ML20213E107

Forwards Revised Sections 9.3.1,9.1.4,9.4.8 & 9.4.4 of 820219 SER Input,Based on Addl Info Received on 820129,0222 & 25 & 0302

ML20213E107
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	03/24/1982
From:	Rubenstein L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CON-WNP-0501, CON-WNP-501 NUDOCS 8204070571
Download: ML20213E107 (11)

Text

. . I Distribution l March 24,1982 Docket File ASB _Rdg. File ASB Members L SRUBEN STEI N l Docket No. 50-397 .

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert L. Tedesco, Assistant Director for Licensing, Division of Licensing, NRR FROM: L. S. Rubenstein, Assistant Director for Core and Plant Systems, Division of Systems Integration, NRR

SUBJECT:

REVISION TO SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT FOR UASHINGTON NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2, AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH D

Plant Name: Washington Nuclear Project No. 2 4 Docket Nunber: SC0397 q Licensing Stage: OL C D

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!111estone Number: 24-02 Responsible Branch: Licensing Branch No. 2

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Project Manager: R. Auluck AS3 Reviewer: J. Ridgely g Requested Completion Date: February 12, 1982 s Review Status: Awaiting Information g

%I I.g The Auxiliary Systems Branch Safety Evaluation Report (SER) < was forwarded to you on February 19, 1982. Ne have subsequently received additional informa-tion in the applicant's submittals dated January 29, February 25 and March 2, 1932 and in a telephone conversation on February 22, 1982.

In the telephone conversation on February 22, 1982, we were made aware that two redundant seismic Category I, Class lE chilled water systens were being installed in the radwaste building. These chillers are to supply cooling to the control room ventilation system as backup to the non-seismic Category I radwaste building chilled water system. This change necessitates i..odifications to our SER input. Enclosed is a revised Section 9.4.4, Radwaste Building Chilled Water System. It is necessary to add a new section to our SER input.

Section 9.4.17, Control Room Chilled Water System, which rresponds to the new FSAR section received as part of the applicant's January 29, 1982 submittal.

In the applicant's submittal dated March 2,1982, the applicant stated that the compressed air system complies with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.30 and the ANSI McIl-1-1976 (ISAS7.3). Compliance with these two guidelines was not addressed in our SER input as forwarded to you on Pbruary 19, 1982.

It is therefore necessary to modify Section 9.3.1 of our SER input. Enclosed is the revised Section 9.3.1.

Contact:

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Robert L. Tedesco The SER input forwarded to you on February 19, 1982 contained four open items.

The information provided in the submittals dated February 25 and March 2,1982, is sufficient to resolve two open items which concern Sections 9.1.4 (Light Load Handling System) and 9.4.8 (Diesel Generator Area Cable Cooling System).

Enclosed are these revised sections.

Thesechangeshavebeenincorporatedintothepreliminaryversion5ftheSER provided to us by the Project Manager for our review. The Project Manager has already submitted these changes to CRESS.

~0riginaTd%6ie8&f L. S. F.ubenstein ,

L. S. Rubenstein, Assistant Director for Core and Plant Systems Division of Systems Integration Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

As Stated cc w/ enclosure:

R. Mattson P. Triplett D. Eisenhut

0. Parr A. Schwencer R. Lobel R. Auluck J. Ridgely 1

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Normal' makeup to the pool is provided by the nonsafety-related condensate transfer system to replace losses due to leakage through the liner and by evaporation.

Emergency makeup is supplied by the seismic Category I standby -

service water system.

Thus, the requirements of General Design Criterion 61,

" Fuel Storage and Handling and Radioactivity Control," and the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.13, " Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis," concerning fuel pool design, are satisfied.

The system incorporates control room alarmed pool water level, water tempera-ture, and building radiation level monitoring systems, thus satisfying the requirements of General Design Criterion 63, " Monitoring Fuel and Waste Storage."

Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, " Design, Testing, and Maintenance Criteria for Engineered-Safety-Feature Atmosphere Cleanup System Air Filtra-tion and Adsorption Units of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," for the fuel handling building is discussed in Section 9.4.2 of this SER.

Based on our review, we conclude that the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system is in conformance with the requirements of General Design Criteria 2, 4, 44, 45, 46, 61, and 63 as related to protection against natural phenomena, missiles, and environmental effects, cooling water capability, inservice inspection, functional testing, radiation protection and monitoring provi-l sions, and the guidelines of Regulatory Guides 1.13 and 1.29 relating to the _

l facility design and seismic and quality group classification and the guide- '

lines of Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1 and ASB 9-2 relating to the effects of high and moderate energy line breaks and decay heat loads and is, therefore, acceptable.

9.1.4 Light Load Handling System (Related to Refueling)

The light load handling system'provides the means of transporting, handling, and storing of fuel.

The fuel handling system consists of equipment necessary for the periodic refueling of the reactor.

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The system is housed within the reactor building which is seismic Cateogry I and flood protected.

In addition, the reactor building provides tornado 1 protection up to the refueling floor, elevation 607 feet. The jib cranes and the reactor building crane are seismic Category I. Other components of the fuel handling system are attached to the fuel pool wall or are too large to fall into the pool.

The refueling platform which travels over the spent fuel storage racks is designed to seismic Category I requirements from a structural standpoint.

The fuel handling system components are not required to function following an SSE.

The design thus satisfies the requirements of General Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena,"

and the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification."

By submittals dated January 14, 1932 and March 2,1982, the applicant has pro-vided a list of loads which weigh less than a fuel assembly, its channel, and handling tool which would be carried over the spent fuel pool and the open reactor vessel.

The applicant has addressed our concern of lifting (dropping) a light load over the open reactor vessel and has evaluated the consequences of dropping the load in tenns of damage to the spent fuel assemblies and released radioactivity to the environment.

The light load which results in the greatest kinetic energy is the instrument strongback (33,600 ft. lbs). This load drop accident was evaluated using the same procedure as the design basis fuel drop accident (refer to Section 15.7.4 of this SER for further discussion of this accident). The applicant stated that dropping the instrument strongback would result in the failure of 2.93 fuel bundles (182 fuel rods). Table 2.1-1 of NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," states that up to 17 fuel bundles could fail before reaching 25% of the Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 100 limits, with a standby gas treatment system operational with filters (refer to Section 6.5 of this SER for a discussion of the standby gas treatment system). In addition, the drop of the light load will not have any adverse effect on the shutdown margin. We therefore conclude compliance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 62, " Prevention of Criticality in Fuel Storage and Handling."

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Based on our review, we conclude that the fuel handling system is in confonnance with the requirements of General Design Criteria 2, 61 and 62 as related to its protection against natural phenomena, safe fuel handling and prevention of criticality and the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29 with respect to maintaining plant safety in a seismic event and is, therefore, a:ceptable.

9.3 Process Auxiliaries LO' 9.3.1 Compressed Air The nonsafety related (quality group D, nonseismic Category I) containment instrument air system consists of two full capacity compressors with filters, coolers, rE.Ceiver tank, twin tower air dryer, and a piping system for distrib-uting air.

In addition, two nitrogen gas bottle banks and associated piping are provided fnr seven of the main steam relief valves which perform the automatic depressurization system function. The nonsafety-related (quality group D, nonseismic Category I) control and service air system for the facil-ity consists of three compressors with filters, dryers, after coolers, and receiver tanks. All compressed air system containment penetrations are pro-vided with redundant seismic Category I, quality group B isolation valves.

The instruments and controls required for safe shutdown of the plant, such as the MSIVs and ADS valves, are provided with seismic Category I passive air accumulators to assure their proper function in a loss of instrument air condition. Therefore, the system satisfies the requirements of General Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," and guidelines of Position C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classi-fication," in that its failure will not prevent safe shutdown or result in unacceptable radioactive releases.

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In the submittal dated March 2, 1982, the applicant stated that the containment instrument air system design is in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI MC 11.1-1976 (ISA 57.3), " Quality Standard for Instrument Air," for distribution to air operated valves and instrumentation throughout the plant. In addition, the preoperational testing will be in compliance with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.80, "Preoperational Testing of Instrument Air Systems" (refer to Section 14.0 of this SER for further discussion).

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t' We ' nave reviewed the system and found it to have no functions necessary for achieving safe reactor shutdown conditions or for accident prevention of

• accident mitigation. Thus, we find the system meets the requirements of General Design Criterion 2 with respect to the need for protection against natural phenomena and the guidelines of Regulatory Guides 1.29, 1.80 and ANSI MC 11.1-19I6 concerning its seismic classification quality and testing and is, therefore, acceptable.

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9.4.4 Radwaste Building Chilled Water System The radwaste building chilled water system is nonseismic Category I and is not safety related.

The system consists of two full capacity pumps, compressors, evaporators, water cooled condensers, purge systems, and controls and is designed.to provide a reliable source of chilled water to the control room, the cable spreading room, radwaste building air handling units and to the condensers of the off cas charcoal adsorber vault refrigeration units. The chilled water to the air handling units passes through dedicated cooling coils. A second cooling coil is in each essential air handling unit which is dedicated to the standby service water system for cooling during emergency conditions or whenever the chilled water system is unavailable except for the control room where the second cooling coil is dedicated to the control room chilled viater system. The radwaste building chilled water system is necessary for proper operation of the equipment, however the second cooling coil can supply all coil requirements under emergency conditions. Thus, the requirements of General Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," and the guidelines of position C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Seismic Design Classification," are met. No other General Design Criteria are applicable.

~ Based on our review, we conclude that the radwaste cu1soing chilled water system is properly classified as nonsafety related and its failure will not result in unacceptable consequences. The system therefore meets the require-l ments of General Design Criterion 2 with respect to the need for protection against natural phenomena and the guidelines of Position C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.29 concerning its ' seismic classification, and is, therefore, acceptable.

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9. 4. 8' Diesel-Generator Area Cable Cooling System m

The critical electrical cabling which runs between the emergency diesel generators <

and the main control room and critical switchgear room is routed in corridors adjacent to the diesel generator building and in corridors between the reactor building and radwaste building. These corridors are normally ventilated by the turbine building and radwaste building ventilation systems. A cable cooling ventilation system provides cable cooling during the loss of offsite power to ensure the temperature in the corridors does not exceed 115 F.

The cable cooling system consists of two exhaust fans and one inlet air handling system. The air handling system consists of a fan, a water cooling coil which is cooled by the standby service water system, and an electric heater. All components of the cable ventilation system are seismic Category I and are located in the seismic Category I, tornado protected diesel-generator building.

Thus, we conclude that the requirements of General Design Criteria 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," and 4, " Environmental and Missile Design Bases" and the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification," are met.

The air intakes and exhausts are protected from tornado missiles by means of a concrete labyrinth which provides tornado missile protection except for the division II exhaust which exhausts into the radwaste building exhaust system.

Thus, the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.117, " Tornado Design Classification,"

are met. .

The cable cooling system is not located near any high or moderate energy piping; thus, the guidelines of Branch Technical Position ASB 3-1, " Protection Against Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment," are satisfied.

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Based on the above, we conclude that the diesel-generator area cable cooling system is in conformance with the requirements of General Design Criteria 2 and 4, as related to protection against natural phenomana and environmental effects and the guidelines of Regulatory Guides 1.29 and 1.117 and Branch Technical Position ASB 3-1 relating to the system's seismic and tornado classification and protection from high- and moderate-energy pipe breaks and is, therefore, acceptable.

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9.4.17 Control Room The control room chilled water system consists of two full capacity pumps, compressors, evaporators, water cooled condensers, purge systems, and controls and is designed to provide a reliable source of chilled water to the control room in the event that the radwaste building chilled water system is not available. The chilled water to the air handling units passes through dedicated cooling coils. The applicant stated at a meeting with the staff on February 19, 198? that the chilled water system is seismic Category I including the isolation from non-seismic Category I systems and is powered from the vital Class lE AC power supply. Thus, the requirements of General Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," and the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification" are met.

Each chilled water train services one of the two redundant essential ventilation system's cooling coils such that the failure of one chilled water system will not result in the loss of the redundant ventilation system.

In addition, each essential ventilation system has a redundant cooling coil which is normally used and is supplied by the radwaste building chilled water system to permit nonnal operation of the ventilation system. Thus, the requirements of General Design Criterion 44, " Cooling Water," are met.

The chilled water system does not connect to any radioactive water sources and makeup water is from the potable water system. Therefore, all components are accessible for inspection and testing during operation. Thus, the requirements of General Design Criterion 45, " Inspection of Cooling Water System," and 46, " Testing of Cooling Water System," are met.

Based on the above, we conclude that the control room chilled water system meets the requirements of General Design Criteria 2, 44, 45 and 46 with respect to the system's protection against natural phenomena, cooling water, inservice inspection and functional testing, and the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29 with respect to the system's seismic classification and is, therefore, acceptable pending submittal of documentation by the applicant.

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