ML20211C990
| ML20211C990 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 02/17/1987 |
| From: | Goldberg J, Wagner M NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#187-2538 LRP, NUDOCS 8702200292 | |
| Download: ML20211C990 (20) | |
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'q February 17, 1987 U@h[
'87 FEB 19 P1210 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CFFn f FUCT. EAR REGULATORY COBfP.?ISFION 00C " Y ,
Before the Presiding Moerd
{c- N In the P.latter of )
) Docket No. LRP IFOUIRY INTO THREE B1!LE IELAND )
UNIT 2 LEAK RATE DATA )
FALSIFICATIOT )
)
NRC STArr'S RESPOFSE TO TIIE PRES! DING DOARD'S REQUEST AND ORDER ,
I. INTRODUCTION On February 2, 1987, the Presiding Board issued a Request and Order (concerning Driefing of Certain Issues in this Proceeding) (Re-quest) stating that it would benefit from briefing by the parties and the NPC Staff on six issues relsed in the Pfemorandum of Law of the Numer-ous Employces dated January 23,1987 (P'errorandum). The Board direct-ed GPU Nuclear Corporation to respond and requested the Staff, which is not a party, to respond on the six specified issues, and generally on the issues dir. cussed at pp.14-23 of tho P.temorandum, by February 17, 1987.
The Staff's response to the Board's Request is set forth below.
0702200292 870217 PDR ADOCK 05000320 g PDH 3301
II. DISCUSSION The six specific issues enumerated by the Board, and the Staff's comments, are set forth below.
- 1. Whether violation of ?!ct Ed procedural requirements relating to leak rates may form the basis for punitive action by the NRC against an employce.
This issue, as worded, raises a number of subissues which must be addressed. Specifically, 4
(a) whether a violation of Met Ed procedural requirements is a vio-lation of NRC~ requirements; (b) if so, whether such a violation may form the basis of enforce-ment action, as distinguished from " punitive" action, by the NRC; and '
(c) if so, whether NRC enforcement action may be taken against individual employees, whether licensed or unlicensed.
Each of these subissues will be discussed in detail. Briefly, the NRC Staff's position is that (a) a violation of Met Ed procedural require-ments is a violation of NRC requirements; (b) such a violation may form the basis of NFC enforcement actions and (c) NRC enforcement action may be taken directly spinst licensed individuals and/or indirectly against employees, whether or not licensed, by action against the TMI licensec.
Ilov'ever, as discussed below, lasues (b) and (c), involving whether NRC enforcement action may be taken, is beyond the scope of this floard's jurisniction and should not he considered in resolving those issues which the Commission specifically limited the Board to sddressing. CLT-85-18, 1
22 NPC 877 (1985).
1 1
(a) Med Ed Procedural Violations f
The record in this proceeding demonstrates that a violation of Surveillance and Administrative Procedures appilcable to leak rate testing at TF11-? Is a violation of NRC requirements, namely, TF11-2 Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1.
10 C . I' . R . 9 50.36 requires each applicant for a facility license to include in its application proposed Technical Specifications. II -
included in these Technical Specifications must be: (1) surveillance requirements relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of systema end components is maintained, and (2) administrative controle relating tc organfretion und management, procedures, record keeping, review and audit , and reporting requirements necessary to assure operation of the facility in a safe manner. Tr.1166-67 (Russell).
Tt'I-2 Technical Specification 6.8, " Procedures ," requires written procedures be established, implemented and maintained in areas of sur-veillance and test activities of safety-related equipment, and specifically includes those procedures identified in Appendix A of Pegulatory Guide 1.33, Ecvember 1972. The Administrative Proceduren identifled in Appen-I
! dix A include: A.8, "I,og Pntries and Record Retention;" A.7, " Shift and i
Relie" Turnovers" and A.3, " Equipment Control" (e.g. , locking and tag-
! ging) . The TPff-? Furveillanco Procedure relevant to RCS leak rate 1
4 testing is SP 2301-3D1, "RCS Inventory" and the relevant TPff-2 Administrative Procedures are AP 1010 " Technical Specification i
1/
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Technical specifications are included in the facility operating license by law. Section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, an amended, 42 U.S.C. I 2232.
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Surveillanco Program;" AP 1012 " Shift Relief and Log Entries;" and AP 1036, " Instrument Out-of-Service Control." Tr.1167 (Russell).
Additionally, 10 C.F.R. I 50.54, " Conditions of Licenses," provides that only licensed operatorn are permitted to manipulate the controls of the facility and that licensed operators be present at all times during the operation of the facility. Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Part 55, operators are issued licenses which specify as follows: ". ..the licensee shall observe the operating procedures and other conditions specified in the facility
!!conse which authorizes operation of the facility or facilities...." Tr.
1167-68 (P.ursell); see , e.g. , Exa. 10-A , 10-B . Thus, by the terms of his license, an operator is required to operate the facility in accordance with the operating procedures of the facility licensee.
Finally , the utility was licensed to possess, use, and operate the facility in accordance with the procedures and limitations set forth in the facility liccuse, which includes the Technical Specifications. Tr. 1168 (Itussell).
Therefore, the TMI-2 operators were required, through their opera-tor and/or senior operator licenses and the facility license, including the technical specifications , to comply with the licensee's Administrative Procedures AP 1010, AP 1012 and AP 1036, and Furveillance Procedure 2301-3DI. Tr.1168 (Russell).
In summary, the Atomic Energy Act, the Commission's regulations, end the evidence in the record support the conclusion that violations of
Ivet Ed procedures constituto violations of NRC requirements, namely.
TF.ll-2 Technical Specification 6.8.1. U (b) Fnforcement Action Whether violations of Met Ed procedures may or will be the basis of NRC enforcement action, or an NRC Ste.ff recommendation of enforcement action, rnd if so, egainst whom, is beyond the scope of the Board's au-thority in this proceeding and should not be considered by the Board.
In CLI-85-18, the Commission made it clear that this Board's authority was specifically limited to findinF the facts as to what individuals were involved in leak rate falsification and the facts surrounding any such involvement. The Commission stated:
- 1. The purpose of this hearing is to develop the facts surrounding the leak rate falsifications that oc-curred at TPff-2 from February 2, 1078 (the date TMI-2 received its operating license) until March 28, 1979, in sufficient detail to determine the involvement of any individual who may now work, or in the future work, at a nuclear facility licensed by the Commission.
- 2. The specific is.utes which the l' residing Board is to address are limited to the following:
[ list of factual issues]
2/
The Staff believes that the record in the proceeding clearly is adequate for the Board to conclude that violations of the Met Ed procedures at issue here are violations of NHC requirements. If there is any doubt ebout the outcome of this issue, however, then the Etaff suggests that the Poerd reopen the record for additional evidence, which the Staff is prepared to submit, to enable the Board to correctly resolve this issue.
The presiding Board is not to entertain issues other than those set forth in (a)-(d) above without the prior suthorization of the Commission.
- 2 NRC at 880-81 (emphasin supplied).
The Presiding Board is to issue a recommended deci-sion which sets forth its findings on who participated in, had knowledge of and condoned, or by their der-eliction or culpable neglect allowed the leak rate falsi-fications , and the facts surrounding any such involvement in sufficient detail to determine the in-volvement of any individual who may now work, or in the future work, at a nuclear facility. The Board's decision shall address eech of the issues set out in Part B of this Order. The Presiding Board is not to make recommendations regardinsr whet ier any actions should be taken,
- d. at 883 (emphasis supplied).
h*oreover, the Commission directed the NRC Staff, not the Presiding Doord, to nahe recommendations to the Commission regarding what action, if any, should be tal on.
On the basis of the Presiding Board's recommended decision and taking into account any other information which it believes is appropriate for Commission consideration, the NFC sinff shall make recommenda-tions to the Commission regarding what action, if any, should be taken. The NRC staff is to provide its recommendations to the Commission within sixty days after issuance of the Presiding Board's decision .
Those recommendations are to include whether the Corrnission should remove the condition imposed in the TtII-1 restart proceeding barring certain individ-uals from certain positions at Tall-1.
After reviewing the Poord's recommended decision and the NEC staff's recommendations, the Commission will decide what further steps, if cny, need to be taken with regard to involved individuals. This will include consideration of whether to remove TNI-1 employment constraints and whether to initiate formal enforcement action or take any licensing oction with rogsrd to involved indkiduals. If as a result of its review the Commission 3
institutes a formal enforcement proccoding or takes any licensinc netton, the facts found by the Presiding Board and Commission in the
hearing ordered here will not be binding in the subsequent enforcement or licensing proceeding.
3 Because the leak rate falsification events to be addressed in this Board hearing are more than five years old, the five-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. I 2462 may bar the NRC from subsequently instituting an enforcement proceeding for involvement in the events that are the subject of this hearing. However, the information developed in the hearing may be used for other purposes, for ex-ample, in evaluating whether an individual's operator Ifeense should he renewed.
Id, d at 883-84 (emphasis supplied).
Thus, the question of whether or not any enforcement action against any individual or entity may be based on violations of Met Ed's procedural requirements is not before this Iloerd. The Board is required by the Commission's Order to determine the involvement of individuals in the leak rate testing issues specified in the Commission's Order, in particular, the Ecard is to make findings on improper actions during leak rate sur-veillance testing including, but not limited to, "taking on failing to take any action in violation of technical specification requirements". Issue (d)(v), 22 NEC at 880-81.
/ dditionally, independent of whether or not Met Ed procedural violations could form the basis of forcial NRC enforcement action, the Board's findings are still required by the Commission's Order for the purpose of the Steff's recommendations, and the Commission's decision, on what action, if any, is appropriate. The Commission's Order does not limit the Staff's recommendations to enforcement actions. Pather, it broadly solicits the Etaff's recommendations "regarding what action, if any, should be taken. . . ." Those recommendations are to include whether the Commission should remove the condition imposed on the Tf11-1
r restart proceeding barring certain individuals from certain positions at TMI-1. " Id. at 833. In addition, the Commission made it clear that some kind of licer. sing action may be appropriate. Id. at 884. Consequently, even if enforcement action could not be based on Met Ed procedural violations, the Board's findings are required and necessary for determining whether other regulatory action may be appropriate.
Even though the issue of rhether formal NRC enforcement action may be based on Met Ed procedural violations is beyond the scope of the 1;oard's authority, the Staff wishes to make clear its position that since, as explained above, violations of f!ct Ed proccdural requirements consti-tute violations of NRC requirements, enforcement action for such viola-tions may be appropriate. Il When asked whether the NRC "should or might take action against an operator found to havo violated only an administrative procedure," Mr. Russell testified, "[t]he answer is yes."
TR. 1170-72. The purpose of any NRC enforcement action in this case would be to promote and protect the public health and safety by ensuring compliance uith NRC requirements , deterring future violations and occurrences of conditions adverso to quality, and encournrling improvement of licensee and licensed individuals' performance. See Cencral Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions, 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Appendix C (1986). Consistent with that policy and the URC's expectation of the necessary meticulous attention to detail and high standards of compliance by its licensees, with due connideration on the circumstances of this caso and the proper exercise of dir.cretion, the 3/ This discussion puts aside the fesue of the statute of limitations.
NRC Staff will evaluate this Board's findings for the purpose of
, recommending to the Commission whether any enforcement or other action is sppropriate.
In stating its first concern, the Board referred to " punitive" action by the NRC. I'owever, NRC enforcement action in general, and in this core in particular, is not merely, or even primarily, " punitive" in nature.
While all enforcement actions may be deemed " punitive" to some extent, NRC enforcement actions are primarily remedial because they aim to im-prove conduct and are not motivated solely to punish. See Atlantic Research Corporation, CLI-80-7,11 NRC 413, 420-21 (1980). O t.'ith this understanding in mind Met Ed procedural violations could form the basis of enforcement action by the NRC. bI (c) Employees There are a number of categories of Met Ed employees who poten-tially could he found by the Board to have been involved in improper lenk rete testing prr.ctices. These include individuals who werc licensed then
- and now, individuals who were licensed then but not now, individuals who were not licensed then or now, and individuals who were not licensed i then but are now or might wish to be in the future.
The NRC's authority to take formnl enforcement action against 11-censed individuals is clear, il 107, 161, 186, 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 11554, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Il 2137, 2201, 2230, 2282. Thus, 4/ Although the Atlantic Research case specifically involved the Commin-
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ston's civil penalty authority, the discussion cited herein app 11eu equally to NHC enforcement actions in treneral.
5/ Ilowever, noe n.3, supra.
the involvement of any currently licensed individuals in leak rate testing practice violetter.s could be the basis for formal enforcement action against such an individual.
Furthermore, licensecs are responelble and secountable for all violations committed by its employees (whether or not licensed) in the conduct of licensed activities. Atlantic Research, supra,11 NRC at 422.
Therefore, enforcement action against the TMt licensee also could be based on a violation of its procedures by its employees. Such action, in appropriate cases, can include prohibiting involved individuals, licensed or not, frem participating in licensed activities.
- 2. Assumfr.g that the answer to question 1 is negative, whether the Board should nevertheless make findings in this legislative inquiry concerning vietations of relevant Met Ed administrative procedures because, in fact if not in law, such violations are relevant to the issues posed to us and because the Commission should be informed of significant gaps in the existing reguistory scheme.
As discussed above, the answer to question 1 is affirmative. Also as discussed above, even if no formal enforcement action could or would he taken for violations of Plet Ed administrative procedures, the Board's findings on such violations are necessary for the purpose of deciding generally what other regulatory action, if any, might be appropriate.
The Board, therefore, should make the findings.
There is no " gap" in the exibting regulatory scheme regarding violations of licensee precedural requirements. As explained above, the record in this case establishen that such violations at Tf11-2 are violations
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of an enforceable NRC requirement, namely, TMI-2 Technical Specification 8.8.1. U ,
- 3. Whether the distinction at page 17 between procedure being 1
" established , implemented and maintained" versus their being ' ' l
" adhered to" is sound. ;
The answer te this question is an unequivocal "no"! First of all,- .
the ordinary dictionary definition of " implement" demonstrates the equiva-lency of implementation and adherence: -
implement it carry out. accomplish: esp: to give prac- i tical effect to and ensure of actual fulfillment by con- l crete measures !
^' '
hebater's Ninth Collegiate Dictionary,1984. /
An NRC requirement that a procedure be " implemented" means that '
a mil operations covered by the procedure will be carried out in accordance ,'4 with the requirements of the procedure (i.e., the operators will adhere to
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the requirements of the procedure). Moreover, the hearing record is .J 7
clear that the operators are required by the terms of their licenses to i
" observe (i.e., implement, adhere to1 the operating procedures"and other [
conditions specified in the facility license." To give effect to the , .
[
Numerous Employees' purported distinction would rob the word /' +
" implement" of its clear and intended meaning. .
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In general, violations of a licensee's administrative procedures can !
constitute violations of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix li, Criterion V. ,
See, e.g., Consumers Power Company (Pellrades Nuclear Generating !
EEtion), EA 86-78, where the lleensee was cited under Appendix II, !
Criterion V for not performing containment leak rate tects in ,
accordance with any established procedure, contrary to Technical i Specification 6.8.1 and licensee's quality sasurance mantial. -
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y The Staff believes that the record is adequate to conclude that licensed operators were required to " adhere to" specified facility procedures when carryinF out licensed duties. However, if there is any doubt about the outcome of this issue, the record should be reopened. O s Finally, and most importantly, the Staff wishes to emphasize its concern that the Numerous Employees , some of whom currently hold ree'ctor operctor or senior reactor operator licenses, take the position that they are not required to " adhere to" facility operating procedures. It is the Sta ff's position that any individual who does not understand his obligation to adhere to facility procedures is not qualified to possess an
/ N110 licenso and that any such indiv cual should not be permitted to be in ved in activities regulated by the NRC. The Staff, in order to meet ite obligation to protect public health and safety, would promptly initiate enforcenont action to remove any such individual from regulated activities, b
, 7/ The argument on which the Presiding Board neeks comment is one
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that was not fully developed during the hearing, and one that, if accepted, would have a pervasive effect on the NRC's regulatory e scheme. Should the floard disagree with the Staff that the record is adequato to clearly show that operators were required to adhere to facility procedures in operating the facility, it should recuire additional evidence to be taken on the issue.
8/ Numerous Employcen also argue that any N!1C regulatory scheme imposing on the operatorn a legal requirement to adhere to adminin-trative proceduren is veld for vagueness. Employees' Memorendum at 18-20. This argument ir not persuasive. As set forth above (see l pp. 3-4, supra), the record is cicer that the T'll-2 operators were t' required to comply with liconnce's administrative procedures.
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- 4. Whether it is correct that the TMI-2 Tech Specs do not require satisfactory leak rate test results measuring unidentified leakage
.. as a condition of. continued operation. In that connection, dis-
~1 cuss whether any of the other three surveillance methods listed ' ;
in Section 4.4.6.2 could demonstrate compliance with the 1 gpm '
, limit on 2 unidentified leakage as it is defined in the TMI-2 Tech Specs . (not as the subject of leakage and surveillance is more generally discussed in Reg. Guide 1.45). See Employee
! Memorandum, pp. 21-22.
It is not correct that the T14I-2 technical specifications do not
,e
- require satisfactory leak rate test results measuring unidentified leakage l as a condition of continued operation. Surveillance Requirement 4.4.6.2 required reactor coolant system" leakage to be demonstrated within each of the above limits by four surveillance tests. Surveillance Requirement 4.4.6.2.d required the performance of a reactor coolant system water inventory balance at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> during steady state operation . Kirkpatrick/Wermeil Testimony, ff. Tr. 376, at 9-10.
Surveillance Procedure SP-2301-3D1, "RC System Inventory", was written and approved by Met Ed in order to ensure compliance with the limiting conditions for operation established by TMI-2 Technical Specifica- .
tion 3.4.6.2. Id. at 31. Section 7.2 of the Acceptance Criteria stated
-that if the unidentified reactor coolant system leakage execeded 1 gpm,
^
s proceed with Action Statement 3.4.6.2.b. Id_. at 22.
Thus, it is clear that unidentified leakage was required to be
' calculated every 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> by using the reactor coolant inventory balance test and that test results demonstrating that unidentified leakage did not exceed 1 gpm was a condition for continued operation.
Unidentified leakage as defined in TMI-2 Technical Specification 1.15 consisted of all leakage which was not identified leakage or controlled leakage. Id . at 5-6. Although the TMI-2 surveillance requirements
9 identified four methods of demonstrating compliance with the limiting condition for operation for reactor coolant lenkages, Technical Specification 4.4.6.2.d (inventory balance test) was the only method that 94 could be used to measure unidentified leakage as defined in the TMI-2 Technical Specification 1.15. Tr. 585-86 (Kirkpetrick); Tr. 586 (Rockwell); Tr. 587-88 (Stier); Tr. 597-99 (Stier).
It was not possible to measure unidentified leakage with the leakage detection systems specified in Surveillance Requirement 4.4.6.2.a (con-tainment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitoring) or 4.4.6.2.b (containment sump inventory and discharge monitoring) because these systems only monitor leakages to the containment and cannot monitor leak-age into a closed system (i.e. , intersystem leakage). Tr. 597-99 (Stier).
In cddition , Surveillance Requirement 4.4.6.2.c (measuring controlled leakage from the reactor coolant pump seals) is not applicable, since un-identified leakage does not include controlled leakage. Once a leak rate test showed unidentified leakage in e:: cess of I gpm, the other leakage detection systems should have been used by the operators to help investi-gate the source of the leakage. Tr. 699-70 (Kirkpatrick).
Regardless of the technical specification definition of unidentified lenhage, the evidence is cicar that the inventory balance test was the only method used at TMI-2 to calculate unidentified leakage and demonstrate compliance with the limiting condition for operation.
Although other leakage detection systems were available to the operators, the operators did not use the sump, the containment particulate monitors or the gaseous monitors to calculate any reactor coolant system leak rates. In fact, there was no surveillance procedure which utili::ed these
. other leakage detection systems to calculate leak rates. Tr. 603 (Kirkpatrick) . Thus, these systems were not and could not be used by operators to demonstrate ecmpliance with the Technical Specifications.
- 5. Whether it is correct that entry into the action statement was not necessarily required when a leak rate test showed unidenti-fled lenkage in excess of 1 gpm and there was no clear basis for invalidating that test -- e.g. , because of an obvious opera-tor error. The basis for this proposition by the Employees ,
appears to be that one of the other surveillance methods might show compliance with the 1 gpm limit. Piemorandum, p. 22.
' Do you agree? ,
No. The Employees' statement that, if the operators ran a leak rate test to comply with Technical Specification 4.4.6.2.d and the result indi-ceted unidentified leakage greater than 1 gpm, they were not necessarily oblicated to enter the Action Statement, is not correct.
Acceptance Criteria 7.2 of Surveillance Procedure 2301-3N states, if unidentified reactor molant leakage exceeds 1 gpm, proceed with Action Statement 3.4.6.2.b. Action Statement 3.4.6.2.b allows the operator four hours to reduce unidentified leakage to below the limit before commencing a plant shutdown. Once the limit is exceeded and the Action Statement has been entered, Section 6 of SP 2301-3D1 directs the operator to per-form a number of actions including: performing another determination of the RCfi leak rate; insuring that no unaccounted for operator action has occurred that would change the RCS inventory (such action would invali-date the measurement); initiating action to determine the source of leak-cge; measuring and documenting the source of the leakage; and evaluating the safety significance of the leakage. Kirkpatrick/hermeil, ff. Tr. 376, at 22-23; Tr. 652 (Kirkpatrick); Tr. 653 (Stier).
In summary, since the reactor coolant inventory balance test was the only method used at TMI-2 to measure unidentified leakage as defined in the Technical Specification, it was not possible to use other leak detection methods to demonstrate compliance with Technical Specification 3.4.6.2.b.
Ilowever, depending upon the source and location, it was possible to use these other methods to help find and classify the leakage. Tr. 669-70 fl;irkpatrick) . Accordingly, when a leak rate test showed greater than 1 gpm leakage, the action statement was automatically entered into and the operator would be required by the procedure to investigate for leakage and initiate another leak rate test. See generally Tr. 658-670.
- 6. Whether the last sentence of the Employee's Memorandum on page 23 is consistent with regulatory requirements. On the record of this proceeding, this sentence appears to the Board to suggest that an employee may certify as accurate and retain records he has reason to believe are not accurate (i.e., any leak rate test result under 1 gpm) while systematically discard-ing records he has no better reason to believe are accurate (i.e., any leak rate test over 1 gpm). ;
Numerous Employees' assertion, that operators complied with Techni-j cal Specification 6.10.1(d) because the Surveillance Requirement contained in Section 4.4.6.2 of the TMI-2 Technical Specifications only required that a leak rate be performed at least once every 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and records dem-onstrating compliance with this requirement were retained, is false.
TMI-2 Technical Specification 6.10.1(d) requires that the records of surveillance activities, inspections and calibrations required by the Tech-nical Specifications be retained for at least five years. Tr. 575 (Kirkpatrick) . This section does not contain any specific exclusions.
l Therefore, records of leak rate tests, including those that show adverse results, were to be retained.
l
. Demonstrating compliance with the Limiting Conditions for Operation of the Technical Specification by the proper conduct of surveillance test-ing is considered an integral part of safe operation and is a mandatory requirement on licensees. SP 2301-3D1 provides the operator with several cautions and limitations to assure the results are reliable and can be used to demonstrate compliance with Technical Specification 3.4.6.2. See Tr.
710-11 (Capra); Tr. 711 (Stier).
If an operator experiences trouble in performing the leak rate test or the results of the test exceed the allowable limits of Technical Specifi-cations , AP 1010 requires that the operator complete an Exception and Deficiency Report. Ex. 1-B , Vol. V-C, Tab 17. The purpose of this report is to ensure tMt these problems are evaluated as soon as possible and that prompt and correct followup action is taken. See Tr. 707-08 (Capra). In addition, if an operator suspects that unreliable test results are being obtained due to inaccurate or unreliable instrumentation, AP 3036 requires that the instrument be marked, documented and controlled until repair. This procedure applies regardless of whether the test results show values above or below the acceptance criteria. The purpose i of this procedure is to ensure that such instrumentation is not relied upon by operators until the instrumentation has been repaired, calibrated and returned to service.
In summary, all leak rate surveillance test results were required to be retained regardless of how often the surveillance test was conducted.
For those tests considered invalid by the operator, even if the result was l
less than 1 gpm, or all tests for which the results exceeded the limits of Technical Specifications, an Exception and Deficiency Report was required l
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to be submitted by the operator and evaluated by the Shift Supervisor.
s These records were required to be retained for a period of five years.
III. CONCLUSION As explained above, the Numerous Employee's arguments at pages 14-23 cf the Memorandum should be rejected.
Eespectfully submitted,
/
Mary 1. Wagne Cou el for NRC Staff ack R. Goldberg Deputy Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 17th day of February,1987 9
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION hhh
'87 FEB 19 P12:10 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD GFFM "~ - e" 00CKE1H.>4 W h, In the Matter of ) sat.sca
)
INQUIRY INTO THREE MILE ISLAND ) Docket No. LRP UNIT 2 LEAK RATE DATA )
FALSIFICATION )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF'S RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDING BOARD'S REQUEST AND ORDER" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, or, as indicated by an asterisk, by deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system, this 17th day of February,1987:
- James L. Kelley, Chairman
- James H. Carpenter Presiding Board Presiding Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555
- Glenn O. Bright Harry H. Voigt, Esq.
Presiding Board James W. Moeller, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae hashington, DC 20555 Suite 1100 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, NW Ernest L. Blake, Esq. Washington, DC 20036 Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N Street, NW James B. Burns, Esq.
Washington, DC 20037 Isham, Lincoln & Beale Suite 5200 Smith B. Gephart, Esq. Three First National Plaza Jane G. Penny, Esq. Chicago, IL 60602 Killian & Gephart Box 886 Michael W. Maupin, Esq.
216-218 Pine Street Ilunton & Williams Harrisburg, PA 17108 P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, V A 23212
1 Mrs. Merjorie M. Aamodt
- Docketing & Service Section 200 N. Church Street Office of the Secretary
, Parkesburg, PA 19356 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission .
Washington, DC 20555 l
7 k'%
Mary E. Wagl ier i
l l
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