ML20214A565

Brief in Support of Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusion of Law Re New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution Contention I.B.2 Concerning Duration of Environ Qualification Times

ML20214A565
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	11/12/1986
From:	Curran D HARMON & WEISS, NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20214A483	List: ML20214A481 ML20214A543 ML20214A565 ML20214A592
References
OL-1, NUDOCS 8611200140
Download: ML20214A565 (11)

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.o I3 DCLKE TE D USNPc UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BO 6 NOV 17 p;2:4j CFFCL

} C0Cu! ~ . 1 In the Matter of ) B '

)

Public Service Company of )

New Hampshire, et al. ) Docket Nos. 5 0-443 OL L

) 5 0-4 4 4 OL -1 (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2) ) ONSITE EMERGENCY

) PLANNING & TECHNICAL

) ISSUES NEW ENGLAND COALITION CN NUCLEAR POLLUTION'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PEGARDING NECNP CONTENTION I.B.2 Introduction NECNP Contention I.B.2 asserts that:

The Applicant (s) ha[ve] not satisfied the requirements of GDC 4 that all equipment important to safety be en-vircnmentally qualified because [they have] not specified tne time duration over which the equipment is qualified.

The New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution has filed Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which detail the ways in which Applicants have failed to provide reasonable as-surance that Seabrook safety equipment can survive an accident for the requisite duration. In its Conclusions of Law, NECNP identifies specific provisions of NRC's environmental qualifica-tion requirements which Applicants have violated. The purpose of this brief is to discuss in greater detail the background and purpose of those requirements, and to discuss the significance of Applicants' noncompliance with NRC environmental qualification standards.

OOOp f gwAOs G

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I. Appli cable Legal Standards A. General Licensing Standards Under NRC regulations at 10 CFR S 50.57(a), the Licensing Board must make the following findings, inter alia, before it can issue an operating license for a nuclear reactor:

(2) The facility will operate in conformity with  !

the application as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; and (3) There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by the oeprating license can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be con-ducted in compliance with the regulations in this chap-ter.

In making this determination, the Licensing Board must make pub-lic safety "the first, last, and a permanent consideration."

Petition for Emergency and Remedial Action, CLI-78-6, 7 NRC 4 00, 404 (1978), quoting Power Reactor Development Corp. v. Interna-tional Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, 367 U.S.

396, 402 (1961).

B. Environmental Qualification Standards It is a " fundamental" principle of nuclear reactor regula-tion that " safety systems must perform their intended functions in spite of the environment which may result from postulated ac-cidents." Petition for Emergency and Remedial Action, C L I- 7 8- 6, 7 N RC a t 4 0 8'. Compliance with this principle must be exacting and thorough, since the qualificatlon of a safety system is only as strong as the weakest component in that safety system.

The Commission's regulatory requirements for environmental qualification of electrical equipment important to safety are

found in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion

("GDC") 4 ; and in 10 CFR S 50.49. In pertinent part, GDC 4 re-quires that:

Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to accomodate the effects of and to be compatible with tne environmental conditions associ-ated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated acc'idents, including loss-of-coolant acci-dents. I In 1980, the Commission upgraded its standard for compliance with GDC 4. The Commission ruled that for reactors under licensing review, NUREG-0588, " Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Equipment," formed the require-ments which applicants "must meet in order to satisfy those aspects of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDC)- 4." 11 NRC at 711. The Commission also announced that it would undertake a rulemaking on environmental qualification, to codify a standard based on NUREG-0588. Id. at 712.

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Three years later, in January of 1983, the Commission promulgated an environmental qualification rule,10 CFR S 50.45.

The r.ule set out parameters for which safety equipment must be qualified, established criteria for establishing qualification, and set forth strict documentation requirements. In affirmance of the requirements of NUREG-0588, the rule provided that plants which were formerly required to satisfy NUREG-0588 need not re-qualify their components. 10 CFR S 50.4 9(k) . Thus, NUREG-0588 is incorporated by the rule as the minimum qualification require- .

l l ments that Applicants must meet in order to achieve compliance l

I with 10 CFR S 50.49. In fact, Applicants have committed to meet

. NUREG-058 8 [ Applicants Dir. Te s t. at 3, Post Tr. 3 57) , and the NRC has found that Applicants comply with that standard. Tr. at 501.

C. Specific Qualification Recuirements

1. Means of Establishing Qualification 10 CFR S 50.49(f) sets forth four alternative methods of g demonstrating that safety equipment is environmentally qualified:

(1) Testing an identical item of equipment under identical conditions or under similar conditions with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable.

(2) Testing a similar item of equipment with a sup-porting analysis to show that the equignent to be qualified is acceptable.

(3) Experience with identical or similar equipment under similar conditions with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable.

(4) Analysis in combination with partial type test data that supports the analytical assumptions and con-clusions.

These criteria are expanded upon in NUREG-0588, S 2.l(2), which states that:

The choice of the methods selected is largely a matter of technical judgment and availability of information that supports the conclusions reached. Experience has shown that qualification of equipment subjected to an accident environment without test data is not adequate to demonstrate functional operability. In general, the staf f will not accept analysis in lieu of test data un-less (a) testing of the component is impractical due to size limitations, and (b) partial type test data is provided to support the analytical assumptions and con-clusion,s reached.

Thus, the NRC generally requires that qualification be supported by test data unless there is some practical impediment to test-

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ing. In that event, license applicants must provide adequate supporting analysis to support a conclusion that the equipment in question is qualified.

With respect to submargence qualification, the NRC's stand-ards are even mote strict and specific. NUREG- 0 58 8, S 2. 2 ( 5 ) ,

requires that:

Equipment should be located above flood level or pro-tected against submergence by locating the equipment in qualified watertight enclosures. Where equipment is located in watertight enclosures, qualification by test or analysis sh'ould be used to demonstrate the adequacy

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of such protection. Where equipment could be sub-merged, it should be identified and demonstrated to be qualified by test for the duration required.

It is clear from this provision that although analysis may be an acceptable means of qualifying submerged equipment that is sur-rounded by a watertight enclosure, unprotected equipment must be qualified by testing for the submergence condition.

2. Documentation of Qualification The Commission's environmental qualification rule requires that A record of qualification, including documentation in paragraph (d) of this section, must be maintained in an auditable form for the entire period during which the covered item is installed in the nuclear power plant or is stored for future use to permit verification that each item of electric equipment important to safety covered by this section:

(1) is qualified for its application; and (2) Aeets its specified performance requirements when it is subjected to the conditions predicted to be present when it must perform its safety function up to the end of its qualified life.

10 CFR 50.4 9( j ) . Thus, Applicants' equipment qualification files must contain sufficient documentation to demonstrate that each safety component is capable of performing its safety function for .

the duration in which it is required to be functional during an accident. The NRC has prescribed that this requirement must be strictly enforced. According to a generic letter from the' Divi-

sion of Licensing to all licensees, equipment is to be treated as

" unqualified" if there is not adequate documentation to establish that it will perform its intended function in the accident en-vironment. NECNP Exhibit 10, Memorandum f rom Hugh L. Thompson to All Licensees of Operating Reactors, re: Information Relating to the Deadlines for Compliance With 10 CFR 5 0.4 9. . .", Generic Le t- I ter 8 5-15 ( August 6,1985) . Thus, regardless of whether there is room for a reasonable judgment that an undocumented piece of equipment is actually qualified, the NRC has established a policy of refusing to make such a judgment if documentation is not pro-vided.

These strict documentation requirements evolved from two earlier cases in which the Commission responded to a petition for emergency action in which the Union of Concerned Scientists chal-lenged the adequacy of environmental qualification at all opera-ting plants. Petition for Emergency and Remedial Action, CLI- 7 8-6, 7 NRC 4 00 (1978) and CLI-80-21,11 NRC 7 07 (1980). In the first decision, the Commission chastized one utility for f ailing to submit timely and accurate documentation regarding the en-vironmental qualification of electrical connectors. The connec-tors later failed a qualification test, resulting in the shutdown of the reactor. 7 NRC at 418. Id.

Noting that some of the reactor licensees' initial responses to its requests for information indicated a " lack on their part of detailed knowledge of the quality of installed plant equip-ment," the Commission called upon licensees to maintain

" detailed understanding of their own plants in order to meet

their obligations for public safety by ensuring a sound basis for making assessments of plant safety." Id. at 419. As the Cc mmis-sion explained, In order to fulfill its regulatory obligations, NRC is dependent upon all of its licensees for accurate and timely information. Since licensees are directly in control of plant design, construction, operation, and maintenance, they are the first line of defense to ensure the safety of the public. NRC's role is one primarily of review and audit of licensee activities, recognizing that limited resource preclude 100 percent inspection.

Id. at 418.

Revisiting the issue of documentation two years later, the Commission observed that "some licensees have ignored the responsibility we emphasized in our original order." C LI- 8 0-21, 11 NRC at 712. Responses to an Inspection and Enforcement Bul-letin requiring licensees to submit documentation of environmen-tal qualification revealed that:

[S]ome licensees, more than a year af ter our April 13 order, had unqualified equipment in their plants.

Others did not have the documentation required to show qualification. Still others, if they possessed the documentation, did not include it in the respont e to the NRC, contrary to the Bulletin requirements.

11 NRC at 713. To assure that qualification was complete and verifiable, the Commission ordered the Staf f to codify documenta-tion requirements for operating plants, and ordered license ap-plicants to comply with NUREG-0588, which contained strict docu-mentation requirements. 11 NRC at 711-12.

Thus, the strict documentation requirements in the environ- _

mental qualification tule arise from the Commission's past expe-rience that licensees did not give adequate attention to the Conr

mission's stringent and detailed requirements for environmental qualification.

II. There is No Reasonable Assurance That Seabrook Safety Equipment is Qualified to Survive the Duration of an Accident.

In CLI-8 0-21, the Commission concluded that the nuclear in-dustry was "not devoting the resources necessary to colve the en ,

vironmental qualification problem." 11 NRC at 714. Summarizing the results of its inquiries to licensees, the Commission ob-served that Deviations from the guidelines include such things as an inadequate test sequence where not all of the serv-ice conditions were addressed, incomplete documentation of tests performed, no consideration given to aging and the fact that the component installed in the plant is not identical to the component tested because of dif-ferences in model, size and materials.

11 NRC at 713-14. The Commission also noted " instances where equipment has not been installed according to its environmental qualification design. Thus, even though the environmental cualification documentation may be in order, the actual equipment in place might not be environmentally qualified." 11 NRC at 714.

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Although the Commission found that these deficiencies did not necessarily mean the equipment was unqualified, it found them to be "cause for concern" which " require further case-by-case evaluations ,since the deviations involve areas which any environ-mental qualification judgment must address." Id.

The Seabrook equipment qualification program is a microcosm of the sorry state in which the Commission found the nuclear in-i i

duFtry in 1980. Applicants' equipment qualification files and

{ hearing testimony revealed inadequate test sequences.for sub-I

merged equipment [ Proposed Findings 72-74]; incomplete documenta-tion of qualification methodology [ Proposed Finding 79]; failure to provide adequate descriptions and analyses in support of qualification by comparison [ Proposed Finding 69]; and installa-tion instructions that are inconsistent with a component's en-vironmental qualification design [ Proposed Finding 76] . At the very least, these deficiencies require further evaluation before the qualification of the affected components can be approved.

The pattern of wide-ranging and repetitious deficiencies revealed in this hearina record, however, points to a systemic problem that cannot be solved solely by the correction of the specific deficiencies identified in the hearings. The systemic and pervasive nature of Applicants' noncompliance with the NRC's environmental qualification requirements is confirmed by the NRC audit, in which half of the audited equipment qualification files showed deficiencies.

As the Commission noted in CLI-78-6, because of limitations on the NRC's resources, it must rely to a large extent on li-censees for assurances that safety equipment is qualified. A crucial component of this self-regulatory approach is the re-quirement that licensees keep auditable qualification files that permit verification that equipment is environmentally qualified.

10 CFR S 50.4 9( j ) . Applicants' persistent noncompliance with the documentation requirements of 10 CFR S 50.49(j) is thus a serious violation of the regulatory scheme by which the NRC attempts to assure the health and safety of the public.

As discussed above, the NRC places a great deal of con-fidence in applicants and licensees to maintain qualified equip-ment in their plants. Although the failure of a single piece of unqualified or inadequately qualified safety equipment could be devastating to the accident response of an entire safety system, the NRC Staff does not review each equipment qualification file !

in its safety review. Instead, the NRC Staf f conducts an en-vironmental qualification review, which encompasses an ap-plicant's summary descriptions of the contents of its equipment qualification files. It also conducts an environmental qualification audit, which involves the detailed examination of only a limited number of equipment qualification files (in this case twelve). Because the NRC has limited its investigation of the details of environmental qualification programs, the program review and audit must be seen as critically important diagnostic tools for assessing the health of the applicant's qualification program. Where, as here, they reveal a consistent and repetitive pattern of environmental qualification deficiencies, they cast doubt on the adequacy of the entire qualification program.

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CONCLUSICN -

The record of this case shows that there is no reasonable basis for concluding that safety equipment at Seabrook can per-form its function for the duration required during an accident at the plant. The operating license must therefore be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

l i W Diane Curran HARMON & WEISS

- 2001 "S" Street N.W. Suite 430 Washington, D.C. 20009 (202) 328-3500 November 12, 1986 O

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