ML20234D926
| ML20234D926 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1987 |
| From: | FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20234D892 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-3.D.3.4, TASK-TM NUDOCS 8707070391 | |
| Download: ML20234D926 (54) | |
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-t FLORIDA POW 3R CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 NUREG-0737, Item IILD.3.4 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY ,
EVALUATION REPORT June 30,1987 i
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TABLE OF CONTENTS - 1 I Section Title Pare' No. TABLE OF CONTENTS i LIST OF TABLES 11 LIST OF FIGURES 111 l
1.0 INTRODUCTION
AND
SUMMARY
1 2.0 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REVIEW 2-1 2.1 CONTROL COMPLEX HVAC SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 2-1 2.2 CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE INSPECTION 2-3 1
'l 3.0 SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS ^ 3-1 3.1 CRE LEAKAGE REDUCTION 3-2 3.2 FAN AND DAMPER CONTROLS 3-2 3.3 CALCULATED CRE LEAKAGES 3-3 4.0 ACCIDENT ANALYSES 4-1 4.1 RADIOLOGICAL EVALU ATION 4-1 4.2 HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL EVALUATION 4-5
5.0 CONCLUSION
S 5-1
6.0 REFERENCES
6-1 i ATTACHMENTS: l
- 1. Information Required for Control Room Habitability Evaluation
- 2. Door Weatherstripping Test Report i
- 3. Silicone Information i
i
;i i
____________________._________.u___.._._________ .__ _______._.- _ _
LIST OF TABLES Table No. Title 4.1-1 Drawdown Analysis - Spray pH 4.1-2 Input Parameters -Iodine Spray Removal Analysis 4.1-3 Spray Distribution - SPRAYCO 1713A Nozzle 4.1-4 Assumptions & Parameters Used in MHA Model 4.1-5 Assumptions & Parameters - Control Room Model 4.2-1 Listing of Chemicals Stored at Crystal River Plant Site l l l l i l li
s 1 LIST OF FIGURES Fisrure No. Title I 2.0-1 Control Room Habitability Envelope ! l 2.1-1 Control Complex HVAC System Diagram 3.3-1 Damper Leakage 4.1-1 Activity Flow Diagram - Control Room 4.2-1 Chemical Storage Locations til i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _
1.0 INTRODUCTION
AND
SUMMARY
This report documents the results of a re-evaluation of Florida Power Corporation's (FPC) Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) control room habitability and provides an update to the status of NUREG 0737, Jtem III.D.3.4(1). The purpose of this re-evaluation was to identify any actions and modifications that are required to ensure that the CR-3 control complex is in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix A, GDC 19(2) and NUREG 0737, Item III.D.3.4. The modifications described in this report will be implemented by the end of i Refuel VI. ! FPC letter to NRC dated January 30, 1981 (3) submitted actions that FPC has initiated and proposed to be undertaken in response to NUREG 0737. As part of that submittal FPC proposed certain actions to assure that the CR-3 control room operators are adequately protected against the effects of accidental releases of toxic and radioactive gases and that the Plant can be safely operated or shut down under design basis accident conditions. FPC letter to NRC dated January 13,1987 (4) updated the status and actions that have been taken to date. The bases for these actions are discussed below. The control room habitability evaluation, submitted in 1981 (3), described the CR-3 control room mode of operation as zone isolation and filtered recirculated air with a positive pressure maintained in the zone by using 2500 CFM of outside makeup air. This description was in error in that a positive pressure is not maintained. A detailed inspection of the control room envelope (CRE) revealed that in order to maintain the required positive pressure, (1/8 in. w.g.), more than 2500 cfm of makeup air is required. Subsequently, it was determined that the required makeup would result in exceeding regulatory guidance for radiation, toxic chemical exposure, and existing chiller capacity. Given the above, it was concluded that the CRE and the existing Heating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) system required minor l modification to meet the requirements of a zone isolation with filtered l recirculated air system as defined in Standard Review Plan (SRP) 6.4(5), 1-1
type 2.. In addition, the advantage of a type 2 system over the pressurized system are given below.
- Filtered recirculation systems are more effective in limiting radiation lodine exposure than those having once-through filters.-
e Filtered recirculation systems do not depend on outside makeup air for protection, thus unfilterable activity (noble gases) which contribute to the whole body gamma exposure, is not drawn into the control room envelope. e Filtered recirculation systems provide a higher degree of protection for both lodine and hazardous gases. I e Simplifies system operation. ! I l e Filtered recirculation systems with in-leakage rates equal to or greater l than 0.06 air volume changes per hour require less surveillance testing, l per SRP 6.4. A calculated infiltration rate of 0.06 air volume changes l per hour is an acceptable infiltration rate without pressure testing per ] Murphy & Campe (6), e The existing HVAC system is more compatible to recirculation than pressurization. ; The modifications to meet the requirements of a type 2 system are discussed in detail in Section 3.0 and consist of sealing of control complex penetrations and changes in ventilation system logic to limit inleakage paths to less than-0.06 habitability envelope volume air changes per hour. These modifications - include adding seals to boundary doors, and sealing / upgrading existing penetrations in the boundary which do not provide air tight barriers. In addition, modifications to HVAC control logic closes dampers and trips the control complex relief fans. Post-modification analyses were performed for control room concentrations from postulated accidental releases of toxic gases and control room operator _ ; 1-2
l l exposures from airborne and direct radiation resulting from design basis accidents. The bases and finding;s of these analyses are presented in Section 4.0. Based on the results of these analyses, the following additional I modifications have been identified.
- Construction of a three-foot high concrete dike around the CR-1 sulfur l dioxide (SO2) storage tank to protect the tank and restrict the spill {
I surface area to approximately 60 m2, l I l
- Installation of two anticipatory SO2 detectors at the tank with alarms j 1
l to the CR-1, 2 and 3 control rooms with control logic to isolate the ) CR-3 control complex.
- Plant administrative procedures to reflect the system changes, as )
discussed in Sections 3 and 4. l 1 l l i 1 i j i i l-3
2.0 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY REVIEW-Regulatory Guide 1.78 (7), Table C-2, defines the control room habitability envelope as the volume of the entire zone serviced by the control room ventilation system. For CR-3 this means the inclusion of all the areas in the control complex except the Controlled Access Area (CA) at floor elevation 9 5'-0". The CA is a. non-essential area and can be isolated from CRE by automatically closing damper AHD-12. The CRE. is shown in Figure 2.0-1, and is shielded with a minimum 2 ft. of concrete with only the roof and east wall exposed to the outside environment. l l 2.1 CONTROL COMPLEX HVAC SYSTEM DESCRIPTION . The CR-3 Control Complex HVAC System is shown in the system diagram Figure 2.1-1 The system consists of the following major components: i l 2- 100% Normal Supply Fans (AHF-17A, B) 1 2- 100% Emergency Supply Fans (AHF-18A, B) i 2- 100% Normal Filters (AHFL-3A, B) l 2- 100% Emergency Filters (AHFL-4A, B) 2- 100% Cooling Colls (AHHE-5A, B) 2- 100% Water Chillers (CHHE-1A, B Not Shown) 2- 100% Chilled Water Pumps (CHP-1A, B Not Shown) 2- 100% Electric Heating Colls (AHHE-4A, B) 2- 100% Return Fans (AHF-19A, B) 2- 100% Controlled Access (CA) Exhaust Fans (AHF-20A, B) 1- 100% CA Fume Hood Charcoal Filter (AHFL-15) 2- 100% CA Fume Hood Exhaust Fans (AHF-44A, B) 1- 100% CA Fume Hood Auxiliary Supply Fan (AHF-30) 1- 100% CA Fume Hood Auxiliary Filter (AHFL-12) 2- 100% Equipment Room Exhaust Fans (AHF-21A, B) 2-1 l
2.1.1 Normal Operation In the normal mode of operation, supply air is filtered through the normal filters (AHFL-3 A, B) and conditioned by the cooling coils (AHHE-5 A, B) or by the electric heating coils (AHHE-4 A, B). Conditioned air is supplied to all areas of the control complex by the normal supply fan (AHF-17A, B). Branch ducts to the different rooms and areas are provided with thermostatically controlled in-duct heaters to maintain the temperature during changes in heat load. Supply air, except air supplied to the CA is returned to the conditioning equipment by the return fan (AHF-19A, B). The outside air dampers l (AHD-1, ID) are throttled to admit makeup air for ventilation. The makeup l air is mixed with return air prior to reconditioning. Air supplied to the CA is exhausted through fume hoods and CA exhaust fans (AHF-44A, B; -20A, B) to the Auxiliary Building Exhaust System. The fume hood auxiliary supply fan (AHF-30) provides additional makeup air (from the Turbine Building) required by the fume hoods. The Mechanical Equipment Room exhaust fan (AHF-21A,B) is provided to ventilate the Equipment Room, Elevator Machine Room, and the Control Room Lavatory. Makeup air for the Mechanical Equipment Room is drawn from the outside through damper AHD-99. 2.1.2 Emergency Operation (Recirculation Mode) l Upon detection of high reactor building pressure or toxic gas all dampers that form the boundary of the CRE are automatically closed. In addition-the Mechanical Equipment Room exhaust fan, CA fume hood exhaust fan, CA fume hood auxiliary supply fan, and CA exhaust fan are de-energized and their corresponding isolation dampers close. The return fan, normal filters, normal fan, and the cooling (or heating) coils remain in operation and operate in a recirculating mode. The emergency fans and filters can be placed in service by the operator. 2-2 l L__-_-_________.-_________ . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ .
4 I i Upon detection of high radiation by RM-A5 the dampers that form the CRE automatically close. The mechanical equipment room exhaust fan, CA fume j hood exhaust fan, CA fume hood auxiliary supply fan, CA exhaust fan, j normal supply fan, and return fan are tripped and their corresponding dampers close. Manual action is then required to start the emergency fan l and restart the return fan to operate in the recirculating mode using the emergency filters. The cooling (or heating) coils remain in operation.
, 1 1
1 2.2 CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE INSPECTION l A field inspection of the CRE was performed to evaluate air tightness. Doors and penetrations throughout the envelope were inspected and their 4 conditions were recorded such that the total leakage could be estimated and the requirements for any modifications established. A total of six (6) doors I i i and 50 penetrations were found to require modifications. Damper and fan ] controls modifications were also required as described in Section 3. 2-3
3.0 SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS 3.1 CRE LEAKAGE REDUCTION 3.1.1 Doors To reduce door in-leakage, door seals will be installed. The door seals are manufactured by Zero Weatherstripping Company, New York. The door seals have been tested by the manufacturer in accordance with the test procedure delineated in the ANSI /AAM A E-283-73 standard. The test results indicated that the leakage through the seals when subjected to a pressure differential ! of 0.30 in.wg (equiv. to a wind velocity of 25 miles per hour) is 0.03 CFM per lineal foot of door crack length (Attachment 2). The total crack length for the 6 doors is 177 feet. Thus, the total calculated door in-leakage is ! 5.3 CFM. This is conservative since SRP 6.4 states that leakage should be calculated based on 1/8 in. water gauge pressure differential. To detect i excessive door seal degradation, each door will be inspected periodically to check for damage, wear, loose hardware, and proper door operation. l { During the June 9,1987 meeting with the NRC staff, a concern was j expressed regarding doors being left open. This concern is precluded by the I existing fire protection and security procedures which require a watch to be posted in the event that these doors need to remain open. I l 3.1.2 Penetrations Silicone caulk, grout, blanking plates, or combination thereof, were utilized to reduce the in-leakage through the 50 penetrations. The caulking material specified is " SILASTIC" 732 RTV Adhesive / Sealant, as manufactured by Dow Corning. This material has been widely used in nuclear plant applications. Wyle Laboratory Data Bank indicates the silicone sealant has an expected life of 40 years at an average temperature of 202*F. As the average temperature decreases the sealant life is expected to increase (Attachment 3). Separate tests (8) have also determined that the sealant is qualified for 1 x 107 rad environments. 3-1
Since the penetration seals are not subjected to wear and tear (passive), or to temperature and radiation levels ' above those for which the sealant is t qualified, periodic surveillance is not required. .. l l To ensure that the seals are installed as specified, site procedures require 1 the use of applicable manufacturers recommendations with Nuclear Quality Control signoff on inspection of the completed installation. 3.2 FAN AND DAMPER CONTROLS The original control room habitability envelope (1) did not include the mechanical equipment room (Fl. El.164'-0"). Subsequent review of the j control complex concluded that this room should be included in the CRE for q the following reasons:
- 1. Office space at this elevation is serviced by the same system that serves the control room.
- 2. In-leakage through large ductwork and equipment located in_this floor space is difficult to evaluate.
1
- 3. Large floor penetrations with fire dampers requiring expansion gaps are l difficult to seal.
- 4. Walls and roof structure above this elevation have less penetrations and are less difficult to seal.
To minimize in-leakage through this added space, the controls for damper AHD-99 and equipment room exhaust fan will be modified. The modification will automatically close the damper and stop the fan upon detection of high reactor building pressure, high-radiation, or toxic gas. The associated fan ; isolation dampers will also close.
' To meet the intent of SRP 6.4, modifications add position switches to-dampers in ductwork that penetrate the CRE. Indication is provided in the control room to verify damper position. Procedures for operator action in 3-2
_ _ . _ . - __-.__._m____-_-____ _
)
1 the event of improper damper alignment will be developed and implemented ] prior to Refuei VI restart. 3.3 CALCULATED CRE LEAKAGES The calculated CRE leakage rates versus the values used in'the radiological 1 . l and hazardous chemical analyses are shown below: l l ' l Calculated Rate Analysis Rate CFM CFM Penetrations Negligible 245 ., Doors 5 1 1 L ) Opening / closing - doors 10 10 -) Dampers (filtered path) 191 70 Dampers (unfiltered path) 30 30 236 355 The calculated rate of 236 CFM If used In the analyses would require periodic testing (to ensure that it is not being exceeded) since this represents - a value less than 0.06 volume changes per hour. To avoid the need for testing, the analyses presented in Section 4 used 355 CFM (equal to 0.06 volume change per hour). The calculated rate of damper in-leakage for the filtered path is based on a design AP of 1 in, w.g. Analysis values used a AP-of 1/8 in. w.g. across the inlet damper as this conservatively predicts operator thyroid dose post accident. See Figure 3.3-1 for damper in-leakage values, and Section 4.1 for radiological evaluation. 1 1 1 i 3-3 - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - - _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ .
-1 4.0 ACCIDENT ANALYSES The control complex operator radiation exposure from airborne radioactive material and direct radiation resulting from _ the Maximum Hypothetical '-
Accident (MHA) has been evaluated. In addition, the control complex toxic gas concentrations following the postulated ~ rupture of Chlorine ' (C12), Ammonia (NH3), and Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) sources have been evaluated. l- These evaluations' are ' based on conservative models and assumptions. l- Attachment I lists information that is used in the radiological and toxic gas I analyses. 4.1 RADIOLOGICAL EVALUATION 1 The MHA is considered the bounding design basis event (DBE) for the control room radiological evaluation. A review of other DBEs shows the MHA provides the limiting radioactive source term- for the control room evaluation. No other postulated accident would result in a higher operation radiological exposure. The MHA analysis presented below is based on conservative assumptions and 1 parameters that are consistent with the guidance provided in SRPs 6.4, j 6.5.2(9), and 15.6.5(10) and Regulatory Guide 1.4(11). 4.1.1 Reactor Buildinst Sorav System Evaluation The reactor building spray system was analyzed to determine its effectiveness in removing airborne iodine activity under MHA conditions. lodine spray removal constants for several different operating modes, were evaluated to establish the limiting condition. These operating modes are as follows:
- 1. Full Flow Case - normal mode in which all components function as designed (both spray trains operate). Spray flow is 3000 gpm.
- 2. Half Flow Case - a half flow mode in which one string of pumps and valves do not operate, e.g., one diesel falls to operate and all other 4-1
components function as designed. The B string was selected as the failure for this analysis. Spray flow is 1500 gpm.
- 3. Sodium, Hydroxide Tank (BST-1) Valve Failure Case - Tank outlet valve BSV-11 (B-side) falls closed and all other components function as designed. In this case, the total spray flow is 3000 gpm, but only Train A with a flow of 1500 gpm receives sodium hydroxide.
- 4. Spray Pump Failure Case - failure of the spray pump (B-side) and all other components function as designed. Spray flow is 1500 gpm. l l
- 5. Decay Heat Pump Failure - failure of the decay heat pump (B-side) and all other components function as designed. The total spray flow is 3000 gpm. However, Reactor Building spray train B receives a reduced amount of sodium hydroxide due to failure of the decay heat pump.
The spray solution pH values for each of these operating modes were previously evaluated as part of the reactor building spray and emergency core cooling system storage tank drawdown analysis. These values are given in Table 4.1-1 and are based on assuming the minimum level and concentration (6 weight percent) of sodium hydroxide in the storage tank and maximum borated water concentration and level in the borated water storage tank. Coverage of the reactor building by the spray system was evaluated. The volume of the sprayed region is 65.2% of the total building free volume and the volume of the unsprayed region is 34.8% The SPIRT Computer Code (12) was used to evaluate spray removal constants for elemental iodine. SRP 6.5.2 calculational methods were used to evaluate spray removal constants for particulate iodine. Since sodium hydroxide does not enhance the absorption of organic lodine, spray removal of methyl iodide was not considered. Additional assumptions and parameters used in this analysis are summarized in Tables 4.1-2 and 4.1-3. l l 4-2
I Results of this analysis for particulate lodine removal are as follows: Spray Removal Constant Spray For Particulate !odine Flow Ap (gpm) (hr-1) 1500 0.30 3000 0.60 l 1 For elemental iodine, the spray removal ~ constant is a function of pH. Based on the . injection pH values given in Table 4.1-1, the initial spray removal constants were calculated to be: , Initial Spray Removal Constant For Elemental Iodine Model Ae Case - (Spray Flow /pH) (hr-1) Full Flow 3000 gpm/pH avg. = 7.3 4.61 3000 gpm/pH avg. = 8.1 19.40 Half Flow 1500 gpm/pH = 7.3 2.30 BST-1 Valve Failure 1500 gpm/pH = 7.5 3.55 3000 gpm/pH avg. = 7.5 7.07 Spray Pump Failure 1500 gpm/pH = 7.4 2.91 Decay Heat Pump Failure case bounded by above cases. The calculated elemental lodine spray removal constants for spray solution pH greater than or equal to 8.5 are: Spray Removal Constant Spray For Elemental Iodine Flow Ae:pH > 8.5 (gpm) (hr-I) 1500 16.58 3000 31.09 4-3 L
l 1 I' The calculated decontamination factor for removal of elemental lodine is 170.4. 4.1.2 Radiological Consequences of a Maximum Hvoothetical Accident - Control Room Dose Analysis The MHA was analyzed to determine radiological consequences in the control room. An analysis was performed for each of the containment spray system operating modes, to determine the worst case conditions. The control room dose limits are based on guidance provided in SRP 6.4 as follows: Dose for duration of accident: Whole Body Gamma: 5 Rem i Thyroid: 30 Rem Beta Skin Dose: 30 Rem The radiological exposure to operators in the control room as a consequence of the MHA would be due to (1) direct radiation from the rad!oactive cloud in the atmosphere which results from reactor building leakage and from postulated recirculation loop leakage in the Auxiliary Building, (2) direct radiation exposure from the containment building and (3) exposure to radioactive materials which leak into the control room from the radioactive cloud in the atmosphere. All of these dose contributions were included in this analysis. Methods and assumptions utilized include:
- 1. The "ACT(13) computer code is used to calculate the post accident unprotected doses in the control building. The combinat'lon of methods described in Murphy and Campe(6) and the unprotected doses from the TACT code were used to evaluate doses to operators inside the control building from the inleakage of radioactive materials. ,
- 2. The analytical model used to calculate the direct dose contribution from the radioactive cloud in the atmosphere is given in Regulatory i 4-4
i Guide 1.4. No credit was taken for dose reduction due to distance effects. The control room shield walls have a thickness of 2 feet of concrete. Conservatively assuming an average gamma energy of 0.733 Mev j results in a calculated reduction factor of 0.007.
- 3. The direct whole body dose contribution from the reactor building was ;
calculated using a cylindrical source model and MHA accident source terms. Credit was taken for a minimum of 5.5 feet of concrete shielding provided by the reactor building and control complex. In addition, credit was taken for dose reduction due to a distance of approximately 48 feet, the minimum distance between the reactor building and the nearest control building location.
- 4. Additional assumptions used in this analysis are listed in Tables 4.1-4 and 4.1-5. An activity flow diagram used to model the inleakage of activity in the CRE is given in Figure 4.1-1.
The calculated control room doses for the postulated MHA are: 1 Thyroid Whole Body Inhalation Gamma Beta Skin (Rem) (Rem) (Rem) 26.5 1.9 17.7 In addition, an evaluation of M.e ilmiting infiltration rate into the control complex while not exceed'.ig the SRP specified 30 day thyroid dose limit of 30 Rem is 323.6 cfm unfbtered plus 70 cfm filtered. Utilizing the calculated infiltration rate of 236 cfm (191 filtered plus 45 unfiltered) results in a 30-day thyroid dose of 5 Rem. Accordingly, the analysis basis and results using .06 air changes per hour infiltration rate (355 cfm) results in a conservative estimate of the 30 day operator thyroid dose. 4-5
4.2 HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL EVALUATION The CR-3 control room habitability, due to the release of hazardous chemicals, has been evaluated for the various chemicals that are located at or near the CR-3 plant site. Analysis results presented below reflect control complex design conditions to be completed by the end of the upcoming Refuel VI outage. A quantitative listing of the chemicals stored at the CR-3 plant site is presented in Table 4.2-1. Figure 4.2-1 presents the storage locations of these chemicals relative to the CR-3 control room intake. Off-site l manufacturing, storage, or transportation facilities of hazardous chemicals do not pose any potentially significant effects on the safe operation of the f plant (see Section 2.2.3, FSAR page 2-5). ) Based on the review and evaluation presented in Reference (1) and as stated 3 in Reference (2), FPC has installed chlorine, ammonia and sulfur dioxide detectors on the intake duct to the control complex ventilation system. These detectors are redundant with the following setpoints: 0.5 ppm (Cl2), 5 ppm (NH3) and 2 ppm (SO2). 4.2.1 Control Complex Chlorine Concentration Analysis Chlorine is used in Circulating and Service Water Systems of Units 4 and 5. Chlorine is periodically fed to the circulating water system for control of biofouling that could affect surface heat transfer and cause deterioration of cooling tower materials. Gas side, rather than liquid side, withdrawal is utilized from the chlorine containers. The chlorine storage facility is common for Units 4 and 5 and is located 3600 feet from the CR-3 control complex intake. There are eight containers stored on site, four in service at any one time and four in reserve. The maximum bulk container capacity is 2000 lbs., each container. An analysis of the postulated rupture of one chlorine tank at the Unit 4 and 5 ' storage facility incorporating Regulatory Guide 1.78 and 1.95(14) assumptions results in a CR-3 control room concentration of less than 0.13 4-6
i ppm, two minutes after its detection in the intake. This value is less than the 15 ppm regulatory guide toxicity limit. The methods contained in NUREG 0570(15) were utilized in performing the calculation. Pertinent calculation parameters are provided in Attachment 1. The resultant concentration is conservative, based upon the assumption that control room air intake is at ground level. 4.2.2 Control Complex Ammonia Concentration Analysis l Ammonia is fed to the condensate system of Units 4 and 5 to control the pH l of the condensate and feedwater, thereby minimizing corrosion throughout ' the condensate-feedwater-steam cycle. Gaseous withdrawal is utilized from the ammonia storage tank. The ammonia storage facility is common for I Units 4 and 5 and is located 3600 feet from the CR-3 control complex intake. i I l An analysis of the postulated rupture of an 8500 lb anhydrous ammonia tank utilizing the methodology contained in NUREG 0570 and Regulatory Guide 1.78 assumptions results in a control room concentration of less than 1.14 ppm, two minutes after its detection in the control room intake. This is well below the regulatory guide toxicity limit of 100 ppm. I The results reflect consideration of the buoyancy of ammonia under Pasquill F conditions and the selection of a wind speed (5 m/s) which would tend to maximize the concentration entering the control complex intake. 4.2.3 Control Complex Sulfur Dioxide Concentration Analysis Sulfur dioxide is stored at Crystal River Units 1 and 2 and utilized at Unit 1 in the Wahico Flue Gas conditioning process unit which is used to control particulate emissions. This process unit consists of a 45 ton storage tank, vaporizer, heaters, piping, valves and control instrumentation. The storage tank is located in an open air environment approximately 750 feet from the CR-3 control complex. The quantity stored at any time varies from 20 to 40 tons; gas side withdrawal is utilized. 4-7
~. - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
In addition, SO2 is also stored at Units 4 and 5 where it is periodically fed to the circulation water system blowdown to reduce total residue chlorine to an acceptable level for discharge. This sulfur dioxide storage facility is common for Units 4 and 5 and consists of one manifold of two containers I (one normally in service and one normally in reserve). The maximum bulk container capacity is 2000 lbs. The storage facility is located approximately 3600 feet from the CR-3 control complex. Due to the quantity stored and its i location, the Unit 1 installation is considered the limiting installation to be j considered. I Licensee Event Report No. 87-024-00 dated January 9, 1987(16) submitted a preliminary evaluation of the potential impact of the Unit 1 SO2 storage tank on the control room habitability and a listing of the interim actions being taken. A detailed evaluation of the potential concentrations of SO2 that could occur in the control complex under various assumed design and environmental conditions following postulated accidental releases was submitted to the NRC via FPC letter dated May 7, 1987(17).. As detailed in this SO2 Supplemental Report, the maximum SO2 concentration in the control complex, utilizing only local (intake duct) detectors, is calculated to be 38.2 ppm, two minutes after detection. i I With the installation of anticipatory SO2 detectors at the tank, which alarm and isolate the control complex, the maximum SO2 concentration in the l control complex two minutes after the accident is calculated to be 4.4 ppm. Regulatory Guide 1.78 specifies the toxic limit for SO2 to be 5 ppm. This limit is considered to be extremely conservative since it corresponds to an 8-hour time weighted average limit for exposures to SO2 specified by OSHA. Based upon a review of authoritative sources as presented in the SO2 Supplemental Report, the estimated SO2 concentrations regardless of the mode of detection, will not result in control room operator incapacitation before an operator would put self contained breathing apparatus into operation. The maximum values calculated are well within the incapacitation limits defined in the literature, as discussed in Reference 17. 4-8
=,-
)
5.0 CONCLUSION
S The re-evaluation of the post accident habitability of.the Crystal River Unit.3 control room resulted in the following actions that have been taken and are scheduled to be completed at the end of Refuel VI outage to begin in September 1987. 1 e Reduction of inleakage into the control room envelope. ! e HVAC control logic changes. 1 e Damper position indication in the control room, e Construction of a three-foot high concrete dike aroung the Unit 1 SO2 I storage tank. i e Addition of two anticipatory SO2 detectors located at the tank with alarms in the CR-1,2 and 3 control rooms. q l e Modifications and additions to the plant procedures. 4 Based on the implementation of the above actions and the analyses -J performed, it is concluded that the Crystal River Unit 3 control room is in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, GDC 19 and NUREG 0737 ' l Item III.D.3.4. The control room will remain habitable for all postulated design basis events. I 1 I i a 5-1
1
6.0 REFERENCES
j 1 The following references were utilized in the preparation of this report. '
- 1. NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements", U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, November,1980. , l
- 2. Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 19, Control Room J
- 3. FPC Letter, Baynard to Eisenhut, dated January 30,1981, " Crystal River Unit 3 NUREG-0737 Requirements."
- 4. FPC Letter, Simpson to Stolz, dated January 13,1987, "NUREG-0737, item IILD.3.4 Control Room Habitability."
- 5. NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan 6.4, " Control Room Habitability l System", Revision 2, July,1981, USNRC.
I
- 6. K. G. Murphy and K. M. Campe, " Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Ventilation System Design for Meeting General Design Criterion 19",
13th AEC Air Cleaning Conference, August,1974.
- 7. USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.78, " Assumptions for Evaluation the l
Habitability of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated l Hazardous Chemical Release", June,1974.
- 8. W. A. Greenhow and J. H. Lewis, " Evaluation of Insulation Materials and Components for Use in Nuclear Radiation Environment, Phase I,"
NASA CR-2045,1972.
- 9. NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan 6.5.2, " Containment Spray as a Fission Product Cleanup System", Revision 1, July,1981, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
l 6-1
- 10. ' NUREG-0800, Standard . Review Plan 15.6.5, " Loss-of-Coolant Accidents Resulting From spectrum of Postulated Pipe Breaks Within the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary", Revision 2, July,1981, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
- 11. USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.4 " Assumptions Used for Evaluatici. the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accide st for -
Pressurized Water Reactors", Revision 2, June,1974.
- 12. NUREG/CR-0009, " Technological Bases For Models of Spray War,hout of Airborne Contaminants in Containment Vessels", U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, October,1978.
- 13. NUREG/CR-3287, ORNL/TM-8763, "A Guide for the TACT 111 Computer Code", Final Report, May,1983, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com mission. l lj
- 14. USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.95, " Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against an Accidental Chlorine Release", )
Revision 1, January,1977.
- 15. NUREG-0570, " Toxic Vapor Concentrations in the Control Room Following a Postulated Accidental Release," June,1979, USNRC.
- 16. Licensee Event Report No. 87-0240-00 dated January 9,1987.
- 17. FPC Letter, Simpson to Document Control Desk, May 7,1987, " Control Room Habitability Sulfur Dioxide Supplemental Report."
i i
- 18. USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.52, " Design, Testing, and Maintenance !
Criteria for Post Accident Engineered-Safety Feature Atmosphere Cleanup System Air Filtration and Absorption Units of Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 2, March,1978. 6-2 l . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ -
e a 1 J I 1 l TABLES 1 1 i l l l J l. s 1 l l l l 1 l l 4 I l 1 I i 1 l 1
pn Ami o Cut O LouI Sa) l N 2 8 2 8 8 4 0 8 2 3
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4 y is e _ l d Eai x e _ g - Ln o aB 5 _ B Ar r e& - - - - _ Any d vA 7 TwH o A d m wu ai rd DoS B _ f n o% i a 1 8 4 1 _ st l r t w i l u0 P T _ s y _ e6 a R r p S l a A _ i in 3 3 5 4 5 _ it a 7 7 7 7 7 _ n r I T e p t e v a s w l a m e w u C a l o l F o V 1 r e Pe r Hyr e F - u yu au _ l f al _ l l Ti l ri cil _ u a S a pa ea F H BF SF DF
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TABLE 4.1-2 Summary of Input Parameters Used For 1 Iodine Soray Removal Analysis j Total containment free volume 2.0 x 106 ft3 i l Sprayed containment free volume 65.2 % i i Unsprayed containment free volume 34.8 % l l Spray nozzle type SPRACO Model 1713A ! Spray distribution Table 4.1-3 Number of drop sizes 56 Mean spray fall height One header model 110 ft. Two header model 109 ft. Spray flow rate l One header model 1500 gpm Two header model 3000 gpm Collection drop efficiency 1.0 Spray solution PH Table 4.1-1 Elemental lodine partition coefficient Standard Review Plan 6.5.2, Figure 6.5.2-1 Normal temperature at which spray water is stored 40*F Maximum post-accident temperature 281*F Laminar boundary layer surface area 4084 ft2 Turbulant boundary layer surface area One header model 58,320 ft2 Two header model 59,180 ft2 Water wall flow fraction 0.1 Temperature difference across wall / gas boundary 1.0
- F Containment diameter 65 ft.
Containment wall surface area impacted by sprays One header model 37,900 ft2 Two header model 38,760 ft2 Liquid volume of containment sump 490,182 gal
'l TABLE 4.1-3 Spray Distribution for SPRACO Model 1713A Nozzle l Data Point No. Drop Size (cm) Relative Frecuency (fraction) 1 3.75-3 .011 2 6.25-3 .027 3 8.75-3 .056 4 1.125-2 .105 5 1.375-2 .995 6 1.625-2 .080 7 1.875-2 .070 8 2.125-2 .051 9 2.375-2 .066 10 2.625-2. .044 11 2.875-2 .026 12 3.125-2 .022 13 3.375-2 .017 14 3.625-2 .020 15 3.875-2 .023 16 4.125-2 .011 17 4.375-2 .011 18 4.625-2 .015 19 4.875-2 .015 20 5.125-2 .013 21 5.375-2 .011 22 5.625-2 .016 23 5.875-2 .012 24 6.125-2 .008 25 6.375-2 .008 26 6.625-2 .008 27 6.875-2 .011 28 7.125-2 .009 29 7.375-2 .011 30 7.625-2 .009 31 7.875-2 .008 32 8.125-2 .007 33 8.375-2 .006 34 8.625-2 .006 35 8.875-2 .008 36 9.125-2 .006 37 9.375-2. .005 38 9.625-2 .005 39 9.875-2 .005 40 :.013-1 .004 41 1.038-1 .005 42 1.063-1 .004
l - TABLE 4.1-3 (Cont'd) Spray Distribution for SPRACO Model 1713A Nozzle Data Point No. Drop Size (cm) Relative Freauency (fraction) 43 1.088-1 .005 44 1.113-1 .005 45 1.138-1 .005 46 1.163-1 .004 47 1.188-1 .005 48 1.213-1 .005 49 1.238-1 .007 50 1.288-1 .005 51 1.313-1 .002 52 1.338-1 .002 53 1.413-1 .001 54 1.438-1 .001 55 1.613-1 .001 56 1.738-1 .002 1 1
TABLE 4'.1-4 List of Assumptions and Parameters Used to Model The Maximum Hypothetical Accident for Control Room Habitability Analysis Parameter Analysis
- 1. Thermal Power (MWt) 2595.
- 2. Containment Free Volume (!t3) 2.0 x 106
% sprayed / volume (ft3 ) 65.2%(1.304 x 106)
% unsprayed/ volume (ft3 ) 34.8%(6.96 x 105)
Air turnover between sprayed and 4800% of unsprayed volume per unsprayed volumes day
- 3. Fraction Activity Released From Core lodines 0.25 noble gases 1.0
- 4. Iodine Species elemental (%) 91 organic (%) 4 particulate (%) 5
- 5. Maximum Decontamination Factor For 170.4 Removal of ElementalIodine by Sprays {
- 6. Containment Spray Flow Itates l
one header (gpm) 1500. ! two header (gpm) 3000. l
- 7. Concentration of Sodium Hydroxide in 6.0 ,
Storage Tanks (weight percent) l
- 8. Spray System Actuation Time 71.
Post-LOCA (seconds) l
. . . . ~ . _ . . . . _ . _ . . . . . -
TABLE 4.1-4 (Cont'd) List of Assumptions and Parameter: Used to Model The Maximum Hypothetical Accident for Control Room Habitability Analysis Parameter Analysis
- 9. Spray Times / Spray Removal Constants A. No Spray 0 B. One Header Spray (1500 gpm)
No Delay 71 see - 8 min Ae = 2.30 hr-1 Ap = 0.30 hr-1
>8 min Ae = 16.58 hr-1 Ap = 0.30 hr-1 C. Two Header Spray (3000 gpm)
No Delay 71 see - 6 min Ae = 4.61 hr-1 Ap = 0.60 hr-1
>6 min
~ Ae = 31.09 hr-1 Ap = 0.60 hr-1 D, BST-1 Valve Failure One Header Mixing (3000 spm) 71 see - 3.75 min Ae = 3.55 hr-1 Ap = 0.30 hr-1
>3.75 min Ae = 16.58 hr-1 Ap = 0.30 hr-1
TABLE 4.1-4 (Cont'd) { l List of Assumptions and Parameters Used to Model The Maximum Hypothetical Accident for. Control Room Habitability Analysis ( Parameter A nalysis ! Two Header Mixing (3000 gpm) 71 see - 6.70 min Ae = 7.07 hr-1 Ap = 0.60 hr-1 i
>6.70 min Ae = 31.09 hr-1 Ap = 0.60 hr-1 l Spray Pump Failure (1500 gpm)
E. 71 see - 9 min Ae = 2.91 hr-1 Ap = 0.30 hr-1
>9 min Ae = 16.58 hr-1 Ap = 0.60 hr-1 F. Decay Heat Pump Failure Bounded by cases D&E, above
- 10. Containment Leakage Rate (%/ day) 0-24 hr 0.25
- 1-30 days 0.125 1
l l
- 11. Recirculation Loop Leakage l Operational Leakage (ce/hr) 4510.
l SRP Assumed Leakage 50 gpm for 30 minutes , starting 24 hosts after i accident '
- 12. Sump Liquid Volume Post-Loca (gal) 490,182.
- 13. Fraction of Recirculation Loop Leakage 10 Flashing to Steam (percent) a-___-_____-_
TABLE 4.1-5 List of Assumptions and Parameters Used to Model The Control Room For The Control Room Dose Habitability Analysis Parameter Analysis
- 1. Mode of Operation Zone isolation with filtered '
recirculated air
- 2. Habitability envelope free volume (ft3) 355,311.
- 3. Infiltration rate through closed isolation 70 0 1/8" W.G.
damper (SCFM)
- 4. Infiltration rate for opening and closing 10 doors (SCFM)
- 5. Habitability envelope infiltration rate 0.06 air volume changes per (SCFM) hour (2) l l
- 6. Filtered recirculation flow rate (SCFM) 43,500.
- 7. Recirculation Charcoal Filter Bed 2 Depth (inch)
- 8. Filter efficiency for lodines 95% for all spec.ies(l) l 9. Control Room X/Q values (sec/m3) l 0-8 hrs 9.00 x 10-4 (3) 8-24 hrs 5.31 x 10 -4 (3) 1-4 days 2.07 x 104 (3) 4-30 days 5.94 x 10-5(3)
- 10. Breathing Rate for Operators in Control 3.47 x 104 Room (m3/sec)
(1) Per USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.52,(18) Rev. 2, for a charcoal filter with a 2 inch bed depth designed to operate outside the primary containment, a filter efficiency of 95% can be assumed. (2) Maximum calculated infiltration is less than 0.06 air volume changes per hour. therefore for this analysis,0.06 air volume changes per hour was used. (3) The original control room X/Q value of 9.0 x 10-4 sec/m3 used in the analysis. However, for time periods greater than 8 hours, credit has been taken for a reduction in this value due to occupancy, wind speed and wind direction factors per SRP 6.4. j
TABLE 4.2-1 CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 CHEMICAL STORAGE' AT PLANT SITE l DISTANCE UNIT FROM CR CHEMICAL QUANTITY LOCATION INTAKE (ft.) CR 4 & 5 Anhydrous Ammonia 8,500 Lbs. 3,625 CR 4 & 5 Carbon Dioxide 12,000 lbs. 3,850 8 "ta " ' 3,600 CR 4 & 5 Chlorine g2 00O bs ea.) 8C" " ' 4,000 CR 4 & 5 Chlorine j5 Lb ea.) I2 CR 4 & 5 Hydrogen ' (40.4 Lbs. ea.) 12 ,075 CR 4 & 5 Hydrogen (40.4 Lbs. ea.) CR 4 & 5 Nitrogen l (56 Lbs. ea 9 b5 CR 4 & 5 Sulfuric Acid 4,000
.'Be H 5g CR 4 & 5 Sulfuric Acid ;3 L$ 3,300 8 iH 50 CR 4 & 5 Sulfuric Acid 7 Lbs.of 3,300 66EBet H CR3 Sulfuric Acid 1,000 Gallons 440 CR3 Sodium Hydroxide 90,000 lbs. 440 CR 3 Anhydrous Ammonia (2) 766 Ft.2 ea. 440 CR 1 & 2 Sulfuric Acid 8,000 Gallons 560 CR 1 & 2 Sodium Hydroxide 8,000 Gallons 560 l 1
CR3 Nitrogen 141,000 Ft.1 204 CR 3 Hydrogen 1,500 Gallons 500 l CR 3 Hydrogen 40,000 Ft.2 730 i CR 1 & 2 Carbon Dioxide 2$ Conta n rs 760 (50 b ) CR 1 & 2 Hydrogen 62,000 Ft.2 760 Nitrogen C0ntainers ' CR 1 & 2 O9 p , 140 CR 3 Carbon Dioxide 10,000 lbs. 200 CR 4 & 5 Sulphur Dioxide (2,000 lbs. ea.) 3,600 8' Lbs CR 1 & 2 Sulphur Dioxide 750 (5 ingle T l CR 1 & 2 Sodium Hypochlorite 800 Gallons 500 CR 1 & 2 Sodium Hypochlorite 300 Gallons 500 l
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e FIGURE 4.2-1 CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL STORAGE LOCATIONS g NITROGEN AND HYDROGEN i STORAGE ARE A g SERVICE WATER CHLORINE STORAGE AREA E DEMINERAttZtR SULF URIC ACID STORAGE TANK V CARSON DIOXIDE STORAGE AREA CIRCULATING WATER 385W CHLORINE AND AMNYDROUS SULFUR DIOxtDE "Y g AMMONIA STORAGE AREA 5 E g 5TORAGE I E h CIRCULATING WATER AREA CRYSTAL RIVER SULFURIC ACID - 5TORAGE TANic 3625, UNITS 4 & 5 { T i 3600' E CONDENSATE POLL 5HER SUL7 URIC ACID STORAGE TANK 5 3300* v 1 l l i DISCHARGE CANAL
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1 l l ATTACHMENTS l l I i
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i i l i l l l l b l l 1 l
i Ill.D.3.4, ATTACHMENT 1, INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR CONTROL-ROOM HABITABILITY EVALUATION (1) Control-room mode of operation Zone Isolation with filtered recirculation - Radiological Releases Zone Isolation - Toxic gas releases See Section 2.1 for system description l (2) Control-room characteristics I (a) Air volume - control room 355,311 ft3 (b) Control-room emergency zone See Figure 2.0-1 and Section 2.0 (c) Control-room ventilation system schematic with normal and emergency air-flow rates See Figure 2.1-1 l (d) Infiltration leakage rate 0.06 air changes per hour used for radiological and toxic gas analyses. See Section 3.3 (e) High efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filte and charcoal adsorber efficiencies 1 I
- 1. Charcoal filters 95% for all species l
l
III.D.3.4 ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont'd)
- 2. HEPA filters not used in analyses (f) Closest distance between containment and air intake 88 ft.
(g) Layout of control room, air intakes, containment building, and chlorine, or other chemical storage facility with dimensions See Figure 4.2-1 (h) Control-room shielding including radiation streaming from penetrations, doors, ducts, stairways, etc. : See Section 4.1 (i) Automatic isolation capability-damper closing time, damper leakage Damper closing time 19.5 to 25 see including instrument response ; Intake damper leakage See Figure 3.3-1 Intake damper ar ea 24 ft2 i (j) Chlorine detectors or toxic gas (local or remote) l Cl2, NH3, and SO2 detectors (redundant in intake duct) SO2 - Two anticipatory remote detectors at CR1 SO2 tank l Self-contained breathing apparatus availability (number) (k) 1 Scott air packs available 4
/
IlloD.3.4 ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont'd) (1) Bottled air supply (hours supply) l l 5 spare for above i (m) Emergency food and potable water supply Emergency food (7 days) Potable water (normal source only) (n) Control-room personnel capacity (normal and emergency) i 4-20 people l (o) Potassium iodide drug supply ) None (3) Onsite storage of chlorine and other hazardous chemicals See Table 4.2-1 (4) Off-site manufacturing, storage, or transportation facilities of hazardous l See FSAR Section 2.2.3. l (5) Technical specifications (a) Toxic Gas Detection System, Cl2, SO2, NH3 proposed Technical Specification 3.3.3.11 TSI 86-50 dated December 19,1986. (b) Control-Room Emergency Ventilation System, Technical Specification 3.7.7.1.
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7"~ . CLIENT: Zero Weather $ tripping'Cempany, Inc. . 9.M;p.i. 9 ; .y
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a M '. n.:. c.;.; T( d'atermine the aih infiltration for .a standard door without ..$.L .?. -:g.SfE7
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.Ai Winfiltratic!n'. tests'were performed in accordance with; ANSI? '
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.# . ' s'tahdard E2 6 3. '(.3. ; Air. infiltration measurements were made with';.0,.27th 5 J ai-sfa' tic pressure d3.fference 'across the door of 0.30 inches ofM' 'jR.
E.g.'Undii', ..whichEii. equ.ivalent to a" wind velocity of 2 5 ' mph; In add $-{E. Tt
."Ty W tMn? three,' dhi'ts were!.. tested at a static pressure difference.'of *i@ @'E ud. .$69'%nd 1*: 20' inche's".cIf water, which is equivalent to a 35 and 504 '.: .5 i
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MF *Jjat.'arstripping testi~ samples were retained by the' client.cfUrdis. repor i Thii4repcrt is the exclusive property of the client so named he:eih' DI and is applicable to the sample tested. Results obtained are test- . i
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. . . ATTACHMENT No. 3 t
( Informa': ion aoout EEzrgs esasame .I S..icone i : as"omers - 1 i j 1 am , l 1 DESCRIPTION SILASTICe 732 RTV adhesive / SILASTICe 732 RTV ADHESIVE / SEALANT sealant is a pastey-tone
- Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . One-pa rt, vulcanizie g silicone rub ber component matenal which cures to Physical Fo rm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N onslumping paste a tough, rubbery solid when Cure . . . . . . . . . ..... . . .. . .. .. . . . Cures at room temperature, on exposure to exposed to moisture in the air. water vapor in the air, giving off a small l Since it will not flow of its own Special Properties .. ... . . ..... . .... . ... May be applied overhead or on sidewall amount of acetic acid )
weight this sealant can be applied ] overhead or on sidewall joints and joints and surfaces; will not sag or run off i surfaces without sagging, slumping. Prirnary Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . General purpose seating and bonding j or running off. It will adhere to as a space.mg rubber adhesive i clean metal, glass, most types of *'
- IU"" " # *** 9"*"*'
wood, silicone resin, vulcanized i silicone rubber. ceramic, natural and synthetic fiber, as well as
- Adhering auto and appliance tJnder pressure,it flows readily
( 1 painted and many plastic surfaces. trim, including metal, fabric, and from its container. The paste-like j fabric-backed plastics consistency makes it easy to work; i Sit:ASTIC 732'RJV adhesive / a spatula or wooden paddle can be sealant has go,cjiesgta,ncy t
- Bonding gaskets in heating and refri9eretion units used for tooling the surface, weathering, vibration, moisture, ozone, and extreme t;mperatures. It
- Attact'ing screwiess brackets or The cure progresses inward from the surface. At conditions of at
)
may be spolieo in sub-zero weather nameplates, and tacking plastic without loss of extrusion or physical . materials to meta! least 75 F (24 C) and 50 percent property characteristics. Fully * * * **
- Sealing windows in oven doors * * "
cuced S!LASTiC 732 RTV adhesive / and flues on gas appliances Y sealant can be used for extendsd flang!d pipe joints, access hoors pcriods at temperatures up tn 450 F skin begins forming, and should be (232 C), and for shorter periods, as
- Formed-in-place gasket for gear completed within 5 to 10 minutes of high as 500 F (260 C). Tests have boxes. compressors, pumps application even though this may shown that even after two months e Sealing trailers, truck cabs require alternate periods of at 450 F (232 C) or up to one week . applying and tooling. Likewise if
*B ding a d sealing appliance masking tape has been used to at 500 F (260 C), the sealant parts mark off an area. it should be remains rubbery. Graphs I and 11 illustrate the effects of heating
- Bonding signs and sign letters removed before the tack-free upon the peel strength (180 degree
- Antiabrasion coating s W fonnt fu nu panel nd upon the
- SeaW d mah cadns and hh ultimate elongation (measured windows Cure time is affected by relative according to ASTM D 412).
- Filleting and caulking joints in humidity. degree of confinement. ..
sheetmetal stacks, ductwork, and and cross sectional thickness of the" SILASTIC 732 RTV adhesive / sealant is available in a variety of equipment housings sealant. Sections up to 1/8-inch colors including aluminum, black, thick become rubbery solids in clear, and white. HOW TO USE about 24 hours at room temperature at 20 percent relative Applying the Material:
. ess m s ure e ntent USES Tack Free Time reduces it slightly, in 24 hours.
SILASTIC 732 RTV adhesive / SILASTIC 732 RTV adhesive / sections up to 1/8-inch thick cure sealant is pnmarily used for; sealant is supplied ready to-use. to a rubber with a Shore A nos i oo. con , c ,,,,,,,,,, Y i
e TYPICAL PROPERTIES These values are not intended for use in preparing specifications. duremeter hardness rating of about 25 points. After 3 days at room As Supp#ed temperature. this durometer f Colors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Aluminum, black, clear, and white
' hardness levels off to about 30 Specific Gravity at 77 F (25 C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.04 E" '
Extrusion Rate (%-inch orifice. 90 psi in applications where SILASTIC 732 air pressure). gms/ min . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350 RTV adhesive / sealant may be partly Flow Rate (sag or slump cn % x 4-in or totally confined during cure, the b e a d ) . i n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . time . . Ni required l for proper cure is Tack Free Time at 77 F (25 C) and 50% RH. min .. 10 - 20 generally lengthened by the degree ; Cure Time at 77 F (25 C) and 50% RH (%-in of confinement. It is possible, with thickness ), hrs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 absolute Confinement, that cure will As Cured * - Physical not be c pleted. The result is the ASTM D 676 Duremeter Hardness. Shore A points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 .sonening of the sealant at elevated ASTM D 412 Tensile S trength, psi (MPa) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350 temperatures. Metal-to-metal bonds ASTM D 412 Elong a tion. perc ent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500 should not overiap more than one ASTM D 746 Brittle Point. degrees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -100 F (-73 C) inch. Every application involvin9 ASTM D 2137A Volume Coefficient of Thermal Expansion. confinement during cure should be 32 to 212 F (0 to 100 C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 x t o, thoroughly tested before Thermal Conductivity, cal /(cm) (degrees C) #U***' "**"0"' ( sec ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 . . .5 .x.10-3
... . . .Curing
. time increases with the BTU per (f t) (d egrees F) (hr) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.11 thickness of the sealant. A 1/2-inch As Curedt - Electifcal cross section, for example, may l i
ASTM D 257 Volume Resistivity, ohm-cm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 x 10's require 3 or 4 days for complete ASTM D 149 Dielectric Strengtn." volts / mil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 550 solidification. However, the cure ASTM D 150 Dielectric Constant, will have penetrated the outer a t 60 H z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8
. 1/8-inch in about 24 hours. !
a t 100 Hz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 Adhered to glass, metal, or most a t 100 K H z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . . 2.8 ..... ASTM D 150 Dissipation Factor. woods. SILASTIC 732 RTV adhesive / sealant has a typical peel a t 60 Hz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . strength of 20 pounds per inch, a t 100 Hz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0.0015 . . . . . . after
. . .72. .hours
. . . at. .room 0.0015 temperature.
a t 100 KHz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0015 "Measurco on 0.125-in.tnick slaes after 72 hrs /77 F (25 C) and 50% RH. The oder given off during cure is tAfter vulcanizing 72 hrs /77 F (25 C) and 50% RH in 1/8-in. thick cross section. due to the liberation of acetic acid.
65.rnd thickness,1/4-in ASTM electrodes in oil, rapid nse. This odor disappears as the cure Specification Writers: Please contact Dow Coming Corporation. Midland' progresses, and is not detectable Michigan, before writing specifications on this product. after the cure is complete
- CAUTION On contact, uncured sealant causes GRAPH I- PEEL STRENGTH VS HEAT AGING
' /rritation. Avoid contact with eyes 30 and skin. Contact lens wearers take appropriate precautions. IN CASE 446 F OF CONTACT flush eyes with (230 C) water. Call a physician. Remove E ' from skin with dry cloth or paper
"" j
/ towel. Sealant releases acetic acid 20 (vinegar-like odor) during cure.
5. KEEP OUT OF REACH OF
@ CHILDREN.
302 F m (150 C) Bonding d 1. Thoroughly clean and degrease' ' ' g 10 i metal and plastic surfaces, then rinse all surfaces, except plastic. with acetone. Rubber surfaces should be roughened with 482 F sandpaper, then wiped with (250 C) acetone. Follow the precautions 0 given on solvent container labet. 10 20 30 40 50 60
- 2. For stronger more uniform TIME AT TEMPERATURE. DAYS bonds. apply a thin film of Y
J
1 i l
.e.
DOW CORNINGe 1200 prime ccat GRAPH 11 - ELONGATION VS HEAT AGING l to all surfaces except rubber and silicone rubber. Allow to air-dry for j 30 to 45 minutes at room j temperature. (Full instructions are ~ _ I provided with the prime coat.) g 600 - 410 F - q CAUTION: DOW CORNING 1200 g prime coat is flammable and has no c. 302 F { FDA status. Keep away from heat ] i f150 C) and open flames. Use only with 9 adequate ventilation. 4oo
- 3. Apply SILASTIC 732 RTV
@ l adhesive / sealant to the prepared gj j
surface in a uniform thickness. Best w ' adhesion is obtained with a 15- to 30- 7 mil glue line. In those cases where j the adhesive is used between two y surfaces, put the second surface in 482 F place, using enough pressure to (250 C) displace the air but not the adhesive. 0 l
- 4. Let the unit stand undisturbed at room temperature to cure. to 20 30 40 50 60 TIME AT TEMPERATURE. DAYS Sealing Using SILASTIC 732 RTV adhesive / A STAWS W. SWM sealant in sealing applications When fully cured and washed, SILASTIC 732 RTV adhesive /
follows approximately the same SILASTIC 732 RTV adhesive / sealant is recognized by step-by-step procedures as outlined sealant meets the requirements of Underwriters Laboratories for T for bonding applications. After FDA Regulation No. 21 CFR 3 service to 302 F (150 C) where , i J preparing the surfaces and priming 177.2600 (formerly 121.2562) elongation is nct essential. where required, the sealant is { subject to end use compliance with applied by forcing it into the joint any applicable total extractive 3 l SPECIFICATIONS - or seam to obtain full contact limitations. SILASTIC 732 RTV adhesive / between sealant and surfaces. sealant is designed to meet the NSF STATUS requirements of MIL-A-40106A, Estimating S ASM 732 RW adhesive / Arnend 2, Type 1. sealant is listed by the National For estimating sealant require-Sanitation Foundation under the SHIPPING LIMITATIONS ments, multiply gallons by 128 fluid criteria C2 for direct contact None" ounces and divide by the cartridge with food. size. Example: 11 gallons required x 128 fluid ounces = 1408 : 10.3 fluid USDA STATUS STORAGE AND SHELF LlFE ounce cartridge = 137 cartndges required. SILASTIC 732 RTV adhesive / When stored in original unopened sealant is authorized by the United containers at or below 90 F (32 C), States Department of Agriculture SlLASTIC 732 RTV adhesive / Using the Tabi, for use in Federally inspected meat sealant has a shelf life of 12 months Example: Find how much sealant is and poultry plants. from date of shipment. Containers required for a joint 3/8 inch wide. 1/8 inch deep and about 225 feet in TABLE 1: ESTIMATING THE AMOUNT OF SEALANT . . - - . overall length. Reading down the wioTH.inchee width column headed "3/8 to the 1/32 1/16 t/s 3/16 1/4 s/16 3/s 7/16 1/2 s/8 3/4 1 alue f 0.25 Th s is th a ount of # "' "* " "' * "' "# "* " #
- sealant. in gallons, required for a . 'irt s0 01 0 02 0.04 o.06 o ce o.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 02o c.25 0.33 joint 3/B inch x 1/8 inch x 100 feet in tength For the joint specified, j ire o 02 0 04 o ce 0 12 o.is o ro o.2s 0 29 c.33 0 41 0 49 o ss y 3/t e o.03 0.06 o tt o.ie 02s o.31 0.37 0 43 o.49 0 81 0.73 0 98 225 feet in length. rnultiply by 225 E o 04 oos o.ie t/4 o.25- o.33 o 41 o 49 o $7 o as o a2 o os t 31 over 100, or 2.25: 0.25 x 2.25 = 0.58 El s/ to o es o to o.2o o.31 o4 o si o.s t o.71 o er 1 02 1.22 1 63 Gallons. To convert this to cartridges, see estimating. n He 0.12 o.2s o.37 0 49 0 61 c.73 0 86 He L22 1 47 1 96 i.
. << e should always be kept sealed when You should thoroughly test any not in use. After a container has proposed use of our products and been opened, a plug of cured independently conclude satisfactory material may form in the nozzle or performance in your application, tube tip during storage. When ready Likewise, if the manner in whic.1 to reuse, unscrew nozzle and our products are used requires remove cured plug. Remaining govemmental approval or sealant is ready to use. clearance, you must obtain it. l PACKAGING w orning warrams ody mat h products will meet its specifica-SILASTIC 732 RTV adhesive / tions. There is no warranty of sealant is available in 3- and merchantability or fitness for use, 4.7-fl oz (90 and 139 mL) tubes, nor any other express or implied 10.3 fi oz (305 mL) cartridges, and warranty. The user's exclusive 4.5- and 52-gal (17 and 197-1) remedy and Oow Corning's sole containers, net weight. liability is limited to refund of the purchase price or replacement of USERS PLEASE READ any product shown to be otherwise l The information and data contained than as warranted. Oow Corning herein are believed to be accurate will not be liable for incidental or ,
and reliable; however, it is the consequential damages of any kind. ! l user's responsibility to determine Suggestions of uses should not be suitability of use. Since taken as inducements to infringe Dow Corning cannot know all of any patents. the uses to which its products may be put or the conditions of use, it makes no warranties concerning the fitness or suitability of its products for a particular use or purpose. l i
'9% a DOW CORNING CORPORATION MIDLAND, MICHIG AN 48640
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*dEY 00510 WYLE LABORATORIES DATABANK MATERIAL AGING DATA ,
1 i GENERIC NAME SILICCNE RUEEER RTV TetIC4NE55 BRAND NAME SILASTIC 732 ELOC E. 6956.635654 GENERIC ABB SIR INTERCEPT -11.49977462 MANUFACTURER DOW CORNING" MAX AGE TE'IP 140 ACTV ENERGY 0.77 RAD XHOLD 1.3E6 PARAMETER 50% ELONGATION ACT ENG A.L.# 019560A RAD A.L.e 026660 REMARK 5 DATE 033061 PRESS E. STER TO VIEW NEXT SCREEN AppR ALS 1 TO DISPLAY REFERENCE 5 1 STATUS 2 TO RETURN TO SEEK MODE
-DELETE 3 TO VIEW PREVIOUS SCREEN i 1
PRINT KEY TO PRINT SCREEN l I ENTER ? I WYLE LABORATORIES 5 DATABAN6 MATERIAL AGING DATA l 0295 60 A TEMPERATURE U. L. FILE I E 40195, AUGUST 15. 1973, DOW CORNING. 0266.60 RADIATION ._
"THE EFFECT OF NUCLEAR RADIATION ON EwA570:v.ERIC AND PLASTIC MA- ~, #~TERIALS." R. W. KING, ET AL., BATTELLE RADIATION EFFECT5 CENTER, REIC REPORT NO. 21 SEPTEMBER 1. 1961.
PRESS ENTER TO RETURN TO MATERIAL DISP _Av' ENTER ? i TO RETURN TO SEEK MODE , PRINT KEY TO PRINT DISPLAY I
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