IR 05000341/1987008
| ML20211J752 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 02/20/1987 |
| From: | Farber M, Greenman E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211J640 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-87-08, 50-341-87-8, NUDOCS 8702260486 | |
| Download: ML20211J752 (5) | |
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REGION III
<r Report No. 50-341/87008(DRP)
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f Docket No. 50-341'
License No. NPF-43 a
Licensee: Detroit Edison Company
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20001Second Avenue Detroit, MI 48224 t
'i F i lity Name: Ferni 2 inspectionAt: Fermi Site, Newport, Michigan Inspection Conducted:
February 2-10, 1987 Y
Inspector:
M. J. F6rber
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fQk $ =,. :n Approved By:
E. G. Greenman, Deputy Director 4 ## 8#
Division of Reactor Projects Date
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Inspection Sunnary
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' Inspection on February 2-10, 1987 (Report No. 50-341/87007(DRP))
Areas Inspected:,5pecial safety inspection by the Augmented Restart Inspection Team Leader of the events and circumstances surrounding the
, licensee's failure to. meet Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation, related ito operability of the drywell airlock.
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Results: Two' violations were identified, which involved operation in WERATTONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2 without demonstrating primary containment integrity in excess of the time allowed by Technical Specifications and changipg GPERATIONAL CONDITION while in a Limiting Condition for Operation
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action statement.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- F. E. Agosti, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- S. G. Catola, Chairman, Nuclear Safety Review Group
- 0. K. Earle, Technical Engineer
- S. R. Frost, Licensing
- R. S. Lenart, Plant Manager
- R. M. O'Sullivan, Technical Engineer G. G. Pierce, Nuclear Shift Supervisor
- R. J. Poche, Licensing
- T. Randazzo, Director, Regulatory Affairs B. J. Scheffel, Supervisor, Inservice Inspection
- F. H. Sondgeroth, Region III Engineer, Licensing
- B. R. Sylvia, Group Vice President
- G. M. Trahey, Director, Quality Assurance
- W. M. Tucker, Acting Superintendent, Operations
- Denotes those who attended the exit meeting on February 10, 1987.
The inspector also contacted other licensee administrative and technical
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personnel during the course of the inspection.
2.
Introduction At 9:30 a.m. (EST) on February 2, 1987, the licensee discovered that Technical Surveillance 43.401.206, " Local Leakage Rate Testing for Airlock X-2," Attachment 1, Section 7.3, "0verall Air Lock," had not been performed on January 12, 1987 as required. This surveillance demonstrates operability of the drywell airlock, which is required to maintain primary containment integrity. The licensee declared the drywell airlock inoperable and entered the action statement for Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.1.1, which requires restoration of PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within one hour or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The licensee immediately attempted to perform this surveillance, however, the airlock failed to pass due to excessive leakage from the packing around the exterior door handwheel. Repairs were commenced to return the airlock to OPERABLE status. At 3:58 p.m. (EST) the operators commenced an orderly shutdown of the plant in order to be in H0T SHUTDOWN by 10:30 p.m. (EST). At 6:57 p.m. repairs and retesting were successfully completed, the drywell airlock was declared OPERABLE, and the plant shutdown was terminated.
Commencing with the onsite notification, the inspector reviewed the circumstances leading up to the event, the consequences, and the licensee's handling of the matter after it was identified. The licensee has also reviewed the matter and understands the nature of the inspection.
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3.
Document Review The inspector reviewed the following documents:
- Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.3.c
- Technical Specification LC0 3.6.1.3
- Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1.1
- Technical Specification LCO 3.0.4
- Control Room Operator's Log for February 2, 1987
- Nuclear Shift Supervisor's Log for February 2,1987
- 12.000.018, Rev. 14, Surveillance Program
- 43.401.206, Rev. 2, Local Leakage Rate Testing for Airlock X-2
- Surveillance Performance Forms for testing on June 18, 1985, November 26, 1985, March 10, 1986, July 14, 1986, August 6, 1986, August 10, 1986, and February 2, 1987 4.
Sequence of Events The inspector's review revealed the following sequence of events:
June 18, 1986 Airlock test completed and primary containment established for the first time.
November 26, 1985 Performance of airlock test approved but not completed due to outage.
March 10, 1986 Completed overall airlock test successfully.
July 14, 1986 Successfully completed all parts of the airlock surveillance at completion of outage.
August 6, 1986 Completed test of interior and exterior airlock door seals. This was a " partial" test of the airlock but inadvertently resulted in rescheduling of the entire surveillance.
August 10, 1986 Completed another test of interior and exterior airlock door seals. This " partial" also resulted in reschedui'ng of the entire surveillance.
January 12, 1987 Airlock surveillance is now due at proper six month i
interval but is not pe: formed because of incorrect l
rescheduling.
January 24, 1987 Plant is started up, leaving Mode 4 and entering Mode 2 at 0435, although airlock surveillance has not been completed.
l January 25, 1987 Plant enters Mode 1 at 0509, although airlock surveillance has not been completed.
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January 28, 1987 Plant enters Mode 2 at 0319 January 31, 1987 Plant enters Mode 1 at 0959, although airlock surveillance has not been completed.
February 2, 1987 Licensee identifies missed surveillance and declares airlock inoperable.
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Root Cause Based on review of the documents listed in Paragraph 3 and discussions with members of the licensee's technical staff, the inspector has determined that the occurrence was caused by a deficiency in the surveillance tracking program as administered by Procedure 12.000.015
" Surveillance Program."
The drywell airlock surveillance procedure consisted of three tests which can be performed independently. Technical Specifications require that the door seals be tested within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following a closure and the licensee used two of the three tests to fulfill this requirement.
This was noted in the " Additional Job Information" block on the SPF.
This practice was referred to as a " partial" and should not have resulted in rescheduling of the entire surveillance. The August 6 and August 10, 1986 tests are examples of this practice.
The surveillance coordinator was familiar with this practice, understood the meaning of the special note, and did not reschedule the entire surveillance.
There were no provisions in the surveillance tracking procedure or on the SPF for identifying the performance of a " partial" surveillance. When the surveillance coordinator was reassigned, his replacement was not familiar with the special note or its meaning.
The new surveillance coordinator noted that the August tests had been signed off as completed and that the requirements had been met. Based on this, he incorrectly rescheduled the surveillance.
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Technical Specification Applicability Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.3.c requires that each primary containment airlock shall be demonstrated operable by conducting an overall airlock leakage test at Pa, 56.5 psig, and by verifying that the overall airlock leakage rate is within its limit prior to initial fuel loading and at six month intervals thereafter.
The overall airlock leakage test was completed on July 14, 1986 and was required to be reperformed by January 12, 1987.
Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1.c states that primary containment integrity shall be demonstrated by verifying each primary containment airlock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.
Because the airlock was inoperable, initially as a result of the missed surveillance and then due to the excessive leakage from the handwheel stem, Technical Specification LC0 action statement 3.6.1.1 became applicable.
This action statement requires that for
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i Operations Conditions 1, 2, and 3, without primary containment integrity, restore primary containment integrity within one hour or be in at least hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The licensee failed to comply with this requirement in that after entering Mode 2 at 0435 on January 24, 1987, the unit was not in hot shutdown by 1735 and not in cold shutdown by 0535 on January 25, 1987. Primary containment integrity was not restored until 1857 on February 2, 1987. This is a violation (50-341/87008-01(DRP))
of Technical Specifications.
Technical Specification LCO Action Statement 3.0.4 prohibits entry into an Operational Condition unless the conditions for the LC0 are met without reliance on provisions contained in the action requirements.
On January 24, 1987, at 0435, the licensee entered Mode 2 from Mode 4 without demonstrating primary containment integrity, i.e. while under the Action Requirements of 3.6.1.1.
This is a violation (50-342/87008-02(DRP)) of Technical Specifications.
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Safety Significance Although primary containment integrity was not technically maintained due to the inoperable status of the airlock caused by excessive leakage around the exterior door handwheel stem, safety significance is minimal because the plant had a low power history and subsequent testing showed that (1) the inner door had an acceptable seal leakage rate and (2) repair of the exterior door handwheel stem restored the airlock to operable status.
8.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
on February 10, 1987 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
The inspector discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary. The licensee acknowledged the findings of the inspection.
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