ML20211Q723

Annual Results & Data Rept 1986

ML20211Q723
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	12/31/1986
From:	WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
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ML20211Q688	List: ML20211Q684 ML20211Q715 ML20211Q723
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NUDOCS 8703030170
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ANNUAL RESULTS AND DATA REPORT 1986 Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 i Wisconsin Electric Power Company U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301 Facility Operating License Nos.

DPR-24 and DPR-27 70 e70227

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r PREFACE This Annual Results & Data Report for 1986 is submitted in accordance with Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 & 2, Technical Specification 15.6.9.1.B and filed under Docket Nos. 50-266 & 50-301 for Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-24 & DPR-27, respectively.

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t TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1 2.0 HIGHLIGHTS 2.1 Unit 1 1 2.2 Unit 2 1 3.0 FACILITY CHANGES, TESTS & EXPERIMENTS 3.1 Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses 2 3.2 Facility or Procedure Changes Requiring NRC Approval 3 3.3 Tests or Experiments Requiring NRC Approval 7 3.4 Design Changes 8 3.5 Temporary Modifications 37 4.0 NUMBER OF PERSONNEL & MAN-REM BY WORK GROUP & JOB FUNCTION 61 5.0 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSERVICE INSPECTION 5.1 Unit 1 62 5.2 Unit 2 63 6.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RELIEF VALVE CHALLENGES 6.1 Overpressure Protection During Normal Pressure &

Temperature Operation 103 6.2 Overpressure Protection During Low Pressure &

Temperature Operation 103 7.0 REACTOR COOLANT ACTIVITY ANALYSIS 7.1 June 12, 1986 103 7.2 November 17, 1986 111 1

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, utilize identical pressurized water reactors rated at 1518 MWt each. Each turbine-generator is capable of producing 497 MWe net (524 MWe gross) of electrical power. The plant is located ten miles north of Two Rivers, Wisconsin, on the west shore of Lake Michigan.

2.0 HIGHLIGHTS 2.1 Unit 1 Highlights for the period January 1, 1986, through December 31, 1986, included a 38-day refueling / maintenance outage, a brief outage to make weld repairs to a moisture separator reheater, a brief outage caused by inverter diode failures, and a brief outage caused by an equipment return to service procedural deficiency.

Unit 1 operated at an average capacity factor of 88.7% and a net electric / thermal efficiency of 32.7%. The unit and reactor availability were 89.2% and 90.4% respectively. Unit 1 generated its 49 billionth kilowatt hour on March 10, 1986; its 50 billionth kilowatt hour on July 13, 1986; its 51 billionth kilowatt hour on October 4, 1986; and its 52 billionth kilowatt hour on December 24, 1986.

2.2 Unit 2 Highlights for the period January 1, 1986, through December 31, 1986, included a 65-day refueling / maintenance outage, a brief outage to repair a steam generator manway gasket, and a brief outage caused by a personnel error during safeguards logic tests.

Unit 2 operated at an average capacity factor of 80.4% and a net electric / thermal efficiency of 32.3%. The unit and reactor availability were 82.2% and 82.9% respectively. Unit 2 generated its 49 billionth kilowatt hour on February 18, 1986; its 50 billionth kilowatt hour on May 13, 1986; and its 51 billionth kilowatt hour on August 5, 1986.

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O i J' 3.0 FACILITY CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS 3.1 Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses During the year 1986, there were 5 license amendments issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Facility Operating License DPR-24 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 and 5 license. amendments issued to Facility Operating License DPR-27 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 2. These license amendments-are listed by date of issuance and are summarized as follows:

3.1.1 06-17-86, Amendment 100 to DPR-24, Amendment 103 to DFR-27 These amendments add additional surveillance requirements for reactor trip breakers. The amendments also add reference to maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment as part of the post-accident sampling program.

i 3.1.2 06-25-86, Amendment 101 to DPR-24, Amendment 104 to i DPR-27 These amendments provide a temporary change to the limiting condition for operation of the component cooling water system to permit installation of an additional component cooling water heat exchanger.

3.1.3 06-27-86, Amendment 102 to DPR-24, Amendment 105 to DPR-27 These amendments revise the reporting requirements for I primary coolant activity levels due to iodine spikes.

l They also delete the requirement to shut down the i reactor if primary coolant activity levels exceed

1.0 microcuries per gram (dose equivalent I-131) for j 800 hours0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br /> during any consecutive 12-month period.

i 3.1.4 07-03-86, Amendment 103 to DPR-24, Amendment 106 to DPR-27 These snendments revise the limiting conditions for operation for the reactor coolant pumps to provide more restrictive limits for critical and suberitical operation.

3.1.5 08-27-86, Amendment 104 to DPR-24, Amendment 107 to DPR-27 These amendments revise the requirements for conducting containment integrated leak rate testing to allow for reduced duration testing (less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />); to allow inclusion of purge supply and exhaust under Type "B" testing; to allow one of two in-series purge supply and exhaust valves to be open for repairs.

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3.2 Procedure Changes There were no procedure changes made during 1986 beyond those 1 authorized with license amendments as noted above, which required Nuclear Regulatory Commission approval. The following procedure. ,

changes made at Point Beach Nuclear Plant during 1986, required a 10 CFR 50.59 review: ,

j 3.2.1 Furmanite N-86070,.To Seal On-line Body-to-Bonnet Leak on 2PCV-431B, Revision 1, dated February 24, 1986.

I Summary of Safety Evaluation: The activity is a potential change to the facility or its operation as described in the FSAR. The studs that connect the body to.the bonnet on 2PCV-431B are made of stainless steel. Therefore, contact with boric acid that has leaked out of the valve will not have degraded the stud ,

strength. The stud strength has been judged to be '

acceptable. The Furmanite procedure will not challenge i the integrity of the primary system or its protection equipment. Since the studs are stainless steel, '

encapsulating them in a potential boric acid environment will not increase the corrosion potential of the studs.

Drilling for the injection path is through the flange face joint which is not the pressure-retaining

! (stressed) metal. Therefore, the drilling does not 4

affect the load carrying capability of the flange.

The change does not pose an unreviewed safety j question. The probability of occurrence or the j consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does i not create the possibility for an accident or i malfunction which has not been previously evaluated.

l The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-076) 3.2.2 RMP #47 (Minor), Unit 2 2X04 Maintenance, Revision 0,

! dated October 17, 1986. (New Procedure) The purpose of the procedure is to control work associated with the

!. removal of 2X04 low voltage station auxiliary-transformer and its subsequent return to service such that offsite power is maintained to station 4160 V '

buses.

2 Summary of Safety Evaluation: An evaluation is required because this procedure defeats interlocks described in i the FSAR not described in the FSAR. Maintaining the 4160 V fast bus transfer capability for Unit 1, while all Unit 2 buses are supplied by the 1X04 transformer, 4

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requires bypassing an interlock for breakers 1A52-37 (1A01 to 1A03 tie breaker) and 1A52-55 (1A02 to IA04 tie breaker). This is an abnormal configuration and as such requires a safety evaluation.

The fast bus transfer capability itself is not required to maintain safety-related functions, and as such, its operation does not require analysis. However, the potential for overload of the IXO4 transformer must be analyzed to ensure that the primary emergency power source is not adversely affected.

i In a conservative load analysis using a Unit 1 full power safeguards actuation and Unit 2 in cold shutdown (present Unit 1 4160 V loads, a Unit 1 safeguards actuation, fully loaded Unit 1 and Unit 2 480 V buses, and no Unit 2 4160 V loads due to cold shutdown), the total load on IXO4 will be approximately 35.7 HVA.

1X04 is rated at 37.3 HVA with forced ventilation. This shows that the worst case is not detrimental to the primary emergency power source. Even upon a fault in the IX04 transformer, the backup emergency power source (emergency diesel generators) is available to maintain at least one train of safeguards in an accident unit and cold shutdown in the other unit.

The change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated.

The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-062) 3.2.3 FSAR Section 11.1, This section would be revised to agree with the Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications (Section 15.7) for on-service gas decay tank oxygen limits and required actions. Statements referring to a 1% alarm limit would be deleted.

Setpoint Document, Section 12.0, Page 5 would be 4 revised to change the gas analyzer oxygen alarm from 1%

to 3% and add a second oxygen analyzer channel.

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Summary of Safety Evaluation: These changes constitute a change to procedures described in the FSAR.

Page 11.1-8 of the FSAR states that, "During operation, gas samples can be drawn automatically from the gas decay tanks and automatically analyzed to determine their hydrogen and oxygen content ... and an alarm will warn the operator if any sample shows 2% or higher by volume of oxygen. This allows time to take required action before the combustible limits of the hydrogen / oxygen mixtures are reached. Another tank is placed in service while the operator locates and eliminates the source of oxygen."

The above section of the FSAR should be revised to agree with the limits and required actions of RETS (Section 15.7.5, " Explosive Gas Mixture"). RETS only requires the on-service GDT to be sampled for oxygen (not hydrogen) with an upper limit of 4% oxygen before requiring action. The required actions include switching to another on-service GDT and reducing the oxygen content to less than 4%.

The 4% limit would probably allow operation with an alarm setpoint of 4%. However, it is prudent to select a setpoint somewhat lower to allow 'some time for action to avoid going over 4% during a slowly rising oxygen situation. Since normal oxygen content runs between 1-2%, a 3% alarm setpoint is more appropriate than the 2% limit specified in the FSAR and in the setpoint document.

During a rapidly rising oxygen situation, i.e.,

open-ended air leak on a waste gas compressor, there would not be sufficient warning time no matter what the l alarm setpoint. For example, with compressor capacity I of 40 cfm, GDT capacity of about 700 cfm at 5 psig, and oxygen concentration in air of 20%, the GDT oxygen i concentration would increase at a rate of about

! 1%/ minute.

f Section 14.2.3 of the FSAR analyzes the consequences of a GDT rupture, and states, "This analysis shows that even with the worst case expected conditions, the off-site doses following release of this gaseous activity would be very low." Therefore, since the oxygen alarm setpoint change from 2-3% does not pose an j unresolved safety question, and because RETS specifies a 4% limit prior to required actions, the recommended setpoint document change and FSAR changes do not need prior NRC approval.

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Additionally, the Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, Chemical Rubber Company, Cleveland, Ohio, 49th Ed.,

lists the limits of inflammability for oxygen in hydrogen as 6-95%. Thus, the revised setpoint for the oxygen analyzer alarm remains below the lower limit.

The change does not increase the probability of the occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR. There is no possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than evaluated previously in the FSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-027) 3.2.4 Furmanite N-86173, Spray Valve 2-431B Body-to-Bonnet Leak Repair, Revision 0, dated June 26,1986.

(New Procedure)

The purpose of the procedure is to provide guidance for the repair of valve body-te-bonnet leaks by the Furmanite process. Holes will be drilled in the valve flange and sealant will be injected into the stud holes. The work will be performed via NWR #51610.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: A 50.59 evaluation is required because this repair constitutes a potential change to the facility or its operation as described in the FSAR.

Calculations were performed to show that the stresses associated with the holes that must be drilled in the flange are acceptable. Design temperature and pressure were used in the calculations. Also, two different situations were looked at: (1) the condition that will exist when the valve is Furmanited and the effective area which pressure acts on is increased, and (2) the condition that will exist when the valve is disassembled, cleaned, and reassembled as designed.

Allowable stresses from ASME Section III were used.

The exact flange thickness was not known; thus the calculations were done to determine the acceptable location of the holes based on thickness and procedure limitations will be applied to check thickness and locate the holes accordingly.

Acceptability justification was also provided by Furmanite.

The studs which will be encapsulated have been verified as being stainless steel and thus potential boric acid attack is not a concern.

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s This change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated.

The margin of safety as defined in'the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-043) 3.2.5 Furmanite N-86174, Unit 2 "A" Steam Generator Inboard Secondary Side Manway Leak Repair, Revision 0, dated June 26, 1986. (New Procedure)

The procedure provides guidance for repair of a leak to the Unit 2 "A" steam generator inboard secondary side manway by drilling holes in the manway cover and injecting sealant via the Furmanite process.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The "A" steam generator inboard secondary side manway repair is a potential change to the facility or its operation as described in the FSAR.

The Furmanite method and procedure have been accepted and used previously including the other secondary manways on the subject steam generator and the pressurizer manway. Based on this, using the same method and procedure are considered acceptable.

Furmanite has provided some calculations showing that the increased stresses associated with the holes are insignificant.

Furmanite also provided calculations to show that bolt loading will also remain within the allowable limits for the bolt material per ASME Section III.

This change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated.

The margin of safety as defined in the Terinical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-044) 3.3 Tests or Experiments There were no tests or experiments performed at Point Beach Nuclear Plant in 1986 which required Nuclear Regulatory Commission approval.

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! The following tests or experiments performed at Point Beach I Nuclear Plant during 1986 required a 10 CFR 50.59 review:

WMTP 11.44 (Major), Unit 2 Turbine Runback Verification, Revision 0, dated July 3, 1986. (New Procedure) l The purpose of this new test procedure is to actuate a planned

! turbine runback of Unit 2 when the unit is being taken out of i service for a scheduled maintenance outage in order to determine whether the load reference turbine runback circuit is operable.

t l Summary of Safety Evaluation: The proposed procedure provides

guidance for conduct of a test or experiment not described in the FSAR.

The procedure initiates a turbine load reference runback by q simulating an NIS dropped rod signal. The method of initiation i is a normal NIS test method and plant design provides for control system response to this event without adverse affects.

) This change does not pose an unreviewed safety' question. The l probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or.

malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. '

- The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated. The margin

of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not i reduced. (SER 86-045) l l 3.4 Design Changes 4

There were no plant modifications made during 1986, beyond those authorized with license amendments as noted above, which required Nuclear Regulatory Commission approval.

I The following modifications made at Point Beach Nuclear Plant during 1986 required a 10 CFR 50.59 review:

3.4.1 MR 86-123 (Unit 2), Main Steam System. The modification

changed the worm-to-worm gear ratio from 45

1 to 76:1 for MOV-2019 and MOV-2020 (steam supply valves to the

steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps) to increase the

valve's stroke time.

! Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification is a potential change to the facility or its operation as

! described in the FSAR. This modification improved the

! capability of the motor operators to deliver the design l stem thrust for the valves. As a result of the

modification, the valve stroke time was increased from

approximately 13 seconds to approximately 21 seconds.

l The change does not have a significant impact on seismic l

concerns (less than four ounces difference in weight) or on environmental qualification concerns.

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'r Increasing the stroke time of MOV-2019 and;2020 will <

not adversely affect the presently installed low suction pressure trip or settings for the motor-driven and turbine-driven auxiliary,fe6dwater pumps. Also, the condensate storage tank level will not be adversely affected by the increased closing stroke time of ~-

MOV-2019 and 2020. Thjs stamary is supported by the design review performed-on November 11, 1986, and the _

additional analysis performed on November 13, 1986.

The change does not pose en unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the ,

consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment,.

important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or i malfunction which has not been previously evaluated; The margin of se.fety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-072) 3.4.2 MR 86-118-(Unit 2), Reacter Core. The modification

! removes leaking fuel rod S5-3 from fuel assembly P54.

As a result, assembly P54 has 178 fuel rods instead of 179.

SummaryofSaEetyEv/Juation: The modificction was a I change to the facilit'y as described in FSAR Section 3.2.3. Techn'ical Specification 15.5.3.A.1-Reactor Core, states, "Where safetyflimits are not -

violated, in' dividual fuel rods suspicted of leaking may '

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be replaced with an inert rod or the assembl'y' left with o, '

a water hole to prevent possible reinsertion of leaking' 3

! fuel rods. No more than one fuel red may be replaced l in any single assembly and no more"than six such 3 modificd assemblies may reside in the core at any time." +

Assembly P54 had only one rpd removed and will be the

only such modified assembly in the Unit 2, Cycle 13 Core.

l This change does not pose an untsviewed safety question.

l The probability of occurrence of an accident, or ' i l

malfunction of equipment imj>c'rtant to safety, is not -

increased.- The change doer not create the possibility l for an accident or nalfunction which has not been i l previously evaluated. The marg..n of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced.

(SER 86-065) b

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3.4.3 36-059 (Unit 2), Reactor Coolant System. The niodification changes the reactor vessel lower internals by plugging existing holes in the core barrel and

_. s machining new holes.in the top former plate to reduce

^ ,- 'the differential pressure across the baffle plates.

The modification results in lower flow velocity across the baffle plates and thus, prevents damage to fuel assemblies stored in areas of the core where baffle

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joints are present.

Lf SurJnary of Safety Evaluation: The modification is a change to the facility as described in the FSAR. The upflow modification does not affect FSAR Chapters 1 through 14, including appendices, Technical

. Specifications, or NRC commitments found in the safety

,} evaluation reports. FSAR Section 3.2.3 is affected in that Figure 3.2.3-5 shows the core barrel flow holes

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, that were plugged as part of the upflow conversion.

All other design criteria and accident analysis

' assumptions are not violated.

. . Based upon a satisfactory Westinghouse safety i evaluation and the supporting analysis, the upflow

. conversion does not result in an unreviewed safety 4

question or Technical Specification change.

(SER 86-034)

d. f 3.4.4 MR 86-124 (Unit 2), Reactor Coolant System. The dL '

modification removed the RCS "B" loop decon line (45*

I ^ fitting, piping, valve 2RC-544, and flanges) and capped l

the nozzle. (The Unit 1 decon line was previously t removed during replacement of that unit's steam j generators in 1983.)

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Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification is a i/ change to the facility as described in the FSAR.

Capping of the "B" hot leg decon line does not affect

the safe operation of the plant. The change was done

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• to the requirements of B31.7-1969, and the additional

-/ Westinghouse requirements found in Section 4 of the i

FSAR. These requirements include evaluating the change of the original seismic qualification, inspection criteria, and hydrostatic testing requirements. The decon line has not been used in the plant and it serves as a radiation trap. The change eliminates some mechanical pressure-retaining joints in the RCS and improves the system's integrity.

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t This changh does not pose an unreviewed safety question' .

The probability of occurrence, or the consequences of an accident, or\ malfunction of equipment important to ,

c . safety, i~s nct increased. The change does not create

. g the pcss0bility for an accident or malfunction which.has i not'been previously evaluated. The margin of safety as

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defined in the Technical Spacifications is not reduced.

(SER 86-075) >

3 3.4.5 84-046-(Unit 2), Feedwater System. The modifications changed the main feed regulating valves' trim and [

s ,facreased the stroke from 2.5" to 3".

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Supuary of Safety Evaluation: This modification

'A '

conctituted potential change to'the facility as i descrDde'd in the FSAR.

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,., The new valve operator will be the same design and -

configuration of the existing operator. The main change is increasing the strokesfrom 2.5" to 3". An extra large air port and an aurillary vent port will be

, provided on the operator to compensate, as required, for an J effect the increased operator stroke will have on opening and closing times. FSAR closing time of 15 seconds was not affected. ,

The proposed change does_ not increase the probability T of a DBA nor present an'unrevi'ewed safety question. No changes to the FSAR or Technical Specifications are 2

required. (SER 86-005-01)

- V 3.4.6 MR 84-046-01 (Unit 2), Feedwater System (original modification reviewed and approved in MSSM 86-20; see SERs86-005 and 85-005-01). The addendum replaces the i regulated instrument air supply at 80 psig to the s

normally closed port of 1(2)SV-466/476A with a direct instrument air supply of approximately 100 psig.

,- Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification is a

. potential change to the' facility or its operation as described in Figure 10.2-2A of the FSAR. The proposed addenduri allows a main feed reg valve opening time of 8-9 seconds being achieved upon a reactor trip when Tavg is >554*F (slugging feature). This change was needed in support of the modification for retrimming the main feed reg valves which resulted in a longer l

valve stroke (approximately 3\"). The longer valve

stroke resulted in longer time requirements to achieve I full open. With the change, the resulting valve operating times have been shown to be approximately.

4-4.5 seconds to close upon SI or high level trips, 8-8,5 seconds to open upon a reactor trip with Tavg

>554*F: and 20 seconds to close upon a reactor trip with Tavg <554*F.

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4 The proposed change is acceptable and does not present an unreviewed safety question in view of the following

' considerations:

The SI and high level closing times will remain

<5 seconds. Fifteen-second closing times have been shown to be acceptable (reference MR 84-129). This is the only requirement which may have any association with the safety analyses steam line break cooldown concerns. The SI trip of the main feed pumps also minimizes cooldown (excessive cooldown).

The opening time of 8 seconds upon a reactor trip with Tavg >554'F is very close to 5 seconds.

Five seconds is referenced only on the logic diagram, and not in the FSAR; thus, it is not a commitment. This feature is intended to ease I~ system transients after a reactor trip, however, it is not a safety feature and no credit is taken for it.in the analysis. In the past, 8-10 second opening times have been accepted with no adverse consequences noted. The logic diagram was changed to reflect this opening time.

The closing time is approximately 20 seconds upon a reactor trip with Tavg <554*F. This is in accordance with the logic diagrams. This time is not described in the FSAR; and thus, it is not a commitment. It is not a safety feature. We are, however, meeting the previously accepted times.

The slightly longer opening time may even ease post-trip system cooldown transients in relation to the approach to the SI setpoint from reduced pressure operations.

- All times are conservative since they are obtained from a fully closed to fully open position. In reality, events resulting in initiating the specific feature would start from a mid-stroke valve position. Pressure effects are negligible due to the force of the spring in relation to the stem diameter pressure force (balanced valve disc).

The original opening time was based on a 2\" stroke valve. The new valve stroke within the first 2" of travel is relatively quick (comparable to the old valve).

Instrument air system quality without a regulator is acceptable (95-105 psig).

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Normal valve operation is with regulated instrument air, and only the slugging (opening) feature is affected.

All components are capable of the extra 25 psig.

4 There is no impact on the seismic mounting of the f solenoid-operated valves.

f The valve operating logic does not change.

The valves remain fail closed devices.

. The changes does not pose an unreviewed safety

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question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment t important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated.

j The margin of safety as defined in the Technical F Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-005-02) 3.4.7 MR 86-119 (Unit 2), Waste Disposal System. The modification replaced globe valve 2WD-1793 with a diaphragm valve to bring this penetration to the

, original design specified configuration.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification was a change to the facility as described in the FSAR. The i new diaphragm valve meets the pressure / temperature i

requirements (Westinghouse Class 151) of the system.

[ The new diaphragm valve was installed to the requirements of B31.1-1967, and was tested per ORT #30. The new diaphragm was seismically qualified j in the system.

l- This change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the I consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment

! important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated.

The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specification is not reduced. (SER 86-066)

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3.4.8 83-151-01, Fire Protection. This modification provided

additional fire dampers to upgrade auxiliary building fire barriers to meet the WE commitment to j 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.

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Summary of Safety Evaluation: The dampers provide improved ventilation and area isolation in a fire event without compromising safety in a non-fire event.

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3.4.9 85-108 (Unit 2), Auxiliary Coolant CVCS Crossconnect.

The modification crossconnects the reactor cavity drain via the spent fuel pool cooling system and the CVCS in order to: (1) allow for continuous purification of the lower cavity while the RHR system is not available; (2) provide more circulation for crud control in the lower cavity; and (3) provide greater flexibility for filtration.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: In addition to considerations contained in the accident analyses:

(1) all work was performed in accordance with ANSI B31.1-1967; (2) the modification will not affect the ability to purify from RHR; (3) the containment boundary will not be affected by the modifications; and (4) the safety flow paths of CVCS and RHR will not be affected by the modifications.

3.4.10 83-111-01* (Unit 2), Feedwater System. This modification changed out existing Asco solenoid-operated valves (SOV) 2SV-466C, 2SV-476C, 2SV-480, and 2SV-481 to Model L206-381-6F and added new SOVs 2SV-466D and 2SV-476D to operate in parallel with 2SV-466C and 2SV-476C, respectively.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: Replacement of the original solenoid-operated valves with those specified in this addendum is considered satisfactory since the new valves are fully qualified (per IEEE-323, IEEE-344, NUREG-0588, and IE Bulletin 79-01B) and are equivalent or better than the existing configurations. The additional air dump SOVs ensure rapid closure

($15 seconds) of the main feed regulating valves on a safety injection signal (or high-high steam generator ,

level) to show adequate margin to DNB for an MSLB accident. Operability of all valves were verified by operational testing. The new SOVs will be normally energized and, therefore, failure of a solenoid coil or power supply will result in the conservative action of

. closure of the main feed regulating valves.

Installation was controlled by written procedure.

• This modification was installed in 1984 and is now documented with modifications installed this year.

3.4.11 85-016 (Unit 2), 480 V Switchgear. The modification installed local open and close pushbuttons on Breaker 33C, provided an additional terminal, and modified the rear bottom panel to permit installation of special receptacles for multi-amp power supplies.

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1-Summary of Safety Evaluation: This modification used a spare 480 V breaker off bus 2B03 for testing purposes to power the multi-amp test unit. All normal protection for the breaker will be maintained (10 amp fuses for protection of the 125 V DC power supply; 2B03 lockout, 2B03 undervoltage and breaker overcurrent tripping for protection of the 480 V AC power supply) and the load imposed on the system will be small and only for a short time duration during outage testing.

Diesel safeguards loading will not be affected since the breaker will trip on an SI signal. The modification does not constitute an unreviewed safety question and does not require a change to the Technical Specifications. Installation was done using written instructions and/or design drawings.

3.4.12 IC-325 (Unit 1), IC-326 (Unit 2), & IC-327 (Common),

Auxiliary Feedwater System. The modifications provided for automatic auxiliary feedwater pump trips on low suction pressure for pump protection following a hypothesized seismic event or tornado where there is an unprotected normal auxiliary feedwater system water supply, such as the condensate storage tanks. The modifications respond to NUREG-0737, Item II.E.1.1 as responded to by Wisconsin Electric, September 14, 1981.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: These modifications installed automatic trip, automatic start block and override capability for the motor-driven and turbine-driven auxiliary (AFW) pumps when a sustained low suction pressure condition exists at each pump individually.

Installation and testing of the modification was controlled by a special maintenance procedure and done one train at a time. After installation, testing of the bistables, time delays, and operability of the pumps and MOVs will be done on a periodic basis, at least once per refueling interval. This modification does not constitute an unreviewed safety question and does not require a change to plant Technical Specifications. An addition to the FSAR will be implemented.

3.4.13 85-103 (Unit 1), Main Control Boards. The modification provided individual train SI block status lights on the main control boards such that positive indication is provided to the control operator that SI actuation is blocked.

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Summary of Safety Evaluation: Splitting the SI block light into two lights will give the operator a more accurate indication of safety injection system status.

No train separation is required between these connections as the indications are considered to not be safety related. An Instrumentation & Control procedure was used to control the installation. The modifications do not require Technical Specification or FSAR changes.

The modifications do not constitute an unreviewed safety '

question.

3.4.14 85-140 (Common), Containment Hydrogen Analyzer. The modification reassigned the containment hydrogen analyzer power supplies at the relay tray assemblies to be unit specific such that all of the monitors for a given unit are supplied by that unit's instrument bus.

This problem was identified in LER 85-001 (Unit 2), NIS Runback.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: This modification provided further separation between instrument buses.

The modification does not require a change to the FSAR or Technical Specifications. It does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

5 3.4.15 85-200 (Common), Safeguards 480 V Motor Control Centers.

4 The modification installed seismic restraints on the 1&2B32/42 motor control centers in accordance with NRC-Generic Letter 81-14 requirements dealing with auxiliary feedwater system concerns. The adequacy of the current anchorage was not evaluated for SSE loading; however, it was adyntageous to provide supports versus performance of a detailed analysis of the existing configuration.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The engineering 4

calculation (85-010) shows that the addition of the brackets protects the units from seismic events. The brackets were installed to not affect the safety considerations of the walls and motor control centers.

Addition of the brackets does not present an unreviewed I safety question or require a change to the Technical Specifications.

3.4.16 84-157 (Unit 1) & 84-158 (Unit 2), Component Cooling Water System. The modifications replaced the "A" and "C" component cooling water heat exchangers with new I heat exchangers having improved design characteristics.

( The previous heat exchangers had suffered tube-to-

tubesheet crevice corrosion.

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Summary of Safety Evaluation: . Replacement of component-cooling heat exchangers HX-12A- and C does not affect a previously evaluated safety question nor create 'an unreviewed safety question. _The design specifications of the new heat _exchangers are essentially the same as E .the original design with the exception of tube and

tubesheet material, a higher shell side design i pressure (250 psig versus 150 psig), and flow 6

(2.103.x 106lbm/ hour versus 1.475 x 10 -lbm/ hour).

The new heat exchangers were also designed and fabricated to withstand design SSE accelerations for El. 46'0" of the primary auxiliary building.

3.4.17 84-159 (Common) & 84-159-01, Component Cooling Water System. The modification replaced the existing "B" component cooling water heat exchanger and Addendum 1 to the modification added a second " swing" heat exchanger to provide additional operating flexibility.

The new heat exchangers have improved design

! characteristics. The previous "B" heat exchanger-suffered tube-to-tubesheet crevice corrosion.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: Replacing component cooling water heat exchanger HX-12B with two heat exchangers will not affect a previously evaluated safety question. The additional heat exchanger will t also be used as a swing heat exchanger for either unit i and will increase the flexibility and redundancy of the component cooling water system. The design specifications of each new heat exchanger are

! essentially the same as original design with the exceptions of tube and tubesheet material, higher shell design pressure (250 psig versus 150 psig), and flow (2.103 x 1081bm/hr versus 1.475 x 106 1bm/hr). The new i

heat exchangers were designed and fabricated to withstand design SSE accelerations for El. 46'0" of the auxiliary building.

3.4.18 85-187 (Unit 1) & 85-188 (Unit 2), Safety Injection System. The modifications changed the existing MOV-851A&B/A0V-897A&B interlock scheme such that the 851A&B valves cannot be opened unless at least one of the 897 valves is fully shut. Valves 897A&B will be normally operated in the manually open position. In addition, to provide reliable operator indication and to correct the problem with the 897A&B valve position indication / safety injection test line isolated annunciator, the present 33X relay was changed from normally deenergized to a normally energized with NC contact configuration.

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Summary of Safety Evaluation: A loss of valve position monitor indication and annunciation due to a single failure in the 897A&B valve circuitry caused by a loss of control power was corrected by changing the alarm logic to a normally energized relay with normally closed contact.

The modifications do not constitute an unreviewed safety question and no changes to the Technical Specifications are required. Special maintenance procedures were used to control installation of the modifications.

3.4.19 83-152-01 (Unit 1) & 83-153-01 (Unit 2), CVCS Charging Pump Control. The modifications installed switching i capability to interconnect charging pumps IP2B and 2P2B

! such that either pump can be operated from 1B03 or 2B03. The interconnect is identical to that planned

for the IP2A and 2P2A pumps.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: These modifications further fulfill the requirements of 10 CFR 50

' Appendix R, :ba regard to safe shutdown operability of the charging pumps. Also, the installation further l ensures that physical train separation is maintained.

! With the new charging pump switch alignment, the present operation of IP2B and 2P2B is unaffected. All protection and administrative controls to be provided by the parent modification exist with this addendum.

! Installation of the addendum was completed with the l parent modification. These addendums do not constitute an unreviewed safety question nor do they require a l'

change to the Technical Specifications.

3.4.20 85-53 (Unit 1) & 85-54 (Unit 2), 480 V AC Safeguards.

This modification wired in a set of spare contacts from 1-86/B04 (Unit 1) and 2-86/B04 (Unit 2) in parallel with those from 2-86/B03 (Unit 1) and 2-86/B03 (Unit 2).

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The potential did exist, with the B03 and B04 tie breaker shut (IB52-16C for Unit 1, 2B52-40C for Unit 2) and the normal supply breaker to B03 open, that an SI signal could occur and safeguard train separation would not occur. Because the B03 to B04 tie breaker would not trip on a train "B" SI signal, this event could happen if only "B" train SI occurred with the safeguards buses B03 and B04 both being supplied by station service transformer X14. It could also occur if the tripping contact from the train "A" bus lockout (off train "A" SI) did not actuate to cause the tie breaker to trip. In either circumstance, electrical separation of safeguards 18 l

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trains would not occur as required by IEEE-384 and Regulatory Guide 1.75 for Physical Independence of Electrical Systems. Therefore, it is desirable to have the B03 a- B04 bus tie breaker trip on both train "A" and trair ' SI signal actuation. This was achieved by placL rain "B" tripping contact in parallel wit' the train "A" tripping contact in the bus tie br aker control scheme.

This modification does not require a change to Technical Specifications and does not constitute an unreviewed safety question. Installation was controlled by a special maintenance procedure.

3.4.21 85-052 (Common), Control Room Cleanup Fans - W14A&B, This modification installed a time delay (Agastat) to prevent turbulence induced cycling of the motor starter. It also evaluated the position of flow switches to eliminate flow-related problems.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The air flow switches were relocated to assure proper performance. Limiting conditions of operation are from Technical Specification 15.3.12, Item 4 (if the fans cannot meet operating conditions then the units must be brought to a cold shutdown after 7' days). All work associated with this modification requiring the fans to be shut off will be completed within the 7 day limit. This modification does not involve any changes to the Technical Specifications and involves no unresolved l safety questions.

l 3.4.22 85-17 (Unit 1), 480 V AC Switchgear. This modification parallels the load sides of breakers 14B and 11B at l 1B03 (Unit 1). It also parallels the load sides of breakers 23A and 23C at 1B04 (Unit 1). Local open and close pushbuttons were installed on breakers 11B and 23A (Unit 1). Breakers 11B and 23A (Unit 1) can be administratively controlled to allow operation only during refueling outages for normal safeguards MCC supply breaker maintenance and to minimize time of l parallel operation.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The paralleling of IB52-14B and IB52-11B and IB03 and of IB52-23A and 1B52-23C at 1B04 allow the removal of the normal supply breakers for MCC 1B32 and IB42 for routine maintenance. Since the supply and load sides of both breakers were connected, and the electrical protection relaying of both breakers are identical, paralleling the breakers did not present any problems. This modification increases the reliability of MCC IB32 and

! 1B42. An SMP was required to control the removal of 1B32 and 1B42 from service during installation of this modification.

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3.4.23 85-079 (Unit 1) & 85-080 (Unit 2), Component Cooling.

The modification resets valve 1(2)-779 to relieve at 65 psi to maintain containment integrity in response'to 4

Westinghouse concerns concerning component cooling I water system potential overpressurization.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification does not affect the safe operation of the plant because: -

~(1) Analysis shows that the modification protects the system against overpressurization; (2) Code requirements have been met; (3) Containment isolation-requirements have been met. No Technical Specification changes are required.

3.4.24 85-009 (Unit 1) & 85-010 (Unit 2), Instrument Power Supplies. The modifications returned a number of instrument channels which were originally designated as white and yellow to their original channels. The channels have been switched to battery-backed sources on the opposite units' red or blue bus per modification IC-194. With completion of the instrument bus upgrade, these channels are now returned to the original white and yellow instrument buses. In addition, channels which were switched to 4

mini-inverters 1&2MQ-400 were returned to the white and yellow' buses, with 1&2MQ-400 being permanently removed from service.

< Summary of Safety Evaluation: These modifications ensure continued reliability of white and yellow instrument channels when they are powered by the new 3

white and yellow instrument bus battery-backed power sources which were installed by the instrument bus upgrade modification. Also, each unit powers its own instrument channels rather than having unit i

crossconnection as was previously installed. This also

' -increases rel hbility of the new system. After all

. instrument channels were removed from the 1&2MQ-400 l'

inverters, these units were removed from service.

These modifications do not constitute an unreviewed safety question and do not require a change to plant Technical Specifications. Installation was controlled per special maintenance procedures.

1 3.4.25 84-143 (Unit 1) & 84-144 (Unit 2), Secondary Sampling.

i The modifications irmalled a steam generator chemical addition and sparging system with permanent piping from the demineralized water system and nitrogen headers.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The addition of a

chemical addition tank to the secondary sampling system

! provides the ability to more precisely maintain steam-

, generator chemistry while in wet layup. The chemical I

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e-s addition tank does'not increase the probability of a previously analyzed accident nor create the possibility of an unanalyzed accident. All components used meet or-exceed original design requirements and do not degrade system integrity.

e 3.4.26 83-152 (Unit 1) & 83-153 (Unit 2), Chemical Volume Control System. The modifications installed mechanically interlocked breakers at local control panels-IN04 and 2N04 to provide alternative power supply-for pumps 1P2A and 2P2A to ensure safety shutdown operability.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modifications supply

, emergency power to the "A" charging pumps to mitigate '

i the fire loss of a unit's B03 and B04 buses, and provide safe shutdown operability of the charging pumps for 10 CFR 50 Appendix R requirements. Normal operation of the charging pumps is unaffected. The

! installation maintains train separation and also i prevents unit power crossconnection. Due to the l complexity of new switching operation, changes to operating' instruction and adninistrative controls i- were implemented. System tie-ins and testing were controlled by a special maintenance procedure. The modification does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

! 3.4.27 84-142 (Common), Buildings / Structures. The modification attached an "I" beam to the ceiling of the emergency diesel generator rooms to permit lifting of i

the turbochargers.

l Summary of Safety Evaluation: The lifting device will

, not be used while the emergency diesel-generators are l in service. The temporary beam assembly will be

removed while the diesels are in service. The 1 permanent structures have been analyzed to assure that I they remain intact during a DBE. Use of the lifting i device will not jeopardize any other safety-related equipment not solely associated with the emergency diesel generators.

! 3.4.28 83-157 (Unit 1) & 83-158 (Unit 2), Fire Protection.

The modifications installed alternate shutdown i instrumentation including necessary power supplies and transfers switches for reactor coolant loop "B" l

pressure, hot leg and cold leg temperatures; t pressurizer level, and steam generator level and pressure. The instruments are located near 1(2)N11 and l 1(2)RK-38. Sound-powered phone capability was also installed between the local control stations. The

modifications meet 10 CFR 50 Appendix R alternate l shutdown capability commitments.

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Summary of Safety Evaluation: Switching channels 1(2)L426 or 1(2)P420C to local without proper administrative controls could result in a Technical Specification violation for failing to meet a minimum degree of redundancy. However, if these switches are selected to local for testing while at power, their bistables will first be placed in the trip condition per procedure. To assist in preventing the switches from being selected to local while at power, the access door was placarded and annunciates an ASIP alarm via an attached microswitch when opened. This occurs at the time of switch access and prior to actual switch operation.

Routine testing will be scheduled during shutdowns and emergency operation of the switch would only be necessary when fire has disabled the normal control room in3trumentation or made it inaccessible. In either case, the reactor will be in hot shutdown at a minimum. Installation of these modifications was controlled by a special maintenance procedure.

3.4.29 83-154 (Unit 1), CVCS. The modification changed the control circuitry for excess letdown valve IMOV-1299 to prevent spurious operation by installing a double break circuit in the opening coil portion of the circuitry.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification installed a double break circuit in the opening coil portion of the control circuitry to prevent spurious operation of the valve. Under this scheme, spurious operation would require the independent shorting of two new fire retardant cables as described in the April 27, 1984, letter from C. W. Fay to H. R. Denton. This is not considered to be a credible accident. The new circuit design inhibits spurious valve operation even during a fire external to the control room. The new control switch on the main control board is at least equivalent to the previous configuration. Installation was controlled by an SMP.

3.4.30 84-24 (Unit 2), Fire Protection. The modification wrapped conduit 2P426 between 2LT-426 and the El. 46'0" 1

floor. It fire sealed all conduit connections to the junction box in this conduit area.

i Summary of Safety Evaluation: This modification I improves / maintains reliability in a fire event and does j not adversely affect system cperability.

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3.4.31 84-25 (Common), Fire Protection. The modification installed cable tray and conduit fire barriers in the auxiliary feed pump room.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: This modification improves / maintains the reliability of these trays in a fire event and does not adversely affect system opt. rability.

3.4.32 83-71-01 (Common), Fire Protection. This modification concerns the service water pump room fire barrier. This modification permanently closed the fire wall with the addition of a Cem-Fil panel and installed a second set of double doors to the north half of the room.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: Design and installation of the new doors and firewall panel are in accordance with applicable seismic and fire protection criteria.

3.4.33 84-132 (Unit 1) & 84-133 (Unit 2), Reactor Coolant System. The modification added two additional nests, modules, and wiring to the Foxboro Spec 200 racks and wiring to the computer room to complete the reactor vessel water level and subcooling monitoring systems independently of the plant computer system.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The new modules fit directly into the Spec 200 racks and are the same style and general construction and are qualified to the same requirements as the existing modules. Additional loading to the affected instrument buses (white and yellow) is minimal.

3.4.34 83-160 (Unit 1) & 83-161 (Unit 2), Fire Protection.

The modifications relocated local control panel IN11 (2N04) and routed "B" train ("A" train) charging pump cables between IP2C and bus 1B04 (2P2A, 2P2B, & 2B03).

Summary of Safety Evaluation: Cable routing and control panel relocation do not result in any changes to the operation or function of the CVCS. Design and installation were consistent with established seismic and fire protection criteria.

3.4.35 84-21 (Common), Fire Protection. The modification installed penetration seals in the ceiling and walls of the auxiliary building at El. 8'. It also installed cable tray fire stops. Both installations were required in order to meet Appendix R commitments.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification is an improvement to safety by limiting the possible spread of a fire. Fire stops and seals do not affect system operability.

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2 3.4.36 84-22 (Common), Fire Protection. The modification wrapped cable tray PV07 and conduits 2P2C1 and 2NP2C1 with material which has passed a one-hour fire test.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: This modification improves and/or maintains the reliability of these cables in a fire event and does not adversely affect system operability.

3.4.37 84-23 (Unit 1), Fire Protection. The modification wrapped conduit 1-57A between ILT-426 and the El. 21'0" floor.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: This modification improves / maintains reliability in a fire event and does not adversely affect systems operability.

3.4.38 83-150, Fuel 011. The modification installed a bypass line around the emergency fuel tank and the fuel oil transfer pumps with a manual isolation valve to enable the gravity feed of oil from the fuel oil storage tanks to the diesel room day tanks. It also provides local level indication at the day tanks to enable operators to prevent overflow of the tanks, without relying on control room level indication.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The new piping and instrumentation meets or exceeds established design and construction criteria for the fuel oil system, thus ensuring that the integrity and reliability of the system will be maintained. The modification has no effect upon existing system controls or operation and provides a means of fueling the emergency diesel generators without the fuel oil transfer pumps.

3.4.39 IC-261-06 upgrades the CT to a "cr2B" which provides dual processors, printer buffer, better printer, and improved software (EPROMS). The modification was approved with the provision that an SMP be utilized to install the new equipment and verify the software.

This modification was needed to improve the CT time response as well as provide desired interface with the i new computer system.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The CT upgrade did not remove any existing RMS functions but improves time response and printer response. An SMP was required to verify correct system operation after modification.

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3.4.40 83-162 (Unit 1), Main Control Board. The modification changed safeguards status light power supplies to power Channel 1 with the red instrument bus, 2 with the white, 3 with the blue bus, and Channel 4 with the yellow bus. Previously, Channels 1 and 3 were powered by the white bus and Channels 2 and 4 were powered by the yellow bus.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: Bistable trip status lights provide indication of logic matrix relay positions only. Operation of matrix relays is not affected by this modification. Status light operation remains the same, except after loss of power. '

Indication of a loss of instrument bus power is provided primarily by channel alert annunciators.

The modification does not pose an unreviewed safety question in that there is no increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction, or for a malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specification is not reduced.

3.4.41 85-189 (Unit 2), Auxiliary Coolant System. This modification added a 2" bypass (globe valve) around 2-742.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification has no effect on the safe operation of the plant because all work was done in accordance with the requirements of B31.1-1967 and NRC EI Bulletin 79-14 (for seismic requirements). The full flow to the refueling water storage tank is not affected. The bypass valve is locked shut to prevent inadvertent crossflow between the containment sump and refueling water storage tank.

The bypass globe valve has as good or better shutoff /

sealing characteristics as the 742 valve. The flow is from under the seat and only sees RWST pressure. The valve will be shut during an accident; therefore, no double packing and leakoff is provided. No Technical Specification changes are required.

3.4.42 IC-324* (Common), Auxiliary Feedwater. The modification installed new pressure transmitters on the suction header of P38A&B, motor-driven auxiliary feed pumps.

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Summary of Safety Evaluation: Design and installation of the new pressure transmitters and their piping connections meet or exceed original system requirements and thereby ensure that the integrity of the auxiliary feedwater system is not reduced.

• This modification was installed in 1984 and is now documented with modifications installed this year.

3.4.43 IC-245* (Unit 2), Reactor Vessel Level Indication. The modification installed full range reactor vessel level sensing and indication using differential pressure.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: Design, installation, and testing requirements meet or exceed those specified for original plant construction. Loss of reactor coolant system inventory on level system break is

limited to less than normal charging inventory by small f size restricting flow orifices on both upper and lower

! tap connections.

• This modification was installed in 1984 and is now documented with modifications installed this year.

l 3.4.44 IC-218* (Unit 1) & IC-219 (Unit 2), Reactor Coolant System Pressure. The requests installed a wide range i

pressure monitoring system for each unit in accordance with Short-Term THI Lessons Learned requirements.

l Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modifications provide redundant wide range (0-3000 psig) reactor coolant pressure transmitters to fulfill the redundant

inputs to the subcooling monitors required by I j NUREG-0578 and Regulatory Guide 1.97.

l *This modification was installed in 1984 and is now documented with modifications installed this year.

! 3.4.45 IC-288 (Unit 1), Pressurizer Safety Valve Direct 4 Position Indication. This modification installed 4

position switches on each pressurizer safety valve to provide direct indication of valve position. Position indication was previously provided by an acoustic monitoring system but was unsatisfactory because it did I not meet environmental qualification requirements.

Approval of the direct position indication system was recommended subject to the successful qualification of l all components and verification that installation ,

clearances for the position switches are adequate.

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Summary of Safety Evaluation: The system only provides

{ indication; no control functions, and is therefore, not nuclear safety related. The system's importance to safety is recognized and therefore seismic, environmental qualification, and single failure criteria apply to the extent practicable.

3.4.46 82-107 (Unit 2), Atmospheric Steam Dump. The modification installed bushings on the four spacers in the steam dump valve actuators and reduced closing spring precompression by modifying the spring adjusting plate. The modification was necessary because the atmospheric steam dumps tend to stick in the closed position, particularly if steam pressure is high. The horizontal mounting of the positioner / valve stem compounds the problem.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The changes reduce the force required to open an atmospheric dump valve, but do not prevent reclosure since there is still adequate spring force available for valve shutoff. Reducing frictional forces in the actuator should improve actuator operation in both the opening and closing directions.

3.4.47 86-049 (Common), Fire Protection System. The modification installed orifice plates at the base of all fire protection hoses to reduce flowing pressures to 100 psig, with a design flow of 100 gpm for Class II standpipes.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification is a change to the facility as described in the FSAR.

The addition of orifice plates is necessary to meet requirements of NFPA codes WE has voluntarily committed to. This addition decreases the chance for a hose handling problem caused by high pressure from the new electric motor-driven fire protection system pump. The decrease in pressure does not pose a safety problem unless serious degradation of the fire pump occurs.

The new pressure will be in the range set by the NFPA code.

This change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident malfunction or equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated.

The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-048) 27

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3.4.48 86-045 (Unit 2), Reactor Coolant System. The modification permits installation of nozzle dams in the Unit 2 steam generators to provide a positive barrier which allows RCS levels to be independent of steam generator maintenance operations.

The basic design of the dam consists of two ring segments which are welded to the steam generator channelhead cladding upon which the two active seals and one passive seal are installed. The diaphragm seals are placed on the aluminum support frame prior to insertion into the hot and cold leg nozzles. Each steam generator is provided with a control console which provides leak detection capability. The control console is equipped with both audio and visual alarm functions.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: Discussion of Postulated Events: The operating conditions of the plant are unaffected by the use of nozzle dams since the dams are used only during reactor shutdown. The nozzle dam system is designed to 20 psig with safety factors greater than 2. Each dam was hydrostatically tested to 25 psig. When installed, each nozzle dam is under a static loading of 13 psig, which corresponds to a load of 9800 pounds on the dam structure, support frame, and nozzle ring or ring segments.

For the evaluation, an event is postulated based upon the worst case consequences of the use of nozzle dams.

Since the nozzle dam is a single barrier between the open channelhead and the reactor primary coolant, the worst case consequences are taken to be the loss of primary coolant and draindown of the flooded reactor cavity and SFP. These consequences are postulated based on the instantaneous and complete failure of a i single nozzle dam.

The failure postulated is considered extremely unlikely due to the safety factors in design and the structural loads expected. The safety factors will also allow the i

nozzle dams to withstand minor dynamic loadings caused l

by RHR and movement within the cavity.

l Analysis of Total Nozzle Dam Failure: Failure of a nozzle dam would result in draining the volume of the flooded cavity and spent fuel pool under their own head through the open steam generator manway. The worst case under these conditions would be a failure in either reactor hot leg. This results in the fastest draindown

! rate since the reactor coolant pump in the reactor cold leg would act as a significant flow restrictor if a cold leg nozzle dam failed.

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't An engineering analysis was performed on the draindown rate of the flooded cavity and_ SFP in the event of a nozzle dam failure in a reactor hot leg. The scenario postulated assumes failure of the nozzle dam at time t=0 followed by a draindown of the coolant volumes

under their own head. The scenarios developed indicate

that an assembly can be returned to a safe position within the time t=12 minutes 24 seconds. This corresponds

-to the time at which the coolant elevation is at the-maximum manipulator / assembly elevation of 55'2". As a result of the maximum horizontal travel distance that

. may be required to traverse the refueling cavity, the fuel assembly in the cavity is expected to be the more m limiting case. In the situation where the assembly in

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question is in'the SFP, i.e., all core assemblies are in a safe position, the draindown of the SFP can be prevented by isolating the SFP from the cavity. This will reduce the volume of contaminated coolant released by approximately 50%. Draining of the SFP and flooded i cavity will result in an estimated 500,000 gallons of contaminated coolant released through the steam j generator manway into the containment.

In all cases, the active fuel will be covered. The geometry of the RCS and RV results in a coolant level of approximately 6'6" over the top-of-core elevation of

, 30'6". No change in the reactor's subcritical j condition will result and no release of radiation or

{ contamination to the environment is predicted. Since

the analysis is for a bounding case, the assumptions

i. taken are conservative and as such, the calculated draindown rates are conservative. Additional sources

! of coolant in the pressurizer and fuel transfer canal

! are available and will lengthen the actual draindown

time. The response times are conservatively i estimated. As estimated, these response times l approximate the time required to perform the actual i transfer operations. Under actual conditions, the

response time would be significantly less. Thus, total

scenario time and personnel exposure would be much less

than implied by this analysis.

Seismic Loading: Under a seismic loading, the nozzle l dam will act as a rigid body in conjunction with the I steam generator. Since the steam generator is

! restrained from motion during such an event, the only l credible increase in nozzle dam loading would result l from the dynamic load caused by shifting coolant in the cavity. The geometry of the cavity is such that a maximum l'4" increase in head above the normal 30' l could result before the coolant spills over the edge of the cavity. This pressure (31'4") is well below the values of the nozzle dam hydrostatic test pressure of 25 psig (60') and ring segment load test pressure of 30 psig (70'). Thus, the nozzle dam would not fail.

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s Dropping of_ Upper Internals: A conceptual evaluation determined that even in the event this shock was sufficient to fail the nozzle dam, the result would be -

a situation no more severe than the draindown event postulated. Consequently, the analysis for draindown of the cavity would remain valid as a worst case.

Attachment Failure: The strength of the attachment is directly related to the strength of the bonding between cladding and base metal. A low heat cladding process does not penetrate deeply into the base metal but does result in fusion with the base metal. This process avoids dilution through mixing, which could reduce the corrosion resistance of the cladding. The degree of penetration, however, does not affect the strength of the bonding, i.e., only fusion is required for bond strength. Any delamination which might exist is expected to occur along the edges of the bead, i.e.,

between two beads and the base metal. This area is a very small part of the total clad area (less than 5%).

Potential Debonding of Cladding: Tests and analyses performed by the vendor on the proposed welding process show that the base metal temperature will not be greater than 500*F during welding, which is less than RCS operating temperature. In addition, the heat-affected zone will not extend into the base metal and no phase changes or migration at grain boundaries will occur as a result. Consequently, if debonding already exists, future operational thermal cycles may propagate cracks at the bond lines, but the welding of

se pents will not contribute to the potential for

further degradation of the interface bonding. A i structural evaluation was performed by the vendor assuming that a 1" x 2" portion of the clad was debonded directly under the ring se pent. The analysis, under dam operating loads, has shown that the ring se pent is comparatively rigid and distributes the stresses into the bonded regions only, and that the i debonded area essentially acts as a soft spot under the ring where no stresses are transferred. It was concluded that the ring se pent weldments and associated dam operational loads can easily accommodate local debonding, even directly underneath the sepents themselves. It was further noted that only a bonding surface on the order of one square inch is required to withstand the operational load.

While the failure of a nozzle dam as the result of debonding is not expected, such a failure would not be any more severe than the postulated draindown event.

The analysis for draindown of the cavity would remain valid as a worst case.

30

a.

. t-Reactor Coolant Pump Start: In the event of an inadvertent startup of an RCP, the nozzle dam in the RV cold leg would be subjected to a pressure opposite to the design load. As the pump starts, the pressure in the cold leg decreases until the vapor pressure of the coolant is reached. At this point, pump cavitation begins and the cold leg pressure remains constant. For pure water at 68'F, this pressure is 0.34 psia. The-resultant pressure on the nozzle dam is then the difference between atmospheric and vapor pressure; 14.4 psia in the opposite direction to the design loading of 20 psid. A conceptual analysis indicated that this pressure will result in reversing tensi e loads into compression and compressive loads into tension. Since metals are generally stronger under compression, failure is not expected. Of special.

concern are the locking pins securing the dam sepents. The pins are normally under tension with the shank under shear loading. In this event, the tensile load will be reduced and possibly removed, while the shank remains in shear at a loading less than design.

For these reasons, the pins will.not fail.

While it is not probable the EPDH diaphra p seal would be damaged due to reduced pressure in the cold leg, this situation would be no more severe than the postulated draindown event.

This change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrer.ce or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated.

The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specification is not reduced. (SER 86-047) 3.4.49 84-048-01 (Common), Radwaste Steam System. This modification routed the radwaste steam line in the area of the operating floor northeast quadrant to avoid interferences with the component cooling heat exchanger modifications.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: This addendum constitutes a change to the facility as described in the FSAR. The revised routing of the radwaste steam lines does not affect the safe operation of the plant.

This conclusion is based upon the following considerations: (1) the work was done in accordance with the original codes (B31.1-1967, 1969, and 1971).

(2) The modification was analyzed for deadweight, thermal, and seismic loadings. (3) Analyses were done to show that the modified design does not change the conclusions of the S&W rupture analysis report dated May 4, 1983, and PBNP FSAR Appendix E.

31

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i 4

The modification addendum does not pose an unreviewed safety question. There is no increase in the _

i probability of occurrence or the consequences of an l accident or malfunction of equipment Laportant to  !

safety. There is not a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously ,

evaluated. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. i

+

1

! 3.4.50 86-002 (Unit 1) & 86-003 (Unit 2?, Waste Disposal System. The modification installed an isolation valve j test connection, piping, valve and threaded cap outside of containment between valve 1793 and valve 1713. The '

modification meets a regulatory commitment with respect 4 to 10 CFR.50 Appendix J leakage testing.

1 Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification does not affect the safe operation of the plant because (1) l: All work was done to the requirements of B31.1-1967; i (2) the tap was designed for seismic considerations; (3) the resulting configuration meets or exceeds

! shutoff requirements for the containment boundary and

) was verified by testing.

{j No Technical Specification changes are required for i this modification.

y P

3.4.51 86-007 (Unit 2), Steam Generator Blowdown System. The modification removes the "T" signal from valves 2042 l and 2045 by eliminating relay 2045X contacts from the

valve control circuit. This also removes the high '

L radiation auto close feature for these valves. The pressure interlock from PS-5955 will not be affected by 1

the modification.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: Although the steam I generator blowdown line is part of the Appendix E analysis, there is no safety equipment in the area and the "T" signal on CV-2042/2045 has nothing to do with protection from this failure.

i ,

In accordance with FSAR Chapter 5.2, " Containment '

Isolation System," this line penetration is a Class 4

} penetration which requires at least one manual isolation ,

. valve located outside of containment in conjunction with *

! the closed system'inside containment. With removal of j the "T" signal from CV-2042/2045, the combination of the CV-5958/5959 (inside containment) and the blowdown l system being a closed system exceed the requirements for

'- a Class 4 penetration. The steam generator blowdown i

i 32

9 line isolation valves inside containment (CV-5958 and 5959) receive an auto-close signal on receipt of a high radiation signal from RE-219 or RE-222 via the same safeguards circuit as CV-2042 and 2045. The proposed modification will not affect the auto-close feature of CV-5958 and 5959. Therefore, this modification will not increase the probability of an effluent release via the steam generator blowdown system. Therefore, removal of the "T" signal from CV-2042/2045 does not involve a change in the Technical Specifications nor does it constitute an unreviewed safety question.

3.4.52 86-028 (Unit 1) & 86-027 (Unit 2), Reactor Protection.

These modifications installed jumpers between the R9 resistor mounting stud and the dual source casing in the reactor protection drawers to minimize the affects of electronic " noise."

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modifications help to provide a more stable and reliable input signal to the reactor protection circuits from the bypass manifold RTDs. The grounding of the mounting post does not affect circuit operation in any way. The modifications do not constitute an unreviewed safety question and do not require a change to the Technical Specifications.

3.4.53 85-241 (Unit 1), Handling Equipment / Fixtures. This modification changes the method of attaching the reactor vessel flange protective ring to the internals lifting rig by installing a quarter turn lock to replace the existing threaded adapters.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The change does not structurally degrade the integrity of the protective ring pick-points.

3.4.54 HR 86-28, Unit 1, Reactor Protection System. This modification made the lead resistances for the TC RTD equal and allow the output of the Dana amplifier to be consistent with its RTD input.

l Summary of Safety Evaluation: Swapping of the common leads makes the lead resistances of the RTDs equal; thus providing a better indication of actual temperature and making the Dana amplifier output consistent with the other cold leg RTD outputs.

Swapping of the leads does not degrade the circuit operation in any way. This modification does not result in an unreviewed safety question nor does it affect a previously reviewed safety question. No changes to Technical Specifications are required.

1 I

33 l

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S

't 3.4.55 86-017 (Common), Instrument Air / Service Air Systems.

This modification installed a cross-tie between the service air and instrument air systems (3/4" diameter line) to provide continuous feed to the instrument air system from service air.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification does not affect the safe operation of the plant because:

(1) all work was performed in accordance with the requirements of B31.1-1967; (2) the cross-tie will not cause a loss of instrument air; (3) the cross-tie lowers instrument air compressor use, thus improves compressor maintenance requirements and reliability.

No Technical Specification changes are required for this modification.

3.4.56 84-254 (Common), Plant Process Computers. The modification replaced the existing P-250 computer system with a new system (including multiplexer hardware, host computers, printers, CRTs, and support peripherals) in order to meet NUREG-0696 and 0737 requirements.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: This computer complex performs the function of the safety assessment system (SAS) as required in NUREG-0737 and the plant process computer system (PPCS). Redundant displays will be available in the TSC, the EOF, and the control room.

A seismically qualified front-end data acquisition system was also included to provide a tie-in to Class 1E systems.

The design of SAS/PPCS is consistent with present operating philosophy of providing supplementary information and does not change any accident analysis presently considered in the FSAR. This also does not constitute an unreviewed safety question and no changes to the Technical Specifications are required.

3.4.57 85-179 (Common), Instrument Buses. The modification reconnected the automatic synchronization feature on the Elgar inverters (DYOC&D, 1&2 DYO3, and 1&2DY04).

The synchronization signal was taken from lighting panel 36E, breaker 12, which supplies emergency lighting to the area of the inverters; a safeguards powered source.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The connection of all inverters to the same external synchronizing source will not adversely affect the inverter operation. If the external synchronizing signal increases or decreases in supply voltage, or deviates in frequency past preset 34

2 a

limits, the inverter reference frequency will switch from " external sync" to " internal syne" and the output frequency is slowly adjusted toward the internal reference frequency. No perturbation in instrument operation should be felt on the buses, which are being powered by these inverters when this switch occurs (reference Elgar Corporation, Inverter technical manual, Section 4.6.2). External synchronization signal connec-tion was controlled by special maintenance procedure since it required the shifting of the instrument buses and connections within the inverter. An FSAR change is not required nor is a Technical Specification change required. The modification does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

3.4.58 86-093 (Unit 2), Reactor Protection System. The modification relocated the reactor trip breaker test pushbuttons for the shunt trip and shunt block functions on the panels in the rod drive rooms.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: No evaluation required.

Relocation of the shunt trip and shunt block pushbuttons to the side of the shunt trip panel did not change their intended function or design purpose. The exact location of these pushbuttons is not described in the FSAR because it is not important to their function. The design of the shunt trip panel as seismic is maintained.

3.4.59 85-280-02 (Unit 2), Containment. The addendum to the modification installed a leak verification system composed of tubing connected to the post-accident containment ventilation system.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification constituted changes to the facility as described in the FSAR.

Installation of this modification will have no effect upon the containment boundary during periods when containment integrity is established if the proper administrative controls are followed. FSAR Figure 5.3.1 will be revised to show attachment points of the leak verification system.

These changes do not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated.

The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-054) 35

[

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1 3.4.60 MR 85-090, Amphenol Connectors for the Containment Polar Crane (Unit 2). Quick disconnect connectors were added to the radio control / crane control interface to aid in mainenance efficiency.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The addition of amphenol connectors to the receiver unit for the polar crane provides for easy installation and removal of the receiver unit. This increases the availability of the crane. No change to the plant FSAR or plant Technical Specifications is required. This does not constitute an unreviewed safety question. The amphenol connectors used are equivalent to or better than the existing terminal strip connections and do not alter the failure mode of the crane.

3.4.61 MR 84-019, Alternate DC Control Power to the Emergency Diesel Generators (common). The modification installed 125 V DC control power cables between station batteries D105 and D106 and emergency diesel generator control panels C34 and C35. The modification provided isolation via transfer switches in order to isolate the cabling during normal plant operation. The cabling must be routed through non-Class 1 plant areas. The modification is required in order to meet Appendix "R" fire protection requirements concerning separation of cabling to safe shutdown equipment such that an alternate means of starting the diesel generators is provided.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: All of the controls, accessories, and systems required to start and operate the diesel generators are contained in the diesel generator room except for a DC power supply. The present DC supplies for both units is from the cable spreading room and the main control room. Power cables for both units also pass through the 4.16 kV switchgear room and the auxiliary feed pump room. A fire in any of these common areas had the potential of severing the DC power supply and rendering both diesel generators inoperable.

This modification provided an alternate source of DC power to each diesel generator. The addition of this

source increases the reliability of the diesel 4 generators and improves the safety of the plant. In j implementation of this modification, positive measures were taken to ensure adequate separation between normal j and alternate sources and isolation at the transfer i panel. Control of the change and testing were done via i a special maintenance procedure. This change does not

involve an unreviewed safety question and does not involve a change to the plant Technical Specifications.

I 1

36 I

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) ( 3 ,l 3.4.62 IC-306', Containment Spray Flow Indication (Unit 2).

i Thisusodification installed flow orifices t transmitters, and associated instrim ntation to allow for measuring containment spray discharge header flow.

Flow information was added in the control room.

4 Summary of Safety Evaluation: Engineering anal-(ses were performed to verify that orifice flange 'f

! installation did not degrade the integrity of the containment spray system. This included a seismic review / analysis of the piping and verification that.

orific.e plate differential pressure will not reduce ,

4 spray flow below design requirements'. .

Material and installation meets or excerd~ original '

i system specifications and' code requireme nts.

3.5 Temporary Modifications * + .

/ h NOTE: THE 1984 TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS INCLUDED BELOW WERE _.

INADVERTENTLY OMITTED FROM THE 1984 ANNUAL REPCAT AND ARE INCLUDED HERE FOR INFORMATION. <

~~

3.5.1 TM 84-08 (Unit 1), HVAC. The temporary modification lifted leads on W35 PAB supply air fan to prevent the '

3 fan's outside air damper from opening during the 4

period. Only one fan heater was operable and the unit placed on recirculation (installed 01/31/84; removed 02/08/84).

f Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary

! modification is a change to the facility as described l in the FSAR.

4 j This temporary modification isolated air flow to the

! PAB supply fan (W35) ar.d initiated recirc flow

{ (approximately 62% of normal flow) due to subzero outdoor air temperatures.  ; ,

1 i- The FSAR in Section 9.6.3, in regard to'the auxiliary building vent system states, " Sufficient outside air is ,!

supplied to maintain a once through' system." The l facility, as described by the above sentence, was

j. altered by the temporary modification. The effect of ,

this temporary chtinge would have been to reduce air changing rate and lower the absolutt air pressure inside I the PAB. This would not constitute an unreviewed safety l question because the FSAR does not reference the air '.

j changing rate in the safety analysis section. In i addition, a lower than atmosphere pressure inside the .

4 PAB is intentionally maintained.

The FSAR, in Section 14.21 (Fuel' Handling Accidents),

states, "The whole body dost ... to personnel in the fuel storage building, were they to remain in the )

l l 37 ,

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g; p g.r, .,

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accident area, would be 4.0 REM. [The] dose is

[?t calculated on the basis of the ... area ventilation rate, 21,000 cfa, and 0.5 REM /MPC (Xe-133)." The l-ventilation rate referenced in this section would be

!' affected by a change in absolute air pressure inside the PAB. However, the effect on the analysis is l [ negligible and no unreviewed safety question exists.

! e i ' The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which ,

F has not been previously evaluated. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is O not reduced. (SER 86-077) n /

! ' . 3.5.2 TH 84-29 (Unit 1), Rod Position Indication. The

, , temporary modification jumpered the rod bottom bistable I for Rod C9 (installed April 18, 1984; temoved May 18, j ,

1984).

i j ' Summary of Safety Evaluation: The RPIs will be available. The rod bottom bistable provides no protective function for nuclear safety. NIS power range runback will still be available.

i N 3.5.3 TM 84-40 (Common), Radwaste System. A differential pressure gauge was installed across the tube side of i the reboiler heat exchanger utilizing the Calgon -

1 injection line at valve BE-130 for the high pressure

leg and an unnumbered high point vent valve at the bottoms return line penetration into the reboiler

, output for the low pressure leg. (The modification was i ,

removed on January 3, 1985.)

i

! Sununary of Safety Evaluation: The principal concern j with this temporary modification would be the effect of

, - a leak in the pressure sensing line. The components j used will be equal to the presently used instrument lines and as described in the technical review will have a pressure rating greater than the system design pressure. Additionally, the sensing lines and gauge will be valved out at all times except when data is l

being taken, thus further reducing the chance of

(

unobserved leakage. Any leakage that might develop would be collected in sump tank T17 and would be l handled as described in FSAR 14.2.2. No Technical l

. Specification changes are required and no unreviewed

( safety questions are initiated.

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38 i

m-+-w,wm,, -,,en,e,-.--,,--,,,-u-,---,nn,,,.,_,- .---..,~~-,,,,..,.n.,,,---~nn-,, -----n-n-~-,,nr,

3.5.4 TM 84-43 (Common), Service Water System. The temporary modification installed a spoolpiece from the bonnet of valve 2-819A to the two-inch stub connection on the service water inlet to the SFP HXs to discharge "B" holdup tank per WMTP 11.30. The temporary modification was required to implement Modification Request 83-125 (installed June 21, 1984; removed June 24,1984).

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The auxiliary coolant / service water crossconnect will be a temporary installation. A seismic evaluation of the service water connection and a hydrostatic test will be performed to ensure the integrity of the two systems is s not degraded. Use of the crossconnect will be controlled by procedure. Corrosion effects on the carbon steel piping will be negligible due to the short time duration and flushing action of the service water flow.

3.5.5 TM 84-62 (Unit 1), Rod Control. The temporary modification removed the automatic rod withdrawal block defeatifunction from the turbine runback defeat switch. (The modification was removed June 7, 1985.)

Summary of Safety Evaluation: By lifting wire No. 159 from the turbine runback / rod stop defeat switch (switch No. 3-S) terminal block in RPI rack 1C120, any possibility for automatic rod withdrawal with an actual dropped rod is eliminated. There no longer will exist a bypass of this function as was available when the turbine runback / rod stop defeat switch was selected to

" defeat." The temporary modification will ensure that the requirement of FSAR 14.1.3, " Rod Cluster Control Assembly (RCCA) Drop," concerning automatic rod withdrawal block is strictly maintained. The lifted lead is controlled by the temporary modification procedure'which also delineates the installation

, process. This temporary modification does not require a change to Technical Specification and does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

The safety concern of selecting the turbine runback / rod i

stop defeat switch to " defeat" in connection with g blocking turbine runback has been answered by the July 6, f 1984, telephone conversation between PBNP staff and u, Westinghouse. It has been concluded that turbine runback is not necessary to demonstrate core protection provided automatic rod withdrawal stop is in effect.

Therefore, operation of the turbine runback / rod stop defeat switch to " defeat" is considered satisfactory for dealing with spurious rod position indications when

the temporary modification is performed.

l' e f 39

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1 3.5.6 TM S4-72 (Unit 2), Incore Flux Mapping System. The i temporary modification installed 36 special adapter / bonnet low pressure seals at the seal table (installed October 16, 1984; removed November 2, 1984).

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The design of the low pressure seals meets or exceeds the original design specifications. No unreviewed safety question exists.

3.5.7 TM 84-76 (Unit 2), Reactor Protection System. The modification installed 3/8" SS Swagelok plugs in 8 bypass manifold RTD holes. (The modification was removed on October 15,1985, when the spare RTDs were installed permanently per MR 85-210.)

Summary of Safety Evaluation: Plugging 8 of 20 bypass manifold RTD positions with stainless steel Swagelok

plugs will meet or exceed RCS design ratings and will not degrade system integrity.

~

The following RTD positions are being plugged:

2TE-406A&B, 2TE-40BA68, 2TE-409A68, 2TE-410A&B. RTDs 2TE-409A&B and 2TE-410A&B are not used to provide an input to any circuit / system. RTDs 2TE-406A&B and 2TE-408A&B and installed spares and serve as backup for the bypass loop RTDs that provide an input into the RPS. Not installing these RTDs will reduce the flexibility of the system by reducing the number of

! installed spares. However, this will not adversely i affect the performance or the capability of the RPS.

l Since only the 8 active bypass loop RTDs are considered in the FSAR safety analysis, not installing the previously listed RTDs and plugging their bypass l manifold position will not increase the probability of l

a previously reviewed safety question nor create an

' unreviewed safety question.

3.5.8 TM 84-80 (tr.it 2), Incore Flux Mapping System. The modification installed a 5/8" Swagelok cap on the thimble tube conduit at the seal table at core location I-5. (The modification was removed October 17, 1985.)

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The loss of one thimble tube will not prevent the acquisition of adequate flux mapping data nor will it reach the limit of two thimbles per quadrant as specified in TS 15.3.11.

The primary system pressure boundary at the seal table is adequately maintained with the use of the tubing cap as described in the modification. No Technical Specification changes are required. (SER 86-015) 40

s t

3.5.9 TM 84-84 (Unit 2), Reactor Protection System. The modification hooked up spare blue channel RTD 2TE-407B to feed the primary yellow protection rack temperature circuits. (The modification was removed October 19, 1985.)

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification reconnects the spare bypass RTDs from their present blue instrument cabling to spare yellow instrument cabling, both of which exist in the same loop bypass RTD junction boxes, and then connects the spare RTDs into the operational yellow instrument loop. The reconnection from blue to yellow cabling will not change the existing separation (physical / electrical) which presently exists between the blue and yellow instrument cabling; and placing the spare RTD into operation will also maintain the yellow loop instrumentation equivalency. The modification does not constitute an unreviewed safety question and does not require a change to the Technical Specifications.

Control of the installation of the modification will be accomplished via radiation work permit and maintenance work request with attached sketch of the configuration. (SER 86-016) 3.5.10 TM 84-86 (Unit 1), Rod Position Indication. The temporary modification jumpers the bottom bistable for rod F8. (The modification was removed May 21, 1985.)

Summary of Safety Evaluation: Technical Specification 15.3.10 allows one control rod to be inoperable including the rod position indication. The balance of the RPI rod drop system will be operable.

The NIS rod drop system will also be operable.

(SER 86-017) i 3.5.11 TM 85-05 (Common), Ventilation. The modification installed a relay in the control circuit from the W14A l

control room emergency filter fan in series with a flow switch relay normally closed contact and included a delay open contact in parallel with the fan flow switch seal-in contact (installed February 7, 1985; removed July 10, 1986).

l Summary of Safety Evaluation: Implementation of the I temporary modification corrects the problem with the W14A fan tripping due to excessive turbulent flow transients experienced by its respective flow discharge switch. Use of qualified materials maintains reliability of the system. Added features of the modification ensure continuous fan operation and automatic switchover in both manual and automatic operating modes. Failures in all cases would result in conservative action compared to potential failure with l

l l

41

h c

3 the present configuration. The temporary modification does not constitute an unreviewed safety question and does not require a change in Technical Specifications.

Installation is controlled via written and approved instructions.

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3.5.12 .TH 85-17 (Unit 1), Upper Internals Storage Stand. The temporary modification installed four spacers on top of the upper internals storage stand in the refueling cavity to provide sufficient clearance under the upper internals when they are placed in the stand (installed March 27, 1985; removed May 27,1985).

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The control rod guide I

tube split pin replacement project required that seven-inch clearance exist between the bottom of the lower guide tube flange and the cavity floor. Four, l'5" stainless steel plates were placed on the internals storage stand ring (one above each leg) to provide this required clearance. The spacers had side tabs to prevent them from moving. The spacers remained on the -

storage stand during core unload and reload. A 50.59 [

evaluation was previously performed for one foot spacers (designed by Westinghouse). The l'1" spacers are less likely to fail than the l' spacers. The safety aspects were reviewed and it was concluded that there is no impact on refueling Technical Specifications; there is no possibility of increasing the likelihood of the fuel handling accidents analyzed in the FSAR; and the possibility of an unanalyzed accident was created.

3.5.13 TM 85-19 (Unit 1), Incore Flux Mapping System. The modification installs 36 new special. adapter / bonnet low pressure seals at the incore flux mapping seal table (installed April 11, 1985; removed May 31, 1985).

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The difference in elevations of the reactor vessel flange and the seal table is such that if the seals did not function and the installed push rods were ejected, the water in the cavity would drain to a level of the seal table. The seal table is at El. 41'. The reactor vessel flange is at El. 40'-7.125". Thus, the core would remain covered at all times. The special adapter / bonnet low pressure seals are made up of Swagelok fittings and are compatible with the Swagelok ferrules on the thimble tube conduits. Thus, the possibility of damaging the ferrules is minimized. If a fuel assembly was being moved when a low pressure seal failure occurred, there would be sufficient time to place the fuel assembly back into the vessel and remain covered.

42

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3.5.14 85-35 (Unit 1), Instrument Buses. The modification connects receptacles for 1DYO3 in 120 V instrument bus 1Y203 to permit post-maintenance testing. After the test was completed, the unqualified receptacles and load were removed (installed June 28,1985; removed July 3, 1985).

Summary of Safety Evaluation: Connection of receptacles to spare breaker #6 in 1Y203 will temporarily place an unqualified load onto a qualified source. This is satisfactory for testing the inverter after post-maintenance as long as there are no other qualified loads placed on the inverter at the same

' time. The maintenance and post-maintenance testing i- procedures specified 1DYO3 not be used as a qualified power supply until testing is satisfactorily completed.

The temporary modification does not pose an unreviewed safety question and does not require a change in the Technical Specificaticas.

3.5.15 TM 85-39 (Unit 1), Reactor Protection System. The temporary modification swapped wires for TE-402B (white a Tcold channel) to equalize lead resistances (installed ,

j.

July 12,1985).

i

Summary of Safety Evaluation

Swapping of the common leads makes the lead resistances of the RTDs equal; thus providing a better indication of actual i

temperature and making the Dana amplifier output consistent with the other cold leg RTD outputs.

Swapping of the leads will not degrade the circuit operation in any way. This temporary modification will

! not result in an unreviewed safety question nor affect

a previously reviewed safety question. No changes to Technical Specifications are required. (SER 86-036) l 3.5.16 TM 85-52 (Unit 1), Residual Heat Removal System. The temporary modification installed pressure gauges on l

Valves 1-856ASB (refueling water storage tank to RHR pump suction) to determine if the valve bonnets were

! being pressurized during plant cycles (installed September 4, 1985).

i Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification alters the upper bonnet assembly pressure boundary for the subject valves. This is accomplished by adding a gauge on the packing leakoff connection and removing the sealing capability from the lower packing set.

l 43

_ - ~ - _ , - _ _ _ _ _

8 3'

The subject valves are located in the line to the RHR pump suction from the RWST. The valves serve two functions. They serve as a maintenance isolation valve for the RHR pumps and also provide a secondary barrier for isolating the RWST from recirculation fluid flow (the primary barrier is the check valve). These valves are not containment isolation valves.

During normal operation, the subject valves are open.

They are shut just prior to placing the RHR system into normal decay heat removal service or in the event of a DBA, just prior to establishing recirculation flow.

The modification will not affect the performance of the valve bonnet assembly sealing capabilities.

Installation of the gauge will be seismic. The pressure / temperature rating of the components will be equal to or better than the high pressure side of the valve. The overall sealing characteristics of the packing was not degraded as the lower packing set has proven to not be needed. Installation will not impact the operation of the valve.

It should be noted that the only time the valve bonnet assembly could be exposed to recirculation fluid flow is when both the downstream check valve and the subject i

valve discs leak. Thus, any leakage would be extremely small and would be into the monitored and filtered primary auxiliary building leak path prior to release.

The modificatien does not present any unreviewed safety questions nor does it require a change to the Technical Specifications.

3.5.17 TM 85-54 (Unit 1), Rod Position Indication System. The temporary modification jumpered the rod bottom bistable for Rod F6 (installed September 16, 1985; removed May 16, 1986).

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The NIS rod drop system will be operable. Since the NIS is redundant to the rod position indication system in detecting a dropped RCCA, the NIS is fully capable of providing a turbine runback when a dropped RCCA occurs.

3.5.18 TM 85-059 (Unit 1), RMS. The TM provided a temporary AC power supply from lighting panel 10L to improve DAM signal processing. The temporary modification had been installed on September 30, 1985.

44

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Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary modification is a change to the facility as described in the FSAR. The temporary modification removed RMS data acquisition module (DAM) #3, C253, from its normal power supply, 1Y114, and connected it to lighting panel 10L. The original safety evaluation report stated that C253 has an internal battery-supplied backup power supply which will provide for eight hours of operation, which will provide sufficient time to reenergize C253 from an AC power supply.

The backup battery maintains power to the microprocessor unit to allow for data acquisition and retrieval. It will not, however, provide power to operate any pumps powered from C253. Therefore, if power is lost to panel 10L the sample pump for 1RE-229, Unit 1 service water overboard monitor, will be lost and 1RE-229 will be out of service due to low sample flow. This condition is covered by RETS Section 15.7.3.A.2 requires grab samples to be collected and analyzed at least once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> if 1RE-229 is out of service. Addition-ally, RETS requires that best efforts be made to restore 1RE-229 to service in 30 days. Therefore, the eight-hour time frame of the backup battery power supply is still the limiting factor, and as stated previously, this will provide sufficient time to restore AC power to C253.

The change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which which has not been previously evaluated. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced.

(SER 86-050-01) 3.5.19 TM 85-66 (Unit 2), Incore Flux Mapping System. The temporary modification installed a " Whitey ball valve and hose at seal table core location 15 to flush debris from the subject thimble conduit (installed October 17, 1985; removed November 11, 1985).

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question. The primary system pressure boundary was adequately maintained with the use of the 2500 psi ball valve and following the flush with a Swagelok plug. The flush line was constructed to catch a potentially radioactive piece of

material and health physics instruments provided to l detect and monitor the same.

l 45

t 3.5.20 TM 85-73 (Common), CVCS. The temporary modification 4 changes the power supply for one train of boric acid tank level from 2MQ-400 to 1YO3 and 2YO3 (installed November 22, 1985; removed May 23, 1986).

t Summary of Safety Evaluation: Changing the power source for one train of boric acid tank level and associated circuitry from inverter 2MQ-400 to 1YO3 (Unit 1 and 2YO3 (Unit 2) will more than adequately maintain operability for that train of boric acid tank level. Shifting the power source will place this one train of boric acid tank level onto a qualified power source, specifically the white instrument bus. Also, power source separation will still be maintained since the other boric acid tank level channel (s) are powered from red and yellow instrument bus power.

(

Therefore, adequate train separation is maintained.

Also, the additional loading to the white instrument bus will not degrade it as a qualified power source.

The temporary modification does not constitute an-l unreviewed safety question and does not require a change to the Technical Specifications or the FSAR.

! 3.5.21 TM 85-82 (Unit 1), Rod Position Indication System. The temporary modification jumpered the rod bottom bistable for Rod I5 (installed December 30, 1985; removed May 14, 1986).

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The NIS rod drop system j will be operable. Since the NIS is redundant to the rod position indication system in detecting a dropped RCCA, the NIS is fully capable of providing a turbine runback when a dropped RCCA occurs.

' 3.5.22 TM 85-79, Unit 1 Yellow RMS Power Supply 1Y114. The temporary modification will install a filter capacitor across the 120 V isolation transformer supply to the RMS system and neutral to minimize the short duration spikes of approximately 60 V which have been observed in the output of the RMS isolation transformers. These 4

voltage spikes have adversely affected calibration >

efforts and have induced stresses on the 120 V motor insu.'.ation and RMS power supply components. A 1

combination of capacitor types will be installed to determine the best combination.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: Installation of this temporary modification can result in an improved power supply to the radiation monitoring system. Failure mechanisms are such that there would be no worse i perturbations on the system than already exist, and would give no additional perturbations. Therefore,

' 46

t

-e this installation does not present an unreviewed safety question, nor does it require a change to plant Technical Specifications.

3.5.23 TM 86-002 (Unit 2), Rod Position Indication. The modification installed a jumper on the rod bottom bistable of Rod Ill (installed January 8, 1986).

Summary of Safety Evaluation: Technical Specification 15.3.10.D.3.a allows for the failure (s) of the RPI(s). The balance of the RPI system will be operable. The NIS rod drop system will also be operable. (SER 86-037) 3.5.24 TM 86-28 (Unit 2), Rod B6 Position Indication. The temporary modification jumpers relay 14 CR terminals 6&7 (wires 100 and 101) in RPI cabinet #3 to defeat the turbine runback signal from the rod bottom bistable (installed April 15, 1986).

Summary of Safety Evaluation: A 50.59 review is required because this temporary modification constitutes a change to the facility as described in the FSAR.

TS 15.3.10.D.3.a allows for the failure of the RPIs.

The balance of the RPI system will be operable. The NIS rod drop system will also be operable.

The temporary modification does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety. There is no possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than evaluated previously. The margin of safety as defined in the TS is not reduced. (SER 86-020) 3.5.25 TM 86-30 (Unit 1), Component Cooling System. The temporary modification places a clamp on the stem of valve IMOV-815 to maintain the valve in the shut position while the valve operator is removed for maintenance (installed April 25, 1986).

Summary of Safety Evaluation: This evaluation is required in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 because it constitutes a potential change to the facility or its operation as described in the FSAR. This temporary modification does not pose an unreviewed safety question because there is no increase in the probability or consequences of an accident, nor a malfunction or equipment important to safety; there is no possibility created for an accident or malfunction than those previously evaluated, and the margin of safety of the plant as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced.

47

f t,

Valve IMOV-815 provides a remotely-operated emergency makeup water path to the Unit 1 component cooling system. Removing the operator and clamping the valve shut will remove this capability. The normal makeup water path still remains, however. There is no FSAR description or accident analysis assumption that requires an emergency makeup water capability. The valve is normally shut as described by the FSAR for systems tied to the component cooling system.

This closed valve provides a boundary between the component cooling system and the reactor makeup water system. The component cooling system outside the containment is described as a " closed" system in the FSAR. Thus, it must be Seismic Class I and thus, 1-815A must be seismic also. By inspection, it can be said that removal of the operator will reduce the weight of the component and thus, reduce the seismic stresses. The weight of the clamp is insignificant in comparison to the valve and operator.

The clamp will be designed to not damage the valve shaft and to provide adequate force to keep the valve clos,ed at design pressure. (SER 86-024) 3.5.26 TM 86-31 (Unit 1), Residual Heat Removal System. The temporary modification will install a clamp on the stem for valve IMOV-700 such that the valve remains in the open position during the period maintenance is being performed on the valve's motor operator.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: This temporary modification constitutes a change to the facility as described in the FSAR. The temporary modification is only applicable during the period Unit 1 is in refueling shutdown when the reactor vessel head is removed while the cavity is flooded and tied to the spent fuel pit. During this period, administrative controls will be required to ensure that the subject valve is returned to its "as designed" configuration with the locking device removed prior to Unit 1 being placed into any mode other than that described above.

Clamping open IMOV-700 will ensure that the common RHR suction path remains available for decay heat removal.

A redundant, remote means of isolating the line will no longer exist in containment. Valve 701 will still be available for remote isolation of the line. If needed, maintenance action could be used to shut valve 1H0V-700 if it becomes necessary. In view of the operating mode, this approach is adequate.

48

I IMOV-700 is interlocked with primary system pressure to prevent opening when the RCS pressure is above 425 psig. Considering the operating mode and the open position of the valve, loss of this interlock feature is not a concern.

In the event of a breach of the cavity boundary, the RHR system will still be capable of a " recirculation" alignment.

The lock shall be seismically designed to ensure decay heat removal capability following a seismic event.

The lock shall be designed such that no damage to the stem will occur (if the stem is to be reused). No lead shall come into contact with the stem for material compatibility reasons.

The potential impact upon the seismic capability of the residual heat removal and reactor coolant systems due to the removal of mass on the MOV was evaluated.

Inspection determines the impact to be negligible in the nonconservative direction.

The temporary modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence nor the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR. The possibility for an accident or malfunction different than those previously analyzed is not created. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-025) 3.5.27 TM 86-32 (Unit 1), Residual Heat Removal System. The temporary modification installs a clamp on the stem of valve IMOV-720 such that the valve is maintained in the open position during the period the motor operator is removed for maintenance.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: This temporary l modification is a change to the facility as described in the FSAR. The proposed modification is needed to support maintenance action. The resultant configuration is only applicable to the refueling mode when the reactor vessel head is removed and the cavity is flooded and tied to the spent fuel pit.

This safety evaluation is limited to that mode.

Administrative controls will be required to ensure that valve IMOV-720 is returned to its "as designed" configuration with the locking device removed prior to the unit being placed into any mode other than that described above.

49

'I clamping open the valve will ensure that the RHR return line to the loop "B" cold leg remains available.

Redundant means (remote and check) of isolating the line will no longer exist in containment. Check valve 1-867B will provide isolation from the RCS. Other means outside of containment could be used to isolate the line (manual valves, remote valves, stopping the pumps, etc.). Maintenance action could be used to shut valve IMOV-720 if it becomes necessary in view of the operating mode. This approach is adequate.

IMOV-720 is interlocked with primary system pressure to prevent opening when RCS pressure is above 425 psig.

Considering the operating mode and the open position of the valve, the loss of this interlock feature is not a concern.

In the event of a breach of the cavity boundary, the RHR system will still be capable of a " recirculation" alignment.

The lock shall be seismically designed to ensure decay heat removal capability following a seismic event.

Removal of the MOV will not significantly impact the seismic capabilities of the system in this operating mode (low pressure and temperature stresses). Removal of the weight will lower peak seismic stresses.

The lock shall be designed such that no damage to the stem will occur (if the stem is to be reused without repair or further analysis). No lead shall come into contact with the stem for material compatibility reasons.

The temporary modification does not increase the probability of the occurrence nor the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR. The possibility for an accident or n.alfunction different than those previously analyzed is not created. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced.

The original 50.59 analysis limited the mode of clamping open 1MOV-720 to refueling, reactor vessel head removed, cavity flooded and tied to the spent fuel pit. These conditions were specified from a conservative standpoint, as a cold shutdown condition 50

I 1

with the RCS open to atmosphere, PORVs open, or with the LTOP system in service would be satisfactory. This is acceptable since the clamp is qualified to hold the valve open (ensuring redundant decay heat removal means) and RHR system overpressurization protection.

would be provided. (SER 86-026) 3.5.28 TM 86-040 (Unit 2), Reactor Protection System. The temporary modification removes IMQ-400 cables from white protection rack 2C114 (and adds jumpers) to provide interim white instrument bus power from the new inverters for containment pressure channel 2P946.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary modifica-tion is performing the same function as the permanent modification to be installed during U2R12 but was performed on a temporary basis so the unit can be maintained at power without taking the entire white protection channel out of service. It was highly desirable to maintain a reliable interim power source.

No safety concerns are raised by the installation differences between the temporary modification and the permanent modification.

The modification will ensure continued reliability of white and yellow instrument channels when they are powered by the new white and yellow instrument bus battery backed power sources which are being installed by the instrument bus upgrade modification. Also, each unit will only power its own instrument channels rather than having unit crossconnection as is presently installed. This will also increase reliability of the new system. After all instrument channels have been removed from the 1&2MQ-400 inverters, these units may be removed from service. This modification does not constitute an unreviewed safety question and does not require a change to plant Technical Specifications.

The installation will be controlled by a special maintenance procedure. (SER 86-049) 3.5.29 TM 86-045 (Unit 2), Rod Position Indication. The modification installed a jumper on the bottom bistable of Rod Ell (installed May 20, 1986; removed November 7, 1986).

Summary of Safety Evaluation: Technical Specification 15.3.10.D.3.a allows for the failure (s) of the RPI(s). The balance of the RPI system will be operable. The NIS rod drop system will also be operable.

51

1 s.

-t 3.5.30 TM 86-065 (Common), Component Cooling System. The temporary modification adds pressure gauges to the inlet and outlet vents to the. component cooling heat exchangers (HX-12B&C) on the component cooling water side to measure the differential pressure across the shell side of the new heat exchangers. (Approved September 25,1986).

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary modification is a potential change to the facility or-its operation as described in the FSAR. Adding pressure gauges to the alet and outlet vents to the component cooling water side will extend the component cooling closed system boundary. This classification must be maintained. Thus, the lines must remain seismic and the pressure capability must be greater than containment design pressure of 60 psig.

The gauges will have a pressure capability of greater than the component cooling water system design pressure of 150 psig. Seismic capability will be verified using the method in the "Bechtel Pipe Supports 2" & Smaller for Class Seismic Lines" pipe support instructions.

The change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated.

The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-056) 3.5.31 TM 86-068 (Unit 2), Reactor Vessel Level Indication.

The temporary modification installs a tee, valve, and "P" tubing between LT-447 and RC-500H to provide an alternate reference leg for LT-447. (Approved October 2, 1986.)

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary modification is a change to the facility as described in the FSAR. The proposed temporary modification to provide additional level indication will not affect the safe operation of the plant. This is based upon the following considerations: (1) the tie-in will only be used during refueling shutdown; (2) the valving in of the cross-tie will be administratively controlled such that an operator will man the isolation valve while the reading is being taken (i.e., crossconnection is valved in); (3) the tie-in (valve and tee) shall be made to the requirements of the system; (4) the system will be returned to normal following closeout of the temporary modification, before power operation.

52

_m. ._- . _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ . __ _ _ . . - . _ - _ . _ __ _ _ _ __

8 i'

s The change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated.

1 ,

The. margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-057) 3.5.32 TM 86-69, Containment Ventilation. The temporary modification replaces the existing MSA steam generator channelhead ventilation blower unit with a Numanco 1000 scfm unit with HEPA/ charcoal filters. (Approved October 2, 1986.)

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary modification is a potential change to the facility or its operation. The existing MSA blower units used in i the steam generator channelhead ventilation system will be replaced by Numanco units with charcoal filters.

The new units are essentially the same as the existing units with the exception of the filters. The new units should result in improved system performance and a reduction in the iodine discharged to the purge exhaust l

' filters. As a result, there should be a reduction in ,

. the radiological releases via the channelhead

! ventilation system. Standard industrial practices will-t be used in installing the subject equipment. The seismic capabilities of the containment HVAC system j will not be degraded. The operation of the containment ventilation systems will remain the same.

The change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment l

important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated.

The margin of safety as defined in the Technical i specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-059) i 3.5.33 TM 86-72 (Unit 2), Main Control Boards. The temporary l

modification lifts leads for RTD bypass flow gauges 2FIA-458 and 459 and installs leads from the steam generator nozzle dam control panels to provide remote j- indication on 2C04 in the event of any nozzle dam malfunction.

i l

l-53

-. - - ..- . . . - - . ~ . . - - - - . - - - - _ . - - - _ . _ - . - _ . - - . - - - - . , - . - - - - . - , - -

g.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary modification constitutes a change to the facility and a change to its operation as described in the FSAR. The change should not have any bearing on plant operation ,

as Unit 2 is in cold shutdown and the RTDs are out of service. The system will be returned to normal conditions prior to the Unit 2 RCS being filled and vented. Nozzle dam alarms are to be tested prior to floodup. The RTD bypass flow meters are to be tested for operability prior to restoration.

The change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the

, consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does

not create the possibility for an accident or

. malfunction which has not been previously evaluated.

The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-058)

! 3.5.34 TM 86-073, Fuel Transfer System. The temporary

! modification installs a toggle switch which performs the function of the fast / slow proximity switch in order to permit use of the fuel transfer system because leakage into the fast / slow proximity switch enclosure resulted in switch failure. (Approved October 6, 1986.)

< Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary modification is a potential change to the facility or

. its operation as described in the FSAR. The failed i

limit switch in the spent fuel pit for the fuel transfer cart will be replaced by a toggle switch. The limit switch was provided to switch the fuel transfer i cart air motor from fast to slow speed prior to the cart arriving at its stop location. An operator will be stationed near the toggle switch to change air motor l speed as appropriate. The operator responsible for j toggle switch manipulation will have no other duties or j be involved in no other activities while the cart is

! traveling in fast speed to the spent fuel pit. The limit switch and its function are not described in the

! FSAR. Additionally, the use of a toggle switch under j administrative control will not increase the likelihood of a fuel handling accident.

The change does not pose an unreviewed safety i question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated.

The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-061) 54

3 3.5.35 TM 86-074 (Unit 2), Reactor Coolant System. The temporary modification installs a strongback on "B" reactor coolant pump to raise the shaft so the seals can be made up with the pump motor removed; (installed October 9, 1986).

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary modification is a potential change to the facility or its operation as described in the FSAR. When the RCP motor is removed, the pump shaft drops down approximately one inch. In order to provide a seal when the cavity is flooded, the shaft must be lifted back into proper position. When the shaft is lifted, it will be held up by a pair of strongbacks. Each strongback consists of a pair of four-inch channels arranged back to back with one-inch threaded rod that is screwed into the pump coupling and held on the strongback with a nut.

At no point would the core be uncovered by a leak through the RCP seals. The discharge elevation is several feet above the top of the vessel flange.

Even if the pump shaft would drop, the leakage out through the pump seals would still be restricted. This leak rate would be relatively slow and would be detected by the seal leakoff alarm or the containment sump alarm.

Action could then be taken to provide makeup to the RCS and to place a fuel assembly, if one is in the manipulator, back into the core.

If the shaft should fall, the shaft has a step machined on that sits on a ledge in the thermal barrier. This was designed into the pump to be a leak limiting seal and is used by some plants to allow seal work with the cavity flooded.

The change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the i consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment l important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated.

The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-073)

{ 3.5.36 TH 86-080 (Unit 2), CRDH Cooling System. The temporary modification provides a welding power supply from 2W3A&B CRDH fan power supply during the period ORT #3 (Loss of AC Simultaneous with S1) is being performed so performance of Modification Request 86-059 can continue uninterrupted during that period (approved, installed, and removed November 4, 1986).

55

t e

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary modification is a potential change to the facility as described in the FSAR. The unit is in the refueling

, shutdown condition with the RV head removed and the l cavity flooded. The W3 fans are CRDM fans intended to primarily cool the CRDMs during operation. Therefore,-

they are not necessary during this plant condition.

The temporary modification will be removed and the system returned to its normal configuration prior to replacing the RV head and heating up the RCS.

The change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated.

The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-074) 3 3.5.37 TM 86-79 (Unit 1), CVCS. The temporary modification blocks 1A0V-313A in the open position such that seal return flow is maintained during the period the valve's i air regulator is being changed out (installed November 3, 1986; removed November 3, 1986).

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary modification is a change to the facility as described in the FSAR. Since Section 5.2 of the FSAR requires a second containment isolation valve, an operator will be designated to provide this boundary by closing 315A&C (seal return filter inlet and bypass isolation valves). Also, Technical Specifications define containment integrity as existing when: " ... all valves are operable or are secured closed." When the clamp is placed on the valve, it will be inoperable and not secured closed. Therefore, the valve clamp must be removed within three hours. Otherwise, the unit will

' be taken to the hot shutdown condition within three hours of clamping.

This change does not pose an unreviewed safety

) question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated.

The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-067) i 4

i 56 l

1

_-_7 ,,.--- -

2 e

3.5.38 TM 86-88, Condensate Drains from HX-100 and HX-101.

This temporary modification installs rubber plugs in drain opening in lower condensate pan for HX-100 and HX-101 to prevent drawing air in through drain line, bypassing filters.

~

Summary of Safety Evaluation: Plugging the condensate will in no way effect the operation of the heat exchangers, but it would prevent unfiltered air from being drawn back through the drain line. No overflow problems should be encountered with these drains plugged due to the low humidity levels during the winter months.

The control room ventilation system is described in Section 7.7-1 and shown on Figure 12-4 Appendix "I" of the FSAR. The condensate drains from the air handlers are not described in the FSAR.

The installation of the plugs in the drain connections from the condensate pans from HX-100 and HX-101 will reduce the possibility of drawing unfiltered air into the control room ventilation system bypassing the cleanup and HEPA filters. Drawing unfiltered air into the air handling system could be construed to be a violation of Technical Specification 15.3.12.

There should be no problems experienced with excessive water building up in the condensate pan between the installation of the temporary modification and the completion of a permanent equipment trap (e.g. , water seal) in the condensate drain line. Control room relative humidity should be low enough to prevent condensation on the chilled water coils (HX-100 and HX-101). The drain pan will be checked (and drained)

. for the presents of excessive water on a weekly basis.

t l There are no unreviewed safety considerations that will be caused by the installation of this temporary modification. No changes to Technical Specifications or the FSAR are required.

3.5.39 TM 86-89 (Unit 2), 2HX-11A. This temporary modification installs closure bolting with single nuts versus double nuts on each end of HX-11A. The technical manual instructions call for installing backing nuts.

I Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary modifi-cation as requested is acceptable. The heat exchanger without all of the double nuts passed the leak test without leakage. The nuts were torqued to the vendor's requirements. The second nuts do not provide extra strength but do function to lock the primary nuts. The t

double nuts should be replaced as soon as they are

! obtained.

1 l

I l 57

2 The component instruction manual for the RHR heat exchangers does call for installing backing nuts on the main flange studs.

The second nuts do not add any extra strength but merely serve a locking function. The primary nuts were torqued to the vendor's recommended value, and it is the opinion of this review that one set of nuts sufficiently torqued is adequate for the short time period until new locknuts can be obtained and installed.

Section 6.2.2 of the FSAR, Safety Injection System Design and Operation, describes the design of the RHR heat exchangers including the " main flange studs with two nuts on each end to ensure permanent leaktightness" (page 6.2-20). Thus, this temporary modification does involve a change to the facility as described in the FSAR. Section 9.3 also gives a general description of the RHR system and components but does not mention the locknuts on the heat exchangers. A review of the Technical Specifications and NRC commitments as found in SERs was performed and no descriptions or commitments affecting this temporary modification were found.

As stated above, the single nuts on the RHR heat exchanger flange studs are adequate for the short duration involved. Thus, this temporary modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question and no permanent changes to the FSAR or Technical Specifications is required.

3.5.40 TM 86-093 (Common), Fuel Handling. The temporary modification replaces the existing 3 KVA, 480 V to 240/120 V transformer for Z17, spent fuel pit bridge crane, with a QA 15 KVA 480 V to 240/120 transformer.

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary modification is a potential change to the facility as described in the FSAR. The 15 KVA transformer is electrically equivalent to the existing 3 KVA transformer except for its larger capacity. It will not present any changes to the control circuit operation or its failure modes. The single failure proof criteria of the crane is not degraded.

The transformer will be mounted securely to prevent it from falling into the spent fuel pit. The additional weight of this transformer will not affect the seismic capability of the bridge.

58

t The change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated.

The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-083) 3.5.41 TM 86-094 (Common), Radwaste System. The temporary modification provides a flush connection between the blowdown evaporator distillate pump and the bottoms sample heat exchanger (installed December 19, 1986).

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary modification is a change to the facility as described in the FSAR. Fittings on the hose will meet the design temperature and pressure ratings of the related piping system. The hose will be disconnected at one end following each use.

Actual discharge pressure for the distillate system is approximately 75 psig and is approximately 35 psig for the bottoms loop. Operating temperatures for both systems are +200*F. The temperature and pressure ratings of the hose are 330 F and 200 psi, respectively. Therefore, the hose and fittings will hold up under these conditions. The differential pressure between the distillate and bottoms will prevent backflow of the bottoms fluid into the distillate system isolated from the blowdown evaporator.

The proposed jumper is truly an operational evolution in that a piece of equipment will be isolated from the system and flushed for interim system layup. Thus, a 10 CFR 50.59 analysis is not necessary in the opinion of the modification engineer.

The change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident of malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated.

The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-086) 3.5.42 TM 86-095 (Unit 2), Rod Position Indication. The temporary modification installs a jumper in Rod K7 RPI (installed December 22, 1986).

59 L

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary modification is a change to the facility as described in the FSAR. Technical Specification 15.3.10.D.3.a allows for the failure (s) of RPI(s). The balance of the RPI system will be operable. The NIS rod drop system will also be operable.

The change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated.

The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-084) 3.5.43 TM 86-097 (Unit 2), Rod Position Indication. The temporary modification installed a jumper on Rod B6 RPI (installed December 30, 1986).

Summary of Safety Evaluation: The temporary modification is a change to the facility as described in the FSAR. Technical Specification 15.3.10.D.3 allows for the failure (s) of RPI(s). The balance of the RPI system will be operable with the exception of K7. The NIS rod drop system will also be operable.

The change does not pose an unreviewed safety question. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. The change does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction which has not been previously evaluated.

The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not reduced. (SER 86-085) l 60

4.0 NUMBER OF PERSONNEL AND MAN-REM BY WORK GROUP AND JOB FUNCTION POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT l 1986 ANNUAL JOB FUNCTION

SUMMARY

Greater Total Reactor ,

Than Rem For Operations & Routine Special Waste Group 100 mrem Work Group Surveillance Maintenance Inspections Maintenance Processing Refueling l Point Beach i Employees Operations 53 43.190 25.650 ------

9.270 ------

0.910 7.360' Maintenance and A

Peak Maintenance 91 92.710 ------

29.960 10.030 26.150 -----

26.570-Chemistry and H:alth Physics 28 21.200 18.980 ------ ------ ------ 0.280 1.940 Instrumentation 1.910 cnd Control 14 4.630 ------ 1.730 0.120 0.870 -----

Reactor Engineering 3 0.730 0.050 ------ 0.030 ------ -----

0.650 Ackninistration and Engineering, Quality

& Regulatory Services 15 8.170 1.690 ------

6.370 ------ -----

0.110 Contract Workers and Others 277 204.850 0.030 ------

48.150 150.580 6.090 ------

GRAND TOTALS 481 375.480 46.400 31.690 73.970 177.600 7.280 -38.540 J

I I

61

5.0 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSERVICE INSPECTION The results of the findings from steam generator tube inspections are as follows:

5.1 Unit 1 5.1.1 Inspection Plan During the Unit 1 Refueling 13 outage, eddy current testing was performed from April 14 to April 19, 1986.

The Technical Specification required 6% inspection program was performed on both steam generators (3% in each generator).

In the "A" steam generator a total of 141 tubes were inspected which included 122 full length tests and 19 U-bend tests. No indications were found which required tube plugging.

In the "B" steam generator a total of 424 tubes were inspected; 146 full length tests, 19 U-bend tests, 11 tests to the fourth tube support plate, and 248 tests to the third tube support plate. No indications were found which required tube plugging.

5.1.2 Inspection Results The following is a summary of the resulting eddy current inspection showing the number of tubes with indications in the ranges listed.

Results of Eddy Current Inspection "A" SG "B" SG Inlet Outlet Inlet Outlet 100-90% 0 0 0 0 80-89% 0 0 0 0 70-79% 0 0 0 0 60-69% 0 0 0 0 50-59% 0 0 0 0 40-49% 0 0 0 0 l

30-39% 0 0 0 0 20-29% 0 0 0 0

<20% 0 0 0 0

• DI O O 2 1 Total 0 0 2 1 l

• DI = Distorted indication - indications whose quantitative l analysis has not been possible but in past instances have not necessitated plugging.

62

f 5.1.3 Repaired or Plugged Tubes No tubes were plugged or repaired in either the "A" or "B" steam generator as a result of the eddy current inspection performed in 1986.

5.1.4 Tubes With Indications Not Plugged The following is a list of tubes which had indications but were not plugged as a result of eddy current inspection performed in 1986:

"B" Steam Generator Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 40-55 **DI 28" A #1 TSP HL OD DI 10" A #1 TSP HL OD DI 29.8" A #2 TSP CL OD 39-63 DI 35.5" ATS HL OD 5.2 Unit 2 5.2.1 Inspection Plan During the Unit 2 Refueling 12 outage eddy current testing was performed from October 10 to October 23, 1986. The extent of the inspection programs in each steam generator is as follows:

Eddy Current Inspection Plan Extent of Inspection Number of Tubes Inspected "A" SG "B" SG Hot Leg (Cold Leg) Hot Leg (Cold Leg)

Full Length (96) 80 Sleeves 61 59 To Top of Sleeve (52) (67)

U-Bend 4 (16) 23

1. 1 TSP 1540(2943) 1566(3040)

1. 2 TSP 9 (31) 37 (12)

1. 3 TSP 2 (3)

1. 4 TSP (1)

1. 5 TSP 2 (3)

1. 6 TSP (1)

TOTALS 1618(3139) 1765(3126) 63

i 5.2.2 Inspection Results The following is a summary of the results of eddy current inspection showing the number of tubes with indications in the ranges listed:

Eddy Current Inspection Results Hot Leg (Cold Leg)

"A" SG "B" SG i

<20% 16(127) 12(198) 20-29% 3 (47) 2(280) 30-39% 4 (4) 1(336) 8-40-49% (0) (46) 50-59% (0) (5) 60-69% 1 (0) (2) 70-79% 3 (0) 1 (1) 80-89% 2 (0) 1 (0) 90-100% 2 (0) (0)

• UDI 6 (0) 2 (0)

• • DI 5 (1) 3 (32)

TOTALS 42(179) 22(900)

• UDI indications are those whose quantitative analysis has not been possible but in previous instances have necessitated plugging.

• • DI - indications whose quantitative analysis has not been possible but in previous instances have not necessitated plugging.

64

- = . _ .- -

t' ,

- ,1

, l

. , r 5.2.3 Repaired or Plugged Tubes ,

The following is a list of tubes which were mechanically plugged as a result of indications found during eddy' - ~

current inspection performed in 1986. -i.,_ ,

Plugged Tubes in the "A" Steam Generator .

Location .

Row - Column Indication % Origin.

1-3 UDI 3.2" ATE HL OD 16-7 UDI 5.5" ATE HL '0D 4-17 93% 11.9" ATE HL OD 32-33 74%

7.3"' ATE SL ' OL '

36-36 94% 4.0" ATE HL OD 42-38 61% 7.3" ATE HL OD 37-39 89% 3.9" ATE HL OD 43-40 UDI 10.1" ATE HL OD 44-40 78% 5.8" ATE HL OD 40-44 74% 6.7" ATE HL OD  :

41-56 UDI 3.0" ATE HL OD 4-73 89% 11.4" ATE HL OD I

4-79 UDI 6.2" ATE HL OD 13-84 UDI 6.2" ATF HL OD ATE - Above Tube End HL - Hot Leg UDI - Undefined Indication Plugged Tubes i'n the "B" Steam Generator Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 10-27 46%' t 1.3" ATS CL OD 13-27 47% 0.4" ATS CL OD 12-29 43% 1.4" ATS CL OD 18-29 43% 0.3" ATS CL '0D

18-32 42% 1.0" ATS CL OD 7-43 44% 0.6" ATS CL OD 14-43 53% 0.4" ATS CL OD 7-44 43% 0.8" ATS CL OD '

19-44 43% '1.0" ATS CL OD 5-45 45% 0.6" ATS CL OD 6-45 62% .

0.9" ATS CL OD 8-45 52%  ? 1.1" ATS CL OD 11-45 43% 1.2" ATS CL OD 1-46 72% 0.9" ATS HL OD 5-46 45% 0.4" ATS CL OD 12-46 45% 0.9" AIS CL , Ou 14-46 46% 0.5" ATS CL OD 5-47 75% 1.5" ATS CL" OD' 10-47 44% 1.2" ATS CL OD 15-47 48% 0.8" ATS CL OD 16-47 41% 2.0" ATS CL OD i- 5-48 42% ,

0.6" ATS CL OD j 65 l

l' 9 Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 6-48 43% 0.6" ATS CL OD

, 21'-48 46% 0.9" ATS CL OD

'- '18-49 0.7" ATS CL OD 44%

20-49 40% 0.8" ATS CL OD 22-49 48% 0.4" ATS CL OD 18-50 41% 1.1" ATS CL OD 19-50 51% 0.7" ATS CL OD 18-51 43% 0.7" ATS CL OD 20-51 46% 0.7" ATS CL OD 21-51 40% 0.6" ATS CL OD 0.8" ATS CL

, 23-51 44% OD 21-52 45% 0.8" ATS CL OD 23-52 43% 0.9" ATS CL OD 24-52 44% 0.6" ATS CL OD

,15-53 45% 0.8" ATS CL OD

., c16-53 40% 0.9" ATS CL OD 22-53 48% 0.7" ATS CL OD 24-53 44% 0.4" ATS CL OD 25-54 48% 0.3" ATS CL OD 24-55 44% 1.1" ATS CL OD 23-57 42% 0.7" ATS CL OD 7-58 46% 0.5" ATS CL OD 6-59 45% 0.7" ATS CL OD

- 7-59 62% 0.5" ATS CL OD 24-59 46% 1.0" ATS CL OD i 4-60 44% 0.3" ATS CL OD 7-62 48% 0.3" ATS CL OD 22-64 46% 0.7" ATS CL OD 22-67 42% 0.3" ATS CL OD 11-68 47% 0.5" ATS CL OD 7-69 42% 0.8" ATS CL OD 18-69 54% 0.3" ATS CL OD 18-70 54%- 0.2" ATS CL OD 23-78 UDI 7.3" ATE HL OD 23-80 UDI 3.7" ATE HL OD 23-82 87% 3.2" ATE HL OD ATS - Above Tubesheet CL - Cold Leg

- ' HL - Hot Leg ATE - Above Tube End

UDI - Undefined Indication

/

, 5.2.4 Tubes with Indications Not' Plugged The following is a list of tubes which had indications

.- - but were not plugged as a result of eddy current inspections performed in 1986.

"A" Steam Generator Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 7-1 29% #1 TSP CL OD 8-3 DI 8.5" ATE HL OD 66 1

',- 4 -- . - - k. _ _--. ~ . ,_. _ . , , _, _ _,

s 3-

\,

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 18-5 26% #1 TSP HL OD ti 18-6 38% #1 TSP HL OD 23-8 31% #1 TSP HL OD 25-8 33% #1 TSP HL OD 4-16 <20% 0" ATS HL OD 3-17 <20% 0.0" ATS HL OD 3-19 <20% .0.0" ATS HL OD 4-19 <20% 0.0" ATS HL OD 18-24 <20% 1.6" ATS CL OD 10-25 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 11-25 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 24% 0.5" ATS CL OD 11-26 21% 'O.4" ATS CL OD 12-26 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD -

13-26 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD -

11-27 22% 0.5" ATS CL OD 13-27 25% 0.7" ATS CL '. OD 14-27 23% 0.8" ATS CL OD 10-28 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 11-28 20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 13-28 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 15-28 22% 0.8" ATS CL OD 16-28 23% 0.6" ATS CL OD 7-29 > <20%' O.4" ATS CL OD 10-29 20% 0.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 13-29 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 14-29 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 15-29 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 16-29 20% 0.5" ATS CL OD r 17-29 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 18-29 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 6-30 <20% 0.5" ATS'CL OD 7-30 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 8-30 <20% 0.F HTS CL OD

<20% f .7 h LTS CL OD 9-30 <20% .6" tTS CL OD

<20% ,," 1TS CL OD 10-30 <20% 0. d; ATS CL OD

'l +13-30 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 14-s0 23% 0.6" ATS CL OD 15-30 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 16-30 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 17-30 21% 0.8" ATS CL OD 18-30 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 6-31 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 7-31 <20% 0.4" 7.TS CL OD 8-31 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 9-31 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 10-31 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 11-31 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 15-31 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 67

1 Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 16-31 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 17-31 24% 0.8" ATS CL OD 18-31 21% 0.7" ATS CL OD 19-31 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 6-32 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 7-32 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 8-32 <20% 0.3" ATS CL OD 9-32 21% 0.5" ATS CL OD 10-32 20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 11-32 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 12-32 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 13-32 33% 0.7" ATS CL OD 14-32 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 15-32 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 16-32 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 17-32 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 18-32 31% 0.6" ATS CL OD 19-32 21% 0.8" ATS CL OD 20-32 20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 43-32 <20% 10.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 10.4" ATS CL OD

<20% 8.5" ATS CL OD 6-33 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 7-33 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 8-33 <20% 0.3" ATS CL OD 9-33 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 10-33 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 11-33 20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 12-33 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 13-33 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 18-33 21% 0.9" ATS CL OD 19-33 23% 0.9" ATS CL OD 26% 1.0" ATS CL OD 20-33 24% 0.8" ATS CL OD 21-33 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 41-33 33% 3.3" ATE HL OD 7-34 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 8-34 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD i 9-34 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 10-34 27% 0.8" ATS CL OD 11-34 23% 0.7" ATS CL OD 12-34 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 17-34 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 18-34 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 19-34 21% 0.8" ATS CL OD 20-34 22% 0.8" ATS CL OD 21-34 20% 0.7" ATS CL OD l 6-35 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 9-35 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 68

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 10-35 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 11-35 29% 0.6" ATS CL OD 21% 1.0" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 12-35 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 13-35 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 17-35 20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 18-35 29% 0.9" ATS CL OD 24% 0.5" ATS CL OD 19-35 24% 0.7" ATS CL OD 21-35 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 7-36 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 38% 0.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 5.3" ATS CL OD 8-36 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 9-36 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.6" ATS CL OD 10-36 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 11-36 26% 0.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.8" ATS CL OD 12-36 28% 0.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 18-36 22% 0.6" ATS CL OD 19-36 21% 0.5" ATS CL OD 20-36 24% 1.0" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 21-36 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 6-37 <20% 2.4" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 7-37 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 9-37 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 10-37 24% 0.5" ATS CL OD 24% 1.0" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD

<20% 5.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 4.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 4.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 3.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 11-37 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 3.3" ATS CL OD 12-37 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD

<20% <1.4" ATS CL OD 14-37 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 3.1" ATS CL OD t 69

t Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 16-37 <20% 3.4" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.6" ATS CL OD l 17-37 26% 0.5" ATS CL OD

! <20% 6.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 5.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 3.0" ATS CL OD 19-37 25% 0.5" ATS CL OD 20-37 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 21-37 <20% 6.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 5.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 5.2" ATS CL OD 42-37 <20% #1 TSP CL OD 8-38 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 9-38 <20% 1.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 10-38 <20% 2.0" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 11-38 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 12-38 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 15-38 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 17-38 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 3.3" ATS CL OD

<20% 5.8" ATS CL OD 18-38 DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 19-38 <20% 4.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.6" ATS CL OD 21-38 <20% 3.2" ATS CL OD 38-38 <20% #1 TSP CL OD 41-38 <20% #1 TSP CL OD 2-39 <20% 7.9" ATS CL OD 9-39 <20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 11-39 <20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 13-39 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 14-39 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 15-39 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 20-39 <20% 3.9" ATS CL OD 41-39 <20% 4.4" ATS HL OD

<20% 4.0" ATS HL OD

<20% 3.4" ATS HL OD 9-40 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 11-40 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 12-40 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 13-40 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 42-40 <20% 5.0" ATS HL OD 24% 3.1" ATS HL OD

<20% 10.4" ATS HL OD

<20% 2.3" ATS HL OD

<20% 1.9" ATS HL OD 3-41 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 10-41 <20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 70

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 9-42 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 10-43 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 17-43 <20% 4.6" ATS CL OD 6-44 <20% 3.0" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.4" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 8-44 <20% 1.8" ATS CL OD 10-44 <20% 1.4" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 43-44 <20% #1 TSP HL OD 7-45 <20% 2.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 1,4" ATS CL OD

<20% #1 TSP CL OD 9-45 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 13-45 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 14-45 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 20-45 <20% 3.3" ATS CL OD

<20% 3.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 30-45 <20% 0" ATS CL OD 31-45 <20% 0" ATS CL OD 8-46 <20% 3.3" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.2" ATS CL OD 9-46 <20% 5.2" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 10-46 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 11-46 20% 0.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 4.7" ATS CL OD 12-46 33% 0.8" ATS CL OD DI 0.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 14-46 26% 0.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.6" ATS CL OD 15-46 21% 0.9" ATS CL OD 16-46 21% 1.4" ATS CL OD 25% 0.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.8" ATS CL OD

! 21-46 <20% 9.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 3.8" ATS CL OD 9-47 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 10-47 26% 0.8" ATS CL OD 11-47 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 12-47 25% 1.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 13-47 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 14-47 <20% 1.8" ATS CL OD 15-47 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 16-47 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 71 i

I

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 17-47 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD DI 4.4" ATS CL OD 18-47 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 10-48 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 18-48 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 33-48 DI 0" ATS HL OD 34-49 <20% 0" ATS HL OD 33-50 DI 1.8" ATS HL OD s

4'-50 <20% #1 TSP HL OD 7-63 22% 0.8" ATS CL OD 6-69 <20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 7-69 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 6-72 <20% 0" ATS HL OD 35-73 DI 3.2" ATE HL OD 6-76 <20% 0" ATS HL OD 3-77 <20% 0" ATS HL OD 8-77 DI 0" ATS HL OD 10-78 <20% 0" ATS HL OD 10-79 24% 0" ATS HL OD 6-80 <20% 0" ATS HL OD 9-80 <20% 0" ATS HL OD 21-87 <20% 3.9" ATS HL OD "B" STEAM GENERATOR 3-1 37% #1 TSP CL OD 6-1 30% #1 TSP CL OD 1-2 23% #1 TSP CL OD 5-2 <20% #1 TSP CL OD 10-2 38% #1 TSP CL OD 12-2 37% #1 TSP CL OD 10-3 DI #1 TSP CL OD 13-4 31% #1 TSP CL OD 20-6 27% #1 TSP CL OD 22-9 <20% 22.7" ATS HL OD

<20% 23.2" ATS HL OD 22-12 28% #1 TSP CL OD 6-16 <20% 0" ATS HL OD 29-16 35% #1 TSP CL OD 5-18 37% 0.3" ATS HL OD 1-21 <20% #1 TSP CL OD 34-22 <20% 0.3" A #1 TSP HL OD 28-23 DI 0.3" ATS HL OD 8-24 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 9-24 <20% 0.3" ATS CL OD 10-24 <20% 0.3" ATS CL OD 11-24 <20% 0.3" ATS CL OD 7-25 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 8-25 25% 0.9" ATS CL OD 27% 0.4" ATS CL OD 72

t Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 9-25 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 25% 0.5" ATS CL OD 10-25 26% 0.9" ATS CL OD 39% 0.4" ATS CL OD 11-25 30% 0.6" ATS CL OD 12-25 31% 0.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.1" ATS CL OD 13-25 36% 0.6" ATS CL OD 14-25 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 5-26 24% 1.2" ATS CL OD 6-26 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 34% 1.2" ATS CL OD 7-26 35% 1.0" ATS CL OD 31% 0.4" ATS CL OD 9-26 22% 1.2" ATS CL OD 34% 0.8" ATS CL OD 39% 0.4" ATS CL OD 11-26 36% 0.5" ATS CL OD 12-26 37% 0.8" ATS CL OD 39% 0.3" ATS CL OD 13-26 34% 0.5" ATS CL OD 14-26 27% 0.7" ATS CL OD 22% 0.5" ATS CL OD 15-26 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 5-27 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 6-27 <20% 2.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.2" ATS CL OD DI 0.4" ATS CL OD 8-27 (20% 1.4" ATS CL OD DI 0.4" ATS CL OD 9-27 30% 1.3" ATS CL OD 11-27 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 36% 0.5" ATS CL OD 12-27 <20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 34% 1.3" ATS CL OD 36% 0.6" ATS CL OD 38% 0.3" ATS CL OD 14-27 34% 0.7" ATS CL OD 15-27 30% 0.4" ATS CL OD 4-28 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 5-28 26% 0.9" ATS CL OD 25% 0.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 6-28 28% 0.9" ATS CL OD 33% 0.4" ATS CL OD 7-28 <20% 1.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 22% 1.0" ATS CL OD 8-28 <20% 2.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 25% 0.5" ATS CL OD 73

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 9-28 <20% 2.4" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.2" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.6" ATS CL OD 30% 1.3" ATS CL OD 28% 0.4" ATS CL OD 10-28 <20% 2.2" ATS CL OD 30% 1.5" ATS CL OD 11-28 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 12-28 <20% 2.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 36% 0.9" ATS CL OD 13-28 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 37% 0.5" ATS CL OD 14-28 36% 0.8" ATS CL OD 28% 0.3" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 15-28 34% 0.8" ATS CL OD 16-28 39% 0.6" ATS CL OD 29-28 <20% #1 TSP CL OD 4-29 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 5-29 <20% 1.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 25% 0.9" ATS CL OD 6-29 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 36% 1.0" ATS CL OD 33% 0.6" ATS CL OD 7-29 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 24% 1.1" ATS CL OD 37% 0.5" ATS CL OD 8-29 <20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 27% 1.3" ATS CL OD 31% 0.7" ATS CL OD 9-29 <20% 2.1" ATS CL OD 38% 1.3" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 10-29 <20% 2.4" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.1" ATS CL OD 27% 1.3" ATS CL OD 28% 0.8" ATS CL OD 11-29 <20% 2.6" ATS CL OD 32% 1.3" ATS CL OD 34% 1.0" ATS CL OD 32% 0.7" ATS CL OD 13-29 34% 1.0" ATS CL OD 14-29 30% 0.6" ATS CL OD 15-29 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 31% 0.6" ATS CL OD 74

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 16-29 24% 1.3" ATS CL OD 36% 0.6" ATS CL OD 17-29 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 23-29 <20% #1 TSP CL OD 4-30 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 28% 0.5" ATS CL OD 5-30 22% 1.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.9" ATS CL OD DI 0.4" ATS CL OD 6-30 24% 1.2" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 39% 0.3" ATS CL OD 8-30 <20% 2.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 38% 0.5" ATS CL OD 9-30 30% 2.0" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 35% 0.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 10-30 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 22% 1.0" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 11-30 <20% 2.2" ATS CL OD 23% 1.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 24% 0.8" ATS CL OD 12-30 <20% 2.7" ATS CL OD 20% 2.3" ATS CL OD 26% 1.5" ATS CL OD 26% 0.9" ATS CL OD 13-30 <20% 2.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.2" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 38% 0.5" ATS CL OD 24% 1.4" ATS CL OD 14-30 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 15-30 <20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 23% 1.1" ATS CL OD 16-30 20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 37% 0.7" ATS CL OD 17-30 24% 0.9" ATS CL OD 18-30 35% 0.8" ATS CL OD 19-30 24% 0.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.3" ATS CL OD 4-31 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 5-31 <20% 1.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 6-31 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 29% 0.4" ATS CL OD 7-31 <20% 2.1" ATS CL OD 26% 1.7" ATS CL OD 26% 1.1" ATS CL OD 30% 0.7" ATS CL OD 75

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 8-31 35% 1.2" ATS CL OD 32% 0.7" ATS CL OD 24% 1.9" ATS CL OD 9-31 36% 1.2" ATS CL OD 23% 0.7" ATS CL OD 30% 1.9" ATS CL OD 10-31 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 30% 1.0" ATS CL OD 11-31 <20% 2.3" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 12-31 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.4" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 13-31 <20% 2.4" ATS CL OD 35% 1.4" ATS CL OD 22% 0.8" ATS CL OD 14-31 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 15-31 22% 1.3" ATS CL OD 16-31 <20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 36% 0.9" ATS CL OD 17-31 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 18-31 31% 1.2" ATS CL OD 28% 0.7" ATS CL OD 19-31 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 4-32 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 5-32 29% 1.0" ATS CL OD DI 0.4" ATS CL OD 6-32 <20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 25% 1.1" ATS CL OD 35% 0.5" ATS CL OD 7-32 <20% 2.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.6" ATS CL OD 27% 2.0" ATS CL OD 22% 1.0" ATS CL OD 8-32 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 9-32 <20% 1.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 39% 1.0" ATS CL OD 10-32 <20% 2.0" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.4" ATS CL OD i 32% 1.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 11-32 38% 1.5" ATS CL OD 28% 1.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 12-32 22% 1.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 13-32 <20% 2.4" ATS CL OD 24% 1.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.8" ATS CL OD i

76

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 14-32 22% 1.0" ATS CL OD 16-32 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 17-32 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 19-32 26% 0.6" ATS CL OD 21-32 DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 22-32 32% #1 TSP CL OD 4-33 28% 0.4" ATS CL OD 32% 0.5" ATS CL OD 5-33 22% 1.2" ATS CL OD 32% 0.8" ATS CL OD 6-33 28% 1.2" ATS CL OD 20% 0.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 7-33 27% 1.3" ATS CL OD 35% 0.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 8-33 31% 1.0" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 9-33 24% 1.9" ATS CL OD 29% 1.3" ATS CL OD 36% 1.0" ATS CL OD i

10-33 25% 2.0" ATS CL OD 37% 1.1" ATS CL OD 23% 0.8" ATS CL OD 11-33 <20% 1.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.0" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 12-33 <20% 2.5" ATS CL OD 36% 1.5" ATS CL OD 26% 0.9" ATS CL OD 22% 0.5" ATS CL OD 13-33 27% 1.4" ATS CL OD 35% 0.8" ATS CL OD 14-33 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 15-33 <20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 16-33 <20% 2.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.4" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 18-33 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 27% 0.9" ATS CL OD 29% 0.3" ATS CL OD 19-33 27% 0.8" ATS CL OD DI 0.4" ATS CL OD 20-33 DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 21-33 24% 0.9" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 4-34 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 5-34 33% 0.9" ATS CL OD 22% 0.7" ATS CL OD 4

6-34 23% 1.1" ATS CL OD 20% 0.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.8" ATS CL OD 77 I _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ . _ . _ _, . _ _ _ . _ - _ _ . _ _ . . . _ _ . _ _

Row - Column ' Indication % Location Origin 7-34 <20% 2.4" ATS CL OD 21% 1.1" ATS CL OD 29% 0.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 3.8" ATS CL OD 8-34 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 9-34 20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 26% 1.2" ATS CL OD 10-34 <20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 33% 1.1" ATS CL OD 11-34 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 12-34 23% 1.0" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 13-34 24% 1.3" ATS CL OD 22% 0.8" ATS CL OD 14-34 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 15-34 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 16-34 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 17-34 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 18-34 23% 0.8" ATS CL OD 19-34 27% 0.7" ATS CL OD 5-35 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 6-35 26% 1.0" ATS CL OD DI 0.5" ATS CL OD 7-35 20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 30% 0.6" ATS CL OD 8-35 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 9-35 <20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 29% 1.0" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 10-35 21% 1.8" ATS CL OD 33% 1.0" ATS CL OD 11-35 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 12-35 <20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 30% 1.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 13-35 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 14-35 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 15-35 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 16-35 24% 0.9" ATS CL OD 18-35 38% 0.8" ATS CL OD 23% 0.4" ATS CL OD

<20% 5.6" ATS CL OD 19-35 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 20-35 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 78

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin-21-35 23% 0.7" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 4-36 20% 0.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 5-36 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 27% 0.6" ATS CL OD 6-36 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 8-36 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.3" ATS CL OD 24% 1.0" ATS CL OD 9-36 29% 1.2" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.3" ATS CL OD

<20% .2.0" ATS CL OD 10-36 31% 1.7" ATS CL OD 29% 1.0" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 11-36 29% 1.7" ATS CL OD 34% 1.5" ATS CL OD 26% 1.0" ATS CL OD 12-36 24% 1.6" ATS CL OD 27% 0.8" ATS CL OD 13-36 26% 1.1" ATS CL OD 14-36 28% 1.2" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 15-36 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 16-36 <20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 29% 0.8" ATS CL OD 17-36 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 18-36 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 19-36 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 20-36 23% 0.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 21-36 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 22-36 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 23-36 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 4-37 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 5-37 29% 1.6" ATS CL OD 30% 0.5" ATS CL OD 6-37 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 22% 0.5" ATS CL OD 7-37 <20% 2.1" ATS CL OD 38% 0.4" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 8-37 <20% 2.2" ATS CL OD 24% 1.1" ATS CL OD 22% 0.7" ATS CL OD 9-37 <20% 2.2" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 27% 0.8" ATS CL OD 10-37 34% 0.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 79 1

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 11-37 30% 0.8" ATS CL OD 12-37 <20% 2.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 29% 0.7" ATS CL OD 13-37 26% 0.8" ATS CL OD 14-37 33% 0.9" ATS CL OD 15-37 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 16-37 23% 0.6" ATS CL OD 17-37 <20% 'O.7" ATS CL OD 18-37 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 20-37 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 21-37 29% 0.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.8" ATS CL OD 22-37 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 23-37 36% 0.5" ATS CL OD 22% 0.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 3-38 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.2" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 5-38 39% 0.4" ATS CL OD 6-38 31% 0.6" ATS CL OD 7-38 32% 1.9" ATS CL OD 30% 0.5" ATS CL OD 8-38 35% 2.1" ATS CL OD 9-38 <20% 2.1" ATS CL OD 23% 0.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 10-38 37% 0.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.1" ATS CL OD 11-38 22% 1.0" ATS CL OD 25% 0.5" ATS CL OD 12-38 30% 0.6" ATS CL OD 13-38 33% 0.9" ATS CL OD 14-38 20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 15-38 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 16-38 25% 0.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 17-38 24% 0.7" ATS CL OD 18-38 27% 1.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 22% 1.3" ATS CL OD 19-38 24% 1.2" ATS CL OD 20-38 29% 0.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 21-38 25% 0.6" ATS CL OD 22-38 23% 0.5" ATS CL OD 23-38 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 4-39 27% 0.7" ATS CL OD 80

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 5-39 29% 0.8" ATS CL OD 31% 0.4" ATS CL OD 6-39 DI 0.5" ATS CL OD 7-39 33% 2.0" ATS CL OD 35% 0.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 8-39 <20% 2.3" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 9-39 <20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 24% 0.8" ATS CL OD 10-39 29% 0.6" ATS CL OD 11-39 23% 1.4" ATS CL OD 33% 0.6" ATS CL OD 12-39 34% 1.0" ATS CL OD 23% 0.6" ATS CL OD 13-39 38% 0.9" ATS CL OD 14-39 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 15-39 21% 0.6" ATS CL OD 24% 0.8" ATS CL OD 16-39 20% 0.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 17-39 21% 1.1" ATS CL OD 23% 0.6" ATS CL OD 18-39 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 19-39 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 20-39 <20% 3.0" ATS CL OD 37% 0.7" ATS CL OD 21-39 34% 0.4" ATS CL OD 22-39 34% 0.3" ATS CL OD 23-39 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 39% 0.4" ATS CL OD 4-40 22% 0.8" ATS CL OD 5-40 36% 0.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 6-40 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 7-40 31% 2.2" ATS CL OD 38% 0.5" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.8" ATS CL OD 8-40 24% 2.2" ATS CL OD 30% 0.7" ATS CL OD 9-40 <20% 2.2" ATS CL OD 28% 0.7" ATS CL OD 10-40 29% 0.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.1" ATS CL OD 11-40 28% 0.6" ATS CL OD 12-40 37% 1.3" ATS CL OD 29% 0.6" ATS CL OD 13-40 36% 0.9" ATS CL OD 14-40 22% 0.7" ATS CL OD 15-40 26% 0.7" ATS CL OD DI 0.4" ATS CL OD 81

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 16-40 23% 0.6" ATS CL OD 17-40 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 19-40 22% 0.7" ATS CL OD 20-40 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 21-40 33% 0.5" ATS CL OD 30% 0.1" ATS CL OD 22-40 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 23-40 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 4-41 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 23% 0.4" ATS CL OD 5-41 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 39% 0.7" ATS CL OD DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 6-41 34% 0.6" ATS CL OD 7-41 37% 0.6" ATS CL OD 8-41 <20%- 2.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 22% 0.5" ATS CL OD 9-41 30% 0.7" ATS CL OD 10-41 <20% 2.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 35% 0.6" ATS CL OD 11-41 30% 0.7" ATS CL OD 13-41 28% 0.8" ATS CL OD 14-41 28% 1.1" ATS CL OD 32% 0.5" ATS CL OD 15-41 24% 0.4" ATS CL OD 16-41 29% 0.5" ATS CL OD 17-41 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 18-41 30% 0.7" ATS CL OD 19-41 27% 0.6" ATS CL OD 20-41 27% 0.5" ATS CL OD 22-41 26% 0.5" ATS CL OD 23-41 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 5-42 30% 0.8" ATS CL OD 6-42 30% 0.6" ATS CL OD 7-42 35% 0.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 3.4" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.0" ATS CL OD

. <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 0.4" ATS CL 8-42 32% OD

<20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 9-42 <20% 1.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 10-42 24% 1.8" ATS CL OD 37% 0.7" ATS CL OD 23% 1.3" ATS CL OD 11-42 24% 1.4" ATS CL OD 28% 0.6" ATS CL OD 12-42 <20% 1.6" ATS CL OD 26% 1.0" ATS CL OD 36% 0.5" ATS CL OD 82

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 13-42 32% 1.5" ATS CL OD 31% 0.8" ATS CL OD 14-42 30% 1.2" ATS CL OD 31% 0.5" ATS CL OD 15-42 26% 0.5" ATS CL OD 16-42 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 18-42 31% 0.6" ATS CL OD 19-42 31% 0.5" ATS CL OD 20-42 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 21-42 36% 0.5" ATS CL OD 27% 1.0" ATS CL OD 37-42 21% #1 TSP CL OD 4-43 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 5-43 31% 0.7" ATS CL OD 6-43 37% 0.6" ATS CL OD 8-43 <20% 1.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 35% 0.5" ATS CL OD 9-43 23% 1.6" ATS CL OD 24% 0.6" ATS CL OD 10-43 39% 1.4" ATS CL OD 27% 0.6" ATS CL OD 12-43 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 35% 0.9" ATS CL OD 32% 0.6" ATS CL OD 13-43 26% 1.6" ATS CL OD 32% 0.6" ATS CL OD 15-43 DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 26% 0.4" ATS CL OD 16-43 26% 0.6" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 17-43 DI 0.5" ATS CL OD 18-43 36% 0.7" ATS CL OD 19-43 26% 1.1" ATS CL OD 36% 0.7" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 20-43 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 21-43 22% 1.1" ATS CL OD 26% 0.6" ATS CL OD 23-43 22% 0.9" ATS CL OD 24% 0.5" ATS CL OD 3-44 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 4-44 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 5-44 30% 0.8" ATS CL OD 8-44 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 37% 1.0" ATS CL OD 38% 0.5" ATS CL OD 9-44 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 10-44 28% 1.1" ATS CL OD 11-44 36% 1.1" ATS CL OD 1 31% 0.5" ATS CL OD 83

a Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 12-44 <20% 1.8" ATS CL OD 31% 0.8" ATS CL OD 13-44 32% 0.8" ATS CL OD 14-44 <20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 26% 0.7" ATS CL OD

.15-44 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 20% 0.7" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 22% 1.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 16-44 32% 0.7" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 17-44 24% 0.9" ATS CL OD 24% 0.9" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 18-44 32% 0.6" ATS CL OD 20-44 24% 0.9" ATS CL OD 21-44 31% 1.0" ATS CL OD 22-44 28% 1.2"_ATS CL OD 23-44 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 24-44 20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 3-45 20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 32% 0.8" ATS CL OD 4-45 22% 1.1" ATS CL OD 9-45 38% 0.7" ATS CL OD 39% 1.8" ATS CL OD 12-45 26% 2.1" ATS CL OD 26% 0.9" ATS CL OD 13-45 38% 2.0" ATS CL OD 30% 1.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 14-45 23% 2.3" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 36% 0.5" ATS CL OD 15-45 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.8" ATS CL OD DI 0.4" ATS CL OD 16-45 36% 1.8" ATS CL OD 25% 0.5" ATS CL OD 17-45 <20% 1.8" ATS CL OD 38% 1.1" ATS CL OD 18-45 28% 1.7" ATS CL OD 35% 0.8" ATS CL OD DI 0.5" ATS CL OD 19-45 32% 0.8" ATS CL OD 20-45 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD DI 0.4" ATS CL OD 21-45 DI 0.5" ATS CL OD 22-45 30% 1.1" ATS CL OD 23-45 36% 0.9" ATS CL OD 24-45 24% 0.7" ATS CL OD 29-45 <20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 84

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 3-46 DI 0.8" ATS CL OD 4-46 32% 1.2" ATS CL OD 35% 0.5" ATS CL OD 13-46 27% 1.6" ATS CL OD 35% 0.8" ATS CL OD 15-46 <20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 27% 0.6" ATS CL OD 16-46 <20% 2.5" ATS CL OD 39% 1.9" ATS CL OD 32% 1.1" ATS CL OD 34% 0.5" ATS CL OD 17-46 <20% 2.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.3" ATS CL OD 27% 2.0" ATS CL OD 20% 1.6" ATS CL OD 37% 0.9" ATS CL OD 18-46 <20% 2.1" ATS CL OD 24% 0.9" ATS CL OD 39% 0.5" ATS CL OD 36% 1.5" ATS CL OD 19-46 22% 2.1" ATS CL OD 37% 0.8" ATS CL OD 20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 20-46 <20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 21-46 <20% 2.4" ATS CL OD 22-46 <20% 2.7" ATS CL OD 23-46 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 25-46 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 29-46 31% #1 TSP CL OD

33-46 27% #1 TSP CL OD 41-46 <20% #1 TSP CL OD 3-47 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 36% 0.6" ATS CL OD 4-47 27% 1.5" ATS CL OD 37% 1.0" ATS CL OD 37% 0.4" ATS CL OD 13-47 27% 2.0" ATS CL OD 36% 0.8" ATS CL OD 14-47 30% 1.9" ATS CL OD 38% 0.9" ATS CL OD 17-47 20% 2.7" ATS CL OD 27% 2.0" ATS CL OD 31% 1.2" ATS CL OD DI 0.6" ATS CL OD 18-47 39% 2.0" ATS CL OD 36% 0.5" ATS CL OD 37% 1.1" ATS CL OD 19-47 39% 1.2" ATS CL OD 20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 20-47 <20% 2.2" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 85

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 21-47 23% 2.4" ATS CL OD 24% 1.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 22-47 <20% 1.8" ATS CL OD 23% 1.3" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.2" ATS CL OD 23-47 30% 1.9" ATS CL OD 27% 1.0" ATS CL OD 41-47 21% #1 TSP CL OD 3-48 <20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 4-48 <20% 1.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 7-48 37% 1.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 32% 0.7" ATS CL OD 8-48 <20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 37% 1.5" ATS CL OD 22% 0.9" ATS CL OD 10-48 34% 1.3" ATS CL OD 12-48 22% 1.7" ATS CL OD .

39% 0.9" ATS CL OD 35% 0.4" ATS CL OD 13-48 <20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 39% 1.0" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 14-48 <20% 2.2" ATS CL OD 35% 1.9" ATS CL OD 38% 0.9" ATS CL OD 37% 0.5" ATS CL OD 15-48 23% 1.9" ATS CL OD 38% 0.8" ATS CL OD 36% 0.5" ATS CL OD 16-48 <20% 1.8" ATS CL OD 32% 0.7" ATS CL OD 17-48 28% 0.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.9" ATS CL 30 19-48 38% 1.1" ATS CL OD 28% 0.5" ATS CL OD 20-48 <20% 2.1" ATS CL OD 28% 1.7" ATS CL OD

, 38% 1.2" ATS CL OD

! 22-48 26% 0.3" ATS CL OD 23-48 23% 1.7" ATS CL OD 32% 0.9" ATS CL OD DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 24-48 DI 0.5" ATS CL OD

! 39% 0.9" ATS CL OD 25-48 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD l 30-48 22% #1 TSP CL OD 33-48 26% #1 TSP CL OD 37-48 <20% #1 TSP CL OD 41-48 <20% #1 TSP CL OD l 86

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 6-49 25% 1.0" ATS CL OD 29% 0.6" ATS CL OD 7-49 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 28% 0.5" ATS CL OD 8-49 35% 1.2" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 9-49 35% 1.8" ATS CL OD 35% 1.3" ATS CL OD 25% 0.3" ATS CL OD 10-49 28% 1.9" ATS CL OD 30% 1.4" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 11-49 32% 1.3" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 12-49 28% 1.3" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 13-49 28% 1.1" ATS CL OD 28% 1.7" ATS CL OD 14-49 32% 0.8" ATS CL OD 15-49 31% 0.6" ATS CL OD i <20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 16-49 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 17-49 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 19-49 38% 0.9" ATS CL OD 21-49 30% 1.3" ATS CL OD 38% 0.6" ATS CL OD 23-49 28% 1.1" ATS CL OD 30% 0.8" ATS CL OD 24-49 32% 0.9" ATS CL OD 25-49 35% 0.3" ATS CL OD 6-50 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 7-50 20% 2.1" ATS CL OD t 26% 0.5" ATS CL OD 8-50 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 28% 0.5" ATS CL OD 9-50 23% 1.1" ATS CL OD 4 33% 0.5" ATS CL OD 10-50 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 11-50 24% 1.2" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 12-50 21% 1.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 13-50 32% 1.0" ATS CL OD 14-50 24% 0.7" ATS CL OD 15-50 25% 0.7" ATS CL OD 16-50 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 17-50 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 21-50 36% 0.9" ATS CL OD 22-50 27% 1.0" ATS CL OD 39% 0.6" ATS CL OD 27% 1.3" ATS CL OD 87 i

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 23-50 36% 1.0" ATS CL OD 39% 0.6" ATS CL OD 24-50 30% 0.6" ATS CL OD 4-51 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 5-51 25% 0.5" ATS CL OD 6-51 23% 1.9" ATS CL OD 20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 25% 0.8" ATS CL OD 7-51 26% 2.2" ATS CL OD 22% 0.9" ATS CL OD 27% 0.4" ATS CL OD 8-51 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.3" ATS CL OD 9-51 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 37% 0.3" ATS CL OD 10-51 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 31% 0.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.6" ATS CL OD 11-51 28% 0.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.1" ATS CL OD 12-51 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 13-51 24% 0.5" ATS CL OD 28% 1.1" ATS CL OD 14-51 21% 0.9" ATS CL OD 15-51 DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 38% 0.8" ATS CL OD 16-51 38% 0.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 17-51 21% 0.7" ATS CL OD 19-51 35% 0.9" ATS CL OD 35% 0.4" ATS CL OD 22-51 32% 0.7" ATS CL OD 24-51 39% 0.5" ATS CL OD 25-51 36% 0.3" ATS CL OD 3-52 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 4-52 31% 0.7" ATS CL OD 5-52 31% 0.4" ATS CL OD 6-52 <20% 2.5" ATS CL OD 33% 0.7" ATS CL OD 7-52 <20% 2.2" ATS CL OD 29% 0.5" ATS CL OD 8-52 <20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 39% 0.4" ATS CL OD 9-52 23% 1.8" ATS CL OD 37% 0.4" ATS CL OD 10-52 DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 24% 0.6" ATS CL OD 11-52 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 21% 0.5" ATS CL OD 12-52 28% 0.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 88

~1

-o; Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 13-52 28% 0.5" ATS CL OD 14-52 25% 0.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 15-52 39% 0.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 16-52 36% 0.7" ATS CL OD 17-52 DI 0.4" ATS CL OD 27% 0.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 18-52 28% 0.8" ATS CL OD 25% 1.4" ATS CL OD 19-52 36% 0.9" ATS CL OD 28% 1.4" ATS CL OD 20-52 24% 0.4" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 25-52 39% 0.3" ATS CL OD 38-52 <20% 0.1" ATS HL OD 3-53 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 4-53 DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 5-53 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 6-53 22% 2.1" ATS CL OD 23% 1.6" ATS CL OD 23% 0.9" ATS CL OD 35% 0.6" ATS CL OD 7-53 <20% 2.2" ATS CL OD 25% 0.6" ATS CL OD 29% 0.3" ATS CL OD 8-53 <20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 36% 0.5" ATS CL OD 10-53 34% 0.4" ATS CL OD 28% 1.1" ATS CL OD 11-53 22% 0.8" ATS CL OD 39% 1.3" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.2" ATS CL OD 24% 0.6" ATS CL OD 12-53 21% 0.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.6" ATS CL OD 13-53 38% 1.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 14-53 31% 1.0" ATS CL OD 17-53 28% 0.7" ATS CL OD 18-53 38% 0.8" ATS CL OD 24% 1.4" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 19-53 34% 0.8" ATS CL OD 22% 2.0" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 20-53 22% 0.5" ATS CL OD 35% 1.0" ATS CL OD 89 1

1 Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 21-53 31% 0.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.6" ATS CL OD 23-53 39% 0.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 25-53 36% 0.3" ATS CL OD 26-53 28% 0.4" ATS CL OD 3-54 25% 0.2" ATS CL OD 6-54 37% 0.8" ATS CL OD 7-54 25% 2.2" ATS CL OD 32% 0.8" ATS CL OD 30% 0.4" ATS CL OD 8-54 31% 1.1" ATS CL OD 25% 0.6" ATS CL OD 25% 0.3" ATS CL OD 9-54 36% 1.8" ATS CL OD 36% 1.2" ATS CL OD 36% 0.4" ATS CL OD 10-54 34% 0.3" ATS CL OD 21% 1.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.4" ATS CL OD 11-54 28% 1.4" ATS CL OD 24% 0.4" ATS CL OD 12-54 <20% 1.8" ATS CL OD 14-54 28% 0.9" ATS CL OD 25% 0.6" ATS CL OD 15-54 34% 0.4" ATS CL OD 35% 0.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.4" ATS CL OD 16-54 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 34% 0.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 17-54 32% 0.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.1" ATS CL OD 18-54 30% 1.0" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.2" AT3 CL OD 19-54 28% 1.0" ATS CL OD 27% 1.3" ATS CL OD 25% 2.2" ATS CL OD 20-54 27% 1.3" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.4" ATS CL OD 21-54 35% 0.6" ATS CL OD 30% 1.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.2" ATS CL OD 22-54 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 21% 1.6" ATS CL OD 24-54 39% 0.4" ATS CL OD 34% 0.8" ATS CL OD 26-54 35% 0.5" ATS CL OD 38-54 24% #1 TSP CL OD 3-55 DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 4-55 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 90

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 5-55 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 6-55 22% 0.7" ATS CL OD '

26% 0.5" ATS CL OD 7-55 22% 0.9" ATS CL OD DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 8-55 20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 26% 0.5" ATS CL OD 9-55 <20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 32% 0.5" ATS CL OD 10-55 32% 1.7" ATS CL OD 11-55 28% 1.5" ATS CL OD 13-55 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 14-55 35% 1.2" ATS CL OD 15 <20% 2.4" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD r 23% 0.9" ATS CL OD 16-55 22% 1.0" ATS CL OD 17-55 <20% 2.2" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 22% 0.8" ATS CL OD

18-55 <20% 2.2" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.0" ATS CL OD

. 19-55 <20% 2.3" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.8" ATS CL OD 21% 1.1" ATS CL OD

21-55 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 22-55 39% 0.7" ATS CL OD 32% 1.3" ATS CL OD

' 1.0" ATS CL OD 23-55 32%

25-55 37% 0.9" ATS CL OD 31% 0.4" ATS CL OD j 4-56 DI 0.1" ATS CL OD 5-56 DI 0.1" ATS CL OD

! 6-56 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 7-56 33% 0.6" ATS CL OD DI 0.2" ATS CL OD j 8-56 DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 9-56 <20% 1.4" ATS CL OD

• DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 10-56 22% 1.7" ATS CL OD 22% 1.1" ATS CL OD 25% 0.4" ATS CL OD 11-56 27% 1.5" ATS CL OD 12-56 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 13-56 30% 1.2" ATS CL OD

! <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD j 14-56 24% 1.1" ATS CL OD 15-56 32% 1.4" ATS CL OD 16-56 <20% 1.6" ATS CL OD

1 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 17-56 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD i

<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD

i 1

l 91 4

- - g .-m--my -- ,. m v. 7 ,. _ , , . - , , < _ , , _ , , , ,,,.-- ,,, m -

,,.,,#yry _w%,. .n,.-,---. , , , _ . r--.m.-,_,,,--mwm-

e Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 18-56 22% 1.6" ATS CL OD 27% 0.8" ATS CL OD 19-56 22% 1.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 21-56 24% 1.5" ATS CL OD 22-56 <20% 1.4" ATS CL '0D 35% 0.8" ATS CL OD 23-56 34% 1.3" ATS CL OD 39% 0.7" ATS CL OD 24-56 27% 0.8" ATS CL OD 39% 0.6" ATS CL OD 25-56 25% 0.9" ATS CL OD 3-57 37% 0.4" ATS CL OD 4-57 33% 0.4" ATS CL OD DI 0.1" ATS CL OD 5-57 DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 6-57 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 37% 0.5" ATS CL OD 7-57 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 8-57 DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 9-57 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 39% 0.3" ATS CL OD 10-57 DI 0.4" ATS CL OD 11-57 <20% 1.4" ATS CL OD DI 0.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.3" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 12-57 27% 0.9" ATS CL OD 13-57 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 14-57 22% 1.2" ATS CL OD i 15-57 20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 16-57 28% 1.1" ATS CL OD 17-57 25% 1.2" ATS CL OD 18-57 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 1.1" ATS CL 36% OD 19-57 25% 1.3" ATS CL OD 30% 0.9" ATS CL OD 21-57 39% 1.0" ATS CL OD 23% 0.7" ATS CL OD 22-57 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 30% 1.3" ATS CL OD 33% 0.8" ATS CL OD 24-57 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 25-57 DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 27% 0.6" ATS CL OD 3-58 20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 4-58 25% 0.3" ATS CL OD 8-58 31% 0.5" ATS CL OD 9-58 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 92

l t

t ,,

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin ,

0.7" ATS CL 10-58 22% OD _

11-58 <20% 1;6" ATS CL OD

• 33% 0.8" ATS CL ' OD s 12-58 <20% 0 . 9 ",iATS CL , OD 13-58 25% 1.1"=ATS CL " 0D 14 <20% 1.0" ATS CL ' p,D '

15-58 23% 1.0" ATS CL . . pb 17-58 \ 25% 1.1" ATS CL OD s 18-58 ,

25% 1.2".ATS CL OD s 38% 0.9" ATS CL OD 19 35% 1.4" AIS CL OD 33% 0.8" ATS CL OD 20-58 DI 0.7" ATS CL OD 21-58 . <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD -

, 30% 0.6" ATS CL OD 22-58 -

22% 0.5" ATS CL Ch 23-58 DI 1.0, ATS CL OD-

<20% ,

0.5" ATS CL OD, 24-58 39% 0.6" ATS CL OD ,

25-58 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD  !'

DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 33-58 27 % #1 TSP CL OD 3-59 22% 0.5"~ATS CL OD 5-59 26% 0.6" ATS CL OD l

8-59 ,23% 1.1" ATS CL OD 39% 0.3" ATS CL OD 10-59 39%

1.1" ATS CL OD -

DI 0.4" ATS CL OD 11-59 28% 0.9" ATS CL OD 12-59 27% 1.3" ATS CL OD 14-59 <20% 1.0",ATS CL OD ,

15-59 '<20% 1.2" A7s CL OD 28% 0.9" AIS CL OD 16-59 25% 1.0" ATS CL OD , '

23% 0.7" ATS CL OD

\

17-59 25% 0.8" ATS CL '0D 18-59 39% 0.9" ATS CL OD 19-59 ' 23% 1.2" ATS CL OD 27 % 0.7" ATS CL OD 20-59 28% 0.7 ATS CL OD -

21-59 23% 0.6" ATS CL OD 22-59 <20% 1.6";ATS CL OD 23% 0.6" ATS CL' OD 23-59 25% 0.7" ATS CL OD 25-59 -

<20% 0.6" ATS CL OD DI 0.2" ATS CL ' OD 3-60 29% 0.4" ATS CL OD 5-60 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 38% 0.4" ATS CL OD /

6-60 33% 0.6" ATS CL OD 37% 0.3" ATS CL OD j 93

y -

't R ,cN - Column Indication % Location Origin

?1 7-60 36% 0.7" ATS CL OD 23% 2.3" ATS CL OD j; 8-60 31% 1.2" ATS CL OD

\ 39% 0.4" ATS CL OD g! 9-60 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD g

37% 0.4" ATS CL OD

( 10-60 26% 1.0" ATS CL OD 33% 0.6" ATS CL OD 22% 1.6" ATS CL OD 11-60 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 1.1" ATS CL 20% OD

' 12-60 20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 13-60 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD s, 14-60 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 60 20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 16-60 22% 1.1" ATS CL OD 17-60 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 18-60 28% 0.9" ATS CL OD

g. 19-60 <20% 1. 2" A' CL OD

,. [ 27% 0.8" ATS CL OD

~'

20-60 36% 0.8" ATS CL OD 21-60 30% 1.1" ATS CL OD DI 0.4" ATS CL OD 22-60 30% 0.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 24-60 39% 1.1" ATS CL OD 25% 0.7" ATS CL OD 20% 0.6" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 25-60 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.6" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 3-61 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 4-61 22% 1.0" ATS CL OD 25% 0.3" ATS CL OD 5-61 23% 0.9" ATS CL OD 31% 0.3" ATS CL OD 6-61 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 7-61 22% 1.1" ATS CL OD 23% 0.5" ATS CL OD 8-61 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 31% 0.6" ATS CL OD 9-61 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 31% 0.9" ATS CL OD 28% 0.4" ATS CL OD 10-61 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD DI 1.4" ATS CL OD

, <20% 1.8" ATS CL OD 11-61 35% 1.7" ATS CL OD DI 2.4" ATS CL OD i

94

__ _ . _ _ . . _ _ . _ . _ .m -- _ - . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _

t

, f

• r h E

\

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin ,

13-61 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD ,

1.4" ATS CL

~

14-61 <20% OD 23% 2.1" ATS CL OD 15-61 35% 1.4" ATS CL OD 16-61 , 23% 1.0" ATS CL OD 17-61 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 18-61'" <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 19-61.

20% 0.6",'A15 CL OD 21-61 , <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 22-61 DI c 0.9" ATS CL OD 23-61 30% ', 1.1" ATS CL '0D 24-61 22% 0.9" ATS CL OD 27% 0.4" ATS CL OD 37-61 <20% #1 TSP CL OD 39-61 <20% #1 TSP CL OD 3-62 DI 0.2" ATS CL OD

, 4-62 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD

( 6-62 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 27% 0.3" ATS CL OD '

l 8-62 <20% 1.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.6" ATS CL OD

, 9-62 20% 1.8" ATS CL OD 22% 0.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 10-62 30% 1.8" ATS CL OD l, 11-62 DI , 1.2" ATS CL OD 25% . 1.6" ATS CL OD i <20% 1.9" ATS CL OD

! 23% 2.3" ATS CL OD i 12-62 <20% 1.3" ATS CL CD 13-62 DI 1.0" ATS CL OD

<20% , 1.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.1" ATS CL OD t 14-62 23% 1.3" ATS CL OD 1 15-62 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD

1 16-62 20% 0.8" ATS CL 09

' 17-62 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD l

19-62 22% 0.7" ATS CL OD 20-62 DI 1.0" ATS CL OD 21-62 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD -

<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 22-62 23% 0.6" ATS CL OD l

t 20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 23-62 DI 0.4" ATS CL OD 24-62 30% 0.6" ATS CL OD 30% 1.0" ATS CL OD 39-62 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 95 l

/

a.-_.,_ - - , , . . . . , _ - . . _ _ - - - . _ - . - - _ _ . . ,, -.--- -_. ~ - -_-- .---.,-.--.._-_- . _. ,, - - .

Row Column Indication % Location Origin 3-63 DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 4-63 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 5-63 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.3" ATS CL OD 6-63 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 7-63 <20% 2.5" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 31% 1.4" ATS CL OD 7-63 35% 0.7" ATS CL OD 31% 0.2" ATS CL OD 8-63 <20% 1.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 9-63 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 35% 0.5" ATS CL OD 10-63 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 11-63 22% 1.6" ATS CL OD 12-63 22% 2.1" ATS CL OD 14-63 <20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 15-63 25% 0.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 16-63 25% 0.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.4" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 17-63 35% 0.5" ATS CL OD 25% 0.7" ATS CL OD 18-63 28% 0.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.1" ATS CL OD 19-63 30% 0.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 21-63 27% 0.8" ATS CL OD 22-63 20% 0.4" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 23-63 27% 0.8" ATS CL OD 24-63 27% 0.8" ATS CL OD 33% 0.4" ATS CL OD 3-64 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 4-64 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 31% 0.7" ATS CL OD 5-64 <20% 0.3" ATS CL OD 6-64 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 7-64 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 20% 0.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 8-64 22% 1.8" ATS CL OD 25% 0.5" ATS CL OD 96 l

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 10-64 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 11-64 <20% 1.6" ATS CL OD 25% 1.3" ATS CL OD 28% 2.2" ATS CL OD 12-64 <20% 2.2" ATS CL OD 14-64 DI 0.7" ATS CL OD 15-64 32% 0.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.0" ATS CL OD

<20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 16-E4 33% 0.8" ATS CL OD 17-64 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 27% 0.7" ATS CL OD 18-64 29% 2.2" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 37% 0.7" ATS CL OD 19-64 28% 0.7" ATS CL OD 20-64 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 21-64 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 31% 1.4" ATS CL OD 26% 0.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.3" ATS CL OD 23-64 22% 1.6" ATS CL OD 22% 1.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.6" ATS CL OD DI 0.4" ATS CL OD 24-64 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.3" ATS CL OD 25-64 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 27-64 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 3-65 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 4-65 DI 0.4" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 5-65 22% 1.0" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 6-65 29% 0.6" ATS CL OD 7-65 25% 1.3" ATS C5 OD 35% 0.5" ATS CL OD t

8-65 26% 1.6" ATS CL OD

! 39% 0.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 10-65 23% 3.2" ATS CL OD 29% 0.6" ATS CL OD 11-65 <20% 2.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD i

37% 0.5" ATS CL OD 12-65 23% 0.5" ATS CL OD 13-65 28% 1.2" ATS CL OD 22% 0.9" ATS CL OD 14-65 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 97 l

l _ , _- _ , - - - , _ -- -

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 15-65 <20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 27% 0.8" ATS CL OD 16-65 31% 0.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 17-65 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 25% 0.7" ATS CL OD 18-65 <20% 2.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 26% 0.6" ATS CL OD 19-65 <20% 1.8" ATS CL OD 20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 20-65 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 21-65 29% 0.6" ATS CL OD 22-65 26% 1.4" ATS CL OD 33% 0.5" ATS CL OD 24-65 22% 0.8" ATS CL OD 40-65 <20% 34.8" ATS HL OD

<20% 26.7" ATS HL OD 3-66 DI 0.4" ATS CL OD 4-66 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 32% 0.4" ATS CL OD 5-66 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 28% 0.5" ATS CL OD 6-66 31% 1.3" ATS CL OD 31% 0.6" ATS CL OD 7-66 25% 1.3" ATS CL OD 37% 0.4" ATS CL OD 8-66 <20% 1.5" ATS CL OD 36% 0.5" ATS CL OD 9-66 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 32% 0.7" ATS CL OD 10-66 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 11-66 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 32% 1.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.6" ATS CL OD DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 12-66 31% 0.6" ATS CL OD 13-66 28% 0.8" ATS CL OD 23% 0.5" ATS CL OD 14-66 28% 0.8" ATS CL OD 15-66 <20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 23% 0.7" ATS CL OD 16-66 <20% 1.4" ATS CL OD 23% 2.1" ATS CL OD 29% 0.7" ATS CL OD 17-66 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 18-66 26% 1.2" ATS CL OD 35% 0.5" ATS CL OD 98

l Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 19-66 25% 1.4" ATS CL OD 28% 0.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 20-66 27% 0.9" ATS CL OD 21-66 28% 1.5" ATS CL OD 22% 0.6" ATS CL OD 22-66 25% 0.8" ATS CL OD 22% 0.4" ATS CL OD 23-66 20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 22% 0.4" ATS CL OD 4-67 26% 0.8" ATS CL OD DI 0.5" ATS CL OD 5-67 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 6-67 28% 1.2" ATS CL OD 23% 0.7" ATS CL OD 7-67 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 35% 0.5" ATS CL OD 8-67 29% 0.6" ATS CL OD 9-67 32% 1.0" ATS CL OD 32% 0.6" ATS CL OD 10-67 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 29% 0.5" ATS CL OD 11-67 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 25% 0.6" ATS CL OD 12-67 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 13-67 25% 0.5" ATS CL OD 14-67 <20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 15-67 <20% 2.0" ATS CL OD 39% 0.8" ATS CL OD 16-67 23% 0.7" ATS CL OD 17-67 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 18-67 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD 35% 0.6" ATS CL OD 19-67 37% 1.3" ATS CL OD 37% 0.6" ATS CL OD 20-67 23% 0.7" ATS CL OD 21-67 26% 0.6" ATS CL OD 4-68 22% 0.8" ATS CL OD 5-68 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 6-68 26% 0.6" ATS CL OD 7-68 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 35% 0.8" ATS CL OD 8-68 <20% 1.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 0_8" ATS CL OD 9-68 <20% 1.7" ATS CL OD 35% 0.9" ATS CL OD 10-68 23% 0.8" ATS CL OD 37% 0.4" ATS CL OD 12-68 35% 0.6" ATS CL OD 13-68 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 32% 0.4" ATS CL OD i 99 l

l r - _- .___ _ -_ - _ --

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 14-68 31% 0.7" ATS CL OD 22% 0.5" ATS CL OD 15-68 32% 0.5" ATS CL OD 16-68 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 26% 0.6" ATS CL OD 17-68 28% 1.0" ATS CL OD 32% 0.5" ATS CL OD 18-68 <20% 1.2" ATS CL OD 36% 0.5" ATS CL OD 20-68 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 21-68 DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 4-69 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 5-69 DI 0.5" ATS CL OD 6-69 <20% 1.8" ATS CL OD 33% 0.8" ATS CL OD 8-69 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 28% 0.8" ATS CL OD 9-69 35% 0.9" ATS CL OD 10-69 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 28% 0.3" ATS CL OD 11-69 39% 0.8" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 12-69 <20% 1.9" ATS CL OD 31% 0.6" ATS CL OD 13-69 30% 0.6" ATS CL OD 14-69 28% 1.1" ATS CL OD 35% 0.5" ATS CL OD 15-69 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 16-69 39% 0.4" ATS CL OD 17-69 39% 0.3" ATS CL OD 19-69 32% 0.5" ATS CL OD 28% 0.3" ATS CL OD 20-69 DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 4-70 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 23% 0.6" ATS CL OD 5-70 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.4" ATS CL OD i 6-70 22% 0.6" ATS CL OD j 7-70 31% 0.9" ATS CL OD l 8-70 39% 0.9" ATS CL OD 9-70 32% 0.9" ATS CL OD 10-70 32% 0.8" ATS CL OD 11-70 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 12-70 35% 0.8" ATS CL OD 13-70 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD l 22% 0.3" ATS CL OD 14-70 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 36% 0.3" ATS CL OD 15-70 39% 0.4" ATS CL OD 16 70 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 23% 0.3" ATS CL OD 100 l - . , . .

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 17-70 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 19-70 DI 0.1" ATS CL OD 35-70 <20% 7.7" ATS HL OD

<20% 6.7" ATS HL OD 4-71 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 5-71 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 26% 0.7" ATS CL OD 6-71 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 26% 0.6" ATS CL OD 7-71 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.7" ATS CL OD 8-71 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 9-71 31% 0.9" ATS CL OD 23% 0.7" ATS CL OD 10-71 35% 0.8" ATS CL OD 11-71 28% 0.7" ATS CL OD 12-71 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD DI 0.1" ATS CL OD 13-71 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 14-71 <20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 28% 0.6" ATS CL OD 15-71 DI 0.4" ATS CL OD 16-71 DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 17-71 DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 18-71 DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 4-72 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 6-72 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD 7-72 <20% 0.5" ATS CL OD 9-72 36% 1.2" ATS CL OD 37% 0.8" ATS CL OD DI 0.5" ATS CL OD 10-72 25% 1.1" ATS CL OD 32% 0.5" ATS CL OD 11-72 26% 0.6" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.8" ATS CL OD DI 0.2" ATS CL OD

<20% 1.1" ATS CL OD 12-72 <20% 1.3" ATS CL OD

<20% 0.6" ATS CL OD 14-72 <20% 0.9" ATS CL OD DI 0.2" ATS CL OD 33-72 <20% 1.0" ATS CL OD 4-73 22% 0.6" ATS CL OD 8-73 <20% 0.6" ATS CL OD DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 9-73 DI 0.3" ATS CL OD 10-73 <20% 0.8" ATS CL OD 22% 0.5" ATS CL OD 26-73 <20% 5.2" ATS HL OD 33-73 31% #1 TSP CL OD 4-74 <20% 0.4" ATS CL OD 101

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ i

Row - Column Indication % Location Origin 5-74 DI 0.3" ATS HL OD 19-74 <20% 0.4" ATS HL OD 9-75 DI 0.0" ATS HL OD 26-75 <20% 1.9" ATS HL OD 10-76 24%. 0.1" ATS HL OD 9-77 <20% 2.0" ATS HL OD 31-77 25% 3.8" ATS HL OD 26-81 <20% 2.2" ATS HL OD

<20% 7.7" ATS HL OD 27-83 <20% 1.5" ATS HL OD 102 L

6.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RELIEF VALVE CHALLENGES 6.1 Overpressure Protection During Normal Pressure & Temperature Operation There were no challenges to the Unit 1 or Unit 2 reactor coolant system power-operated relief valves or safety valves at normal operating pressure and temperature in 1986.

6.2 Overpressure Protection During Low Pressure & Temperature Operation During low pressure and temperature operation, the low temperature overpressure protection circuit momentarily opened a Unit 1 power-operated relief valve on May 10, 1986, at 1455 hours0.0168 days <br />0.404 hours <br />0.00241 weeks <br />5.536275e-4 months <br /> following an inadvertent isolation of letdown.

There were no challenges to the Unit 2 power-operated relief valves during low pressure and temperature operation.

7.0 REACTOR COOLANT ACTIVITY ANALYSIS 7.1 June 12, 1986 The PBNP Unit 1 reactor entered a limiting condition of operation (LCO) on July 12, 1986, at 0747 hours0.00865 days <br />0.208 hours <br />0.00124 weeks <br />2.842335e-4 months <br /> when the reactor coolant dose equivalent I-131 exceeded 1.0 pCi/ gram. The dose equivalent I-131 peaked at 1.30 pCi/ gram. The LCO cleared at 2230 hours0.0258 days <br />0.619 hours <br />0.00369 weeks <br />8.48515e-4 months <br /> on July 12, 1986, when the dose equivalent I-131 was measured at 0.984 pCi/ gram. The total time above 1.0 pCi/ gram was 14.7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />. Plant Technical Specifications permit operation for up to 48 continuous hours above 1.0 pCi/ gram before requiring reactor shutdown and cooldown to an average reactor coolant temperature of less than 500 F. See attached tables and graphs for pertinent data required by Technical Specifications.

l 103

l Unit 1 Reactor Power Summary Date Time  % Power 07/05/86 0700 100.0 07/06/86 1330 100.0 07/07/86 0752 100.0 07/08/86 0741 100.0 07/09/86 0735 100.0 07/10/86 0812 100.0 07/11/86 0735 100.0 07/11/86 1905 100.0 07/11/86 2100 72.0 07/11/86 2300 42.0 07/12/86 0100 20.0 07/12/86 0300 6.0 07/12/86 0500 2.0 07/12/86 1930 12.0 07/12/86 2030 17.0 07/12/86 2300 30.0 07/13/86 0830 30.0 07/13/86 1202 73.0 07/13/86 143C 95.0 07/13/86 1435 100.0 07/14/86 0813 100.0 07/16/86 0815 100.0 07/16/86 2300 100.0 07/17/86 0200 57.0 07/17/86 0400 59.0 07/17/86 0600 77.0 07/17/86 0736 100.0 07/18/86 0730 100.0 l

1 104

UNIT 1 IODINE

SUMMARY

I-131 Equiv. I-131 I-132 I-133 I-134 I-135 Date Time pCi/cc pCi/cc pCi/cc pCi/cc pCi/cc pCi/cc 07/11/86 0822 0.1160 0.0763 0.0773 0.1050 0.0896 0.0811 07/11/86 2100 0.1200 0.0079 0.0814 0.1070 0.0892 0.0789 07/11/86 2302 0.1280 0.0882 0.0709 0.1120 0.0596 0.0699 07/12/86 0102 0.2020 0.1450 0.0828 0.1690 0.0384 0.0848 07/12/86 0307 0.1570 0.1150 0.0665 0.1260 0.0138 0.0626 07/12/86 0500 0.7040 0.5140 0.1990 0.6070 <MDA 0.2300 07/12/66 0747 1.0900 0.7320 0.2120 1.0000 <MDA 0.3170 07/12/56 1000 1.3000 0.9370 0.1990 1.2200 <MDA 0.3400 07/12/86 1204 1.2900 0.9350 0.1750 1.2000 <NDA 0.3060 07/12/86 1412 1.170 0.8540 0.1470 1.0600 <MDA 0.2230 07/12/86 1550 1.1400 0.8470 0.1440 0.9990 <MDA 0.1840 07/12/86 2050 1.2700 0.9710 0.2060 1.0500 <MDA 0.1400 07/12/86 2230 0.9840 0.7630 0.1220 0.7740 <MDA 0.0889 105

1 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 1 CLEANUP FLOW HISTORY CHARGING AND LETDOWN FLOW DATA (07-10 to 07-12-86) 07/10/86:

Charging Letdown Flow Flow Time (qpm) (qpm) 0100 62.27 73.15 0200 62.03 73.17 0300 62.27 73.16 0400 62.02 73.22 0500 62.24 73.18 0600 62.04 73.14 0700 62.19 73.17 0800 62.14 73.14 0900 62.50 73.19 1000 62.17 73.14 1100 61.99 73.15 1200 62.33 73.16 1300 62.01 73.14 1400 62.46 73.18 1500 62.09 73.13 1600 62.24 73.12 4

1700 62.16 73.17 1800 62.13 73.13 1900 62.16 73.13 2000 62.16 73.15 2100 62.08 73.14 2200 62.26 73.14 2300 62.07 73.13 00.00 62.28 73.13 1

106

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 1 CLEANUP FLOW HISTORY CHARGING AND LETDOWN FLOW DATA (07-10 to 07-12-86) 07/11/86:

Charging Letdown Flow Flow Time (qpm) (qpm) 0100 62.02 73.11 0200 62.27 73.10 0300 61.98 73.07 0400 62.20 73.05 0500 62.05 73.07 0600 62.22 73.07 0700 62.09 73.10 0800 62.30 73.11 0900 62.53 73.12 1000 62.09 73.12 1100 62.07 73.10 1200 62.15 73.07 1300 62.05 73.08 1400 62.18 73.08 1500 61.99 73.05 1600 62.28 73.10 1700 62.05 73.07

! 1800 62.17 73.12 1900 62.17 73.11 2000 62.36 73.11 l 2100 62.08 73.11 2200 62.17 73.18 2300 62.68 73.05 0000 64.70 73.09 l

107 i

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 1 CLEANUP FLOW HISTORY CHARGING AND LETDOWN FLOW DATA (07-10 to 07-12-86) 07/12/86:

Charging Letdown Flow Flow Time (qpm) (qpm) 0100 63.00 73.02 0200 64.39 73.05 0300 62.03 73.00 0400 66.91 73.08 0300 60.15 72.81 0600 63.09 73.01 0700 63.06 73.07 Of00 62.39 73.05 0900 62.99 73.05 1000 62.75 73.04 1100 62.92 73.03 1200 62.92 73.03 1300 62.53 73.01 1400 62.67 72.99 1500 62.41 72.99 1600 61.77 72.90 1700 63.07 72.90 1800 64.31 72.93 1900 61.52 72.92 2000 61.00 72.84 l

2100 60.19 72.90 i

2200 59.18 72.85 2300 63.53 72.96 0000 62.79 72.95 l

l I

l l

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I 108

RCS ACTIVITY (uCi/cc)

P O O P Q O P O O P O O O O O O O

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7.2 November 17, 1986 The PBNP Unit I reactor entered a limiting condition of operation (LCO) on November 17, 1986, at 2230 hours0.0258 days <br />0.619 hours <br />0.00369 weeks <br />8.48515e-4 months <br /> when the reactor coolant dose equivalent I-131 exceeded 1.0 pCi/ gram. The dose equivalent peaked at 2.674 pCi/ gram. The LCO cleared at 0605 hours0.007 days <br />0.168 hours <br />0.001 weeks <br />2.302025e-4 months <br /> on November 18, 1986, when the dose equivalent I-131 was measured at 0.833 pCi/ gram. The total time above 1.0 pCi/ gram was 7.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />. Plant Technical Specifications permit operation for up to 48 continuous hours above 1.0 pCi/ gram before requiring reactor shutdown and cooldown to an average reactor coolant temperature of less than 500*F.

See the attached tables and graphs for pertinent data required by Technical Specifications.

110 L.

Unit 1 Reactor Power Summary Date Time  % Power 11/15/86 0000 100.0 11/15/86 0800 100.0 11/15/86 1600 100.0 11/16/86 0000 100.0 11/16/86 0800 100.0 11/16/86 1000 100.0 11/17/86 0000 99.8 1- 11/17/86 0600 100.4 11/17/86 1200 99.9 11/17/86 1800 99.9 11/17/86 1820 0.0 11/17/86 1840 0.0 11/17/86 1900 0.0 11/17/86 1920 0.0-11/17/86 1940 0.0 11/17/86 2000 0.0 11/17/86 2020 0.0 11/17/86 2040 0.0 11/17/86 2100 0.0 11/17/86 2120 0.0 11/17/86 2140 0.0 11/17/86 2200 0.0 11/17/86 2220 0.0 11/17/86 2240 1.6 11/17/86 2300 4.7 11/17/86 2320 8.6 l 11/17/86 2340 10.8 11/18/86 0000 11.0

, 11/18/86 0100 12.3 l 11/18/86 0200 21.3 11/18/86 0300 29.4 11/18/86 0400 29.0

11/16/26 0500 28.6 11/18/86 0600 29.6

! 11/18/86 0700 29.2 11/18/86 0800 29.3 11/18/86 0900 44.4 11/18/86 1000 47.5 11/18/86 1100 48.0 11/18/86 1200 52.7

11/18/86 1300 68.5 i 11/18/86 1400 80.6 11/18/86 1500 93.8 11/18/86 1600 99.7 111 I

/

UNIT 1 IODINE

SUMMARY

I-131 Equiv. I-131 I-132 I-133 I-134 I-135 Date Time (pCi/cc) (pCi/cc) (pci/cc) (pCi/cc) (pCi/cc) (pCi/cc) 11/11/86 0753 0.052554 0.0183 0.0874 0.0678 0.1570 0.1210 11/13/86 0742 0.061157 0.0261 0.0867 0.0700 0.1560 0.1240 11/14/86 0742 0.061668 0.0273 0.0906 0.0668 0.1580 0.1240 11/17/86 2203 2.673695 2.0600 0.4810 1.9000 0.0318 0.9880 11/18/86 0200 1.778221 1.4300 0.1650 1.1300 0.0124 0.4410 11/18/86 0605 0.300392 0.6930 0.0713 0.4600 0.0312 0.1560 11/18/86 1000 0.577455 0.4830 0.0711 0.3080 0.0504 0.0940 11/18/86 1400 0.322717 0.2680 0.0725 0.1660 0.0842 0.0699 11/18/86 1802 0.187688 0.1500 0.0588 0.1010 0.1200 0.0748 11/18/86 2206 0.115750 0.0864 0.0634 0.0681 0.1300 0.0773 11/19/86 0202 0.113320 0.0837 0.0595 0.0664 0.1200 0.0897 11/19/86 0758 0.054707 0.0235 0.0683 0.0459 0.1400 0.0953 112

I-POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 1 CLEANUP FLOW HISTORY CHARGING AND LETDOWN FLOW DATA Charging Letdown Flow Flow Time (@m) (wm) 11/15/86 0000 28.0 37.0 0800 28.0 37.0 1600 28.0 37.0 11/16/86 0000 28.0 37.0 0800 28.0 37.0 1000 28.0 37.0 11/17/86 0000 28.1 37.0 0600 28.3 36.9 1200 27.9 36.9 1800 27.8 36.9 1820 25.9 37.2 1840 22.5 36.8 1900 22.6 36.6 1926 46.2 37.0 1940 30.9 36.6 2000 33.1 36.8 2020 29.4 36.8 2040 28.1 36.6 2100 29.8 36.6 2120 34.0 36.8 2140 31.7 36.7 2200 60.8 73.5 2220 60.1 73.0 2240 56.4 73.0 2300 64.8 73.6 l 2320 53.6 72.9 r 2340 60.9 72.9

' 11/18/86 0000 60.3 73.0 0100 60.1 73.1 0200 59.2 72.8 0300 59.6 73.4 0400 61.1 73.3 0500 62.0 72.9 0600 61.5 73.1 0700 61.7 73.1 0800 62.7 73.2 0900 61.7 73.1 1000 62.1 73.3 1100 62.2 73.1 1200 62.7 73.1 113

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