ML20215L552

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Control Room Habitability Supplemental Assessment Due to Sulfur Dioxide Release at Units 1 & 2, Summary Rept
ML20215L552
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/31/1987
From:
FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20215L549 List:
References
NUDOCS 8705120283
Download: ML20215L552 (18)
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Text

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FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY SUPPLEMENTAL ASSESSMENT DUE TO SULFUR DIOXIDE RELEASE AT UNITS 1 AND 2 StMMARY REPORT i

i-I MAY 1987 l

l 8705120283 DR 870507 ADOCK 05000302 PDR

i TABLE OF CONTENTS I

SECTION TITLE PAGE l l

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1 1.1 PURPOSE 1 1.2 OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE 1 l 1.3 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 2

1.4 CONCLUSION

2 i

2.0 METHODS, ASSUMPTIONS AND CONDITIONS 3 2.1 PARAMETERS AND CONDITIONS 4 2.2 RELEASE ASSIMPTIONS 5 2.3 CONCENTRATIONS 6 3.0 RESULTS 7 3.1 MAXINtM INSTANTANEOUS RELEASE ACCIDENT 7

- 3.2 MAXINtM DURATION RELEASE ACCIDENT 8 3.3 TRANSPORTATION CONSIDERATIONS 8

4.0 REFERENCES

9 l TABLES AND FIGURES 11 l

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-e h J1.0 INTRODUCTION' ,

This ;reportLsumm~ a rizes the results of analyses conducted to determine the concentrations of sulfur dioxide (S0 2 ) that

. could occur. in the, Crystal. River (CR) Unit 3 Control Room

. Lunder Evarious . assumed design ~ and environmental .. conditions following postulated accidental - releases of S02 at CR Units *

- 1 and 2..'

Sulfur dioxide is stored at Crystal River-Units 1_ and 2 and utilized at - Unit 1 in the Wahlco Flue Gas . Conditioning process unit which is used to control . particulate emissions. , .This L process unit consists of a nominal 45 ton l storage. tank, vaporizer, heaters, piping, valves and control '

instrumentation. The storage tank is located .in an open air-environment approximately 750 feet . from the CR-3 control complex. (see Fig. - 1) The quantity stored, at any time,

- varies from 20 to 40 tons; gas side withdrawal is utilized. ,

.1.1 PtRPOSE d

2 The purpose of: this evaluation is to demonstrate that the CR-3 Plant's design features will assure compliance with .the control room habitability requirements of General Design Criteria 19, Appendix A to 10CFR50(Ref.1) in the event of an accidental release from the Unit 1 S02 Gas Conditioning Unit. These analyses used the-modified CR-3 plant / facility conditions which will exist subsequent to' the upcoming Refuel- VI; outage beginning in September 1987. FPC is scheduled to submit a Control Room Habitability Summary ,

Report by June.30, 1987.

1.2 OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE L

The objective of this study and the analyses performed are i to show that in the event of postulated, design bases events

'the CR-3 control room operators will ~

not become incapacitated, considering subsequent protective measures, ,

- and will be capable of carrying out their duties with a minimum of interference caused by the toxic gas release.

i' Postulated design bases events are based upon Regulatory i Guide 1.78(Ref.2) and involve the following accident relcase scenarios:

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O D o Maximum Instantaneous Release Accident -

Tank rupture releasing the total contents of the 45 ton S02 storage tank o Maximum Duration Release Accident - continuous release of S02 from the safety relief valve or connecting pipe break.

A transportation accident release is considered and discussed herein but is not specifically evaluated since a detailed analysis was not warranted based upon the low shipping frequencies and the installed detection and isolation capabilities of the control complex.

1.3 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA Regulatory Guide 1.78 presents assumptions which are to be used in the evaluation of control room habitability during a postulated hazardous chemical rel ease. This guide specifies the criteria for determining if a hazardous chemical must be considered in the evaluation of control room habitability. The criteria are based on the toxicity limit of the chemical, distance of the chemical source from the control room inlets, control room type (based on air exchange rates) and meteorological conditions. For chemicals closer than 0.3 miles from the control room inlet, the guide requires consideration of any chemical which is present in weights over 100 lbs.

Table C-1 of Regulatory Guide 1.78 specifies the toxicity limit for S0p to be 5 ppm (26 mg/m3) which is adapted from Sax's " Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials". The ppm limit and mg/m3 values provided are inconsistent, (5 ppm does not equal 26 mg/m3,10 ppm = 26 mg/m3)* Nor is 5 ppm considered incapacitating. According to OSHA (Ref 5) the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> time weighted average limit for exposure to S02 is 5 ppm. Therefore, other authoritative sources (per Regulatory Guide position c.4) were consulted to establish an appropriate short term toxicity limit to be used as a basis for acceptance. An S02 concentration of approximately 125 ppm has been determined to be a realistic toxicity limit for assessing control room habitability.

  • Conc (ppm) = mg/m3 x 24.25 molecular weight (MW)

MW(S0 2 ) = 64.06 Conc (ppm) = 5 mg/m3 = 13

1.4 CONCLUSION

The results of these evaluations denonstrate that the CR-3 control room operators will be protected from postulated S02 failures at CR 1

& 2. This conclusion is based upon callculated control room S02 concentrations, which are well within the acceptance criteria for short term exposures. The results are conservative in that reliance on only the intake duct monitors is all that is required for protection, however, anticipatory type detection is avail able to further reduce the calculated short term and long term concentrations. Only the short term concentrations are those of concern because self contained breathing aparatus are available and would be in use within two minutes from the time of detection.

2.0 METHODS, ASStMPTIONS AND CONDITIONS The methodology utilized to assess the postulated design bases accident scenarios is based upon the assumptions and mathematical models contained in NUREG-0570, " Toxi c Vapor Concentration in the Control Room Following a Postulated Accidental Release". (Ref.12)

The Control Complex Ventilation System is shom on Fig. 2. The ,

existing toxic gas protection consists of redundant monitors for S02 CL2 , and NH3 which upon actuation of either monitor will place the system in the recirculation mode of operation.- This system logic closes dampers AHD-1, 10, 2, and 12 and opens AHD-3 in order to isolate the outside environment and continue to condition internal I air. The control complex has been thoroughly reviewed for potential  ;

inleakage paths and several areas of improvement were identified. In addition, protective measures are being taken at the unit 1 & 2 S02 storage tank and at CR3 for alann and anticipatory toxic gas isolation of the control complex. These permanent changes have been factored ,

into the S02 analysis based upon completion by the end of the upcoming Refuel VI outage. A brief summary of each of these modifications is as follows:

1. Addition of two local S02 detectors at the tank with alarms in the CR-1 and 2 control room and at the CR3 contro room. .

Installation completed. I 1

2. Construction of a three foot high concrete dike around the tank restricting the exposed surface area to 55.75 m2 -

scheduled for completion by June 30, 1987.

3. Sealing of control complex penetrations and ventilation logic changes to lia.i t inleakage paths to less than .06  !

Habi tability Envelope Volume air changes per hour. This modification includes adding seals to boundary doors, and sealing / upgrading existing penetrations in the boundary which do not provide air tight barriers. In addition HVAC ,

control logic will be changed to close AHD-99, 24, 25, 26, 1 23, and 27 and trip the control complex relief fans AHF-21A and 21B on the existing isolation signal as well as for the added anticipatory isolation signal from the local detectors ,

at the tank. These changes will be completed during Refuel I i VI.

l l

m 2.1 PARAETERS AND CONDITIONS The following parameters and conditions are utilized in estimating the maximum concentration to be expected in the control room.

1. Maximum contents of S02 tank is 40 tons.
2. 18.3 percent of the liquid S02 instantaneously flashes (puff release); the remaining liquid (81.7%) is assumed to spill on the ground and is vaporized by drawing heat from the surroundings within the diked area form a continuous plume. ',

1

3. The S02 gas, being heavier than air, remains near the ground with insignificant plume rise due to density differences.
4. The tank is located 750 feet from the CR3 control complex at Elevation - 100 f t. (grade).
5. The control complex air intake is located at- Elevation 186'-10" (26.5m above grade). e, l

The volume of the control complex is 355,311-ft3 (100 61.7 6.

m3),

7. The outside air exchange rat' for the control complex in the unisolated condition is 5700 CFM.
8. The inleakage rate for the control complex af ter isolation is conservatively assumed to be 355.-3 CFM or 0.06 Habitability Envelope Volume air changes per hour, (RG1.78 Type B Control Room). A detailed walk down of Control Complex boundaries identified available leak paths and calculations of actual leakage paths per Regulatory Guide 1.78 yielded a value of 333.75 CFM. See Fig. 3 and 4 for Habitability Envelope.

/

9. S02 dectors are located remotely at the tank which alarm in and isolate the Crystal River #3 control room (when this modification is completed in Refuel VI) in the event of an in addition, S02 sensors are located in the accident; intake duct which will also automatically isolate the control complex. For the intake detectors, the damper closure time, including detector response time, is 30 ,

seconds; sensor setpoint is 2 ppm +/- 20%.

10 The area of the spill is restricted by a dike to 55.75m2

11. The vaporization rate from the s. pill to the plume is <

conservatively based on 2.1-12(12), and considers the / '

effects of atmospheric and solar radiation, forced convection of air and earth conduction.

12. The vapor from' instantaneous flashing (puff) and from continuous vaporization moves in the direction -of the wind from the spill to the control room intake and disperses in a Gaussian distribution by diffusion in the atmosphere.

-13. The diffusion equations for the instantaneous puff and for the continuous release of the plume with a finite initial volume and a receptor at the air intake are- based on Slade (Ref.13), page 115 and 99 respectively.

14. Building wake' and meandering effects are not assumed in the puff release calculations; however, building wake (based upon an area = 800 m2) and meandering effects are included in the continuous plume relase calculations. Methods contained in Regulatory Guide 1.145(Ref.14) are utilized.

-15. Three atmospheric stability conditions are reviewed. For

-the puff release, the power function approximation of Islitzer and Slade(Ref.13) are used for unstable, neutral and _ _ very - stable conditions. For the continuous plume release, the Pasquill-Gifford curves (Ref.15) are used to determine the standard deviations for stability conditions B (moderately unstable), D (neutral) and F (moderately s table) ,

16. Wind speeds are varied from 1 to 5 m/sec.
17. The concentration of S02 entering the control complex is the sum of the puff and the plume centerline concentrations at any instant.

2.2 RELEASE ASStMPTIONS The maximum duration release accident assumes the continuous release of S02 .from the storage tank safety relief valve and or a connecting pipeline failure. The safety _ relief valve is a Crosby 1-1/2"-J05-15A with a set. pressure of 135 psig. The maximum flow due to a val /e f ailure' is 1470 gm/sec. A(1-1/2") pipeline rupture would result in a reduced -flow (=1368 gm/sec), however, the larger flow was utilized to estimate either type of failure.

The assumption and parameters used for the continuous plume release in the tank rupture scenario were also utilized for this analysis with the following exceptions: (1) building wake and meandering effects are not included, and (2) two release heights are considered: 3 meters above grade to correspond to - the height of the relief valve and 6 meters above grade for a pipeline break, corresponding to the height of the berm surrounding the CR-3 plant.

i

2.3 CONCENTRATIONS The short term toxicity limit was realisticly determined from authori tative industry resources. According to Sax (Ref.3), sulfur dioxide in concentrations of 0.3-1 ppm can be detected by the average individual possibly by taste rather than sense of smell. Three ppm has an easily noticeable odor while 6-12 ppm causes immediate irritation of thd nose and throat. Twenty ppm is the least amount that is irritating to the eyes. The maximum permissible concentrations for exposures of 30-60 minutes is 50-100 ppm; 400-500 ppm is immediately dangerous to life.

According to Matheson(Ref.4), sulfur dioxide is readily detectable in concentrations of 3-5 ppm. Acute exposure to sulfur dioxide has the following effects: 8-12 ppm causes throat i rri tation , coughing, constriction of the chest, tearing, and smarting of the eyes; 150 ppm causes extreme irritation and can be tolerated only a few minutes; 500 ppm is so acutely irritating that it causes a sense of suffocation.

3 There are no known systemic effects of acute exposure to sulfur 5

dioxide. No chronic systemic effects have been observed in workers exposed to allowable concentrations of sulfur dioxide.

NUREG/CR-1741(Ref.6) provides data, models and methods to be used for the estimation of incapacitation times following exposure to toxic gases or vapors. Utilizing Model A (Concentration Dependent-Immediate Sensory Irritants) of this document, the predicted times to incapacitation as a function of S02 concentration are defined by the following equation:

TI(seconds) = 665 RD50(ppm)

Concentration (ppm)

Where RD50 is the concentration of a sensory irritant at which a 50 percent decrease in respiratory rate occurs in laboratory animals.

This value (RD50) was deemed equal to that which humans would find intolerably irritating and hence assumed incapacitating. The RD50 provided for S02 is 117 ppm (Ref.8).

Based upon the above guidelines, and in consideration of the importance to the plant in terms of maintaining safe shutdown capability, it is proposed that the allowable short term (2 min) concentration in the control room be conservatively determined by the above equation using an assumed RD50 equal to 20 ppm (least amount i rri tating to the eyes). Accordingly, the concentration of S02 determined to be a realistic toxicity limit for assessing the control room habitability is approximately 125 ppm.

r; 3.0 RESULTS Based upon the assumptions and conditions described in Section 2.0, a series of analyses were performed to determine the post-accident concentrations : of S02 in the control room. Concentration estimates were developed _for .two minutes after detection as well as the long-term concentration assuming no corrective actions, other than isolation of the control complex.

Two design / operational . situations were reviewed for the postulated design bases events: (1) detection of the accidental release by the remote monitor located in close proximity to the tank, and (2) detection of the S02 release by the intake monitors only, assuming that the remote monitors either do not detect the release or are otherwise inoperable for any reason. As stated above, the isolation of the control complex is conservatively assumed to be accomplished 30 seconds af ter detection.

3.1 MAXIMtM INSTANTANEOUS RELEASE ACCIDENT The maximum instantaneous release accident assumes the instantaneous release of the total contents (40 tons) of the S02 storage tank.

Table 1 provides a- summary of the resultant control room concentrations.

For the remote detection (tank) cases analyzed, the maximum S02 concentration in the control room, two minutes af ter the accident, is estimated to. be 4.4 ppm. This concentration is well wi thin the acceptance criteria postulated in Section 1.3 and was obtained at an assumed wind speed of 2 m/sec under unstable atmospheric stability conditions. The use of more stable atmospheric conditions tend to reduce the concentration, whereas the use of a lower wind speed would tend to ircrease the expected concentration. The maximum long term concentration of S02 in the control room was found to be 12.3 ppm.

This was obtained at an assumed 1 m/sec and unstable conditions. The control room S02 concentration, two minutes af ter detection, under these conditions is negligible since the control complex is isolated before the gas cloud arrives at the intake.

For the local detection (intake duct) cases, the maximum S02 concentration in the control room, two minutes af ter detection in the duct, is estimated at 38.2 ppm. This concentration is also within the acceptance criteria. This concentration was obtained at a wind speed of 5 m/sec again under unstable atmospheric conditions. Lower wind speeds and more stable conditions generally result in lower control room concentrations. The maximum long term concentration (38.3 ppm) is approximately equal to the 2 minute value.

3.2 MAXIMtM DURATION RELEASE ACCIDENT The maximum - duration release accident assumes the continuous release of S02 from the safety relief valve on the tank or from a pipeline (1 1/2") f ailure. Table 2 provides a summary of the resultant control room concentrations.

For the remote detection- (tank) cases, the maximum S02 concentration in the control' room, two minutes after the accident, was found to be negligible (.04 ppm) and well within the acceptance criteria. The maximum long term concentration of S02 in the control room was calculated at 34.7 ppm. This was found to occur at 1 m/sec windspeed and with moderately unstable atmospheric conditions. The difference in the height of the release (3 to 6 meters) does not materially affect the control room concentration.

For the local detection (intake duct) cases, the maximum S02 concentration in the control room, two minutes after detection in the intake, was found to be approximately 1 ppm; again well within the acceptance criteria. The maximum long tenn concentration of S02 in the control room was estimated at 35.3 ppm.

3.3 TRANSPORTATION CONSIDERATIONS The S02 Gas Conditioning Process unit requires the liquid S02 to be replenished, on the average, every four to six weeks. The S02 is delivered to the plant site in a 20-ton tank truck. The truck delivery route is depicted on Figure 1.

Position C.2 of Regul atory Guide 1.78 requires consideration of transportation accidents which could release hazardous chemicals that are shipped to or near nuclear power plant sites. Shipments are defined as being frequent if there are 10 per year for truck traffic, 30 per year for rail traffic or 50 per year for barge traffic.

Subsequent to the provided in Regulatory Guide 1.78, NUREG/CR-2650(Ref.16) wasguidance issued to provide generic, bounding estimates of the maximum allowable shipping frequencies for the transport of a chemical near the pl ant, such that the regulatory criteria for the protection of operators are met.In short, this report concluded that truck shipments of 35/ week or greater would require l automatic isolation.

l In view of the low S02 delivery frequency (8 to 12 shipments per year) 1 and the fact that S02 detectors that isolate the control complex are installed in the intake ducts, a detailed analyses of a transport l

accident was not deemed necessary to demonstrate that the regulatory

criteria for the protection of CR-3 plant operators is met for this

! situation.

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4.0 REFERENCES

The following references were utilized in the preparation of this report.

-1. U.S. Code of Federal Regul ations, Title 10', part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 19; Office of, the

-Federal Register, General Services Adminis tration , -

Washington,'DC, 1981.

2. " Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power. Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release", USNRC/SD, Regulatory Guide 1.78, June, 1974.
3. Sax, N. Irving, " Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materi al s", Sixth Edition, Reinhold Book Corp., New York, New York (1984).
4. "Matheson Gas Data Book", Fourth Edi tion, The Matheson Company, Inc., East Rutherford, New Jersey (1966).
5. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 29, Section 1910 1000, " Air Contaminants," Occupational Safety and Heal th Reporter, Published by the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.,

Washington,DC,(11-12-86).

6. Smith, G.J., and Bennett, D.E., "Models for the Estimation of Incapacitation Times Following Exposures to Toxic Gases or Vapors" Sandia National Laboratories, Al buquerque, NM, NUREG/CR-1741, SAND 80-2226, December 1980.
7. Threshold Limit Values for Chemical Substances and Physical Agents in the Workroom Environment with Intended Changes for 1979, American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, Cincinnati,1979.
8. Kane, L.E. Barrow, C.S. and Alarie, Y., "A Short-Term Test to Predict Acceptable Levels of Exposure.to Airborne Sensory Irri tants," Am. Ind. Hyg. Associ .J. ,40:207(1979) .
t" -

4_

9. . Kisskal t, 'K. Uber Den Einfluss Der -Inhalation Schwefliger Saure..Auf Die ~ Entwickelung . Der Lungentuberculose, 1 Ein Beitrag.Zum Studien- Der Gewerbekrankheiten, Ztsche Hug.

48.269. (1904). . [ Cited by Greenwald, I., Effects of.

' Inhalation of Low Concentrations of Sulfur Dioxide Upon Man and Other . Mammal s, Arc. Indf.. Huyg. Ocup. Med.,

'10:455(1954)].

10. Lehmann, -K., Experimentelle .Studiem Uber Den Einfluss Technisch 'Und Hygienish Wichtiger Gase und Dampfe Auf Den Organismus; VI Schwefliger Saure. Arch. Hyg. 18:180 (1893)

[ Cited .by Grenwald, I.,- Effects of Inhalation of Low Concentrations of Sulphur Dioxide upon Man and Other Mannals, Arch.Ind.Hg.0ccup Med., 10:455(1954)].

11. Henderson, Y. - and Haggard, H., " Noxious Gases," Reinhold Publishing Corp., New York,1978.
12. Wing, J., " Toxic Vapor' Concentrations _ in the ' Control Room Following a Postualte Accidental Reles", NUREG-0570, June s 1979.
13. Sl ade, D.H., " Meteorology and Atomic Energy, " TID-24190, c

~

U.S. Atomic Energy Comission, Washington, DC (1968).

14. " Atmospheric Dispersion Models for Potential Accident Consequence Assessments at Nuclear Power Plants", USNRC/SD, Regulatory Guide 1.145 Rev.1, November 1982.
15. Hilsmeier, W.F., Gi fford, F.A., " Graph for Estimating Atmospheric Dispersion", OR0-545 (1962).
16. Bennett, D.E., and Heath, D.C., " Allowable Shipment Frequencies for. the Transport of To<ic Gases Near Nuclear Power ' Plants", Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, NUP,EG/CR-2650, SAND 82-0774, October 1982.

TABLE 1 MAXIMlM INSTANTANEOUS REldASE ACCIDENT: TANK RUPTURE S02 CONCENTRATION (PPM) IN CR-3 CONTROL R0(M SIMMARY (F RESULTS

' ~ REM 5TE, DETECTION LOCAL DETECTION .

ATTANK INTAKE DUCT WIND ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY 50 2CONC.IN 50 2CONC.IN SPEED CONDITION . CONTROL ROOM CONTROL ROOM (IW5EC) ,

PUFF /Pt.UME

@ 2 MIN. MAX. 92 MIN. MAX.

(PPM) (PPM) (PPM) (PPM)

Unstable /Pasquill B 2.4 2.4 38.2 38.3' 5 Neutral /Pasquill D 0.4 0.4 6.3 6.3 i Very Stable /Pasquill F ~ NA NA NA NA Unstable /Pasquill B '

34.2 34.2 3 Neutral /Pasquill D 'NOT -

10.5 10.6 Very Stable /Pasquill F ANALY, SED . 0.4 0.4 ,

Unstable Pasquill B 4.4 5.2 15.0 15.0

. 2 Neutral /Pasquill D 0.9 1.0 15.1 15.1 VeryStable/Pasquill F 0.04 0.04 0.7 0.7 Unstable /Pasquill B 0.0 12.3 12.5 14.0 1 Neutral /Pasquill D 0.0 2.1 7.5 7.5 Very Stable /Pasquill F 0.0 0.08 1.2 1.2 e .. . ..

p

TABLE 2 MAXIMIM DURATION RELEASE ACCIDENT:

FAILURE OF SAFETY RELIEF VALVE / PIPELINE (1-1/2")

502 CONCENTRATION (PPM) IN CR-3 CONTROL ROOM SIMMARY F RESULTS REMOTE DETECTION AT TANK LOCAL DETECTIO.N . INTAKE SO CONC.IN CONTROL ' DUCT HEIGHT PASQUILL ROOM SO CONC.IN CONTROL WIND OF SPEED ROOM RELEASE CLASS I

(m) (PLUME)

@ IN. *

, MAX. (PPM) PPM MAX. (PPM)

)

B 0.04 6.9 0.20 7.0 3 5 0 0.01 1.8 0.08 1.8 p . . . .

B 0.0 34.5 1.0 35.0 3 1 D 0.0 5.2 0.15 5.2 F 0.0 - 0.0 -

, - - B 0.04 7.0 0.2 7.1 1 6 5 0 0.01 3.4 0.08 3.4 F - - - -

8 0.0 34.7 1.0 35.3 6 1 D 0.0 9.5 0.3 9.6 F 0.0 - 0.0 0.004 Indicates insienificant values 1

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