensing Section 2 Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS FROM:
Mary Adams Licensing Section 2 Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS
=
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING WITH SIEMENS POWER CORPORATION, SEPTEMBER 8, 1993 Enclosed is a copy of the agenda, attendance list, summary, and handouts of our meeting with Siemens Power Corporation (SNP) on September 8, 1993, to i
discuss the Criticality Safety Analysis Update Program and dry conversion 2
expansion plans. As you recall, we also discussed issues related to SNP's y
license renewal and NRC's plans to revise 10 CFR Part 70 and to develop Standard Review Plans.
Or@nel Signed h Mary Adams Licensing Section 2 Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS
Enclosures:
1.
Agenda 4
2.
Attendance list 3.
Summary of meeting 5
4.
Handouts Distribution: w/encls.
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SPC-ND l
SIEMENS POWER CORPORATION l
1 1
CRITICALITY SAFETY ANALYSES UPDATE PROGRAM l'
l k
- 09/93
SPC-ND Siemens Power Corporation Criticality Safety Analyses l
Update Program Description l
Three phase program Phase 1:
Review, validate and categorize CSAs, ECD: June 30,1993 Phase 2:
Prioritize and reanalyze Category i CSAs, ECD: January 31,1994 Phase 3:
Prioritize and reanalyze Category 11 CSAs, ECD: January 31,1995 Expected duration:
Two years - completion scheduled for January 31,1995 Program resource analysis: Expected 12 to 14 man-year effort Multi-disciplinary effort:
Operations, Manufacturing Engineering, Criticality Safety t
09/93
SPC-ND SIEMENS POWER CORPORATION CRITICALITY SAFETY ANALYSES UPDATE-PROGRAM TASK OUTLINE e
09/93
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Phase 1 Review, Validate, Categorize CSAs Criticality Safety Review Consultant Reviews Existing '
Team Defines CSAs and Provide Process Systems Ust of Assumptions to Project Manager I
l I
l Project Manager Arranges Groups of CSAs into Systems Packages l
Project Manager Prepares Summary of i
Assumptions, Accident Condition l
_ for CSAs j
i Engineering and Operations Validation of Current Assumptions and Accident Conditions 1
Criticality Safety Review for Ucense Compliance and 91-01 Reportability i
Sort CSAs into Safety Impact Categories 1
I Category i Category 11 Category ill CSAs for the System CSAs for the System Need CSAs for the System are Needs Major / Urgent Addenda to Strengthen Adequate as is and will be Upgrading to Demonstrate Controls Pending Final Upgrade Reformatted as Part of Periodic Review Safe Operation Phase 1 Complete 5/93
Phase 2 Prioritize and Reanalyze Category 1 CSAs "As-Built"
'g
_ Each Process System l
l Engineering & Criticality Safety Review As-Builts & Validated Assurnptions &
i Establish Credible Accident Conditions
)
l I
Engineering to Mark Complete New System CSAs
'g Add Assumptions to a
'g Pertinent Drawings as l
Matrix for Future Review l l
Requiring C.S. Approval Before Changing System C.S. Review Team Validates Dimensions, Assumptions, Accident Conditions etc.
Plant Manager Indicates by
]
l Signature That Safety Margin and l
Residual Risk are Appropriate l
Place all Criticality Safety l Technical Basis
'g Requirements in Criticality l Document l
Safety Specifications i
I I
I Operating
'g Limit g
IRM/PM
'g l Hazards Cards l
l Analysis Procedures 3
Document Establish Periodic Review of
'g
, Assumptions Used in CSAs l
Phase 2 Complete 5/93
/
Phase 3 Prioritize and Reanalyze Category 11 CSAs "As-Built"
'g Each Process System l
l Engineering & Criticality Safety Review As-Builts & Validated Assumptions &
_ Establish Credible Accident Conditions I
Engineering to Mark Complete Addenda
'g Add Assumptions to a j Pertinent Drawings as to CSAs l
Matrix for Future Review l l
Requiring C.S. Approval Before Changing System Place all Criticality Safety iTechnical Basis
'g Requirements in Criticality LDocument l
Safety Soecifications I
I I
I Operating
'g Limit
'g IRM/PM g
i Hazards l
, Procedures l
_ Cards l
l Analysis l
_ Document i
Establish Periodic Review of Assumptions Used in CSAs L
Phase 3 Complete 5/93
Phase 3(Revised)
Prioritize and Reanalyze Category 11 CSAs "As-Built"
'g Each Process System l
l Engineering & Criticality Safety Review As-Builts & Validated Assumptions &
. Establish Credible Accident Conditions I
I Engineering to Mark Complete New System CSAs
'g Add Assumptions to a
'g Pertinent Drawings as l
Matrix for Future Review l Requiring C.S. Approval
,Before Changing System C.S. Review Team Validates Dimensions, Assumptions,
_ Accident Conditions etc.
Plant Manager Indicates by Signature That Safety Margin and Residual Risk are Appropriate Place all Criticality Safety ITechnical Basis
'g Requirements in Criticality
[ Document l
Safety Specifications l
I I
I
- Operating
'g Umit
'g IRM/PM
'g I Hazards
_ Procedures l
Cards l
l Analysis
_ Document i
Establish Periodic Review of
'g Assumptions Used in CSAs
-l i
Phase 3 Complete 4
4 9/93
SPC-ND Siemens Power Corporation Criticality Safety Analyses Update Program Progress Summary DATE ACCOMPLISHMENT December 11,1992 Draft plan of CSA update program issued December 29,1992 Resource requirements analysis completed December 30,1992 Plan approved by SPC management January 6,1993 Draft task outline for CSA update plan issued January 8,1993 CSA program Steering Committee established / Project Manager appointed Criticality safety review teams (CSRT) assigned with written charter -
Phase IA begins January 29,1993 Criticality safety review teams establish 53 systems envelopes to encompass 216 existing CSAs 1
' February 4,1993 CSA assumption validation teams (Plant Engineering / Operations) assigned i
09/93
SPC-ND Siemens Power Corporation Criticality Safety Analyses Update Program Progress Summary (Continued)
DATE ACCOMPLISHMENT February 10,1993 CSA systems packages prepared February 16,1993 All CSA systems packages issued to review teams by Project Manager March 29,1993 Implemented weekly status reporting and review at Safety, Security, and Licensing (SS&L) Weekly Planning Meeting April 27,1993 NRC Bulletin 91-01 reportable condition on inadequate SWUR incineration criticality safety controls May 13,1993 Phase-1 A complete - initial CSRT review of all CSA systems packages completed May 17,1993 Presentation on CSA update program to NRC HQ and Region V representatives in Walnut Creek
'J u n e 9, 1 9 9 3 SPC makesBulletin 91-01 Report on Line 1 Process Offgas (POG)
Scrubber Separator configuration. NRC Report Number 25632 and SPC letter dated July 9,1993 refer.
09/93
^
SPC-ND Siemens Power Corporation Criticality Safety Analyses Update Program Progress Summary (Continued)
DATE ACCOMPLISHMENT June 17,1993 SPC makesBulletin 91-01 Report on UO Pellet Grinder Water Centrifuge 2
Reservoir Configuration. NRC Report Number 25662 and SPC letters dated June 17,1993, and July 15,1993 refer.
June 14-18,1993 NRC routine inspection review of program status. (NRC Inspection Report No. 93-07).
June 29,1993 Phase 1B complete - review and categorization by Criticality Safety Component.
July 15,1993 Oversight Committee program status review. System review priorities established for first four systems. Team members for walkdown (as-built) of first system selected.
July 23,1993 As-built walkdown pilot team trained.
e-09/93
SPC-ND Siemens Power Corporation Criticality Safety Analyses Update Program Progress Summary (Continued)
DATE ACCOMPLISHMENT July 26-30,1993 NRC routine inspection review of program status. (NRC inspection Report Number 93-09).
August 11,1993 As-built pilot team debriefing to Oversight Committee. Additional walkdown required.
August 23,1993 Oversight Committee meeting to review as-built task resources and refine instructions for task.
August 24,1993 Quarterly Progress Report submitted to NRC.
August 30,1993 Initial contract engineering team (Meier and Associates) on-site for "as-built" task team augmentation.
09/93
SPC-ND Siemens Power Corporation Criticality Safety Analyses Update Program Phase I Completion Summary Total Number of CSAs.......
216
........53 Total Number of original systems Total Number of current systems 59 Number of category 1 systems identified.........
.4 Number of category 2 systems identified.
28 27 Number of category 3 systems identified.
Of the 4 packages originally identified as category 1 during this review, only SWUR remains a category 1. One category 2 system, MOP powder dissolution, will remain out of service pending implementation of stronger criticality safety controls on the process. Immediate actions taken for each of the systems initially identified as category 1 shown on following slide.
09/93
SPC-ND Siemens Power Corporation Criticality Safety Analyses Update Program Category I Determination System Package Action Taken 1.4 The checklist for this package shows this as a category 1 system. However, Line 1 Uranium the GEN 2.0 analysis adequately provides a safety basis for this operation.
Recovery Therefore the system will be handled as a category 2.
1.6 An additional overflow line was added to the Line 1 POG Offgas scrubber Process Offgas, system and an addendum to CSA U-1.29 was completed and this system was Line 1 changed to category 2.
2.6 The centrifuge clean water tank was equipped with an overflow line with a Pellet Grind &
maximum overflow depth of 8 inches. An elbow was found to be turned Inspection upward and the overflow depth was approximately 10 inches. The elbow was immediately turned down which returned the system to compliance.
Engineering did further modifications to provide a more positive means of overflow. After these changes the system was changed to category 2.
4.10 The system was shut down for repairs prior to this review. This system will SWUR remain down until a new analysis is complete and a startup council gives permission for the system to restart.
09/93
SPC-ND Siemens Power Corporation CSA Update Program Phase I Categorization Checklist a.
Are all obvious accident conditions with serious consequences documented?
b.
Is the existing CSA adequately consistent with plant configuration to assure safety?
c.
Are all major assumptions that have a primary impact on safety valid?
d.
Are stronger controls needed to implement existing limits?
e.
Does the system description need to be updated to include key items?
f.
Are all major / minor assumptions that have a small impact on safety valid?
g.
Does the existing analysis meet license conditions for FWR & Optimum Moderation?
A "no" for any items a-c is a criterion for a Category 1 unless / until an addenda and / or modifications are complete so these questions could be answered affirmative.
A "yes" for items d and e or a "no" for items f and g are criteria for a Category 2 A "yes" for all items except d and e is a criterion for a Category 3 09/93
SPC-ND Siemens Power Corporation CSA Update Program Phase 1 Categorization Matrix System #
a b
c d
e f
g Category Comments 1.2 y
y y
y n
y y
2 Interaction analysis should be more detailed Line 1 and include a model of specific equipment Vaporization rather than use solid angle.
CSA prohibits the use of water during heel reduction operations. It is noted that cylinder washing after the cylinders are weighed and verified to contain less than 15.8 kg, up to 5-gallons of water is used to wash the interior of the UF cylinders. This is consistent with ANSI s
N14.1.
Vaporization scrubber assumptions in U-1.2.1 regarding interlocks / alarms need to be added to the CSS where the requirement is more visible.
09/93 h
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,~.
SPC-ND Siemens Power Corporation CSA Update Program Phase I Categorization Matrix System #
a b
c d
e f
g Category Comments 1.2 y
y y
y n
y y
2 U-1.2 requires 2 independent, positive controls Line 1 to prevent moisture from process streams from Vaporization entering UF cylinders-the presence of these g
(Continued) two positive controls was evaluated and found to be in place. However, desired improvements were identified and will be specifically listed in the CSS when the new system CSA is complete.
The frequency for periodic checks of these systems should be documented in the CSS where they are more visible.
1.3 y
y y
n n
y y
2 The interaction analyses should be updated to ADU y
y y
n n
y y
reflect current equipment arrangements.
Process y
y y
n y
y y
y y
y n
y y
y The dryer analysis does not include the y
y y
n n
y y
consequences of spilling uranium liquids on y
y y
n n
y y
the insulation. However, the insulation was y
y y
n n
y y
recently changed and the consequences are not major. This condition will be specifically addressed when the analysis is redone.
09/93 e
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SPC-ND Siemens Power Corporation Criticality Safety Analyses Update Program Observations Exoected Benefits:
Improved safety analyses document packages to meet evolving standards Multi-disciplinary review - greater involvement of, and understanding by Operations and Manufacturing Engineering personnel System drawings and diagrams brought up to "as built" condition improved logic in establishing systems and interfaces I
e Reduced number of CSAs to administer Expanded and clear statement of accident / upset condition scenarios evaluated and barriers / defenses to preclude criticaiity
(
09/93 l
.