ML20214U013

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Preliminary Safety Evaluation Re LER 50-267/86-017. Recommends That Licensee Provide Details of Evaluation & Response to 860403 Event Involving Short Periods of Loss of Forced Circulation
ML20214U013
Person / Time
Site: Fort Saint Vrain Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/26/1986
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20214T997 List:
References
TAC-61491, NUDOCS 8609300470
Download: ML20214U013 (8)


See also: IR 05000267/1986017

Text

_ _ _ - __

_

e

[h#"'*4"I

,

n

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASH;NGTON, D. C. 20555

.....

SAFETY EVALUATION (PRELIMINARY) BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATING TO LER NO. 50-267/86-017

>

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPA'NY OF COLORADO

FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

DOCKET NO. 50-267

1.0 BACKGROUND

On April 3, 1986, with the reactor at 25% power Fort St. Vrain (FSV)

experienced a period of grid fluctuations during a storm which resulted in

several short periods of loss of forced circulation. While an actual

loss of off-site power did not occur during the event, off-site voltage

transients were transmitted into, and through the plant's electrical

distribution system. This initially caused the trip of an undervoltage

protection relay in the helium circulator bearing water pump system,

resulting in circulator trips and loss of the Loop-2 forced circulation.

The electrical transients also caused the isolation of the helium

purification system. It was this latter failure that led the operating

staff to manually scram the reactor. Further bearing water trips,

apparently due to undervoltage relay operation, later resulted in four

brief periods of complete loss of forced circulation. In all cases, the

'

plant operating staff promptly restored the circulators to operation.

The maximum core heatup during the loss of forced circulation was

estimated to be 19.6 F. No fuel damage occurred, however, a small

release occurred due to leakage past a circulator shaft shutdown seal.

These events were reported to the NRC in Licensee Event Report (LER)

50-267/86-017 submitted by letter dated May 3, 1986 (P-86349).

2.0 EVALUATION

i

As part of their project, " Analysis and Evaluation of Operational

'

Experience from Fort St. Vrain," Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)

provided a brief evaluation (copy attached) of the event described in the

LER identified above and the current status of the licensee's followup

efforts. The ORNL evaluation provided the event scenario, details of the

protection systems which tripped due to electrical transients, and a

review of similar past occurrences. The evaluation indicated some doubt

as to whether the FSAR bearing water protection logic had indeed been

present in the previous events. The evaluation also noted that backup

l bearing water was not available for this incident, since it is not

required by plant procedures at low reactor power levels.

The ORNL evaluation did provide information on some preliminary

' corrective actions by the licensee, which had confirmed that the pump

undervoltage relays were already powered by uninterruptable DC buses,

i

'

W2nuME7W

S

.

s -2-

These DC buses were not affected by the grid transient. However,

the AC undervoltage sensing coil was being powered by the off-site grid,

and the preliminary evaluation by the licensee indicated that the low-

voltage setpoint was set too high. The ORNL evaluation indicates that

these equipment protection trips occurred, eve'n though the off-site power

transients were never severe enough to cause an automatic start of on-

site emergency power. The evaluation also suggests that in a situation

with such severe grid instability, electrical isolation of the plant and

reversion to the plant's emergency AC power system may have been prudent.

ORNL points out the lack of any specific guidance to the plant operating

personnel on when to isolate from the grid during adverse transient

conditions.

ORNL has also indicated that a licensee response to this LER remains

open. Currently the licensee plans that corrective actions will be

closed out in the closeout package assembled for the review of the NRC

Senior Resident Inspector. There appear to be no plans by the licensee

1.0 provide any additional followup to the staff on the event analysis or

corrective actions.

3.0 STAFF ASSESSMENT

The staff's review of the ORNL evaluation and the LER clearly indicates

that no significant- risk to the public existed during this event.

However, this event also indicates the relative sensitivity of Fort St.

Vrain's helium circulation system to off-site grid upsets. While no

probabilistic risk assessment is available for this plant, studies

completed for LWR's indicate that loss of off-site power transients

contribute significantly to plant risk. The response of a high

temperature gas cooled reactor to loss of off-site power would, of

course, be somewhat different than light water reactors. However, even

with a fundamentally more forgiving design, the potential seriousness of

the complete loss of forced circulation cooling cannot be overlooked.

These concerns must be coupled with the fact that the licensee had

apparently not considered grid transients such as occurred on April 3,

and consequcntly, had no operator guidance in place to minimize its

impact on plant systems. ~

4.0 STAFF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

Review of the ORNL evaluation leads to the following preliminary

conclusions:

1. The event did not of itself pose a significant threat to the

public.

2. The event did, however, suggest the sensitivity of various

plant systems to off-site AC power grid instabilities, most

notably the potential for complete loss of forced circulation

cooling for grid transients which did not cause electrical

isolation of the plant, and initiation of emergency AC power.  ;

. _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ ._. _ . _

_

'

.

'

-3-

3. The availability of backup bearing water at lower reactor power

levels should be considered.

4. The plant operational staff responded well to the event, but

apparently did not have adequate guidance for considering the

possibility of manual isolation from the grid and initiation of

emergency AC power sources.

5. The licensee had not yet completed their response to the event,

and has no plans for any formal submittal to the staff on

planned corrective actions.

Based upon the above factors, we conclude that the April 3 ever.t raises

sufficient concerns regarding Fort St. Vrain, and that a more formal

review of the licensee closeout should be conducted. Therefore, we

recommend that the licensee provide details of their evaluation and

response to this event, and that this material be reviewed by the Plant,

Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control Systems Branch, in the Division

of PWR Licensing-B.

Principal Contributor: M. P. Rubin, DPWRL-B/F0B

Date: September 26, 1986

Attachment: Analysis and Evaluation of

Operational Experience from Fort St. Vrain

- - . . . -_ -- -- - __- -_- _ _ _ ~ - -- _-

.

.

~

, ,

'

.

' Attachment

j

.

PROJECT: Analysis and Evaluation of Operational

Experience from Fort St. Vrain

CONTRACTOR: Oak Ridge National Laboratory BUDGET PERIOD: May 1986

'

CONTRACT MONITOR: Frederick J. Hebdon BUDGET AMOUNT: 44 K (FY-86) i

i!

PERCENT EXPENDED: 62

-TECHNICAL MONITOR: Peter S. Lam

J. R. Buchanan PHONE: FTS 624-0393 or

CONTRACTOR PROGRAM MANAGER:

(615) 574-0393

David L. Moses PHONE: FTS 624-6103 or

! PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR:

(615) 574-6103

PROGRAM OBJECTIVES:

l/

!1 The NRC Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AE00)

has established an extensive program for screening, analyzing, and

ll:i 4}( evaluating the operational experience data, particularly the data

reported in Licensee Event Reports (LERs), and other information from

' ' .) all connercial nuclear power plants in the United States. Because of

the unique design of the Fort St. Vrain.HTGR, the technical expertise at

i

the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is being used to fulfill the

required AE0D staff engineer functions for following and assessing the

operational experience developed at Fort St. Vrain.

,

.

'

ACTIVITIES DURING REPORTING PERIOD:

1. LER Screening

!

l

During the current reporting period, two LERs covering 2 events have

i been received and screened. One LER (R0 86-016) has been classified The

as reporting a Category 4 event requiring no further action.

l

other LER (R0 86-017) has been classified as reporting a Category 3

I event requiring more information to make a final classification and

i

recommendation for disposition. R0 86-016 reported' a missed com-

'

.

pletion date for the hydraulic power system functional test due to'

personnel error in scheduling delayed portions of the quarterly

,

surveillance. R0 86-017 is discussed in more detail as follows.

,

The LER for R0 86-017 describes in reasonable detail the series of

incidents which cccurred during the period 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br />.-(MST).. During this

April 3, 1986, and 2030 hours0.0235 days <br />0.564 hours <br />0.00336 weeks <br />7.72415e-4 months <br /> (MST) April 4,1986.

period, " heavy snowfa'll and severe wind conditions caused numerous

ground faults, voltage transients, and breaker trip actuations to ,

occur on three of the five 230 kv transmission lines supplying

outside electrical power to the Fort St. Vrain Station." At the

beginning of the period of transient conditions, the reactor was

operating at only 25% power, and so the turbine-generator set was

During

not operating and not loaded onto the reactor steam supply.

the transient conditions, total loss of offsite electrical power

never occurred, and low voltage swings were never low enough to

the automatic start of the standby / emergency diesel

actuate

generator sets. However, the offsite voltage transients were

,

,----=-,e - - - .-%.e-wey,.--- -- .---------------------w.v.---..-v..*.-e.-. ----..,,,...--,.,---,--1--,,,,w-wr--

e ,

-

.

  • 2

.

  • transmitted into and through the plant's electrical distribution

System. As a result, " electrical noise" caused the automatic

actuation and closure of the respective helium purification trains'

isolation. valves and the actuation of the helium circulators'

bearing water pump trip via undervoltage protection. The under-

voltage protection aytomatically closed the isolation valve on the

bearing water supply line, thereby leading to a low differential

pressure (loss of flow) trip of the bearing water pump (see FSAR

Section 4.2.2.3.7, pages 4.2-26). -Trips of the bearing water pumps

in turn caused circulator trips and loop shutdowns since backup

bearing water was not available a'nd is not normally made available

below about 25-30% power per plant procedures. Following a shutdown

on Loop 2, which occurred early during the period of transient con-

ditions, an apparent failure of the 'D' helium circulator shaft

shutdown seal to seat properly led to a small release of primary

coolant. The radioactive inventory of the small release was found

to be well below maximum permissible concentrations for such

releases. .

As a result of the electrical transients, operators performed a

manual scram of the reactor soon after the transients began. During

-

the remainder of the period of experienced transient conditions, the

plant experienced four brief periods of total loss of forced cir-

culation with the operators responding in each case within a few

minutes to restore circulator and steam generator operability.

Prior to this investigator's receipt of this LER, a telephone

discussion was held with NRC-NRR's Mr. K. L. Heitner and NRC-AE00's

Dr. R. R. Tripathi with regard to NRR's concern about this event.

In particular, NRR expressed concern over the apparent weak follow-

through on corrective actions with regard to (1) the electrical

supply circuit reliability for the relays for the bearing water

pumps (i .e. , improved power supplies off uninterruptable dc bus),

(2) means to avoid spurious control circuit transients on the inlet

valve to the helium purification trains (i .e. , possible improved

a

power supplies), and (3) means to effect adequate monitoring of such

transients. Since the text of the LER had stated that "the event

' initiating actions were directly storm related," NRR was also con-

cerned that the LER had not adequately addressed what will be done

by the licensee to prevent such occurrences in the future.

( ,

Also. prior to discussing th'e LER with the licensee, this inves-

l

tigator researched the history of the effects of electrical

l transients on loop shutdowns and circulator trips. This research

was performed using the LER file in the computerized Nuclear Safety

>

Information F)le Data Base. Other than technician-induced transi-

ents (i.e., opening the wrong breaker) such as reported in R0 85-

027, which was reviewed in our monthly report for January 1986, this

investigator found only two other apparently relevant LERs, both of

'

which were also of recent date. These LERs are RO 84-007 and R0 84-

e 008 (the partial f ailure scram event of June 1984). Both of these

!

previous events were initiated by the faulty actuation of a rapid The

(pressure) rise relay on the ~4160/480 volt transformer.

i

resulting transformer trip led to the temporary loss of 480 V

I

.

- - -. . - --. .- . --- - .-. .. - - -. - .-

-

. ..

-

..

3

,

'

!

- Essential Bus 1 and to the trip of the bearing water pumps, in the

case of R0 84-007, the reactor was operating at less than 2% power

'

without backup bearing water. available, and a Loop 1 shutdown

occurred. In the case of R0 84-008, the reactor was operating at

about 50% power with backup bearing water available, and an 'A'

!

'

circulator trip occurred on buffer-mid-buffer differential pressure

as the result of a surge of backup bearing water following trip of

the bearing water . pump. The surge of backup bearing water caused a

water ingress event via the circulator sh' aft.

FSAR (Revision 3) Section 4.2.2.3.4, pages 4.2-17 and 4.2-18, states

'

that "if one of the operating bearing water pumps should fail, its

standby pump is automatically started by a low differential pressure

switch." This same section also describes the backup bearing water

system function. However, FSAR Section 4.2.2.3.7, pages 4.2-25 and

4.2-26, indicates that pump failure due to loss of power on Bus 1

L

(Loop 1) or Bus 3 (Loop 2) will trip all three bearing water pumps

, in the loop affected and initiate undervoltage protection. The

undervoltage logic is implied to cause a throwover to Bus 2 accom-

panied by ths isolation of the normal bearing water supply line so

i that pumps can be restarted automatically off of Bus 2 but will not .

t cause an overs"pply of bearing water since backup bearing water

would have beer nutomatically initiated if in service. In R0 84-007

and R0 84-008, there was a loss of bus-supplied power. In R0 86-

017, there was initiation of the undervoltage protection without

total loss of bus power. The undervoltage protection closed the

valve in the supply line and thereby caused the low differential

pressure (loss of flow) trip on the bearing water pumps.

However, in the two earlier LERs, it is not clear whether the FSAR-

described bearing water protection logic was in force. Subsequent

, discussions with the licensee (M. Joseph) tends to indicate that the

system described in the FSAR was in fact the result of at least R0

l

84-008, wherein a reverse water ingress was experienced. Notably,

R0 84-008 corrective actions addressed only control rod-related

problem resolution and not that of the initiating event'.

Following preliminary analysis, the LER for R0 86-017 was thbn

!

discussed at some length with the licensee (D. Goss and M. Joseph).

l

'

The licensee (M. Joseph) explained again, as this investigator has

heard often before, that the corrective actions for the LER will be

'

closed out in the closeout package assembled for the review of the

NRC Senior Resident. Inspector (SRI). The licensee has ao plans to

submit a supplemental LER or necessarily any other type report to

j NRC on this event and its follow-up. This position is consistent

with that developed and expressed previously following the licen-

'

+

see's participation in an industry course for utilities. The

industry course recommended the avoidance of consnitments to LER

supplements as an unnecessary burden on licensee commitment track-

I ing. The " weak follow-through" noted by NRR in R0 86-017 apparently

j results from the complicated nature of the events and the fact that

investigations are still ongoing into long-term corrective

j actions. The licensee had simply not completed corrective actions

'

within the 30-day period regulated by 10 CFR 50.73 for submitting

.

i

- -.- -_-..._-- - - -_ - . - -_ _ - . - _ . - _ - - _ ___ - -__.

. .

,

. 4

n'

'

. LERs and now defers the assurance of completion of corrective

actions to the SRI on an unspecified time schedule.

As discussed in the LER, the licensee (M. Joseph) again indicated

that the protection setpoint for the bearing water pump undervoltage

relay was being addressed as part of the corrective action. The

licensee emphasized that this undervoltage relay was already on an

uninterruptable de bus, which .was unaffected by the electrical

transients. Instead, the sensing coil for ac undervoltage (where

the ac bus was affected by offsite power transients) was surmised to

have possibly been too high a low voltage setpoint (30 V ac). Since

none of the ac buses is immune to offsite electrical power transi-

ents unless it is already isolated onto an onsite power source, the

possible reduction of this low voltage setpoint appears to be the

primary practicable option under consideration.

Also, the licensee did not choose to go onto onsite power during the

snowstorm because the severity of the storm's effects was claimed

not to be predictable from the past 30 years of experience with the

grid. The storm-induced loss of offsite power event (R0 83-018) in

May 1983 was apparently not factored into the choice to remain tied

to the grid except that the result of the previous event had been

for fiRC to officially discourage the carrying of common loads on

both onsite and offsite power simultaneously during grid distur-

bances. Also, as mentioned previously, the offsite power transients

were never severe enough to cause an automatic start of onsite

emergency power. Adecisiontoisolatecertainessentialbusesfromf

the grid would appear to be a judgement call unless specific rulesI

, can be developed for such cases.

1

The transients experienced with the automatic isolation of the

j helium purification train are also still under review and analysis

by the licensee. There are apparently many inputs to and interlocks

on the valve closure control for the inlet to the helium purifica-

, tion train. The licensee could have overriden all , prohibits to

l opening the valve in order to effect a DBA-1 depressurization and

exhaust cleanup; however, the electrical transients would not permit

normal operation for coolant cleanup and recirculation of purified

helium. This situation led to the licensee's management decision to

l scram the reactor manually and also kept the purification train from

l performing normal coolant cleanup and recirculation for some two

hours. The valve closure signals may not have been due to any

instability on the dc instrument bus but rather may have been due to

feedback signals front various components operating on unstable ac

power. As illustrated in the drawing PI-23-1, Issue AT, the

interlocks on the control of the inlet valve to each purification

train are extremely complex because of the complexity in the equip-

ll

i ment configuration for the downstream processes. The licensee

't (M. Joseph) asserts that there is a continuing review and assessment

of this particular problem but that this problem is an operability

'

issue and not a safety issue since the capability to perform DBA-1

depressurization and coolant exhaust cleanup were not affected. *

- - = - _ --. - _ - . . _ _ _ _ _ - - . _ . - _ _ - - _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . __ _ _

_ _ . _

,

' '

-

. .

,

.,

.. 5

.

.

Finally, the licensee (M. Joseph) notei that initial failure of the

'D' circulator shutdown seal to set properly cannot now be dupli- I

cated in' testing. Such failure to seat shutdown seals occurs

randomly but infrequently on various circulator shafts. Presumably,

some'small particle of foreign material is the source of this type

problem which typically disappears when t.he seal is reseated.

This investigator will continue to monitor the progress of solutions

to the corrective actions on R0 86-017; however, this investigator

finds generally that the cause of the problems are probably unique

to the Fort St. Vrain design complexity, particularly for the water-

lubricated circulator bearings and the coolant purification train.

Other than perhaps pump shaft seals on LWRs, there is little equiva-

lent complexity in similar functional systems on other reactors.

Preliminary information from the licensee also indicates that appar-

ently the uninterruptable dc buses and circuits were not affected.

Until the licensee's investigations are completed, this investigator

classified this event as Category 3.

Copies of NRC Form 423 are attached .for filing.

2. Review of Other Documents

During the current reporting period, other potential sources of

operating data have been screened. Some of these are listed as

follows:

a. Inspection and Enforcent (IE) Report 50-267/86-07 with

regard to the March 1985 inspection of the Radiological

'

.

Environmental Monitoring Program (the IE Report noted that

'

the release documented in R0 85-004 and which occurred on

March 17,1985, had not been summarized in the subsequent

Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Report for the affected ,

period).

l ,

I

b. Early Reporting of Events. A 10 CFR 50.72 report, event

number 04516, dated May 6,1986, described a brief power

transient due to the drift open of a tagged out Loop 1

'

drag block valve on the. main steam system. Reactor power

i rose from 34.5% to about 39% in response to automatic

'

reactor regulation against the steam demand. The transi-

i ent lasted 15 minutes until operators returned the valve

position and syst,em to normal. At the time, NRC-mandated

limits required that reactor power not exceed 35% of

l rated. A Region IV daily report of May 7,1986, described

the same event.

c. NRC-NRR letter, April 10, 1986, requesting of the licensee

additional information on the proposed fuel surveillance

j program.

l d. NRC-NRR ' letter and accompanying safety evaluation,

! April 15, 1986, on the Fort St. Vrain 1985-86 licensed

j operator requalification program.

.

1

I

- - . . - - . _ . . - , . . . . . . , . _ __ . - . - . - . - . - . - - . _ . - _ - _ - - - -