ML20212K444

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Forwards Sser 9 (NUREG-0887) Supporting Findings on Seismic Design After 860131 Earthquake,Congressman Mk Udall Requesting Testimony & Press Release Re 860408 Hearing Re Earthquake.Related Info Encl
ML20212K444
Person / Time
Site: Perry  FirstEnergy icon.png
Issue date: 03/13/1986
From: Stello V
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To: Asselstine, Palladino, Pallapino, Roberts
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20212K371 List:
References
FOIA-86-297, RTR-NUREG-0887, RTR-NUREG-887 NUDOCS 8608220060
Download: ML20212K444 (11)


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UNITEO sTA s This issue has a short f e

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

.usmNoroN. o c. 2asss Your comments are reques March l3, 1986 '\.by Friday, March 14, 19:

  • ..... t Phil Polk MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladino ,/13/86 Commissioner Roberts e '
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Commissioner Asselstine '

Commissioner Bernthal Commissioner Zech FROM: Victor Stello, Jr.

Acting Executive Director for Operations PLANNED LOW POWER LICENSING OF PERRY, UNIT 1

SUBJECT:

A magnitude 5.0 earthquake occurred near the Perry plant site on January 31, 1986. We were in the late stages of our ifcensing review when the earthquake occurred. Since then, the staff and consultants of NRR, Region III and RES have completed an extensive evaluation of the earthquake. Our findings are reported in Supplement No. 9 to the Perry SER, a copy of which is provided as Enclosure 1. We have concluded that, although certain confirmatory work needs to be completed during 1986, our prior favorable findings on the seismic design of the Perry ~ plant have been reaffirmed.

We are meeting with the ACRS on March 12 and 13,1986. If the ACRS is in agreement with our findings on this issue, we would be prepared to proceed with the issuance of the low power license. The staff expects that this could occur close of business March 17, 1986. However, Congressmen Seiberling and Eckart have said they hoped the license

.y would not be granted until after the hearing scheduled by Congressman Udall for April 8. Mr. Denton will inform the two Congressmen of our action.

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Unless you direct otherwise, we will proceed as planned.

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Victor Ste110, Jr'r '

Acting Executive Director for Operations

Enclosures:

1. SER Supplement No. 9
2. Chairman Udall's letter, dated 3/11/86 cc: SECY OGC OPE RIII U '

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8608220060 860808 C PDR FOIA HIATT86-297 Pop

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N OETIGS OF CQGRESSN21 JCEN F. SE25 LING AND ENNIS E U.S. 52JSE OF RERESDrmTIVIS WASHI! GEN, D.C. 20515 Cbntact: Mark Miller (202)225-5231 or Connie Dykstra (202)225-6331 11, 1986 EUR IMEDIA'2 RELEASE, %!ESIAY, PRRG f

i Congresanan John F. Seiberling (D-Akron, Chio) and Congresman Dennis E. Eckart (D-itantor, Chio) today annotncad that the Ecuse Sub-committee on Energy and Environnent will hold an Agil 8,1986 hearing on the earthqtake that struck Northeastern Ohio in January and its effect on the Mrry nuclear pwer plart located jtst outside ct Cleve-land, Otio. Se Perry nuclear plart is not yet in opration, tut fuel is expected to be leaded at the plant in the rear future.

Although the Perry power plant apprently did not sustain any

.' major structural & mage fran the Aqtake, Nuclear Regu- preliminary excess of thom the plant was designed to withstand.

1 latory Wa*4 cm (NRC) staff reprt states that the NRC believes that the earthqtake catsed no major damage at the Perry plant, and Sethat a low lev,el pwer license should be granted in the near future.is also indepndert Advisory Camittee on Reactor Safeguards (AGS) exantining the effects of the earthqtake en the afe opration of the Mrry platt and the general qtastian of the adeqtacy of NRC earthqtake regulations.

Se purpse of the AEril 8 hearing is to provide an oppettnity for the Sttccanittee and the public to review the NRC staff repet and the AGS findings regarding the effect of the earthqtake on the safe

.. : Although the NRC has indicated that it opration of the pwer plant. .

may soon issue a low pwer license to the plant, Cbngressnan Seiber- l ling and Eckart aid that they hoped that the icw pwer license will e

r not be hearing. granted until af ter the Energy and Envirement S settle any renaining questions about the effects of the earthqtake on the safe opration of the Perry plart, and the adeqtacy cf NRC 4

' earthqtake regulations.

Se hearing will take place in Washington, D.C. on April 8,1986 at a time and location to be annotmoed.

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k.3 NUREG-08tr  !

Supplement No. 9 l 1  ;

, Safety Evaluation Report  !

related to the operation of Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 ..

Docket Nos. 50-440 and 50-441 .-

Cleveland Sectric lliuminating Cornpeny [

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

.g Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

$ March 1986 i., .

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NUREG-0887 Supplement No. 9 Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Perry Nuclear Power Plant,

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Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-440 and 50-441 Cleveland Electric illuminating Company U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation March 1986

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ABSTRACT Supplerent No. 9 to the Safety Evaluation Report (NUPEG-0887) on the applica-tion filed by the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company on behalf of itself and as agent for the Duquesne Light Company, the Ohio Edison Company, the Penn-sylvania Power Company, and the. Toledo Edison Company (the Central Area Power Coordination Group or CAPCO) for a license to operate the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Docket Nos. 50 440 and 50-441), has been prepared by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

The facility is located in Lake County, Ohio, approximately 35 miles northeast of Cleveland, Ohio. This supplement reports the staff's evaluation findings pertaining to the earthquake event that occurred in the vicinity of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant site on January 31, 1986, and is limited to that evaluation.

Future supplemental reports will continue reporting on the status of new or unresolved issues since Supplement No. 8 was issued in January 1986.

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Perry SSER 9 iii

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT ... . . ................. ........ .................. iii 1 INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION ... ..... ... ............ 1-1 1.1 Introduction ~

1.2' Summary of Principal Review Matters 1.3 -Conclusion 2 SITE CHARACTERISTICS ......................................... 2-1 2.5 Geology and Seismology

- Seismic Design Bases for the. Perry Plant January 31, 1986 Earthquake Conclusions 3 DESIGN CRITERIA FOR STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS ........ 3-1 3.7 Seismic Design ..... ..................................... 3-1 3.7<1 Seismic Input 3.7.2 Seismic System and Subsystem Analysis Evaluation Recorded Foundation Motion vs. Free-Field Motion.

Building Response

_ Energy Content Stress Comparison Conclusions 3.7.3 Seismic Instrumentation Program r

4 Evaluation

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Conclusions 3.10~ Seismic and Dynamic Qualification of Seismic Category I Mechanical and Electrical Equipment .. .. 3-8 3.10.1 Seismic and Dynamic Qualification Conclusions 13 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS ..... ... . .............. ..... ...... 13-1 13.3 _ Emergency Plan j Perry SSER_9- y i

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,.o 1 INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION 1.1 Introduction The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-0887) on the application of the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI or the applicant) for a license to operate the Perry Nuclear Power Plant (Perry),

Units 1 and 2, was issued in May 1982. Supplements to the Safety Evaluation ,

j Report (SER) were issued as follows:

j . Supplement No. 1 in August 1982

  • Supplement No. 2 in January 1983

' . Supplement No. 3 in April 1983

. Supplement No. 4 in February 1984 Supplement No. 5 in February 1985 1

. Supplement No. 6 in April 1985

. Supplement No. 7 in November 1985

. Supplement No. 8 in January 1986 The purpose of this supplement to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER No. 9) is to report the results of the staff's evaluation of the earthquake that occurred on January 31, 1986 near the Perry site. This evaluation is based on.the staff's review of information submitted by the applicant by letters dated February 5, '

4 February 12, February 28, and March 3,1986. In these letters, the applicant l reported t.he results of its analysis of-the earthquake that occurred on January 31, 1986 (herein referred to as the January 31, 1986 earthquake) in the vicinity of the Perry plant site. Unlike past SSERs, this report is devoted solely to reporting the NRC staff's evaluation of T. hat event and its conclusion relative to the significance of the seismic event and its reaffirmation of prior favorable determinations regarding the plant design as documented in the SER and Supplement Nos. 1 through 8. SER Supplement No. 10 will continue updating the status of all past and current issues listed in Sections 1.9, 1.10, and y 1.11 of the SER.

Each section or appendix of this supplement is designed and titled so that it -

corresponds to the section or appendix of the SER that has been affected by

the staff's earthquake evaluation and, except where specifically noted,- does t

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not replace the corresponding SER section or appendix. Appendix A is a con-tinuation of the chronology of correspondence between the NRC and the applicant.

Appendix B is a list of references cited in this supplement.* Appendix E is a list of the principal contributors to this supplement. No changes were made i to Appendices C, 0, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, 0, P, Q or R.

i Copies of this supplement are available for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room at 1717 H Street N.W., Washington, D.C., and at the Perry Public Library, 3735 Main Street, Perry, Ohio. Copies of this supplement are also available for purchase from the sources indicated on the inside front cover of this report.

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  • Availability of all material cited is-described on the inside front cover of this supplement.

Perry SSER 9 l-1 l i

D Consideration of the impact of enriched high-frequency content (Section 2.5)

. Further generic evaluations of energy content and potential safety significance of high-frequency-short-duration earth-quakes (Sections 3.7.2 and 3.10.1)

Relocation of seismic instrument (Section 3.7.3)

Modification of specific plant procedures (Section 3. 7.3)

Additional assessment of seismic qualification of equipment (Section 3.10.1) 1.3 Conclusion The staff has completed a preliminary review of the January 31, 1986 earthquake near the Perry plant site and finds that:

(1) The event was a magnitude 5.0(m earthquake; the in plant seismic recordingswereshortinduratibb9()about1second)andcontainedhigh frequency elements; (2) there was no observable significant damage to the plant attributable to the earthquake; (3) the design of the plant's structures and equipment has substantial margins of safety relative to loads and stresses induced by the earthquake; (4) there is no basis at this time to revise the seismic design bases for the plant; (5) there are a number of matters (identified in this evaluation) that need to be confirmed by further analyses and reviews by the applicant and the staff; and (6) the confirmatory work will be completed in a timely manner (schedules are identified in this evaluation) and will be reported in a future supplement to the SER; licensing and operation of the Perry plant while this con-firmatory work continues is acceptable because it is unlikely that any

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c requirements will develop which would significantly change the design of tne Perry plant's structures or its equipment.

Accordingly, the staff has reaffirmed the adequacy of the Perry-plant seismic

design, and concludes that the plant may be licensed for operation without t

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undue risk to the health and safety of the public. Before the plant can be

( authorized to operate at levels above 5% of rated thermal power, the items

} identified above and discussed in this report must be confirmed.

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2 SITE CHARACTERISTICS 2.5 Geology and Seismoloay In the following sections, the seismic design bases for the Perry plant and the staff's understanding of these recent earthquakes are discussed. The engineering significance of the in plant seismic recordings is discussed in Section 3.7 of this SER supplement (SSER 9).

Seismic Design Bases for the Perry Plant The design basis of safety features for each nuclear power plant must take into account the potential effects of two levels of earthquake motion. The greater earthquake motion is based on an evaluation of the maximum earthquake potential and is designated the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE). It is the SSE that produces the maximum ground motion for which certain structures, systems and components necessary for safe shutdown are designed to remain functional. The lesser earthquake motion represents an earthquake event that has a reasonable chance of occurring during the life of the plant and is designated the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE). It is the OBE that pro-duces the ground motion for which those features of the nuclear power plant necessary for continued operation are designed to remain functional.

Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 requires that the design bases for earthquakes be dete'rmined through evaluation of the geologic and seismic history of the

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site and surrounding region. A determination is also required of the influ-ences that result from human activities and from local site soil conditions.

The largest earthquakes occurring in the site region must be assessed. An evaluation is required to determine whether faults in the site region are active and could generate earthquakes large enough to be of significance to the earthquake design bases. Those earthquakes that cannot be correlated

-, with geological structure must be assumed to be capable of occurring through-

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out regions containing similar geologic structures (tectonic provinces).

The Perry site is located in the Central Stable Region tectonic province.

The reactor building foundation is Upper Devonian Chagrin shale bedrock.

& Paleozoic sedimentary rock formations, about 5000 feet thick, overlie a Pre-Cambrian crystalline basement. Pleistocene glaciation induced localized shallow faults and folds in the shale strata in the site vicinity. There are no known capable faults in the site region.

Seismic activity in the site region is typical of that in the Central Stable Region. Within 200 miles of the site, the largest events have been the following:

1. The 1929 Attica, New York earthquake of Modified Mercalli (MM)

Intensity VIII and estimated magnitude 5.2 about 160 miles from the Perry site;

2. the 1937 Anna, Ohio earthquake of intensity VII-VIII and estimated mag- I nitude 5.0-5.3 about 185 miles southwest of the site; and l
3. the January 31, 1986 earthquake of intensity VI and magnitude 5.0 about '

10 miles south of the site.

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Perry SSER 9 2-1 l

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4 SER. The staff will also examine the affect of this information on previous assessments of faults which were believed to be induced by Pleistocene glacia-tion (i.e., faults in the intake and discharge tunnels). The resuits of this additional confirmatory work will be reported in a future supplement to the SER.

The USGS and the applicant's consultants are also exploring the possibility that injection of chemical wastes in two wells about 3 miles south of the Perry plant and about 7 miles north of the recent earthquakes may have been related. The high pressures associated with injection into the wells and the large volume of waste that has been injected (almost 300 million gallons since 1971 in the older well) suggests the effective stress at depth in the vicinity of the well may be higher than the lithostatic stress caused by the overburden. However, past experience with induced seismicity has shown seismicity beginning near the wells and later spreading to surrounding areas.

In the case of the January 31, 1986 earthquake, no seismicity had been reported prior to this event near the wells and the recent earthquakes are about 7 miles from the wells. In addition, previous seismicity, such as the 1943 magnitude 4.5 earthquake, occurred in the vicinity prior to construction of the wells. As a result, the staff considers it unlikely that the seismic event was induced by these wells. Confirmation of this determination will involve a further study of the earthquakes, including their locations, possible associa-tion with a tectonic structure, fault plane solutions, and the possibility of undetected earlier events near the wells. In addition, calculations will be made to determine distances from the well where pressures from the injection of wastes can affect the state of stress.

The January 31, 1986 earthquake actuated the in plant seismic monitoring instruments. Some of the recorded ground motions exceeded the OBE and SSE design spectra at high frequencies (above 15 Hz). The earthquake motion recorded at the reactor building foundation was of short duration (about 1 second) and predominantly at high frequencies. However, the earthquake c was not recorded in the free-field outside the plant. To assess what part of this high frequency exceedance was due to the earthquake source or local site conditions, we have asked the applicant and the USGS to provide and assess all available ground motion recordings near the plant site and in

!' the epicentral area of the January 31, 1986 earthquake and its aftershocks.

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By letter dated March 3, 1986, the applicant has provided some preliminary ground motion data.

It is not unusual in an earthquake to have high-amplitude, high-frequency peak accelerations of limited duration. In recent SERs for eastern U.S.

sites (for example, Seabrook) high-frequency ground motions were discussed.

Evaluations of eastern U.S. data suggest that the presence of high-frequency ground motion is more likely a local site phenomenon (conditions at the recording site) than a source condition. These high-frequency peak accelera-tions have not been used and should not be used in scaling and applying R.G. 1.60 design spectra because they are usually of short duration and little energy and are not representative of spectral response at lower, more significant frequencies.

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Perry SSER 9 2-3

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3 DESIGN CRITERIA FOR STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS 3.7 Seismic Design 3.7.1 Seismic Input In SER Section 2.5, the staff concluded that the seismic design parameters used in the plant structure design are acceptable and meet the requirements of General Design Criteria (GDC) 2 and Appendix A to 10 CFR 100 referenced in Section 3.7.1 of The Standard Review Plan (SRP) (NUREG-0800).

The Ohio earthquake that occurred on January 31, 1986 near the Perry site generated a question regarding the adequacy of the Perry design-basis earth-quake because the motions recorded by the plant seismic instruments indicated that the design-basis response spectrum was exceeded in the high-frequency region (above 15 Hz). The impact of this event on the seismic design of structures and on the seismic analysis methods, including soil-structure interaction and structural response, is evaluated in Section 3.7.2. (A discussion of the seismic instrumentation is contained in Section 3.7.3 of this report; the impact of tne siismic event on plant equipment is discussed in Section 3.10 of this report).

3.7.2 Seismic System and Subsystem Analysis In the Section 3.7.2 of the SER, the staff concluded that the plant design was acce'p' table and met the requirements of GDC 2 and Appendix A to 10 CFR 100 with respect to the capability of the structures to withstand the effects of earthquakes in that their design reflects:

(1) appropriate consideration for the most severe earthquake recorded for the site with an appropriate margin (GDC 2) and consideration of two levels of earthquakes (Appendix A, 10 CFR 100);

., (2) appropriate combination of the effects of normal and accident

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conditions with the effect of the natural phenomena; and (3) the importance of the safety functions to be performed (GDC 2); the use of a suitable dynamic analysis or a suitable qualification test to demonstrate that the structures, systems, and components can withstand k the seismic and other concurrent loads, except where it can be

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demonstrated that the use of equivalent static load method provides adequate consideration (Appendix A, 10 CFR 100).

As a result of the Ohio earthquake of January 31, 1986, questions were raised regarding the adequacy of the plant seismic design, because of the character-istics of the earthquake as stated in SER Sections 2.5 and 3.7.1. Extensive plant walkdowns were conducted by the applicant, and the staff and its consul-tants (see Section 3.10 of this report). With the exception of hairline cracks observed on reinforced concrete walls, no other apparent structural damages were observed that could possibly be attributed to the earthquake. The hair-line cracks that were observed are of a type that normally result from concrete shrinkage after construction and are not believed to be have been caused by the earthquake.

Perry SSER 9 3-1

to amplify the recorded motion was derived by performing a fixed-base time-history analysis using the recorded foundation acceleration time histories as input. The response spectra for the recorded foundation motions were compared with the calculated containment vessel response at approximately elevation 688 feet. In addition, comparison was also made for response spectra of the recorded motions on the foundation and on the containment vessel at elevation 686 feet. doth comparisons show clearly the amplification of the 20 Hz motion from the foundation to the point on the containment vessel. The magnitude of the calculated amplification is less than the recorded motion; however, this preliminary analysis simply assumed a design damping factor of 4% of the critical value. In the case of this earthquake, an analysis performed with a lower damping factor may have produced a result closer to that actually measured. Also, peak spactral amplification is widely recognized to be uncertain.

The staff has also discussed a similar independent analysis of the reactor building performed by the applicant's consultants and found that the amplifi-cations obtained are comparable with those obtained by the staff's consultant as discussed above. The staff, therefore, concludes that the Perry reactor building dynamic model is acceptable.

Energy Content There is a vast amount of literature which documents the low-damage poten-tial of farthquakes of short duration and high frequencies. One of the most recent investigations sought scale factors by which earthquake records must be scaled to induce specified levels of nonlinear deformation. A ductility level (the ratio of strain to the strain at the onset of non-linearity) of about 1.85 was found to represent a best estimate of the inelastic deformations which would occur in a shear wall designed for static lateral loads to the American Concrete Code (ACI) 349 Code capacity. Representative stiff structures of fundamental frequencies ranging from 2.14 Hz to 8.54 Hz were

.i considered, as well as recorded ground motions of varying frequency content and duration. None had as short a duration or as high a high frequency con-tent as that recorded at Perry. Two records of short duration and somewhat higher frequency content (although still less than 10 Hz) were the Gavilan

College, Hollister, 1974 record and the Melendy Ranch Barn, Bear Valley, 1972 E record. For a structure of fundamental frequency of 3.20 Hz (near that of the Perry reactor building), the two recorded motions would need to be scaled by factors of 1.6 to 2.2 to achieve deformations corresponding to the design level forces. Alternatively, a measure of the effective peak ground acceler-ation of these records would be the instrument recorded peak divided by these factors. If a similar procedure was applied to the recor 9 d foundation motions at Perry, the scale factors are expected to be significa"tly h#ghar tran two and, consequently, a me uure of the effective peak ground acceleration of the Perry motiom; would be perhaps 1/3 of the instrument cecorded peak acce'eration or less. Excitations of eis type have limited energy and, hence, little l damage potential.

Stress Comparison To quantify the significance of high frequency acceleration on the structural das;gn, in a letter dated March 3, 1986 the applicant first noted that the Perry SSER 9 3-3 h

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.. the containment basemat approximately 90 degrees apart. Either'of the triggers will start the system recording and annunciate in the control room.

2 A tnird triaxial accelerometer, which is mounted on the containment basemat, switches on a light on the int.trument recording panel and annunciates in tne J control room if the acceleration equals or exceeds the OBE in any of tre tnree 4

directions. The triaxial accelerometer recorders were triggered by the January - 31, 1986 earthquake and records of the motion at the instrument

- location were recorded on the magnetic tape in the recorders.

l In a letter dated March 3, 1986,_the applicant described _the testing of mountings for the 051-N101 accelerometer system (containment base mat) to cetermine its natural frequency. A test box and a strip chart recorder were connected to the accelerometer for testing purposes. A recording of the accelerometer natural _ frequency of 50 Hz was made by electrically pulsing the accelerometer from the test box. This test yielded a trace with the

, Hz frequency recorded on a strip chart. The mounting _was artificially 4 excited by a rap on the mount and a recording of the motion was made on-the A comparison of the 50 Hz strip chart and the rap test chart strip chart.

shows the frequency of the mount to be larger than the 50 Hz_ test frequen_cy.

Therefore, the test clearly shows the mount frequency would not influence 1

the recordings made'during the earthquake.

The applicant reported that the active orthogonal accelerometers had been calibrated at the instrument manufacturer's factory in January 1985. The instruments were recalibrated for sensitivity by the Perry plant personnel in t

DecembeY 1985. The applicant also reported that the active instrument

. recordings were removed from the recorders beginning approximately 30 minutes after_the January 31, 1986 earthquake. The recordings were played back through the playback unit incorporated into the system. -This playback produced a permanent recording of the acceleration-versus-time record of the earthquake motion measured at.the two locations. The magnetic tapes were

, then transported to the manufacturer's facilities and the records were

! .. digitized. These digitized records were used as input to a computer program

" that scaled the records to acceleration units and plots were made. The f' records were then instrument and baseline corrected'and then used to produce _

l plots of acceleration, velocity.and displacement for each component of the

'. r recorded data. The acceleration time-histories were used to produce response

! spectra for comparison with the design response spectra. Copies of these

records were provided to the staff'for evaluation.
Four sets of passive triaxial response spectra recorders (PSR1200) are.

! installed at four different locations to measure-the response spectra directly

. at.12 specific frequencies in each of three orthogonal directions (N-5, E-W, i and Vertical). The earthquake motion causes a reed to vibrate and a diamond

stylus inscribes a permanent record on a plate inside the instrument that is proportional to the acceleration. Additionally, the triaxial response spectra
recorder that is. mounted on the containment basemat lights an amber lamp ca tne control room panel at each of the frequencies (12 frequencies in 3 directions) if 70% of the OBE level is measured
or a red lamp if 100% of the OBE level is measured. A panel is located in an equipment rack in the. control room and if a lamp is lit, the annunciau r is triggered. Seven of these lamps were' lit i during the January 31, 1986 ecrtequake, five in the North-South direction and two in the East-West dirt.ction. No lanps were lit in the vertical direction, i

Perry SSER 9 . 3-5 l

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instrument located on the reactor building drywall platform at elevation 630 feet was the only instrument where the calibration was completed. This -

instrument is lccated on a structural steel platform that is cantilevered from the biological shield concrete wall and serves as the support for several piping snubbers in the area. The motion sensed and recorded by this instru-ment is considered by the staff to be a combination of piping and structural response and the exact relationship between the two cannot be determined.

The staff considers the recordings made by this instrurrent to be invalid for determining the structu'r:1 or piping response. The records from th.s in-strument yield no useful information. By letter datec March 3, 1986, the applicant has agreed to resolve.this matter by relccating the instrument prior to exceeding 5% of rated thermal power. We find this acceptable.

The records from the other three response spectra recorders are considered valid data and the motions recorded are valid structural responses. The response spectra recorder located on the auxiliary building foundation mat near the HPCS pump only had the N-S and E-W recorders operative. The vertical instrument had been removed for calibration. The staff considers the hori-zontal measurements valid data.

The acceleration values were read by the applicant and a representative of the instrument manufacturer and later read by a different manufacturer's representative who did not review the first readings. The readings were compared and good agreement was obtained. The instruments were originally qualified using the same mountings design as the ones used in this plant.

The appl.icant reported that some of the response spectra recordings had some indication of construction activities in the area but the records were clear enough to give good overall results. On the basis of its review, the staff considers the readings valid. The data recorded on the peak acceleration recorders that were located on the reactor recirculation pump and the HPCS pump base mat were reported by the applicant to be useable data. The staff agrees with this determination by the applicant. The peak acceleration recorder that was mounted on a pipe in the reactor drywell at elevation

..~. 630 feat, near the response spectra recorder, had been removed for calibration and no record from this location is available.

, , The applicant reported that recalibration of the instruments has been performed

in preparation for fuel loading.

E Procedure OM48: ONI-051 directs the operator to determine if the OBE accelera-tion limits have been exceeded by observation of the high lights. The pro-cedure does not clearly indicate if this means the red or amber lights.

Further, the question of OBE exceedance is not clear; does this mean if one red light is lit, the plant should be shutdown for exceeding the OBE? The staff recognizes the potential for some confusion to exist in the control room as to whether or not the OBE is exceeded and what action is required for exceedance to be immediately taken by the operators. Furthermore, when the data from the various instruments was evaluated, some differences in recorded response levels were noted. Section 3.0 of procedure OM48: ONI-051 should be amplified to include more explicit instructions as to what constitutes OBE exceedance. A review of the corresponding American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standards may be helpful in this regard.

Perry SSER 9 3-7 h

i inspections at the Perry plant. This confirms the findings made from a comparable inspection conducted by the applicant.

A SQRT team which consisted of a member from the original SQRT team and a member of the_NRC staff subsequently conducted another site audit on February 6, 1986 primarily to investigate the effect of the earthquake on the safety-related equipment of the station. During the above audit. the applicant and its architect engineer, Gilbert / Commonwealth Associates,-Inc. (GAI), presented brief background information on the event and implications of their views of the recorded motions at various locations of the plant. Preliminary 4

observations were that some exceedance of the recorded response spectra over the Perry OBE and SSE had occurred in the high frequency region (above 15 Hz). A qualitative evaluation of the safety impact of the event on plant equipment was then presented by GAI. GAI stated that,' in view of the short-duration (strong motion portion is.less than 1 second), and the high frequency characteristics of the recorded motion, the impact of the exceedance would be insignificant from an engineering viewpoint. The SQRT concurred with the applicant's preliminary determination during the audit but requested that the applicant provide a quantitative assessment of the impact of the earthquake by reviewing a sample of plant equipment and to provide the results for SQRT review. In addition to the above technical session, the SQRT performed a  :

walkdown and observed some representative equipment. items that were a part of the detailed review in the SQRT audit.of August 1984. The equipment inspected included the H13-680 Unit Control Console, Division 1 battery and rack, motor control center, and RCIC turbine and its related pipings and accessories. No .

dam, age'that could be attributed to the January 31, 1986 earthquake was observed 3 on equipment itself, the equipment supports, or the mounting configuration .

Furthermore, no apparent structural damage was observed during the walkdown.

An open meeting was subsequently held on February 11, 1986 at Perry plant site in which the applicant and its consultants made a formal' presentation on the

.. earthquake characteristics and.its efforts in evaluating the safety impact of

-d the event. It was emphasized by the applicant and/or his consultants that the 4

January 31, 1986 earthquake was of a smaller magnitude than the design basis earthquake for Perry plant and, becath of low-energy and high-frequency con-r tent, the earthquake had no safety significance to the plant operation. In 2

4 fact, the applicant documented that all of the 39 safety-related and 36 non-

  1. safety related systems that were energized during the earthquake had functioned as designed.

The applicant stated that three non-safety systems tripped as a. result of the earthquake. Specifically, it was noted that a rotating cylinder type of pro-tective relay for the turbine generators located in the switchyard and not energized caused two breakers to trip in the switchyard. The applicant stated that if the relay were energized, the actuation of the breakers in the yard may have not occurred.because the energizing force would have held the contacts in place. An' instrument air compressor tripped; however,_one of the three other instrument / service air compressors in the plant automatically started. j The third item to trip was the station auxiliary boiler that provides heat to 'I the plant. During the above meeting, the SQRT's concern regarding a quantitative l assessment of the safety impact of the January 31, 1986 earthquake on equipment i seismic que.lification was brought to the applicant's attention for a followup

response.

l Perry SSER 9 3-9 ,

1 h J

4

.b. MSIV Leakage Control System Blower at Auxiliary Building, Elevation 620 feet, General Electric /LOMPOC Model No. 2CH-6-041-lU, GAI.MPL NO.

4 1E32-C0001, lE32-C00028, 1E32-C0002F.

c. , Recirculation Pump Trip Control Switchgear at Intermediate Building elevation 620', General Electric Model No. Power /VAC, GAI MPL No. 1R22-50012, 1R22-50013, IR22-50014, 1R22-50015.

The estimated spectra were based on the recorded spectra at the auxiliary i building foundation, modified to reflect the predicted amplification ratio of the reactor building. The estimated spectra and the testing response spectra at proper elevations ~were compared to indicate ample-margin to i

accommodate this recorded January 31,-1986 earthquake.

! The staff has reviewed all the above information provided by the applicant '

i and' agrees with the results.

e

Conclusions On the basis of the results of detailed walkdowns conducted by the NRR staff i

and its consultants, Region III, and utility personnel which found no apparent equipment or structural damage that could be attributed to the Ohio earthquake

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of January 31, 1986, and on a reassessment of the seismic capability of a i sampling of equipment types, it is the staff's opinion that the earthquake did i not have any significance from an engineering view point on the equipment at the Perry plant. In other words, the design-basis earthquake may have been excee.ded'at some high, narrow frequency region of the response spectra, but the or.iginal overall plant seismic design was not affected. Therefore, the staff concludes that the previous conclusions regarding ~the adequacy of the applicant's seismic qualification program remain valid.

By its letters of February 28, 1986, and March 3, 1986, the applicant has com-mitted to provide the following confirmatory information: .

1) additional quantitative assessments on the seismic qualification of a

! more comprehensive sample of ?quipment types'that are located at other elevations of different buildings, and which would cover equipment that

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!' have been qualified by the testing method and by the analysis method; '

t consideration shall include the balance-of plant equipment that has been qualified by analysis methods; and

2) results of a generic. evaluation based on an acceptable analytical approach, s

of a high-frequency, short-duration earthquake with regard to its energy'

  • content and potential safety significance for equipment'and structures i at Perry; using the results obtained from the analysis, assess the seismic capability of the Perry plant, assuming ~that other earthquakes of similar characteristics, but with higher magnitude and/or longer-duration occurs near the site.

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l By letter dated March 3, 1986, the applicant-has committed to provide the above detailed information by June 1986.' The staff finds the applicant's commitment, in-l this regard, to be acceptable and plans to report the results of its review of these confirmatory items in a future supplement to the SER.

Perry SSER 9 3-11 l

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W 13 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 13.3 Emeraency Plan The overall assessment of the applicant's performance from an emergency pre-paredness perspective as a result of the January 31, 1986 earthquake was good.

Although under no obligation to activate the emergency organization, Perry did so. This enabled them to augment all resources and staff necessary to respond to the earthquake. Although a number of problems were identified, these were not indicative of any major programatic concern, and are all correctable. It is also noted that the applicant had already-identified all-the problems and concerns raised by the NRC in the course of this inspection. (IE Inspection Report 50-440/86004; 50-441/86002 dated February 21, 1986.)

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Perry SSER 9 13-1 M.

APPENDly A CONTINUATION OF CHRCN0 LOGY PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 and 2 Decemcer 27, 1985 Letter from applicant requesting extension of Perry Unit 1 Construction Fermit (CPPR-148) to March 3,1986.

January 8, 1986 Letter from applicant submitting fee for extending Perry Unit 1 Construction Permit to March 3, 1986.

January 15, 1986 NRC letter transmitting two advance copies of Perry SER Supplement No. 8.

January 22, 1986 NRC letter submitting craft reports concerning technical insights gained from probabilistic risk assessments for comments.

January 27, 1986 NRC letter transmitting 20 printed copies of Perry SER Supplement No. 8.

January 29, 1986 Letter from applicant advising of Perry plant organizational changes in preparation for fuel load and plant operation (no

- new positions or personnel were added; only duties were reassigned.

January 31, 1986 Letter from applicant requesting extension of Perry Unit 1 Construction Permit (CPPR-148) to April 15, 1986.

February 5, 1986 Letter from applicant summarizing his response and activities related to the seismic event (earthquake) that occurred on January 31, 1986, in the vicinity of the Perry plant site.

February 6, 1956 Letter from applicant submitting fee for extending Perry r

- Unit 1 Construction Permit (CPPR-148) to Ap'ril 15, 1986.

6 February 10, 1986 Letter from applicant submitting Revision 2 to the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual incorporating agreed-to NRC staff changes. .

February 12, 1986 Letter from applicant providing a report of CEI's detailed assessment of the Perry plant's response to the January 31, 1986, earthquake.

February 28, 1986 Letter from applicant providing supplemental earthquake assessment information to that furnished by letter dated February 12, 1986.

March 3, 1986 Letter from applicant providing additional supplemental earthquake assessment data to that furnished by letters dated February 12 and February 28, 1986 Perry SSER 9 1 Appendix A M

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APPENDIX B REFERENCES

  • Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, " Final Safety Analysis Report for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2" (Docket Nos. 50-440 and 50-441),

through Amendment 24, Dec 1985.

Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, " Energy" (10 CFR), includes General Oe-sign Criteria (GOC).

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), NUREG-0800 (formerly NUREG-75/087),

" Standard Review Plan for Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants," Rev. 2, July 1981 (includes Branch Technical Position).

-- ,NUREG-0887, " Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2," May 1982; Supp. 1, Aug. 1982; Supp. 2, Jan. 1983; Supp. 3, Apr. 1983; Supp. 4, Feb. 1984; Supp. 5, Feb. 1985; Supp. 6, Apr. 1985; Supp. 7, Nov. 1985; Supp. 8, Jan. 1986.

U.S. NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement Reports 50-440/86004(ORSS) and 50-441/86002(DRSS), dated February 21, 1986.

Weaver & Burdick, " Spectral Analysis of Perry Nuclear Power Plant Velocity -

Time Histories Resulting from Ohio Earthquake," Livermore, 2/25/86.

Letter to Robert Herman of NRC from J. J. Johnson, " Contributions to the Revised Perry SER due to the January 31, 1986 Earthquake," Structural Mechanics Associates, 2/26/86.

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  • All correspondence between the applicant and the NRC staff referenced in this supplement is listed in Appendix A of the SER and its supplements on a continuing basis.

Perry SSER 9 1 Appendix B M

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APPENDIX E NRC STAFF CONTRIBUTORS AND CONSULTANTS

- NRC Staff Name Title Branch 4

R. Hermann Acting Section Leader BWR Engineering A. Lee Mechanical Engineer BWR Engineering H. Polk Structural Engineer Technical. Assistance Management L. Reiter Senior Reliability & Reliability and Risk Assessment Analyst W. Snell* Regional Inspector Region III P. Sobel ,. Geophysicist BWR Engineering S.-Stern Project Manager BWR Project Directorate #4 1

NRC CONSULTANTS Name . Organization

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J. Johnson Structural Mechanics Associates J. Singh EG&G Idaho

  • 0ffice of Inspection and Enforcement, Region III.

Perry SSER 9 1 Appendix E M .

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,.e .a. e BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET flVREG-0'337 Suoniement

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.e Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of - * - " - -

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 __

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See 8. above Technical January 31, 1986 -

March 1986 1.... E '.* t N * . * * *. ' E i Docket Nos. 50-440 and 50-441

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This report relates to the application for licenses to onerate the Perry fluclear Power Plant. Units 1 and 2 filed by the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Conpany on behalf of itself and as agent for the Duquesne Light Comnany, The Ohio Edison Company, the Pennsylvania Power Company and the Toledo Edison Company as apolicants and owners.

The Perry Nuclear Power Plant facility is located in Lake County. 0hio, aoproximately

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. 35 miles northeast of Cleveland, Ohio.

This supplement reports the staff's evaluation findings pertaininc to the earthauake event that occurred in the vicinity of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant site on January 31.

1996, and is limited to that evaluation. Future supolemental reports will continue t

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reporting on the status of new or unresolved issues since Suoplement No. 8 was issued in January 1986.

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Perry OL - Theresa Haiost (The Perry Nuclear Power Plant consists of two General Electric Boiling Water Reactors, rated at 1265 megawatts each, located on Lake Erie, 35 miles north of Cleveland, Ohio. The lead licensee is Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company. (Cleveland Electric Illuminating has agreed to merge with Toledo Edison into an as yet unnamed holding company). The architect-engineer is Gilbert Commonwealth and the prime contractor is Kaiser Engineers. Unit 1 is approximately 99% constructed. The NRC Staff expects that it will be ready for fuel loading in mid February. Unit 2 is 44% constructed but has no completion schedule.)

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6 Perry OL - Theresa Haiost

- (The Perry Nuclear Power Plant consists of two General Electric Boiling Water Reactors, rated at 1265 megawatts each, located on Lake Erie, 35 miles north of Cleveland, Ohio. The lead licensee is Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company. (Cleveland Electric Illuminating has merged with Toledo Edison to form Centerion Energy Corporation.) The architect-engineer is Gilbert Commonwealth and the prime contractor is Kaiser Engineers. Perry's low power license was issued March 18, 1986.)

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CEI STAFFING

! PERRY POWER PLANT

! JANUARY 27,1986 i

Nuclear Construction Department 58

! Nuclear Engineering Department 127

Nuclear Quality Assurance Department -

77 l Perry Plant Operations Department 323

Perry Plant Technical Department 430

! Perry Project Services Department 172 l Other Support Elements at Perry 103 l Management 17

! Cleveland Electric illuminating Company 1307

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ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

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NRC INSPECTIONS l

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  • Construction Appraisal Tea' m J
  • Integrated Design inspection J

O NRC CONFlitMATORY AUDITS PERRY POWER' PLANT l

  • Detailed Control Room Design Review
  • Equipment Qualification .
  • Fire Protection -

Instrumentation and Control System Design i

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  • Security j

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OPERATIONAL READINESS REVIEW PERRY POWER PLANT

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.i f 18235 Quinn Rd.

Chagrin Falls, Ohio 44022 l Febntary 18, 1986 l

Mr. Nunzio J. Pa111dino, Chairman l' Nuclear Regulatory Commission +

1717 H St., N.W. i Washington D.C., 20555 l

Dear Mr. Pallidino:

I am writing in regards to the recent envirorunental events

that have occured in Ohio. Ohio isn't exactly what people However, an earthquake would call an earthquake prone state.

j did occur here on January 31, 1986. Because of this, pre-cautions should be taken to prevent an earthquake related disas-ter from happening at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant.

l I woul'd like to know exactly what would happen to the plant if an earthquake struck again? What are.the possibilities of a meltdown? If the possibilities of a meltdown are nil, then what other damages to the plant could jeopardize the lives of l

the people who live in Ohio? Was the Perry Nuclear Power Plant built to withstand an earthquake? How long would it take to

., repair the plant if it were seriously damaged?

I would also like to know what steps must.be taken in order for the plant to start operation again? What asatrances do we i have that some form of earthquake damage has not been overlooked?

6 As a resident of Northeast Ohio, I am truly concerned with the

- plant's safety and would like to know the answers to my concerns.

Sincerely yours, T//2W fr.QD ,

? Connie Piteo 4W q- h D/f _

f M April 15, 1986 Mr. J.M. Felton, Director Otviston of Rules and Recores Office er Admsnzstroezon U.S. nuclear Regulatory Commission FREEDOM OF IfGORMATION Washinston. 0.C. 20555 ACT REOUEST FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUE5T Wb

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3)I 7

Dear Mr. Feleon:

hkj-h Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 Usc $52, as amendee, and the provissons of 10 CFR Port 9 ehe understanee herecy requests the following:

1. any communscotions or correspcndence (memos, letters, notes, etc.) to the Commission or any member thereof regard:ng the licenszng of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant rece:ved from cny person or party (includ:ng =ut not limited to members cf Congress, employees tnereof, or other elected or ocpointec officials of federol. state, or local governments, NRC employees, the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., zes partners or asents, the Department of Energy, tne Presicene or persons cettng on nts benalf, butiding trodes unions or their members, or members of the public) ssnce January 19865
2. any memos. letters, repores, postrian papers, or other documents concernin9 kne Commission's April 17, 1936 decision ec vocate ene Appeal Booro's March 20, 1986 Memoroneum ano order regarding OCRE's morson to reopen ene Perry neor ng ree:re on ene January 31, 1986 eorehaucke.

I agree to accece che charges for these items, and : uould opereciate o prompe response to this FOIA requese.

itncerely,

_ ,s - --

  • Wh  ? f s C suson L. Hioet OCRE Representotsve

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(Ole) 255-3158 w_ _