Text

Forwards Proposed Change to STSs for Review & Comment.Change Would Remove TS Requirements for ESF Features to Be Operable After Sufficient Radioactive Decay Has Occurred to Ensure Off Site Doses Remain Below SRP Limits
	ML20212J320
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	06/23/1999
From:	Beckner W; NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	Wermiel J; NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
References
	NUDOCS 9906290216
	Download: ML20212J320 (325)
	v • d • e

June 23, 1999 MEMORANDUM FOR: Jared S. Wermiel, Chief Reactor Systems Branch Division of Systems Safety and Analysis, NRR FROM: William D. Beckner, Chief Original Signtd By Technical Specifications Branch Division of Regulatory improvement Programs, NRR

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL REVIEW OF TSTF-051, REVISION 1 Y Attached is a proposed change to the Standard Technical Specifications (TSs) for your staff I

review and comment. The proposed change would remove the Technical Specification U

requirements for ESF features to be OPERABLE after sufficient radioactive decay has occurred to ensure off-site doses remain below the SRP limits. The justification for this proposed change is contained in the industry /TSTF Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler, attached. Except for some minor editorial and plant specific differences, the changes proposed in TSTF-051, Rev.1 are the same as those recently approved for the Perry Technical Specifications.

These changes have been a low priority for some time, bue have recently received increased interest. Therefore, we requies your review and input be complete within the next 30 days.

Also, please let Debbie Johnson, of my staff, know the name of the staff member you have assigned to review this package either by telephone (415-3060) or e-mail (DLJ), for our records. Once review is complete, please retur " A package, with the reviewer's comments, to me at mail stop O-13 H15.

The reviewer .;hould charge time devoted to this item to TAC number M84806 for Babcock &

Wilcox, M84807 for Westinghouse, M84808 for Combustion Engineering, M84809 for GE BWR/4 and M84810 for GE BWR/6 Standard Technical Specification review . Any technical comments or questions should be directed to Bob Giardina of my staff at 415-3152. Should you have any other questions or need further clarification, I may be reached at 415-1161.

Attachment:

TSTF-051, Rev.1 O

'f '

cc: w/o Attachment DISTRIBUTION: 2 D. Matthews \ FILE CENTER S.Newbeny PUBLIC b - L} - } [J[ [O G. Holahan TSB R/F (w/o attachment, see 5/7/99 memo) e . I 'M R. Dennig TSB Staff (w/o attachment)

R. Giardina D. Johnson DOCUMENT: G TRTSBVOHNSON\SRXBOS1.R1.WPD m _

OFFICE RTSB: DRIP:NRR RTSB: DRIP:NRR RT Dh:NRR C:RTSB: DRIP:NRR NAME DLJohnson dl$ RJGiardina k RfDhnni WDBecknerM$

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DATE 06/21/99 06/ A/99 06/W/99 06/d/99

^"lOIS NACIAL RECORD COPY 99 . f f 3 9906290216 990623 -

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g i UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f WASHINGTON, D.C. 2006641001

,,g # June 23, 1999 MEMORANDUM FOR: Jared S. Wermiel, Chief Reactor Systems Branch Division of Systems Safety and Analysis, NRR FROM: William D. Beckner, Chief yh Technical 3pecifications Branch Division of Regulatory improvement Programs. NRR

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL REVIEW OF TSTF-051, REVISION 1 Attached is a proposed change to the Standard Technical Specifications (TSs) for your staff review and comment. The proposed change would remove the Technical Specification requirements for ESF features to be OPERABLE after sufficient radioactive decay has occurred to ensure off-site doses remain below the SRP limits. The justification for this '

proposed change is contained in the industry /TSTF Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler, attached. Except for some minor editorial and plant specific differences, the changes proposed in TSTF-051, Rev.1 are the same as those recently approved for the Perry Technical Specifications.

These changes have been a low priority for some time, bue have recently received increased interest. Therefore, we requies your review and input be complete within the next 30 days.

Also, please let Debbie Johnson, of my staff, know the name of the staff member you have assigned to review this package either by telephone (415-3060) or e-mail (DLJ), for our records. Once review is complete, please return this package, with the reviewer's comments, to me at mail stop O-13 H15. 1 The reviewer should charge time devoted to this item to TAC number M84806 for Babcock &

Wilcox, M84807 for Westinghouse, M84808 for Combustion Engineering, M84809 for GE BWR/4 and M84810 for GE BWR/6 Standard Technical Specification review . Any technical comments or questions should be directed to Bob Giardina of my staff at 415-3152. Should you have any other questions or need further clarification, I may be reached at 415-1161.

Attachment:

TSTF-051, Rev.1 cc: w/o Attachment D. Matthews S. Newberry G. Holahan R. Dennig R. Giardina D. Johnson

u j

Travelcr TSTF for,STS Rev. 2 Chnngos from 01/01/90 to 06/21/99 Paga 1 h MED/l b bPY [

Package No.: TSTF-051, R.1

Contact:

Giardina, R.

Dicposition: Pending NUREGs Affected: BWOG WOG CEOG BWR4 BWR6 Date Action (History Status) Name 05/03/99 Assigned To Giardina, R. l 05/03/99 Asrigned To Weston, M. !

05/11/99 Forwarded To Tech Branch SPLB Proposed Changes , Name: STS Administrator Date: 05/03/99 Cl2ssification: 3) Improve Specifications TSTF-051 was compared to the issued Perry amendment (PPNP Amendment 102) and there l cra no te'chnical differences between the basis of the two. The Reviewer's Note has been l l m3dified to reflect the Perry commitment. The following editorial changes were made: !

1

1) The continued header for BWR/4 and BWR/6 Secondary Containment Actions was changed l to m2tch the changes made to the first page header. '

1 1 2) A period was added before the insert in the BWR/4 and BWR/6 SGTS specification (paga B 3.6-105).

1

3) A "[recently)" was added to the BWR/6 (page B 3.8-62) Applicable Safety Analysis, first p2rsgraph for consistency with the Perry amendment and the other NUREG markups.

1 1 Tech Branch Comments Name: Goel, R. Date: l M:mo dated 5/7/99 was dispatched to Plant Systems Branch (SPLB), Mechanical and Civil l

! Engineering Branch (MCEB), Electrical and Instrumentation Controls Branch (EICB), and l Opsrstor Licensing, Human Performance and Plant Support Branch (Radiation Protection). l l

l Mrmo, discovered to have been routed in error to Operator Licensing, Human Performance and Plant Support Branch, was retrieved and delivered by hand to Mark Reinhart, l Probabliistic Safety Assessment Branch (SPSB) on 5/12/99.

5/12/99 R:sponse received from Dave Terrell, MCEB: responded with "no comments".

6/9/99 M. Blumberg, SPSB, is awaiting a call from the BWR OG Chairman to clarify technical points.

6/11/99 l

R:sponse received from Paul Gill, EICB: responded that changes are acceptable.

l i

1

1 cswnOc-iv,mev.e) isTrsi

- , meri . I kdustryffSTF Standard Technic 1 Specificatice Change Travsler Revise ecstalament requirements during handling irradiated fuel and cost alterations Claanification: 3) Improve Specifications NUREGs Affected: E 1430 E 1431 E 1432 2 1433 2 1434

Description:

Remove the Tecluncal Specification requirement < for ESF features (e.g., pnmary/seconda:y con +=h' stan6y gas treatment, isolation capability) to be OPERABLE aner sufBeient radioactive decay has occurred to ensure off-site doses remain below the SRP limits (a small baction of 10CFR100). Fuel. movement could still proceed prior to the amount of decay occurnas but only with the appropriate ESF systems OPERABLE-Amanciated with this change is the deletion of OPERABILITY requirement < during CORE ALTERATIONS for ESP mitigation features. This change will allow plants the flexibility to move personnel and equipment and perform work which would affect containment OPERABILITY during the handling ofirradiatad fuel.

}nstireneinn-Following reactor shutdown, decay of the short-lived fission products greatly reduces the fission product inventory present in irradiated fuel. The proposed changes are based on performing analyses assunung a longer decay period to take advantage of the reduced radionuclide inventory available for release in the event of a fuel handling accident Following sufBeient decay occurnng, the primary success path for mitigating the fuel handling accident no longer includes the functioning of the active containment systems Therefore, the OPERABILITY requirements of the Technical Specifications are modified to reflect that water level and decay time are the pnmary success path for mitigating a fuel handling accident (which meets Criterion 3).

To support this change in requirements during the handling ofirradiated fuel, the OPERABILITY requirements during CORE ALTERATIONS for ESF mitigation features are deleted. The accidents postulated to occur during core alterations, in addition to fbel handling accidents, are: madvertent criticality (due to a control rod removal error or continuous control rod withdrawal error during refhehng or boron dilution) and the inadvertent loading of, and subsequent operation with, a fbel assembly in an improper locanon. These esents are not postulated to result in fbel cladding integrity damage. . Since the only accident postulated to occur during CORE ALTERATIONS that results in a significant radioactive release is the fbel handhng accident, the proposed Technical Specification requirements omitting CORE ALTERATIONSisjustified.

Also, the Technical Specifications only allow the handling ofirradiated fuel in the reactor vessel when the water level J in the reactor casity is at the high water level. Therefore, the proposed changes only affect contamment requirements during periods of relatively low shutdown risk during refueling outages. Therefore, the proposed changes do not .

significantly increase the shutdowti risk. I Industry

Contact:

Ford, Bryan (601)437 6559 bford@entergy.com NRC raniere- Weston, Mag 301 314-3151 mww@nrc. gov !

Revision History -

OG Revision 0 Revision Status: Closed Revision Proposed by: Grand Gulf Revision

Description:

OriginalIssue M22/99 Trewier Rev. 2. Copyrisis (C) 199s, Essel services C, r Une by Emoel services assocasies, utility clianas, and dw U.s. Nuclear Resulaeary Canuussion is yanted All other use witham wnsen psW is prohibiend DW88'"'."S b 1 9, peg.w &4

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(BWROG-17, Raw. 9) TSTF-51, Rev.1 OG Revision 0 Revision Status: Closed Owners Group Review Information DateOriginatedby OG: 01-Feb-96 Owners Group easannasa.

Contact:

Bryan Ford, Grand Gulf. (601)437 6559 Owners Group Resolution:' Approved Date: 31-Jan 96 TSTF Review Inforsnation TSTF Received Date: 01 Fat >96 DateDistributedforReview 01-Feb-96 OGReviewCPM E BWOG E WOG E CEOG E BWROG TSW r====s==-

(No Conuments)

, TSTFResolution: - Approved Date: 21-Mar-96 NRC ReviewInforntation NRC Received Date: 25-Mar 96 NRC ran===*a 6/11/96 - C. Grinnes conunent TSTF-51 pkg is not a job for TSB; it was referred to DRPB. TSTF-51 is being e:=jw to an action plan. DRPM staff will revisit fbcl handling and revise the SRP.

9/18/96-no change in status 3/18/97 no change in natus -

4/17/97 nochangeinnatus 10/1/97 - Low NRC pnoriity because CBLA related. Package still pending.

12/15/98 '- All affected NRC technical branches were at TSTF / NRC meeting except the c aneminneen Systems Branch. NRC is continuing to discuss TSTF-51 and will consider the need for the change, and the

TSW will consider the Wehility of provuhng additional commitments concerning radioactive matenal control. NRC will push the Perry plant-specific submittal now to approve for the Perry April 1999 outage.

Bill Beckner would concur in both the Perry plant-specific license amendment and TSTF 51 together, using the Peny approval as basis for generic approval af TSTF 51.

FinalResolution: Enperceded by Revision Final Resolution Date:

TSTF Revision 1 Revision Status: Active Next Action: NRC Revnion Proposed by: NRC Revision Desenption:

TSTF-51 was w. . id to the issued Peny amendment (PPNP Amendment 102) and there are no technical diferences between the basis of the two. The Revnewer's Note has been mod: Bed to reflect the Peny ennuniennen . The following editorial changes were made:

1) The annrunuut header for BWR/4 and BWR/6 Secondary cantain===' Actions was changed to match the changes made to the first page header. % .

2) A pened was added before the insent in the BWR/4 and BWR/6 SGTS specification (B 3.6-105).

3) A "[recently]" was added to the BWR/6, page B 3.8 62, Applicable Safety Analysis, first paragraph for ennalmanty with the Peny anendawns and the other NUREG markups-TSTF Review Inforstation 4/22/99 Tes=lernew.2. copynsis(c)teos,Leelsomouc , - the by Enest serwass -*= mBy cliens,and de U.s. Nuclear Rayleemy e- is poseed AB ether use webout wrissa pannunon is preldbhad

, n: ..- . _ , _. n . - -

l (BWROG-17,Rev. 0) 'ISTF-51 Rev.1 TSTF Revision 1 Revision Status: Active Next Action: NTC TSTF Received Date: 14.Apr.99 Date Distributed for Reviert 14.Apr-90

~

OG Review Completed: E BWOG E WOG E CEOG E BWROG

') .

TSTF C m===

1 (No Comments) i TSTF Resolution: Approved Date: 14.Apr.99 l

NRC Review Inforntation NRC Received Date: 26.Apr.99 NRC Comments.

(No Comments)

Final Resolution: NRC Action Pending FinalResolution Date:

Incorporation Into the NUREGs File to BBS/I.AN Date: TSTFInformed Date: TSTF Approved Date:

NUREG RevIncorporated: )

Affected Technical Specifications '

S/A 3.8.2 Benes AC Sources. Shutdown LCO 3.82 Bones AC Swees. Shuldewn ,

~

Appl. 3.82 AC Sources. Shutdown Appl. 3.8.2 Bases AC Sources. Shutdown Action 3.8.2.A AC Sources. Shutdown Action 3.8.2.A Bases AC Sources. Shutdown Action 3.8.2.B AC Sources. Shutdown S/A '3.a.5 Bases DC Sources. Shutdown LCO 3.8.5 Bases DC Sources. Shutdown Appl. 3.8.5 DC Sources. Shutdown Appl. 3.8.5 Bones DC Sources. Shutdown i Achon 3.8.5A DC Sources. Shutdown i

Action 3.8.5A Beees DC Sources. Shutdown S/A 3.8 8 Bones inwrts. Shutdown l 4/2289 Traveler Rev. 2. Copyright (C) 1998, Excel Services Corporation. Une by Excel Sarwcas associates, utility clieres, and de U.S. Nuclear Regulesary Cormnission is ynnted. All other use without wrisen pernussion is prohibited.

. . . . _ _ . _ ~- - - . . . . . . _ . . . . . . - I

(BWROG.17 Rev. 9) TSTF.51, Rey, I LCO 3.8.8 seems irwerts.Steadown Appt 3.8.8 Irworters. Studewn

Appt 3.8.8 seses inwwiers. Stundown "Achon 3.8.8.A trwwters.Simadown Acuan 3.8.8.A Saees Irwerters.Stuadewn WA 3.8.10 tones Detribuuon '4yviems - Senadown

]

LCO 3.8.10 tones Distribuuan Systems. Shutdown Appl 3.8.10 Distribuuan Systems. Shutdown Appl 3.8.10 asses Distribuuan Systems. Shutdown Action 3.8.10.A DistributionSystems Senadown

, Acuan 3.8.10.A Bones Detribubon Systems. Shuldman 4 Appt 3.7.10 Control Room EFS or CREVS NUREG(sb 1401431 Only 1

Appl. 3.7.10 Bases Control Room EFS or CREVS NUREC.(s> 140141 Only I Acuan 3.7.10.C Control Room EFS or CREVS NUREG(sb 1401431 Only Acton 3.7.10.C 8 eses Control Room EFS or CREVS NUREG(s)1401431 Only Achon 3.7.10.D Control Room EFS or CREVS NUREG(s)i4301431 Only Achon 3.7.10.D Saees Control Room EFS or CREVS NUREG(sb 1401431 Only Appt 3.7.11 Control Room Ernergency Air Temperature Control System NUREG(sb 14301431 Only Appt 3.7.11 Bones Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Cortrol System NUREG(sb 1401431 Only Action 3.7.11.C Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Cortrol System NUREG(s> 14301431 Only Acuan 3.7.11.C Seses Control Room Emergency A!r Temperature Control System NUREG(s)- 1401431 Only j Achon 3.7.11.D Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System NUREG(s)1401431 Only Achon 3.7.11.D Bases Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Cottrol System NUREG(s)1430141 Only WA 3.7.13 Bones Fuel Building Air Cloenup Systems or Fuel Storage Pool NUREG(ob 14301431 Only venuieuon System .

LCO 3.7.13 Bases Fuel Buading Air Cloenup Systems or Fuel Storage Peel NUREG(s).1430141 Only ,

Venuleuen system . !

Appl 3.7.13 Fuel Building Air Cleanup Systems or Fuel Storage Peel NUREG(s)14301431 Only Ventuonon System ,

4/22/99 i

Traveler Rev. 2. Copyright (C) 1998, Excel Sarness C r - Use by Excel Servues sonocuses, utility clismes, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulsery l Commmmon is pante L All other use without wrisen permission is prolm'bitesL w .-'-e e. = .u,so.pyw'emp= wesaw a w. -' *'* -+-m.aw- _=

(BWROG-17.Rev. 0) 13TF-$1. Rev.1 Appl. 3.7.13 Seses Fuel Buildng Air Cleanup Systems or Fuel Storage Pool NUREG(s)1@1431 Only ,

vernemen System l

Action 3.7.13.C Fuel Buildng Air Cloenup Systems or Fuel Storage Pool NUREG(sF 1@141 Only versation System Acuan 3.7.13.C Bones Fuel Building Air Cleanup Systems or Fuel Storage Pool NUREG(ab 1@ 1431 Only ventiistion System

~

Aomon 3.7.13.D Fuel Buildng Air Cleanup Systems or Fuel Store 0s Pool NUREG(sF 1M1431 Only vendation System

~

Action 3.7.13.D Beses Fuel Building Air Cleanup Systems or Fuel Storage Pool NUREG(s> 1@ 1431 Only ventumaan System SR 3.6.3.s seems Conseinment teotagon Vehes NUREG(s)1@1@ Only j i

Skgnd 3.9.3 Bases Containment Penetrations NUREG(sF 1@1432 Only I S/A 3.9.3 Seems Conseinmort Penetreuens NUREG(s)1@ 1432 Only 1.CO 3.9.3 Bones Containment Penetragons NUREG(s> 1@ 1@ Only A;;i 3.9 3 Containment Penetrations NUREG(s)im1@ Only Appl. 3.9.3 semes Containment Penetrebens NUREG(sh 1@1@ Only l

Action 3.9.3.A Containment Penetrodons NUREG(s)1@1432 Only Action 3.9.3.A Bones Containmort Penetrebens NUREG(s)1G1G Only SR 3.9.3.1 Seems Containment Penetrebens NUREG(s)1@1432 Only ,

SR 3.9.3.2 seems Containment Pensestions NUREG(s> 1@ 1432 Only Appl. 3.3.1s Rs Purge leoleton High Redenen NUREG(sh 1M Only Appl. 3.3.1s Bones RB Purge Isoisbon High Radiogen NUREG(s)1@ Only Acuan 3.3.ts.C RB Purge leoleben High Radiation NUREG(sp 1@ Only Acuan 3.3.1s.C asses no Purge leoisson High Radiation NUREG(sp 1@ Only Appl. 3.3.16 Control Room leoinhon Hgh Redistion NUREG(s> 1m Only Appl. 3.3.16 Bases Control Room leoisuon High Redelion NUREG(sp 1@ Only Achon 3.3.16.C Contrei Room laan=Han High Redegen NUREG(s> 1@ Only Achon 3.3.16.C Bases Control Room lectation High Redenen NUREG(s> 1@ Only Skend 3.7.13 Bases Fusi Storage Pool Ventuohon System NUREG(s)1@ Only i

1.CO 3.7.13 Bases Fuel Storage PoolVentuohon System NUREG(sb im Only i 4/22M l Traveler Rev. 2. Ccpyngla (C) 1998, Excel Sarwass Corporanen. Use by Easel Serwas associstas, utility climes, and the U.S. Nuclear Replanery Comnusuon is yanud. AH other uns whhout wrisen penussion is prohibited.

. - m_ . . _ . _ ._~ - ---_ . . . - -

j

(BWROG-17,Rew 0) 73TF-51. Rev.1 .

Action 3.7.16A Senes Spent Fuel Assemtdy Storage NUREG(s> 1430 Only amend 3.9.6 seses Refusang Canet Water (mol NUREG(s)- 140 Only S/A 3.9.6 Benes Refusing CanalWater Lael NUREG(s)-140 Only Appl. 3.9.6 Refuenng CanalWater Level NUREG(s)1430 Only Action 3.9A Bones Refueling CansiWater Level NUREG(eb 1430 Only Action 3.9.6.A Refuelin0 CanalWater Lael NUREG(s)140 Only J'

Action 3.9.6.A esses Refuenne CanalWater Lmet NUREG(s> 140 Only 8/A 3.3.6 Bases Containment Pwge and Enhaust imai=Han instrumentation NUREG(s)- 1431 Only Appt 3.3.s Conleinment Purge end Exhaust leoistions instrumentation NUREG(ab 141 Only Appt 3.3.6 Bases Containment Purge and Exhaust lec%tions Instrumentation NUREG(s)- 1431 Only Action 3.3.6.C Containment Purge and Exhaust anal =hans instrumentaban NUREG(s).141 Only Action 3.3.6.C Bases ConWnment Purge end Exhaust imai=hans instrumentation . NUREG(s) 141 Only 8/A 3.3.7 Bases CREFS Actuationinstrumentagon NUREG(s)141 Only Appl. 3.3.7 CREFS ActuationInstrumentation NUREG(s).1431 Only Appl 3.3.7 Bases CREFS ActustumInstrumentuhon NUREG(s)- 141 Only Action 3.3.7.D CREFS Actushoninstrumentation NUREG(s).141 Only Action 3.3.7.D Bases CREFS ActuohonInstrumentation NUREG(s)- 141 Only Sk0nd 3.3.8 Bases FBACS Actuabon instrumentshon NUREG(ab 141 Only S/A 3.3.8 Bases FBACS ActuationInstrumentshon NUREG(s).141 Only Appl 3.3.s Bases FBACS Actuahon instrumentehen NUREG(s> 141 Only '

SR 3.3.8 FBACS Actuationinstrumentaban NUREG(s)- 141 Only Change Desertpean. Tetde 3.3.s 1, Note (e)

Action 3.3.8.C FBACS Actusbon instrumentshon NUREG(sF 141 Only i l

Action 3.3.e.C Bros FBACS Actuationinstrumentation NUREG(s)- 141 Only SR 3.6.3.10 Bases Containtnent toolshon Velves (Atmosphenc, Substmospheric, los NUREG(s> 141 Only Condenser, and Dumi)

Shond 3.9.4 Benes Containmort Penetrations NUREG(eb 141 Only S/A 3.9.4 Saoes Containmord Penetraitone NUREG(s> 141 Only M2289 Trewler Rev. 2. Copyright (C) 1993, Excel Semas Corporation. Um h Exor! Semess associsus, waity clisen, and sw U.S. Nuclear Reguleswy Comminion is Fanted. AH other uw without wnsen penmusen is prohibited. .

l l

..a..._-._ . . _ . . . __

~ _.. - - - . _ . . _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ .. __ _ .. _ _ - - - .

j

(BWROG-17.Rev. 0) TSTF-51, Rev. I l CO 3.9.4 seems Containment Penetrations NUREG(s)141 Only ,

Appl 3.9.4 Contommert Penetrations NUREG(s)- 1431 Only l i

1

. Appl. 3.9.4 Bones Containmort Penetrebons NUREG(s)- 141 Only i

Action 3.9.4.A Containment Penetrations NUREG(s)- 141 Only Action 3.9.4.A Beans Containment Penetrations NUREG(s} 141 Only

)

SR 3.9.4.1 Seems Containmort Penetratione NUREG(s)- 1431 Only SR 3.9.4.2 8 eses Containmort Penetrations NUREG(s)-1410nly l Appt 3.3.7 CPIS (Aneing) NUREG(s)- 142 Only Appt 3.3.7 Bones CPts (Aneio0) . NUREG(s).142 Only Action 3.3.7.A CPIS (Analog) NUREG(s) 142 Only Action 3.3.7.A Bases CPIS (Aneing) NUREG(s) 1432 Only l

Bh0nd 3.3.8 Bones CPIS (Digten NUREG(s) 142 Only S/A 3.3.8 Bases CPIS (Digitsi) NUREG(s)- 142 Only

~

Appl 3.3.8 CPIS (DigitsQ NUREG(s) 142 Only Appl. 3.3.8 CRIS (Analog) NUREG(s).142 Only Appl 3.3.8 Bones CPIS (DW NUREG(s).142 Only Appt 3.3.8 Bases CRIS (Aneing) NUREG(s)- 142 Only Achon 3.3.8.C CPIS (DigteQ NUREG(s) 142 Only ,

Action 3.3.8.C CRIS (Analog) NUREG(s).142 Only Action 3.3.8.C seses CPIS (Diptel) NUREG(s)- 142 Only Action 3.3.8.C Bases CRIS (Analog) NUREG(s)- 1432 Only Appl 3.3.9 CRIS (Oignal) NUREG(s).142 Only Appt 3.3.9 Bases CRIS(Dignal) NUREG(s).142 Only Acean 3.33.C CRIS (Dignal) NUREG(s)-142 Orwy Action 3.3.9.C Samos CRIS (Dignal) NUREG(s)-142 Only S/A 3.3.10 Bases Fuel Handhng loelabon Signal (DigAsi) NUREG(s)- 142 Only Appl 3.3.10 Fuel Hendeng lealetion Signal (DigneQ NUREG(s).142 Only 4/22N9 Treveler Rev. 2. Copynsis (C) 1998, Excel Sarwoes Corporeuos. Ues by Excel Servues -- utility clienes, and alw U.S. Nuclear Repleenry Canunnsson is yenied All other use without wrimso permissaco is prohibited 4

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T W$ W'#L."hf* " ' " *emW .

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(BWROG-17.Rev. 0) TSTFs51. Rev.1 Appl. 3.3.10 Bases Fuel Handling leoiaten Signal (Digitar) NUREG(:)- 142 Ony Action 3.3.10.C Fuel Handling isolation Signal (Digital) NUREG(s> 1432 Ony Action 3.3.10.C Bases Fuel Handling isolation Signal (Digitsi) NUREG(s> 142 Ony l Appl. 3.7.11 Control Room Emergency Air Cloenup Systems NUREG(s> 142 Ony l

Appl. 3.7.11 Bones Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup Systems NUREG(s> 142 Ony l Acton 3.7.11.C Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup Systems NUREG(s)- 1432 Ony Action 3.7.11.C Bases Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup Systems NUREG(s).1432 Only

Acton 3.7.11.0 Crx.*rol Room Emergency Air Cleanup Systems NUREG(s> 1432 Only 1

Action 3.7.11.0 Bases Control Rocm Emergency Air Cleanup Systems NUREG(s)- 1432 Only l l

Appl. 3.7.12 Control Room Emergency Temperature Cortrol System NUREG(s)- 142 Only 1

Appl. 3.7.12 Bases Control Room Emergency Temperature Cortml System NUREG(s) 142 Ony Action 3.7.12.C Control Room Emergency Temperature Control System NUREG(s)- 142 Only Acton 3.7.12.C Bases Control Room Emergency Temperature Cortrol System NUREG(s).1432 Ony Acton 3.7.12.D Control Room EmerDency Temperature Cortrol System NUREG(s) 142 Only Action 3.7.12.D Bases Control Room Emergency Temperature Cortrol System NUREG(s)- 1432 Ony S/A 3.7.14 Bases Fuel Building Air Cleanup System NUREG(s).1432 Only l

Appl. 3.7.14 Fuel Building Air Cleanup System NUREG(s)- 142 Only I Appl. 3.7.14 Bases Fuel Building Air Cleanup System NUREG(s).142 Only Action 3.7.14.C Fuel Building Air Cleanup System NUREG(s)- 1432 Only Action 3.7.14 C Bases Fuel Building Air Chanup System NUREG(s).1432 Only Action 3.7.14.D Fuel Building Air Ciesnup System NUREG(s)- 1432 Only l

Action 3.7.14 D Bases Fuel Building Air Cleanup System NUREG(s) 1432 Only S/A 3.6.4.1 Bases Secondary Containment NUREG(s) 14331434 Ony Appl. 3.6.4.1 Secondary Cortainment NUREG(s)- 14331434 Only .

Appl. 3.6.4.1 Bases Secondary Cortainment NUREG(s)- 14331434 Only "

Acton 3.6.4.1.C Secondary Conteinment NUREG(s)- 14331434 Ony Action 3.6.4.1.C Bases Secondary Cortainmort NUREG(s)- 14331434 Ony ;

I 4/22/99 l

Traveler Rev. 2. Copyngts (C) 1998. Excel Services Corporatiart Use by Ex:sl services associates, utility clierns. and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory l Commission is granted All other use without wricen pemussion is protuMed. j

. _z __

e -ee N.- = =e.g .we. veg. miw.w owe e,

" * - - Nwa.u-4-. _w - e

(BWROG-17 Rev. 0) TSTF-51. Rev.1 S/A 3.6.42 Bones Secondary Containment lecletion Velves NUREG(sF 1431434 Only -

Appl 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment leoistion Velves NUREG(sF 1431434 Only -

Appl 3.6.42 Bases Secondary Containment lani=Han Velves NUREG(s)1431434 Only Action 3.6.4.2.D Secondary Containment leoisten Velves NUREG(s> 1431434 Only i Acuan 3.6.42.0 Bases Secondary Containment leoission Velves NUREG(s)- 1431434 Only i

S/A 3.6.4.3 Bones Standtry Gas Treatmort System NUREG(sF 1431434 Only I 3 i.

Appt 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatmait System NUREG(sb 14331434 Only Appl. 3.6.4.3 Bones Standby Gas Trestnwit System HUREG(sb 14331434 Only >

Action 3.6.4.3.C Standtry Gas Treatment System NUREG(sp 1431434 Only Acton 3.6.4.3.C Bases Standby Gas Treatment System NUREG(s).1431434 Only Action 3.6.4.3.E Standtry Gas Treatmort System NUREG(s)-1431434 Only l Achon 3.6.4.3.E Bones Stendby GasTreatment System NUREG(s)1431434 Only S/A 3.3.62 Bones Secondary Cantainment lealetion instrumartstion NUREG(s) 143 Or4 -

t SR 3.3.6.2 Secondary Cantomment teoistion instrumentshon NUREG(s)- 1433 Only Change Deecrtplion. Tobis 3.3.6.2-1, Note (b)

S/A 3.3.7.1 Bones Main Control Room Erwironmental Control System Instrumentation NUREG(s)- 1433 Only SR 3.3.7.1 Mesn Control Room Erwironmental Control System Information NUREG(s) 143 Only Change Desenptort Table 3.3.7.1 1, Note (b) l Action 3.6.1.3.G Pr6mery Containment lecinhon Valves NUREG(s)143 Only 1

Acton 3.6.1.3 H Pnmery Containment leolabon Velves NUREG(s> 143 Only Change Descripson: Oeisted Action 3.6.1.3.8 Pnmery Containment leoishon Velves NUREG(s).143 Only Change Descrtpuen. Renamed to *H' Action 3.6.1.3.1 Bones Primary Contenment leoistion Vehes NUREG(s) 1433 Only SR 3.6.1J.1 Bones Primary Containment teolenen Velves NUREG(s).143 Only SR 3.6.1.3.7 Bones Primary Containment leoisuon Velves NUREG(s)- 1433 Only S/A 3.7.4 Bases Mein Control Room Erwironmental Control System NUREG(s)143 Only Appl 3.7.4 Mein Control Room Erwironmental Control System NUREG(s) 143 Only Appt 3.7.4 Bones Mein Centrol Room Erwironmental Control System NUREG(s)- 143 Only 4/2239 Traveler Rev. 2. CopyngPa (C) 1998. Excel Serviam Corporation Use by Excel Services em utility clienis, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulenary Comnussion is yented. All other use without wriaen penmesion is prohibited

--. - . . ~ . . - . . . . -......_.- . ~ .

Am .4 eu.1.r -Mehm-w1e *-+we ** +=/NN wee m.m.s ier p NmW * - +

o (BWROG-17.Rev. 9) TSTF-51, Rev.1

{ Aston 3.7.4.C Main Control Room Erwironmental Coreel System NUREG(:)- 1433 Only Action 3.7.4.C Samos Main Control Room Erwironmental Contal System NUREG(s)- 1433 Only Acean 3.7.4.E Main Contal Room Erwironmental Control System NUREG(s).1433 Only .

Aenen 3.7.4.E Bones Main control Room Environmental Control System NUREG(s).1433 Only .

Appl. 3.7A Control Room Air Consinoning System NUREG(s).1433 Only Appt 3.7A Seems Control Room Air conditioning System NUREG(s) 1433 Only Action 3.73.C Control Room Air CondWoning System NUREG(s) 1453 Only l Aobon 3.7.b.C Saoes Control Room Air CondWoning System NUREG(s).1433 Only Aasen 3.71E Control Room Air CondWoning Syelem NUREG(s)- 1433 Only Aston 3.7.5.E Saees Control Room Air Condhoning System NUREG(s).1433 Only j S/A 3.3.6.1 Bones Primary Contamment lealetion Instrumenteuen NUREG(s).1434 Only ,

l SR 3.3.8.1 Pnmery Containment leoisuon instrumentshon NUREG(s) 1434 Only Change Descripton. Tabis 3.3.6.1-1. Note (b)

Action 3.3.6.1.K Primary Containment leciabon instrumenteuen NUREG(s)- 1434 Only l Acuan 3.3.6.1.KSeems Primary Containment leoistion Instrumenleben NUREG(s)- 1434 Only S/A 3.3.6.2 Senes Secondary Conseinment toolsNon instrumoreabon NUREG(s).1434 Only SR 3.3.6.2 Secondary Conleinment isoisson instrumentaban NUREG(s)- 1434 Only Change Descriptor. Tobis 3.3.6.21, Note (b)

S/A 3.3.7.1 Saoes Control Room Fresh Air System Instrumentenon NUREG(s).1434 Only SR 3.3.7.1 Control Room Fresh Air System instrumordshon NUREG(s).1434 Only Change Descripman. Tobis 3.3.7.1 1, Note (b)

S/A 3.6.1.3 Seems Primary Containment leciation VWwee NUREG(s).1434 Only .

Appl. 3.6.1.3 Semes Primary Containment lecianon Velves NUREG(s).1434 Only Acton 3.6.1.3.G Primary Containment leoisuon Velves NUREG(s).1434 Only Aouon 3.6.11H Primary Containment teoisuon Velves NUREG(s).1434 Only Change Desertpeon. Deleted l Aston 3.6.12.1 Primary Conleitunent leolanon Velves NUREG(s).1434 Orsy Change Descripson. Renamed to H

! Action 3.6.1.3.1Saoes Primary Conleinment leoisuon Vehes NUREG(s).1434 Only 1

Change Descripeen. Deleted j l i I

4/22/99 Traveler Itev. 2. Copynds (C) 1998 Excel Servues Carpersman Use by Esost services emocasies, utility cliana, and the U.S. Nuclear Reguissuy Commuseon is panied. All other use without wrisen pernnesson is proluHe:L 89b4#-=d J'e*.

. gem e. w a e.mge .bn -ww.,. m. -%. w

1 l

(BWROG-17.Rev. 0) TSTF-51. Rev.1 SR 3.6.1J.1 Bases Primary Containment teoletion Velves NUREG(:)1434 Only e sR 3.6.1.3.6 Bones Primary Containment leoistion Velves NUREG(s> 1434 Only , I SR 3.6.1.3.12 Bones Primary Containmort leotation Vehes NUREG(s)1434 Only S/A 3.7.3 Beans Control Room Fresh Air System' NUREG(s> 1434 Only Appl. 3.7.3 Control Room Fresh Air System NUREG(s> 1434 Only Appl. 3.7.3 seems Control Room Fresh Air system NUREG(sb 1434 Only Action 3.7.3.C Control Room Fresh Air System NUREG(s)1434 Only Achon 3.7.3.C Basse Control Room Fresh Air System NUREG(s> 1434 Only Acuan 3.7.3.E Control Room Fresh Air System NUREG(ob 1434 Only Action 3.7.3.E 8 eses Control Room Fresh Air System NUREG(s> 1434 Only Appl. 3.7.4 Control Room Air Conditioning System NUREG(s)1434 Only Appl. 3.7.4 Bones Control Room Air Conditioning System NUREG(s> 1434 Only Action 3.7.4.C Control Room Air Conditionin0 System NUREG(s> 1434 Only Action 3.7.4.C senes Control Room Air Conddioning System NUREG(s> 1434 Only Action 3.7.4.E Control Room Air Conditioning System NUREG(s)1434 Only Action 3.7.4.E Bones Control Room Air Condiboning System NUREG(s)1434 Only 1

4/2289 Treveler Rev. 2. Copyngle (C) 1998, Excel semens Corpormhan. Use by Emmet Semass -- utility cliams, and tlw U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conurussion is yante L All other uns without wriaen pernussicais prohibited.

..~ - . . . . . . . .

M 8.M*-*Wm-@MPsWW - .u.yp .p$ N'.'M*'m-SN*.'* * * *-'"--M**

T ~S T~F- S % .; -

BWOG Inmarts Insert A

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days)]

insert B

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel]

Inmart C ,

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, CREVS is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occup!sd part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X]

days)].

Inmart D

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, AC electrical power is only required to ' mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days)].

Insert E

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days)]

InsertF

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, DC electrical power is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days).]

Inmart G

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, the inverters are only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days).]

. _ . _. . _ .__ .._ _ .. _ _. f

~[~5 TF SI, A. t .

I BWOG Inserts . ,

Insert H l

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, AC, DC, and AC '

vital bus electrical power is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X) days).]

Insert l .

[ irradiated fuel movement with containment closure capability or a minimum decay time I of [X] days without containment closure capability] l l

l i

Insert L

[ Additionally, due to radioactive decay, a fuel handling accident involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has o::cupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days) will result in doses that are well within the guldeline values specified in 10 CFR 100 even without containment closure capability.]

9

. . - . . . - - . _ . _ . ~ . ._...;-- .

TsF-57, A. I -

I 4

i REVIEWER'S NOTE

{

. The addition of the term "recently" associated with handling irradiated fuel in all of the containment function Technical Specification requirements is only applicabis to those licensees who have demonstrated by analysis that after sufficient radioactive

]

decay has occurred, off-site doses resulting from a fuel handling accident remain below the Standard Review Plan limits (well within 10CFR100).

Additionally, licensees adding the term "recently" must make the following commitment which is consistent with draft NUMARC g3-01, Revision 3, Section 11.2.6 " Safety Assessment for Removal of Equipment from Service During Shutdown Conditions" , subheading " Containment - Primary (PWR)/ Secondary (BWR)",

[

"The following guidelines are included in the assessment of systems removed from

- service during movement of irradiated fuel:

- During fuel handling / core alterations, ventilation system and radiation monitor availability (as defined in NUMARC 91-06) should be assessed, with respect to filtration and monitoring of releases from the fuel. Followin0 shutdown, radioactivity in the fuel decays away fairly rapidly. The basis of the Technical Specification operability amendment is the reduction in doses due to such decay. The goal of maintaining ventilation system and radiation monitor availability is to reduce doses even further below that provided by the natural decay.

- A single normal or contingency method to promptly close primary or secondary containment penetrations should be developed. Such prompt methods need not completely block the penetration or be capable of resisting pressure.

The purpose of the " prompt methods" mentioned above are to enable ventilation systems to draw the release from a postulated fuel handling accident in the proper direction such that it can be treated and monitored." 4 Insert N , l l

[(i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous (X) days))

4 e * * *

seem'en.

. + *'s=*.* *' pa N-- **

RB Purge Isolation-High Radiation 3.3.15 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION !< b /

3.3.15 Reactor Building (RB) Purge Isolation-High Radiation LC0 3.3.15 [One) channel of Reactor Building Purge Isolation-High Radiation shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,g__3,and4 ,

e . ., . . . , , m . nm . . . . . _

9 During movement or g irradiated fuel assemblies within the RB.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One channel inoperable A.1 Place and maintain RB 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. purge valves in closed positions.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months i associated Completion i Time of Condition A E not met.

B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months C. One channel inoperable C.1 Place and maintain RB Immediately a fauringt.unt.T purge valves in ML1tKA11Una un during Closed positions.

movement of irradiated fuel assembi es within QB the RB. _

.1 CO N Imme ely 4.ca4\h ALT 10NC \

m (continued)

BWOG STS 3.3-36 Rev 1, 04/07/95

- o+ - . . . . . . . - - - .g w=~ . .*

RB Purge Isolation-High Radiation 3.3.15 73 FF-E #* 1 ACTIONS CONDITION COMPLETION TINE I REQUIRED ACTION C. (continued) C.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies within the RB.

EMC-m _%%

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.15.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.3.15.2 PerformCHdNNELFUNCTIONALTEST. 92 days SR 3.3.15.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION with setpoint [18] months Allowable Value s [25] mR/hr.

I I

BWOG STS 3.3-37 Rev 1, 04/07/95

.- ... --.- . - _L~l: :~:~ ~ ~ _. T : _ ... :. L ~ :

~~

Centrol R:o2 Isolation-High Radiation 3.3.16 TS 77-s't, fu. t 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.16 Control Room Isolation-High Radiation LC0 3.3.16 [0ne] channel of Control Room Isolation-High Radiation shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 2, 3, 4, :5,and_6,)

.S cr' r,T= = r"aT:=,1; During movement g of irraatated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

)

A. One channel inoperable A.1 --------NOTE---------

in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. Place in toxic gas protection mode if I automatic transfer to toxic gas protection mode is inoperable.

Place one OPERABLE 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) train in the emergency recirculation mode.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion

. Time of Condition A Alf not met.

B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued)

BWOG STS 3.3-38 Rev 1, 04/07/95 )

= = = - .

Control Room Isolation-High Radiation 3.3.16 I T.5TF-5l,ts,t ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Orte channel inoperable C.1 Place one OPERABLE Immediately 1 (C0 CREVS train in LTE during emergency i movement of irradiated recirculation mode.

fuel.

l .

R C. 1 Sus d CORE Immed ely l ALTERA NS. .

% l u9/ M2 /

[ca,,c.sr.MT\q j j _

e f-=x y D

l l -

M( v@Suspendmovementof Immediately N irradiated fuel assemblies.

l l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l

SR 3.3.16.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.3.16.2 -------------------NOTE--------------------

When the Control Room Isolation-High Radiation instrumentation is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of this Surveillance, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months .

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92 days l

l SR 3.3.16.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION with setpoint (18] months Allowable Value s (25] mR/hr.

1 1

i I

BWOG STS 3.3-39 Rev 1, 04/07/95

CREVS <

3.7.10 {

3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) l LC0 3.7.10 Two CREVS trains shall be OPERABLE.

(Tpe.eM APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, [5, and 6,].

Du_ ring movement off radiated fuel' assemblies,].

j L92 r; =; ;ui.;' c HSD 1

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CREVS train A.1 Restore CREVS train 7 days inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A NlQ not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months C. Required Action and C.1 --------NOTE--------

associated Completion Place in emergency

. Time of Condition A mode if automatic not met duri in. -

transfer to emergency movement offirra g mode inoperable.

gueyssembliesp --------------------

@T;dTidfj Place OPERABLE CREVS train in emergency Immediately (Scag)Q mode.

98 (continued)

BWOG STS 3.7-23 Rev1,04/07/95 l

l

,, _ . . . . _m. . ..

i I

CREVS 3.7.10 l ACTIONS T57T-sI.At I CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l l

1 C. (continued) .. Su iat C.2[Suspendmovementof irradiated fuel Immediately (assemblies.

g u M g3 D. Two CREVS trains D.1 Suspend movement of Immediately inoperable during f irradiated fuel movement of assemblies.

irradiated f 1 -

assemblies I~ V _

h hbh? he,# .2 Suspe RAT COR

%d E. Two CREVS trains E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable during MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. .

i i

l l

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY 1

, SR 3.7.10.1 Operate each CREVS train for [a: 10 31 days continuous hours with the heaters operating or (for system without heaters)

=15 minutes).

(continued)

BWOG STS 3.7-24 Rev 1, 04/07/95

_ . _ _ _ .r- - ~ ~ ~

~~ ~

CREATCS 3.7.11 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.11 Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System (CREATCS)

LC0 3.7.11 Two CREATCS trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, an'd 4, [5, and 6,].

During movement of rradiated fuel assemblies,].

(

_a y"M g C0 K ALTreT:0NC R ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CREATCS train A.1 Restore CREATCS train 30 days inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A A!!Q not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months C. Required Action and C.1 Place OPERABLE Immediately associated Completion CREATCS train in Time of Condition A operation. 1 not met during '

movement of 98 irradiated d I[assembliesL, r C.2 Suspend movement of Immediately

. irradiated fuel e ' assemblies.

10 N

(continued)

I 1

1 BWOG STS 3.7-26 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l

- r:::- -

.-_: . ==: --

j

CREATCS 3.7.11 T5TF-5I,Lt ACTIONS (continued) l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l D. Two CREATCS trains D.1 Suspend movement of Immediately inoperable during irradiated fuel movement of f - assemblies.

, irradiated f 1 assemblies or (E

C*yN l E. Two CREATCS trains E.1 Enter LC0 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable during MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY )

SR 3.7.11.1 Verify sach CREATCS train has the (18] months capability to remove the assumed heat load. .

1 i

l BWOG S75 3.7-27 Rev 1, 04/07/95

~ ~ ~ ~

.~

~ ~ ~ '

l ~~ ::::::--.-.T

FSPVS l 3.7.13 l

/ $ / 7 - N , d ,/

3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.13 Fuel Storage Pool Ventilation System (FSPVS)

LC0 3.7.13 [Two) FSPVS trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: [ MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 )

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

C.co. M \g3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One FSPVS train A.1 Restore FSPVS train 7 days inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and 8.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A A_N,J not met in MODE 1, 2, .

3, or 4. B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months E

TwoFSPVstrains inoperable in MODE 1,

'2, 3, or 4.

5 C. Required Action and C.1 Place OPERABLE FSPVS Immediately associated Completion train in operation.

. Time of Condition A not met during E movement ofairradiated fuel assemb y in the C.2 Suspend movement of Immediately fuel building. f t

- irradiated fuel

' assemblies in the y fuel building.

(continht.u)

BWOG STS 3.7-30 Rev 1, 04/07/95

R PVS 3.7.13 i S TC-SI,fra. t ACTIONS' (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i D. Two FSPVS trains D.1 Suspend movement of Immediately inoperable durint >virradiated fuel '

movement of41rraciatef f assemblies in the fuel assemblies in the ( fuel building.

fuel building. '

(Ccyc.h SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.13.1 Operate each FSPVS train for [a 10 31 days continuous hours with the heaters operating or (for systems without heaters)a15 minutes].

SR 3.7.13.2 Perform required FSPVS filter testing in In accordance accordance with the (Ventilation Filter with the Testing Program (VFTP)]. [VFTP]

SR 3.7.13.3 Verify each FSPVS train actuates on an (18] months actual or simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.13.4 Verify one FSPVS train can maintain a (18] months on pressure s [ ] inches water gauge with a STAGGERED respect to atmospheric pressure during the TEST BASIS

[ post accident] mode of operation at a flow rate s (3000) cfm.

(continued)

BWOG STS 3.7-31 Rev 1, 04/07/95 egi= 4-

AC Sources--Shutdown 3.8.2 b Y~$l,fe,.L 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.2 AC Sources--Shutdown LCO 3.8.2 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. One qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE AC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.10

" Distribution Systems--Shutdown"; and

b. One diesel generator (DG) capable of supplying one train of the onsite Class IE AC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LC0 3.8.10.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

[esca.ed'IO BWOG STS 3.8-19 Rev1,04/07/95

.p.e.- +~-..-.ww..-=-w-- 4 --a *-wwm,.- .y. ,--e.- .--h.-_ .e...+--

l 1

AC Sources-Shutdown j 3.8.2 l b W . S l, b v. I ACTIONS CONDITION . REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required offsite ------------NOTE-------------

circuit inoperable. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.10, with one required train de-energized as a result of Condition A.

A.1 Declare affected Imediately required feature (s) with no offsite power available inoperable.

9E l

A.2.1 Suspend CORE Imediately l ALTERATIONS.

59 A.2.2 Suspend movement of Imediately

-irradiated fuel ,

, {es.ca.hlq ' assemblies. l A.2.3 Initiate action to Icwediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions.

22 .

A.2.4 Initiate action to Imediately restore required offsite power circuit to OPERABLE status.

(continued)

BWOG STS 3.8-20 Rev 1, 04/07/95

" +9 *a 4.. .eewa- e mmmmums e =d-eig ed-'494'We 4 a -8'mw a eg Nu. ge+y,. spues gem- . _

6-pa.

AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 TS 7~F-StJn t ACTIONS fcontinued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One required DG B.I Suspend CORE Imediately inoperable . ALTERATIONS. ,

M B.2 Suspend movement'of Imediately irradiated fuel

~7 assemblies.

[ re. a c. M Oa> -

B.3 Initiate action to Imediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions.

M B.4 Initiate action to Imediately restore required DG to OPERABLE status.

l BWOG STS 3.8-21 RevI,04/07/95

- . . ~ . . .,e 1 -- ,,,c. s 9

DC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.5 3.8 ELECTRICAL FOWER SYSTEMS T5 TF-5Q0 '

3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown I

i LC0 3.8.5 DC electrical power subsystem shall be OPERABLE to support i the DC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.10, " Distribution Systems-Shutdown."

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, ..

Durir" movement of g irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Declare affected Immediately DC electrical power required feature (s) subsystems inoperable, inoperable.

E A.2.1 Suspend CORE ImmMiately ALTERATIONS.

AND .

4 A.2.0 Suspend movement of Immediately EMMMh -

-virradiated fuel assemblies.

M A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations involvin.g positive reactivity additions. ;

M (continued) ,

BWOG STS 3.8-30 Rev 1, 04/07/95 p%.e w+.awee.-esJe aJrwe _ . _ . M e h- * ****we *e mp-9 -

. 1 Inverters-Shutdown 3.8.8 l TS TP-s t, A.t l 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.8 Inverters-Shutdown l

LCO 3.8.8 Inverters shall be OPERABLE to support the onsite Class 1E AC vital' bus electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.10. " Distribution Systems-Shutdown."

l APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, .

During movement ofgradiated fuel assenblies.

l eeEe/kly ACTIONS __-- -- _

l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME.

l A. One or more (required] A.1 Declare affected Immediately inverters inoperable. required feature (s) inoperable.

98 A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

l AND A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel (eteg,My]

assemblies.

l

~

M l A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately

! suspend operations involving positive

reactivity additions.

? .

M (continued) ,

l l

l BWOG STS 3.8-38 Rev1,04/07/95 l

w y ,,me+7 <ggq.,te p, .-dem en--myn-mgwe=ee -o--se-

_ .-,amim.s m

Distribution Syste2s-Shutdown 3.8.10 l S TF-51,L t 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown l

LC0 3.8.10 The necessary portion of AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical !

power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE to support

, equipment required to be OPERABLE. ,

' APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and'6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

A",TIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME.

A. One or more required A.1 Declare associated Immediately AC, DC, or AC vital supported required bus electrical power feature (s) distribution inoperable.

subsystems inoperable.

9R A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately '

ALTERATIONS.

M A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately j c virradiated fuel g % 4) assemblies.

g !

I A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations involving positive j reactivity additions. ,

i a !

l (continued) l t

BWOG STS 3.8-42 Rev1,04/07/95

Containment Penetrations 3.9.3 I 5 TF- 5 I,9w.t 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations l LCO 3.9.3 The containment penetrations shall be in the following status:

a. The equipment hatch closed and held in place by four 1 bolts; ,

b. One door in each air lock closed; and

c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere either:

1. closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent, or -

2. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE Containment .

Purge and Exhaust Isolation System.

APPLICABILITY: .h .m b : fd b ka N Juring movement o7 trradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

ACTIONS _

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more .1 Suspend h mmedia containment TERATIONS.

penetrations not in 1 required status.

, . Suspend movement of Immediately i tradiated fuel (g4 assemblies within containment.

BWOG STS 3.9-4 Rev 1, 04/07/95

-d-< e, sur,--a -c.+ are. m _e-=- .-h.,ynp%,,.,,,,,,,,,,..,,,,,,m.,,,,,,,,.ws -

Refueling Canal Water Level 3.9.6 T5TF-5Iaf~.<

3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.6 Refueling Canal Water Level LCO 3.9.6 Refueling canal water level shall be maintained a: 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange.

APPLICABILITY: ing C ERA During movement of rrradiated fuel assemblies within containment. -

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

_m n .-

A. Refueling cavity water .I suspen Imm at y I level not within TERATIO m limit. l S i

. Suspend movement of Immediately A.( irradiated fuel assemblies within .

containment. '

AND LA.

% Initiate action to Immediately i

g restore refueling cavity water level to within limit.

BWOG STS 3.9-10 Rev I, 04/07/95

-wm.e *er e > sem M. maw-%+466NwwhpN ' *

mu-r we .* a~.,

RB Purge Isolation-High Radiation B 3.3.15 l STF-S't,ta BASES LCO For this unit, the basis for the setpoint Allowable Value is~-

(continued) _

as follows: _

APPLICABILITY The RB purge isolation-high radiation shall be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. Outside of these MODES, the ur e ura.k h isolation must be OPERABLE'whenever M L ;L;;"/T! C movement ohirradiated fuel assemblies within the RB is taking piace. These conditions are those under which the potential for fuel damage, and thus radiation release, is pg the greatest. While in MODES 5 and 6, without fuel handling in progress, the Purge Valve Isolation System does not need g to be OPERABLE because the potential for a radioactive release is minimized and operator action is sufficient to ensure post accident offsite doses are maintained within the limits of 10 CFR 100. The need to use the purge valves in MODES 5 and 6 is in preparation for entry. This capability is required to minimize doses for personnel entering the building and is independent of the automatic isolation capability.

ACTIONS A.1 With one channel inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the RB purge valves must be placed and maintained in the closed position. This action accomplishes the safety function of the RB Purge Isolation-High Radiation Function. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the relative importance of maintaining containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

B.1 and B.2 If Required Action A.1 cannot be met within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in wiich the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasona' ole, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

(continued)

BWOG STS B 3.3-129 Rev1,04/07/95

+

w-,&w ,es- W,-mise m. __

aePW m e- sw.e +opprimmy. -> -up -

RB Purge Isolation-High Radiation B 3.3.15 l 5 TF-S%d BASES ACTIONS C.I. C.2.1. C.2.2 (continued)

Condition C applies to failure of the high radiation purge function durin CautdCOMduring movement of bi y M irradiated fue assemblies wtt.iin the RB.

With one channel inoperableid; IGE siidf0Z ;N ~

auring movement of* irradiated fuel assemoties within the_RB, the RB purge valves must be closed, or- nu u n; = #

movement ofW rradiated fuel assemblies within t1e RB must be suspended. Required Action C.1 accomplishes the function of the high radiation channel. Required Action C.2.1 and Required Action C.2.2 place the unit in a configuration in which purge isolation on high radiation is not required.

The Completion Time of "Immediately" is consistent with the urgency associated with the loss of RB isolation capability under conditions in which the fuel handling accidents are !

possible and the high radiation function provides the nly I automatic actions to mitigate radiation release. fin 3A d-SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.15.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.15.1 is the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK for the RB purge isolation-high radiation instrumentation once

. every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to ensure that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parmneter indicated on one ;

channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is i based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value.

Significant deviations between two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the I channels or of something even more serious. Performance of l the CHANNEL CHECK helps to ensure that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The high radiation instrumentation should be compared to similar unit instruments located throughout the i unit. If the radiation monitor uses keep alive sources or check sources OPERABLE from the control room, the CHANNEL CHECK should also note the detector's response to these sources.

Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, (continued)

BWOG STS B 3.3-130 Rev 1, 04/07/95 PhMemq-w m a em, n. ads Ws

gv. re,pagg__ 4eMof " eq. h gm _

v 9

Control Roo::: Isolation-High Radiation.

B 3.3.16 T~S T'F- 5% <

BASES LCO uncertainties are defined in the " Unit Specific Setpoint (continued) Methodology" (Ref. 2).

At this unit, the basis for the Allowable Value is as follows:

e APPLICABI'ITY L The control room isolation capability on high radiation g ~ shall be OPERABLE whenever there is a chance for gSgQ je accidental release ofydtoacgty. This includ MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, [5, and 6] Sano aur my C.7. T = "' u and all l MOD hs.N g j N"ES and W S.

conditions If a radioactive during release movement any ofItese conditions, the control room would have to wereof.drraalated to occur duringfuel remain habitable to ensure reactor shutdown and cooling can be controlled from the main control room.

ACTIONS Ad Condition A applies to failure of the Control Room Isolation-High Radiation Function in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

With one channel of Control Room Isolation-High Radiation inoperable, the CREVS must be placed in a condition that does not require the isolation to occur. To ensure that the i ventilation system has been placed in a state equivalent to that which occurs after the high radiation isolation has occurred, one OPERABLE train of the CREVS is placed in the emergency recirculation mode of operation. Reactor operation can continue indefinitely in this state. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time is a sufficient amount of time in which to take the Required Action.

The Required Action is modified by a Note, which requires the CREVS be placed in the toxic gas protection mode if automatic transfer to the toxic gas protection mode is inoperable, since the pressurization mode would increase vulnerability to toxic gas releases.

(continued)

BWOG STS B 3.3-135 Rev 1, 04/07/95 a - m. .*-mes ea-. m---.em+ee.W4_

m = ~ ~ --e*w--maseve. -y.:., y m .y,

Control Room Isolation-High Radiation B 3.3.16 Ts TF-Tifut BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

If the CREVS cannot be placed into recirculation mode while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, actions must be taken to minimize the chances of an accident that could lead to radiation releases. The unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , with a subsequent cooldown to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . This places the reactor in a low energy state that allows greater time for operator action if habitation of the control room is precluded. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. ,

C.1[C. 2fCD d. " .9 ^

et Y Required Action C.1 is the same as discussed earlier for Condition A, except for Completion Time. If the g S cannot be placed into recirculation mode during R J &""n= a =tTQmovingairradiated fuel assh- L_s, O then Reautred Action C.2.1 and) Required Action C.2.2 suspend C[MM tions that could lead to an accident that could release radioactivity resulting from a fuel handling accident.

a Required Action C.2(s _. W L i d arU =m g he core in a safe and sible configuration in whic less likely to experience an accident that could result in a SDq.?A release of radioactivity. The reactor must be maintained in these conditions until the automatic isolation capability is returned to operation or when manual action places one train of the CREVS into the emergency recirculation mode. The Completion Time of "Immediately" for Required Action C.2.1 and Required Action C.2.2 is consistent with the urgency of the situation and accounts for the high radiation function, which provides the only automatic Control Room Isolation

_7 Function capable of responding to radiation release due to a

'1nd E fuel handlina accident The Completion Time does not preclude placing any fuel assembly into a safe position 6 "

before ceasing any such movement.

Note that in certain circumstances, such as fuel handlingA in the fuel building during power operation, both Condition Ah and Condition C may apply in the event of channel failure. I

~1nAk

\6 J (continued)

BWOG STS B 3.3-136 Rev 1, 04/07/95 ,

l l

l

* ' * - +,--.. -- - . . . _ _ , , , , , , , _

W *'--==S---.*Ms--+;me F.e um e,w m-e. w % e_ -gpe d. "--'"**N8'W6***'--+M=+-f * * * ^* * ' ""'A = **W'"

I Containment Isolation Valves

. B 3.6.3 l S TF- 5 tA t BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.7 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS radioactive material from containment following a DBA. This l SR ensures that each automatic containment isolation valve '

will actuate to its isolation position on a containment isolation signal. This SR is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position under administrative controls. The (18) month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the l conditions that apply during a plant outage and the I

potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass this Surveillance when performed at the [18] month Frequency.

Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

l SR 3.6.3.8 l Reviewer's Note: This SR is only required for those units I l with resilient seal purge valves allowed to be open during l l [ MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4) and having blocking devices on the i l _

valves that are not permanently installed. ,_

l Verifying that each [48) inch containment purge valve is blocked to restrict opening to :s; [50%) is required to ensure that the valves can close under DBA conditions within the times assumed in the analyses of References 3 and 4. If a l LOCA occurs, the purge valves must close to maintain containment leakage within the values assumed in the accident analys!s. At other times when purge valves are l

gyQ required to be ch')able of closing (e.g., during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies), pressurization concerns are not l present, thus the purge valves can be fully o>en. The

[18] month Frequency is appropriate because tie blocking devices are typically removed only during a refueling outage.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 20.

2. FSAR, Section (5.6].

3. FSAR, Sections [14.1 and 14.2).

(continued)

BWOG STS B 3.6-27 Rev1,04/07/95

( w w .= mw--. ..__e p% g#- .= e . w+ e- p= b 4 +a*-e- -

CREVS B 3.7.10 BASES C" C"'

Durino movement o radiated fuel assemblie -

(continued . the CREVS must be OP RABLE to cope T h a APPLICABILITY retenu aue to[Q^PE ".*P a uel handling !?""f acciden j ACTIONS .A_d With one CREVS train inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREVS train is adequate to perfona the control room radiation protection function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a failure in the OPERABLE CREVS train could result in loss of CREVS function.

The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of ,

I a DBA occurring during this time period, and ability of the remaining train to provide the required capability.

B.1 and B.2 i In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable CREVS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

- ~

C.1. C. J (In MODE 5 o during movemen irradiated fuel assemblie * = 03E Ai.ii.sTJCMS., if the inoperable CREVS trainht t>e restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE CREVS train must immediately be placed in the emergency mode. This action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE, that no failures preventing automatic actuation will occur, and that I any active failure will be readily detected. Required Action C.1 is modified by a Note indicating to place the system in the emergency mode if automatic transfer to emergency mode is inoperable. -

(continued)

BWOG STS B 3.7-52 Rev 1, 04/07/95

. . . .. - - =:-- = = = = - - ._ = :.- : = = .-

CREVS B 3.7.10 TS TF-57,fp. i BASES ACTIONS C .1. C . E continued)

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately sus)end activities that could release radioactivity that mig 1t require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident risk.

This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

~

g [M e (In MODE 5 or 6, orl during movement assemblieq, eT L.-l..; =0.T;" ,,y...,, gadiated when twofuel CREVS trains are Inopirable, action must De taKen immediately to W6t A sus end activities that could release radioactivity that g1oM) "* pe;;_.e-4 the control room. This places the unit in a c5nditton that minimizes the accident risk. This does not

\5 preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

I f.d.

If both CREVS trains are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the CREVS may not be capable of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.10.1 REQUIREMENTS Standby systems should he checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. As the environment and normal operating conditions on this system are not severe, testing each train once enry month adequately checks this system.

Monthly heater o)erations dry out any moisture that has accumulated in tie charcoal because of humidity in the ambient air. [ Systems with heaters must be operated for a 10 continuous hours with the heaters energized. Systems without heaters need only be operated for = 15 minutes to demonstrate the function of the system.] The 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliabi11ty of the equipment and the two train redundancy available.

(continued)

BWOG STS B ?,.7-53 Rev 1, 04/07/95 w- wwww w w e +. sea,,em,e.es -eme, , .s * * ~ ~ ' -

_.m me eM .om.~*u~

- "='

CREATCS B 3.7.11 TS TF-5I,L t i BASES APPLICABLE consideration of equipment heat loads and personnel SAFETY ANALYSES occupancy requirements, to ensure equipment OPERABILITY.

(continued)

The CREATCS satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy

.. Statement.-

LCO Two independent and redundant trains of the CREATCS are ,

required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is I available, assuming a single failure disables the other train. Total system failure could result in the equipment operating temperature exceeding limits in the event of an accident.

The CREATCS is considered OPERABLE when the individual components that are necessary to maintain control room temperature are OPERABLE in both trains. These components include the cooling coils, water cooled condensing units, and associated temperature control instrumentation. In

,L M addition, the CREATCS must be OPERABLE to the extent that 9 air circulation can be maintained.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, [5, and 6,) _and durina movement of Cf"ET=T%E %e irradiated fuel assemblie du g,h eg c.e.M uu,.%

CREATCS must be OPERABLE to ensure that the contro' room temperature will not exceed equipment OPERABILITY requirements following isolation of the control room.

i ACTIONS AJ, With one CREATCS train inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 30 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREATCS train is adequate to maintain the control room temperature within limits. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a failure in the OPERABLE CREATCS train could result in a loss of CREATCS function. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring requiring control room isolation, the consideration that the remaining train can provide the required capabilities, and the alternate safety or nonsafety related cooling means that are available.

(continued)

BWOG STS B 3.7-56 Rev 1, 04/07/95

! CREATCS

! B 3.7.11 l T5TF-51,9w BASES 1

ACTIONS A.1 (continued) l Concurrent failure of two CREATCS trains would result in the loss of function capability; therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

1 B.1 and B.?

In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable CREATCS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does.not apply. To achieve this status, the unit l

must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are l

reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner without challenging unit systems.

I

~

C.1 and C.2 cp%%

o ";o u , .uu c;LI,rain MODE mm 5 or-m6,ifor]

-.m. thedurga movement inoperable CREATCS ofkrradiated fue l

cannot be. restored to OPERABLE status within the l required Completion Time, the OPERABLE CREATCS train must be l placed in operation immediately. This action ensures that I the remaining train is OPERABLE, that no failures preventing l automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure ,

l will be readily detected. l l

l An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately I suspend activities that could release radioactivity that i might require the isolation of the control room. This i

places the unit in a condition that minimizes accident risk.

I This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

C4c.Q M h -

na_ g-(InMODE5or6.orlduMnamovem<!ntoftradiatedfuel assembliel*f. :r 6 9 PODC fl"[' M u M , With tWo CREATCS

! trains inoperabTe, action must be taken to immediately suspend activities that could release radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places -

(continued)

BWOG STS B 3.7-57 Rev 1, 04/07/95 I - - - --

--- = :- .-

FSPVS B 3.7.13 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS i S TF-GIJM l B 3.7.13 Fuel Storage Pool Ventilation System (FSPVS)

BASES BACKGp:0UND- The FSPVS provides negative pressure in the fuel storage area, and filters airborne radioactive ) articulates from the area of the fuel pool following a fuel sandling accident.

The FSPVS consists of portions of the normal Fuel Handling i Area Ventilation System (FHAVS), the station Emergency Ventilation System (EVS), ductwork bypasses, and dampers.

The portion of the normal FHAVS used by the FSPVS consists of ducting between the spent fuel pool and the normal FHAVS '

exhaust fans or dampers, and redundant radiation detectors 4 installed close to the suction end of the FHAVS exhaust fan l ducting. The portion of the EVS used by the FSPVS consists of two independent, redundant trains. Each train consists I of a heater, profilter, or high efficiency particulate air I (HEPA) filter, activated charcoal adsorber section for !

removal of gaseous activity (principally iodines), and fan.

Ductwork, valves or dampers, and instrumentation also form part of the system. Two isolation valves are installed in

, series in the ductwork between the FHAVS and the EVS to 64A i

provide isolation of the EVS from the FHAVS on an Engineered Safety Feature actuation signal. These valves are opened (6 i neior to fuel handlina operations, The EVS is the subject of LC0 3.7.12, " Emergency Vent 1Fation System (EVS)," and is fully described in the FSAR, Section [6.2.3), Reference 12.

A ductwork bypass with redundant dampers connects the FHAVS to the EVS.

During normal operation, the exhaust from the fuel handling area is passed through the FHAVS exhaust filter and is -

discharged through the station vent stack. In the event of a fuel handling accident, the radiation detectors (one per EVS train), located at the suction of the FHAVS exhaust fan ducting, send signals to isolate the FHAVS supply and i exhaust fans and ductwork, open the redundant dampers in the bypass ductwork, and start the EVS fans. The EVS fans pull the air from the fuel handling area, creating a negative pressure, and discharge the filtered air to the station vent.

The FHAVS is discussed in the FSAR, Sections (6.2.3),

[9.4.2], and [15.4.7) (Refs.1, 2, and 3, respectively),

(continued)

BWOG STS B 3.7-64 Rev 1, 04/07/95

~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~~

-. J ~ 2 7 ~- . .L -.- ?

FSPVS B 3.7.13 I STF-51,fw e BASES l

i BACKGROUND because it may be used for normal as well as post accident, l (continued) atmospheric cleanup functions.

APPLICABLE The FSPVS design basis is established by the consequences of ;

SAFETY ANALYSES the limiting Design Basis Accident (DBA), which is a fuel l E% 4 handling accidenPe. The analysis of the fuel handling acchi?nt, given 7 n Reference 3, assumes that a certain

> number of fuel rods in an assembly are damaged. The DBA analysis of _the fuel handling accident assumes 4 that only one train of the FSPV5 is iudcT,ional cue IE a single failure that disables the other train. The accident analysis l accounts for the reduction in airborne radioactive material provided by the remaining one train of this filtration i system. These assumptions and the analysis follow the l guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.25 (Ref. 4).

The FSPVS satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO [Two] independent and redundant trains of the FSPVS are l required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, assuming a single failure that disables the other train coincident with a loss of offsite power. Total system failure could result in the atmospheric release from the fuel handling area exceeding 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 5) 1 s in the event of a fuel handling accidenth %

t8-The FSPVS is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to control operator exposure in the fuel handling building are OPERABLE in both trains. An FSPVS train is considered OPERABLE when its associated:

1. Fan is OPERABLE;

2. HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber are not excessively restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration functions; and 3.- [ Heater, demister,] ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.

(continued)

BWOG STS B 3.7-65 Rev 1, 04/07/95

~ ~~ '~: _ -. .--.

~:~~~ ~~~~ ~ ~

FSPVS B 3.7.13 BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY ~ In [ MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4,] the FSPVS is required to be OPERABLE to provide fission product removal associated with ECCS leaks due to a loss of coolant accident (refer to LCO 3.7.12) for units that use this systou as part of their EVSs.

{0tr.e_Mh-During movement o rradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling area, the FSPVS is always required to be OPERABLE to mitigate the consequences of a fuel handling accident.

In MODES 5 and 6, the FSPVS is not required to be OPERABLE

_ since the ECCS is not required to be OPERABLE. _

ACTIONS Ad ;

i With one FSPVS train inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. During this time period, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the FSPVS function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE FSPVS train could result in a loss of FSPVS functioning. The 7 day 4 Completion Time is based on the risk from an event occurring requiring the inoperable FSPVS train, and ability of the remaining FSPVS train to provide the required protection. 1 B.1 and B.2 In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, when Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within the associated Completion Time, or when both FSPVS trains are inoperable, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to

' reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit

_ systems. _

C.1 and C.2 If the inoperable FSPVS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, during movement (continued)

BWOG STS B 3.7-66 Rev1,04/07/95

FSPVS B 3.7.13 T.S 77:-CI/s.t BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) g' h ' ih g%h egg of 4rradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel ud((-)Nhe OPERABLE FSPVS train must be started immediatF y or4 fuel movement suspended. This action ensures that the remaining N train is OPERABLE, that no undetected failures preventing -

system operation will occur, and that any active failures cec.a.nk'y will be readily detected. _ ggg If the system is not laced in operation, this action requires suspension o fuel movement, which precludes a fuel Iysd handlina accident This action does not preclude the

{g movement of fuel assemblies to a safe position.

El ha M g 7 When two trains of the FSPVS are inoperab duri_ng movement C.ec. cs.nT ST4 irradiated fuel assemblies in the fu m;"j = 2 the unit must be placed in a condition in hic D he LCO does not ap' ply. This LC0 involves immediately nding movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fue w... = q = This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a, safe position.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.13.1 REQUIREMENTS Standby systems should be checked seriodically to ensure that they function properly. As tie environment and normal operating conditiens on this system are not severe, testing each train once every month provides an adequate check on )

this system. Monthly heater operation dries out any moisture accumulated in the charcoal from humidity in the ambient air. [ Systems with heaters must be operated for

= 10 continuous hours with'the heaters energized. Systems !

without heaters need only be operated for a 15 minutes to .

demonstrate the function of the system.] The 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliabi'ity of the equipment and the two train redundancy available.

SR 3.7.13.2 This SR verifies that the required FSPVS testing is performed in accordance with the [ Ventilation Filter Testing (continued)

BWOG STS B 3.7-67 Rev 1, 04/07/95

=. --

Spent Fuel Assembly Storage B 3.7.16 BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY This LCO applies whenever any fuel assembly is stored in (Region 2] of the spent fuel pool.

ACTIONS M Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply.

When the configuration of fuel assemblies stored in the spent fuel pool is not in accordance with Figure [3.7.16-1],

immediate action must be taken to make the necessary fuel assembly movement (s) to bring the configuration into compliance with Figure (3.7.16-1].

If movinkwiM fuel assemblies while in H0DE 5 or 6, d not specify any action. If moving A *LCOa*'-"^

3.0.3 fuel woTiassemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fifel movement is independent of reactor operation.

Therefore, in either case, inability to move fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.16.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies by administrative means that the initial enrichment and burnup of the fuel assembly is in accordance with Figure [3.7.16-1] in the accompanying LCO.

REFERENCES None.

l BWOG STS B 3.7-76 Rev 1, 04/07/95

- -: :: = . - _ . - -

- T- _ . - -- -- -

I l

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

- B 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating."

APPLICABLE The OPERAEILITY of the minimum AC sources during MODES 5 SAFETY ANALYSES and 6 and during movement ofairradiated fuel assemblies ensures that: J b"k

a. The unit can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is ,

available for monitoring and maintaining the unit '

status; and !

c. Adequate AC electrical power is provided to mitigate

$M events postulated ring shutdown, such as a fuel handling acciden 3

t O "

In general, when the unit is shut down, the Technical

Specifications requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) that are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 have no specific analyses in MODES 5 and 6. Worst-case bounding events are dcemed not credible in MODES 5 and 6 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and

. pressure, and the corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrence being significantly reduced or eliminated, and in minimal consequences. These deviations from DBA analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCO for required systems.

During MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 various deviations from the analysis assumptions and design requirements are allowed within the Required Actions. This allowance is in (continued)

BWOG STS B 3.8'-35 Rev 1, 04/07/95

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9 AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 BASES t S TF4Ife..I LC0 offsite circuit and DG ensures the availability of (continued) sufficient AC sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated eventsquring shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accident The qualified offsite circuit must be capable or maintaining rated frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) bus (es). Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the FSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the unit.

Offsite circuit #1 consists of Safeguards Transformer B, which is supplied from Switchyard Bus B, and is fed through breaker 52-3 powering the ESF transformer XNB01, which, in turn, powers the #1 ESF bus through its normal feeder breaker. The second offsite circuit consists of the Startup Transformer, which is normally fed from the Switchyard Bus A, and is fed through breaker PA 0201 powering the ESF transformer, which, in turn, powers the #2 ESF bus through

_ its normal feeder breaker. _

The DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This sequence must be l accomplished within (10) seconds. The DG must be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and must continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby with the engine hot and DG in standby at ambient conditions.

Proper sequencing of loads, including tripping of non-essential loads, is a required function for DG OPERABILITY.

In addition, proper sequencer operation is an integral part of offsite circuit OPERABILITY since its inoperability impacts on the ability to start and maintain energized loads

_ required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.10. _

It is acceptable for trains to be cross tied during shutdown i conditions, allowing a single offsite power circuit to supply all required trains. i (continued)

BWOG STS B 3.8-37 Rev 1, 04/07/95

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-_-=-_ --

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 DTF-gn,su t BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY The AC sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 and during movement of itradiated fuel assemblies provide g assurance that:

a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel a:semblies; l

gg A b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident

% are available; g -

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and es f- a

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The AC power requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.1. ,

ACTIONS hl An offsite circuit would be considered inoperable if it were not available to one required ESF train. Although two trains are required by LC0 3.8.10, the one train with offsite power available may be ca able of supporting

[%Mh sufficient required features to a low continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS andafuel movement. By the allowance of the

' ce.L-h.(J option to declare features inoperable with no offsite power available,' appropriate restrictions will be implemented in accordance with the affected required features LCO's ACTIONS.

l A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. A.2.4. B.1. B.2. B.?. and B.4 With the offsite circuit not available to all required i

trains, the option would still exist to declare all required features inoperable. Since this option may involve undesired administrative efforts, the allowance for suff.iciently conservative actions is made. With the required DG inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC l

(continued) !

BWOG STS B 3.8-38 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l

_ _ ~ . _ _ _ _. ar r rr _ _ ______ _ _ _

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 T.s T F e l, Le BASES ACTIONS A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. A.2.4. B.I. B.2. B.3. and B.4 l (continued) l 4\ power sources is not available. It erefore, required s -

to sus and CORE ALTERATIONS, movement o tradiated fuel assemb ins, and operations involving positive reactivity additions. The Required Action to suspend positive l reactivity additions does not preclude actions to maintain or increase reactor vessel inventory provided the required SDM is maintained. ,

1 Suspension of these activities does not' preclude completion I of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize the probability or the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC sources and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary AC power to the unit safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the unit safety systems may be without sufficient power.

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System's ACTIONS are '

not entered even if all AC sources to it are inoperable, resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition A are modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition A is entered with no AC power to any required ESF bus, the ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.10 must be immediately entered. This Note allows Condition A to provide requirements for the loss of the offsite circuit, whether or not a train is de-energized. LCO 3.8.10 provides the appropriate restrictions for the situation involving a de-energized train.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.2.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.2.1 requires the SRs from LCO 3.8.1 that are necessary for ensuring the OPERABILITY of the AC sources in other than MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. SR 3.8.1.8 is not required (continued)

BWOG STS B 3.8-39 Rev 1, 04/07/95

~ ~

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DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS '

B 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources-Operating."

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter [6] (Ref.1) and Chapter [14) (Ref. 2), assume that Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the DGs, emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation.

The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC electrical power sources during MODES 5 and 6 and during movement4of irradiated fuel assemblies ensures that: 4y

a. The unit can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and lC gg c. Adequate DC electrical power is provided to mitigate p events postulated,.during shutdown, :;uch as a fuel l

handlingaccidentf The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO The DC electrical power subsystems, each subsystem consisting of two batteries, one battery charger per battery, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling within the train, are required to be (continued)

BWOG STS B 3.8-60 Rev 1, 04/07/95

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I DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5

,,, g T5 TF- SI, b' LC0 OPERABLE to support required trains of the distribution (continued) systems required OPERABLE by LC0 3.8.10 " Distribution i Systems-Shutdown." This ensures the availability of i sufficient DC electrical power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accident .

jgg A

i APPLICABILITY The DC electrical ower sources required to be OPERABLE in j MODES 5 and 6 and uring movement of rradiated fuel assemblies, provide assurance that. % ,@)

a. Required features to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core; r

gg b. Required features needed to mitigate a fuel handling accidengare available;

c. Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition. !

l The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, j and 4 are covered in LC0 3.8.4. l 1

ACTIONS A.I. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. and A.2.4 If two trains are required by LC0 3.8.10, the remaining l train with DC power available may be capable of supporting ,

sufficient systems to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS !

%a8 and fuel movemenk By allowing the option to declare requirea reawres inoperable with the associated DC >ower I

gJ source (s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions will >e i

implemented in accordance with the affected required I features LCO ACTIONS. In many instances this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the (continued)

BWOG STS B 3.8-61 Rev1,04/07/95

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DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5 BASES ACTIONS A.I. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. and A.2.4 (continued) ) gg allowance for sufficiently conservative actionshis made -

(i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of* irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivityadditions). The Required Action to suspend

positive reactivity additions does not preclude actions to maintain or increase reactor vessel inventory, provided the required SDM is maintained.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required DC electrical power subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary DC electrical power to the unit safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required DC electrical power subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the unit safety systems may be without sufficient power.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.5.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.5.1 requires performance of all Surveillances required by SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8. Therefore, see the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.4 for a discussion of each SR.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DC sources from being discharged below their capability to provide the required

. power supply or otherwise rendered inoperable during the.

performance of SRs. It is the intent that these SRs must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required.

(continued) ,

1 BWOG STS B 3.8-62 Rev 1, 04/07/95 ,

)

Inverters-Shutdown !

B 3.8.8 l B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSiti45 D ~ b /A^/

s 8 3.8.8 Inverters--Shutdown i

BASES l

BACKGROUND A description of the inverters is provided in the Bases for l LC0 3.8.7, " Inverters-Operating." l l

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and .l SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter (6) (Ref.1) and Chapter (14) (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The DC to AC inverters are designed to provide the required capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to the Reactor Protection System and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation and controls so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

The OPERABILITY of the inverters is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

1 i

The OPERABILITY of the minimum inverters to each AC vital bus'during MODES 5 and 6 ensures that:

a. The unit can be maintained in the shutdown or ,

refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

c. Adequate power is available to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as a fuel handling

{g acciden 7

'G The inverters were previously identified as part of the

distribution system and, as such, satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

4 (continued)

~

BWOG STS _B 3.8-75 Rev 1, 04/07/95 ;

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Inverters-Shutdown B 3.8.8 BASES (continued)

LC0 The inverters ensure the availability of electrical power for the instrumentation for systems required to' shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated DBA. The battery powered inverters provide uninterruptible supply of AC electrical power to the AC vital. buses even if the 4.16 kV safet) buses are de-energized. OPERABILITY of the inverters requires that the vital bus be powered by the inverter. This ensures the availability of sufficient inverter power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events _during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidentQ. r fng.y' APPLICABILITY The inverters required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6, and during movement of rradiated fuel assemblies provide assurance that: - - -

[St Smh

a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core; y^5 "g

b. Systems needed to niitigate a fuel handling accident pare available; E

E "

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

Inverter requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LC0 3.8.7. I ACTIONS A.I. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. and A.2.4 If two trains are required by LCO 3.8.10, " Distribution Systems-Shutdown," the remaining OPERABLE inverters may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movemen4 and operations with 'a potential for positive react vny Tn59.

6 ,

(continued) ;

I BWOG STS B 3.8-76 Rev1,04/07/95

- --_ :: , - . - ~~T: - ~ T: .:~~ ~ ~~

(

Inverters-Shutdown l 8 3.8.8 J BASES ACTIONS A.I. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. and A.2.4 (continuad) additions. The Required Action to suspend positive reactivity additions does not preclude actions to maintain or increase reactor vessel inventory, provided the required SDM is maintained. By the' allowance of the option to '

I declare required features inoperable with the associated inverter (s) Inoperable, appro)riate restrictions will be implemented in accordance witi the affected required features LCOs' Required Actions. In many instances, this (cgqAQ option may involve undesired administrative efforts.

Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement or+1rradiated feel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required inverters and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the.necessary inverter power to the unit safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required inverters should be com)1eted as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time tte unit safety systems may be without power or powered from a constant voltage source transformer.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the inverters are functioning properly with all required circuit breakers closed and AC vital buses energized from the inverter. The verification of proper voltage and frequency output ensures that the required power is readily available for the instrumentation connected to the AC vital buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the inverters and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to inverter malfunctions.

(continued)

BWOG STS B 3.8-77 Rev1,04/07/95

Distribution Systems-Shutdown '

B 3.8.10 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

/ S TP 57' tw' B 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown ,

BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC, DC and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems is provided in the Bases for LC0 3.8.9, " Distribution Systems-0perating."

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basit Accident (DBA) and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter (6) (Ref. 1) and J' Chapter [14] (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

The OPERABILITY of the AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems during MODES 5 and 6, and during movement of irradiated fuel mblies ensures that: .p

a. The unit can be maintained in t e shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is ,

available for monitoring and maintaining the unit i status; and i

c. Adequate power is provided to mitigate events ;

postulatgf during shutdown, such as a fuel handling-1TN, .

accidentf M

l The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

(continued)

BWOG STS B 3.8-89 Rev 1, 04/07/95

a m- n- r - . . . . , . . ~ , -.w .... , m_ , . . ._

0 Distribution Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.10

/ STF-5 % .I BASES (continued)

I LC0 Various combinations of subsystems, equipment, and components are reouired OPERABLE by other LCOs, depending on the specific plant condition. Implicit in those requirements is the required OPERABILITY of necessary i support required features. This LC0 explicitly requires l energization of the portions of the electrical distribution system necessary to support OPERABILITY of required systems, equipment, and components-all specifically addressed in each LCO and implicitly required via the definition of OPERABILITY.

Maintaining these portions of the distribution system energized ensures the availability of sufficient power to operate the unit in a safe manner to mitigate the consequences of postulated events durino shutdown (e.g.,

fuel handling accidents . % ij:t

-i 6 3 APPLICABILITY The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems requircJ to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6, and during movement of irrad_iated fuel assemblies, provide assurance (de [

a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core; l b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident

}' pare available; C j

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered ,

in LC0 3.8.9.

(continued)

BkOG STS B 3.8-90 Rev1,04/07/95

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Distribution Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.10 T5TF- S't, L t BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A.1. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. A.2.4. and A.2.5

= -

Although redundant required features may require redundant gA trains of electrical power distribution subsystems to be 1

OPERABLE, one OPERABLE distribution subsystem train may be

( SWoI,eM capable of supporting sufficient re3uired features to allow

' conunuation of LUKt ALTERATIONS ancVuel' movement. By allowing the option to declare required features associated

'with an inoperable distribution subsystem inoperable, a)propriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with tie affected distribution subsystems LCO's Required Actions.

In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend Y -M V] rnRE ALTERATIONS, movement of+ irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions).

Suspension of these activities does not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary power to the unit safety systems.

Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, a required decay heat removal (DHR) subsystem may be inoperable. In this case, Required Actions A.2.1 through A.2.5 do not adequately address the concerns relating to coolant circulation and heat removal. Pursuant to LC0 3.0.6, the DHR ACTIONS would not be entered.

Therefore, Required Action A.2.6 is provided to direct declaring DHR inoperable, which results in taking the appropriate DHR actions.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required distribution subsystems should be com)leted as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time tie unit safety systems may be without power.

(continued)

BWOG STS . B 3.8-91 Rev 1, 04/07/95

1 Containment Penetrations B 3.9.3 l S T F - S T, f u .t B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations (C t.ceMh BASES f*O O BACKGROUND. During 6 D . tn', movement o fuel assemblies within containment 5 G'c;.dnu m- r := m....s,y,a release of fission product radioactivity within containment will be restricted from escaping to the environment when the LCO requirements are met. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, this is accomplished by maintaining containment OPERABLE as described in LCO 3.6.1, " Containment." In MODE 6, the potential for containment pressurization as a result of an accident is not likely; therefore, requirements to isolate the containment from the outside atmosphere can be less 1 stringent. The LC0 requirements are referred to as

" containment closure" rather than " containment OPERABILITY."

Containment closure means that all potential escape paths are closed or capable of being closed. Since there is no potential for containment pressurization, the Appendix J 1eakage criteria and tests are not required.

The containment serves to contain fission product radioactivity that may be released from the reactor core following an accident, such that offsite radiation exposures are maintained well within the requirements of 10 CFR 100.

Additionally, the containment provides radiation shielding from the fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.

The containment equipment hatch, which is part of the !

_ _T containment pressure boundary, provides a means for moving i 1 1arge equi onents into anpout of containment. !

C"A1 Duri d f D >3ment L T""_=and5comp % movement of* irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, the equipment hatch must be ;

held in place by at least four bolts. Good engineering i practice dictates that the bolts required by this LCO be approximately equally spaced.

The containment air locks, which are also part of the containment pressure boundary, provide a means for personnel access during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 unit operation in accordance with LC0 3.6.2, " Containment Air Locks." Each air lock has a door at both ends. The doors are normally interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening when containment OPERABILITY is required. During periods of unit shutdown (continued)

BWOG STS B 3.9-8 Rev 1, 04/07/95

-Me" obM +

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4 Containment Penetrations B 3.9.3 l S TF- SI,tL.:

BASES BACKGROUND when containment closure is not required, the door interlock (continued) mechanism may be disabled, allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open for extended periods when frecuent_ _

7 containment _ entry is necessary. During ^ A in C E. c 4. 3 movement oMirradiated fuel assemblies wNn nment conm;.2"' f aW containment closure is required; therefore, the door interlock mechanism may remain disabled, but one air lock door must always remain closed.

The requirements on containment penetration closure ensure that a release of fission product radioactivity within containment will be restricted from escaping to the environment. The closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict fission product radioactivity release from containment due to a fuel handling accident refueling.

ing ,

r 19fkfg l

The Containment Purge and Exhaust System includes two subsystems. The normal subsystem includes a (42) inch purge penetration and a (42) inch exhaust penetration. The second subsystem, or minipurge system, includes an (8) inch purge penetration and an (8) inch exhaust penetration. During MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the two valves in each of the normal purge and exhaust penetrations are secured in the closed position. The two valves in each of the two minipurge penetrations can be opened intermittently but are closed automatically by the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation !

System (ESFAS). Neither of the subsystems is subject to a Specification in MODE 5.

In MODE 6, large air exchangers are necessary to conduct refueling operations. The normal (42) inch purge system is used for this purpose, and all four valves are closed on a reactor building (RB) high radiation signal in accordance with LC0 3.3.15, " Reactor Building (RB) Purge Isolation-High Radiation.

The other containment penetrations that provide direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere must be isolated on at least one side. Isolation may be achieved by an OPERABLE automatic isolation valve or by a manual isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent.

Equivalent isolation methods must be approved and may include use of a material that can provide a temporary, atmospheric pressure ventilation barrier for the other containment penetrations during fuel movements f.1).

g t

(continued)

BWOG STS B 3.9-9 Rev 1, 04/07/95

~~ -

T^r -

3

T5TF-51,Li

~

Containment Penetrations B 3.9.3 BASES (continued) CQQ YD -

APPLICABLE During @ f "li i"T M mmovement _ofb fuel assabl SAFETY ANALYSES within containment Qgpi. .h.jfa_ .W " =ht .g=mthe most severe radiologicaT consequences result from a Tual ,

- 'In I handlinii accidenje. The fuel handling accident is a l j postulausa event that involves damage to irradiated fuel l

. Fuel handlin accidents, analyzed in Reference 3, y

(Ref.

include2) drop ing a sing e irradiated fuel assembly and .I gM'.n handling too or a heavy object onto other irradiated fuel '

"%/ Water assemblies. _

Level, uirements of LCO 3.9.6, " Refueling Canal

_ . . _ mi y time of l100] hours 7 g prior to p ~ ' P E %

product Tadioactivity subs hat the release of fission t to a fuel handling accident I ) results in doses that are within the requirements specified in 10 CFR 100. The acceptance limits for offsite radiation exposure are contained in Reference 2.

Containment penetrations satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. !

L LCO This LC0 limits the consequences of a fuel handling accident s l in containment by limiting the potential escape paths for fission product radioactivity from containment. The LCO requires any penetration providing direct access from the ;

containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to be closed except for the OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust penetrations. For the OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust penetrations, this LC0 ensures that these penetrations are isolable by the RB purge isolation signal.

The OPERABILITY reauirements for this LCO ensure that the ,

automatic purge and exhaust valve closure tims specified in the FSAR can be achieved and therefore meet the assumptions used in the safety analysis to ensure releases through the valves are terminated such that radiological doses are within tha acceptance limit.

-- r f

APPLICABILITY The c n D enetration requiremen re applicable'CcLc.GM -

duri n = = 5 @ movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment because this is when there is b NJa potential ror uel handling accident. In MODES 1, 2, 3,

-- and 4, containmen penetration requirements 2re_a g sed by LC0 3.6.1. In MODES 5 and 6, when 'T EicW-~ -

movement of irradiated fuel assemblies w hin containment (continued)

BWOG STS B 3.9-10 Rev1,04/07/95

Containment Penetrations B 3.9.3 BASES nAL T5Tf-si/~t It APPLICABILITY not being conducted, the potential for a fuel handling (continued) acc dent does not exist. Therefore, under these conditions no requirements are placed on containment penetration I

-LM

status.

\ fn f ACTIONS A.1 %

With the containment equipment hatch, air locks, or any containment penetration that provides direct access from the i containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere not in the required status, including the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System not capable of automatic actuation when the {

purge and exhaust valves are open, the unit must be placed in a condition in which the isolation function is not P geded._ _ This is accomplished by immediately suspending k m TERSPm -:== movement Aof irradiated fuel assemblies wlhTncentainment. Performance)of these actions shall not -

precludemovingacomponenttoa(safeposition.0 CLcNNs-1 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.3.1 1 REQUIREMENTS )

This Surveillance demonstrates that each of the containment penetrations required to be in its closed position is in that position. The c urve111ance on the open purge and l exhaust valves will cemonstrate that the valves are not j blocked from closing. Also the Surveillance will demonstrate that each valve operator has motive power, which will ensure each valve is capable of being closed by an !

OPERABLE automatic RB purge isolation signal.

The_Surveillanceisberformedevery7daysduring

_._ - .._ ___ movement of+1rradiated fuel asse tee containment. The Surveillance interval is selected to be commensurate with the normal duration of time to complete fuel handling operations. A surveillance before the start of refueling operations will provide two or three surveillance verifications during the applicable period for this LCO.

As such, this Surveillance ensures that a postulated fuel handling acciden that releases fission product i

hN 6 _

(continued)

BWOG STS B 3.9-11 Rev 1, 04/07/95

Containment Penetrations B 3.9.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.3.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS radioactivity within the containment will not result in a release of ission prod radioactivity to the environment.

5kN87 %^

SR 3.9.3.2 -

This Surveillance demonstrates that each containment purge l

and exhaust valve actuates to its isolation position on

! manual initiation or on an actual or simulated high radiation signal. The 18 month Frequency maintains consistency with other similar ESFAS instrumentation and l

valve testing requirements. In LC0 3.3.15, "RB Purge i

Isolation-High Radiation," the isolation instrumentation i requires a CHANNEL CHECK every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and a CHANNEL l FUNCTIONAL TEST every 92 days to ensure the channel l OPERABILITY during refueling operations. Every 18 months a l CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed. The system actuation response time is demonstrated every 18 months, during refueling, on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. SR 3.6.3.5 demonstrates that the isolation time of each valve is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program requirements.

These Surve111ances erformed during MODE 6 will ensure that l

the valves are capab e of closing after a postulated fuel l I5cd handlina accidenk to limit a release of fission product radioactivity from the containment.

6 )

i I

i REFERENCES 1. GPU Nuclear Safety Evaluation SE-0002000-001, Rev. 0, l May 20, 1988.

l

2. FSAR, Section [ ).

3. NUREG-0800, Secti~no 15.7.4, Rev. 1, July 1981.

l 1

l BWOG STS B 3.9-12 Rev1,04/07/95 l

~ _ _ _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. 1 Refueling Canal Water Level B 3.9.6 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS l STF- 5%I l 1

l B 3.9.6 Refueling Canal Water Level l I

BASES BACKGROUND Jgvement of irradiated fuel assembliesg n,L....d y w ":^:.=:.DhE, :=:;t tn:,;, ; w- - - a a '.hhh,; W l 10P L "0" J.;.. ,h;'+r,r ith'n w containment requTres a-minimum water leve' of 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange. During refueling, this maintains sufficient i water level in the containment, the refueling canal, the fuel transfer canal, the refueling cavity, and the spent fuel pool. Sufficient water is necessary to retain iodine fission product activity in the water in the event of a fuel handling accident (Refs. I and 2). Sufficient iodine l activity would be retained to limit offsite doses from the accident within 10 CFR 100 limits, as provided by the guidance of Reference 3.

1 APPLICABLE Duri(ng a.QRfidif"AT'05 n 68mmovement of irradiated SAFETY ANALYSES fuel assemDiias, the water level in the refueling canal and the refueling cavity is an initial condition design parameter in the analysis of the fuel handling accident in containment postulated by Regulatory Guide 1.25 (Ref.1). A minimum water level of 23 ft (Regulatory Position C.I.c of Ref.1) allows a decontamination factor of 100 (Regulatory Position C.I.g of Ref. 1) to be used in the accident analysis for iodine. This relates to the assumption that 99% of the total iodine released from the pellet to cladding gap of all the dropped fuel assembly rods is retained by the refueling cavity water. The fuel pellet to cladding gap is assumed to contain 10% of the total fuel rod iodine inventory (Ref.1).

The fuel handling accident analysis inside containment is described in Reference 2. With a = h "= ter level of 23 ft, and a minimum decay time prior to fuel handling, the analysis and programs test (of]2] hour that aemonstrate the iodine release due to a postulated fuel handling accident is adequately captured by the water, and offsite doses are maintained within allowable limits (Ref. 3).

Refueling canal water level satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

(continued)

BWOG STS B 3.9-21 Rev1,04/07/95 5 idw- s.M. s- r essa 6- u,w.,s ,

C" _ew

wgaw ge.w as.w - m,.y--.3g g.,y na ep g as +

-it=s- * * * - * - '

Refueling Canal Water Level B 3.9.6 BASES (continued)

LC0 A minimum refueling cavity water level of 23 ft above the reactor vessel flange is required to ensure that the radiological consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident inside containment are within acceptable limits as provided by 10 CFR 100.

APPLICABILITY LC0 3.9.6 is applicablo u CORE AL IONS, M >t ur1Lry 4aLehing and uwWhing o TROI. R ive s hr$4 ,

wien mov1nfl irraciatea ruel assemblies witnin the containment. "he LCO minimizes the possibility of a fuel handling accident in containment that is beyond the assumptions of the safety analysis. If irradiated fuel is not present in containment, there can be no significant radioactivity release as a result of a postulated fuel handling accident. Requirements for fuel handling accidents in the spent fuel pool are covered by LCO 3.7.14, " Fuel Storage Pool Water Level."

ACTIONS A . 1 E d ".. P -

V With a water level of < 23 ft above the to) od the reactor vessel flange, all operations involving Er /iT:re.n5 SL movement of irradiated fuel assemblies shall be suspended ~

immediately to ensure that a fuel handling accident cannot occur.

The suspension of C RE A; = # '^? uel movement shall ,

not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe positic3.

In addition to immediately suspendingDE ETEFlii6ni m -

movement of irradiated fuel, action to restore refueling cavity water level must be initiated immediately.

(continued)

BWOG STS B 3.9-22 Rev 1, 04/07/95

ISTF-S'l/~d l

Wi1Cdnaana Insert A l

[Due to radioactive decay, containment is only required to isolate during fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days).]

Inmart B accident [ involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days)]

Insert C

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel]

Insart D

[Due to radioactive decay, the FBACS instrumentation is only required to be OPERABLE during fuel handling involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days).1 Insert E

[The CREFS is only required to be OPERABLE during fuel handling involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days), due to radioactive decay.]

Insert F l

[(i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] l days)]

Insert G

[Due to radioactive decay, FBACS is only required to isolate during fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X1 days).]

IntertB

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, AC electrical power is only required to rnitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days)).

4% -.

m- _ , - - . . , .ee-- . - - -.--

r I 5 TF-S'f tu.t WOG Inmarta insert t

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days)]

l Inmart J

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, DC electrical power is only required to miti; ate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irtadiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the l previous [X] days).] !

l Insert K !

(involving handlin0 recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, the AC and ,

DC inverters are only required to mitigate fuel handling accidcr.ts involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core l within the previous [X] days).] ,

l l Innert L

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, AC and DC electrical power is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor .

core within the previous [X] days).] I insert M

[ irradiated fuel movement with containment closure capability or a minimum decay I time of [X] days without containment closure capability]

l Insert N l

[ Additionally, due to radioactive decay, a fuel hand!!ng accident involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core j within the previous [X] days) will result in doses that are well within the guideline

, values specified in 10 CFR 100 even without containment closure capability.]

l 1

1 l

1

1 737Fc!/ev.I l

l WOG Inserts r

insert O l

REVIEWER'S NOTE The addition of the term "recently" associated with handling irradiated fuel in all of l the containment function Technical Specification requirements is only applicable to those licensees who have demonstrated by analysis that after sufficient radioactive i

decay has occurred, off-site deaes resulting from a fuel handling accident remain

below the Standard Review Plan limits (well within 10CFR100).

Additionally, licensees adding the term "recently" must make the following commitment which is consistent with draft NUMARC 93-01, Revision 3, Section l 11.2.6 " Safety Assessment for Removal of Equipment from Service During l

Shutdown Conditions" , subheading " Containment - Primary (PWR)/ Secondary (BWR)".

"The following guidelines are included in the assessment of systems removed from service during movement of irradiated fuel:

- During fuel handling / core alterations, ventilation system and radiation monitor availability (as defined in NUMARC 91-06) should be assessed, with respect to filtration and monitoring of releases froin the fuel. Following shutdown, radioactivity in the fuel decays away fairiy rapidly. The basis of the Technical Specification operability amendment is the reduction in doses due to such decay. The goal of maintaining ventilation system and radiation monitor availability is to reduce doses even further below that provided by the natural l

I decay.

- A single normal or contingency method to promptly close primary or secondary containment penetrations should be developed. Such prompt methods need ,

not completely block the penetration or be capable of resisting pressure. I The purpose of the " prompt methods" mentioned above are to enable ventilation systems to draw the release from a postulated fuel handling accident in the proper direction such that it can be treated and monitored."

Insert P l

[The CREATCS is only required to be OPERABLE during fuel handling involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the '

previous [X) days), due to radioactive decay.]

l I

l l,

Containment Penetrations B 3.9.4 B 3.9 REFUELING OP.ERATIONS 737F-T/'Per'i B 3.9.4 Containment Penetrations BASES cIM BACKGROUND Dur k u ": .'."5n '"N; 3S movement o irradiated fuel assemblies wnh' containment, a release of fission product radioactivity within containment will be restricted from escaping to the environment when the LC0 requirements are met. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, this is accomplished by maintaining containment OPERABLE as described in LC0 3.6.1,

" Containment." In MODE 6, the potential for containment pressurization as a result of an accident is not likely; therefore, requirements to isolate the containment-from the outside atmosphere can be less stringent. The LC0 requirements are referred to as " containment closure" rather than " containment OPERABILITY." Containment closure means that all potential escape paths are closed or capable of being closed. Since there is no potential for containment pressurization, the Appendix J 1eakage criteria and tests are not required.

The containment serves to contain fission product radioactivity that may be released from the reactor core following an accident, such that offsite radiation exposures are' maintained well within the requirements of 10 CFR 100.

Additionally, the containment provides radiation shielding from the fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.

The containment equipment hatch, which is part of the l containment pressure boundary, provides a means for moving i large g ui> ment and components into and out of containment,

" -"" " movement CA*q } DuringI=s S assemb1 _within containment, theMof irradiated fus1pment hatch mu

- held in place Dy at~ least tour polts. Good engineering i practice dictates that the bolts required by this LCO be approximately equally spaced.

The containment air locks, which are also part of the containment pressure boundary, provide a means for personnel access during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 unit operation in accordance with LC0 3.6.2, " Containment Air Locks." Each air lock has a door at both ends. The doors are normally interlocked to prevent' simultaneous opening when containment OPERABILITY is required. During periods of unit shutdown (continued)

WOG STS B 3.9-11 Rev1,04/07/95

. . -. - .. r :: _ . . - _ .. - .-.- ~ ~ . r. - . -- -

Containment Penetrations B 3.9.4 TsTF-s%. c BASES l l

BACKGROUND when containment closure is not required, the door interlock (continued) mechanism may be disabled, allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open for extended periods when fg e n k 4 containment entry is necessary. During wrsun-. - a i L movement ofeirradiated fuel assemblies within containment,

[ce.csMh"T containment closure is required; therefore, the door I

interlock mechanism may remain disabled, but one air lock door must always remain closed.

The requirements for containment penetration closure ensure !

that a release of fission product radioactivity within containment will be restricted from escaping to the environment. The closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict fission product radioactivity release from _ l c a mentduetoafuelhandlingaccidentpring gg t C2 '

The Containment Purge and Exhaust System includes two subsystems. The normal subsystem includes a 42 inch purge penetration and a 42 inch exhaust penetration. The second subsystem, a minipurge system, includes an 8 inch purge ,

penetration and an 8 inch exhaust penetration. During )

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the two valves in each of the normal purge and exhaust penetrations are secured in the closed position. The two valves in each of the two minipurge l penetrations can be opened intermittently, but are closed ;

automatically by the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS). Neither of the subsystems is subject to a l Specification in MODE 5.

In MODE 6, large air exchangers are necessary to conduct refueling operations. The normal 42 inch purge system is used for this purpose, and all four valves are closed by the ESFAS in accordance with LC0 3.3.2, " Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation."

The minipurge system remains operational in MODE 6, and all four valves are also closed by the ESFAS.

or The minipurge system is not used in MODE 6. All four 8 inch

_ valves are secured in the closed position. _

The other containment penetrations that provide direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere (continued)

WOG STS B 3.9-12 Rev 1, 04/07/95 L. _ .l.~ Z_ Z~_ _ _ ~_T.i __

-1 Containment Penetrations 1 B 3.9.4 l

/ 5 7FS'Ifw.t' BASES BACKGROUND must be isolated on at least one side. Isolation may be (continued) achieved by an OPERABLE automatic isolation valve, or by a manual isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent.

Equivalent isolation methods must be approved and may include use of a material that can provide a temporary,

, atmospheric pressure, ventilation barrier for the other containment penetrations durinn. fuel movements (Ref.1). )

[otdn%.[3!cNE!MtM py C.

APPLICABLE During' CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel SAFETY ANALYSES assemblies within containment, the most severe radiological consequences result from a fuel handling accident C The fuel handling accident is a postulated event that involves damage to irradiated fuel (Ref. 2). Fuel handling accidents, analyzed in Reference 3, include dropping a single irradiated fuel assembly and handling tool or a heavy object og

, [L M onto other irradiated fuel assemblies. The requirements of LCO 3.9.7, " Refueling Cavity Water Level," mWEatmainimum MgD l

l g

decay time of 100 nours prior tfI^= "' nsalI^"Ofensures) pp j that the release of fission product radioactivity 7 -

subsequent to a fuel handling accident, results in doses that are well within the guideline values specified in 10 CFR 100. Standard Review Plan, Section 15.7.4, Rev.1 (Ref. 3), defines "well within" 10 CFR 100 to be 25% or less of the 10 CFR 100 values. The acceptance limits for offsite radiation exposure will be 25% of 10 CFR 100 values or the NRC staff approved licensing basis (e.g., a specified fractionof10CFR100 limits).

Containment penetrations satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

C sk L_J -

LCO This LC0 limits the consequences of a fuel handling accident u in containment by limiting the potential escape p.aths for fission product radioactivity released within containment.

The LCO requires any penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to be closed except for the OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust penetrations. For the OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust penetrations, this LCO ensures that these penetrations are. isolable by the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System. The OPERABILITY requirements for this LCO ensure that the automatic purge and exhaust valve (continued)

WOG STS B 3.9-13 Rev1,04/07/95

"^

- -. :7 . - - .

Containment Penetrations B 3.9.4 BASES

/ 5 TF- S'/A l LC0 closure times specified in the FSAR can be achieved and, (continued) therefore, meet the assumptions used in the safety analysis to ensure that releases through the valves are terminated, such that radiological doses are within the acceptance limit.

- A APPLICABILITY MMW The containment penetration requirements are appTicable durinf'^3 movement o rradiated fuel U assemblies within containment because this is when there is cum.h a potential fonStfuel handling accident. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, containmenf penetration requirements are addressed by LCO 3.6.1. In MODES 5 and 6, when Cuiu h a=SP e movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment

-%M

not being conducted, the potential for a fuel handling

( tJ ace w nt d_oes not exista Therefore, under these conditions no requirements are placed on containment penetration g status.

, \ O M ACTIONS A.1 hd ^ $ =

If the containment equipment hatch, air locks, or any containment penetration that provides direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere is not in the required status, including the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System not capable of automatic actuation l when the purge and exhaust valves are open, the unit must be placed in a condition whtre the isolation function is nob --

needed. __This is accomplished by immediately suspending w a

" '"' TTT ^"^ and movement of rradiated fuel assemblies l within containment. Performance of these actions shall not l preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

l C 4lk -

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.4.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance demonstrates that each of the containment penetrations required to be in its closed position is in that position. The Surveillance on the open purge and j exhaust valves will demonstrate that the valves are not blocked from closing. Also the Surveillance will (continued)

WOG STS B 3.9-14 Rev1,04/07/95 l

r

Containment Penetrations B 3.9.4

/ 5 TM(fe.l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.4.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS demonstrate that each valve operator has motive power, which will ensure that each valve is capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment purge and exhaust isolation 8 ' 9""I *

([ S.en-M M

, The Su_rveillance is performed}every 7 days during

'A # rm"Uli. :r movement offrradiated fuel assemb1 es within containment.. The Surveillance interval is selected to be commensurate with the normal duration of time to complete fuel handling operations. A surveillance before the start of refueling operations will provide two or three surveillance verifications durin the applicable period for this LCO. As such, this Surveil ance ensures that a Iwekk C, postulated fuel handling accidentgthat releases fission product radioactivity within the containment will not result i

in a release o ission product radioactivit to the environment.

SR 3.9.4.2 This Surveillance demonstrates that each containment purge and exhaust valve actuates to its isolation position on manual initiation or on an actual or simulated high radiation signal. The 18 month Frequency maintains consistency with other similar ESFAS instrumentation and -

valve testing requirements. In LCO 3.3.6, the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation instrumentation requires a CHANNEL CHECK every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and a COT every 92 days to ensure the channel OPERABILITY during refueling operations.

Every 18 months a CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed. The system actuation response time is demonstrated every 18 months, during refueling, on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

SR 3.6.3.5 demonstrates that the isolation time of each valve is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Prcgram requirements. These Surveillances performed during MODE 6

, will ensure that the valves are capable of closing after a postulated fuel handling accident o limit a release of fission product radioactivity from he containment.

ho 3t.r e >

(continued)

WOG STS B 3.9-15 Rev1,04/07/95

m. = v r, *s.+ -

,m...e, .. 4-. 2,*4i...-+-, .- *+=*e--- 4- - - -4

Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6

~

3.3 INSTRUMENTATION /

A,/

3.3.6 Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6 The Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation instrumentation ,

for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.

i APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4_, _

.AdETsu,3 wnc n w - . ~_, m During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

m Ec cs.nMM d ACTIONS _

..................................... NOTE---------------------- -.............

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One radiation A.I Restore the affected 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months monitoring channel channel to OPERABLE I inoperable. status. l (continued) l WOG STS 3.3-50 Rev I, 04/07/95 l

- - ...4 -

Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Instrumentation l 3.3.6 l ACTIONS (continued) l57F-5/pu,I /

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I C. ---------NOTE--------- c.1 Place and maintain Immediately On1r aco11 cable during containment purge and exhaust valves in

_.rg:1 "l'E" 9of4mirradiate g=d

. l movement closed position. l fuel assemblies within hun i

containment. OJ C.2 Enter applicable Immediately l One or more Functions Conditions and l with one or more Required Actions of manual or automatic LCO 3.9.4, actuation trains " Containment inoperable. Penetrations," for containment purge and g exhaust isolation i valves made Two or'more radiation inoperable by ,

monitoring channels isolation inoperable. instrumentation. ;

l E '

Required Action and I associated Completion Time for Condition A not met.

s WOG STS 3.3-52 Rev 1, 04/07/95

-.--.-.:. - = = = - - - -

CREFS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.7 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION !

3.3.7 Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) Actuation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.7 The CREFS actuation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.7-1 shall be OPERABLE.

(ceca.h\q}

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3,4,k5,and6,] 4 l During movement of kirradiated fuel assemblies 49

- ..~..y wncm.m.m. mag - -

ACTIONS 1

............................---------NOTE-------------------------- ----------

i Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function. ,

.............................................................................. 1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME .

1 A. One or more Functions A.1 --------NOTE--------

l with one channel or Place in toxic gas train inoperable. protection mode if automatic transfer to toxic gas l protection mode is inoperable.

Place one CREFS train 7 days in emergency

[ radiation protection) mode.

1 4' w AS (continued) l l

WOG STS 3.3-55 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l 7....,..-..

CREFS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.7

' / S Tf-51pm '

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME ,

1 D. Required Action and ls Suspen ORE \ Immediatel j associated Completion ALTERATIO Time for Condition A or B not met _durina AND movement of4 irradiated i

, Suspend movement of Immediately p'mfuel. weassemblies Q ' irradiated fuel d_ T "' " : ^ . assemblies.

^ '1b l

__ l E. Required Action and E.1 Initiate action to Immediately associated Completion restore one CREFS l Time for Condition A train to OPERABLE or B not met in status.

MODE 5 or 6. I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS .

....__.......................__ ..... NOTE-------------------------------------

Refer to Table 3.3.7-1 to determine which SRs apply for each CREFS Actuation Function.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.7.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months l

SR 3.3.7.2 Perform COT. 92 days (continued)

WOG STS 3.3-57 Rev 1, 04/07/95

. ..~.~ - - ~ . . . ~ . - . . - .

I FBACS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.8 ACTIONS bW~ Qfml CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) 8.2 Place both trains in Immediately emergency [ radiation protection] mode.

b C. Required Action and C.1 Suspend movement of Immediately associated Completion gpirradiated fuel Time for Condition A assemblies in the -

or B not met _during___ __, f movement of'trradiated fuel assemblies in the ( @ b uel building.

fuel building. \_ M[Q _

D. Required Action and D.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time for Condition A ANQ or B not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. D.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

.................................----NOTE-------------------------------------

Refer to Table 3.3.8-1 to determine which SRs apply for each FBACS Actuation Function.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.8.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.3.8.2 Perform COT. 92 days (continued)

WOG STS 3.3-61 Rev1,04/07/95

FBACS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.8 Table 3.5.8 1 (pese 1 of 1)

FSACS Actuation Instrumentation Ts TF-sisw APPLICABLE EES OR SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVE!LLANCE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS SETPOINT

1. Manuel Initiation (1,2,3,43 2 st 3.3.8.4 NA (s) 2 st 3.3.8.4 NA

2. Automette Actuation Logle and 1,2,3,4 2 trains SR 3.3.8.3 hA Actuation Retsys (a)

3. Fuel Building Radiatlon

s. Gaseous (1,2,3,4) (23 SR 3.3.8.1 5 (2) sa/hr (a) SR 3.3.8.2 SR 3.3.8.5

b. Particulate 11,2,3,41 (23 SR 3.3.8.1 s (23 sa/hr (a) SR 3.3.8.2 SR 3.3.8.5 (a) During movement of radiated fuel assen6tles in the fust building.

{ccc.4MIM WOG STS 3.3-63 Rev 1, 04/07/95

CREFS 3.7.10 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

' 'l 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) 1 l

LC0 3.7.10 Two CREFS trains shall be OPERABLE.

cAeN%k APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, [5, and 6.)

. During movement _o birradiated fuel assemblies [g 7 Mem con =1 m nM5A ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CREFS train A.1 Restore CREFS train 7 days inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A AHA not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months C. Required Action and C.1 -------NOTE------

associated Completion Place in toxic gas Time of Condition A protection mode if l not met Lin MODE 5 automatic transfer or 6, or] during to toxic gas movement offirradi tef protection mode is fuel assemblies , inoperable.

-m; = ...................

- p.mg*1T U.".T!0 % .

P1 ace OPERABLE CREFS Immediately hy n in emergency n

(continued)

WOG STS 3.7-23 Rev 1, 04/07/95

, ae seemer --en we***m. oge e.meup * * ' e

CREFS 3.7.10 ACTIONS T5 TF-S % i CONDITION -

REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) .1 AL' h ; pend COR Im intely TIONS.

L C.2 Suspend movement of Immediately-irradiated fuel 1 assemblies.

1 C T D. Two CREFS trains I 1 Suspen ORE Immediate inoperable [in MODE 5 ALTERATI .

or 6, or] durina movement offirrad b fuel assemblies 9 L .nv wm (e

N AND Suspend movement of Immediately I

. (dLTEP^T'^Z ,. irradiated fuel assemblies.

E. Two CREFS trains E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.10.1 Operate each CREFS train for 31 days

[a 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating or (for systems without heaters)

= 15 minutes].

(continued)

WOG STS 3.7-24 Rev 1, 04/07/95

CREATCS 3.7.11 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.11 Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System (CREATCS)

LC0 3.7.11 Two CREATCS trains shall be OPERABLE.

([ce 44 4 APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3,4,([5,and6,)

Durina movement ofN rradiated fuel assemblies Ja . . .., =:. ".; .;:'f. : . ;=g -

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Dr.e CREATCS train A.1 Restore CREATCS train 30 days inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A M not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months C. Required Action and C.1 Place OPERABLE Immediately associated Completion CREATCS train in Time of Condition A operation.

not met [in MODE 5 or 6, or] durina movement ofiirra ted <QR -

fuel assemblies t C.2. Suspend RE Imed ely j

P ""r' z = LTERATI l

\

S S TED^TIO."" ,. I

{

i M

~

C. Suspend movement of Immediately cank airradiated fuel assemblies.

(continued)

WOG STS 3.7-26 Rev 1, 04/07/95

CREATCS 3.7.11 TsTF4/AL, ACTIONS (continued) l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Two CREATCS trains 1 pend C0 Immediat inoperable (in MODE 5 ,

AL TIONS.

or6,or).durina _

movement of%irra d %

AN p urin t ,p. Suspend movement of Immediately h(fuelassemblies L 0 d

,rirradiated fuel h : assemblies.

Ctua4%t{ -

s I

E. Two CREATCS trains E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately l inoperable in MODE 1, 1 I

2, 3, or 4.

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.11.1 Verify each CREATCS train has the (18] months capability to remove the assumed heat load.

1

/

WOG STS 3.7-27 Rev 1, 04/07/95

FBACS 3.7.13 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.13 Fuel Building Air Cleanup System (FBACS)

LCO 3.7.13 Two FBACS trains shall be OPERABLE.

- APPLICABILITY: [ MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4,]

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

(j__ Ce<.s.nk1 K

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One FBACS train A.1 Restore FBACS train 7 days inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and associated Completion Time of gg Condition A not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months or 4.

M Two FBACS trains !

inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. )

C. Required Action and C.1 Place OPERABLE FBACS Immediately associated Completion train in operation.

Time (ofConditionA) not met during E movement of irradiated fuel assembi in the C.2 Suspend movement of Immediately fuel building. irradiated fuel

_ assemblies in the mM fuel building.

(continued)

WOG STS 3.7-30 Rev 1, 04/07/95 1

e* =w n r. se - w.we -%es, emauwer e m* d e-* - m -m..= *. -e *+

FBACS ,

3.7.13 l i8u/ l ACTIONS (continued) l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i

D. Two FBACS trains D.1 Suspend movement of Immediately inoperable durinc eirradiated fuel movement of*1rrac isted N assemblies in the fuel assemblies in the Ifuelbuilding.

fuel building.

4 l

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.13.1 Operate each FBACS train for 31 days

[a 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating or (for systems without heaters) )

=15 minutes).

SR 3.7.13.2 Perform required FBACS filter testing in In accordance accordance with the [ Ventilation Filter with the [VFTP)

Testing Program (VFTP)).

SR 3.7.13.3 Verify each FBACS train actuates on an (18] months )

actual or simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.13.4 Verify one FBACS train can maintain a (18) months on pressure s [-0.125) inches water gauge with a STAGGERED respect to atmospheric pressure during the TEST BASIS

[ post accident mode of operation at a flow '

rates [20,000 cfa.

(continued)

WOG STS 3.7-31 Rev1,04/07/95

== ~ - - - - .- : :-- . : . .m

. l AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS i

3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown j l

LC0 3.8.2 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. One qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE AC electrical power l distribution subsystem (s) required by LC0 3.8.10,

" Distribution Systems-Shutdown"; and

b. One diesel generator (DG) capable of supplying one train.

of the onsite Class IE AC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.10. j

)

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, During movement of g irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required offsite ------------NOTE-------------

circuit inoperable. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.10, with one required train de-energized as a result of Condition A.

............................. l A.1 Declare affected Immediately required feature (s) .

with no offsite power l available inoperable.

98 i A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

AIEl (continued)

WOG STS 3.8-18 Rev 1, 04/07/95

- - - - . . = - : =- . . .

AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 7~5TF-S% i ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2.2 Suspend movement of Imediately irradiated fuel assemblies.

, M Cca.ca.Yh A.2.3 Initiate action to Imediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions.

M A.2.4 Initiate action to Insnediately restore required offsite power circcit to OPERABLE status.

B. One required DG B.1 Suspend CORE Imediately inoperable. ALTERATIONS.

M B.2 Suspend movement of Imediately irradiated fuel assemblies.

AND (c kQ) <

B.3 Initiate action to Imediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions.

. M B.4 Initiate action to Imediately restore required DG to OPERABLE status.

WOG STS 3.8-19 Rev I, 04/07/95

__ = . - . . _

DC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.5 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown LCO 3.8.5 DC electrical power subsystem shall be OPERABLE to support the DC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.10. " Distribution Systems-Shutdown."

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, During movement of diated fuel assemblies.

cu.a.nM ACTIONS -- _-

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1.1 Declare affected Immediately DC electrical power required feature (s) sub;ystems inoperable. inoperable.

9B A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

M A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately

<rirradiated fuel i

semblies.

(ccip f)

A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately l suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions. l E

(continued)

WOG STS 3.8-28 Rev1,04/07/9S

~ ~ ~

__.__ _ ,:7 - - _ __ 7. _ . _ . _ _ .. ' ~~ . T.T_ _. _

Inverters-Shutdown 3.8.8 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.8 Inverters-Shutdown LC0 3.8.8 Inverters shall be OPERABLE to support the onsite Class IE AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required b LCD 3.8.10. " Distribution Systems-Shutdown." ;

~

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, i During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. I 9

f ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I

A. One or more (required] A.1 Declare affected Imediately '

inverters inoperable, required feature (s) >

inoperable.

98 A.2.1 Suspend CORE Imediately ALTERATIONS.

M A.2.2 Suspend movement of Imediately rradiated fuel assemblies.

AND (,ca. M3 3

A.2.3 Initiate action to Imediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions.

M .

(continued)

WOG STS 3.8-36 Rev 1, 04/07/95

.. .a -.mww- .--..m-+m ---e .,-.,wm,am...

Distributien Systems-Shutdown 3.8.10 T5 TF-5l,6.1 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown LCO 3.8.10 ' The necessary portion of AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE to support equipment required to be OPERABLE. ,

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

M ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Declare associated Immediately AC, DC, or AC vital supported required bus electrical power feature (s) distribution inoperable.

subsystems inoperable.

E A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately <

ALTERATIONS. ,

M 1

A.2.2 , Suspend movement of Immediately

-irradiated fuel

[,caca. Md assemblies. ,

l M ,

A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations involving positive

. reactivity additions.

M ,

(continued)

WOG STS .

3.8-40 Rev1,04/07/95

-,.m....-s, -m..me- - y. n ore v " ~

ew s, + m me -- - e ws -~w,

i Containment Penetratit;ns 3.9.4 l 3.9. REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.4 Containment Penetrations LCO 3.9.4 The containment penetrations shall be in the following status:

a. The equipment hatch closed and held in place by (four) bolts;

b. One door in each air lock closed; and

c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to tb outside atmosphere either:

1. closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent, or

2. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System.

APPLICABILITY: L c h; C^^: RT S S IC % D During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

(NA -

~

M ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME nt nmen E penetrations not in i required status. ,

i Suspend movement of Immediately p irradiated fuel I assemblies within

( containment.

ctskb

'WOG STS 3.9-6 Rev 1, 04/07/95

~zz: ::- . . . - . , -- . - - - .

~; -^~~~~~- -

Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Instrumentation I B 3.3.6 TSTF5/A ; l BASES J

l BACKGROUND and the Shutdown Purge System. These systems are described (continued) in the Bases for LCO 3.6.3, " Containment Isolation Valves."

APPLICABLE Tha safety analyses assume that the containment remains SAFETY ANALYSES' intact with penetrations unnecessary for core cooling isolated early in the event, within approximately 60 seconds. The isolation of the purge valves has not been analyzed mechanistically in the dose calculations, although its rapid isolation is assumed. The containment purge and exhaust isolation radiation monitors act as backup to the SI signal to ensure closing of the purge and exhaust valves.

They are also the primary means for automatically isolating containment in the event of a fuel handling accident during shutdown. Containtrent isolation in turn ensures meeting the containment leakage rate assumptions of the safety analyses, _

and ensures that the calculated accidental offsite t%3A radiological doses are below 10 CFR 100 (Ref.1) limits.4 g The containment purge and exhaust isolation instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO The LC0 requirements ensure that the instrumentation necessary to initiate Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation, listed in Table 3.3.6-1, is OPERABLE.

1. Manual Initiation The LCO requires two channels OPERABLE. The operator can initiate Containment Purge Isolation at any time by using either of two switches in the control room.

Either switch actuates both trains. This action will cause actuation of all components in the same manner as any of the automatic actuation signals.

The LCO for Manual Initiation ensures the proper amount of redundancy is maintained in the manual actuation circuitry to ensure the operator has manual initiation capability.

Each channel consists of one push button and the interconnecting wiring to the actuation logic cabinet.

(continued)

WOG STS B 3.3-151 Rev1,04/07/95

9 Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 I s TF-S'l,fui BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY The Manual Initiation, Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays, Containment Isolation-Phase A, and Containment Radiation Functions are required OPFRABLE in -"IreN 1 MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, and during Ca .".!I""!M N f CE*** ~ movement of elrradiated fuel assembTies.Within containment.J Under these conditions, the pot.ential exists for an accident that could release, fission product radioactivity into l

St 0#@

r containment. Inerefori~~the conta'inment purge and exhtust isolation instrumentation must be OPERABLE in these MODES.

While in MODES 5 and 6 without fuel handling in progress, the containment purge and exhaust isolation instrumentation need not be OPERABLE since the potential for radioactive releases is minimized and operator action is sufficient to ensure post accident offsite doses are maintained within the limits of Reference 1.

ACTIONS The most common cause of channel inoperability is outright l failure or drift of the bistable or process module sufficient to exceed the tolerance allowed by unit specific l calibration procedures. Typically, the drift is found to be l small and results in a delay of actuation rather than a ,

total loss of function. This determination is generally '

made during the performance of a COT, when the process instrumentation is set up for adjustment to bring it within specification. If the Trip Setpoint is less conservative than the tolerance specified by the calibration procedure, the channel must be declared inoperable immediately and the appropriate Condition entered.

A Note has been added to the ACTIONS to clarify the I a) plication of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of t1is Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed in Table 3.3.6-1. The Completion Time (s) of the inoperable channel (s)/ train (s) of a Function will be tracked separately for each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered for that Function.

El ;

Condition A applies to the failure of one containment purge ;

isolation radiation monitor channel. Since the four containment radiation monitors measure different parameters, (continued)

WOG STS B 3.3-153 Rev 1, 04/07/95

Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Instrumentation !

B 3.3.6

~ E)lw./

ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) valves in their closed position is met or the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.9.4, " Containment Penetrations," are met for each valve made inoperable by failure of isolation instrumentation. The Completion Time for these Required Actions is Isenediately.

A Note states that Condition C is applicable during CORE ALTERATIONS and during movement of rradiated fuel assemblies within containment. --

3 t.c.nSS)

SURVEILLANCE A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that REQUIREMENTS Table 3.3.6-1 determines which SRs apply to which i Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Functions. !

SR 3.3.6.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indtication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.

The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of (continued) !

WOG STS B 3.3-155 Rev 1, 04/07/95 em ~ , mm==**-- + -m eo

CREFS Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.7 T5 TF-Dfw.)

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 8 3.3.7 Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) Actuation j Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The CREFS provides an enclosed control room environment from l which the unit can be operated following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity. During normal operation, the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System provides control room i ventilation. Upon receipt of an actuation signal, the CREFS initiates filtered ventilation and pressurization of the ;

control room. This system is described in the Bases for LCO 3.7.10, " Control Room Emergency Filtration System."

.The actuation instrumentation consists of redundant radiation monitors in the air intakes and control room area.

A high radiation signal from any of these detectors will initiate both trains of the CREFS. The control room operator can also initiate CREFS trains by manual switches ,

in the control room. The CREFS is also actuated by a safety j injection (SI) signal. The SI Function is discussed in I LCO 3.3.2, " Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System i' (ESFAS) Instrumentation."

APPLICABLE The control room must be kept habitable for the operators i SAFETY ANALYSES stationed there during accident recovery and post accident l l

operations.

The CREFS acts to terminate the supply of unfiltered outside air to the control room, initiate filtration, and pressurize the control room. These actions are necessary to ensure the control room is kept habitable for the operators stationed there during accident recovery and post accident operations by minimizing the radiation exposure of control room personnel.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the radiation monitor actuation of the CREFS is a backup for the SI signal actuation. This ensures initiation of the CREFS during a loss of coolant accident or steam generator tube rupture.

The radiation monitor actuation of the CREFS in MODES 3__ _

and 6, during movementg of irradiated fuel assemblies 8d" -

(continued)

WOG STS B 3.3-159 Rev1,04/07/95 h-@@ E 4 S b

CREFS Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.7 BASES i S TF-su. >

LC0 2. Automatic Actuation Loaic an_d Actuation Relays (continued) restrictive Actions specified for inoperability of the CREFS Functions specify sufficient compensatory ,

measures for this case. i

3. Control Room Radiation The LCO specifies two required Control Room Atmosphere Radiation Monitors and two required Control Room Air '

Intake Radiation Monitors to ensure that the radiation monitoring instrumentation necessary to initiate the CREFS remains OPERABLE.

For sampling systems, channel OPERABILITY involves more than OPERABILITY of channel electronics.

OPERABILITY may also require correct valve lineups, sample pump operation, and filter motor operation, as well as detector OPERABILITY, if these supporting features are necessary for trip to occur under the

. conditions assumed by the safety analyses.

l

4. Safety In.iection Refer to LCO 3.3.2, Function 1, for all initiating Functions and requirements.

APPLICABILITY The CREFS_ Functions must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, p S " # =.T as 00r G a @ and movement ofMrradiate a@(9 fue' assemblies. Ine Functions must also be OPERABLE in -

MODES [5 and 6) when required for a waste gas decay tank rupture accident, to ensure a habitable environment for the control room operators.

ACTIONS The most common cause of channel inoperability is outright failure or drift of the bistable or process module sufficient to exceed the tolerance allowed by the unit specific calibration procedures. Typically, the drift is found to be small and results in a delay of actuation rather (continued)

WOG STS B 3.3-161 Rev1,04/07/95

CREFS Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.7 I S TP -TIAl ACTIONS D.1 V N 4 l (continued)

Condition D applies when the Required Action and associated Completion Time for Condition A or B have not been met

Orin; we ~ -imi ;rb when irrad ated fuel assemblies are beino moved. Movement of irra ae fuel assemblies i

7;.,J CC: ^1TEPP "5; must be uspended immediately to l reduce the risk of accidents tha ould require CREFS '

actuation. <

Cnc.a.66g u

Condition E applies when the Required Action and associated Completion Time for Condition A or B have not been met in MODE 5 or 6. Actions must be initiated to restore the inoperable train (s) to OPERABLE status immediataly to ensure .

adequate isolation capability in the event of a waste gas I decay tank rupture.

1 SURVEILLANCE A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that )

REQUIREMENTS Table 3.3.7-1 determines which SRs apply to which CREFS .

Actuation Functions.

SR 3.3.7.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, (continued)

WOG STS B 3.3-164 Rev 1, 04/07/95

FBACS Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.8 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.8 Fuel Building Air Cleanup System (FBACS) Actuation Instrumentation BASES

' C BACKGROUND The FBACS ensures that radioactive materials in the fuge __

building atmosphere following a fuel handling accident or a loss of coolint accident (LOCA) are filtered and adsorbed prior to exhausting to the environment. The system is described in the Bases for LC0 3.7.13, " Fuel Building Air Cleanup System." The system initiates filtered ventilation of the fuel building automatically following receipt of a high radiation signal (gaseous or particulate) or a safety injection (SI) signal. Initiation may also be performed manually as needed from the main control room.

High gaseous and particulate radiation, each monitored by either of two monitors, provides FBACS initiation. Each FBACS train is initiated by high radiation detected by a channel dedicated to that train. There are a total of two channels, one for each train. Each channel contains a gaseous and particulate monitor. High radiation detected by any monitor or an SI' signal from the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) initiates fuel building isolation and starts the FBACS. These actions function to prevent exfiltration of contaminated air by initiating filtered ventilation, which imposes a negative pressure on the fuel building. Since the radiation monitors include an air sampling system, various components such as sample line valves, sample line heaters, sample pumps, and filter motors are required to support monitor OPERABILITY.

APPLICABLE The FBACS ensures that radioactive materials in the fu (b&

C, SAFETY ANALYSES building atmosphere following a fuel handling accident ra' LOCA are filtered and adsorbed prior to being exhausted to the environment. This action reduces the radioactive

- content in the fuel building exhaust following a LOCA or fuel handling accident so that offsite doses remain within the limits specified in 10 CFR 100 (Ref.1).

The FBACS actuation instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

(continued)

WOG STS B 3.3-168 Rev1,04/07/95

~

~ ~~ ~ ^

- - - - . . "L::

FBACS Actuation Instrumentation i B 3.3.8 i BASES 1 LC0 3. Fuel Buildina Radiation (continued) l For sampling systems, channel OPERABILITY involves j more than OPERABILITY of channel electronics. '

OPERABILITY may also require correct valve lineups, I sample pump operation, fi1+er motor operation, detector OPERABILITY, if these_ supporting features are necessary for actuation to occur under the conditions assumed by the safety analyses.

Only the Trip Setpoint is specified for each FBACS Function in the LCO. The Trip Setpoint limits. account for instrument uncertainties, which are defined in the Unit Specific Setpoint Calibration Procedure (Ref. 2).

A SH APPLICABILITY The manual FBACS initiatio ust be OPERABLE in MODES (1, 2, 3, and 41 and when movin, rradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel bui! ding, to ensure the FBACS o erates to remove fission products associated with lea age after a LOCA or a

}L C.LMJ fuel handling accident, The automatic FBACS actuation instrumentat on is also required in MODES [1, 2, 3, and 4]

to remove fission products caused by post LOCA Emergency {

Core Cooling Systems leakage.

E.MatM High radiation initiation of the rua a must, be OPERABLE in any MODE during movement of rradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building to ensure utomatic initiation of the E

FBACS when the potential -

f 1 handlina accident (7jA exists. , % }L',%] ]g '

While in MODES 5 and 6 without fuel hand 11ng 6n progr'esi,-

the FBACS instrumentation need not be OPERABLE since a fuel handling accident cannot occur.--

Lsed Cl 1

ACTIONS The most common cause of channel inoperability is outright failure or drift of the bistable or process module sufficient to exceed the tolerance allowed by unit specific calibration procedures. Typically, the drift is found to be.

small and results in a delay of actuation rather than a l total loss of function. This determination is generally made during the performance of a COT, when the process !

instrumentation is set up for adjustment to bring it within I

(continued)

WOG STS B 3.3-170 Rev1,04/07/95

~ ~~ ~ T :~ .: - - . . -- . - - L - - . .

I FBACS Actuation Instrumentation l B 3.3.8 i BASES

( .5 TP-St ll i ACTIONS B.1.1. B.I.2. B.2 (continued)

Alternatively, both trains may be placed in the emergency l

[ radiation protection) mode. This ensures the FBACS '

Function is performed even in the presence of a single failure.

1

.G d

-- Condition C applies when the Required Action and associated i M Completion Time for Condition A or B have not been met and irradiated fuel assemblies are being moved in the fuel building. Movement ofHrradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building must be suspended imediately to eliminate the .

potential for events that could require FBACS actuation.

D.1 and D.2 Condition D applies when the Required Action and associated Completion Time for Condition A or B have not been met and the unit is in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. The unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO requirements are not applicable.

To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that REQUIREMENTS Table 3.3.8-1 determines which SRs apply to which FBACS l Actuation Functions.

! SR 3.3.8.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comoarison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument (continued)

WOG STS B 3.3-172 Rev1,04/07/95 l

l l

c . . . - - - . . . _

Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric, Subatmospheric, Ice Condenser, and Dual) l B 3.6.3 J

l 5 7'F~ 51 tPw. / i :

BASES l l

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.9 ~

l REQUIREMENTS (continued) In subatmospheric containments, the check valves that serve l a containment isolation function are weight or spring loaded I e to provide positive closure in the direction of flott. This l ensures that these check valves will remain closed when the l inside containment atmosphere returns to subatmospheric conditions following a DBA. SR 3.6.3.9 verifies the operation of the check valves that are not testable during

' unit operation. The Frequency of 18 months is based on such factors as the inaccessibility of these valves, the fact that the unit must be shut down to perform the tests, and the successful results of the tests on an 18 month basis during past unit operation.

SR 3.6.3.10 Reviewer's Note: This SR is only required for those units with resilient seal purge valves allowed to be open during

[ MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4] and having blocking devices on the valves that are not permanently installed.

Verifying that each [42] inch containment purge valve is blocked to restrict opening to :s; [50]% is required to ensure that the valves can close under DBA conditions within the times assumed in the analyses of References 1 and 2. If a LOCA occurs, the purge valves must close to maintain containment leakage within the values assumed in the accident analysis. At other times when purge valves are

\ required to be fuelcapable of closing (e.g., during movement of

[Ocu.rNh irradiated assemblies), pressurization concerns are not present, thus the purge valves can be fully open. The 18 month Frequency is appropriate because the blocking devices are typically removed only during a refueling l _

outage. _

I SR 3.6.3.11 This SR ensures that the combined leakage rate of all shield building bypass leakage paths is less than or equal to the specified leakage rate. This provides assurance that the l assumptions in the safety analysis are met. The leakage

,_. rate of each bypass leakage path is assumed to be the _

(continued)

WOG STS B 3.6-43 Rev 1, 04/07/95

~~ ee. e e.w e

-ms.* e a .w m e-ow .e m see se . .-. . . . . . . . -

CREFS B 3.7.10 BASES APPLICABLE loss of coolant accident, fission product release presented SAFETY ANALYSES in the FSAR, Chapter (15] (Ref. 2).

(continued)

The analysis of toxic gas releases demonstrates that the toxicity limits are not exceeded in the control room following a toxic chemical release, as presented in U Reference 1.

l The worst case single active failure of a component of the CREFS, assuming a loss of offsite power, does not impair the ability of the system to perform its design function.

The CREFS satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

l l

l LC0 Two independent and redundant CREFS trains are required to I

be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available assuming a single failure disables the other train. Total system failure could result in exceeding a dose of 5 rem to the control room operator in the event of a large radioactive relense.

l The CREFS is considered OPERABLE when the individual l components necessary to limit operator exposure are OPERABLE I in both trains. A CREFS train is OPERABLE when the I associated:

1

a. Fan is OPERABLE; ,

1 l

b. HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers are not excessively restricting flow, and are capable of l

performing their filtration functions; and

c. Heater, demister, ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.

In addition, the control room boundary must be maintained, including the integrity of the walls, floors, ceilings, ductwork, and access doors.

l l

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, [5, and 6,) and during movement of l

irradiated fuel assemblies Pd dum COPI A:.Tef.::^A'Q,

%% (continued) l WOG STS B 3.7-52 Rev1,04/07/95 l

l = . ~ . em - .m.- ~ . .

CREFS B 3.7.10 THF-St,L I BASES 1

APPLICABILITY CREFS must be OPERABLE to control operator exposure during (continued) and following a DBA.

In [ MODE 5 or 6], the CREFS is required to cope with the i ggrelease from the rupture of an outside waste gas tank. ,

Agent of+ irradiated

-,-f, the CREFS must fuelbeassemblies OPERABLE to copeMO^"A with the release from a fuel handling acciden ,

Vf w 4c huh 9 '

ACTIONS A_J When one CREFS train is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREFS train is adequate to perform the control room protection function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE CREFS train could result in loss of CREFS function.

The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and ability of the remaining train to provide the required capability.

B.1 and B.2 In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable CREFS train cannot be restored to OPEPABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes accident risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

C . lc i - aand C.

[In MODE 5 or 6, or] durina movement of" irradiated fuel assembliest = i80ri n""e_n....,b if the ino >erable CREFS train cannot be restored to OPERABIE status witsin the required Completion Time, action must be taken to immediately place the OPERABLE CREFS train in the emergency (continued)

WOG STS B 3.7-53 Rev 1, 04/07/95

-e e.- ..m=.-n.e --. - -

. . _ _ _ . , _ _ . . _ _ . m _ . _ _ _ . . , _ -

1 I

CREFS B 3.7.10 )

BASES

)STPS% i l ACTIONS C.1/ M and C.2 d continued) mode. This 7 action ensures that the remaining train is j OPERABLE, that no failures preventing automatic actuation !

will occur, and that any active failure would be readily detected. ,

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that could result in a release of ]

l radioactivity that might require isolation of the control i room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

Required Action C.1 is modified by a Note indicating to place the system in the toxic gas protection mode if automatic transfer to toxic gas protection mode is inoperable.

D.1 @ " W

[In MODE 5 or 6 or] durina movement of irradiated fuel assemblies t g, ~mn rm m.

-omum with two CREFS trains inoperable, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that could result in a releasa of radioactivity that might enter the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes accident risk.

This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

1.d If both CREFS trains are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the CREFS may not be capable of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside the accident analyses. Therefore, LC0 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.10.1 REQUIREMENTS-Standby systems should be checked )eriodically to ensure that they function properly. As t1e environment and normal operating conditions on this system are not too severe, (continued)

WOG STS B 3.7-54 Rev1,04/07/95

. 1 CREATCS B 3.7.11 BASES (continued) bIFSl'&I LC0 Two independent and redundant trains of the CREATCS are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, assuming a single failure disabling the other l train. Total system failure could result in the equipment '

operating temperature exceeding limits in the event of an i accident.

l The CREATCS is considered to be OPERABLE when the individual l components necessary to maintain the control room !

temperature are OPERABLE in both trains. These components I include the heating and cooling coils and associated. j temperature control instrumentation. In addition, the i CREATCS must be operable to the extent that air circulation can be maintained. l l

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, [5, and 6,] and during movement of o.MM

=

irradiated fuel assemblies 'ti ex C^or a' -

=Y the CREATCS must be OPERABLE to ensure that the control room l

i tempv ature will not exceed equipment operational requirements following isolation of the control room. m

[In MODE 5 or 6,] CREATCS me.y not be required for those facilities that do not require automatic control room [ .

i isolation.

ACTIONS A.1 With one CREATCS train inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 30 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREATCS train is adequate to maintain the control room temperature within limits. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE CREATCS train could result in loss of CREATCS function. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event requiring control room isolation, the consideration that the remaining train can provide the required protection, and that alternate safety or nonsafety related cooling means are available.

(continued)

WOG STS B 3.7-58 Rev 1, 04/07/95 1

_ _ _ z _ __ ~~ ~~ ~~.12 _

)

CREATCS B 3.7.11 BASES TsTFS(A/

ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (centinued)

In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable CREATCS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes the risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be ) laced in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 5 witiin 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

C.1 and C.2 ha.Mg (In MODE 5 or 6, or] durina movement of f irradiated fuel J 7, r c r m; w;a. ALTEPF I= u , if the inoperable CREATCS

rain cannot ce restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE CREATCS train must be placed in operation immediately. This action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE, that no failures preventing automatic actuation will occur, and that active failures will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

D.1 MY fmud (In MODE 5 or 6, or] during movement of h irradiated fuel ass W: 11esk nr num wE Ai.iUdT!ONS", with two CREATCS trains inoperable, action must be taken immediately to

, suspend activities that could result in a release of radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

(continued)

WOG STS B 3.7-59 Rev1,04/07/95 s _ . ._

1 i

FBACS l B 3.7.13 l T5TM%/ i BASES'(continued)

APPLICABLE The FBACS design basis is established by the consequences of SAFETY ANALYSES the limiting Design Basis Accident (DBA), which is a fuel F 1 handlina accident The analysis of the fuel handling s

( j accident, given in Reference 3, assumes that all fuel rods in an assembly are damaged. The analysis of the LOCA

o. assumes that radioactive materials leaked from the Emergency

^ Core Cooling System (ECCS) are filtered and adsorbed by the FBACS. The DBA analysis of the fuel handling accident assumes that only one train of the FBACS is functional due to a single failure that disables the other train. The accident analysis accounts for the reduction in airborne radioactive material provided by the one remaining train of this filtration system. The amount of fission products e available for release from the fuel handling buildin hakC, determined for a fuel handling accident and for a L0 bis

--9These assumptions and the analysis follow the guidance

( -

provided in Regulatory Guide 1.25 (Ref. 4).

The FBACS satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LC0 Two independent and redundant trains of the FBACS are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one train is available, assuming a single failure that disables the other train, coincident with a loss of offsite >ower. Total system failure could result in the atmosp1eric release from the fuel handling building exceeding the 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 5) limits in the event of a fuel handling accidentg I The FBACS is considered OPERABLE when the individual i C.

components necessary to control exposure in the fuel handling building are OPERABLE in both trains. An FBACS train is considered OPERABLE when its associated:

a. Fan is OPERABLE; 3

. b. HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber are not excessively restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration function; and

c. Heater, desister, ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.

l l

l (continued) idOG STS B 3.7-67 Rev 1, 04/07/g5 l

?.~._v.- .__: v~~ - m . -- --

FBACS B 3.7.13 BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the FBACS is required to be OPERABLE to provide fission product removal associated with ECCS leaks due to a LOCA and leakage from containment and annulus.

In MODE 5 or 6, the FBACS is not required to be OPERABLE

( since the ECCS is not required to be OPERABLE.

During movement oFirradiated fuel in the fuel handling area, the FBACS is required to be OPERABLE to alleviate the consequences of a fuel handling accident.

ACTIONS A_d With one FBACS train inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. During this period, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the FBACS function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the risk from an event occurring requiring the inoperable FBACS train, and the remaining FBACS train providing the required protection.

B.1 and B.2 In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, when Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within the associated Com)letion Time, or when both FBACS trains are inoperable, tie unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner. and without challenging unit systems.

C.1 and C.2 bCCCA When Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, during movement ofd rradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building, the OPERABLE FBACS train must be started immediately opfuel movement suspended.

This action ensures that the{ remaining train is OPERABLE, i _ -- -

y k& E%A 0A(continued)

WOG STS B 3.7-68 Rev1,04/07/95

FBACS B 3.7.13 l STF-Ell.1 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.t (continued)

~

that no undetected failures preventing system operation will

_ _ _ ] occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

D* If the system is nothla_ced in operation, this action

\tca8 requires suspension ofVuel movement, which precludes a fuel handling accident This does not preclude the movement of fuel assemblies t safe position, Ed we

{ 4 J temMl '

I When two trains of the FBACS are inoperable during movement of+ irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building, action I must be taken to place the unit in a condition in which the L LCO does not apply.1 Action must be taken immediately to suspena movement offirradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.13.1 REQUIREMENTS Standby systems should be checked seriodically to ensure 4 that they function properly. As t1e environmental and l normal operating conditions on this system are not severe, i testing each train once every month provides an adequate '

check on this system.

l Monthly heater operation dries out any moisture accumulated in the charcoal from humidity in the ambient air. [ Systems with heaters must be operated for = 10 continuous hours with the heaters energized. Systems without heaters need only be operated for = 15 minutes to demonstrate the function of the ,

system.] The 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliability of the equipment and the two train redundancy available.

SR 3.7.13.2 This SR verifies that the required FBACS testing is performed in accordance with the [ Ventilation Filter Testing (continued)

WOG STS . B 3.7-69 Rev1,04/07/95

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ~ bd./

B 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC sources is provided in the Bases for LC0 3.8.1, "AC Sources-0perating."

APPLICABLE The OPERABILITY of'the minimum AC sources during MODES 5 SAFETY ANALYSES and 6 and during movement of, irradiated fuel assemblies ensures that: g4 g

a. The unit can be maintained In the s tdown or refueling, condition for extended periods;

.b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

c. Adequate AC electrical power is provided to mitigate y events postulated during shutdown, such as a fuel g handling accident 9 In general, when the unit is shut down, the Technical Specifications requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or all onsite power is not 1 required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that I that are analyzed in l many MODES Design 1, 2, 3,Basis and 4 Accidents (DBAs)fic analyses in MODES 5 have no speci 1' and 6. Worst case bounding events are deemed not credible in MODES 5 and 6 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and the corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrence being significantly reduced or eliminated, and in minimal consequences. These deviations ,

~

from DBA analysis assumptions and design requirements during !

shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCO for required ,

l systems. .

. During MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, various deviations from the analysis assumptions and design requirements are allowed (continued)

WOG STS B 3.8-35 Rev1,04/07/95

= - _ . _ . . , .

1 1

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 T5 T/r- r/, A/

BASES LCO provide electrical power support, assuming a loss of the (continued) offsite circuit. Together, OPERABILITY of the required offsite circuit and DG ensures the availability of sufficient AC sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated eventsJ uring shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidentQ. In3@

~

The qualified offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the Engineered Safety .

Feature (ESF) bus (es). Qualified offsite circuits are those {

that are described in the FSAR and are part of the licensing '

basis for the unit.

offsite circuit #1 consists of Safeguards Transformer B, which is supplied from Switchyard Bus B, and is fed through breaker 52-3 powering the ESF transformer XNB01, which, in turn, powers the #1 ESF bus through its normal feeder !

breaker. The second offsite circuit consists of the Startup Transformer, which is normally fed from the Switchyard Bus A, and is fed through breaker PA 0201 powering the ESF l transformer, which, in turn, powers the #2 ESF bus through )

its normal feeder breaker. _

{

The DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This sequence must be accomplished within [10] seconds. The DG must be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby with the engine hot and DG in standby at ambient conditions.

Proper sequencing of loads, including tripping of nonessential loads, is a required function for DG OPERABILITY. ;

In addition, proper sequencer operation is an integral part l of offsite circuit OPERABILITY since its inoperability J impacts on the ability to start and maintain energized loads required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.10.

(continued)

WOG STS B 3.8-37 Rev1,04/07/95

1 l

AC Sources-Shutdown f B 3.8.2 73 TF- s-/4,./ )

BASES ,

J LC0 It is acceptable for trains to be cross tied during shutdown (continued) conditions, allowing a single offsite power circuit to supply all required trains.

APPLICABILITY The AC sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies provide assurance that: ggg

a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core; l b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident lw ; are available;

\

1

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The AC power requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.1.

ACTIONS Ad An offsite circuit would be considered inoperable if it were not available to one required ESF train. Although two q trainsoffsite are required by LC0 3.8.10, the one train with power available may be capable of supporting

{ced } sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE l

i k r= 8 A A ALTERATIONS and. fuel movement. By the allowance of the option to ceclare required featurer, inoperable, with no 1 offsite power available, appropriate restrictions will be i implemented in accordance with the affected required features LCO's ACTIONS.

(continued)

WOG STS B 3.8-38 Rev1,04/07/95

_ T ~ ~~ - . _ , . _ _ . . . _ .* * ~Z ' ' _ _ . _ _ . . . - '

... ? ~ ~

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 Ts Tf-st, L.i BASES ACTIONS A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. A.2.4. B.I. B.2. B.3, and B.4 (continued)

With the offsite circuit not available to all required '

trains, the option would still exist to declare all required features inoperable. Since this option may involve undesired administrative efforts, the allowance for I sufficiently conservative actions is made. With the l mg9] required DG inoperable, the minimum required' diversity of AC power sources is not available. It is, therefore, required to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement$ of irradiated fuel assemblies, ano operations involving positive reactivity additions. The Required Action to suspend positive reactivity additions does not preclude actions to maintain or increase reactor vessel inventory provided the required SDM is maintained.

Suspension of these activities does not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize the probability or the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC sources and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary AC power to the unit safety j systems.

The completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention,. The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the unit safety systems may be without sufficient power.

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System's ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it are inoperable, resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition A are modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition A is entered with no AC power to any required ESF bus, the ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.10 must be immediately entered. This Note allows Condition A to provide requirements for the loss of the offsite circuit, whether or not a train is de-energized. LCO 3.8.10 would provide the app'ropriate restrictions for the situation involving a de-energized train.

I (continued)

WOG STS B 3.8-39 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l

- e -w hpoe --se-a- . mom e +% ,-' ** an . gap , .,q,, , , , - ~4-4 , -4 m.-

DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases for LC0 3.8.4, "DC Sources-0perating.*-

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter [6] (Ref.1) and Chapter (15] (Ref. 2), assume that Engine 6 red Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the diesel generators, emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation.

The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC electrical power sources durigliesensuresthat: MODES 5 and 6 and during movement of+1rra asse g g

a. The unit can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

c. Adequate DC electrical power is provided to mitigate 1%g events postulated during shutdown, such as a fuel handlingaccident(9

{7 The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy

- Statement.

1 LC0 The DC electrical power subsystems, each subsystem consisting of two batteries, one battery charger per battery, and the corresponding control equipment and (continued)

W0G STS B 3.8-60 Rev1,04/07/95 4"-w * -~ *mg.,,eea. ,, v.p,,. .y. ,%,%, , . _ _ , .

1 DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5 BASES Sf(th) ,

i interconnecting cabling within the train, are required to be LC0 (continued) OPERABLE to support required trains of the distribution systems required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.10, " Distribution ,

Systems-Shutdown." This ensures the availability of 1 sufficient DC electrical power sources to operate the unit l in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling Fg g accidentp.

C APPLICABILITY The DC electrical power sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6, and during movementgof irradiated fuel a2semblies, provide assurance that: ggg

a. Required features to provide adequate coolant ]

inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel , j assemblies in the core;

b. Required features needed to mitigate a fuel handling ,

j accident,are available; j u .T j c. Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown 3 are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.4.

ACTIONS A.1. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3, and A.2.4 If two trains are required by LC0 3.8.10, the remaining train with DC power available may be capable of supporting Gs.udth sufficient e tems to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS 4

pg and fuel movement. By allowing the option to declare fTii0 ired features inoperable with the associated PC sower source (s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions will m implemented in accordance with the affected required features LCO ACTIONS. In many instances, this option may

. involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the (continued)

WOG STS B 3.8-61 Rev 1, 04/07/95

- :: X: . - - - - - ;~ ~ L__

DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5 BASES ACTIONS A.1. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3, and A.2.4 (continued) r o.,.dQ allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made J (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of* irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions). The Required Action to suspend positive reactivity additions does not preclude actions to maintain or increase reactor vessel inventory, provided the required SDM is maintained.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required DC electrical power subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary DC electrical power to the unit safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required DC electrical power subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the unit safety systems may be without sufficient power.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.5.1 l REQUIREMENTS l SR 3.8.5.1 requires performance of all Surveillances required by SR 3.844.1 through SR 3.8.4.8. Therefore, see i the corresponding banes for LCO 3.8.4 for a discussion of i each SR. l This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Nate is ,

to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DC sources from being discharged below their capability to provide the required

. power supply or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs. It is the intent that these SRs must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required.

(continued)

WOG STS B 3.8-62 Rev 1, 04/07/95

= :-- - :- _ - -- - - -

l Inverters-Shutdown B 3.8.8 !

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.8 Inverters-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the inverters is provided in the Bases for .

LCO 3.8.7, " Inverters-Operating." l l

l APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and )

SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter (6) (Ref.1) and '

Chapter (15] (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The DC to AC inverters are designed to provide the required capacity, capability, redundancy, I and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to the Reactor Protective System and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation and controls so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment !

design limits are not exceeded.

The OPERABILITY of the inverters is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the spported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum inverters to each AC vital I bus during MODES 5 and 6 ensures that: ;

1

a. The unit can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

c. Adequate power is available to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as a fuel handling

.Tnd accidentf d The inverters were previously identified as part of the distribution system and, as such, satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

(continued)

WOG STS B 3.8-75 Rev 1, 04/07/95

...__. -~ 1:: Z ~ '" ~ _. _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ . ._ ~: -

I Inverters-Shutdown B 3.8.8 BASES (continued)

LC0 The inverters ensure the availability of electrical power for the instrumentation for systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated DBA. The battery powered inverters provide uninterruptible supply of AC alectrical power to the AC vital buses even if the l 4.16ckV safety buses are de-energized. OPERABILITY of the I inverters requires that the AC vital bus be powered by the '

inverter. This ensures the availability of sufficient inverter power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accident r D APPLICABILITY The inverters required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 and i during movement ofQrradiated fuel assemblies provide I assurance that:

a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup l are available for the irradiated fuel in the core; l

b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident i pTM i

1 vare available; i' T " >

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

Inverter requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.7.

ACTIONS A.1. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. and A.2.4 If two trains are required by LCO 3.8.10. " Distribution Systems-Shutdown," the remaining OPERABLE Inverters may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for sitive reactivity additions. By the allowance of tion to declare D .c.m. M O

\cn=MM (continued)'

WOG STS B 3.8-76 Rev1,04/07/95 i

6-' , - es<w-- A g e, e,6 .,w.-g4 g ape r a i-meH.m.me5.a,b,%+..

Inverters-Shutdown B 3.8.8 TS 7~F-s~6pn.i BASES ACTIONS A.I. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. and A.2.4 (continued) required features inoperable with the associated inverter (s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions will be implemented in accordance with the affected required features LCOs' Required Actions. In many instances, this o> tion may involve undesired administrative efforts. Taarefore, the allowance fde sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement o rradiated _

fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivityadditions). The Required Action to suspend bm4 positive reactivity additions does not preclude actions to maintain or increase reactor vessel inventory, provided the required SDM is maintained.

Suspension of these activities shall 'not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required inverters and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary inverter power to the unit safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required inverters should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the unit safety systems may be without power or powered from a constant voltage source transformer.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the inverters are functioning properly with all required circuit breakers closed and AC vital buses energized from the inverter. The verification of proper voltage and frequency output ensures that the required power is readily available for the instrumentation connected to the AC vital buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the inverters and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to inverter malfunctions.

(continued)-

WOG STS B 3.8-77 Rev 1, 04/07/95

- . . . . .,,,,...--4 .%w.- -r -- . . --,,_% . -- -.

Distribution Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.10 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown BASES DACKGROUND A description of the (C, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.9, " Distribution Systems-Operating."

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter (6) (Ref.1) and Chapter [15] (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

The OPERABILITY of the AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution system is consistent with the initial assumstions of the accident analyses and the requirements for tie supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The UPERABiLITY of the minimum AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems during MODES 5 and 6, and during movement of 4irradiated __ fuel assemblies

. ensures that: y

a. The unit can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and Adequate power is provided to mitigate events r IQ] c.

postulated during shutdown, such as a fuel handling accident $

The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

(continued)

WOG STS B 3.8-89 Rev 1, 04/07/95

^~ '

. .-_ . .--. L.1- -

- - . - _ . ..- l l

Distribution Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.10 BASES (continued)

LCO Various combinations of subsystems, equipment, and components are required OPERABLE by other LCOs, depending on the specific plant condition. Implicit in those requirements is the required OPERABILITY of necessary support required features. This LCO explicitly requires energization of the portions of the electrical distribution system necessary to support OPERABILITY of required systems, equipment, and components-all specifically addressed in each LCO and implicitly required via the definition of OPERABILITY. ,

Maintaining these portions of the distribution system energized ensures the availability of sufficient power to operate the unit in a safe manner to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g.,

fuel handling accident y APPLICABILITY The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, provide assurance that: 3

a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core;

%,M b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident y are available; y

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition and refueling condition.

The AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.9.

(continued)

WOG STS B 3.8-90 Rev I, 04/07/95 1

e+, e. . w ww. ,

- = **-% * * --e p ...m., , , , , ,,

Distribution Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.10 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A.I. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. A.2.4. and A.2.5 Although redundant required features may require redundant trains of electrical power distribution subsystems to be OPERABLE, one OPERABLE distribution subsystem train may be

( c. a & Q capable of suonortina sufficient reautred features to allow igg J continuation of CORE ALTERATION $ andTuel movement. By 1

allowing the option to declare required features associated with an inoperable distribution subsystem inoperable, a)propriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with t1e affected distribution subsystem LCO's Required Actions.

In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend

[cteMM CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving o ive reactivity additions).

Suspension of these activities does not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary power to the unit safety systems.

Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, a required residual heat removal (RHR) subsystem may be inoperable. In this case, Required Actions A.2.1 through A.2.4 do not adequately address the concerns relating to coolant circulation and heat removal. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the RHR ACTIONS would not be entered.

Therefore, Required Action A.2.5 is provided to direct declaring RHR inoperable, which results in taking the appropriate RHR actions.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required distribution subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the unit safety systems may be without power.

(continued)

WOG STS B 3.8-91 Rev1,04/07/95 l

. - . = _ _ _ - - -

j

Ts TF-5Ife,. i CEOG Inmarts 1

Insert A !

[(i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] ,

days)]

Insart B Alternately, action must be taken to place the unit in a condition where the LCO does not apply. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

Inmart C ,

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a !

critical reactor core within the previous [X) days)]

Insert D I

[Due to radioactive decay, CPIS is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a .

critical reactor core within the previous [X] days)]. l Insert E 1

[Due to radioactive decay, CRIS is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days)].

Inmart F

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel) insert G

[Due to radioactive decay, FHIS is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] a ys)].

Inmart H IDue to radioactive decay, CREACS is only required to cope with fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days)].

. - _ _ - ~~'~_. ~~

. 1 TS TF-5% t CEOG Inserts insert I

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, FBACS is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X]

days)].

Insert J

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, AC electrical power is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days)].

I insert K

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, DC electrical power is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days).]

Inmart L

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, the inverters are only' required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days).]

insert M

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days).]

Inmart N

[ irradiated fuel movement with containment closure capability or a minimum decay time of [X] days.,without containment closure capability]

insert O

[ Additionally, due to radioactive decay, a fuel handling accident involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days) will result in doses that are well within the guideline values specified in 10 CFR 100 oven without containment closure capability.]

. .~

~

z- _ . -.a.-.=-.-.-_.-- -

. 2. -

T5 TF-5lb.c BWR 6 Inserts insert N

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, AC and DC electrical power is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous

(X) days).]

l l

l 9

l l

l

< - - ~ . . . . _ - . .__.

' ' " 'h=-e w w -wgm s . _

l 937F44 A /

CEOG Inse_ rig insert P REVIEWER'S NOTE The addition of the term "recently" associated with handling irradiated fuel in L!l of the containment function Technical Specification requirements is only applicable to those licensees who have demonstrated by analysis that after sufficient radioactive decay has occurred, off-site doses resulting from a fuel handling accident remal i below the Standard Review Plan limits (well within 10CFR100).

Additionally, licensees adding the term "recently" mest make the following j commitment which is consistent with draft NUMARC 93-01, Revision 3 Sectica !

I 11.2.6 " Safety Assessment for Removal of Equipment from Service During Shutdown Conditions" , subheading " Containment - Primary (PWR)/ Secondary (BWR)".

l "The following guidelines are included in the assessment of systems removed from service during movement of irradiated fuel: ,

- During fuel handling / core alterations, ventilation system and radiation monitor availablihy (as defined in NUMARC 91-06) should be assessed, with respect to filtration and monitoring of releases from the fuel. Following shutdown, radioactivity in the fuel decays away fairly rapidly. The basis of the Technical Specification operability amendment is the reduction in doses due to such !

decay. The goal of maintaining ventilation system and radiation monitor {

availability is to reduce doses even further below that provided by the natural j decay. 1

- A single normal or contingency method to promptly close primary or secondary )

containment penetrations should be developed. Such prompt methods need not completely block the penetration or be capab!e of resisting pressure.

The purpose of the " prompt methods" mentioned above are to enable ventilation systems to draw the release from a postulated fuel handling accident in the proper i l

direction such that it can be treated and monitored."

E

.y __ -. .- 4 , m_. . -

1 CPIS (Analog) 3.3.7 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION l

. i 3.3.7 Containment Purge Isolation Signal (CPIS) (Analog) l LCO 3.3.7 [Four] C.PIS containment radiation monitor channels and one l ,CPIS automatic Actuation Logic and one Manual Trip train-I shall be OPERABLE.

= _

3 g,,,

APPLICABILITY: .a C03: "LT:MTiGiQa (During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment. _

Cn.uM%g_ 3) l ACTIONS <

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COM.PLETION TIME l <

l A. One radiation monitor A.1 Place the affected 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months i channel inoperable. channel in trip.

E I

.2.1 uspe Imm tely A

~

A.2[Suspendmovementof Immediately

. irradiated fuel D % ~ assemblies within containment.

l B. One required Manual B.1 Place and maintain Immediately Trip or automatic containment purge and l '

Actuation Logic train exhaust valves in inoperable, closed position.

I 1

E 8.!E i

(continued)

CEOG STS 3.3-30 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l

l

. : = -- :. :. -- ~'

CRIS (Analog) 3.3.8 Tsrf-srtju,,

3.3 INSTRUMENTATION ,

3.3.8 Control Room Isolation Signal (CRIS) (Analog)

LCO 3.3.8 One CRIS' channel shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2,_3, 4 :, 5,and 6),

. . . . ....m.m.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

Cet M ACTIONS -

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. CRIS Manual Trip, A.1 --------NOTE---------

Actuation Logic, or Place Control Room (one or more required Emergency Air Cleanup channels of System (CREACS) in particulate / iodine or toxic gas protection gaseous) radiation mode if automatic monitors inoperable in transfer to toxic gas MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. protection mode inoperable. ;

Place one CREACS 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months train in emergency radiation protection ,

mode.

l l

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A _AE not met.

8.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued)

CEOG STS 3.3-33 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l

m e-*, - ,. ...~,4.._- - . - - - ,.,g,,., s ,_,

CRIS (Analog) l 3.3.8 l ACTIONS (continued) ,

CONDITION COMPLETION TIME I REQUIRED ACTION C. CRIS Manual Trip, C.1 --------NOTE---------

Actuation Logic, or- Place CREACS in toxic

[one or more required gas protection mode channels of if automatic transfer particulate / iodine or to toxic gas gaseous) radiation protection mode monitors inoperable inoperable.

[in MODE S or 6,) ---------------------

during Place one CREACS Immediately movement of irradiated train in emergency fuel assemb radiation protection '

mode. l Cetc1 M Li -

g C.2.1 Suspend movement of Immediately j irradiated fuel ;

j] assemblies. .

p*Cct.ca- AND C.2.2 Suspend positive Immediately reactivity additions.

!E -

.2.3 uspend C V edi ly RATIONS. -

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.8.1 Perform a CHANNEL CNECK on the required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months control room radiation monitor channel.

(continued)

CEOG STS 3.3-34 Rev 1, 04/07/95

-.---.,...-u=. --- --

1 CPIS (Digital) l 3.3.8 l

3.3 INSTRUMENTATION l

l 3.3.8 Containment Purge Isolation Signal (CPIS) (Digital)

l l LC0 3.3.8 One CPIS channel shall be OPERABLE. 4 l

l l

APPLICABILITY: ME0S1 1 2, 3, altd 4. _ \

,- diirr t ceE ' m EIT10R O During movement of rradiated fuel assemblies within containment. gqg i

.............................N0TE----------------------------

Only required when the penetration is not isolated by at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.

ACTIONS l

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l A. CPIS Manual Trip, A.1 Enter applicable Immediately Actuation Logic, or Conditions and one:or more required Required Actions for channels of radiation affected valves of monitors inoperable in LCO 3.6.3, MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. " Containment Isolation Valves,"

made inoperable by CPIS instrumentation.

1 B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met in .AR MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months

, (continued)

CEOG STS 3.3-35 Rev 1, 04/07/95

~

.- .- . . - - ~.C.:. .L --.- : L. - ::.:

CPIS (Digital) 3.3.8 TSTF-stfa ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l

CPIS Manual Trip, C.. C.1 Place and maintain Immediately Actuation Logic, or containment purge and one or more required exhaust valves in channels of radiation closed position.

monitorgerable

m b503 .1 I atel 1

m6vement ofi1rradiated Sus d CORE fuel assemb' ithin ALTE ONS.

containment.

ca.nMM)

(

C.2 Suspend movement of Immediately prradiated fuel assemblies in.

containment.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l

SR 3.3.8.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK on required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months l containment area and gaseous radiation I monitor channel.

SR 3.3.8.2 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK on required 7 days containment particulate and iodine radiation monitor channel.

(continued)

CEOG STS 3.3-36 Rev1,04/07/95

,. .. - ,.- - - 2 :.:: L

~

.- -.- ...... - : . ~~

CRIS (Digital) 3.3.9 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.9 Control Room Isolation Signal (CRIS) (Digital)

LC0 3.3.9 One CRIS channel shall be OPERABLE.

I APPLICABILITY: MODES I, 2, 3, 'and' J '. 5, and 6],

d - Sw GRE idiiRAtt92 Juring movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS -

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. CRIS Manual Trip, A.1 --------NOTE---------

Actuation Logic, or Place Control Room (one or more required Emergency Air Cleanup channels of System (CREACS) in particulate / iodine or toxic gas protection gaseous] radiation ,

mode if automatic monitors inoperable in transfer to toxic gas MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. protection mode inoperable.

Place one CREACS 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months train in emergency radiation protection mode.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A_ gg not met.

B.2 Be'in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued)

CE0G STS 3.3-39 Rev 1, 04/07/95

_ _. .~~----- _ !L_ _._ _ _ _ _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _

. CRIS (Digital) 3.3.9 T5 TF-SIfo.1 ACTIONS (continued) i CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETiONTIME C. CRIS Manual Trip, C.1 --------NOTE--------- -

Actuation Logic, or Place CREACS in toxic l required particulate / gas protection mode iodine or gaseous if automatic transfer radiation monitors to toxic gas

. inoperabl in MODE 5 protection mode l or 6 ..rir' inoperable.

n i ATinuc_ or during ---------------------

movement of irradiated i fuel assemblies. Place one CREACS Immediately train in emergency i A radiation protection l L mode.

s. t 1

l a

C.2.1 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.

C.2.2 Suspend positive Immediately reactivity additions.

m

.2. Suspend E I RATION.. \mmedia SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.9.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK on the required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months control room radiation monitor channel.

(continued)

CEOG STS 3.3-40 Rev 1, 04/07/95

. . _ . . . _ _ , _ _ _ . ,m== = .- n _ . . _ _ . - . _-

l

FHIS (Digital) 3.3.10 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.10 Fuel Handling Isolation Signal (FHIS) (Digital)

LC0 3.3.10 One FHIS channel shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: (MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4,]

During movement of irradiated fuel in the fuel building.

ACTIONS QtsAnh CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Actuation Logic, A.1 Place one OPERABLE 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Manual Trip, or (one Fuel Building Air or more required Cleanup System channels of (FBACS) train in particulate / iodine operation.

and gaseous] radiation monitors inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

URequiredActionand B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months l associated Completion !

Time of Condition A AN,2 i not met. -

B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months i

C. Actuation Legic, C.1 Place one OPERABLE Immediately Manual Trip, or (one FBACS train in or more required operation.-

channels of particulate / iodine and 93 gaseous] radiation .

monitors inoperable C.2 Suspend movement of Immediately durina movenent of ; irradiated fuel

> irradiated fuel T assemblies in the assemblies. fuel building.

~

CEOG STS. 3.3-42 RevI,04/07/95

..::=:- - - -,. : - -- - . . . .- ..: : :

CREACS '

3.7.11 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.11 Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System (CREACS)

LC0 3.7.11 Two CREACS trains shall be OPERABLE. I Cice,< at APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, [5 and 6,]

Durina movement of rraliated fuel assemblies ann q; p.qq u m mu g ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CREACS train A.1 Restore CREACS train 7 days inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A 8LQ not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months C. Required Action and C.1 --------NOTE---------

associated Completion Place in toxic gas Time of Condition A protection mode if not met [in MODES 5 automatic transfer to and 6, Drl during toxic gas mode inoperable.

( movement of91rr oated fuel assemblie ---------------------

j IONS Place OPERABLE CREACS Immediately train in emergency .

phM ation protection n

(continued) !

CE0G STS 3.7-24 Rev 1, 04/07/95 i

~

2 :: : : T: 7 . - - - -. - . . - . - - - ~ ..:Tr..~::~r: ~ ' ~ ~

CREACS 3.7.11 TS TF-St,A,. I ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME y _- _ _-

C. (continued) [ .1 Sus ALTE d CORE ONS.

Imedia Imediately

~

C.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblie C ct.e n m \& ~

T D. Two CREACS trains I . Suspend E Ime ately inoperable [in MODES 5 l ALTERATION and 6, or] durina _

f I movementof9rradiateh M fuel assemblies

~

o _ _

Imediately LT ing CD ONS .

D.K1 Suspend movement of tirradiated fuel }

assemblies.

CC5cekd E. Two CREACS trains E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Imediately inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENC.Y SR 3.7.11.1 Operate each CREACS train for 31 days

[a 10 continuous hours with heaters operating or (for systems without heaters)

=15 minutes). )

1 (continued) j CEOG STS 3.7-25 Rev 1, 04/07/95

.- - -- . =2:. . . ':: - 2. . :_ - -

i CREATCS j 3.7.12 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS / S TF- S'lI At 1' i

3.7.12 Control Room Emergency Air Te.5perature Control System (CREATCS)

LC0 3.7.12 Two CREATCS trains shall be OPERABLE. l Cescan y APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3,'4,f:5, and 6,]

During moveme_nt ohirradiated fuel assemblie O A g i.3 = Apr = = n ACTIONS !

l i

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CREATCS train A.1 Restore CREATCS train 30 days inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A SQ not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months

~

C. Required Action and C.1 Place OPERABLE Immediately l associated Completion CREATCS train in i Time of Condition A operation.

not met "in MODE 5 or6,orjdurina gg movement of'irradia ed --

=

f fuel _ assemblies ,

f C.2. Suspend C ediately TERATIONS. I ring [

L , I \ (

I sa Jg C. Suspend movement of Immediately M tirradiated fuel assemblies.

(continued)

CEOG STS 3.7-27 Rev 1, 04/07/95

. . .-.. : . L :L r - -

~ ~~

- .-- .~~-.~~~~

~

CREATCS 3.7.12 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Two CREATCS trains g D.1 3end CORE Imm ately inoperable [in MODE 5 AL ; TIONS.

v me o fuel assemblies , (AN .

g _

J ,

w '

D.Z Suspend movement of Immediately __ i ON .

c i irradinted fuel assemblies.

E. Two CREATCS trains E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l l

SR 3.7.12.1 Verify each CREATCS train has the [18] months capability to remove the assumed heat load.

CEOG STS 3.7-28' Rev 1, 04/07/95

._. _ __.._ 2 r :- _ _ _ . - . 1_ _. z:-- . n::_ . -

FBACS 3.7.14 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.14 Fuel Building Air Cleanup System (FBACS) l LC0 3.7.14 Two FBACS trains shall be OPERABLE.

c.

APPLICABILITY: [ MODES _1, 2, 3, and 4,)

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel

building. .

Cctca M M ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One FBACS train A.1 Restore FBACS train 7 days inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and associated Completion Time AlEl of Condition A not met in MODE 1, 2, B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months 3, or 4.

98 l

~Two FBACS trains inoperable in MODE 1, 1 2, 3, or 4.

C. Required Action and C.1 Place OPERABLE FBACS Inmediately Associated Completion train in operation.

Time (of Condition A) not met durino 98 movement ofh rradiate ,d fuel assemblies in the C.2 Suspend movement of Immediately fuel building. - + irradiated fuel assemblies in the cecanhh fuel building.

(continued)

CEOG STS 3.7-31 Rev1,04/07/95

- ,: . ;-zu_r -

_- :=__- .__:.-

FBACS 3.7.14 T S T F c l, A .i ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Two FBACS trains D.1 Suspend movement of Immediately inoperable durinc _ irradiated fuel movement oftirraciated assemblies in the fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

fuel building.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.14.1 Operate each FBACS train for 31 days

[a 10 continuous hours with the heaters operatingor(forsystemswithoutheaters)

= 15 minutes).

SR 3.7.14.2 Perform required FBACS filter testing in In accordance accordance with the [ Ventilation Filter with the [VFTP)

Testing Program (VFTP)].

SR 3.7.14.3 Verify each FBACS train actuates [18] months on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.14.4 Verify one FBACS train can maintain a (18] months on negativepressuren[]incheswatergauge a STAGGERED with respect to atmospheric pressure, TEST BASIS '

during the [ post accident] mode of operation at a flow rate s [3000) cfs.

(continued)

CEOG STS 3.7-32 Rev1,04/07/95

" - ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~

l AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS l

3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown '

LC0 3.8.2 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE: I

a. One qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE AC electrical power l distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.10,

" Distribution Systems Shutdown";'and ,

b. One diesel generator (DG) capable of supplying one train of the onsite Class IE AC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LC0 3.8.10.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.__

ACTIONS

]

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required offsite ------------NOTE-------------

circuit inoperable. _ Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.10, with one required train de-energized as a result of Condition A.

A.1 Declare affected Immediately required feature (s) with no offsite power available inoperable.

E A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

8!E (continued) l CEOG STS 3.8-19 Rev 1, 04/07/95

- -.--==1.

- - . . . : : :-. ...:=:

l AC Sources-Shutdown ;

3.8.2 !

TSrF-st,s i ;

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2.2 Suspend movement of Imediately c & irradiated fuel 1 assemblies. l m !

A.2.3 Initiate action to Imediately -

suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions.

M A.2.4 Initiate action to Imediately ,

restore required l offsite power circuit CMCAgM] to OPERABLE status.

B. One required DG B.1 Suspend CORE Imediately inoperable. ALTERATIONS.

1 5 j B.2 Suspend movement of Imediately L T irradiated fuel assemblies.

M B.3 Initiate action to Imediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions.

M B.4 Initiate action to Imediately restore required DG to OPERABLE status.

CEOG STS 3.8-20 Rev 1, 04/07/95

. _. ,_ . _ _2 2:1_- . Z -~_. 1 . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . ...~

DC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.5 TS 7F-Si,r.1 ~

3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS l 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown LCO 3.8.5 DC electrical power subsystem shall be'0PERABLE to support the DC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.10, " Distribution Systems-Shutdown."

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, .

1

.During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

Ece.c.a4 )

ACTIONS l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l l

A. One or more required A.1 Declare affected Immediately DC electrical power required feature (s) I subsystems inoperable. inoperable. l l

9.E A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

l A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately

irradiated fuel C.NS 6gM] ~

assemblies.

M A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately I

suspend operations

, involving positive l reactivity additions.

l m (continued) l l

CEOG STS 3.8-29 Rev I, 04/07/95 zzz: :~~ _ .::.71 _.._. .- r

Inverters-Shutdown 3.8.8 T5 TFs%./

3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

.3.8.8 Inverters-Shutdown LCO 3.8.8 Inverter (s) shall be OPERA 8LE to support the onsite Class IE AC vital' bus electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.10, " Distribution Systems-Shutdown."

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. _

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more [ required) A.1 Declare affected Immediately l inverters inoperable. required feature (s) inoperable.

9E A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

8!E A.2.2 Suspend movemer.t of Immediately virradiated fuel assemblies.

]

btQ A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions.

$N.E (continued)

CEOG STS 3.8-37 Rev1,04/07/95

_. . . . . . 1.f T_;Z_Z.L _ _T T ~ _--.. . . - _ _ _.. _

~

Distribution Systers-Shutdown l 3.8.10 T5 TF-S'l %./ i 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown

.LCO 3.8.10 The necessary portion of AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE to support equipment required to be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 , Declare associated Immediately AC, DC, or AC vital supported required

' bus electrical power feature (s) distribution inoperable.

subsystems inoperable.

9.8 A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

M A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately

- > irradiated fuel CNnMat) assemblies.

m A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions.

M (continued)

CE0G STS 3.8-41 Rev1,04/07/95

Containment Penetrations 3.9.3 75 TP- 5 I, L, /

3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations i

LCO 3.9.3 The containment penetrations shall be in the following status:

a. The equipment hatch closed and held in place by (four]

bolts;

b. One door in each air lock closed; and

c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere either:

1. closed by a ma'nual or automatic isolation valve,. !

blind flange, or equivalent, or

2. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System.

APPLICABILITY: i s NRE n5"ffkbh Yuring movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

ACTIONS k

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

= -

A. One or more A.1 uspend at containment A RATIONS ,. ~

penetrations not in required status. AND

. Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel

c. [ assemblies within containment.

CEOG STS 3.9-4 Rev1,04/07/95

,A ,e-.m.--- -+e-M++

n.e - m. -wwe usw , w.% m , _

l CPIS (Analog)

B 3.3.7 Y l busj i LCO .

analysis in order to account for instrument uncertainties (continued) appropriate to the trip Function. These uncertainties are defined in Reference 3. A channel is' inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value.

The Bases for the LC0 on the CPIS are discussed below for each Function:

a. Manual Trio The LCO on Manual Trip backs up the automatic trips and ensures operators have the capability to rapidly initiate the CPIS Function if any parameter is trending toward its setpoint. At least one channel must be OPERABLE to be consistent with the requirements of LCO 3.9.3, " Containment Penetrations."

b. Containment Radiation-Hiah The LC0 on the radiation channels requires thet all four be OPERABLE.

For this unit, the basis for the Containment

__ Radiatior.-High setpoint is as follows: _

c. Actuation Loaic One train of Actuation Logic must be OPERABLE to be consistent with the requirements of LCO 3.9.3. If one fails, it must be restored to OPERABLE status.

i APPLICABILITY In MODE 5 or 6, the CPIS isolation of containment purge _ j valves is not required to be OPERABLE. However, S H w CC L ,

J% TEPA!P c M during movement of rradiated fuel, there is the pessibility of a fuel handlin accident requirTng theT t,PIS on h1gn raajation in containment. Accordingly, the CPIS must be OPERABLE during u m sy enT u --"

a gg go.ca. a --

N moving any+1rradiated fuel in containment. L -

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the containment purge valves are I sealed closed. l 1

(continued)

CEOG STS B 3.3-111 Rev 1, 04/07/95

- -- ==- = = _ _ .

CPIS (Analog)

B 3.3.7 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A CPIS channel is inoperable when it does not satisfy the OPERABILITY criteria for the channel's Function. The most common cause of channel inoperability is outright failure or ,

drift of the bistable or process module sufficient to exceed {

the tolerance allowed by the plant specific setpoint analysis. Typically, the drift'is not large and would !

result in a delay of actuation rather than a total loss of function. This determination is generally made during the ;

performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST when the process 1 instrument is set up for adjustment to bring it within j s)ecification. If the actual trip setpoint is not within j t1e Allowable Value in SR 3.3.7.2, the channel is inoperable and the appropriate Conditions must be entered.

In the event a channel's trip setpoint is found nonconservative with respect to the Allowable Value, or the sensor, instrument loop, signal processing electronics, or bistable is found inoperable, then all affected Functions provided by that channel should be declared inoperable and the LCO Condition entered for the particular protective ,

function affected. i 1

When the number of inoperable channels in a trip Function exceeds those specified in any related Condition associated with the same trip Function, then the plant is outside the safety analysis. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 should be immediately entered if applicable in the current MODE of operation.

A.1. A.2m [

Condition A applies to the failure of one Containment Radiation-High CPIS channel. The Required Action is to place the affected channel in the trip condition within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The Completion Time accounts for the fact that three redundant channels monitoring containment radiation are still available to provide a single trip input to the CPIS logic to provide the automatic mitigation of a radiation release. y 4 '

t G J B.1 and B.2 Condition B applies to the failure of the required Manual Trip or automatic Actuation Logic train, to the failure of more than one radiation monitoring channel, or if the (continued)

CE0G STS B 3.3-112 Rev1,04/07/95

~~

- ==== ~r.~ L -.- - .- - . -

CRIS (Analog)

B 3.3.8 BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY The CRIS Functions must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 and (MODE 5 or 6], - .o Coa- t m e t and during q o ensure a habitable ;

environment for the control room operators Cet " g h _ movement of irradiated fuel assemblies LM l A a For those plants that credit gas decay tank rupture accidents, the CRIS must also be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6.

ACTIONS A CRIS channel is inoperable when it does not satisfy the OPERABILITY criteria for the channel's function. The most .

common cause of channel inoperability is outright failure or )

drift of the bistable or process module sufficient to exceed )

the tolerance allowed by the plant specific setpoint :

analysis. Typically, the drift is not large and would result in a delay of actuation rather than a total loss of j function. This determination is generally made during the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST when the process instrument is set up for adjustment to bring it within l specification. If the trip setpoint is not within the {

Allowable Value, the channel is inoperable and the l appr.opriate Conditions must be entered. j A.I. B.I. B.2. C.I. C.2.1, w

O-4 Conditions A and C have been modified by a Note, which specifies that CREACS be placed manually in the toxic gas protection mode if the automatic transfer to the toxic gas protection mode is inoperable. (At this unit, the basis for this Note is as follows:]

Conditions A, B, and C are applicable to manual and automatic actuation of the CREACS by CRIS. Condition A applies to the failure af the CRIS Manual Trip, Actuation Logic, and required particulate / iodine and required gaseous radiation monitor channels in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. Entry l into this Condition requires action to either restore the failed channel (s) or manually perform the CRIS safety ,

function (Required Action A.1). The Completion Time of i 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is sufficient to complete the Required Actions and accounts for the fact that CRIS supplements control room isolation by other Functions (e.g., SIAS) in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. If the channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 (continued)

CEOG STS B 3.3-120 Rev 1, 04/07/95

~

Z Z Z ~ Z i Z .~~~ T __

CRIS (Analog)

B 3.3.8 Ts7F57,/cki ACTIONS A.I. B.1. B.2. C.1. C.2.1. continued) does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months (Required Action B.1) and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (Required Action B.2). The Completion Times of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months for reaching MODES 3 and 5 from MODE I are reasonable, based on operating experience and normal cooldown rates, for reaching the required MODE from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant safety systems or operators.

Condition C applies to the failure of CRIS Manual Trip, Actuation Logic, and required particulate / iodine and requigdgaseousradiationmonitorchannels(inMODE5 or 6], T P n; 7 0 i M *J! = ,B or when movin Tirradiate assembi'es. Tlie Required Actions are immediate y taken to place one OPERABLE CREACS train in the emeroenty radiation ,L '

~

protection mode or t uspendcan n=^JMrtu positive reactivity additions and movement ofe rradiated fuel assemblies. The Co etion Time recognizes tne fact that WT -

the radiation signals are the only Functions available to initiate control room isolation in the event of a fuel j handling acciden Q J SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.8.1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value.

Significant deviations bet een the two instrument channels could be an indication of c tessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(continued)

CEOG STS B 3.3-121 Rev 1, 04/07/95

. . . .- - - : .-. :L-- . _ ~~ ~ ~

~'

~ ~ : -.. .-

CPIS (Digital)

B 3.3.8 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION _

B 3.3.8 Containment Purge Isolation Signal (CPIS) (Digital)

BASES BACKGROUND This LCO encompasses the CPIS, which is a plant specific instrumentation channel that perfories an actuation function required for plant protection but is not otherwise included in LCO 3.3.6, " Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Logic and Manual Trip," or LCO 3.3.7, " Diesel Generator (DG)-Loss of Voltage Start (LOVS)." Individual plants shall include the CPIS Function and LCO requirements that are applicable to them.

- t idM

^ The CPIS provides protection from adioactive contamination Oo h the containment in the event a fuel assembly should be severely damaged during handling. It also closes the purge valves during clant operation in response to a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak.

The CPIS will detect any abnormal amounts of radioactive material in the containment and will initiate purge valve closure to limit the release of radioactivity to the environment. Both the minipurge and large volume purge supply and exhaust valves are closed on a CPIS when a high radiation level in containment is detected.

The CPIS includes two independent, redundant logic subsystems, including actuation trains. Each train employs four sensors, each one detecting one of the following:

Gaseous e Airborne particulate

Iodine e Gamma (area)

If any one of these sensors exceeds the bistable trip setpoint, the CPIS train will be actuated (one-out-of-four logic).

Each train actuates a separate series valve in the containment purge supply and return lines. Either train controls sufficient equipment to perform the isolation (continued)

CEOG STS B 3.3-138 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l

l

_ _ - - '~T1__ - 1 J _ J. ~ ~ T !

CPIS (Digital)

B 3.3.8 4 TS 7/:-5t/sj BASES i

l BACKGROUND function. These valves are also isolated on a Safety (continued) Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) and Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS). .

i Trio Setpoints and Allowable Values Trip setpoints used in the bistables are based on the analytical limits (Ref.1). The selection of these trip setpoints is such that adequate protection is provided when

all sensor and processing time delays are taken into account. To allow for calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, and instrument drift, trip setpoint Allowable Values s secified in LCO 3.3.8 are conservatively adjusted witi respect to the analytical limits. A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate the trip setpoints, including their explicit uncertainties, is provided in " Plant Protection System Selection of Trip Setpoint Values" (Ref. 2). The actual nominal trip setpoint entered into the bistable.is normally still more conservative than that specified by the Allowable j Value to account for changes in random measurement errors detectable by a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. One example of such a change in measurement error is drift during the surveillance interval. If the measured setpoint does not exceed the Allowable Value, the bistable is considered OPERABLE.

Setpoints in accordance with the Allowable Value will ensure that safety limits are not violated during anticipated operational occurrences (A00s) and the consequences of Design Basis Accidents will be acceptable, providing the plant is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the A00 or accident and the equipment functions as designed.

APPLICABLE The CPIS is a backup to the CIAS systems in MODES 1, 2, 3, SAFETY ANALYSES and 4 and will close the containment purge valves in the event of high radiation levels resulting from a primary leak in the containment. I The CPIS is also required to close the containment purge 1 Mq valves in the event of the fuel handling accident in C ~

containment, as described in Reference 1. This accident is a limiting case representing a class of accidents that might (continued)

CE0G STS B 3.3-139 Rev1,04/07/95

~

- -. ._ . .. L - . ~L -- -- - -

i

i CPIS (Digital)

B 3.3.s BASES Ts TPste i APPLICABLE involve radiation release in containment without CIAS SAFETY ANALYSES actuation. The CPIS ensures the consequences of a dropped (continued) fuel assembly in containment are not as severe as a dropped assembly in the fuel handling building. This ensures that M the offsite consequences of radiation accidents in M containment are within 10 CFR 100 limits (Ref. 3).

The CPIS satisfies the requirements of Criterion 3 of the

' NRC Policy Statement.

I LC0 LCO 3.3.8 requires one CPIS channel to be OPERABLE. The

! required channel consists of [ particulate, iodine, gaseous, ;

and area radiation monitors]; Actuation Logic; and Manual .

Trip. The specific Allowable Values for the setpoints of the CPIS are listed in the SRs.

Only the Allowable Values are specified for each trip Function in the LCO. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable, provided that the difference between the nominal trip setpoint and the Allowable Value is equal to or greater than the drift allowance assumed for each trip in the transient and accident analyses. A channel l 1s inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its Allowable Value.

l Each Allowable Value specified is more conservative than the i analytical limit assumed in the transient and accident l analysis in order to account for instrument uncertainties appropriate to the trip function. These uncertainties are defined in the " Plant Protection System Selection of Trip Setpoint Values" (Ref. 2).

The Bases for the LC0 on CPIS are discussed below for each Function:

a. Manual Trio i

The LCO on Manual Trip backs up the automatic trip and ensures operators have the capability to rapidly initiate the CPIS Function if any parameter is trending toward its setpoint. Only one manual channel of CPIS is required in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, since the l

CPIS is redundant with the CIAS and SIAS. 'Only one (continued)

CEOG STS B 3.3-140 Rev1,04/07/95 l

- -_ : = = = = - - :.2 _- . _ . : ::: :-

CPIS (Digital)

B 3.3.s TS TF-Sifu.i BASES LC0 a. Manual Trio (continued) manual channel of CPIS is required during CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, since there are additional means of 3 closing the containment purge valves in the event of a channel failure.

b. Airborne Radiation and Containment Area Radiatigg The LC0 on the radiation channels requires that each channel be OPERABLE for each Actuation Logic channel, since they are not totally redundant to each other.

The trip setpoint of twice background is selected to allow detection of small deviations from normal. The absolute value of ti;e trip setpoint in MODES 5 and 6 differs from the setpoint in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 so that a fuel handling accident can be detected in the lower background radiation expected in these MODES.

c. Actuation Loaic One channel of Actuation Logic is required, since the valves can be shut independently of the CPIS signal either manually from the control room or using either the SIAS or CIAS push button.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the minipurge valves may be open.

In the MODES, it is necessary to ensure the valves will shut in the event of a primary leak in containment whenever any of the containment purge valves are open.

With the purge valves open during@."15"'J5b2 AcA M gk movement there is of9rradiated fuelofassemblies withinaccident containment, the possibility a fuel handling requiring CPIS on high radiation in containment. 4 ILM g

il j

The APPLICASILITY is modified by a Note, which states that the CPIS Specification is only required when the penetration is not isolated by at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.

(continued)

CE0G STS B 3.3-141 Rev1,04/07/95

.- _. a.--- .-

= _ -.--

CPIS (Digital)

B 3.3.8 TS7FTtAt i BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued) or 4. 'If Required Action A cannot be' met within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in whici the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within .

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

C.I. C.20 . .nd ".2 Q C Condition C applies to the same conditions as are descr< bed in Condition A; however, the applicability is '" '^^ -

?"' L.r := r/during the movement ofairradiateo fuel assemblies w i thin containment.f Required Action C.1 is to place the containment pwge and exhaust isolation valves in h\ the closed position. rne Required Action immediately perfgtms the isolatlo;Lfunction of the CPIS. Required Acti5nt C.26 .i.; c10%ay be performed in lieu of Required Action C.l. Required Action C. C c g = : t.'.; a . m ,L e m enor um= - > ' - - ^d

^zti;n C.2.2Crequires L suspension of movement ofeirradiated fuel in containment immediately. The Complet'on Time accounts for the fact that the automatic capability to isolate containment on valid containment high radiation signals is degraded during conditions in which a fuel handling accident is possible and CPIS provides the only automatic mitigation of radiation release.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.8.1 REQUIREMENTS !

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred on l the required area and gaseous radiation monitor channels

. used in the CPIS. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison

. of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value.

Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to (continued)

CEOG STS B 3.3-143 Rev 1, 04/07/95

......_--_:==-.- -- -. - . . - -

CRIS (Digital)

B 3.3.9 BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY The CRIS Functions must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 and [ MODE 5 or 6 M r = ce" - W a Tandduring movement ofairradiated fuel assemones to ensure a habitable gg;::nh environment for the control room operators.t .g M For those plants that: credit gas decay tank rupture 1E o J accidents, the CRIS must also be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6.

ACTIONS A CRIS channel is inoperable when it does not satisfy the OPERABILITY criteria for the channel's function. The most common cause of channel inoperability is outright failure or drift of the bistable or process module sufficient to exceed ,

the tolerance allowed by the plant specific setpoint analysis. Typically, the drift is not large and would result in a delay of actuation rather than a total loss of function. This determination is generally made during the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST when the process instrument is set up for adjustment to bring it within i specification. If the trip setpoint is not within the Allowable Value, the channel is inoperable and the appropriate Conditions must be entered.

A.1. B.I. B.2. C.I. C.2.1 w9 a "

e Conditions A and C have been modified by a Note, which specifies that CREACS be placed manually in the toxic gas protection mode if the automatic transfer to the toxic gas protection mode is inoperable. (At this unit, the basis for this Note is as follows:]

Conditions A, B, and C are applicable to manual and automatic actuation of the CREACS by CRIS. Condition A applies to the failure of the CRIS Manual Trip, Actuation Logic, and required (particulate / iodine and required gaseous radiation monitor channels) in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. Entry I into this Condition requires action to either restore the .

l failed channel (s) or manually perform the CRIS safety function (Required Action A.1). The Completion Time of I hour is sufficient to complete the Required Actions and 4 accounts for the fact that CRIS supplements control room

~

isolation by other Functions (e.g., SIAS) in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. If the channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 (continued)

CEOG STS B 3.3-151 Rev 1, 04/07/95

-. :r m - .-.-.r: .- . - - :: := - =

CRIS (Digital)

B 3.3.9 BASES N M~MM/

ACTIONS A.I. B.I. B.2. C.1; C.2.1. C.2.2 and C.2.3 (continued) does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months (Required Action B.1) and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (Required ActionB.2). The Completion Times of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months for reaching MODES 3 and 5 from MODE I are reasonable, based on operating experience and normal cooldown rates, for reaching the required MODE from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant safety systems or operators.

Condition C applies to the failure of CRIS Manual Trip, Actuation Logic, and required particulate / iodine and T required gaseous radiation mon (tor channels [in__ MODE 5 _ E0"

or 6L'~i. R C" ^' mammWor when moving *irradiat assemblies. The Required Actions are immediately taken to] -

place o'ne OPERABLE CREACS train in _the emeraency radiation protection mode, or to suspend 60R: AI.TE"aTIC@ositive )

reactivity additions, and movement 4of irradiated fuel /

assemblies. The Completion Time recognizes the fact that the radiation signals are the only Functions available to initiate control room isolation in the event of a fuel handling acciden gg+

ra SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.9.1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value.

Significant deviations between the two. instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(continued)

CEOG STS B 3.3-152 Rev 1, 04/07/95

. . Cr- . -._ ~ ,

FHIS (Digital)

B 3.3.10 N de/

/

BACKGROUND Trio Setooints and Allowable Values (continued) account. To allow for calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, and instrument drift, Allowable Values specified in LC0 3.3.10 are conservatively adjusted with respect to the analytical limits. A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate the trip setpoints, including their explicit uncertainties, is provided in " Plant Protection System Selection of Trip Setpoint Values" (Ref. 3). The actual nominal trip setpoint entered into the bistable is normally still more conservative than that specified by the Allowable Value to account for changes in random measurement errors detectable by a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. One example of such a change in measurement error is drift during the surveillance interval. If the measured setpoint does not exceed the Allowable Value, the bistable is considered OPERABLE.

Setpoints in accordance with the Allowable Value will ensure that Safety Limits are not violated during anticipated operational occurrences (A00s) and the consequences of Design Basis Accidents will be acceptable, sroviding the plant is operated from within the LCOs at tie onset of the A00 or accident and the equipment functions as designed.

APPLICABLE The FHIS is required to isolate the normal Fuel Building Air SAFETY ANALYSES Cleanup System (FBACS) and automatically initiate the recirculation and filtration systems in the event of the '

fuel handling accident,in the fuel handling building, as

__7 described in Reference 2. The FHIS helps ensure acceptable MS consequences for the dropping of a spent fuel bundle F breaching up to 60 fuel pins.

The FHIS satisfies the requirements of Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LC0 LCO 3.3.10 requires one channel of FHIS to be OPERABLE. The required channel consists of Actuation Logic, Manual Trip, and [ particulate / iodine and] gaseous radiation monitors.

The specific Allowable Values for the setpoints of the FHIS are listed in the SRs.

(continued)

CEOG STS B 3.3-157 Rev1,04/07/95

~~

n -~

FHIS (Digital) l B 3.3.10

/ 5 TF-S~l,& -

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY One FHIS channel is required to be OPERABLE during movement of+ irradiated fuel in the fuel building. The FHIS isolates CL"'esca.ngH ) the fuel building area in the event of a' fuel handling accident, g

~ ~

infLU The FHIS is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 and during movement of irradiated fuel because' the fuel

( building heatin, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC)

_ is shared with Engineered Safety Features (ESF) equipment. _

The FHIS must be OPERABLE in [ MODES 1, 2, 3, and 41 and

[CNA 1 during movement oFirradiated fuel in the fuel buiiding, since the FHIS isolates the fuel handling area in the event ofafuelhandlingaccidentinanyMODEorothercondition.g n%k ACTIONS An FHIS channel is inoperable when it does not satisfy the - b" OPERABILITY criteria for the channel's function. The most common cause of channel inoperability is outright failure or drift of the bistable or process module sufficient to exceed the tolerance allowed by the plant specific setpoint analysis. Typically, the drift is not large and would result in a delay of actuation rather than a total loss of function. This determination is generally made during the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST when the process instrument is set up for adjustment to bring it within specification. If the trip setpoint is not consistent with the Allowable Value in LCO 3.3.10, the channel must be declared inoperable immediately and the appropriate Conditions must be entered.

In the event a channel's trip setpoint is found nonconservative with respect to the Allowable Value, or the sensor, instrument loop, signal processing electronics, or bistable is found inoperable, then all affected Functions provided by that channel are required to be declared

, inoperable and the LCO Condition entered for the particular protective function affected.

When the number of inoperable channels in a trip Function exceeds that specified in any related Condition associated with the same trip Function, then the plant is outside the safety analysis. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 is immediately entered if applicable in the current MODE of operation.

(continued)

CE0G STS B 3.3-159 Rev1,04/07/95

= =-. -. : = - - - .--___-

u

FHIS (Digital)

B 3.3.10 l

~S hl ACTIONS A.1. B.1. and 8.2 (continued)

Conditions A and B apply only to those plants whose fuel building HVAC is shared with an ESF equipment room.

Condition A applies to FHIS Manual Trip, Actuation Logic, and required (particulate / iodine and gaseous radiation monitors] inoperable.

The Required Actions are to restore the affected channels to I OPERABLE status or slace one OPERABLE FBACS train in operation within 1 tour. The Completion Time of I hour is sufficient to perform the Required Actions. The Completion Time accounts for the fact that the FHIS radiation monitors are the only signals available to automatically initiate the FBACS to mitigate radiation releases in the fuel building and credits the relatively lower likelihood of such events when irradiated fuel is not being moved.

Condition B applies if the affected channels cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or one OPERABLE FBACS train cannot be placed in operation. If the channels cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODE from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging

_ plant systems. ,_ l l

C.1 and C.2 Condition C applies to FHIS Manual Trip, Actuation Logic, and required [ particulate / iodine and] gaseous radiation monitor inoperable during movement o irradiated fuel in the

- fuel building.

% The Required Actions are t restore required channels to OPERABLE status, or place one OPERABLE FBACS train in operation, or suspend movement o rradiated fuel in the fuel building. These Required Actions are required to be comaleted immediately. The Completion Time accounts for the higier likelihood of releases in the fuel building during fuel handling.

(continued)

CEOG STS B 3.3-160 Rev 1, 04/07/95

Containment Isolation Valves (Atmospheric and Dual)

B 3.6.3 6 l,lknI SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.7 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Automatic containment isolation valves close on a containment isolation signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment following a DBA. This SR ensures each automatic containment isolation valve will actuate to its isolation position on a containment isolation N actuation signal. This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under' administrative controls. The

[18] month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this SR'be performed only during a unit outage, since isolation of penetrations would eliminate cooling water flow and disrupt normal operation of many critical components.

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass this SR when performed on the [18] month Frequency.

Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

. SR 3.6.3.8 Reviewer's Note: This SR is only required for those units with resilient seal purge valves allowed to be open during

[ MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4] and having blocking devices on the valves that are not permanently installed. )

Verifying that each [42] inch containment purge valve is blocked to restrict opening to :s [50]% is required to ensure th&t the valves can close under DBA conditions within the times assumed in the analyses of References 2 and 3. If a LOCA occurs, the purge valves must close to maintain containment leakage within the valves assumed in the accident analysis. At other times when purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g., during movement of i

-r rradiated i fuel assemblies), pressurization concerns are not '

g'gH] present, thus the purge valves can be fully o)en. The

[18] month Frequency is appropriate because tie blocking i devices are typically removed only during a refueling !

outage. I SR 3.6.3.9 This SR ensures that the combined leakage rate of all

_. secondary containment bypass leakage paths is less than or ._.

(continued)

CEOG STS B 3.6-32 Rev 1, 04/07/95 0

.. e v w w em+ sw --- ---6** u* 4

)

CREACS I B 3.7.11 BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the CREACS must be OPERABLE to limit operator exposure during and following a DBA.

In MODES [5 and 6], the CREACS is requ' ired to cope with the release from a rupture of an outside waste gas tank.

During mo ,

@p5'*qent of*CREACS L the irradiated mustfuel be OPERABLEassemblies s wTth tha to cope reReast tron a fuel handling accident.g ' Ing, L H ;

ACTIONS Ad .

With one CREACS train inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREACS subsystem is adequate to i perform control room radiation protection function. !

However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE CREACS train could result in loss of CREACS function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, 1 and the ability of the remaining

rain to provide the ;

required capability. l B.1 and B.2 If the inoperable CREACS cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes the accident risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 5 i' within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

C.l. C.2f. =i C. @ %

Required. Action C.1 is modified by a Note indicating to place the system in the emergency radiation protection mode if the automatic transfer to emergency mode is inoperable.

(continued) ,

CE0G STS B 3.7-57 Rev1,04/07/95

.- % . . . . - , o-- . . - . -. --

. . . . . . . 2_ . -. . . - - .

CREACS B 3.7.11 BASES ACTIONS C.1 C.Y'. rd 0.2. ontinued)

In H0DE 5 or 6. or durino movement __of4 irradiated fuel assemblies *E ;, conng rno aiTEm:00, if Required ud Action A.1 cannot be completed within trie required Completion Time, the OPERABLE CREACS train must be immediately placed in the emergency mode of operation. This action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE, that no failures preventing automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that could result in a release of

. radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel assemblies to a safe position.

D.1 ; .. , 4 k' hen (in MODES 5 and 6, orl durino movement of'1rradiated fuel assembliesu, ., our ii w wmm m .une J 8 with two CREACS trains inoperaole, action must be taken immediately

._to suspend activities that could result in a release of My radioactivity that might e*MRthe control room. This bel f places the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident 0 risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

L.1 If both CREACS trains are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the CREACS may not be capable of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.11.1 REQUIREMENTS Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. Since the environment and normal operating conditions on this system are not severe, (continued)

CEOG STS B 3.7-58 ,

Rev 1, 04/07/95

~

- - __. :.: 7 ~~ T ~ ~ . . .-

4

~

CREATCS B 3.7.12 N 6 lg ht.< l BASES (continued)

LC0 Two independent and redundant trains of the CREATCS are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, assuming a single failure disables the other train. Total system failure could result in the equipment operating temperature exceeding limits in the event of an accident.

The CREATCS is considered OPERABLE when the individual components that are necessary to maintain the control room temperature are OPERABLE in both trains. These components include the cooling coils and associated temperature control instrumentation. In addition, the CREATCS must be OPERABLE to the extent that air circulation can be maintained.

% ssb As APPLICABILITY InMODES1,2,3,4,(5,(and6-,1-and_durinomovementof irradiated fuel assemblierGrg (C% T'?"G the CREATCS must be OPERABLE to ensure that the control room CSsytM temperature will not exceed equipment OPERABILITY requirements following isolation of the control room.

In MODES 5 and 6, CREATCS may not be required for those facilities which do not require automatic control room i isolation.

ACTIONS L1 With one CREATCS train inoperable, action must be taken to !

restore OPERABLE status within 30 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREATCS train is adequate to maintain the control room temperature within limits. The 30 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on the low probability ;

of an event occurring requiring control room isolation, consideration that the remaining train can provide the ,

required capab'ilities, and the alternate safety or nonsafety related cooling means that are available.

B.1 and B.2 In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, when Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes the accident risk. To (continued)

CEOG STS B 3.7-62 Rev1,04/07/95

. +

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CREATCS B 3.7.12 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued) achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completi.on Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

C.I. C.2M

-^^g (In MODE 5 or 6_, or during movemen<: nI'irgdiated fuel assembliesm. c - i n- m m _, u, when Required j Action A.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE CREATCS train must be placed Ccece.^gM] in operation immediately. This action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE, that no failures preventing automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that could result in a release of radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel assemblies to a safe position.

~

D.1_p " . D ^ '

In [ MODE 5 or 6. od during movement radiated fuel assemblies i, vi auring wmm-" ith two CREATCS trains inoperable, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that could result in a release of radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

f.d If both CREATCS trains are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the CREATCS may not be capable of performing the intended ;

(continued)

CE0G STS B 3.7-63 Rev 1, 04/07/95

__ _ _?_ ' ~ ' 7-~_T. i . _. . ... _ . .

FBACS B 3.7.14 NY D,0a /

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE The FBACS is designed to mitigate the consequences of a SAFETY ANALYSES fuel handling accident +1n which [all] rods in the fuel 9 7 assemb'y are assumea to be damaged. The analysis of the fuel handling accident is given in Reference 3. The Design

@*Ca

\- o Basis Accident analysis of the fuel handling accident assumes that only or.e train of the FBACS is functional, due to a single failure that disables the other train. The accident analysis accounts for the reduction in airbotae radioactive material provided by the remaining one train af this filtration system. The amount of fission products available for release from the fuel handling building is determined for a fuel handling accident. These assumptions and the analysis follow the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.25 (Ref. 4).

The FBACS satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy State:nent.

LC0 Two independent and redundant trains of the FBACS are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, assuming a single failure that disables the other train coincident with a loss of offsite power. Total system failure could result in the atmospheric release from the fuel building exceeding the 10 CFR 100 limits (Ref. 5) in the event of a fuel handling accident. j The FBACS is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to control exposure in the fuel handling building are OPERABLE in both trains. An FBACS i train is considered OPERABLE when its associated. l i

a. Fan is OPERABLE; .

i

b. HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber are not excessively l restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration functions; and

c. Heater, demister, ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the FBACS is required to be OPERABLE to provide fission product removal associated with ECCS leaks due to a LOCA (refer to LCO 3.7.13, " Emergency (continued)

CE0G STS B 3.7-72 Rev 1, 04/07/95 1

-.~

~

-.. . A_ .

FBACS B 3.7.14 TS TF-5 I, A.i BASES APPLICABILITY Core Cooling System (ECCS) Pump Room Exhaust Air Cleanup (continued) System (PREACS)") for units that use this system as part of their ECCS PREACS.

During movement of9rradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel (Cee **

building, the FBACS is required to be OPERABLE to mitigate m )

the consequences of a fuel handling accidentgggt .1j In MODES 5 and 6, the FBACS is not required to be OPERABLE, i since the ECCS is not required to be OPERABLE.

I ACTIONS A_d i

If one FBACS train is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. During this time period, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the FBACS function. The 7 day Completion Time is {

reasonable, based on the risk from an event occurring requiring the inoperable FBACS train, and ability of the remaining FBACS train to provide the required protection.

B.1 and B.2 In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, when Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within the Completion Time, or when both FBACS trains are inoperable, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are i reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the i required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

C.1 and C.2 When Recuired Action A.1 cannot be completed within the ,

requirec Completion Time during movement offirradiated fuel i in the fuel building, the OPERABLE FBACS train must be started immediately or fuel movement suspended. This action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE, that no undetected failures preventing system operation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

(continued)

CEOG STS B 3.7-73 Rev 1, 04/07/95

._; . _ _ 1.

1_ _ _ . _

l l

FBACS B 3.7.14 N bh[m/

BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) GW__ t. d M J@ M If the system is not laced in operation, this action requires suspension o fuel movement, which precludes a fuel handling accident. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

L1-When two trains of the FBACS are inoperable during movement I c' C< U o irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building, action I I

( must be taken LC0 does to place not apply. Thisthe unit LC0 in a condition involves in which the immediately suspenaing movement of* irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.14.1 REQUIREMENTS Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. As the environment and normal operating conditions on this system are not severe, testing each train once every month provides an adequate check on this system. Monthly heater operation dries out any moisture accumulated in the charcoal from humidity in the ;

ambient air. [ Systems with heaters must be operated for a 10 continuous hours with the heaters energized. Systems without heaters need only be operated for a 15 minutes to demonstrate the function of the system.] The 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliability of the equipment and the two train redundancy available.

SR 3.7.14.2 This SR verifies the performance of FBACS filter testing in accordance with the (Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP)]. The FBACS filter tests are in accordance with the Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 6). The [VFTP] includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific (continued)

CEOG STS B 3.7-74 Rev1,04/07/95 l .- . .-

a- -. - - - _ --- - . - . -

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

. Ts TPs~tda B 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown BASES .

BACKGROUND A description of the AC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating."

APPLICABLE The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC sources during MODES 5 SAFETY ANALYSES and 6 and during movement of. irradiated fuel assemblies ensures that: g

~

4

a. The unit can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

c. Adequate AC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdow1, such as a fuel handling accidentTL- g g ,TMj

In general, when the unit is snut down, the Technical Specifications requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) that are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 have no specific analyses in MODES 5 and 6. Worst case bounding events are deemed not credible in MODES 5 and 6 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and the corresponding stresses result in the .

probabilities of occurrence being significantly reduced or eliminated, and in minimal consequences. These deviations from DBA analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCO for required systems.

During MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, various deviations from the analysis assumptions and design requirements are allowed (continued)

CEOG STS B 3.8-35 Rev1,04/07/95

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.6.2 TS7~F-Sidki BASES LC0 offsite circuit. Together, OPERABILITY of the required (continued) offsite circuit and DG ensures the availability of sufficient AC sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated event tring shutdown (e.g.,fuelhandlingaccidentp.

i5 nm .

The qualified offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) bus (es). Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the FSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the unit..

Offsite circuit #1 consists of Safeguards Transformer 8, which is supplied from Switchyard Bus B, and is fed through breaker 52-3 powering the ESF transformer XNB01, which, in turn, powers the #1 ESF bus through its normal feeder breaker. The second offsite circuit consists of the Startup Transformer, which is normally fed from the Switchyard Bus A, and is fed through breaker PA 0201 powering the ESF transformer, which, in turn, powers the #2 ESF bus through its normal feeder breaker. _

The DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated ,

speed and voltage, connecting to its respective ESF bus on j detection of bus undervoltage, and accepting required loads.

This sequence must be accomplished within (10] seconds. The DG must be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and must continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby with the engine hot and DG in standby at ambient conditions.

Proper sequencing of loads, including tripping of nonessential loads, is a required function for DG OPERABILITY.

In addition, proper sequencer operation is an integral part of offsite circuit OPERABILITY since its inoperability impacts on the ability to start and maintain energized loads required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.10.

(continued)

CEOG STS B 3.8-37 Rev 1, 04/07/95

- - ETed4 = Webe ssu i nag [a-m 4Wpawp agggm qg+eese, __

W-> ++h gwg .g.m.gegy - , gem.mm. ei,-e,ej."g e-

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 I8 b b/i LC0 It is acceptable for trains to be cross ti.ed during shutdown (continued) conditions, allowing a single offsite power circuit to supply all required trains.

APPLICABILITY The AC sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 and during movement of irradiated _ fuel assemblies provide assurance that: g 4

a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies;

b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available; 4h gg}

k

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events -

that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation.and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The AC power requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.1.

ACTIONS Ad l An offsite circuit would be considered inoperable if it were not available to one required ESF train. Although two trains are required by LCO 3.8.10, the retaining train with offsite power available may be capable of supporting l

_7 sufficient required features to allcw continuation of CORE Gsceittlg1 ALTERATIONS andduel movement. By the allowance of the sgM option to declare required features inoperable, with no offsite power available, appropriate restrictions will be .

implemented in accordance with the affected required

~

features LCO's ACTIONS. ,

(continued)

CE0G STS B 3.8-38 Rev 1, 04/07/95

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 D @h Meg,/

BASES .

ACTIONS A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3 A.2.4. B.1. B.2. B.3, and B 4 (continued)

With the offsite circuit not available to all required trains, the option would still exist to declare all required features inoperable. Since this option.may involve undesired administrative efforts, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made. With the required DG inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC power sources is not available. It is, therefore, required to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement ofiirradiated fuel

[.co.c.a. H assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions. The Required Action to suspend positive reactivity additions does not preclude actions to maintain or increase reactor vessel inventory provided the required SDM is maintained.

Suspension of these activities does not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize the probability or the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC sources and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to p-ovide the necessary AC power to the unit safety systems.

The Comph. tion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the unit safety systems may be without sufficient power.

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System's ACTIONS are not entered even if all AC sources to it are inoperable, resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition A are modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition A is entered with no AC power to any required ESF bus, the ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.10 must be immediately entered. This Note allows Condition A to provide requirements for the loss of the offsite circuit, whether or not a train is de-energized. LCO 3.8.10 provides the appropriate restrictions for the situation involving a de-energized train.

l (continued)

CEOG STS B 3.8-39 Rev1,04/07/95

. - _ . _ . Z.Z. ~ ~ ~T'-~ ~ i . . _ _ _ _ _ __ i

\

DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases.for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources-0perating."

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter [6] (Ref.1) and Chapter [15) (Ref. 2), assume that Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC ;.lectrical power for the DGs, emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation.

The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC electrical power sources during MODES 5 and 6 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies ensures that:

a. The unit can be maintained in the shutdown or l

refueling condition for extended periods; I

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit l status; and

c. Adequate DC electrical power is provided to mitigate ,

events postulated durin handling accident 8 ;ga-4 g shutdown, tuch as a fuel

. The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 oIIe NRC Policy Statement.

LC0 The DC electrical power subsystems, each subsystem consisting of two batteries, one battery charger per battery, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling within the train, are required to be (continued)

CEOG STS B 3.8-60 Rev 1, 04/07/95 s , w+

w- e. ,wa -[ r . - . E~E E-.-=---e e c.S -

4,c, - -,

1 DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5 i

kk,[

LCO OPERABLE to support required trains of distribution systems (continued) required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.10, " Distribution Systems-Shutdown." This ensures the availability of sufficient DC electrical power sources to operate the unit

, in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling s

accident g

( V .

APPLICABILITY The DC electrical power sources required to be OPERABLE in l MODES 5 and 6, and during movement of irradiated :

assemblies provide assurance that: ggAy

a. Required features needed to mitigate a fuel handling p- g- g accidentpare available; k C w b. Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

c. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.4.

ACTIONS A.I. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3, and A.2.4 If two trains are required per LCO 3.8.10, the remaining train with DC power available may be capable of supporting sufficient systems to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS

, bC# "y and+ fuel movement. By allowing the option to declare (cedd required features inoperable with the associated DC power source (s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions will be implemented in accordance with the affected required features LCO ACTIONS. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions _is made

%M (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of' irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions). The Required Action to suspend positive reactivity additions does not preclude actions to (continued)

CEOG STS B 3.8-61 Rev 1, 04/07/95

~~ ~ ~~

Inverters-Shutdown B 3.8.8 8 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS tb"l B 3.8.8 Inverters-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the inv_erters is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.7, " Inverter: ,0perating."

APPLICABLE The initial condit' ions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter [6] (Ref.1) and Chapter (15) (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The DC to AC inverters are designed to provide the required capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to the Reactor Protective System and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation and controls so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

The OPERABILITY of the' inverters is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum inverters to each AC vital bus during MODES 5 and 6 ensures that:

a. The unit can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

c. Adequate power is available to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as a fuel handling accideng

[I The inverters were previously identified as part of the l- LJ distribution system and, as such, satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

(continued)

CE0G STS B 3.8-74 Rev1,[4/07/95

. . . ::: ~~ ~

~~~~

Inverters-Shutdown B 3.8.8 T.S TF - s't,pu.i BASES (continued)

LC0 The inverters ensure the availability of electrical power for the instrumentation for systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated DBA. The l battery powered inverters provide uninterruptible supply of AC electrical power to the ACL vital. buses even if the 4.16 kV safety buses are de-energized. OPERABILITY of the inverters requires that the vital bus be powered by the inverter. This ensures the availability of sufficient inverter power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events _during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accident g 4 t F i APPLICABILITY The inverters required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies provide assurance that:

{c 4g

a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core;

, b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident t are available;

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold i shutdown condition or refueling condition.

Inverter requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.7.

ACTIONS A.I. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3 and A.2.4 If two trains are required by LCO 3.8.10 " Distribution Systems-Shutdown," the remaining OPERABLE inverters may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow (continued)

CE0G STS B 3.8-75 Rev 1, 04/07/95

. -- L7 - L -.. _.-._ .- :: : - : '- ~

}

. )

Inverters-Shutdown B 3o8.8 )

BASES T 5 T F - p/ g ,/

l A.1. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3, and A.2.4 l

ACTIONS (continued) {

1(CCWM3 continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS) fuel movement, operations

~

with a potential for draining the reactor vessel, and -

5, p ' M operations with a potential for positive reactivity

_ additions. The Required Action to suspend positive reactivity additions does not preclude actions to maintain or increase reactor vessel inventory, provided the required SDM is maintained. By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with the associated inverter (s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions will be implemented in accordance with the affected required features LCOs' Required Actions. In many instances, this !

option may involve undesired administrative efforts.

Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement o irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving bW positive reactivity additions).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion

. of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required inverters and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in i order to provide the necessary inverter power to the unit I safety systems. l The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the i required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required inverters should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the unit safety systems may be without power or powered from a constant voltage source transformer.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the inverters are functioning properly with all required circuit breakers I closed and AC vital buses energized from the inverter. The j verification of proper voltage and frequency output ensures that the required power is readily available for the (continued) i CEOG STS B 3.8-76 Rev 1, 04/07/95

-. - = = . - - -. . .--._:-

Distribution Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.10 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems is provided in the Bases for LC0 3.8.9, " Distribution Systems-Operating."

l APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter (6) (Ref.1) and I

Chapter [15] (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature '

(ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems are designed to a provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and l reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to l ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

The OPERABILITY of the AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution system is consistent with the initial ,

assum>tions of the accident analyses and the requirements for tie supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems during MODES 5 and 6, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, ;

ensures that:

a. The unit can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. R4ficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

- c. Adequate power is provided to mitigate events postulat durina shutdown, such as a fuel handling-acciden 4 J

-IwW m 3 The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

(continued)

CEOG STS B 3.8-88 Rev 1, 04/07/95

~

^

.. - - --. 2: ~~~T~.-.: . - . . - -.-

Distribution Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.10 BASES (continued)

LCO Various combinations of subsystems, equipment, and components are required OPERABLE by other LCOs, depending on the specific unit condition. Implicit in those. requirements is the required OPERABILITY of necessary support required features. This LCO explicitly requires energization of the portions of the electrical distribution system necessary to support OPERABILITY of required systems, equipment and i

components-all specifically addressed in each LCO and implicitly required via the definition of OPERABILITY. {

l Maintaining these portions of the distribution system '

energized ensures the availability of sufficient power to operate the unit in a safe manner to mitigate the )

consequences of postulated events dnHnn shutdown (e.g., '

fuelhandlingaccidentQ. %d ,

1 F J APPLICABILITY The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6, and during movement of irradiated fuel _ assemblies, provide assurance C_ce.c_adkt

a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inven' tory makeup 1 are available for the irradiated fuel in the core;

- b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident

-f g - =are available; C c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available l for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition and refueling condition.

The AC, DC, and AC vital- bus electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.9.

l l

l (continued) i CE0G STS B 3.8-89 Rev1,04/07/95 '

l

Distribution Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.10

'TS TF- s%f BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A.I. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. A.2.4. and A.2.5 Although redundant required features may require redundant trains of electrical power distribution subsystems to be OPEP.ABLE, one OPERABLE distribution subsystem train may be

[ adQ capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow By Ir d

h allowing tne option continuation of toCORE declare requTred ALTERATIONSfeatures associated and. fuel mo with an inoperable distribution subsystem inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected distribution subsystems LCO's Required Actions.

In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend Cy 4-f and operations involving positive reactivity additions).g % CORE ALTE Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to imediately initiate action to restore the required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary power to the unit safety systems.

Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, a required shutdown cooling (SDC) !

subsystem may be inoperable. In this case, Required Actions i A.2.1 through A.2.4 do not adequately address the concerns {

relating to coolant circulation and heat removal. Pursuant 1 to LCO 3.0.6, the SDC ACTIONS would not be entered.

Therefore, Required Action A.2.5 is provided to direct declaring SDC inoperable, which results in taking the appropriate SDC actions.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the !

required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The !

restoration of the required distribution subsystems should !

be com>1eted as quickly as possible in order to minimize the !

time tis unit safety systems may be without power.

l (continued)

CEOG STS B 3.8-90 Rev 1, 04/07/95

_ _ m. m . _ 1 ~n.. _ _ n _

Containment Penetrations ,

B 3.9.3 l B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations _

BASES C*C*^ ,

BACKGROUND During 6 RTE".?T 5"! 3 movement of uel assemblies .

within containment 5 .... m . r- '- ~ m - Y a release of fission product radioactivity within the containment will be restricted from escaping to the environment when the LC0 requirements are met. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, this is accomplished by maintaining containment OPERABLE as described in LC0 3.6.1, " Containment." In i MODE 6, the potential for containment sressurization as a result of an accident is not likely; t1erefore, requirements to isolate the containment from the outside atmosphere can be less stringent. The LC0 requirements are referred to as

" containment closure" rather than " containment OPERABILITY."

Containment closure means that all potential escape paths I are closed or capable of being closed. Since there is no potential for containment pressurization, the Appendix J leakage criteria and tests are not required.

~

The containment serves to contain fission product radioactivity that may be released from the reactor core i following an accident, such that offsite radiation exposures I are maintained well within the requirements of 10 CFR 100.

Additionally, the containment structure provides radiation shielding from the fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.

The containment equipment hatch, which is part of the containment pressure boundary, provides a means for moving large equipment and components into and out of containment.

DurinM"I M """"" " movement of4 irradiated fuel assemblies with n containment, the equipment hatch must b held in place by at least four bolts. Good engineering '

practice dictates that the bolts required by this LCO be _

approximately equally spaced.

The containment air locks, which are also part of the containment pressure boundarv, provide a means for personnel access during MODES 1, 2, 3 snd 4 operation in accordance with LCO 3.6.2, "Containmen ' *r Locks." Each air lock has a door at both ends. The dovr2 are normally interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening when containment OPERABILITY is required. During periods of shutdown when containment (continued)

CEOG STS B 3.9-8 Rev1,04/07/95

Containment Penetrations B 3.9.3 I 5 TF- s'I,Li .

BASES BACKGROUND closure is not required, the door interlock mechanism may be (continued) disabled, allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open for extended periods when frecue_nt containment entry is

=- necessary. During%' HPF "-m movement of rradiated fuel assemblies within containment, containment bNg] closure is required; therefore, the door interlock mechanism may remain disabled, but one air lock door must always remain closed.

The requirements on containment penetration closure ensure that a release of fission product radioactivity within containment will be restricted from escaping to the environment. The closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict fission product radioactivity release from containment due to a fuel handling accident during refueling. Ingr The Containment Purge and Exhaust System includes two subsystems. The normal subsystem includes a 42 inch purge penetration and a 42 inch exhaust penetration. The second subsystem, a minipurge system, includes an 8 inch purge penetration and an 8 inch exhaust penetration. During MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the two valves in each of the normal purge and exhaust penetrations are secured in the closed position. The two valves in each of the two minipurge penetrations can be opened intermittently, but are closed automatically by the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS). Neither of the subsystems is subject to a Specification in MODE 5.

In MODE 6, large air exchanges are necessary to conduct refueling operations. The normal 42 inch purge system is used for this purpose and all valves are closed by the ESFAS in accordance with LC0 3.3.2, " Reactor Protective System j (RPS)-Shutdown." l The minipurge system remains operational in MODE 6 and all four valves are also closed by the ESFAS. l or The minipurge system is not used in MODE 6. All four

_ 8][ inch valves are secured in the closed position. _

The other containment penetrations that provide direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere (continued)

CEOG STS B 3.9-9 Rev 1, 04/07/95

~~

- ~r . -_- - - - --

Containment Penetrations B 3.9.3 Ts rF-5/k BASES BACKGROUND must be isolated on at least one side. Isolation may be (continued) achieved by an OPERABLE automatic isolation valve, or by a manual isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent.

Equivalent isolation methods must be approved and may include use of a material that can provide a temporary, atmospheric pressure ventilation barrier for the other containment penetrations __during4 fuel movements (Ref. 1).

C c u s. 2 w 3 ke d ! M [/ ..

I

u. p J 1 APPLICABLE During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel SAFETY ANALYSES assemblies within containment, the most severe radiologicalj consequences result from a fuel handling accidentr The fuel handling accident is a postulated event that involves damage to irradiated fuel (Ref. 2). Fuel handling accidents, analyzed in Reference 3, include dropping a single irradiated fuel assembly and handling tool or a heavy object jn L'Str[

N onto LCO other 3.9.6. irradiated

" Refuelingfuel assemblies.w_unnimum Water.Leve_l," The_ requirements aecay Xw

,. ansuredthat the of g;Aa)b,

( time of [72] 1ours prior to h _. --

release of fission product radioactivity, subsequent to a fuel handling accident, results in doses that are well within the guideline values specified in 10 CFR 100. The acceptance limits for offsite radiation exposure are contained in Standard Review Plan Section 15.7.4, Rev. 1 )

(Ref. 2), which defines "well within" 10 CFR 100 to be 25% l or less of the 10 CFR 100 values.

Containment penetrations satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC !

Policy Statement.

LC0 This LCO limits the consequences of a fuel handling accident _ T o in containment by limiting the potential escape paths for fission product radioactivity released within containment.

The LCO requires any penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to be closed except for the OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust penetrations. For the OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust penetrations, this LC0 ensures that these penetrations are isolable by the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System. The OPERABILITY requirements for this LCO ensure that the automatic purge and exhaust valve closure times specified in the FSAR can be achieved and therefore meet the assumptions used in the safety analysis (continued)

CEOG STS B 3.9-10 Rev 1, 04/07/95

. 1. _ _ _~ Z~ '~Z _ _ . _.1 .. _ _. _

Containment Penetrations B 3.9.3 T5TF- S~lk. I BASES LC0 to ensure releases through the valves are terminated, such (continued) that the radiological doses are within the acceptance limit.

m C C N. e % )/

APPLICABILITY Thecontrinment_pe_neirationrequirements]areapplicable duringh SF ^~ " movement of*Trradiated fuel

(, lL.Mg) assemblies a potential for7m7wittin fuel containment handling accident.because In MODESthis is3,when ther 1, 2, and 4, containment penetration requirements are addressed by LC0 3.6.1. " Containment." In MODES 5 and 6, when C - -

% - 4'"": ?.; movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment not being conducted, the potential for a y 9 fuel handlin ccident does not exist. Tierefore, under J LM p these conditions no requirements are place on containment enetration status.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 With the containment equipment hatch, air locks, or any containment penetration that provides direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere not in the required status, including the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System not capable of automatic actuation when the purge and exhaust valves are open, the unit must be placed in a condition in which the isolation function is not g

needed. __This is accomplished by immediately suspending 7

- 7.f""05 r.: movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment. Performance of these actions shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

Y'd SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance demonstrates that each of the containment penetrations required to be in its closed position is in that position. The Surveillance on the open purge and exhaust valves will demonstrate that the valves are not blocked from closing. Also, the Surveillance will demonstrate that each valve operator has motive power, which will ensure each valve is capable of being closed by an (continued)

CEOG STS B 3.9-11 Rev 1, 04/07/95

~ ~"

- ~~_.---.-

i Containment Penetrations B 3.9.3 T S TF- TI,b.(

BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.3.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS OPERABLE automatic containment our nd exhaust isolation signal..

Q g

, The Surveillance is perfor jmedvery 7 days during C ^

- pr"'"2 t; movement ofCrradiated fuel assemblies within the containment. The Surveillance interval is selected to be commensurate with the normal duration of time to complete l fuel handling operations. .A surveillance before the start of refueling operations will provide two or three surveillance verifications during the applicable period for j this LC0. As such, this Surveillance ensures that a l postulated fuel handling accident that releases fission l product radioactivity within the containment will not result {

in a release of ission product dioactivity to t_he {

environment. - I SR 3.9.3.2 s&n*) rf], -

This Surveillance demonstrates that each containment purge '

and exhaust valve actuates to its isolation position on manual initiation or on an actual or simulated high radiation signal. The 18 month Frequency maintains consistency with other similar ESFAS instrumentation and valve testing re In LCO 3.3.4 [(Digital) or 3.3.3 (Analog)],quirements.

" Miscellaneous Actuations," the Containment -

Purge Isolation Signal System requires a CHANNEL CHECK every 7 days and a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST every 31 days to ensure ,

the cha.nnel OPERABILITY during refueling operations. Every 18 months a CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed. The system actuation response time is demonstrated every 18 months, during refueling, on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. SR 3.6.3.5 demonstrates that the isolation time of each valve is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program requirements.

These surveillances performed during MODE 6 will ensure that the valves are capable of closing after a po;tulated fuel handling accidentato limit a release of fission product radioactivityfrom}thecontainment.

.Tnd L F j ;

(continued)

CE0G STS B 3.9-12 Rev1,04/07/95

<.mn.- a .am a.. e w, .- - - e m. ..e.>.- . -,,w, , ---

4 N 87, d, /

I BWR/4 Inserts l

I Insert A

[Due to radioactive decay, this Function is only required to isolate secondary

. containment during fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X) days).)

l l

Insett B

) [Also due to radioactive decay, this Function is only required to initiate the MCREC l System during fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e.,

l fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X) days).)

Insert C

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X) days))

InsertD l

[Due to radioactive decay, secondary containment is only required to be OPERABLE during fuel handling involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has l '

j occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X) days).)

I l

l l

1

_ . _ . _ _ _ _r;~ --- -- .;_._._..______.__ _ . _ _ . _ . . . . _ -

[Ml,if.e, / 1 1

Insert E REVIEWER'S NOTE The addition of the term "recently" associated with handling irradiated fuel in all of the containment function Technical Specification requirements is only applicable to

. those licensees who have demonstrated by analysis that after sufficient radioactive .

decay has occurred, off-site doses resulting from a fuel handling accident remain below the Standard Review Plan limits (well within 10CFR100).

Additionally, licensees adding the , term "recently" must make the following commitment which is consistent with draft NUMARC 93-01, Revision 3, Section 11.2.6 -Safety Assessment for Removal of Equipment from Service During Shutdown Conditions" , subheading " Containment - Primary (PWR)/ Secondary (BWR)".

"The following guidelines are included in the assessment of systems removed from service during movement of irradiated fuel.

I

- During fuel handling / core alterations, ventilation system and radiation monitor availability (as defined in NUMARC 91-06) should be assessed, with respect to filtration and monitoring of releases from the fuel. Following shutdown, radioactivity in the fuel decays away fairly rapidly. The basis of the Technical Specification operability amendment is the reduction in doses due to such decay. The goal of maintaining ventilation system and radiation monitor availability is to reduce doses even further below that provided by the natural decay.

- A single normal or contingency method to promptly close primary or secondary containment penetrations should be developed. Such prompt methods need not completely block the penetration or be capable of resisting pressure.

l The purpose of the " prompt methods" mentioned above are to enable ventilation systems to draw the release from a postulated fuel handling accident in the proper direction such that it can be treated and monitored."

Insert F

[Due to radioactive decay, SCIVs are only required to be OPERABLE during fuel handling involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days).]

i 1

__ unn.ncrxxxxxxx_ _ _ _ 1 l

TW6l,6.1 l

BWR 4 Inserts insert G

[Due to radioactive decay, the SGT System is only required to be OPERABLE during fuel handling involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days).]

insert H F

[Due to radioactive der:ay, the MCREC System is only required to be OPERABLE during fuel handling involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days).]

Innert I

[Due to radioactive decay, the Control Room AC System is only required to be OPERABLE during fuel handling involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days).]

Innert J

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, AC electrical power

. is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X]

days)].

1 Insert K

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel]

Innert L

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days)]

insert M

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, DC electrical power is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days).]

insart N

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, AC and DC electrical power is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous

[X] days).]

+ *Pv .se . mrse w+e@ti M seru-i**8- 9 me- -m-ww ^ we e -a-- . e-A * * - - + ^ * * "

T5TFT/,pu; BWR 4 Inserts )

l insert O l

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, the AC and DC inverters are only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous

[X) days).]

1 l

. -~ ._

g e. 9 . , .- .a q,w www.=+ . Me n - * - -tee..v,4 w .v. . p ,.

,mqw ,

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 Table 3.3.6.2 1 (page 1 of 1) T 5 7 F s 7 a69,f p

secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE MCDEs OR REQUIRED l OTHER CHANNELS l SPECIFIED PER SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE l FUNCTION CONDITIONS TRIP stsTEM REQUIREMENTS VALUE I l

l

1. Reactor vessel Water 1,2,3, [2] sa 3.3.6.2.1 a t 473 inches l Level-Low Low, Level 2 ((a)) sa 3.3.6.2.2 l Est 3.3.6.2.33 st 3.3.4.2.5 st 3.3.6.2.6 st 3.3.6.2.7

2. Drywell Pressure-Nish 1,2,3 123 sa 3.3.6.2.1 s 11.923 pois SR 3.3.6.2.2 tsa 3.3.6.2.33 sa 3.3.6.2.5 SR 3.3.6.2.6 SR 3.3.6.2.7

3. Reactor Butiding Exhaust 1,2,3, [2] st 3.3.6.2.1 5 [603 aft /hr Radiation - Nigh !(a),(b)) st 3.3.6.2.2 SR 3.3.6.2.5 sa 3.3.6.2.6 SR 3.3.6.2.7 4 Refueling Floor Exhaust 1,2,3, [2] SR 3.3.6.2.1 5 [203 aft /hr Radiation - Migh !(a),(b)) $2 3.3.6.2.2 tsa 3.3.6.2.43 sa 3.3.6.2.6 st 3.3.6.2.7

5. Manual InttIation 1,2,3, [1 per gro w3 sa 3.3.6.2.6 NA

((a),(b)3 (a) During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vesset.

y (b) During"g;Ai;;.J;5: W 1-:. f movement of rradiated fuel assemblies in (secondary) contelnment.

cm4 SkR/4 STS 3.3-66 Rev 1, 04/07/95

- - - _ . : ::= _ _ =::- - _z... ._ = . . = .

[MCREC) System Instrumentation 3.3.7.1 Table 3.3.7.1 1 (page 1 of 1)

[ Main Control Room Envirorynental Control) system Instrumentation Ts7f-s l e[ #

i APPLICASLE CoffDITIONS MODES OR REGUIRED REFERENCED 1 CTNER CHANNELS . FR(31 SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS STSTEM ACTION A.1 REQUIRJMENTs VALUE

1. Reactor Vesset Water 1,2,3,tal (23 8 SR 3.3.7.1.1 R t 1133 inches Level - Low Low Low, SR 3.3.7.1.2 I Levet 1 tst 3.3.7.1.31 st 3.3.7.1.4 st 3.3.7.1.5

2. DryweLL Pressure-Nigh 1,2,3 (23 5 st 3.3.7.1.1 s (1.923 pelg SR 3.3.7.1.2 tst 3.3.7.1.31 SR 3.3.7.1.4 st 3.3.7.1.5

3. Main steam Line 1,2,3 (2 per a st 3.3.7.1.1 (1383% rated Flow - Nigh MSL1 SR 3.3.7.1.2 steam flow

[st 3.3.7.1.33 SR 3.3.7.1.4 st .3.3.7.1.5 4 Refueling Floor free 1,2,3, til C st 3.3.7.1.1 s [203 mR/hr Radiation - Nf sh [(a),(b))

SR 3.3.7.1.2 gg 3,3,7,g,4 SR 3.3.7.1.5

5. Control Room Air Inlet 1,2,3, [1] C st 3.3.7.1.1 s (1) aft /hr Radietion - NIsh (s), W SR 3.3.7.1.2 g, 3,3,7,g,4 st 3.3.7.1.5 4

1 (a) During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

(b) During contatim m@'. "T?r" ::= R y.._movementof{irradiatedfustassembliesinthe(seconda DN 1

l 1

BWR/4 STS 3.3-74 Rev 1, 04/07/95 !

i I

. - . . .. T .. - .: :^ ? L . L ., _ . - - . - . . . .-. :: . -.:: .

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 b Y $lr Alv,/

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION, TIME 5(continued) E.3 Perform SR 3.6.1.3.7 Once per for the resilient (92] days seal purge valves closed,to comply with Required Action.E.1.

F. Required Action and F.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A, .A_NJ B, C, D, or E not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. F.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months URequiredActionand G.1 --------NOTE-----.---

associated Completion LC0 3.0.3 is not Time of Condition A, applicable.

B, C, D, or E not met ---------------------

for PCIV(s) required to be OPERABLE during Suspend movement of Immediately movement ofii rradiated j irradiated fuel fuel assemblies inl assemblies in (secondary] (secondary]

,tg l containment. containment. I

~

- g

~

"7 5 H. Requir Action and .1 Suspen CORE ediately ,

associat Completion ALTERATI S.

Time of Co ition A, B, C, D, or ot met or PCIV(s) re tred t be OPERABLE d ing '

COR LTERATIONS.

Q ~

W 'N- .N ~

w~' ,

l (continued)

BWR/4 STS' 3.6-12 Rev1,04/07/95

- - ~ ~ "

- - .. . : 2 - ..:: ~ .

j PCIVs 3.6.1.3 l

TS W- W,R, ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME f M -

( . Required Action and. 1.1 Initiate action to Immediately associated Completion suspend OPDRVs.

l Time of Condition A, B, C, D, or E not met QR for PCIV(s) required 4 to be OPERABLE during u 1.2 Initiate action to Immediately MODE 4 or 5 or during y restore valve (s) to operations with a OPERABLE status.

potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

9

' SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.1 ------------------NOTE------------------ l I

Only required to be met in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

Verify each [18) inch primary containment 31 days purge valve is sealed closed except for '

one pu_rge valve in a penetration flow ,

Ji ath while in Condition E of this LCO.

1 i

(continued) t O

BWR/4 STS 3.6-13 Rev 1, 04/07/95

- . - . . . = = - - . - -- -

. [ Secondary) Containment 3.6.4.1 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

'I 3.6.4.1 (Secondary] Containment LCO 3.6.4.1 The [ secondary] containment shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, -

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondaryl con _tainment, Q .4.,,rno~ -- y a During operations witi a potential for draining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs).

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (Secondary] A.1 Restore (secondary] 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months containment inoperable containment to in MODE 1, 2, or 3. OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A E not met.

B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months C. (Secondary] C.1 --------NOTE---------

containment inoperable LCO 3.0.3 is not during movement of applicable.

f? irradiated' fuel ---------------------

f assemblies in the (secondary] O containmenL Suspend movement of irradiated fuel Immediately

* "' " " " "" ^"Adr assemblies in the during OPDRys. (secondary]

containment.

s -

g (continued)

BWR/4 STS 3.6-47 Rev 1, 04/07/95

- ~: = _-_ _ :

[ Secondary) Containment 3.6.4.1 Ts 7'F- s t Lii ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) r. C . " ' % r d ht; C l C.y Initiate action to Immediately a suspend OPDRVs.

l . .

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 1

l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY I

SR 3.6.4.1.1 Verify [ secondary] containment vacuum is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months a [0.25) inch of vacuum water gauge.

SR 3.6.4.1.2 Verify all (secondary) contair. ment 31 days equipment hatches are closed and sealed.

SR 3.6.4.1.3 Verify each (secondary) containment 31 days access door is closed, except when the I access opening is being used for entry and exit [, then at least one door shall be closed).

l SR 3.6.4.1.4 Verify each standby gas treatment [18] months on l (SGT) subsystem will draw down the a STAGGERED I

[ secondary) containment to TEST BASIS a [0.25] inch of vacuum water gauge

. in :s; [120] seconds.

1 (continued) i i

BWR/4 STS 3.6-48 Rev 1, 04/07/95

=z =-- - -... , _ . - - -- --

SCIVs 3.6.4.2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

'3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)

LCO 3.6.4.2 Each SCIV shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and b t. Wh of 3,(irradiated fuel assemblies in the Durin movement econdaryLcontainment, y @P.;; ..._ y c,m . _

During operations witra potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS

...................................--NOTES------------------------------------

1. Penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by SCIVs.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Isolate the affected 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months penetration flow paths penetration flow path with one SCIV by use of at least inoperable. one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, ,

or blind flange.

AND (continued) l BWR/4 STS 3.6-50 Rev 1, 04/07/95

- - - .r~ - -r- -

t SCIVs 3.6.4.2 TS U-Cl,&l ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and D.1 --------NOTE---------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not Time of Condition A applicable.

or B not met during ---------- ----------

movement of, irradiated ffuel assemlBies in the Suspend movement of Immediately 1rradiated fuel

[ Gencnucu (secondary containmen %]i:07 assemblies in the

.,1 o r (secondary) during OPDRVs. containment.

e.2 .,upenoCURN t 4

^1T:"AT:00,'Oh AND D.3 ' Initiate action to Immediately

- suspend OPDRVs.

j i

I 0

3 BWR/4 STS 3.6-52 Rev 1, 04/07/95

_ .._ . _ _:.. _ _ ._~~- ; ~ r _ _ _ _ . __

[ .

]

l SGT System I 3.6.4.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System LCO 3.6.4.3 [Two] SGT subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

l APPLICABILITY:

N c_ _

MODES Durin movement 1, 2, andof3,(irradiated fuel assemblies in the l

l #

a._. seccgd g ment, 1 1 1 During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

1 l

l. ACTIONS l l

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l A. One SGT subsystem A.1 Restore SGT 7 days inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met in MO*E 1, 2, or 3.

B.2 Be in M,0DE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months C. Required Action and ------------NOTE------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition A ----------------------------

not met during movement of irradiated C.1 Place OPERABLE SGT Immediately fuel assemblies in the subsystem in (secondary] operation.

c

.a_,gg}ajnmentg,guog I wm m i - ,_.. ,or e QR

during OPDRVs.- .

(continued)

BWR/4 STS 3.6-54 Rev1,04/07/95

-, ., e w...m, -e a**

=4e- 4 -sw e a s ,m. mswsm . s .e.wm waresur em.mwee. - e e.- .e <we=- me e n. m. g . - - , e m. e

SGT Systen 3.0.4.3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.2.1 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in CCOy [ secondary) -

containm6nt.

a un

, . . . ct C . .TQ m..........y 4t4EbEOHh )

^

~

8.NE

. C.24 Initiate action to Immediately

'2 suspend OPDRVs.

D. Two SGT subsystems D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3 Immediately inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

E. Two SGT subsystems E.1 --------NOTE---------

inoperable during LCO 3.0.3 is not movement of ir adiated applicable.

fuel assembl es in the ------------- -------

(secondary]

, containmentf"^2dMp Suspend' movement of Immediately l unn = ..= " L or irradiated fuel during OPDRVs. assemblies in (secondary) m -

containment.

(continued)

~

BWR/4STS 3.6-55 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l

-w., m e . * - -. - --e---+# w~ *q-,-.. --w%-

SGT Systea 3.6.4.3 7~5 7F- S/A 1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. (continued) k.4 au m ..f C0"_

Atttfb H M NGr

[

t l

8Mt E.1 Initiate action to Immediately 2 suspend OPDRVs.

. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.3.1 Operate each SGT subsystem for a: [10] 31 days continuous hours (with heaters operating). j SR~ 3.6.4.3.2 Perform required SGT filter testing in In accordance accordance with the Ventilation Filter with the VFTP Testing Program (VFTP).

SR 3.6.4.3.3 Verify each SGT subsystem actuates on an (18] months actual or simulated initiation signal.

SR 3.6.4.3.4 Verify each SGT filter cooler bypass (18] month 7 damper can be opened _and the fan started.

4 e

1 BWR/4 STS 3.6-56 Rev 1, 04/07/95 i l

p-4 o-e . w =. - g er +me __ **-* ** == = I

.% . .w w ,g. ~w + -- m. m=,-w._-e- ~ + + +

[MCREC) Systea 3.7.4 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.4 [ Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC)] System LCO 3.7.4 Two [MCREC] subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, ,

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the

-Isecondaryl conf 2inment, e QH r.; C0"C ^1TEY?!^D During operations witTi a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I ,

i 1 A. One [MCREC) subsystem A.1 Restore [MCREC] 7 days I inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months 4

(continued)

O e

BWR/4 STS 3.7-9 Rev 1, 04/07/95

-- - :=== == = . . - =. - === : =r- --

j

[HCREC) Systen 3.7.4 0 W T { A.w.I 1 ACTI6NS (continued) l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and. ------------NOTE-------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition A -----------------------------

not met during -

movement of irradiated C.1 --------NOTE-------- 1 fuel assemblies in the Place in toxic gas (secondary) protection mode if containment M

- TOR A LT;n""^LTr automatic transfer '

to toxic gas l during OPDRVs. I protection mode is l

_ inoperable.

q .................... l Place OPERABLE Immediately

[MCREC) subsystem in

[ pressurization) mode.

98 C.2.1 Suspend movement of Immediately

$ irradiated fuel assemblies in the

[ secondary) containment.

_ AMQ )

w ,

.2.2_'uapeimjg" AllLMa - j h.J ;.telj,L m

C.2.K Initiate action to Immediately 1 suspend OPDRVs.

D. Two [MCREC) subsystems D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

(continued)

BWR/4 STS 3.7-10 Rev 1, 04/07/95

. === : =.- _... .-.-. .: : --

l i

(MCREC] Systea I 3.7.4 TsTPst, s.i ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Two(MCREC] subsystems ------------NOTE-------------

inoperable during LCO 3.0.3 is not appilcable.

movement of irradiated -----------------------------

fuel assembi es in the I (secondary] E.1 Suspend movement of Immediately I containment.M irradiated fuel

- (CONE ^ LTE"'TI^"E dr assemblies in the during OPDRVs. .[ secondary]

g- containment.

6%*. 'i F

@l

( . , . auaponu w ru. . . . . . . . . . - . . . ,

. -ALTERAT:^?1 j AND E.) Initiate action to Immediately

2. suspend OPDRVs.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.4.1 Operate each (MCREC] subsystem for (a 10 31 days continuous hours with the heaters operating .

or (for systems without heaters) !

a 15 minutes]. l l

SR 3.7.4.2 Perform required (MCREC] filter testing in In accordance accordance with the (Ventilation Filter with the [VFTP]

Testing Program (VFTP)].

(continued)

BWR/4 STS 3.7-11 Rev 1, 04/07/95

- - - :- ====- -----..--.:_-.-

[ Control Room AC] Systen 3.7.5 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.5 (Control Room Air Conditioning (AC)] System LC0 3.7.5 Two (control room AC] subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement o irradiated fuel assemblies in the

[ secondary 1 containment, f 4 ' M . . . - . . . .. . . . . . m During operations witn a potential for draining the reactor l vessel (OPDRVs). I ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 1

A. One [ control room AC) A.1 Restore (control room 30 days subsystem inoperable. AC] subsystem to OPCRABLE status.

l B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 Ic>srs associated Completion -

Time of Condition A AND <

not met in MODE 1, 2, )

or 3. B.2 Be in MODE 4., 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued)

S l

I BWR/4 STS 3.7-13 Rev1,04/07/95 t - - , . . ..w--. .. - . .

[ Control Room AC) Sy tem 3.7.5 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and ------------NOTE-------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition A -----------------------------

not met during movement of irradiated C.1 Place OPERABLE Immediately fuel assemb1 s in the (control room AC)

(secondary) subsystem in containmenLGur' operation.

C r urronvinuc 8.r - N during OPDRVs. QR

= C.2.1 Suspend movement of Immediately (5-+h "l;;;uti;'("*ls.

(secondary]

containment.

Q ...

'--d4 ko.:.2

'" T--d C^"E At-TERAMONS,. -

t:)!;)

S \

C.2. Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.

I

-D. Two (control room AC) D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately subsystems inoperable

,in MODE 1, 2, or 3. .

(continued) 4 8

9

~ BWR/4 STS 3.7-14 Rev 1, 04/07/95

, , . + - . ~ , , or ,, ..-m enpee m ww w - . , ~ . . w

[ Control Room AC) System 3.7.5 TS W- si,s.i ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l E. Two [ control room AC) ------------NOTE-------------

subsystems inoperable LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

,l duringmovementof. ----------------------------- -

l pirradiated fuel -

fassembliesinthe E.1 Suspend movement of Immediately

[ secondary] irradiated fuel containment; =,Mr* assemblies in the

-.,x m...~

" Tr (secondary]

l during 0)DRVs. containment.

A

~

l ht E.; auspmd C0"E -

lr:dhtMI #

"J.T:"T : C",

E E .1 , Initiate actions to Immediately 2' suspend OPDRVs.

1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.5.1 Verify each (control room AC) subsystem has (18) months the capability to remove the assumed heat load.

BWR/4 STS 3.7-15 Rev 1, 04/07/95

~ - . -.:: :: =.- .-- -.-- _ _ :. m :- - - -

AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 l 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS TS TF-tl'L.I !

3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown LCO 3.8.2 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. One qualified circuit between. the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE AC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.10

" Distribution Systems-Shutdown"; and

b. One diesel generator (DG) capable of supplying one division of the onsite Class IE AC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.10.

- ^

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, [

During movement of' irradiated fuel assemblies in the (secondary] containment.

9 0

BWR/4 STS 3.8-18 Rev 1, 04/07/95 r - - - - _. - .- .:: : ..

AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 7~S TF-51,pp.i 1

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I

i A. One required offsite ------------NOTE------------- ]

circuit inoperable. Enter applicable Condition l and Required Actions of I LCO 3.8.10, with one required division de-energized as a result of Condition A.

A.1 Declare affected -

Imediately required feature (s),

with no offsite power available, inoperable.

E

.2.1 Suspend CORE Imediately ALTERATIONS.

M A.2.2 Suspend movement of Imediately tirradiated fuel g g M}_ assemblies in the (secondary] l containment. I AND

. A.2.3 Initiate action to Imediately suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

- M A.2.4 Initiate action to Imediately restore required offsite power circuit to OPERABLE status.

_]

(continued)

BWR/4 STS 3.8-19 Rev 1, 04/07/95

_ :__ ::::~ - .-

AC Sources-Shutdown 3.S.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One required DG B.1 Suspend CORE Immediately inoperable. ALTERATIONS.

M 3 B.2 Suspend movement lif' Immediately CE-w2 1;'nti:' n

[ secondary]

containment.

8!E B.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.

AND {

i B.4 Initiate action to Immediately restore required DG to OPERABLE status, j l

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.2.1 -------------------NOTE--------------------

The following SRs are not required to be performed: SR 3.8.1.3, SR 3.8.1.9 through SR 3.8.1.11, SR 3.8.1.13 through SR 3.8.16, !

[SR3.8.1.18),andSR3.8.1.19. 1 For AC sources required to be OPERABLE the In accordance SRs of Specification 3.8.1, except with applicable SR 3.8.1.8, SR 3.8.1.17, and SR 3.8.1.20, SRs are appl.icable. -

BWR/4 STS 3.8-20 Rev 1, 04/07/95

. _ _..t_;_ _ _. = = _ .= . _.=_._.

l DC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.5 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS !

3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown LCO 3.8.5 DC electrical power subsystems shall be OPERA 8LE to support the DC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.10, " Distribution Systems-Shutdown."

Cree.u%ly

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, Durin movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary] containment.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l

A. One or more required A.1 Declare affected Immediately DC electrical power required feature (s) subsystems inoperable. inoperable.

9E A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

M

- A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately

irradiated fuel CM - - ~ - Y assemblies in the

[ secondary]

containment.

l l

m l (continued) l e

i

.. BWR/4 STS 3.8-28 Rev 1, 04/07/95 o

. . ...._ . . ._ iT ~ ~ ~_11 ' * ~ ~ ~ ~ _ .-..-..___~__.____.___1. _. . . .

Inverters-Shutdown 3.8.8 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.8 Inverters-Shutdown LCO 3.8.8 Inverter (s) shall be OPERABLE to support the onsite Class IF AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.10, " Distribution Systems-Shutdown."

[N.c.Udlag3' APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, Durin movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the

- secondary] containment.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Oneormore[ required) A.1 Declare affected immediately inverters inoperable. required feature (s) inoperable.

E A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

M A.2.2 Suspend handling of Immediately

sse a the

[ secondary]

containment.

M A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately

- suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

- M ,

(continued)

BWR/4 STS 3.8-36 Rev 1, 04/07/95

- - _-- r- ._ _ -r- - - --

Distribution Systems-Shutdown 3.8.10 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown LCO 3.8.10 The necessary portions of the AC, DC, [and AC vital bus) electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE to support equipment required to be OPERABLE.

[ N.AO APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, During movement o irradiated fuel assemblies in the 1

secondary) containment.

ACTIONS CONDITION COMPLETION TIME I REQUIRED ACTION A. One or more required A.1 Declare associated Imediately l AC, DC, [or AC vital supported required bus) electrical power feature (s) distribution inoperable. ;

subsystems inoperable.

9.6 A.2.1 Suspend CORE Imediately ALTERATIONS.

AND Suspend handling of Imediately K A.2.2 tirradiated fuel N 9 assemblies in the

[ secondary]

containment. .

I h.Np A.2.3 Initiate action to Imediately sus)end operations witi a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

AND (continued)

BWR/4 STS 3.8-40 Rev 1, 04/07/95

. - - . - . - - - - = = = - 5 = ==- - - . - . .

i Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 T5 7F-s7, s,.I \

BASES 1 1

' APPLICABLE 3. 4. Reactor Buildina and Refuelina Floor Exhaust SAFETY ANALYSES, Radiation-Hiah (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY The Reactor Building and Refueling Floor Exhaust Radiation-High Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists; thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature . !

limitations of these MODES; thus, these Functions are not 1 pg I required. In add n, the Functions are a o required to !

be OPERABLE durin "I X""""*n OPDRV and movement of l

- birradiated fuel assemblies in the sicondary containment, I because the capability of detecting radiation releases due j to fuel failures (due to fuel uncovery or dropped fuel assemblies) must be provided to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded. ,

Manual Initiation

[L5MA) )

5.

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the secondary containment isolation logic that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation channels and provide manual isolation ca> ability. There is no specific FSAR safety analysis that ta(es credit for this Function. It is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the secondary containment isolation instrumentation as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

There are two push buttons for the logic, one manual initiation push button per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Function, since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Two channels of Manual Initiation Function are available and art requiretto be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, and during 9CY M""em OPDRVs yand a movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. These are the MODES and other specified conditions in which the Secondary Containment Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.

CN.eadlt.h (continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.3-190 Rev 1, 04/07/95

- -__.= - =. . . = = - ==. =-.:.-

MCREC System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 BASES

' T57Fn'L.t APPLICABLE 3. Main Steam Line Flow-Hioh (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and The Main Steam Line Flow-High Function is required to be APPLICABILITY OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that control room personnel are protected during a main steam line break (MSLB) accident. In MODES 4 and 5, the reactor is depressurized; thus, MSLB protection is not required.

4. Refuelina Floor Area Radiation-Hiah High radiation in the refueling floor area could be the result of a fuel handling accident. A refueling floor high radiation signal will automatically initiate the MCREC System, since this radiation release could result in radiation exposure to control room personnel.

The refueling floor area radiation equipment consists of two independent monitors and channels located in the refueling floor area. Two channels of Refueling Floor Area Radiation-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude MCREC System initiation. The Allowable Value was selected to ensure that the Function will promptly detect high activity that could threaten exposure to control room personnel.

g The Refueling Floor Area Radiation-High Function is

_m required _to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 and during movement oNirradiated f assemblies in the secondary containmen um. A a."fi^., and operations with a -

. potential or Uraining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs), to ensure that control room personnel are protected during a LOCA, fuel handling event, or vessel draindown event.

During MODES 4 and 5, when these specif,ied conditions are not in progress (e.g_. ,CE = " ' _.aj, the probability of a LOCAbr n-St is low; thus,' the Function is not required. , pgg ha e

5. Control Room Air Inlet Radiation-Hiah

. The control room air inlet radiation monitors measure

. radiation levels exterior to the inlet ducting of the MCR.

A high radiation level may pose a threat to MCR personnel;

thus, automatically initiating the MCREC System.

l (continued) l BWR/4 STS B 3.3-211 Rev1,04/07/95 l

_ _ - ~ , . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . , _ . _ ._

MCREC System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 TS O-SW,t BASES J

APPLICABLE 5. Control Room Air Inlet Radiation-Hiah (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and The Control Room Air Inlet Radiation-High Function consists APPLICABILITY of two independent monitors. Two channe's of Control Room

. Air Inlet Radiation-High are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single %strument failure can preclude MCREC System initiation. The Allowable Value was selected to ensure protection of the control room personnel.

CCcar.shM The Control Room Air Inlet Radiation-H1gh Function is reoired to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2 and 3 and during g S0 0 ;""," 0~aOPDRVrdandmovementof rra iated fuel assemb'ies in the secondary containment, to ensure that control room personnel are protected during a LOCA, fuel handling event, or vessel draindown event. During MODES 4 ce Rpand 5,_ when J (e.g., - these_

-.y=- specified

~), theconditions probability are of anot in progressf LOCA U~ 1

.9eIEpis low; thus, the Function is not required.@*tnsa s]

ACTIONS Reviewer's Note: Certain LCO Completion Times are based on approved topical reports. In order for a licensee to use the times, the licensee must justify the Completion Times as required by the staff Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for the )

_ topical report. _,,,

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to MCREC System instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, j Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each

, additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable MCREC System instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable MCREC System instrumentation channel.

(continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.3-212 Rev1,04/07/95

= = - - - = - . - - - - -

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES

- I ACTIONS E.1. E.2 and E.3 (continued)

For the containment purge valve with resilient seal that is isolated in accordance with Required Action E.1, SR 3.6.1.3.7 must be performed at least once every [ ] days.

This provides assurance that degradation of the resilient seal is detected and confirms that the leakage rate of the containment purge valve.does not increase during the time the penetration is isolated. The normal Frequency for SR 3.6.1.3.7 is 184 days. Since more reliance is placed on a single valve while in this Condition, it is prudent to perform the SR more often. Therefore, a Frequency of once per [ ] days was chosen and has been shown to be acceptable based on operating experience.

I F.1 and F.2 {

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating !

experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full '

power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

~ ~

G.I. H.1, Q an 1.2 7

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the unit must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, d. - == La M -

M*y% movement of, irradiated fuel assemblies must be immediate'y suspenaeo.- Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe .

condition. Also, if applicable, action must be immediately )

initiated to suspend operations with a potential for l draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential ,

for fission product release. Actions must continue until '

OPDRVs are suspended and valve (s) are restored to OPERABLE status. If suspending an OPDRV would result in closing the residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling isolation

_ valves, an alternative Required Action is provided to _

(continued)

BWR/4STS B 3.6-23 Rev1,04/07/95

= - ._ _. - .. . _-

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 S W Q $ ,(

BASES H

ACTIONS G.I. H.I. O and 1.2 (continued) a, %

immediately initiate action to restore the valve (s) to 0PERABLE status. This allows RHR to remain in service while actions are being taken to restore the valve.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.1 REQUIREMENTS Each [18] inch primary containment purge valve is required to be verified sealed closed at 31 day intervals. This SR is designed to ensure that a gross breach of primary containment is not caused by an inadvertent or spurious opening of a primary containment purge valve. Detailed analysis of the purge valves failed to conclusively demonstrate their ability to close during a LOCA in time to limit offsite doses. Primary containment purge valves that are sealed closed must have motive power to the valve operator removed. This can be accomplished by de-energizing the. source of electric power or removing the air supply to the valve operator. In this application, the term " sealed" has no connotation of leak tightness. The 31 day Frequency is a rasult of an NRC initiative, Generic Issue B-24 (Ref. 4), related to primary contrinment purge valve use during unit operations.

This SR allows a valve that is open under administrative controls to not meet the SR during the time the valve is open. Opening a purge valve under administrative controls is restricted to one valve in a penetration flow path at a given time (refer to discussion for Note 1 of the ACTIONS) in order to effect repairs to that valve. This allows one purge valve to be opened without resulting in a failure of the Surveillance and resultant entry into the ACTIONS for this purge valve, provided the stated restrictions are met.

Condition E must be entered during this allowance, and the valve opened only as necessary for effecting repairs. Each purge valve in the penetration flow path may be alternately opened, provided one remains sealed closed, if necessary, to complete repairs on the penetration.

The SR is modified by a Note stating that primary .

containment purge valves are only required to be sealed closed in MODES 1, 2, and 3. If a LOCA inside primary (continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.6-24 Rev 1, 04/07/95

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 T.5 U S 4 I BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.1 (continued)

- ~

REQUIREMENTS containment occurs in these MODES, the purge valves may not be capable of closing before the pressure pulse affects systems downstream of the purge valves or the release of radioactive material will exceed limits prior to the closing of the purge valves. At other times when the purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g., during handling

,.f ofairradiated fuel), pressurization concerns are not present

_and the purge valves are allowed to be open. _

SR 3.6.1.3.2 This SR ensures that the primary containment purge valves are closed as required or, if open, open for an allowable reason. If a purge valve is open in violation of this SR, the valve is considered inoperable. If the inoperable valve is not otherwise known to have excessive leakage when closed, it is not considered to have leakage outside of limits. (The SR is also modified by a Note (Note 1),

stating that primary containment purge valves are only required to be closed in MODES 1, 2, and 3. If a LOCA inside primary containment occurs in these MODES, the purge valves may not be capable of closing before the pressure pulse affects systems downstream of the purge valves, or the release of radioactive material will exceed limits prior to the purge valves closing. At other times when the purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g., during handling of irradiated fuel), pressurization concerns are not present and the purge valves are allowed to be open.]

The SR is modified by a Note (Note 2) stating that the SR is not required to be met when the purge valves are open for the stated reasons. The Note states that these valves ny be opened for inerting, de-inerting, pressure control, ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or Surveillances that require the valves to be open. The (18] inch purge valves are capable of closing in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore, these valves are allowed to be open for limited periods of time. The 31 day Frequency is consistent with other PCIV requirements discussee in SR 3.6.1.3.3.

4 (continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.6-25 Rev1,04/07/95 ;

. = = ..-.=-== __ - - -

1 l

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES

/ S 7'F- Shh I SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.7 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS OPERABILITY. Operating experience has demonstrated that this type of seal has the potential to degrade in a shorter time period than do other seal types. Based on this observation and the importance of maintaining this penetration leak tight (due to the direct path between primary containment and the environment), a Frequency of ,

184 days was established.

Additionally, this SR must be performed once within 92 days after opening the valve. The 92 day Frequency was chosen recognizing that cycling the valve could introduce additional seal degradation (beyond that which occurs to a valve that has not been opened). Thus, decreasing the I interval (from 184 days) is a prudent measure after a valve has been opened.

The SR is modified by a Note stating that the primary containment purge valves are only required to meet leakage rate testing requirements in MODES 1, 2, and 3. If a LOCA inside primary containment occurs in these MODES, purge valve leakage must be minimized to ensure offsite radiological release is within limits. At other times when the purge valves are required to be capable of closing

[ctc.md)q -

(e.g., during handling ofdrradiated fuel), pressurization concerns are not present and the purge valves are not required to meet any specific leakage criteria.

SR' 3.6.1.3.8 Verifying that the isolation time of each MSIV is within the specified limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY.

The isolation time test ensures that the MSIV will isolate in a time period that does not exceed the times assumed in the DBA analyses. This ensures that the calculated radiological consequences of these events remain within

. 10 CFR 100 limits. The Frequency of this SR is [in accordance with the requirements of the Inservice Testing Program or 18 months).

(continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.6-28 Rev 1, 04/07/95

[ Secondary) Containment B 3.6.4.1 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.4.1 (Secondary) Containment BASES BACKGROUND The function of the (secondary) containment is to contain, dilute, and hold up fission products that may leak from primary containment following a Design Basis Accident (DBA).

In conjunction with operation of the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System and closure of certain valves whose lines penetrate the [ secondary) containment, the [ secondary) containment is designed to reduce the activity level of the fission products prior to release to the environment and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during certain operations that take place inside primary containment, when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE, or that take place outside primary containment.

The (secondary) containment is a structure that completely encloses the primary containment and those components that may be postulated to contain primary system fluid. This structure forms a control volume that serves to hold up and dilute the fission products. It is possible for the pressure in the control volume to rise relative to the environmental pressure (e.g., due to pump and motor heat load additions). To prevent ground level exfiltration while allowing the (secondary) containment to be designed as a conventional structure, the (secondary} containment requires support syst"ts to maintain the contro , volume pressure at less than th. external pressure. Requirements for these systems are g ecified separately in LCO 3.6.4.2, " Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs) " and LCO 3.6.4.3,

" Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System."

APPLICABLE There are two principal accidents for which credit is taken SAFETY ANALYSES for [ secondary) containment OPERABILITY. These are a loss

, of coolant accident (LOCA) (Ref.1) and a fuel handling

%AC "

accident ,inside (secondary) containment (Ref. 2). The

[ secondary) containment performs no active function in response to each of these limiting events; however, its leak tightness is required to ensure that the release of radioactive materials from'the )rimary containment is restricted to those leakage patis and associated leakage ,

rates assumed in the accident analysis and that fission

- (continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.6-97 Rev1,04/07/95

.. - L L'~-.-.. - ----- J L r . . : :.' 2 : ' T

[ Secondary] Containment l B 3.6.4.1 D M-' OM l BASES APPLICABLE products entrap >ed within the [ secondary] containment SAFETY ANALYSES structure will se treated by the SGT System prior to '

(continued) discharge to the environment. 1 (Secondary] containment satisfies Criterion 3 c,f the NRC Policy Statement.

l l

l LCO An OPERABLE [ secondary] containment arovides a control l volume into which fission products t1st bypass or leak from primary containment, or are released from the reactor coolant pressure boundary components located in (secondary]

containment, can be diluted and processed prior to release ;

to the environment. For the (secondary] containment to be considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum can be established and maintained.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to [ secondary]

containment. Therefore, [ secondary] containment OPERABILITY is required during the same operating conditions that require primary containment OPERABILITY.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of the ]

LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature l limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining ,

[ secondary] containment OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 l or 5 to ensure a control volume, except for other situations l for which significant releases of radioactive material can 1 be postulated, such as during operations with a colential g for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVshTci ; C^3.%

a J = =a or during movement ofeirradiatea assemblies in the [ secondary] containment.e q?t@

khd E M l h ei D3 ACTIONS A_d If [ secondary] containment is inoperable, it must be restt. red to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ,

Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of (continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.6-98 Rev1,04/07/95

- .. Tr - - - - - . . T~ ~

[ Secondary) Containment B 3.6.4.1 15 TF-5TAJ BASES ACTIONS L,,), (continued) maintaining (secondary) containment during MODES 1, 2, and 3.. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring [ secondary) containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where [ secondary) containment is inoperable is minimal.

B.1 and 8.2 If [ secondary) containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C.1m n ,. - -/-

Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the [secondar

@ M' containmenO = ..d and OPDRVs can be postulated to causeVission product release to the [ secondary) containment. In such cases, the [ secondary) containment is the only barrier _to relea_se of fission products to the environment. _ _. - - - - ovement of9 irradiated -

fuel assemblies must be immediately uspended if the (secondary) containment is inoperable. (g4 Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing an action that involves moving a component to a safe position. Also, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

1 Reaudred Action C.1 has been modified by a Note stating that !

@,yt4% LCO 3.0.3 is not applicab'e. If moving 1 rradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LC0 3.0.3 would not specify any action. n moving

irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor . 1 operat' ions. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend .

(continued}

BWR/4 STS B 3.6-99 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l

.- . ~ . -- - . . . . .-.

'wh'"+s re amet,es-w-e mm- *WM 5PA'r9-- *P'remnyg ytmeen ueme d6. =ge-e . *L

[ Secondary] Containment i

B 3.6.4.1 i S TF-57,L t BASES I ACTIONS C . lm C2f)(continued)

_ - -vv p- movement offirradiated fuel assemblies would not Le a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures that the (secondary] containment boundary is sufficiently leak tight to preclude exfiltration under expected wind conditions. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency of this SR was developed based on operating experience related to (secondary] containment vacuum variations during the i applicable MODES and the low probability of a DBA occurring I between surveillances.

Furthermore, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal (secondary] containment vacuum condition.

SR 3.6.4.1.2 and SR 3.6.4.1.3 Verifying that (secondary] containment equipment hatches and access doors are closed ensures that the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent maintaining the desired negative pressure does not occur. Verifying that all such openings are closed >rovides adequate assurance that exfiltration from tie (secondary] containment will not occur. In this a> plication, the term ' sealed" has no connotation of leak tigitness. Maintaining [ secondary) containment OPERABILITY requires verifying each door in the access opening is closed, except when the access opening is being used for normal transient entry and exit (then at least one door must remain closed). The 31 day Frequency for these SRs has been shown to be adequate, based on operating experience, and is considered adequate in view of i the other indications of door and hatch status that are i available to the operator.

(continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.6-100 Rev 1, 04/07/95 '

~

_'_7 E

[ . ._ .

1 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS S V 5 ]' A v.I B 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)

BASES ,

BACKGROUND- The function of the SCIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis ,

Accidents (DBAs) (Ref.1). Secondary containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that fission products that leak from primary containment following a DBA, or that are released during certain operations when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE or take place outside primary containment, are maintained within the secondary containment boundary.

The OPERABILITY requirements for. SCIVs help ensure that an adequate (secondary) containment boundary is maintained during and after an accident by minimizing potential paths to the environment. These isolation devices consist of either passive devices or active (automatic) devices.

Manual valves, de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed position (including check valves with flow through the valve secured), and blind flanges are considered passive devices.

Automatic SCIVs close on a (secondary] containment isolation signal to establish a boundary for untreated radioactive material within (secondary) containment following a DBA or other accidents.

Other penetrations are isolated by the use of valves in the closed position or blind flanges.

APPLICABLE The SCIVs must be OPERABLE to ensure the : secondary)

SAFETY ANALYSES containment barrier to fission product releases is established. The principal accidents for which the (secondary) containment boundary is required are a loss of

- coolant accident (Ref.1) and a fuel handling accident

ToMC.-' ;inside (secondary) containment (Ref. 2). The (: ,econdary) containment performs no active function in response to either of these limiting events, but the boundary .

~

(continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.6-102 Rev 1, 04/07/95

SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 TSW'&tU BASES APPLICABLE established by SCIVs is required to ensure that leakage from SAFETY ANALYSES the primary containment is processed by the Standby Gas (continued) Treatment (SGT) System before being released to the environment.

Maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE with isolation times within limits ensures that fission products will remain trapped inside (secondary] containment so that they can be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.

SCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO SCIVs form a part of the (secondary] containment boundary.

The SCIV safety function is related to control of offsite radiation releases resulting from DBAs.

The power operated isolation valves are considered OPERABLE when their isolation times are within limits and the valves actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves

. covered by this LCO, along with their associated stroke times, are listed in Reference 3.

The normally closed isolation valves or blind flanges are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, automatic SCIVs are de-activated and secured in their closed position, and blind flanges are in place. These passive -

isolation valves or devices are listed in Reference 3.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to the primary containment that leaks to the

[ secondary] containment. Therefore, the OPERABILITY of SCIVs is required.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs@m;4 (continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.6-103 Rev1,04/07/95

- - - . :::" ~L,...----.. .:

'~~ ~~

SCIVs B 3.6.4.2

' BASES M APPLICABILITY M N 9? 9 . or during movement of irradiated fuel (continued) assemblies in the (secondary] containment. Moving 6 irradiated fuel assemblies in the [ secondary] containment may also occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3. g s ACTIONS- The ACTIONS are modified by three Notes. The first Note allows penetration flow paths to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is ;

in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for (secondary] containment isolation is indicated.

i The second Note provides clarification that-for the purpose )

of this LCO separate Condition entry is allowed for each

. penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate com)ensatory actions for each inoperable SCIV. Complying 4 wit) the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, I and subsequent inoperable SCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

The third Note ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system (s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable SCIV.

A.1 and A.2 ,

In the event that there are one or more penetration flow paths with one SCIV inoperable, the affected penetration flow path (s) must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure.

Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic SCIV, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. For penetrations isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available device to

. [ secondary] containment. The Required Action must be completed within the_8 hour Completion Time. The specified -

time period is reasonable considering the time required to (continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.6-104 Rev 1, 04/07/95

. -. _::::::::- ..-. L :L -

1 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ACTIONS j.d (continued) with two isolation valves. This clarifies that only l Condition A is entered if one SCIV is inoperable in each of I

two penetrations.

1 C.1 and C.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the

. required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant sptems.

D.h If any Required Action and associated Completion Time are I not met, the plant must be placed in a egin which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, e W M L= r %%

the movement of, irradiated fuel assemblies in the

[secondaryj containment must be immediately suspended.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion CN_t4]

~ -

1 of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product .

release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

' Required Action D.1 has been modifie a Note stating that

- I LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable. If movi irradiated fuel I assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify l any action. If moving fuel while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

- Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend inovement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. ,

4 0

(continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.6-106 Rev 1, 04/07/95 x::: . _ _ - . - - _ _

SGT Systen B 3.6.4.3 TSTF-54s.1 BASES BACKGROUND of the airstream to less than (70]% (Ref. 2). The profilter (continued) removes large particulate matter, while the HEPA filter removes fine particulate matter and protects the charcoal fr'om fouling. The charcoal adsorber removes gaseous elemental iodine and organic iodides, and the final HEPA v filter collects any carbon fines exhadsted from the charcoal adsorber.

The SGT System automatically starts and operates in response to actuation signals indicative of conditions or an accident that could require operation of the system. Following initiation, both charcoal filter train fans start. Upon verification that both subsystems are operating, the redundant subsystem is normally shut down.

APPLICABLE The design basis for the SGT System is to mitigate the SAFETY ANALYSES @consecuences of a loss of coolant accident and fuel handling accident &(Ref. 2). For all events analyzed, the SGT System

{"fnsgM,~ 1s snown to be automatically initiated to reduce, via filtration and adsorption, the radioactive material released to the environment.

The SGT System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO Following a DBA, a minimum of one SGT subsystem is required to maintain the (secondary] containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and to process gaseous releases. Meeting the LCO requirements for two OPERABLE subsystems ensures operation of at least one SGT subsystem in the event of a single active failure.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, SGT System OPERABILITY is required during these MODES.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the SGT (continued)

BWR/4 STS 8 3.6-110 Rev1,04/07/95

-. . . . . ::::: :::: . - - . . - . L -

l SGT Systea B 3.6.4.3 TSTF-S~t,Lt BASES APPLICABILITY System in OPERABLE status is not required in MODE 4 or 5, (continued) except for other situations under which significant releases I of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during I operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel QuAhq> (OPDRVs k J f n: =--12. -e or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the (secondary] containment.4

%d Gl ACTIONS A.d l

With one SGT subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status in 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE SGT subsystem is adequate to perform the required radioactivity release control function. However, the overall system reliability is raduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem .

could result in the radioactivity release control function not being adequately performed. The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant SGT System and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.1 and B.2 If the SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant'must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within .

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner j

. and without challenging plant systems.

C .1. C . 2. b ,-

=

g *- -

Qu:.nMh During movementlof irradiated fuel assenblies, in the (secondary] containmentGrin; Cepr ^'"EP2 "* or during OPDRVs, when Required Action A.1 cannot be comp'eted within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE SGT subsystem ,

should immediately be placed in operatien. This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is 9PERABLE, that no failures that could prevent automatic actuation have (continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.6-131 Rev1,04/07/95

~~

-_ =_ L _ JQ: -- . -=- - J / ^G

SGT Systen B 3.6.4.3 BASES TWWA(

ACTIONS C.1. C.2.1. C.2.2. and C.2.3 (continued) occurred, and that any other failure would be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that represent a potential for releasing 79 cgdr radioactive material to the (secondary] containment, thus TgC **

A placing the, plant in a condition that minimizes risk. If "mm- e movement gfsirradiated fuel applicable, m 8 assemblies must immediate1v be suspended.JSuspension of these activities must not preciuoe completion of movement of 7

a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs in bt r t 4 %q order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until 0PDRVs are suspended.

The Required Actions of Condition C have been modified by a Note stating that LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving 9 irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either

{ case, inability to suspend movement fi oJ rradiated fuel (assemblies reactor shutdown.would j a sufficient [ reason to require a not be L1 If both SGTS subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the SGT system may not be capable of supporting the required radioactivity release control function. Therefore, actions are required to enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately.

E.1.

4:. e- -

O hec.ca.

When two SGT subsystems arefnoperable, if applicable,6

-*%e-" movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in (secondary] containment must immediately be suspended.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel (continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.6-112 Rev 1, 04/07/95

- == =-. -- ..= = -- -- -

l SGT System B 3.6.4.3 T.5 TF S~tJa.t BASES ACTIONS E . h, , . . -

(continued) draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action 1.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel ecMk assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving 3i rradiated fuel assemblies while in Muut 1, z, or 3, ne tuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a l uffletent reason to require a reactor shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.3.1 REQUIREMENTS Operating each SGT subsystem for n [10] continuous hours ensures that (both] subsystems are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action. . Operation

[with the heaters on (automatic heater cycling to maintain temperature)) for 2 (10] continuous hours every 31 days i eliminates moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The 31 day Frequency was developed in consideration of the known reliability of fan motors and controls and the redundancy available in the system.

SR 3.6.4.3.2 This SR verifies that the required SGT filter testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The SGT System filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 3). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

(continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.6-113 Rev 1, 04/07/95

_ . ., ~~ ~ _ ~

- .- - - - . L :-

[MCREC) Systea '

B 3.7.4 shl BACKGROUND room habitability is discussed in the FSAR, Chapters (6)-

(continued) and [9), (Refs. I and 2, respectively).

APPLICABLE The ability of the [MCREC) System to maintain the SAFETY ANALYSES habitability of the control room is an explicit assumption for the safety analyses presented in the FSAR, Chapters [6]

.- and (15] (Refs. I and 3, respectively). The pressurization mode of the [MCREC) System is assumed to operate following a

(~7m"A

\ [- lau of coolant accident. fuel handling accident, main steam line break, and control rod drop accident, as aiscussed in theFSAR,Section(6.4.1.2.2](Ref.4). The radiological doses to control room personnel as a result of the various DBAs are summarized in Reference 3. No single active or passive failure will cause the loss of outside or recirculated air from the control room. .

The [MCREC) System satisfies Criterion 3 of 'the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO Two redundant subsystems of the [MCREC) System are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, assuming a single failure disables the other subsystem.

Total system failure could result in exceeding a. dose of l 5 rem to the control room operators in the event of a DBA.

The [MCREC) System is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to control operator exposure are OPERABLE in both subsystems. A subsystem is considered OPERABLE when its associated:

a. Fan is OPERABLE;

b. HEPA filter and charcoal adsorbers are not excessively restricting flow and are capable of performing their filtration functions; and

c. Heater, demister, ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.

In addition, the control room boundary must be maintained, includ.ing the integrity of the walls, floors, ceilings, -

ductwork, and access doors.

(continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.7-19 Rev 1, 04/07/95

- - - = -... - - . .-.=---... =~ --- - --

[MCREC) System B 3.7.4 '

BASES' (continued)

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the [MCREC) System must be OPERABLE to control operator exposure during and following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission product release.

I In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced because of the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the

[MCREC) System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for the following situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated:

a. During operations with potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs);

1. Ou, ..~ CGRT 1: "naTT00 4

h During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the

[ secondary) containment.h YZmeA R)

ACTIONS A.1 With one [MCREC) subsystem inoperable, the inoperable

[MCREC) subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE [MCREC)subsystemisadequatetoperformcontrol room radiation protection. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced [MCREC) System capability.

The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and that the remaining subsystem can provide the required capabilities.

B.1 and B.2 In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the inoperable [MCREC) subsystem i cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within-12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

(continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.7-20 Rev 1, 04/07/95

(MCREC] Systen B 3.7.4 TS TF-5t,&,(

BASES ACTIONS C.I. C.2.14

A' Q&

(continued)

The Required Actions of Condition C are modified by a Note 1 indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the mfuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

~

Therefore, inability to suspend movement obirradiated fuel

@ utdown.

assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor During movement Nof irradiated fuel assemblies in the (secondary] containment 9 < 6 ~ . m 'FM or during OPDRVs, if the inoperable (MCREC) subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE (MCREC) subsystem rsy be placed in the pressurization mode. This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

Required Action C.1 is modified by a Note alerting the operator to (place the system in the toxic gas protection mode if the toxic gas automatic transfer capability is )

inoperable).

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk. Qwg ,

If applicable,b "'""" "e O movementohirradiated fuel assemblies in the [ secondary] containment must be

, suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also,- if applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

M If both (MCREC) subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the (MCREC) System may not be capable of performing (continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.7-21 Rev 1, 04/07/95 i

[MCREC) Systeo B 3.7.4 TSTF-Enfu.I BASES ACTIONS L}, (continued) the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered ,

immediately. )

E.k O^ 4 7 n-The Required Actions of Condition E are modified by a Note indicating that LC0 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving (etMh I

firradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

Therefore, inability to suspend movement of 9 irradiated fuel j e

assemblies is not sufficient reason to[reliii re a reactor hutdown. -

During movement of' irradiated fuel assemblies in the

[ secondary] containment n c.n; = m " " M r during OPDRVs, with two (MCREC) subsystems inoperable, action must 4 be taken immediately to suspend activities that present a !

potential for releasing radioactivity that might require l 1 solation of the control room. This places the unit in a I condition that minimizes risk. g{g If applicable,6= id.TSM @ movement of 4 rradiated i fuel assemblies in the [ secondary] containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. If applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDVRs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.4.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that a subsystem in a standby mode starts on demand and continues to operate. Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they start and function properly. As the environmental and normal operating conditions of this system are not severe, testing each subsystem once every month provides an adequate check on this system. Monthly heater operation dries out any (continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.7-22 Rev 1, 04/07/95

- ==::: . . . - . . _ - -

[ Control Room AC) Systen B 3.7.5 BASES Ts rf-sui,. c APPLICABLE heat loads and personnel occupancy requirements to ensure SAFETY ANALYSES equipment OPERABILITY.

(continued)

The (Control Room AC) System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LC0 Two independent and redundant subsystems of the (Control Room AC) System are required to be OPERABLE to ensu:e that at least one is available, assuming a single failure disables the other subsystem. Total system failure could result in the equipment operating temperature exceeding limits.

. The (Control Room AC) System is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to maintain the control room temperature are OPERABLE in both subsystems. These components include the cooling coils, fans, chillers, compressors, ductwork, dampers, and associated instrumentation and controls.

APPLICABILITY In MODE 1, 2, or 3, the (Control Room AC) System must be OPERABLE to ensure that the control room temperature will not exceed equipment OPERABILITY limits following control room isolation. .

In H0 DES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a Design Basis Accident are reduced due to the pressure and .

temperature limitations in.these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the (Control Room AC) System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for the following situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated:

a. During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs);

8^ -

>ur mo CoREALT"ATIO"D Ds.c.a.

During movement of9 i rradia5d fuel assemblies in the.

[ secondary) containment.4 NmwD (continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.7-26 Rev1,04/07/95*

--r wu==.e,.w,=,ews.., esu n es ame = . . . *

[ Control Room AC) Systeo B 3.7.5 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS 8.d With one [ control room AC) subsystem inoperable, the inoperable [ control room AC) subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE [ control room AC) subsystem is adequate to perform the control room air conditioning function. However, the overall reliability is ;

reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in loss of the control room air conditioning function. The 30 day Completion Time'is based on the low '

I probability of an event occurring requiring control room isolation, the consideration that the remaining subsystem can provide the required protection, and the availability of alternate safety and nonsafety cooling methods.

B.1 and B.2 In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the inoperable [ control room AC) subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the i associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the )

required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. )

C.1. C.2.1a hC.2.

g - - -

M9-The Required Actions of Condition C are' modified by a Note indicating that LC0 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving 4 irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the

-h) fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

' Therefore, inability to suspend movement o irradiated fuel assemblies is not suffic.ient reason to equire a reactor (shutdown. _

During movement ofkrradiated fuel assemblies in the

[ secondary) containmentec r -: LO'""!!M or during ,

OPDRVs, if Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within i the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE [ control room AC) subsystem may be placed immediately in operation. This

action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, l (continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.7-27 Rev1,04/07/95 4

, . . . . .,%.s + -- ---wee. ...w..

(Control Room AC) System B 3.7.5 T 5 T F T I,/?u.l BASES ACTIONS C.I. C.2.1. (continued) g - -

that no failures that would prevent actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

@ Q .y g If applicable, O RE R T S* " ~ '. movement of4 irradiated fuel assemblies in the [ secondary) containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be initiated ,

'immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of I a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission '

product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

N If both [ control room AC) subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the [ Control Room AC) System may not be capable of performing the intended function. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

E.h d A 6 *~~

The Required Actions of Condition E are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the G sca "M O fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

Therefore, inability to suspend movement irradiated fuel assemblies is not a sufficient reason to require a reactor

. shutdown.

During movement ofdirradiated fuel assemblies in the

[ secondary) containment forduring OPDRVs, with two [ control room AC) subsystems inoperable, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might (continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.7-28 Rev1,04/07/95

_1__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._

[ Control Rooa AC) System B 3.7.5 TSTF-5I,fy.(

' BASES ACTIONS E.1, E.2, and E.3 (continued) require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable,40RE Ai r : W E

(- g handling of4 irradiated 3

fuel in the'[ secondary) containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended. i SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.5.1 REQUIREMENTS )

This SR verifies that the heat removal capability of the system is sufficient to remove the controi room heat load assumed in the [ safety analyses). The SR consists of a combination of testing and calculation. The [18] month Frequency is appropriate since significant degradation of the (Control Room AC) System is not expected over this time period.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section [6.4].

. 1 1

BWR/4 STS B 3.7-29 Rev1,04/07/95

-,- -- :- . . . - r

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS T.S TF-5%.t

. B 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC. sources is provided in the Bases for LC0 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating."

APPLICABLE The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC sources during MODES 4 SAFETY ANALYSES and 5 and during movement _ofeirradiated fuel assemblies ensures that: g

a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

~

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

~

c. Adequate AC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling Ls accident $4 In general, when the unit is shut down the Technical Specifications requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or loss of all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) that are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, and 3 have no specific analyses in MODES 4 and 5. Worst case Munding events are deemed not credible in MODES 4 and 5 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrences significantly reduced or '

eliminated, and minimal consequences. These deviations from DBA analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LC0 for required ,

systems. -

)

During MODES 1, 2, and 3, various deviations from the analysis assumptions and design requirements are allowed :

1 (continued) .

l BWR/4 STS B 3.8-35 Rev1,04/07/g5 l

^sr ei.w+ w *.ms 9 we+ + 3 e,w ve -

-Wr%,ew.--.

. .+$ ~r - .s -w. --ee--=

AC Sources-Shutdown

. B 3.8.2 Ib bw.I LCO power source is available for providing electrical power (continued) support assuming a loss of the offsite circuit. Together, OPERABILITY of the required offsite circuit and DG ensures the availability of sufficient AC sources to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidentsj and reactor vessel draindown).

The qualified offsite circuit (s) must be capable of naintaining rated frequency and voltage while connected to their respective ESF bus (es), and of accepting required loads during an accident. Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the FSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the unit. [The offsite circuit consists of incoming breaker and disconnect to the 2C or 2D startup auxiliary transformer (SAT), associated 2C or 2D SAT, and the respective circuit path including feeder breakers to all 4.16 kV ESF buses required by LC0 3.8.10.)

The required DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage, and accepting required loads. This sequence must be accomplished within

[12] seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and must continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby with engine hot and DG in standby with engine at ambient conditions. Additional DG capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required Surveillances, e.g.,

capability of the DG to revert to standby status on an ECCS signal while operating in parallel test mode.

Proper sequencing of loads, including tripping of nonessential loads, is a required function for DG OPERABILITY. [In addition, proper sequence operation is an integral part of offsite circuit OPERABILITY since its ,

inoperability impacts the ability to start and maintain energized loads required OPERABLE by LC0 3.8.10.]

It is acceptable for divisions to be cross tied during shutdown conditions, permitting a single offsite power circuit to supply all required divisions. No fast transfer capability is required for offsite circuits to be considered OPERABLE.

(continued)

BWP/4 STS B 3.8 37 Rev 1, 04/07/95

.- - :: : X ~ - - . - --

AC Sources-Shutdown 8 3.8.2 TSYF-CI,Pe.(

BASES (continued) - _

suedkil)

APPLICABILITY The AC sources are ired to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movemen irradiated fuel assemblies.in the secondary containment to provide assurance that: ".

a. Systems providing adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel; 3 b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident inssc'% -' are available; -

L l

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

AC power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in ,

LC0 3.8.1. '

1 ACTIONS Ad An offsite circuit is considered inoperable if it is not available to one required ESF division. If two or more ESF 4.16 kV buses are required per LCO 3.8.10, one division with offsite power available may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE (NMS ALTERATIONS,, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor. vessel. By the allowance of the g

80fgg option to declare required features inoperable with no l

offsite power available, appropriate restrictions can be implemented in accordance with the affected required

, . feature (s) LCOs' ACTIONS.

A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. A.2.4. B.1. B.2. B.3, and B.4 -

With the offsite circuit not available to all required divisions, the option still exists to declare all required <

features inoperable. Since this option may involve undesired administrative efforts, the allowance for (continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.8-38 Rev 1, 04/07/95

=:= == =- .-- . - - - . :=:= -- = = -

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 BASES T5TF-57,/k.I l ACTIONS A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3 A.2.4. B.I. B.2 B.3. and B.4 (continued) j sufficiently conservative actions is made. With the required DG inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC power sources is not available. It is, therefore, required to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of rradiated fuel ,

assemblies in the [ secondary) containmen and activities I that could result in inadvertent draining f the ructor vessel. g g Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC sources and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary AC power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it are inoperable, resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required ;

Actions of Condition A have been modified by a Note to :

Indicate that when Condition A is entered with no AC power !

to any required ESF bus, ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.10 must be immediately entered. This Note allows Condition A to l provide requirements for the loss of the offsite circuit l whether or not a division is de-energized. LCO 3.8.10 provides the appropriate restrictions for the situation involving a de-energized division. !

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.2.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.2.1 requires the SRs from LCO 3.8.1 that are

necessary for ensuring the OPERABILITY of the AC sources in '

other than MODES 1, 2, and 3. SR 3.8.1.8 is not required to (continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.8-39 Rev1,04/07/95

.- = = : : = -.:.. = T_: -.: ~~~~~~T^

DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS '

B 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown BASES' BACKGROUND A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources-0perating."

l APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter (6) (Ref. 1) and Chapter (15] (Ref. 2), assume that Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the diesel generators (DGs), emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation. .

The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is cons'istent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC electrical power sources during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of rradiated. fuel assemblies ensures that:

=--

a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or tv$h

^ - -

refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit '

status; and

c. Adequate DC electrical power is provided to mitigate .

events postulated during shutdown, such as an l inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling T pg, accidentg 1 a The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

. LC0 The DC electrical power subsystems-with: 1) each station service DC subsystem consisting of two 125 V batteries in -

series, two battery chargers, and the corresponding control (continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.8-60 Rev 1, 04/07/95 s

" ~ ~ ~ ~ ' '

.i. . . . 77.1,L.E* . . _ .~ L , : - -_,-,

. . _ . . . _ _ ~ , - ' '*J'

. .* * -^ ' * -

DC Sources-Shutdown i B 3.8.5 l BASES l

LCO equipment and interconnecting cabling; and 2) each DG DC (continued) subsystem consisting of one battery bank, one battery charger, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling-are required to be OPERABLE to support required DC distribution subsystems required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.10 " Distribution Systems-Shutdown."

This requirement ensures the availability of sufficient DC electrical power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents nd inadvertent reactor vessel draindown).

\ Tn

Ark N-APPLICABILITY The DC electrical power sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containmen rovide assurance that: g

a. Required features to provide adequate coolaTit inventory makeus are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in tie core in case of an inadvertent i draindown of the reactor vessel; fnw'h L "

b. Requir2featuresneededtomitigateafuelhandling accident *are available;

c. Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LC0 3.8.4.

l ACTIONS A.I. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. and A.2.4 l If more than one DC distribution subsystem is required according to LCO 3.8.10, th~e DC subsystems remaining OPERABLE with one or more DC power sources inoperable may be !

. )

l (continued) i i

BWR/4 STS B 3.8-61 Rev 1, 04/07/95 ,

= ====u-.-- --=...=_:-----:--

1 DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5 '

TsTF-St,&.I BASES ACTIONS A.1. A.2.1; A.2.2. A.2.3. and A.2.4 (continued) ggCee. cme %

capable of supporting sufficient (required features to alfow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS,d fuel movementi, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

By allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with associated DC power sources inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected system LCOs' ACTIONS. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts.

Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement

y13 & irradiated fuel assemblies, and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion I of ections to establish a safe conservative condition. l These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required DC electrical power subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary D'. electrical power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The !

restoration of the required DC electrical power subsystems i should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.-

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.5.1 '

REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.5.1 requires performance of all Surve111ances required by SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8. Therefore, see ,

the corresponding Bases for LC0 3.8.4 for a discussion of each SR.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DC sources from being discharged below their capability to provide the required power supply or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs. It is the intent that these SRs must -

(continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.8-62 Rev 1, 04/07/95 w , . _7 . ' 7 EH LM*

M - .

._3,w, ,, ,

9

Inverters-Shutdown B 3.8.8 B 3.8 ELECTP.* CAL POWER SYSTEMS l

l l B 3.8.8 Inverters-Shutdown l

l l BASES l BACKGROUND A description of the inverters is provided in the Bases for l LC0 3.8.7, " Inverters-0perating."

l l

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter (6) (Ref.1) and Chapter (15] (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The DC to AC inverters are designed to provide the required capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to the Reactor Protection System and Emergency Core Cooling Systems instrumentation and controls so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits.

are not exceeded.

The OPERABILITY of the inverters is consistent with the I initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY. .

l The OPERABILITY of the minimum inverters to each AC vital bus during MODES 4 and 5 ensures that:

a. The facility can he maintained in the shutdown or ,

refueling condition for extended periods; l ,

l

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability are available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

c. Adequate power is available to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent I ~Jnad}

O draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accidenh 1.

The inverters were previously identified as part of the l Distribution System and, as such, satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

i l

l l . (continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.8-75 Rev1,04/07/95 i

L l

- .- : ===:- -

== .z -

Inverters-Shutdown B 3.8.8 BASES (continued)

LCO The inverters ensure the availability of electrical power for the instrumentation for systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or postulated DBA. The battery powered inverters provide uninterruptible supply of AC electrical power to the AC vital buses even if the 4.16 kV safety buses are de-energized. OPERABLE inverters require the AC vital bus be powered by the inverter through inverted DC voltage. This ensures the availability of -

. sufficient inverter power sources to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents ,and inadvertent reactor vessel draindown).

hnsM k .

APPLICABILITY The inverters required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and also any time during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the [ primary or secondary) containment rovide assurance C caEMO

a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel; 4

b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident Lx/t) ;are available; L

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events I that can lead to core damage during shutdown are

. available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

Inverter requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.7.

I ACTIONS A.1. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. and A.2.4 If two divisions are required by LCO 3.8.10 " Distribution Systems-Shutdown," the remaining OPERABLE inverters may be l

(continued) l BWR/4 STS B 3.8-76 Rev 1, 04/07/95 I

- . 2 : = = w - - _ .. - . - -

l

l Inverters-Shutdown B 3.8.8 t5TF-S~%I BASES .

ACTIONS A.I. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3, and A.2.4 (continued) capable'of supporting sufficient require [ feature (s) to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS,4 fuel movement; and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

By the allowance of the option to declare required feature (s) inoperable with the associated inverter (s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected required feature (s) of the I LCOs' ACTIONS. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement o irradiated fuel assemblies in the [ primary or seconda containment, and any activities that could result in ertent draining of the reactor vessel). gg Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required inverters and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary inverter power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the l required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The '

restoration of the required inverters should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the plant safety systems may be without power or powered from a )

constant voltage source transformer.

l

. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.8.1

REQUIREMENTS

. This Surveillance verifies that the inverters are functioning properly with all required circuit breakers closed and AC vital buses energized from the inverter. The verification of proper voltage and frequency output ensures that the required power is readily available for the instrumentation connected to the AC vital buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the inverters and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to inverter malfunctions.

(continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.8-77 Rev 1, 04/07/95

. - ==== _.

= = = - - - -

L Distributien Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.10 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS i S T P C I L .I /

B 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution system is provided in the Bases for LC0 3.8.9, " Distribution ' Systems-Operating."

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter [6] (Ref. 1) and Chapter [15] (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to l ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

The OPERABILITY of the AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution system is consistert with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC, DC, and AC vital bus w electrical power sources and associated power distribution ggl4 subsystems during MODES 4 and 5, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment ensures that:

a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or

, refueling condition for extended periods; 1

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit i

status; and

c. Adequate power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling a'cciden Esd 3 The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems satisfy N j Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

4 man (continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.8-89 .

Rev 1, 04/07/95

=- = ===--.- - ==- - . = - = --

Distribution Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.10 73 TAs%I BASES (continued)

LCO Various combinations of subsystems, equipment, and components are required OPERABLE by other LCOs, depending on the specific plant condition. Implicit in those requirements is the required OPERABILITY of necessary support required features. This LCO explicitly requires energization of the portions of the electrical distribution system necessary to support OPERABILITY of Technical Spec M eations required systems, equipment, and componerits-both specifically addressed by their own LCO, and implicitly required by the definition of OPERABILITY.

Maintaining these portions of the distribution system energize. ansures the availability of sufficient power to ,

operate ,ne plant in a safe manner to mitigate the l consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g.,

fuel handling accidents and inadvertent reactor vessel draindown).

APPLICABILITY The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems !

required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement I irradiated fuel assemblies in the (secondary] containment

{*gM} provide assurance that:

a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel; l b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident L5d _

yare available; L

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available

, for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold l shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.9.

(continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.8-90 Rev 1, 04/07/95

2 r - --

1 Distribution Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.10 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A.I. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. A.2.4. and A.2.5 4 C ce.e.a A Q % Il Although redundant required features may require redundant k divisions of electrical power distribution subsystems to be i OPERABLE, one OPERABLE distribution subsystem division may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS,4Tliel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reac+:r vessel.

By allowing the option to declare required featv..s associated with an inoperable distribution subsystem inoperable, approsriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with tie affected distribution subsystem LCO's Required Actions. In many instances this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made, (i.e., to f suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement oftirraaiated fuel \ ,/

assemblies in the (secondary] containment, and any activities that could result in inadvertent. draining of the reactorvessel).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary power to the plant safety systems.

Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, a required residual heat removal-shutdown

. cooling (RHR-SDC) subsystem may be inoperable. In this case, Required Actions A.2.1 through A.2.4 do not adequately address the concerns relating to coolant circulation and heat removal. Pursuant to LC0 3.0.6, the RHR-SDC ACTIONS would not be entered. Therefore, Required Action A.2.5 is provided to direct declaring RHR-SDC inoperable, which results in taking the appropriate RHR-SDC ACTIONS. I l

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the I required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required distribution subsystems should be com)1eted as quickly as possible in order to minimize the

. time tie plant safety systems may be without power.

(continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.8-91 Rev 1, 04/07/95

- -- = _ . = - - - . = = - -- --- -

TS YPct,/PL. l BWR6 Inserts insertA

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel)

Insert B

[Due to radioactive decay, this Function is only required to isolate primary containment during fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X) days)).

Insert C

[Due to radioactive decay, this Function is only required to isolate secondary containment during fuel handling accidents involving handling necently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X) days).) 1 Insert D

[Also due to radioactive decay, this Function is only required to initiate the CRFA ,

System during fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e.,

fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X) days).)

Insert E

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X) days)) :

1 O

4 9

_ ..n ,.n , y- , .- .e ..

TSl'F-C/ 96,.t BWR 6 Inserts -

Insert G

[Due to radioactive decay, SCIVs are only required to be OPERABLE during fuel handling involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days.).]

Inmart M

[Due to radioactive decay, the SGT System is only required to be OPERABLE during fuel handling involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days).]

InantL.1

[Due to radioactive decay, the CRFA System is only required to be OPERABLE during fuel hanodng involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days).]

insert J

[Due to radioactive decay, the Control Room AC System is only required to be OPERABLE during fuel handling involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days).]

Inmart K l l

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, AC eter.trical power is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X]

days)]. !

i Insert L

[ involving handling recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, DC electrical power is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days).]

Inmart M

. [ involving handling recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, the DC to AC inverters sre only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part.of a critical reactor core witt.in the previous IX] days).]

~

er wm em,1-.h-sa w9..-+eidaeymiy pw.y , .

e4 *A*N 4.gmeim g.q-eWw w,an -*--direbmge-s -- + e em

Pri:ary C:atuinment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 I S Tf-s7, L.I ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME K. As required by K.1 Isolate the affected Immediately Required Action C.1 penetration flow and referenced in path (s).

Table 3.3.6.1-1. ,

E !

2.1 M end C \ Immeh+ely)

AL TIONS. \

AN [

K.2. l Suspend movement of Immediately l irradiated fuel l CT. MIOj assemblies in the

[ primary and i secondary !

containment].

4 AE K.2. Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

O BWR/6STS 3.3-53 Rev 1, 04/07/95

* - ~ = - R +w ei seem _ e * * * **"=We =n -

1 1

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1 1 (pose 2 of 4)

I 5 7~P-5{M Prfmery Contafrunent Isolation Instrtmentation APPLICASLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTNER CNANNELS FR(M SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVE!LLANCE ALLOWASLE FUNCTION C0CITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

2. Prfmery contefranent Isolation (continued)

b. Drywell Pressure-Nigh 1,2,3 (2) N SR 3.3.6.1.1 s (1.432 pelg SR 3.3.6.1.2 (SR 3.3.6.1.31 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

c. Reactor vesset Water 1,2,3 (21 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 1 t 152.51 Level -Low Low Low, SR 3.3.6.1.2 inches Level 1 (ECCS (SR 3.3.6.1.31 Divisions 1 and 2) SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

d. Drywell Pressure-Nigh 1,2,3 (21 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s (1.441 pels l (ECCS Divisions 1 SR 3.3.6.1.2 and 2) ISR 3.3.6.1.31 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

e. Reactor vesset Water 1,2,3 (4) F SR 3.3.6.1.1 t ( 43.51 Level -Low Low, Level SR 3.3.6.1.2 inches 2 (HPCS) (SR 3.3.6.1.31 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

f. Drywell Pressure-Nigh 1,2,3 [4] F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s (1.441 pels (NPCS) SR 3.3.6.1.2 (SR 3.3.6.1.31 SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

g. Contefreent and Drywell 1,2,3 (21 F SR 3.3.6.1.1 s (4.01 mR/hr Vent 1LetIon Exhaust SR 3.3.6.1.2 RedIatIon NIgh SR 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7 (continued)

(b) During r[9""::Dmovement of irradiated fuel assesbiles in tprimary or secondary contaf tsment),

or operations with a potentist for retning the reactor vessel.

Ec=&MM BWR/6 STS 3.3-57 Rev.1,04/07/95 m . _ r :n_._ - . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . -c

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation l 3.3.6.1 Table 3.3.6.1 1 (pose 3 of 6)

/5TF-S7 4, , i Primary Contelruent Isolation Instrtamentation APPLICAsLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTNER CNANNELS FRWI SPECIFIED PFR TRIP REQUIRED SURVE!LLANCE ALLOWAsLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

2. Primary Contalrment Isolation (continued)

((b)) (23 K SR 7.3.6.1.1 s (4.01 sa/hr st 3.3.6.1.2-BR 3.3.6.1.5 st 3.3.6.1.6 st 3.3.6.1.7

- - I

h. Manus 1 InttIetIon 1,2,3 (2) G st 3.3.6.1.6 MA

3. Reactor Core Isotation Cooling (RCIC) system Isolation

e. RCIC steen Line 1,2,3 til F st 3.3.6.1.1 s (643 inches water F1ow - Nigh st 3.3.6.1.2 tst 3.3.6.1.31 SR 3.3.6.1.5 st 3.3.6.1.6 st 3.3.6.1.7 l b. RCIC Steen Line Flow (1,2,31 (1) F SR 3.3.6.1.2 t !31 seconds and Time Delay SR 3.3.6.1.4 s [7] seconds j st 3.3.6.1.6 i

c. RCIC steem supply Line 1,2,3 til F st 3.3.6.1.1 t (533 pelg Pressure - Low st 3.3.6.1.2 tst 3.3.6.1.31 st 3.3.6.1.5 st 3.3.6.1.6 SR 3.3.6.1.7

d. RCIC Turbine Exhaust 1,2,3 (21 F sa 3.3.6.1.1 5 [201 psig Diephrego Pressure-Nigh st 3.3.6.1.2

[SR 3.3.6.1.31 st 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6

e. RCIC Equipment Room 1,2,3 (1) F 3R 3.3.6.1.1 s [1911'F An6f ent st 3.3.6.1.2 Tesperature - High st 3.3.6.1.5 SR 3.3.6.1.6

f. RCIC Egulpment Room 1,2,3 *

(13 F st 3.3.6.1.1 5 [1283'F Differential SR 3.3.6.1.2 Tenperature - Nigh _ _ _

st 3.3.6.1.5

- ~

st 3.3.6.1.6 h8P lf (continued)

(b) During ? O W 'k D movement irradiated fuel assenbtles in Iprimary or secondary contalruent),

or opereu ons with a potentist for draining the reactor vessel.

U Table 3.3.6.1 1 (pose 6 of 6) R p.5 % y ,ri ,y Contei,.ent isoieti. m.entation a, BWR/6 STS 3.3-58 Rev.1,04/07/95 l

l

. - - . - . - - r:.- - -- - - -

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 l S T F - C l, b .I Table 3.3.6.2 1 (pose 1 of 1) secondary Contefrument Isolation Instrumentation APPLICASLE IKDEs Als REQUIRED OTNER CNANNELs SPECIFIED PER TRIP SURVE!LLANCE ALLOWASLE

, FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Reactor vesset Water 1,2,3,t(s)) (23 st 3.3.6.2.1 a t 63.81 inches Level-Low Low, Level 2 st 3.3.6.2.2 tsa 3.3.6.2.31 st 3.3.6.2.6 st 3.3.6.2.5 Est 3.3.6.2.63

2. Drywett Pressure-Nigh 1,2,3 (23 st 3.3.6.2.1 s (1.43) pels st 3.3.6.2.2

[st 3.3.6.2.31 st 3.3.6.2.6 sa 3.3.6.2.5 tst 3.3.6.2.61

3. Fuel Handling Area 1,2,3, [2] SR 3.3.4.2.1 s (4.02 sa/hr VentIletion Exhaust ((a),(b)] SR 3.3.6,2.2 RediatIon-Nf gh NIsh SR 3.3.L.2.6 st 3.3.6.2.5 (SR 3.3.6.2.61

4. Fuel NandtIng Area Poot 1,2,3, [2] SR 3.3.6.2.1 5 [35] mR/hr sweep Exhaust [(a),(b)) SR 3.3.6.2.2 RedIation-Nfgh NIsh SR 3.3.6.2.4 st 3.3.6.2.5

[st 3.3.6.2.61

5. Manust InttIat1on 1,2,3, t1 per gro g) st 3.3.6.2.5 NA !

((o),(b))

(a) During operations with a potentfel for draining the reactor vesset.

(b) Durins ^ ~ ^ - - - ' ' 5. ..-A l movement of f eradf ated fuel assemblies in the [ primary or secondary containment). - -- -

(M _

M BWR/6 STS 3.3-65 Rev 1, 04/07/95

1 l

l

[CRFA) System Instrumentation i 3.3.7.1

/ STF-5/s s

\

Table 3.3.7.1 1 (pege 1 of 1) ;

[ Control Room Fresh Af r] System Instrwnentation I i

l APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED , SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3, (2) s st 3.3.7.1.1 m t 43.8) Inches Level-Low Low, Level 2 SR 3.3.7.1.2

[(a)) ist 3.3.7.1.3)

SR 3.3.7.1.4

_ SR 3.3.7.1.5 _

2. Drywell Pressure-Nigh 1,2,3 (2) C SR 3.3.7.1.1 5 11.43) pelg SR 3.3.7.1.2 (SR 3.3.7.1.31 st 3.3.7.1.4

_ SR 3.3.7.1.5 _

3. Control Room 1,2,3, (2) D st 3.3.7.1.1 s ($1 aft /hr Ventilation Radiation SR 3.3.7.1.2 Monitors (a),(b) SR 3.3.7.1.4 st 3.3.7.1.5 (a) During operations with a potentist for draining the reactor vessel.

q .

(b) During u Z LL iu - a a t, movement of Irradiated fuel atsemblies in the tprimary or secondary ccFntainment).

l y

bM l

l l

l I

1 l

l l

BWR/6 STS 3.3-79 Rev 1, 04/07/95 1

~~ "

" . . :. * ~ T7*-- - - . . . . - - - - T T ~.-.- - '.^*'

i i

l PCIVs 3.6.1.3 l ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I

F. Required Action and- F.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A, _AR B, C, D, or E not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. F.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months G. Required Action and G.1 --------NOTE--------- l associated Completion LC0 3.0.3 is not l Time of Condition A, applicable.

B, C, D, or E not met ---------------------

for PCIV(s) required to be OPERABLE during Suspend movement of Immediately i movement of4i rradiated irradiated fuel fuel assemblies in assemblies in the [ primary or -_ _ [ primary and secondary secondary containment). " ,4 l containment).

w s = / -em -_--

H. Requi Action and Suspend C0 Immed ely associa Completion ALTERATIONS. 4 Time of Co ition A, I

, C, D, or et met PCIV(s) req red I to OPERABLE du g \

CORE TERATIONS.

N*hRequiredActionand .1 Initiate action to Innediately associated Completion suspend OPDRVs.

Time of Condition A, B, C, D, or E not met R for PCIV(s) required f to be OPERABLE during 1.2 Initiate action to Immediately MODE 4 or 5 or during I M restore valvc(s) to operations with a OPERABLE status.

potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

BWR/6 STS 3.6-13 Rev 1, 04/07/95

..7,-.,

[ Secondary Containment]

3.6.4.1 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.1 (Secondary Containment]

LC0 3.6.4.1 The [ secondary containment] shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MCDES 1, 2, and 3, -

C"Q 9 During movement of rradiated fuel assemblies in the

%,e . . .,),rimary_orsecondarycontainment],

- - m . ~ m . . ., .

During operations with a potential for draining the reactor

_ vessel (OPDRVs). ,,_

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. [ Secondary A.1 Restore (secondary 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months containment] containment)to inoperable (in MODE 1, OPERABLE status.

2,or3].

l B. Required Action and 8.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months l associated Completion Time [of Condition A] AN) not met. '

B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued)

BWR/6 STS 3.6-44 ' Rev1,04/07/95

~

. l

[ Secondary Containi. ant]

3.6.4.1 T5 TF-T/g,j ACTIONS (continued) -

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. [ Secondary ( tc u @C.1

NOTE--------- .

containment _ LC0 3.0.3 is not inoperable uring applicable.

movement o irradiated fuel assemblies in the

\ ---------------------

[ primary or seconda containment % /,,g -

N ( Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel

~^" -

-~ ^"~ 8 assemblies in the during OPDRVs. [ primary and secondary containment).

N I ~ _

q C. spen ORE

%ed ely L RATIO . f- --

b.N1 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.1.1 Verify : secondary containment) vacuum is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months a: [0.25? inch of vacuum water gauge.

SR 3.6.4.1.2 Verify all (secondary containment) 31 days equipment hatches are closed and sealed.

1 (continued) l l

BWR/6 STS 3.6-45 RevI,04/07/95

. -- --. = . - - - . . - - - -:- - _- :- = :- . .

SCIVs 3.6.4.2 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)

LC0 3.6.4.2 Each SCIV shall be OPERABLE.

SLc.LNh APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1,2,and3,[irradiatedfuelassembliesinthe During movement of yrimary or secondary containment),

a m_a,_.m rnor ar m ar nue s DurTng-operations w' th i potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS

..................................... NOTES------------------------------------

1. Penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by SCIVs.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Isolate the affected 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months

, penetration flow paths enetration flow path with one SCIV y use of at least inoperable. one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.

BD (continued)

BWR/6STS 3.6-47 Rev1,04/07/95

. y. , w e,... as+em e == = =+a,em---

m. --

SCIVs 3.6.4.2

( S TF-E(/h,.I ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and D.1 --------NOTE---------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not Time of Condition A applicable. i or B not met durina - ---------------------

l movementoffirradiated) fuel assemblies in the - Suspend movement of Immediately (primary o secondtry irradiated fuel assemblies in the '

containment'Wo.T:c" / [ primary and during OPDRVs. Secondary containment].

I uspen ORE \ _ 1 l (D. ERATIO y -

g m

Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.

l l

1 l

l t

I BWR/6 STS 3.6-49 Rev 1, 04/07/95

- . . . . . --n=.=-=~-= . - . .~...:=-. . . - - .

i SGT System 3.6.4.3 :

/ STF-5'/p 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS . . - .

3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System e 1 l

LC0 3.6.4.3 Two SGT subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, .

I During movement o irradiated fuel assemblies in the orimary or_seenndar Af b-ug= r "=$ y containment),

a -

r Juring operations with a potential for draining the reactor ,

l vessel (0PDRVs).

1 AC l

- TIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One SGT subsystem. A.1 Restore SGT subsystem 7 days inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. "12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A MQ ,

not met in MODE 1, 2, 4 or 3. B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months C. Required Action and ------------NOTE-------------

associated Completion LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition A- -----------------------------

not met during (auh movement ofN rradiated fuel assemblies in the C.1 Place OPERABLE SGT subsystem in Immediately

[ primary or s operation.

,gntainment]ptp unu m . - - _ .or_

- QB uring OPDRVs.

(continued)

BWR/6 STS- 3.6-51 Rev1,04/07/95

- ======.. -. -- :-- ::: - : =:== -

SGT System 3.6.4.3 I W - S f f u ,\

9, CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l

C. (continued) C.2.1 Suspend movement of Imediately

~

._ irradiated fuel

'l assemblies in the

[" h M

(primary and secondary containment).

.2 'len E Ime tely ALTEf(TION _%

M Imediately OC.2.VInitiateactionto suspend OPDRVs.

D. Two SGT subsystems D.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3 Imediately inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

E. Two SGT subsystems E.1 --------NOTE---------

inoperable during LCO 3.0.3 is not movement of* irradiated applicable.

fuel assemblies in the ---------------------

(primary or secondary containment f t.l--'- Suspend movement of Imediately K nT;."JJ :^%Y rradiated fuel

(@duringOPURVs. assemblies in the (primary and secondary CSM M containment).

E (continued)

BWR/6 STS 3.6-52 Rev 1, 04/07/95

,. m = . - oo ,m .e . --m m- ,w- _

1 SGT Systen 3.6.4.3

'T5TF-st,L.I '

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. (continued) .2 I ate AN 14 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRVs.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.3.1 Operate each SGT subsystem for 31 days a: [10] continuous hours (with heaters )

operating).

SR 3.6.4.3.2 Perform required SGT filter testing in In accordance accordance with the Ventilation Filter with the VFTP Testing Program (VFTP).

l SR 3.6.4.3.3 Verify each SGT subsystem actuates on an (18] months l actual or simJlated initiation signal.

SR 3.6.4.3.4 Verify each SGT filter cooler bypass (18] months damper can be opened and the fan started.

BWR/6 STS 3.6-53 Rev1,04/07/95

.m.,% _ , , , . 2~ 4- .

(CRFA] System 3.7.3 3.7 PLANT SYSTEM 3.7.3 (Control Room Fresh Air (CRFA)] System LC0 3.7.3 Two (CRFA] subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

[ce.c ^

MLt APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or g ry containment),

.. nhakm saw...y During operations wit.n a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRW ).

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I

)

A. One (CRFA] subsystem A.I Restore (CRFA] 7 days l inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Associated Completion Time of Condition A gg not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued)

BWR/6 STS 3.7-7 Rev I, 04/07/95

= . - . ======-- . _ . .- -. = - - - - - - - - -

s [CRFA) Syste]

3.7.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and. ------------NOTE-------------

associated Completion LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition A -----------------------------

not met durina .

movementoffirradiate?l C.1 -------NOTE---------

fuel assemblies in the Place in toxic gas

[ primary or s g protection mode if containment 1 .. automatic transfer

" u,GE ETiiv's"'C" N. i to toxic gas during M Vs. protection mode is inoperable.

k PlaceOPERABLE(CR5)Imediately subsystem in

[ isolation) mode.

CnMpY 9E C.2.1 Suspend movement of Imediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the (primary and secondary containment].

A (

. C. Su and RE Im ately LTE% ION g

k I

C.2.\"1Initiateactionto Imediately suspend OPDRVs.

D. Two (CRFA] subsystems D.1 Enter LC0 3.0.3. Imediately inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

(continued)

BWR/6 STS 3.7-8 Rev 1, 04/07/95 i

~" * ^'

~ _'~_'

.'.~Z ,:-.. L . ----. ._. - .. .~~ ~ ~~' ~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

[CRFA) System 3.7.3 T5&f/Qw.I ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. ------------NOTE-------------

Two (CRFA) durinasubsystems inoperable LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

movement of4Trradia -----------------------------

fuel assemblies in the

[ primary or secondary Suspend movement of Immediately f E.1 irradiated fuel p:ainmenty:c-*aw"1.

w07, "*LP = assemblies in the during OPDRVs. ) [ primary and secondary

(

I containment].

s Cca#p & -

x ately k_ E.2 Susp d CORE Imm TERA _ NS._ % _

ANJ Initiate action to Imediately suspend OPDRVs.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS .

l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.3.1 Operate each [CRFA) subsystem for [a 10 31 days continuous hours with the heaters operating ,

or (for systems without heaters) !

a 15 minutes).

l SR 3.7.3.2 Perform required (CRFA) filter testing in In accordance accordance with the (Ventilation Filter with the [VFTP)

Testing Program (VFTP)].

(continued)

BWR/6 STS 3.7-9 Rev1,04/07/95

.: =...-- -.-- .: .

_ - -. = ; -_ 3 3

(Control Room AC) Syste2 3.7.4 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.4 [ Control Room Air Conditioning (AC)] System LCO 3.7.4 Two (control room AC] subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

9 APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of[ irradiated fuel assemblies in the A @J: b h 0[ '

During operations w th a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One (control room AC) A.1 Restore [ control room 30 days subsystem inoperable. AC] subsystem to OPERABLE status. J B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Associated Completion Time of Condition A MiQ not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. B.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued)

I i

BWR/6 STS 3.7-11 Rev1,04/07/95

. _ _ . - - . = . , _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ = = = . - . . . - . . . . .

[ Control Room AC) Systen 3.7.4 T.5 TF -57,4,u.{

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION . REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and ------------NOTE-------------

associated Completion LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition A -----------------------------

not met duririt _

movement oftirradiateh C.1 Place OPERABLE Imediately fuel assemblies in the [ control room AC)

-[primaryorsecondago k subsystem in containment:, M g , operation.

I;"; LT= CL or ' j during OPDRVs. , f98

_ M )

C.2.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel Imediately h Soy 4 assemblies in the

[ primary and secondary containment).

AN l

.2.2 uspen CORE Im intel A E_RATI .

AN.lQ Initiate action to Imediately suspend OPDRVs.

1 I

D. Two [ control room AC) D.1 Enter LC0 3.0.3. Imediately subsystems inoperable j in MODE 1, 2, or 3. ;

(continued) l BWR/6 STS 3.7-12 Rev1,04/07/95

.,- .. . - :.L~ ::: ~~ - -. _ . . - - . - _ .. ..

[ Control Room Vi 4ystem 3.7.4 )

T$TN~5kby.l ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Two [ control room AC] ------------NOTE------------- I subsystems inoperable LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable.

during movement of -----------------------------

irradiated fuel assemblies.in the E.1 Suspend movement of Immediately

[ primary or secon r irradiated fuel containment';, . d - assemblies in the I ccEnarIONN m [ primary and secondary during OPDRVs.

containment).

I A

uspen TIO RE p-e tely#

[M ctn% .

\

m Initiate action to Immediately ,

suspend OPDRVs. l l

1 l '

1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l

SR 3.7.4.1 Verify each [ control room AC] subsystem has [18] months the capability to remove the assumed heat l load.

BWR/6 STS 3.7-13 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l

.-..--...-*~"'"***~'

^ ~' ' ~ ~

, ~ . . ~ ~':. "; L . **" TL - -

1 AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 )

3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS i 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown LCO 3.8.2 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. One qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE AC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.10,

" Distribution Systems-Shutdown"; and

b. One diesel generator (DG) capable of supplying one division of the Division 1 nr 2 onsita Class IE AC electrical power distributin subsystem (s) required by

- LCO 3.8.10; and

c. One qualified circuit, other than the circuit in LC0 3.8.2.a, between the offsite transmission and the Division 3 onsite Class IE electrical power distribution subsystem, or the Division 3 DG capable of supplying the ,

Division 3 onsite Class IE AC electrical power i distribution subsystem when the Division 3 onsite Class 1E electrical power distribution subsystem is required by LCO 3.8.10.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, (C(v-a-@O]

~

During movement o irradiated fuel assemblies in the (primaryorsecondary] containment.

9 9

4 BWR/6 ETS 3.8-20 Rev1,04/07/95

:= = ====--. .- =- . - : = :

f '

/

AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 ACTIONS ,

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. LC0 Item a. not met. ------------NOTE------------- :

Enter applicable Condition and Required Actions of LC0 3.8.10, with one required division de-energized as a result of Condition A.

1 A.1 Declare affected Imediately '

. required feature (s) with no offsite power available inoperable.

92 A.2.1 Suspend CORE Imediately ALTERATIONS.

E A.2.2 Suspend movement of Imediately y irradiated fuel D*" h$r secondary]

n containment. ;

M A.2.3 Initiate action to Imediately sus send operations witi a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

. M A.2.4 Initiate action to Imediately I restore required offsite power circuit i to OPERABLE status. l I

(continued)

BWR/6 STS 3.8-21 Rev1,04/07/95

i AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. LCO Item b. not met. B.1 Suspend CORE Imediately ALTERATIONS.

$N.Q B.2 Suspend movement of Imediately irradiated fuel

{ctc.zMh assemblies in

[ primary and secondary) containment.

AND B.3 Initiate action to Imediately suspend OPDRVs.

AND B.4 Initiate action to Imediately restore required DG to OPERABLE status.

C. LCO Item c. not met. C.1 Declare HPCS [and 2C [72 hours)

Standby Service Water System) inoperable.

BWR/6 STS. 3.8-22 Rev1,04/07/95

r.

DC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.5 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ~7 5 TE-s /4'l e 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown LC0 3.8.5 DC electrical power subsystem (s) shall be OPERABLE to suppor* the electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.10, " Distribution Systems-Shutdown."

MODES 4 and 5, APPLICABILITY:

During movement kof irradiated fuel assemblies in the

[ primary or secondary) containment.

! ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Declare affected Immediately DC electrical power required feature (s) subsystems inoperable, inoperable.

9.E A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately I ALTERATIONS.

M A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately l' w irradiated fuel assemblies in the O t at.jM h h [ primary or secondary) containment.

M l A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations l

with a potential for i draining the reactor i

vessel.

(continued) l BWR/6 STS 3.8-31 Rev 1, 04/07/95 1

1 -; _ _

Inverters-Shutdown 3.8.8 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

$ /Y"Tl#hl 3.8.8 Inverters-Shutdown LCO' 3.8.8 AC vital (bus electrical power distribution subsystem (s) Inverter s) s required by LC0 3.8.10, " Distribution Systems-Shutdown."

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, During movement4of irradiated fuel assemblies in the

[ primary or secondary] containment.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more (required] A.1 Declare affected Immediately inverters inoperable. required feature (s) inoperable.

98 A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

E A.2.2 Suspend handling of Immediately g -- ~ irradiated fuel rkr secondary]

r containment.

M A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

M (continued)

BWR/6 STS 3.8-39 Rev1,04/07/95

-:= .- ._

. - . - . : z-

~

'. Distribution Syste2s-Shutdown f 3.8.10

( l 5 TF-5/,b. (

3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown LCO 3.8.10 The necessary portions of the Division 1, Division 2, and ,

Division 3 AC, DC, [and AC vital bus] electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE to support equipment required to be OPERABLE.

^

MODES 4 and 5, f

APPLICABILITY:

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the

.: primary or secondary) containment.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Declare associated Immediately AC, DC, [or AC vital supported required bus) electrical power feature (s) distribution inoperable.

subsystems incperable.

E A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

AND A.2.2 Suspend handling of Immediately Tirradiated fuel ggg j assemblies in the

[ primary or secondary) containment.

AND (continued)

BWR/6 STS 3.8-44 Rev 1, 04/07/95

- - ~ :::= = = : :_..__ .-_: .-

Prieary Containment Isolation Instrumentation ,

B 3.3.6.1 l BASES N Y T % .I APPLICABLE 2.c. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low. Level 1 SAFETY ANA'YSES, (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Allowable Value is chosen to be the same as the ECCS Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Allowable Value (LC0 3.3.5.1) to enure the valves are isolated to prevent offsite doses from exceeding 10 CFR 100 limits. l This Function isolates the E61 isolation valves.

?.c'. Containment and Drywell Ventilation Exhaust tac iation-Hiah i

High ventilation exhaust radiation is an indication of l possible gross failure of the fuel cladding. The release !

may have originated from the primary containment due to a break in the RCPB. When Exhaust Radiation-High is detected, valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment atmosphere are isolated to limit the

'm release of fission products. Additionally, the Ventilation 9Ag Exhaust Radiation-High is assumed to initiate isolation of the primary containment during a fuel handling accident k N (Ref. 2).

The Exhaust Radiation-High signals are initiated from i radiation detectors that are located on the ventilation exhaust piping coming from the drywell and containment. The signal from each detector is input to an individual monitor whose trip outputs are assigned to an isolation channel.

Four chamels of Containment and Drywell Ventilation Exhaust-High Function are available and are required to be i OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can i preclude the isolation function. j The Allowable Values are chosen to promptly detect gross !

failure of the fuel cladding and to ensure offsite deses '

remain below 10 CFR 20 and 10 CFR 100 limits.

e The Function is required to be OPERABLE during

.c.RRC;g operations with a potential for drain ng the reactorvrssel (OPDRVs)gand movement of tradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment because the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel failures (due to fuel uncovery or ropped fuel assemblies) :

M84 39 led 6M continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.3-152 Rev1,04/07/95

::T:::L-- . - - J ::zT:::::=:" .~~

Pri;::ary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 h$./

. APPLICABLE 2.a. Containment and Drywell Ventilation Exhaust SAFETY ANALYSES, Radiation-Hiah (continued)

LCO, and .

APPLICABILITY must be provided to ensure offsite dose limits are not exceeded 3

_Tn:w.c4 6 . These Functions isolate the Group 7 valves.

2.h. Manual Initiation i

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the primary containment isolation logic that are '

redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation and j provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific I FSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function.

It is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There are four push buttons for the logic, two manual initiation push buttons per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the

' push buttons.

Four channels of the Manual Initiation Function are available and arc required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since these are the MODES in which the Primary Containment Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE. l

3. Reactor Core Isolation Coolina System Isolation 3.a. RCIC Steam Line Flow-Hioh RCIC Steam Line Flow-High Function is provided to detect a break of the RCIC steam lines and initiates closure of the steam line isolation valves. If the steam is allowed to continue flowing out of the break, the reactor will depressurize and core uncovery can occur. Therefore, the isolation is initiated on high flow to prevent or minimize core damage. The isolation action, along with the scram function of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Specific credit for this Function (continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.3-153 Rev1,04/07/95

-< + . . - , . , , , , .-..e.,..% . .

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 i lb S ht .I ACTIONS I.1 and I.2 (continued) are provided by declaring the associated SLC subsystem inoperable or isolating the RWCU System. l The Completion Time of I hour is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing sufficient time for personnel to isolate the RWCU System.

J.1 and J.2 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated penetration flow path should be closed. However, if the shutdown cooling function is needed to provide core cooling, these Required Actions allow the penetration flow path to remain unisolated provided action is immediately initiated to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to isolate the RHR Shutdown Cooling System (i.e., provide alternate decay heat removal capabilities so the penetration flow path can beisolated). ACTIONS must continue until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status or the RHR Shutdown Cooling '

System is i olated.

K.1. K.2.1. K.2. W d b .~5 ' * -

m

_w If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated penetration flow path (s) should be isolated (Required ActionK.1). Isolating the affected penetration flow path (s) accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable instrumentation. Alternately, the plant must be placed in a

condition in__which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, wnt mRTi= ermovement of irradiated fuel assemblies must be immediatiiily suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe condition. 1so, if applicable, action must be immediately initiated to sus end OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel drain own and subsequent potential for fission production release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

(continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.3-172 Rev1,04/07/95

. . . - . z . .- . . - - - --

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 '

~l'S TF-SIfe,. t BASES APPLICABLE 3. 4. Fuel Handlina Area Ventilation and Pool Sweep Exhaust.

SAFETY ANALYSES, Radiation-Hich Hioh (continued)

LCO, and -

APPLICABILITY ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Values are chosen to promptly detect gross failure of the fuel cladding.

The Exhaust Radiation-High High Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists; thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES; thus, these Functions are not required. In addition,__the Functions are required to be c,m,$l] OPERABLE durini c "s T T = : m OPDRVsf and movement of

- ; irradiated fuel assembr es in the primary or secondary containment because the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel failures (due to fuel uncovery or dropped fuel assemblies) must be provided to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded.

L C-

5. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the secondary containment isolation logic that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation channels, and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific FSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for the overall redundancy and i diversity of the secondary containment isolation instrumentation as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

There are four push buttons for the logic, two manual initiation push buttons per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Four channels of the Manual Initiation Function are available and are_ required _to_be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 and during Q n=#p 7 OPDRV and movement of N

(continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.3-182 Rev1,04/07/95

_ ..= z :- = _ -

-~;--

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 TSTF-sis,.t BASES APPLICABLE 5. Manual Initiation (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and g irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, APPLICABILITY ! since these are the MODES and other specified conditions in t

which the Secondary Containment Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.

en.

ACTIONS Reviewer's Note: Certain LCO Completion Times are based on approved topical reports. In order for a licensee to use the times, the license must justify the Completion Times as required by the staff Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for the

_ topical report. _

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels.

Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition.

Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for ino>erable secondary containment isolation instrumentation c1annels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable secondary containment isolation instrumentation channel.

8.d Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide I isolation signals and the redundancy of the isolation ,

design, an allowable out of service time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , depending on the Function, has been shown to be acceptable (Refs. 3 and 4) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. This out of service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function is still maintaining isolation capability (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases). If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of (continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.3-183 Rev1,04/07/95 i

1 I

l CRFA System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1

~7's TF5%.g BASES APPLICABLE 2. Drywell Pressure-Hiah (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and initiate the CRFA System, since this could be a precursor to APPLICABILITY a potential radiation release and subseauent radiation exposure to control room personnel.

Drywell Pressure-High signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense drywell pressure. Four channels of Drywell Pressure-High Function are available 1 (two channels per trip system) and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude CRFA System initiation.

The Drywell Pressure-High Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the Secondary Containment Isolation Drywell Pressure-High Allowable Value (LC0 3.3.6.2).

The Drywell Pressure-High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that control room personnel are protected during a LOCA. In MODES 4 and 5, the Drywell Pressure-High Function is not required since there is insufficient energy in the reactor to pressurize the drywell to the Drywell Pressure-High setpoint.

l

3. Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitors The Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitors measure radiation levels exterior to the . inlet ducting of the MCR.

I A high radiation level may pose a threat to MCR personnel; l thus, a d6.tector indicating this condition automatically signals initiation of the CRFA System.

The Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitors Function consists of four independent monitors. Four channels of Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitors are available l

and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude CRFA System initiation. The Allowable Value was selected to ensure protection of the control room personnel.

The Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitors Function is and 3 and during recuired_ to be OPERABLEand in MODES movement 1, 2, Ifkrr,adiated fuel in S GEC ALTE^aTIOQ OPDRV the' secondary containmen to ensure that control room personnel are protected during a LOCA, fuel handling even

~

j (continued) l i BWR/6 STS B 3.3-224 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l

1

~ ^ ~~"

~ ~ T '*: L .- - ~ l : ,.- _. _ - . ..

CRFA System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 t 5 TF s%.<

BASES APPLICABLE 3. Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitors (continued) - -

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and or a vessel draindown event. During MODES 4 and 5, when hPO@3 APPLICABILITY these s pecified conditions are not in progress (e.g., W S ~ , the probability of a LOCAcon L.C : = Q s Tw;thus,theFunctionisnotrequired.m =), -

"I n se.c k O

~ ~

ACTIONS Reviewer's Note: Certain LC0 Completion Times are based on approved topical reports. In order for a licensee to use these times, the licensee must justify the Completion Times as required by the staff Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for

_ the topical report. '

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to CRFA System instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. }iowever, the Required Actions for inoperable CRFA System instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable CRFA System instrumentation channel.

8.d Required Action A.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.7.1-1. The applicable Condition specified in the Table is Function dependent.

Each time an inoperable channel is discovered, Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

(continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.3-225 Rev 1, 04/07/95

. - . = = .. -. _

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 Ts77-s%.t BASES (continu'ed)

APPLICABLE The PCIV LCO was derived from the assumptions related SAFETY ANALYSES to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory, and establishing the piimary containment boundary during major accidents. As part of the primary containment boundary, PCIV OPERABILITY supports leak tightness of primary containment. Therefore, the safety. analysis of any event requiring isolation of primary containment is applicable to this LC0.

The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material for which the consequances are mitigated by PCIVs are a loss 3*M E of coolant accident (LOCA), a main steam line break (MSLB),

and a fuel handlina accident inside primary containment

[ =, (Refs. 1 and zj. En the analysis for each of these accidents, it is assumed that PCIVs are either closed or function to close within the required isolation time following event initiation. This ensures that potential paths to the environment through PCIVs (including primary containment purge valves) are minimized. Of the events analyzed in Reference 1,'the MSLB is the most limiting event due to radiological consequences. The closure time of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) is a significant variable from a radiological standpoint. The MSIVs are required to close within 3 to 5 seconds since the 5 second closure time is assumed in the analysis. The safety analyses assume that the purge valves are closed at event initiation. Likewise, it is assumed that the primary containment is isolated such that re'iease of fission products to the environment is controlled.

The DBA analysis assumes that within 60 seconds after the accident, isolation of the primary containment is complete and leakage terminated, except for the maximum allowable leakage, L . The primary containment isolation total response tTme of 60 seconds includes signal delay, diesel generator startup (for loss of offsite power), and PCIV stroke times.

[The single failure criterion required to be imposed in the conduct of unit safety analyses was considered in the original design of the primary containment purge valves.

Two valves in series on each purge line provide assurance that both the supply and exhaust lines could be isolated even if a single failure occurred.]

(continued)

BWR/6STS B 3.6-16 Rev 1, 04/07/95

l PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 TS TF-s % .t )

EASES (continued) .

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, most PCIVs are not required to be OPERABLE and the primary containment purge valves are not required to be sealed closed in MODES 4 and 5. Certain valves are required to be OPERABLE, however, to prevent inadvertent reactor vessel draindown and releans of radioactive material during a postulated fuel handling These valves are those whose associated o accidenj,tationisrequiredtobeOPERABLEaccordingto instrumen E. LC0 3.3.6.1, " Primary Containment Isolation i a Instrumentation." (This does not include the valves that isolate the associated instrumentation.)

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note allowing penetration flow path (s) (except for the [ ] inch primary containment purge valve flow path (s)] to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. (The primary containment purge valve exception applies to primary containment purge valves that are not qualified to close under accident conditions.] j These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at l the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary ;

containment isolation is indicated. Due to the size of the containment purge line penetration and the fact that those I penetrations exhaust directly from the primary containment atmosphere to the environment, the penetration flow path containing these valves may not be opened under administrative controls. A single purge valve in a penetration flow path may be opened to effect repairs to an inoperable valve, as allowed by the exception to SR 3.6.1.3.1 and Note 2 to SR 3.6.1.3.2.

A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, for the purpose of this LCO, separate Condition entry is ;

allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable PCIV.

Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable PCIVs are governed by (continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.6-18 Rev1,04/07/95 n- : - :-_ - - -- -

( .

} PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 i STF-5%. t j BASES ACTIONS F.1 and F.2 (continued)

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met -in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MOCE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

- i 4

G.I. H.1. ~

andII.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot p be met, the plant must be placed in a condition _in which the 1

(Cre.x.,-6-Q s LCO does not apply. If applicable, F2 AGERAT** ^

movement of+1rradiated fuel assemblies must be imediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe condition. . Also, if applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. If suspending the OPDRVs would result in closing the residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling isolation valves, an alternative Required Action is provided to immediately initiate action to restore the valves to OPERABLE status. This allows RHR to remain in service while I actions are being taken to restore the valve.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.1 l REQUIREMENTS Each [ ] inch primary containment purge valve is required to be verified sealed closed at 31 day intervals. This SR is intended to apply to primary containment purge valves that are not fully qualified to open under accident conditions.

This SR is designed to ensure that a gross breach of primary containment is not caused by an inadvertent or spurious opening of a primary containment purge valve. Detailed analysis of the purge valves failed to conclusively

_ demonstrate their ability to close during a LOCA in time to ,_

(continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.6-24 Rev1,04/07/95

~

i PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES T5TF9 L. t SURVEILLANCE " SR 3.6.1.3.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS limit offsite doses. Primary containment purge valves that are sealed closed must have motive power to the valve o)erator removed. This can be accomplished by de-energizing tie source of electric power or removing the air supply to the valve operator, In this a > plication, the term " sealed" has no connotation of leak tigitness. The 31 day Frequency is a result of an NRC initiative, Generic Issue B-24 (Ref. 5), related to primary containment purge valve use during unit operations.

This SR allows a valve that is open under administrative controls to not meet the SR during the time the valve is open. Opening a purge valve under administrative controls is restricted to one valve in a penetration flow path at a given time (refer to discussion for Note 1 of the ACTIONS) in order to effect repairs to that valve. This allows one purge valve to be opened without resulting in a failure of the Surveillance and resultant entry into the ACTIONS for this purge valve, provided the stated restrictions are met.

Condition E must be entered during this allowance, and the valve opened only as necessary for effecting repairs. Each purge valve in the penetration flow path may be alternately opened, provided one remains sealed closed, if necessary, to complete repairs on the penetration.

The SR is modified by a Note stating that primary containment purge valves are only required to be sealed closed in MODES 1, 2, and 3. If a i.0CA inside primary containment occurs in these MODES, the purge valves may not be capable of closing before the pressure pulse affects systems downstream of the purge valves or the release of radioactive material will exceed limits prior to the closing of the purge valves. At other times when the purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g., during movement of+1rradiated fuel assemblies), pressurization concerns are

}" 9} not present and the purge valves are allowed to be open.

l 1

SR 3.6.1.3.2 .

This SR verifies that the (20] inch primary containment ,

purge valves are closed as required or, if open, open for an j

_, allowable reason. If a purge valve is open in violation of _

(continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.6-25 Rev 1, 04/07/95

n z :z = - - __ _: = =- :: = = -

i PCIVs B 3.6.1.3

/ S TPsifea.t BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.6 (continued) D 'E M }'1 REQUIREMENTS

'e.g., during handling of irradiated fuel), pressurization concerns are not present and the purge valves are not required to meet any specific leakage criteria.

i SR 3.6.1.3.7 l Verifying that the full closure isolation time of each MSIV l is within the specified limits is required to demonstrate l OPERABILITY. The full closure isolation time test ensures I that the MSIV will isolate in a time period that does not exceed the times assumed ir. the DBA analyses. The Frequency of this SR is [in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program or 18 months]. l l

l SR 3.6.1.3.8 l'

Automatic PCIVs close on a primary containment isolation signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment following a DBA. This SR ensures that each automatic PCIV will actuate to its isolation position I on a primary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.1.6 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. The [18] month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance i under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and l the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass this Surveillance when performed at the [18] month Frequency.

Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

~

SR 3.6.1.3.9 7 This SR ensures that the leakage rate of secondary containment bypass leakage paths is less than the specified leakage rate. This provides assurance that the assumptions in the radiological evaluations of Reference 6 are met. The leakage rate of each bypass leakage path is assumed to be !

_the maximum pathway leakage (leakage through the worse of _

l l

l (continued) l l BWR/6 STS B 3.6-29 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l

l 1 . -

. , - = ,. - - - . . . . -

l

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.10 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS exemptions; thus, SR 3.0.2 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not apply.

SR 3.6.1.3.11 Surveillance of hydrostatically tested lines provides

. assurance that the calculation assumptions of References 2 and 3 are met. The combined leakage rates must be demonstrated to be in accordance with the leakage test frequency of Reference 4, as modified by approved exemptions; thus SR 3.0.2 (which allows Frequency extensions) does not apply.

[This SR is modified by a Note that states that these valves are only required to meet the combined leakage rate in MODES 1, 2, and 3 since this is when the Reactor Coolant System is pressurized and primary containment is required.

In some instances, the valves are required to be capable of automatically closing during MODES other than MODES 1, 2, and 3. However, specific leakage limits are not applicable in these other MODES or conditions.)

SR 3.6.1.3.12 Reviewer's Note: This SR is only required for those plants with purge valves with resilient seals allowed to be open during [ MODE 1, 2, or 3) and having blocking devices on the

, valves that are not permanently installed.

Verifying that each [ ] inch primary containment purge valve is blocked to restrict opening to s (50%) is' required to ,

ensure that the valves can close under DBA conditions within l the time limits assumed in the analyses of References 2 ;

and 3.

The SR is modified by a Note stating that this SR is only required to be met in MODES 1, 2, and 3. If a LOCA inside primary containment occurs in these MODES, the purge valves must close to maintain containment leakage within the values assumed in the accident analysis. At other times when purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g., during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies), pressurization Q

'1 (continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.6-31 Rev1,04/07/95

= = . - . . . _

[ Secondary Containment]

B 3.6.4.1 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.4.I [SecondaryContainment]

BASES BACKGROUND Thi3unctionofthe[secondarycontainment)istocontain, dilute, and hold up fission products that may leak from primary containment following a Design Basis Accident (DBA).

In conjunction with operation of the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System and closure of certain valves whose lines penetrate the [ secondary containment], the [ secondary containment) is designed to reduce the activity level of the fission products prior to release to the environment and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during certain operations that take place inside primary containment, when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE, or that take place outside primary containment.

The [ secondary containment) is a structure that completely encloses the primary containment and those components that may be postulated to contain primary system fluid. This structure forms a control volume that serves to hold up and dilute the fission products. It is possible for the pressure in the control volume to rise relative to the _

environmental pressure (e.g., due to pump / motor heat load l additions). To prevent ground level exfiltration while allowing the [ secondary containment] to be designed as a conventional structure, the [ secondary containment] requires support systems to maintain the control volume pressure at less than the external pressure. Requirements for these systems are specified separately in LCO 3.6.4.2, " Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)," and LCO 3.6.4.3, i

" Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System."

APPLICABLE There are three principal accidents for which credit is SAFETY ANALYSES ' taken for (secondary containment] OPERABILITY. These are a 4- LOCA (Ref. 15 a fuel handling ac:identtinside primary + -

?7 b con m nment (Ref. 2), and a fuel aand11ng accidentein the _ "fn:kh

~

( _

auxiliary building (Ref. 3). The [ secondary containment] (- ;; "

performs no active function in response to each of these limiting events; however, its leak tightness is required to ensure that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis, (continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.6-92 Rev1,04/07/95

= = . - - - = - - - - -

1

[ Secondary Containment]

B 3.6.4.1 BASES APPLICABLE and that fission products entrapped within the [ secondary SAFETY ANALYSES containment] structure will be treated by the SGT System (continued) prior to discharge to the environment.

[ Secondary containment) satisfies' Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO An OPERABLE [ secondary containment] provides a control volume into which fission products that bypass or leak from primary containment, or are released front the reactor coolant pressure boundary components located in [ secondary containment), can be diluted and processed prior to release to the environment. For the [ secondary containment) to be considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum can be established and l maintained.

l 4

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to [ secondary containment]. Therefore, [ secondary containment]

OPERABILITY is required during the same operating conditions l that require primary containment OPERABILITY.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of the '

LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining (secondary containment] OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5 to ensure a control volume, except for other situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can C'" g be postulated, such as durina operations with a potential

, " tor _dra-_ning the reactor vesse "T '"O, or during movement DRVs f +r M:

irradiated fuel Ot Tewu7 assemblies in the [ primary or secondary containment].

I f M ACTIONS 3.d If [ secondary containment] is inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of (continued)

BWR/6STS B 3.6-93 Rev1,04/07/95

.. = --~= = . . - . - . .--___-m -

[ Secondary Containment]

B 3.6.4.1

/STPvtAt ACTIONS A.1 (continued) maintaining [ secondary containment) during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring [ secondary containment]

OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where [ secondary containment] is inoperable is minimal.

B.1 and B.2 ,

If the [ secondary containment] cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

3M

~ -

C.1m g g-- - ~ _

4 Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the [ primary or }

secondary containmenty ME ^'.PM9tand OPDRVs can be i

.gl y,di c- n oostulated to cause , fission product release to the (secondary containment]. In such cases, the [ secondary containment]istheonlybarrgrto_releastoffission I products to the environment. -w ETEidT?%2 movement !

of6 irradiated fuel assemblies must be immediately suspended '

@aM@

if the [ secondary containment) is inoperable. ,

i Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing i an action that involves moving a component to a safe l position. Also, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action C.1 has been modified b a Note stating that l LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel l assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify

@u drh ; any action. If moving

irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is indepedent of reactor

_ operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend _

(continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.6-94 Rev1,04/07/95

(Secondary Containment]

B 3.6.4.1 i kVl ACTIONS C.ls N,@ continued) -

movement ofbrradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. _

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.1 g REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures that the (secondary containment] boundary is sufficiently leak tight to preclude exfiltration under expected wind conditions. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency of this SR was developed based on operating experience related to (secondary containment] vacuum variations during the applicable MODES and the low probability of a DBA occurring between surveillances.

Furthermore, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal (secondary containment) vacuum condition.

SR 3.6.4.1.2 and SR 3.6.4.1.3 Verifyirig that (secondary containment) equipment hatches and access doors are closed ensures that the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent maintaining the desired negative pressure does not occur. Verifying that all such openings are closed )rovides adequate assurance that exfiltration from tie (secondary containment]

will not occur. In this a> plication, the term " sealed" has no connotation of leak tig1tness. Maintaining (secondary containment] OPERABILITY requires verifying each door in the access opening is closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit; then, at least one door must remain closed. The 31 day Frequency for these SRs has been shown to be adequate based on operating experience, and is

. considered adequate in view of the other indications of door and hatch status that are available to the operator.

(continued)

BWR/6STS B 3.6-95 Rev 1, 04/07/95

. - - _ - . 2 .: -

SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valvos (SCIVs)

BASES BACKGROUND The function of the SCIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis (Ref. 1). Secondary containment isolation

'within Accidents (DBAs) limits specified for those isolation valves the time designed to close automatically ensures that fission products that leak from primary containment following a DBA, I that are released during certain operations when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE, or that take place outside primary containment, are maintained within the secondary containment boundary.

The OPERABILITY requirements for SCIVs help ensure that an adequate secondary containment boundary is maintained during and after an accident by minimizing potential paths to the environment. These isolation devices are either passive or active (automatic). Manual valves, de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed position (including check valves with flow through the valve secured), and blind flanges are considered passive devices. Check valves or other automatic valves designed to close without operator action following an accident are considered active devices.

Isolation barrier (s) for the penetration are discussed in Reference 2.

Automatic SCIVs close on a secondary containment isolation signal to establish a boundary for untreated radioactive material within secondary containment following a DBA or other accidents.

Other penetrations ant isolated by the use of valves in the closed position or blind flanges.

APPLICABLE The SCIVs must' be OPERABLE to ensure the secondary SAFETY ANALYSES- containment barrier to fission product releases is established. The principal accidents for which the secondary containment boundary is required are a loss of coolant accident (Ref.1), a fuel handling accident,inside (LseM E 1 !

(continued) 1 BWR/6 STS B 3.6-97 Rev1,04/07/95 l I

i

- . _ _ . _ = = = - = - - u._ _ _ _ . - - -

l SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES primary containment in the atxiliary (Ref.

building 3), and (Ref. a fuel 4). The handling accidentk secondary (continued) containment performs no active function in response to each i of these limiting events, but the boundary established by A ,

SCIVs is required to ensure that leakage from the primary containment is processed by the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT)

System before being released to the environment.

Maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE with isolation times within limits ensures that fission products will remain trapped inside secondary containment so that they can be treated by i the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.

J SCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO SCIVs form a part of the secondary containment boundary. The SCIV safety function is related to control of offsite radiation releases resulting from DBAs.

The automatic power, operated isolation vales are considered OPERABLE when their isolation times are within limits and the valves actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO, along with their associated stroke times, are listed in Reference 5.

The normally closed isolation valves or blind flanges are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, automatic SCIVs are de-activated and secured in their closed position, and blind flanges are in place. These passive isolation valves or devices are listed in Reference 5.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to : fission product release to the primary containment that leaks to the secondary containment. Therefore, OPERABILITY of SCIVs is required.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other (continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.6-98 Rev1,04/07/95 i 3 :- .- .

SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 D 55lfeu,l BASES l

1 l

APPLICABILITY situations under which significant releases of radioactive (continued) material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs)'&H5^ e, 8 LGEE ALETQ@ or during movement offrradiatedY assembTies. dovingxirradiated fuel assemblies in the

[ primary or secondary containmentj may also occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

e LN M7 93 so.e4 Gd ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by three Notes. The first Note l allows penetration flow paths to be unisolated l intermittently under administrative controls. These !

controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when the need for

[ secondary containment) isolation is indicated.

The second Note provides clarification that for the purpose l of this LCO separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable SCIV. Complying l with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable SCIVs are governed by subseauent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

The third Note ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system (s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable SCIV.

A.1 and A.2 In the event that there are one or more penetration flow paths with one SCIV inoperable, the affected penetration flow path (s) must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure.

Isolation barriers that meet this criteria are a closed and de-activated automatic SCIV, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. For penetrations isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available device to (continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.6-99 Rev1,04/07/95

~

~ :_ -

'~

~ ' ^~

r SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ACTIONS L.1 (continued) with two isolation valves. This clarifies that only Condition A is entered if one SCIV is inoperable in each of two penetrations.

l l

C.1 and C.2 i

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot

.be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO j does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

D.h ?- l' 4 x-If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LC0 does not apply. If applicab1@ r ==5 mathe movement of4 irradiated fuel assemblies in the (primary and secondary containment) must be immediately suspended.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if DN4'4 applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel i

! draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product l release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

l Required Action D.1 has been modified a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not plicable. If movi irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify l any action. If movin irradiated fuel assemblies while in i MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor l operations._ Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement ot+1rradiated fuel assemblies would not be a

sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

1 (continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.6-101 Rev 1, 04/07/95

.=_ - . - - - - - - --

SGT Syste2 B 3.6.4.3 '

l BASES BACKGROUND humidity of the airstream to less than (70]% (Ref. 2). The l (continued) prefilter removes large particulate matter, while the HEPA filter is provided to remove fine particulate matter and protect the charcoal from fouling. The charcoal adsorber removes gaseous element.a1 iodine and organic iodides, and the final HEPA filter is provided to collect any carbon fines exhausted from the charcoal adsorber.

The SGT System automatically starts and operates in response I to actuation signals indicative of conditions or an accident that could require operation of the system. Following initiation, both enclosure building recirculation fans and both charcoal filter train fans start. SGT System flows are controlled by modulating inlet vanes installed on the charcoal filter train exhaust fans and two position volume control dampers installed in branch ducts to individual l l regions of the secondary containment. l l

APPLICABLE The design basis for the SGT System is to mitigate the SAFETY ANALYSES es of a loss of coolant accident and fuel handling F _c bconse accident (Ref. 3). For all events analyzed, the SGT System

, MSc.e n is shown to be automatically initiated to reduce, via l

H "

filtration and adsorption, the radioactive material released to the environment.

The SGT System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO Following a DBA, a minimum of one SGT subsystem is required to maintain the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and to process gaseous releases. Meeting the LCO requirements for two operable subsystems ensures operation of at least one SGT subsystem in the event of a single active failure.

l APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, SGT System OPERABILITY is required l

during these MODES.

1 1

(continued)

Rev1,04/07/95 BWR/6 STS B 3.6-105 l

l - --

-- = -- .-. _ . - z- -: - --

SGT Systeo B 3.6.4.3 BASES APPLICABILITY In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these (continued) events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the SGT.

System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant releases of C[rmd radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPCRVske&d 5'= la.TE" J T 2 or during movement of l irradiated fuel assemblies in thiiii (primary or secondary i

b*h H y containment].N t

ACTIONS .A_d With one SGT_ subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE SGT subsystem is adequate to perform the required radioactivity release control function. However, the overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in the radioactivity release control function not being adequately performed. The 7 day Com)1etion Time is based on consideration of such factors as tie availability of the OPERABLE redundant SGT subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.1 and B.2 If the SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C.1 C.2.1. s@-

JV During movement ofgirradiated fuel assemblies _in the y

%4 [ primary or seconcury containment] C ..y -

or during OPDRVs, when Required Action A.1 cannot be (continued)

BWR/6STS B 3.6-106 Rev1,04/07/95 l

j

. . . = ~ ~ - _ _

SGT Systeo B 3.6.4.3 BASES ACTIONS C .1. C . 2.1. m (continued) c -._-

completed within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE SGT subsystem should be imediately placed in operation. ,

This Required Action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that could prevent automatic actuation have occurred, and that any other failure would be 4- readily detected.

I S MN An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to imediately amoM suspend activities that represent a potential for releasing Mradioactive material to the secondary containmen+., thus placing the unit in a Conditionpat minimizes risk. If applicable, C&rf*" " movement cf rradiated fuel assemblies must be immediately suspended. uspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicaole, maNN'3 4) action must be imediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Action must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

The Required Actions of Condition C have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving dirradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 1

< would not specify any action. If movinasirradiated fuel l assembries while in MODI 1, 2, or 3, thi fuel movement is l independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a (reactor shutdown. __

u If both SGT subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the SGT system may not be capable of supporting the required radioactivity release control function. Therefore, actions are required to enter LC0 3.0.3 imediately.

l E.la h

4. A. ~

When twoJGT subsystems are inoperable, if applicable, t NLno^Th movement of irradiated fuel assemblies the [ primary and secondary containment) must be imediately 1

b (continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.6-107 Rev1,04/07/95

SGT Systen B 3.6.4.3 BASES ACTIONS E.1m fiD (continued) m A- - 6. ,

suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission .

ptoduct release. Action rust continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

-- RequiredActionE.1hasbeenmodifiedb3aNotestatingthat LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable.

_g ] Vssemblies whi' a in MODE 4 orIf5,100 movinf irradiated fuel 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If movingTirradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend i movement 3 of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be 1 (sufficient [reasontorequireareactorshutdown. j SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.3.1 REQUIREMENTS Operating each SGT subsystem for n [10] continuous hours ensures that both subsystems are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action. Operation

[with the heaters on (automatic heater cycling to maintain temperature)] for n [10] continuous hours every 31 days eliminates moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The 31' day Frequency was developed in censideration of the known reliability of fan motors and controls and the redundancy available in the system.

SR 3.6.4.3.2

- This SR verifies that the required SGT filter testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The MT System filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 4). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specified test frequencies (continued)

BWR/6STS B 3.6-108 Rev1,04/07/95

= == :_. -_ :.= : :. = :

[CRFA) Systen B 3.7.3 i BASES (continued)

[$M- $ /g '

APPLICABLE The ability of the [CRFA) System to maintain the SAFETY ANALYSES habitability of the control room is an explicit assumption for the safety analyses presented in the FSAR, Chapters [6] 1 and [15] (Refs. 3 and 4, respectively). The isolation mode I of the [CRFA] System is assumed to operate following a loss of coolant accident, main steam line brea uel handling I "fMg acciden4 and control rod drop accident. e radiological doses to control room personnel as a result of the various i a DBAs are summarized in Reference 4. No single active or passive failure will cause the loss of outside or recirculated air from the control room. ,

l The [CRFA] System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO Two redundant subsystems of the [CRFA] System are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, assuming a single failure disables the other subsystem.

Total system failure could result in exceeding a dose of 1 5 rem to the control room operators in the event of a DBA.

The [CRFA] System is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to control operator exposure are OPERABLE in both subsystems. A subsystem is considered OPERABLE when its associated: j

a. Fan is OPERABLE;

b. HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber are not excessively '

restricting flow and are capable of performing their !'

filtration functions; and

c. Heater, demister, ductwork, valves, and dampers are ;

OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.

In addition, the control room boundary must be maintained, including the integrity of the walls, floors, ceilings, ductwork, and access doors.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the [CRFA) System must be OPERABLE to control operator exposure during and following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission product release.

(continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.7-13 Rev 1, 04/07/95 .

[CRFA] System B 3.7.3 BASES APPLICABILITY In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a DBA (continued) are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the [CRFA] System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for the following situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated:

a. During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (0PDRVs);

C Dutu.y 5 5 E lfMT i r and N During movement of' irradiated fuel assemblies in the

[ primary or secondary containment]. m gy t 1 J ACTIONS Ad With one [CRFA] subsystem inoperable, the inoperable [CRFA]

subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE

[CRFA] subsystem is adequate to perform control room .

radiation protection. However, the overall reliability is ,

reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem l could result in loss of [CRFA] System function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and that the remaining subsystem can provide the required capabilities.

B.1 and B.2 In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the inoperable [CRFA] subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full pow 2r conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

(continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.7-14 Rev 1, 04/07/95

~, ,. w w e r.* --..w.= .=4===e. .-ewm~ , - . . . . - . . u

[CRFA] Systan B 3.7.3 l BASES l

ACTIONS C.I. C.2.1.

W bW (continued)

The Required Actions of Condition C are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving f eirradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the

'f fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to req re a reactor shutdown.

During movement of) irradiated fuel assemblies in-the Cg [ primary or secondary containment 1f a ...u C0 % ^U EaF iou @

or during OPDRVs, if the inoperable [CRFA; subsystem cannoI l

be restored to OPERABLE status within the required 1 Completion Time, the OPERABLE [CRFA) subsystem may be placed in the isolation mode. This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected. -

l Required Action C.1 is modified by a Note alerting the operator to [ place the system in the toxic gas protection mode if the toxic gas, automatic transfer capability is inoperable).

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to imediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that mini s risk. gc,,,,ggy If applicable f ^P7"^T!s5 =Cmovement of+1rradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment]

must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

(continued)

BWR/6STS B 3.7-15 Rev1,04/07/95

=. . = --

i (CRFA) Systen B 3.7.3 TS TF-5%.(

BASES j ACTIONS 9,.d I (continued) ,

If both [CRFA) subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, i the (CRFA) System may not be capable of performing the i intended function and the unit is in a condition outside of the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

E g j The Required Action's of Condition E are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving pirradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the h* fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

(Therefore, inability to suspend movement ofoirradiated fuel ;

assemblies is not sufficient reason to requ're a reactor shutdown.

During movement ofkrradiated fuel assemblies in the (primary or secondary containment]_ Z 5 : CC"5 '" . zm%9-or during OPDRVs, with two (CRFA) subsystems inoperable, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that

.present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the u t i in a condition that minimizes risk. gy@g If applicable b LT h AT M .?,3 movement of1 irradiated fuel assemblies in the , primary and secondary containment]

must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. If applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that a subsystem in a standby mode starts on demand and continues to operate. Sundby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that, they start and function properly. As the environmental and normal operating conditions of this system are not severe, testing (continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.7-16 Rev 1, 04/07/95 r:gn:- ____;_._ -~_-

[ Control Room AC] System B 3.7.4 h/m(

APPLICABLE heat loads and personnel occupancy requirements to ensure SAFETY ANALYSES equipment OPERABILITY.

(continued) .

. l The [ Control Room AC] System satisfies Criterion 3 of the !

NRC Policy Statement. !

LC0 Two independent and redundant subsystems of the [ Control Room AC] System are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that i at least one is available, assuming a single failure !

disables the other subsystem. Total system failure could result in the equipment operating temperature exceeding limits.

The [ Control Room AC] System is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to maintain the control room temperature are OPERABLE in both subsystems. These components include the cooling coils, fans, chillers, compressors, ductwork, dampers, and associated i instrumentation and controls.

APPLICABILITY In MODE 1, 2, or 3, the [ Control Room AC] System must be OPERABLE to ensure that the control room temperature will not exceed equipment. OPERABILITY limits following control room isolation. .

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a Design Basis Accident are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the [ Control Room AC] System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for the following situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated:

a. During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs);

S d ] Durinu CORE ;J.T Q an ca.

During movement of' irradiated fuel assemblies in the

[ primary or secondary containment]. \ r Tnut i 7 .

(continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.7-20 Rev1,04/07/95

~ ~ ~ ' - ~ ^

1,._^.,_.~ T- " Z~_ *2_ - *~~"-_"f_. !"".-. ..- _ , .-.~l 7 '

[ Control Room AC] Syster B 3.7.4 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS Ad With one [ control room AC] subsystem inoperable, the inoperable [ control room AC] subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE [ control room AC) subsystem is adequate to perform the control room air conditioning function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in loss of the control room air conditioning function. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring requiring control room isolation, the consideration that the remaining subsystem can provide the required protection, and the availability of alternate cooling methods.

B.1 and B.2 In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the inoperable [ control room AC) subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes risk. To achieve this status the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in

~

i10DE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

C.I. C.2.1.

ea @*

The Required Actions of Condition C are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply.

fif moving lirradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of r%g1]

L % irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to C

(requireareactorshutdown.

Duringmovementof3rradiatedfuelastembliesinthe - -

[ primary or secondary containment]r " rias ccRE I 7:C ^"?u or during OPDRVs, if Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE [ control room AC] subsystem may be placed immediately in operation.

(continued)

BWR/6STS B 3.7-21 Rev 1, 04/07/95

- r2 -; 2:

~ - - ~ ~ ~

(Control Room AC] System B 3.7.4 BASES (STPSiy I ACTIONS C.1. C.2.1 dC.2.2 M continued) 7-This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to imediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room.

risk. This places the unit in a condition that minimizeshe.J

+1f applicable, movementofbradiated fuel assemblies in the [ primary and secondary containment]

must be suspended imediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be initiated imediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

D.d If both (control room AC] subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the (Control Room AC] System may not be capable of performing the intended function. Therefore, ,

LCO 3.0.3 must be entered imediately. l 1

E.len l M V l The Required Actions of Condition E.1 are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving

{ceqses irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

Therefore, inability to suspend movement of6 irradiated fuel assemblies shutdown. is not sufficient reason tofe unre a reactor i

During movement of* irradiated fuel assemblies in the~

O

, (primary or secondary containment] n ..ou -un C""*"G l or during OPDRVs with two (control room AC) subsystems inoperable, action must be taken to imediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing (continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.7-22 Rev 1, 04/07/95

=-- = = = - - - --

[ Control Room AC) System B 3.7.4 7 5 T P S tygs,\

ACTIONS E.1. continued) v 4-radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes "i'k' J cesc.m&h If applicable, EnE AlifMTIGid mwhandling o irradiated fuel in the [ primary or secondary containment) must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.4.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the heat removal capability of the system is sufficient to remove the control room heat load assumed in the [ safety analyses). The SR consists of a combination of testing and calculation. The (18] month Frequency is appropriate since significant degradation of the (Control Room AC) System is not expected over this time period.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR,Section(6.4).

2. FSAR, Section [9.4.1).

1 BWR/6 STS B 3.7-23 Rev1,04/07/95

== _ - .

,= ; _:= :_._ -

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown BASES

~.- .

BACKGROUND A description of the AC sources is provided in the Bases for LC0 3.8.1, "AC Sources-0perating."

APPLICABLE The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC sources during MODES 4 SAFETY ANALYSES and 5 and during movement of irradiated f 1 assemblies l ensures that:

Q

! a. The unit can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is l available for monitoring and maintaining the unit i status; and i

c. Adequate AC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an

]j grt t draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling g !

I In general, when the unit _is shut down the Technical Specifications (TS) requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or loss cf all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fcet that many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) that are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, and 3 have no specific analyses in MODES 4 and S. Worst case bounding events are deemed not credible in MODES 4 and 5 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant '

temperature and pressure, and the corresponding stresses

. result in the probabilities of occurrence significantly reduced or eliminated, and minimal consequenct These deviations from DBA analysis assumptions and des.wn requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCO for required systems.

During MODES 1, 2, and 3, various deviations from the analysis assumptions and design requirements are allowed (continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.8 Rev1,04/07/95

._c . :r c_n._ _ ~ . ~

T

l 1

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2

/ S 7 F-574.l LC0 (ESF) bus required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.10, ensures a diverse (continued) power source is available to stovide electrical power support, assuming a loss of tie offsite circuit. Similarly, when the high pressure core spray (HPCS) is required to be OPERABLE, a separate offsite circuit to the Division 3 Class 1E onsite electrical power distribution subsystem, or an OPEftABLEsDivision 3 DG, ensures an additional source of power for th'e HPCS. This additional source for Division 3 is not necessarily required to be connected to be OPERABLE.

Either the circuit required by LCO Item a., or a circuit required to meet LC0 Item c. may be connected, with the second source available for connection. Together, OPERABILITY of the required offsite circuit (s) and DG(s) l ensure the availability of sufficient AC sources to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences

{hk jq of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accident 3 reactor vessel draindown).

The qualified offsite circuit (s) must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage while connected to their respective ESF bus (es), and of accepting required loads during an accident. Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the FSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the plant. (Theoffsitacircuit consists of incoming breaker and discunnect to the respective service transformers 11 and 21, the 11 and 21 service transformers, the ESF transformers 11 and 21, and the respective circuit path including feeder breakers to all 4.16 kV ESF buses required by LCO 3.8.10.]

1 l The required DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to .

rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective i ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage, and accepting l required loads. This sequence must be accomplished within (10] seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and must continue to operate until offsite power l can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such l as: DG in standby with the engine hot and DG in standby with the engine at ambient conditions. Additional DG capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required l Surveillances, e.g., capability of the DG to revert to l standby status on an ECCS signal while operating in parallel test mode l

(continued) l BWR/6 STS B 3.8-37 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l

l .

l 7 ~: n __ ._ _ZTz _ _ ~---~ - - ~ ~

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 1 5 T F 5 I,(ks.(

LC0 Proper sequencing of loads, including tripping of (continued) nonessential loads, is a required function for DG OPERABILITY. (In addition, proper sequencer operation is an integral part of offsite circuit OPERABILITY since its inoperability impacts on the ability to start and maintain energized loads required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.10.]

It is acceptable for divisions to be cross tied during -

shutdown conditions, permitting a single offsite power circuit to supply all required divisions. [No fast transfer capability is required for offsite circuits to be considered OPERABLE.]

As described in Applicable Safety Analyses, in the event of an accident during shutdown, the TS are designed to maintain the plant in a condition such that, even with a single failure, the plant will not be in immedlate difficulty.

APPLICABILITY The AC sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and uring movement of+ irradiated fuel assembifes in the

@u$')

-~

[ primary or secondary] containment provide assurance that:

a. Systems to provide adequ:te coolant inventory makeup l are available for the irradiated fuel in the core in '

case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel; (Lsu

\ (. P

b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident vare available;

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The AC power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.1.

(continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.8-38 Rev 1, Oit/07/95

. . . -- ::::::: ==:-- :' -- .

I l

AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 T5 TPS~tSw.(

BASES (continued) l ACTIONS Ad i 1

An offsite circuit is considered inoperable if it is not available to one required ESF division. If two or more t

ESF 4.16 kV buses are required per LCO 3.8.10, division (s) pu.J

,pe,j!h 3 with offsite power available may be capable of supporting mfficient re 4

s ALTERATIONS) quired features fuel movement, to allow continuation and operations of CORE with a potential far draining the reactor vessel. By the allowance of the ,

option to declare required features inoperable with no I offsite power available, appropriate restrictions can be implemented in accordance with the.affected required feature (s) LCOs' ACTIONS.

A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3 A.2.4. B.I. B.2. B.3, and B.4 l

With the offsite circuit not available to all required divisions, the option still exists to declare all required features inoperable. Since this option may involve l undesired administrative efforts, the allowance for ,

sufficiently conservative actions is made. With the r - -- required DG inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC g,.$l@ power sources is not available. It is, therefore, required to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement ofeirradiated fuel l assemblies in the [ primary or seconoa y containment), and activities that could potentially result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to initiate action immediately to restore the required AC sources and to continue this action until restoration is a:complished in order to provide the necessary AC power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to !

minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may .

be without sufficient power. !

t i

I (continued) l BWR/6 STS B 3.8-39 Rev1,04/07/95 l

.:::- .- _ 2. : - =: -

}

DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS l B 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown l

BASES BACKGROUND A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources-Operating."

,,n APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter (C) (Ref.1) and .

Chapter (15] (Ref. 2), assume that Engineered Safety Feature l l systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system provides nor.nal and emergency DC electrical power for the i

diesel generators, emergency auxiliaries, and control and I switching during all MODES of operation.

The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial ~ assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC electrical power sources during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of tradiated fuel assemblies r sures that: g

a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or i refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and I

c. Adequate DC electrical power is provided to mitigate l events postulated during shutdown, such as an i Q@3 . inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accidentg

( .

The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO The DC electrical power subsystems, each consisting of

[tro] battery banks, (one or two] battery charger (s], and (continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.8-61 Rev1,04/07/95

- - .====- ._:- _ - = = = - - -

l DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5 T S T F 57 A u.(

BASES LCO the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting (continued) cabling within the division, are required to be OPERABLE to support required divisions of Distribution System divisions required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.10. " Distribution Systems-Shutdown." This ensures the availability of sufficient DC electrical power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling p7 .

accidentyandinadvertentreactorvesseldraindown). l

(<cce A 3) .

l APPLICABILITY The DC electrical power sources re aired to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movemen of irradiated fuel assemblies in the (primary or secondary containment] provide assurance that:

a. Required features to provide adequate coolant inventory makeus are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in tie core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;

b. Required features needed to mitigate a fuel handling fpg i accident,are. available;

( T a c. Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and I

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.4.

ACTIONS A.I. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3 and A.2.4 If more than one DC distribution subsystem is required according to LCO 3.8.10, the DC subsystems remaining OPERABLE with one or more DC power sources inoperable may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for raining the reactor vessel.

Cde.nMflh le cdlJ R _

(continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.8-62 Rev 1, 04/07/95

=__ -__ - :=. . - ---

DC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5 BASES ACTIONS A.I. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3 and A.2.4 (continued)

By allowing the option to declare required features inoperable with associated DC power source (s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with i the affected system LCOs' ACTIONS. In many instances this option may involve undesired administrative efforts.

, Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative h actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement CQM\- _ ofairradiated fuel assemblies, and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel). j Suspension of these activities sh'all not preclude completion l of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. i These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of l postulated events. It is further required to immediately ,

initiate action to restore the required DC electrical power !

subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary DC electrical power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required DC electrical power subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.5.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.5.1 requires performance of all Surve111ances required by SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8. Therefore, see the corresponding Bases for LC0 3.8.4 for a discussion of each SR.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DC sources from being j~ discharged below their capability to provide the required power supply or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs. It is the intent that these SRs must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required.

(continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.8-63 Rev1,04/07/95

..~. - _; .

Inverters-Shutdown B 3.8.8 8 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.8 Inverters-Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the inverters is provided in the Bases for LC0 3.8.7, " Inverters-Operating."

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and SAFETY ANALYSES transient accident analyses in the FSAR, Chapter (6)

(Ref.1) and Chapter (15) (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Featura systems are OPERABLE. The DC to AC inverters are designed to provide the required capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to the Reactor Protection System and Emergency Core Cooling Systems instrumentation and controls so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

The OPERABILITY of the inverters is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum inverters to each AC vital bus during MODES 4 and 5 ensures that:

a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability are available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

c. Adequate power is available to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent Q drair,down of the vessel or a fuel handling accident 6 The inverters were previously identified as part of the Distribution System and, as such, satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

3nd kM .

(continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.8-77 RevI,04/07/95

======- :==- . = = = - - - - -

l Inverters-Shutdown B 3.8.8 T S T P c t p .(

BASES (continued) l LCO The inverters ensure the availability of electrical power for the instrumentation for systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or postulated DBA. The battery powered inverters provide uninterruptible supply of AC electrical power to the AC vital buses even if the 4.16 kV safety buses are de-energized. OPERABLE inverters require the AC vital bas be powered by the inverter through inverted DC voltage. This ensures the availability of sufficient inverter power sources to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated -

events during shut'down (e.g., fuel handling accidents an inadvertent reactor vessel draindown). l uN <

l APPLICABILITY The inverters required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and !

als'o any time during movement of. irradiated fuel assemblies in the [ primary or secondary] containment provide _ assurance that:

a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup l are available for the irradiated fuel in the core in '

case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;

b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident SM3 vare available; L c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

Inverter requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.7.

ACTIONS A.1. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3 and A.2.4 If two divisions are required by LCO 3.8.10. " Distribution Systems-Shutdown," the remaining OPERABLE inverters may be (continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.8-78 Rev1,04/07/95

, e . . . . _

. o a w m ,., , , , . ._

1 Inverters-Shutdown B 3.8.8 BASES ACTIONS A.I. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. and A.2.4 (continued) y capable of supporting sufficient required feature (s) to i ctMM allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS. Afuel movement, and

@'p d ,' M " / operations with a potential for draining the rea By the allowance of the o) tion to declare required feature (s) inoperable wit) the associated inverter (s) inoperable, approsriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with tie affected required feature (s) of the LCOs' ACTIONS. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is 4made (d fueli.e., to M( suspend CORE ALTERATIONS. movement of 1rradiate assemblies in the [ primary or seconda~ry) containment, and any activities that could result f a inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel).

Suspension of thise activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required inverters and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary inverter power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required inverters should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the plant safety systems may be without power or powered from a :

constant voltage source transformer.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the inverters are functioning properly with all required circuit breakers closed and AC vital buses energized from the inverter. The verification of proper voltage and frequency output ensures ,

that the required power is readily available for the !

instrumentation connected to the AC vital buses. The 7 day '

Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the inverters and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to inverter malfunctions.

(continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.8-79 Rev 1, 04/07/95 t _ _ _ u n nr _ _._ __ ~n-'7

~

Distribution Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.10 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown BASES )

e BACKGROUND A description of the AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.9, " Distribution Systems-Operating."

l APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the FSAR, Chapter [6] (Ref.1) and 1 Chapter [15] (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

The OPERABILITY of the AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution' system is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC, DC, and AC vital bus ,

electrical power sources and associated power distribution l (FJCCM4 subsystems during MODES 4 and 5, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment ensures that:

I

.a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

c. Adequate power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent 4 draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accidentf The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. J l

'Md t M f (continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.8-91 Rev 1, 04/07/95 g _

._ . . . , ._ _ _ . _.m _- . _ . _

l Distribution Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.10 BASES (continued)

LC0 Various combinations of subsystems,' equipment, and components are required OPERABLE by other LCOs, depending on the specific plant condition. Implicit in those requirements is the required OPERABILITY of necessary support required features. This LC0 explicitly requires energization of the portions of the electrical distribution system necessary to support OPERABILITY of Technical Specifications' required systems, equipment, and components-both specifically addressed by their own Lrn<,,

and implicitly required by the definition of OPERABILF.1 1

Maintaining these portions of the distribution system energized ensures the availability of sufficient power to operate the plant in a safe manner to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g.,

fuel handling accidents and inadvertmit reactor vessel draindown). Lech L A APPLICABILITY The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement o irradiated fuel assemblies in the [ secondary) containment g w h\ Q provide assurance that:

a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor ,

vessel; l

b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident c1 r_re available;

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown or refueling condition.

The AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.9.

(continued)

BWR/6 STS B 3.8-92 Rev 1, 04/07/95

.:=======--=---- -

=-- --

Distribution Systems-Shutdown B 3.8.10 -

BASES (continued)

TS TF-S %{

ACTIONS A.I. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. A.2.4. and A.2.5 Although redundant required features may require redundant divisions of electrical power distribution subsystems to be

, -@ OPERABLE,oneOPERABLEdistributionsubsystemdivisionm be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS,qfuel movement, and dM[) operations with a potential for dratnmg the reactor vessel.

[( # " By allowing the option to declare required features associated with an inoperable distribution subsystem inoperable, apsro>riate restrictions are implemented in accordance wit 1 tie affected distribution subsystem LC0's Required Actions. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movementfi oJ rradiated fuel assemblies in the [ primary or secondary]fcontainment and any activities that could result in inadvertentldraining of the reactor vessel). g Suspension of these activities shall not preclude complerion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition.

These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary power to the plant safety systems.

Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, a required residual heat removal-shutdown cooling (RHR-SDC) subsystem may be inoperable. In this case, Required Actions A.2.1 through A.2.4 do not adequately address the concerns relating to coolant circulation and heat removal. Pursuant to LC0 3.0.6, the RHR-SDC ACTIONS would not be entered. Therefore, Required Action A.2.5 is provided to direct declaring RHR-SDC incperable, which results in taking the appropriate RHR-SDC ACTIONS.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required distribution subsystems should be comsleted as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time tie plant safety systems may be without power.

(continued) l BWR/6 STS B 3.8-93 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l l

i

'~~

. . . . ~ - 'X

. . . . , . . . _ . _ y f^}((~ ~~

ML20212J320

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