ML20212K327

Aamodt Response to Motion of GP Miller,870216.* Response Opposing GP Miller 870216 Motion Objecting to Aamodt 870202 Request for Documents Re Facility Leak Rate Falsification. Svc List Encl

ML20212K327
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	03/02/1987
From:	Aamodt M, Aamodt N AAMODTS
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
CON-#187-2709 86-519-02-SP, 86-519-2-SP, LRP, NUDOCS 8703090274
Download: ML20212K327 (7)

Text

4 l %7df UNITED STATES OF AMERICA j NUCLEAR REGULNIORY C0bHISSION MCKETED BEFORE 'IEE PRESIDING BOARD USNRC In the Matter of Docket No. LR$7 ISR -6 N1 :07 INQUIRY IN'IO '1HREE MILE ISIAND UNIT 2 ) ASLBP No. 86-519-02 SP LEAK RATE DATA FALSIFICATION ) 0FFl2 F St d-I F

) 00C8ET:% 4 ':L*VICL BRANCH March 2, 1987 AAMODP RESPONSE 'IO MOTION OF GARY P. MILLER, FEBRUARY 16, 1987 Gary P. Miller, a party to the proceeding, objected by Motion of February 16, 1987 to the Aamodts' request (in their Findings of February 2, 1987 at T 14) for official notice of an NRC document provided as Attachment 1. Attachment 1 is the NRC's internal notification of the

'IMI-2 accident, PNO-79-67, dated March 28, 1979. The portion the Aamodts' believe is relevant to the instant proceeding is the statement that there was "a known previous primary to secondary leak in Steam Generator B".

See Aamodt Findings 1 14, 23. Now, Miller objects to the Aamodt request for official notice of that portion of PNO-79-67 arguing that the informa-tion is untimely, unreliable and irrelevant.

Miller is wrong in all his arguments.M

1. Relevancy.

Excess leakage through the steam generators h relevant to the issue of this proceeding, the calculation of unidentified leak rate. The unidenti-fied leak rate is obtained by subtracting the quantified, identified leakage from the gross leakage. See, for instance, Board Exhibit 2, Vol. Three A, Exhibits 13 (p.7) and 3 (pp. 1-4). Leakage from the steam generators would h Other parties, GPU and the Numerous Employees, also objected to the Aamodt request for official notice of PNO-79-67. However, neither framed their objections as a motion. Nevertheless, their arguments, in total, were the same as Miller's and are, thus, rebutted by the evidence presented against Miller. The only other party, John Herbein, did not object. See Findings, February 16,1987, GPU (pp. 2-4); Employees (pp. 31-2); Herbein.

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" be reflected in the measurement of gross leakage. leakage from the steam generators was required to be identified by continuous surveillance (see Id., Ex. 13, pp. 47-8), quantified E and subtracted from gross leakage as identified leakage (see Id., p. 7). However, we now know from the testimony of employees in the hearing of this proceeding that the leakage from the steam generators was not measured during operation. _Se_e Tr. 4825 (Kunder); 4156 (Guthrie). The operators recorded steam generator tube leakage as "0" or "0.0".

See leak Rate Computer Calculation Sheets, Board Exhibit 5-A, Test Evaluation Worksheets, December 1978 through March 1979. Serefore, primary to secondary leakage through the steam generators would have been included in the unidenti-fled leak rate'. Steam tube leakage would have affected the capabilities of the operators to obtain " good" (under 1 gpm) leak rates.E Therefore, the matter of leakage from the steam generators as well as the operators or others i

knowledge of the leakage are relevant to this proceeding.

Miller's arguments, pp. 5-6, that the proceeding is limited to issues surrounding unidentified reactor coolant system leakage, that steam generator leakage should be excluded from consideration because it "is" identified -

leakage, and that there is no evidence that steam generator leaks exceeded the limiting condition for operation, are obviously incorrect. Unidentified leakage could not be calculated without quantification of identified leakage, steam generator leakage that was not measured was not identified leakage, and there could be no evidence that steam generator leaks exceed the limiting condition for operation if, as the employees testified, the leakage was not measured.

_2/ 3e limiting leakage for steam generators was 1 gpm.

y Inexplicably, the other parties misunderstood a similar point (Aamodt Findings, 2/2/87, 1 23-27) that the rate of increase of identified leakage i as well as the approach to limiting conditions (10 gpm) put the managers on notice that tests for unidentified leakage were difficult if not impossible to perform. _See Reply findings, February 16,m 1987: GFU (pp.5-6); Miller (pp. 5-6); Herbein (p. 2); Employees (p. 30).

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• 2. Reliability.

'Ihe NRC document, PNO-79-67, meets the standard for " Official Notice",

contrary to Miller's clearly incorrect assertions (pp. 2-5). The document is an official pronouncement of a public agency and is currently on file as definitive information concerning 'IMI in the agency's public document room under the 'IMI-2 accident investigation docket. Employees of the NRC branch Inspection and Enforcement were responsible for the document and are clearly identified: G. Klinger, F. Nolan and S.E. Bryan. The document was distribu-ted widely -- to 22 NRC officials, including all five Comnissioners. The document was prepared for transmittal at 3:40 p.m., nearly six hours after NRC Staff arrived at 'IMI and nearly twelve hours after the 'IMI accident began, providing sufficient time for the facts stated to be ascertained. See PNO-79-67, T 1, 3.

The-document is not rank heresay, composed the morning of the accident, or without authors, as is asserted by Miller ( pp. 2-4).

'Ite document statement concerning leakage from B Steam Generator was confirmed by subsequent investigations referenced by the evidence Miller cited (p. 5). Reference 1 of the Rogovin report (Miller's reference), the NRC investigation, confirms leakage from B Steam Generator: " isotopic analysis of a sample taken frca B OS'IU on March 30 showed 7.9 uCi/mi of iodine - 131 and 2.1 uci/mi of iodine - 133. These levels are so high that it seems likely that any leakage out of B OS'IU would have been easily de-tected at the condenser or condensate vacuum pump discharge." NUREG-0600, II-3-5.

Reference 3 of the Rogovin report (Miller's reference), GPU's investi- .

gation, the Keaton Report, states that when B OS'IG, isolated at 0527 (87 minutes into the accident) was put back in service, "within five minutes the J

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condenser vacuum pump exhaust radiation monitor began to increase sharply. .

from'20 cpm". Ten minutes later "a high radiation alarm was reached at a 4

count rate of 5 x 10 cpm. Steam generator B was reisolated at 0704 and remained isolated for the duration of the accident. 'Ihe count rate on the 5

exhaust monitor peaked at 0715 at 1 x 10 cpm and then decreased and stabi-lized at about 2 x 10 4cpm by approximately 0830." Keaton Report, Third Draft, October 1979.

Miller's argument that the leakage from B Steam Generator, reported in the PNO, "may not have been a leak" (Miller, p. 5) exhibits an amazing ignorance of the 'IMI investigations or utter deceit.

Miller does not address the crux of the matter -- whether the B Steam Generator leaked prior to the accident and the employees' knowledge of that. The NRC did not pursue an investigation of pre-accident leakage and employees' knowledge. The NRC was led afield by the employees' alleged reason for initially isolating the B Steam Generator -- the rise of reactor pressure. The NRC reasoned that the operators must not have known about the primary to secondary leak if they cited rising reactor pressure (and presumed leakage from the steam generator into the reactor building) as the basis for isolating the steam generator. See NUREG-0600, II-3-3 and 4. Although 4/ Miller omitted, in referencing the Rogovin report, the Event No. 158 (p. 671, Vol. II, Part II) where it is stated that the B Steam Generator was re- and completely isolated at this time -- a step that would not have been taken, had the B Steam Generator not leaked, with the function of steam generators critically needed.

S/ Rogovin references the first Keaton draft report. We have no reason to believe that the author changed his opinion on this matter bstween drafts. In any case, the third draft would be more depositive. (We have not been able to check Rogovin's second reference, the EPRI report.)

It would appear that Rogovin's gross error derived from his It would appear that Rogovin's gross error derived from his reference to the the Control Room logs, his third and only other source of information listed.

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. not stated, to the best of our. knowledge, the NRC must have presumed that there was no pre-accident leakage from the stean generators since the calculations of the leak rate reported steam tube leakage as "0" or "0.0". The NRC could not have known that the operators were not measuring and/or reporting steam tube leakage; otherwise the NRC would have cited GPU for this violation. We are not aware of any relevant citation.

'Ihe statement in the PNO, that B Steam Generator leaked prior to the accident and that the leakage was known, is supported by the preponderance of evidence. The operators quick action to isolate the B Steam Generator on the basic of spurious reasons is evidence. See Id., II-3-6 12 also. Despite a mixup in the lines to the primary sample room which misidentified the steam tube leak as due to generator A, the employees insisted that it was B.

See Id., II-3-5 and 6. The problems the operators had during the operation of

'1NI-2 in obtaining good unidentified leak rates, even when sump pump starts were fewer than the number associated with unidentified leakage greater than 1 gpn, alerted the operators that there was primary to secondary leakage.

See Board Ex. 2, Vol. Three A, Ex.12 (for sump pump start tabulation).

During the period prior to the accident, the operators were having great difficulty in obtaining. leak rate tests below 1 gpm (see Board Ex. 1-A, Vol. 1, pp. 82, 90, 101), and the sump pump starts were below the number that indicated over 1 gpn unidentified leakage. See Board Ex. 2, Vol. Two, pp. 23-4 (for gallons pumped per start). 'Ihe fact that the I&E Staff asserted that the 'IMI employees had prior knowledge of leakage from the steam generator is evidence that someone at 'IMI told the NRC that there was prior knowledge.

It is not reasonable to presume that the I&E Staff would have gone beyond merely reporting that there was leakage from the steam generators if they did not, in fact, have further information.

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3. Timeliness.

S e Board made it clear, near the end of the hearing, that it would be open to additions to the record where additional evidence was clearly needed.

%c Aamodts could not have raised the matter of leakage from the steam generators and asked for consideration of PNO-79-67 prior to the time that they'did so. The testimony of Kunder and Guthrie that leakage from the steam generators was not measured made them realize the importance of the statement' in the PNO concerning leakage and prior knowledge of it. The Aamodts did not have the transcripts in hand until after the close of the hearing.

In ccnclusion, Miller's arguments against the Board's official notice of PNO-79-67 for the statement concerning the B steam generator are without merit and should be rejected. The Board should, in fact, place the PNO on the record of the proceeding and question appropriate witnesses.

An understanding of the failure of the operators to measure steam tube leakage is essential to the Board's decision concerning the circumstances surrounding the leak rate data falsification.

1 Respectfully submitted

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• bY i Marjorie f. Aamodt ')I p~._._ ,

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Norman O. Aamodt March 2, 1987

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UNITES STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 00L KfI1C

USNPC BEFORE THE PRESIDING BOARD

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In the Matter of

) MET *G & 3EPVICf.

) Docket No. LRP BRANCH INQUIRY INTO THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 2 )

) ASLBP No. 86-519-02 SP LEAK RATE DATA FALSIFICATION

)

This is to certify that copies of AAMODP RESPONSE 'IO NOTION OF GARY P. MILLER, FEBRUARY 16, 1987 were served on the following Service List on March 2, 1987 by deposit in U.S. Mai ,,first class, postage prepaid.

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, A Marjorid M. Aamodt March 2, 1987 Service List

'The Honorables Judges James L. Kelley (Chairman)

Harry H. Voigt, Esq.

James H. Carpenter Michael F. McBride, Esq.

Glenn O. Bright Robert St. John Roper, Esq.

Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Holly S. Boast, Esq.

James W. Hoeller, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Marlene L. Stein, Esq.

Washington, D. C. 20555 C. Christopher Sprague, Esq.

LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae Docketing & Service Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 1100 1333 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20036 Jack Goldberg, Esq. Smith B. Cephart Esq.

Mary Wagner, Esq. Jane G. Penny, Esq.

Of fice of Legal Staf f Terrence G. McGowan Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Killian & Cephart Washington, D.C. 20555 216-18 Pine .treet Harrisburg, PA 17108 Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esq.

John H. Nassikas, III, Esq. Michael W. Haupin, Esq.

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Maria C. Hensley, Esq.

2300 N Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20037 Hunton & Williams P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, VA 23212 Isham, Lincoln & Beale Three First National Plaza

• Suite 5200 Chicago, IL 60602

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