ML20211A173

Gpu Nuclear Corp Response to Presiding Board Request & Order of 870202.* Util Response to Six Concerns Identified by ASLB Addressing Legal Analysis & State of Record Parts V & VI of Numerous Employees Memorandum of Law.W/Certificate of Svc

ML20211A173
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	02/17/1987
From:	Blake E GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
CON-#187-2514 86-519-02-SP, 86-519-2-SP, LRP, NUDOCS 8702190106
Download: ML20211A173 (8)

Text

r ggyy NEScP UNITED STATES OF AMERICA '87 FEB 17 P3 :55 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CFF: . ,

BEFORE THE PRESIDING BOARD GX d' h 1

)

In the Matter of )

) Docket No. LRP.

INQUIRY INTO THREE MILE )

ISLAND UNIT 2 LEAK RATE ) ASLBP No. 86-519-02'SP DATA FALSIFICATION )

)

GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION'S RESPONSE TO PRESIDING BOARD REQUEST AND ORDER OF FEBRUARY 2, 1987 In a Request and Order of February 2, 1987, the Presiding Board noted that Numerous Employees had submitted a Memorandum of Law and that the Board would benefit by briefing of certain points made in the Memorandum. The Board requested Staff to com-ment, directed GPU Nuclear Corporation to comment, and solicited comments from other parties if they chose. GPU Nuclear responds herein as directed by the Board. Our response is directed to the six specific concerns identified by the Board, thereby addressing with respect to both legal analysis and state of the record Parts V and VI of Numerous Employees' Memorandum of Law.

1. Whether violation of Met Ed procedural require-ments relating to leak rates may form the basis for punitive action by the NRC against an employee.

2. Assuming that the answer to question 1 is nega-tive, whether this Board should nevertheless make findings in this legislative inquiry concerning violations of role-vant Met Ed administrative procedures because, in fact if 07021'?O106 070217 0 DR ADOCK 0500

1 I, '

! not in law, such violations-are relevant to the' issues posed to us and because the commission should be informed of sig-nificant gaps in'the existing regulatory scheme.

! At the outset we note our belief that-the Numerous

} Employees' brief in this regard was premature. We. view the argu--

ment in Part V of Numerous Employees' Memorandum, which prompted

! these two concerns, to be beyond the scope of the instant pro-I j ceeding. The Commission's Order and Notice of Hearing establish- i i

j ing this proceeding envisioned a three-step process starting-with 3 a fact-finding hearing by this Presiding Board, followed by Staff ,

recommendations on any actions that should be taken, and ulti- t j mately a Commission determination based on the Board's findings ,

i  !

l and the Staff's recommendations. Broadly stated, this Board is j to make determinations as to how leak rate testing was conducted, i

! who was involved, and in what way. We believe any questions I regarding possible enforcement action against individuals (and thus questions regarding NRC's jurisdiction to take such enforce-i j ment action) are matters to be addressed by the Staff in its sub-sequent recommendations and by the commission. Accordingly, GPU l

Nuclear offers no comment on these two concerns. '

3. Whether the distinction at page 17 between proce-  ;

t dures being " established, implemented and maintained" versus  !

their being " adhered to" is sound.

l  !

I The Numerous Employees make the following statement:

TMI-2 Technical Specification 6.8.la oni:t re-quires that the " procedures recommended .n Appendix A of Regulator:t Guide 1.33, November 1 1972" "be established, ,mplemented and main-  ;

tained." It does not require Met Ed to ad-here to the procedures, much less identify any specific requirements to be followed.

1  !

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. Memorandum of Law at 17. This distinction between procedures being " established, implemented and maintained" versus their being " adhered to" is not sound. It is a distinction without a

] sensible difference. Its implementation would result in a utility's establishing, implementing, and maintaining procedures, a

only to ignore them. The words " established, implemented and maintained" commonly appear in the Technical Specifications of licensees and signify a need for adherence as a means of satis- t j fying the requirements of the Technical Specifications. Egg, j 1222, Toledo Edison Co., Docket No. 50-346, Appendix at 1-2; j American Electric Power Service Corp., Docket Nos. 50-315,

} 50-316, EA 82-03, Appendix A at 4-5 (attached).

! 4. Whether it is correct that the TMI-2 Tech Specs do not require satisfactory leak rate test results measuring

) unidentified leakage as a condition of continued operation.

In that connection, discuss whether any of the other three surveillance methods listed in Section 4.4.6.2 could demon-strate compliance with the 1 gpm limit on unidentified leak-age as it is defined in the TMI-2 Tech Specs (not as the subject of leakage and surveillance is more generally dis-

cussed in Reg. Guide 1.45). Egg Employee Memorandum, pp.

l 21-22.

The record of this proceeding makes clear that the TMI-2 Technical Specifications as applied required satisfactory leak ,

j rate test results measuring unidentified leakage as a condition 1

) of continued operation. The sump method for monitoring leakage could have been employed for measuring unidentified leakage.

TMI-2 Tech Spec 4.4.6.2.(b) required performance of sump moni-

{

l toring every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and such data were recorded. Indeed, after i -

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. the TMI-2 accident,.such sump data were employed as a. test check to ascertain what the pre-accident lee': age . had been. However, in L practice before the TMI-2 accident, the simp data were not em-4 l ployed at TMI-2 to quantify unidentified ~1eakage as a means for-demonstrating compliance with the 1 gpm limit on unidentified i

j leakage as it is defined in the TMI-2 Tech Specs. As stated in

} our proposed findings:

Although Tech Specs required other leakage i detection systems, the leak rate test became i the primary means of assuring compliance with

. the limiting condition for operation.estab-

! lished in Tech Spec 3.4.6.2. The TMI-2 FSAR l described the leak rate test as the " primary i means of detecting reactor coolant system -

! leakage." Board Exh. 1-A, Stier Report, Vol. I at 41; id., Vol. V(C) at Tab 15 l (FSAR); 111 1112 Wermiel, ff. Tr. 376 at 8-9; j Board Exh. 22, FSAR Sections 5.2.7.3 and j 5.2.7.4. It was in fact the only one of the *

tests prescribed in the Tech Specs that pro-vided a quantifiable means of measuring l unidentified leakage. Egg Tr. 683 (Stier, j Russell); Tr. 3865 (Mehler).

! GPUN Proposed Findings, 1 82.

l I 5. Whether it is correct that entry into the action J statement was not necessarily required when a leak rate test showed unidentified leakage .n excess of 1 gpm and there was

no clear basis for invalidating that test -- e.g. because of

! an obvious operator error. The basis for this proposition i by the Employees appears to be that one of the other sur-veillance methods might show compliance with the 1 gpm i limit. Memorandum, p. 22. Do you agree?

j We believe that the record of this proceeding clearly estab-i j lishes that entry into the action statement was required when, in

! the Board's words, "a leak rate test showed unidentified leakage l

i in excess of 1 gpm and there was no clear basis for invalidating that test." To repeat, as we stated in our proposed findings:

I

! I 4

. - _ , _ . . , , - . . - . . , _ _ _ - . , _ _ - - _ . , , , - - - - , , . _ . -_ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ , , - ,,,.___,.____.-__,-_._,.,.._m,-,

~t L Although Tech Specs required the leakage de- .

taction systems, the leak rate test became .

the primary means of assuring. compliance with.  ;

L the limiting condition for operation.estab-lished in Tech Spec 3.4'.6.2. The TMI-2 FSAR

described the leak rate test as.the " primary means of' detecting reactor coolant system

leakage." Board Exh. 1-A, Stier Report,

.Vol; I at 41; 14.,-Vol. V(C) at Tab 15

. (FSAR); 333 h Wermiel, ff. Tr. 376 at 8-9;.

Board Exh. 22, FSAR Sections 5.2.7.3 and 5.2.7.4. It was in fact the only one of the tests prescribed in the Tech Specs that pro- ,

I vided a quantifiable means of measuring i unidentified leakage. 321 Tr. 683-(Stier,

[ Russell); Tr. 3865 (Mehler).

I GPUN Proposed Findings,182.

i  !

i e

i. 6. Whether the last sentence of the Employees' Memo-randum on page 23 is consistent with regulatory require-1 ments. On the record of this proceeding, this sentence ap-

{- pears to the Board to suggest that an employee may certify

". as accurate and retain records he has reason to believe are not accurate (i.e., any leak rate test result under 1 gpm) while systematically discarding records he has no better.

reason to believe are accurate (i.e., any leak rate test ,

j over 1 gpm).

{ In the last sentence on page 23 of their Memorandum of Law, l': the Numerous Employees state that "[t]he operators complied with the regulation and the Technical Specifications because the Sur-

{

veillance Requirement contained in Section 4.4.6.2 of the TMI Technical Specifications only required that the leak rate be per-formed at least once every 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and records demonstrating l compliance with this requirement were retained." GPU Nuclear does not believe that this sentence is consistent with regulatory l requirements. .

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),

- . .= . .-- .. .. - _ _ -_ _

i In its proposed findings of fact, GPUN described the Techni -

cal Specifications and procedures relevant to leak rate testing.

GPUN Proposed Findings, 11'74-94. The findings then applied the

' elaborate regulatory framework to the practice of discarding leak rate tests and concluded that "[blased on the evidence in_the record, it is clear that TMI 2 personnel uniformly failed to 4

document leak rate testing properly." Id.; 133 aenerally 11 180-191. Our approach was based on an appropriate and mean-ingful application of the Technical Specifications.

1

? Dated: February 17, 1987 Respectfully submitted, j

l $Wl f FM.

Ernest L. Blake, Jr.

] John N. Nassikas III

! SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROW; RIDGE 1

2300 N Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20037 l 202/663-8000 i

! Counsel for GPU Nuclear Corporation  ;

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'87 FEEF17 P3 :59 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION gg ,

00Ch!ilhG A ! ? /id BEFORE THE PRESIDING BOARD ERAhcH

)

In the Matter of )

) Docket No. LRP INQUIRY INTO THREE MILE )

ISLAND UNIT 2 LEAK RATE ) ASLBP No. 86-519-02 SP DATA FALSIFICATION )

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on February 17, 1987 I served the foregoing "GPU Nuclear Corporation's Response to Presiding Board Request and Order of February 2, 1987" by having a copy thereof hand delivered to the following persons marked with an asterisk and by having a copy thereof sent by express mail to the remain-ing individuals and office on the following list:

• Administrative Judge James L. Kelley, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

• Administrative Judge Glenn O. Bright Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

• Administrative Judge James H. Carpenter l Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 I

l

. - _ _ _ _ _ - . _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _- J

S 1

• Mary E. Wagner, Esq.

Office of General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 i

• Docketing and Service Branch (original and 2 copies)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 1

• Harry H . Voigt, Esq. ,

James W. Moeller, Esq.

-LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.

Suite 1100 Washington, D.C. 20036 l Smith B. Gephart, Esq.

Jane G. Penny, Esq.

Killian & Gephart r

216-218 Pine Street I Box 886 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108

.i James B. Burns, Esq.

Isham, Lincoln & Beale Three First National Plaza j Suite 5200 Chicago, Illinois 60602 l

4 4

Michael W. Maupin, Esq.

2 Hunton & Williams

P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 ,

4 i J"ohn N. Nassikan att l

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UNITED STATES Ong 7. ; y ,,,,

c' 7 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (: k i on .

f i REGION 111 ( N."y f 790 R0o6aV4LT R0AD L. a. cf,,ne

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LRS Ceseto..ts l W A Jo*'nsent RE0EIVED is """

Docket No. 50-3!.o(DETP) gg Toledo Edison Company APR 61982 d8d l

ATIN: Mr. Richard P. Crouse Vice President TOLEDO EDISON skMLaf l Nuclear Edison Plaza

• 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH I.3652 Gentlemen:

This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Messrs.

J. A. Grobe and R. Mendez of this office on January 11-15, 1982, of activi-ties at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station authorized by NRC Operating License No. NPF-3 and to the discussion of our findings with Mr. T. Murray at the conclusion of the inspection.

The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during

- the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations, and in-tarviews with personnel.

During this inspection, certain of your activities appeared to be in non-compliance with NRC requirements, as specified in the enclosed Appendix.

A written response, submitted under oath or affirmation, is required.

In addition to your response to the apparent items of noncompliance presented in the Appendix, please provide the necessary information to demonstrate the fire resistance qualifications of Door Nos. 206 and 311. 'ntis finding is ad-dressed in more detail as Unresolved Ites No. 50-346/82-03-03 in Paragraph 2 of the enclosed report.

In accordance with 10 CTR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter, the enclosures, and your response to this letter will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room. If this report contains any information that you (or your contractors) believe to be exempt from disclosure under 10 CFR 9.5(a)(4), it is necessary that you (a) notify this office by tele-phone within ten (10) days from the date of this letter of your intention to file a request for withholding; and (b) submit within twenty-five (25) days from the date of this letter a written application to this office to --

withhold such information. If your receipt of this letter has been /q IW W i n m A a G 0~ S M LO*C e) U)' ') ) l T Prdce Services Leed C C A t.end Q %w

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1 kin ose ceii (J 177 N $ l1 Z

c{t Toledo Edison Company 2 Afd a~"

delayed such that less than seven (7) days are available for your review, please notify this office promptly so that a new due date may be estab-lished. Consistent with Section 2.790(b)(1). any such application must be accompanied by an affidavit executed by the owner of the information which identifies the document or part sought to be withheld, and which contains a full statement of the reasons which are the bases for the claim that the information should be withheld from public disclosure.

This section further requires the statement to address with specificity the considerations listed in 10 CFR 2.790(b)(4). The information sought to be withheld shall be incorporated as far as possible into a separate part of the affidavit. If we do not hear from you in this regard within the specified periods noted above; a copy of this letter, the enclosures, and your response to this letter will be placed in the Public Document

Room.

The responses directed by this letter (and the accompanying Notice) are

• not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.

Sincerely,

. AJ/

C. E. Norelius, Director Division of Engineering and Technical Programs

Enclosures:

1. Appendix, Notice of Violation

2. Inspection Report No. 50-346/82-03(DETP) cc w/encis:

T. D. Murray, Station s Superintendent DMB/ Document Control Desk (RIDS)

Resident Inspector, RIII Harold W. Kohn, Power Siting Commission Helen W. Evans, State of Ohio Robert M. Quillin, Ohio Department of Health I

a

4 Appendix f

NOTICE OF VIOLATION Toledo Edison Company Docket No. 50-3!.6 As a result of the inspection conducted on January 11-15, 1982, and in accordance with the Interie Enforcement Policy, 45 FR 66754 (October 7, 1980), the following violations were identified:

1. Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.10 requires that all penetration fire barriers protecting safety-related areas be functional at all times. If a penetration fire barrier is nonfunctional, a continuous fire watch must be established within one hour on at least -

one side of the affected barrier.

Contrary to the above, on January la and 15, 1982, Fire Door Nos. 312, 319A, and 400 were observed in a nonfunctional condition due either to obstruction or inoperable closure mechanise. Although these fire doors protect areas containing cabling and/or equipment necessary for safe shutdown of the plant, no continuous fire watch was established on either side of the affected fire barrier.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I.D.2).

2. Technical Specification 6.8.1.f requires that written procedures be established, implemented and esintained covering the fire protection program.

a. Administrative Procedura AD 1810.01, Control of Combustibles, requires that storage of combustible gases, lubricants, solvents,-

fuels, and paints shall be prohibited in safety-related areas.

Also, this procedure requires that all wood used in safety-related l areas shall be treated with a flame retardant and that combustion l waste, scrap, debris and oil resulting from a work activity shall l be removed from the plant following the completion of the work I activity or the end of the shift, whichever is sooner.

Centrary to the above, on January 13 and 14, 1982, between the hours of 1600 and 2000, the inspectors observed the following violations of these requirements:

(1) Accumulations of combustible materials including untreated wood, rags, trash, cardboard and paper in the following selected areas:

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Appendix 2 No. 2 Diesel Generator Room and Day Tank Room No. 1 Diesel Generator Room No. 1, No. 3 and No. 4 Penetration Rooms "B" Battery Room and 1.ow Voltage Switchgear Room Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Reem (2) Storage or accumulations of flammable liquids and/or gases in the following selected areas. ,

No. 1 Diesel Generator Room No. 4 Mechanical Penetration Room  ;

Diesel Generator Corridor

b. Administrative Procedure AD 1844.00, Maintenance, requires that a fire watch continuously monitor an area for a minimum of thirty  !

minutes following open flame, cutting grinding or welding work. l Contrary to the above, on .Tanuary 15, 1982, during the lunch break, the inspectors observed that no fire watch was posted in the No. 2 Diesel Generator Day Tank Room where welding operat' ions had been taking place prior to the lunch break.

c. Administrative Procedure AD 1828.20, Fire 3rigade Training, requires that each fire brigade team participate in at least l one fire drill each calendar quarter. l Contrary to the above, fire brigade drills were not conducted in. l the first and third quarters of 1981 for any of the fire brigades.

i This is a Severity I,evel IV violation (Supplement I.D.3).

/

3. 10 CFR 50.48 states, in part, "Each operating nuclear power plant shall have a fire protection plan that satisfies Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part... Appendix R to this part established fire protection features required to satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part..."

In areas of the plant where the protection of systems whose function is required for hot shutdown does not satisfy-the requirements of Paragraph G-2 of Section III of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, Paragraph G.3 -

requires that alternative shutdown capability be provided independent i of the area and that fire detection and fixed fire suppression systems be installed in the area. i I

Contrary to the above, the licensee did not provide a fixed fire l t suppression system in the control room which is an area that does not  ;

satisfy the hot shutdown protection requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, l

,Section III.G.2, nor did the licensee submit a request for exemption l from this requirement as permitted in 10 CFR 50.48(c)(6). I l

This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement I.E.). j l

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Appendix

• 3d

4. Amendment No. 18 to License No. NPF-3 issued July 26, 1979, requires that the fire protection administrative controls be upgraded to bring them into conformance with the NRC guidance documents, " Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance." The implementation date for this modification was prior to startup after the 1980 refueling outage (approximately November 1, 1980).

Contrary to the above, the following fire protection administrative controls procedures have not been upgraded to bring thee into con-formance with the NRC guidance document:

AD 1810.00 - Fire Protection Program AD 1810.01 - Control of Combustibles AD 1844.00 - Maintenance .

AD 1828.20 - Fire Brigade Training This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement I.E.).

5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVIII, requires that a comprehensive system of planned and periodic audits be carried out to verify compliance with all aspects of the quality assurance program.

Toledo Edison Company Nuclear Quality Assurance Procedure QAP 2180,

" Audits," states in part, "A comprehensive system of planned periodic audits to verify compliance with QA program requirements and to deter-mine QA program effectiveness shall be conducted... The goals of the audit system are...to provide an objective assessment of compliance with established requirements."

Toledo Edison Company Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual, Volume I, Section 1.2.8, defines Audit Activity as " Documented QA/QC activities to determine, through investigation, the adequacy of, and adherence to... licensing requirements."

Contrary to the above, the quality assurance audits of the fire pro-taction program performed in June 19-26, 1979 (Audit No. 598),

Apsil 21 - May 30, 1980 (Audit No. 666) and March 23-25, 1981 (Audit No. 744), only reviewed the adequacy of implementation of the existing plant procedures. Assessments were not made concerning the adequacy of those procedures utilizing the fire protection licensing require-monts as inspection guidance. This narrow scope for the quality assurance audits permitted deficiencies in fire protection procedures to go undetected.

This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement I.E.).

6. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, requires that conditions adverse to quality be promptly corrected.

Appendix- 4 Contrary to the above the fire fighting practice training for the fire brigade was documented as being deficient in Toledo Edison Audit No. 729, dated August 20-22, 1980, and in Toledo Edison Audit No. 781, dated July 20-22, 1981, but the necessary corrective action had not been taken at the time of this inspection to upgrade the fire fighting practice training program to satisfy the requirements in Paragraph 2.0 of Attachment No. 2 to " Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional-Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance."

This is'a Severity Level V violation (Supplement I.E.).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 GFR 2.201,-you are required to' submit to this office within thirty days cf the date of this Notice a written state-ment or explanation in reply, including for each item of noncompliance:

(1) corrective action taken and the results achieved; (2) corrective action to be taken to avoid further noncompliance; and (3) the date^when full com-pliance will be achieved. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation. Consideration may be given to extending your response time for good cause shown.

Dac6d / . E Ntfrgius,~ Director Division of Engineering and Technical Programs i

l J

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III

., Ns. 50-346/82-03(DETP)

No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 an: Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza, 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652 ty Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station tien At: Oak Harbor, OH tion Conducted: January 11-15, 1982 tors:

fh W$Wf' J. A. Grobe

/A%/[1 (P[ W A 3 h +/ h -

R. Mendes '

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- C.ff r C. Williams, Chief D/AY!

Plant Systems Section sed-E .

tien Summary tion on January 11-15,1982 (Report No. 50-346/82-03(DETP))

Insoncted: Routine unannounced inspection to review the imple-ion of the licensee's fire protection and and prevention programs l ing review of fire fighting equipment and systems; fire protection evention administrative controls; and fire brigade, general employee, atrcctor fire protection and prevention training. The inspection cd 88 inspector-hours onsite by two (2) NRC inspectors including 16

) tor-hours off-shift.

s: In the three areas inspected, six apparent items of noncompliance destified (Violation of the limiting condition for operation for fire rs - Paragraph 2; Lack of fire suppressica system in the control 10/81, Parcgraph 2; Lack of implementation of admiristrative controls over 24/82, t tibio natorials, ignition sources and fire briagde training - Para.

3 and 4; Lack of formulation of adequate administrative controls ha fire protection program, fire protection / prevention training, 36/81, tibio esterials, ignition sources, and fire brigade training .

cpha 3 and 4; Incomplete quality assurance audits of the fire .l9/81 tion program - Paragraph 3; Lack of corrective action on idgetified cacics in the fire brigade training program - Paragraph 4). l l' ( #

)

1

Number Title Dates ST 5016.04 Accessible Detector 04/20/81, 10/19/81 Char.nel Functional and Supervisory Circuit Checks-ST 5016.07 Fire Protection System 01/16/81, 04/07/31, Automatic Sprinkler System 07/16/81 Test ST 5016.08 Electric Fire Pump 10/09/80, 11/04/81 Annual Flow Test ST 5016.09 Fire Hose, Fire Hose 08/21/81, 09/29/81, Station and Fire 10/21/81, 11/27/81, System Valve Testing 12/23/81 ST 5016.12 Diesel Fire Pump Annual 10/09/80, 11/03/81 Flows Test -

ST 5016.15 Diesel Generator and 11/25/81 Water Curtain Deluge Annual Surveillance Test Fire Door Surveillance 10/81, 11/81 Inspection

. (2) Plant Tours The inspectors examined fire protection and emergency systems and equipment during tours of the turbine and

auxiliary buildings on January 13, 14 and 15, 1982.

{ b. Findinas I Noncompliance (50-3 6/82-03-01): Technical Specification

, Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.7.10 requires that all penetration fire barriers protecting safety-related areas be functional at all times. If a penetration fire barrier is not functional, a continuous fire watch must be established within one hour on at least one side of the affected barrier.

Contrary to the above, on January 14 and 15,1982, the inspectors observed three non-functional fire doors which protect areas that contain cabling and/or equipment necessary for safe shutdown of a the plant: t'

1. - Door No. 312 whic i protects Fire Zone U-2 (Spent Fuel Pool Pump Room 312) onIElevatico 585' was obstructed from closing by cablin$ run through the doorway. -

- 1 l

. _ ~ . . . . - - -- -

- Door No. 319A which protects Fire Zone L-1 (Diesel Generator Day Tank Room 320A) on Elevation 595' was obstructed from closing by temporary ventilation " elephant" trunk run through the doorway.

- ' Door No. 400 which protects Fire Zones V-8 (Passage 400) and V-9 (Corridor 404) on Elevation 603'.was found standing

- open on .two occasions due to a non-functional closure mechanism. The closure device was not strong enough to counteract the ventilation systes leakage when the door-was opened. 'this prevented the door from closing.

A continuous fire watch had not been posted on either side of these non-functional penetration fire barriers.

Noncompliance (50-346/82-03-02): 10 CFR 50.48 states in part, "Each operating nuclear power plant shall have a fire protection plan that satisfies Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part...

Appendix R to this part established fire protection features ,

required to satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part. . ."

In areas of the plant where the protection of systees whose function is required for hot shutdown does not satisfy the requirements of Paragraph G.2 of Section III of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, Paragraph G.3 requires that alternative shutdown capability be provided independent of the area and that fire detection and fixed fire suppression systems be installed in the area.

Contrary to the above, the licensee did not provide a fixed fire suppression system in the control roce which is an area that does not satisfy the hot shutdown protection requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, nor did the licensee submit a request for exemption from this requirement as permitted in 10 CFR 50.48(c)(6).

c. Discussion .

Unresolved Ites (50-346/82-03-03): On January 14 and 15, 1982, l

' the inspector observed two doors into areas that contain cabling and/or equipment necessary for safe shutdown of the plant which did not have the required qualification rating label:

- Door No. 206 which protects Fire Zones G-11 (Passage 227) and G-12 (Passage 241) on Elevation 565' is required in the Fire Hazards Analysis Report to possess an Underwriters s Laboratory Class B level fire rating. Door No. 206 was not affixed with any label designating its fire rating.

i

- - Door No. 311 which protects Fire Zone U-1 (Passage 610 and j Match Area 313) on Elevation 585' is required in the Fire Hazards Analysis Report to possess an Underwriters Laboratory Class A level fire rating. Door No. 311 was not affixed with l

any label designating its fire rating.

i 4

. l

• d pending licensee verification that amable liquids and/or 1.

/ pt s the necessary fire resistance cap.

/ fot

.no appropriate Underwriters Laboratory a entien Administrative Controls a No. 4 tha licensee's fire protection and prevention including the control of combustible and Maintenance.. requires i centrol of ignition sources, fire emergency The er an area for a miniana fira protection audits and inspections. ie, cutting, grinding or w ro reviewed using the commitments and re.

No. 18 to License No. NPF-3 including the Fire stien Report, issued July 26, 1979, and the 1982, during the lunch 11 Sptcifications. -

o fire watch was posted k Room where welding 1 r to the lunch break, ment No. 18 to License hat the fire protection Title ng them into conformance

.Firo Protection Progras lant Fire Protection '

e Controls and Quality Ccatrol of Combustibles 21s modification was Maintenance zutage (approximately

-*re Emergency Procedure Preplan - Room 319 - Diesel Generator 1-2 a the 1980 refueling Fue Preplan - Roon 323 - High Voltage Switchgear I administrative Room B with the NRC guidance Fire Preplan - Room 321A - Day Tank 1-1 Room mctional Responsibili-Fire Proplan Room 115 - ECCA Pump Roon No. 2 (East) esurance, in the ition which has Dates sament of the rogram was not June 19-26, 1979 a. of Attachment

ica Quality ususi Audit has direct respon-tion Quality April 21 I May 30,1980 , and assessing the regram was not inuti Audit 3.(1) of Attachment August 20-22, 1980 tion Consultant Pl**enting a program Tri-Annual Audit  ; t fire protection trsency procedures

' March 23-25, 1931 traph 1.d.(5} of clon Quality

' mt. '1he General

. - Audit i 5

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Orientation Training program does not provide training in the fire prevention administrative controls over the use of combustible materials and~ ignition sources.

(4) Administrative controls over the use of combustible materials did not include a requirement for the removal of all combustible materials at the completion of the work anivity or the end of each work shif t, whichever is sooner, as required in Paragraph C of Attachment No. 3 to the guidance document.

(5) Administrative controls over ignition sources did not include the restriction that oxyacetylene equipment be checked for leaks prior to moving it into safety-related -

areas as required in Paragraphs 2.b(4) of Attachment No. 4 to the guidance document.

(6) Administrative controls over ignition sources did not include a requirement that the fire watch remain at the worksite for thirty minutes following the completion of work to check for smoldering fires as required in Para-graph 2.b.(3) of Attachment No. 4 to tho' guidance document.

(7) Administrative controls over ignition sources did not j

include fire watch qualifications as required in Para-

graph 2.b(3) of Attachment No. 4 to the guidance document.

(8) Administrative controls over ignition sources did not include the stipulation that the responsible foreman or supervisor physically survey the area to assure that all-precuations have been taken as required in Paragraph 2.b.

of Attachment No. 4 to the guidance document.

i In addition, at the time of this inspection, Items 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 and 8, as listed above, had not been corrected in the current j revisions to the appropriate procedures. l Noncompliance (50-346/82-03-06): 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, l l

Criterica XVIII, requires that a comprehensive system of planned j and periodic audits be carried out to verify compliance with all i

)

' aspects of the quality assurance program.

i Toledo Edison Company Nuclear Quality Assurance Procedure (QAP)

! 2180, " Audits," states in part, "A comprehensive system of ,

plassed periodic audits to verify compliance with QA program a requirements and to determine QA program effectiveness shall be g conducted... The goals of the audit system are...to provide an objective assessment of compliance with established requ'irements."

Toledo Edison Company Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual,-Jolune I,

! Section 1.2.8, defines Audit Activity as, " Documented QA/QC l

activities to determine, through investigation, the adequacy of, and adherence to... licensing requirements."

S

l I

I Contrary to the above, the quality assurance audits of the fire i protection program performed in June 19-26, 1979 (Audit No. 598),

' April 21 - May 30, 1980 (Audit No. 666) and March 25, 1981 (Audit No. 744), only reviewed the adequacy of implementation of the existing plant procedures. Assessments were not made concerning

the adequacy of these procedures as inspection guidance utilizing

the fire protection licensing requirements. This narrow scope for the quality assurance audit permitted deficiencies in fire protection program administrative procedures to go undetected.

4. Fire Protection and Prevention Trainina ne inspectors examined the licensee's fire protection and prevention

training programs for contractors, general employees and fire brigade i personnel. These training programs were reviewed using the commitments and requirements in Amendment No. 18 to License No. NPF-3 including the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report, issued July 26, 1979, the l

Fire Hazards Analysis Report (Revision 6), issued May 16, 1980, and

• i the plant Technical Specification.

a. Areas of Inspection l

l (1) Procedures and Records 1

2 Number Title Dates  ;

AD 1828.20 Fire Brigade Training -

- Fire Brigade Training 1981 and Drill Record Forms (2) Observations l

The inspectors observed and participated in the General Orientation Training on January 11, 1982, and the Radiation Control Training on January 12, 1982.

l b. Findinas Nonconoliance (50-346/82-03-04(B)): Technical Specification 6.8.1.f

! requires that written procedures be established, implemented and l maintained covering the fire protection program. Administrative

) Procedure AD 1828.20, Fire Brigade Training, requires that each fire brigade team participate in at least one fire drill each

! calendar quarter.

E Contrary to the above, fire brigade drilla were not conducted

. j, in the first and third quarters of 1981 for any of the f. ire brigades.

l

! Nonconoliance (50-346/82-03-05(B)): h at No. 18 to License No. NPF-3 issued July 26, 1979, requires that the fire protection i administrative controls be upgraded to bring them into conformance j with the NRC guidance document, " Nuclear Plant Fire Protection s

9

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Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and Quality i Assurance." De implementation date for this modification was l f l prior to startup after the 1980 refueling outage (approximately November 1, 1980),

i Contrary to the above, at the startup following the 1980 refueling outage, the licensee had not fully upgraded administrative controls to bring them into conformance with the NRC guidance document,

" Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, i

i Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance," in the following areas:

l (1)' Fire Brigade practice sessions did not include practice in the proper method of fighting fires of similar magnitude, l complexity and difficulty as those that could occur in the plant as required in Paragraph 2.0 of Attachment No. 2 to the guidance document.

1 (2) Fire Brigade practice sessions did not include practice in -

the use of emergency breathing apparatus under strenuous -

fire fighting conditions as required in Paragraph 2.0 of l j Attachment No. 2 to the guidance document.

. (3) Documentation of fire brigade drill critiques was not

. esintained as required in Paragraph 4.0 of Attachment

No. 2 to the guidance document.

i Noncompliance (501346/82-03-07): 10 CFR 50, Appendia B, l Criterica XVI, requires that conditions adverse to quality be promptly corrected.

Contrary to the above, the fire fighting practice training for 4

the fire brigade was documented as being deficient in Toledo i

Edison Audit No. 729, dated August 20-22, 1980, and in Toledo Edison Audit No. 781, dated July 20-22, 1981, but the necessary corrective action had not been taken at the time of thia l inspection to upgrade the fire fighting practice training program to satisfy the requirements in Paragraph 2.0 of i Attachment No. 2 to " Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance."

l Toledo Edison Annual and 34 Nonth Fire Protection Audit No. 729, Section 4.4.7, states in part, "A fireground training facility

, should be provided to allow realistic " hands-ca" training in other than the open pit fire situations. D e training facility l

8 should provide enclosed areas with heat and smoke and should be 2 able to simulate oil spill fires indoors."

• The response to this audit finding states in part, "A fiireground training facility is provided at Davissesse for fire brigade I training on opea pit fire siw ations. The Fire Protection Coordinator is developing the criteria for a fire /seoke building for fire brigade training on indoor fire situations. In this 10

4 L

Y regard, the usefulness and availability of the old Sewage Treatment Plant building for fire brigade training is being evaluated by the Fire Protection Coordinator."

This respcase was issued by the Station Superintendent in Memoranduz M80-2299 dated December 11, 1980.

Toledo Edison Annual Fire Protection Audit No. 781, Section 4.4.5, states in part, "A fire ground training facility should be provided to allow for more realistic " hands-on" training. The training facility should provide enclosed areas with heat and smoke to simulate fires indoors."

Section 4.4.3 states in part, " Fire Brigade practice sessions should include the use of self-contained breathing apparatus under strenuous firefighting conditions."

n e response to these audit findings states in part, "The Station fireground training facility does provide for "handr-on" training on pit fires. The Fire Protection Coordinator, with the coopera-tion of the Maintenance Engineer, will solve this problem of providing an area for fighting fires in an enclosed area with heat and smoke and use of SCBA under strenuous firefighting conditions in the near future."

. This response was issued by the Station Superintendent in Nemorandus M81-1442 dated August 18, 1981.

4 At the time of this inspection, no facility existed onsite which j was designated for use to accomplish this, type of fire fighting training and the training was not being provided to the fire brigade members as required through Amendment No. 18 to License ,

No. NFF-3 issued July 26, 1979.

5. Unresolved Items

{

' Unresolved Items are matters about whic1. mare information is required I in order to ascertain whether they are neceptable or Items of Noncom-i pliance. An Unresolved Ites identified during this inspection is l

discussed in Paragraph 2.

6. Exit Interview l

l The inspeetors set with the licensee representatives denoted in

(

Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on January 15, 1982.

i 8 The inspectors summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection l

2. and discussed the findings. .

11

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Fire Protection July 20-22, 1981 Consultant Annual Audit No. 781 (3) Plant Tours The inspectors examined the impletsentation of the licensee's fire protection and prevention administrative controls during tours of the turbine and auxiliary buildings on January 13, 14, and 15, 1982.

Noncompliance (30-346/72-03-04(A)): Technical Specification 6.8.1.f requires that written procedures be. established, implemented and maintained covering the fire protection program. .

i (1) Administrative Procedure AD 1810.01, Control of Combustibles, requires that storage of combustible gases, lubricants, solvents, fuels, and paints shall be prohibited in safety-related areas. Also, this procedure requires that all wood ,

used in safety-related areas shall be treated with a flame retardant and that combustible waste, scrap, debris and oil resulting from a work activity shall be removed from the plant following the completion of the work activity or the end of the shift, whichever is sooner.

4 f Contrary to the above, on January 13 and 14, 1982, between the hours of 1600 and 2000, the inspectors observed the l

following violations of these requirements:

(a) Accumulations of combustible materials including untreated wood, rags, trash, cardboard and paper in

)

the following areas:

i

- 2 Diesel Generator Room

- No. 1 Diesel Generator Room

- No. 2 Diesel Generator Day Tank Room

- Auxiliary Shutdown Fanel Room

- "R" Low Voltage Switchgear Room

- "R" Battery Room .

- Diesel Generator Corridor '

- Steam /Feedwater Rupture Control System dP Cell Area

- No. 3 Mechanical Penetration Room

- No. 4 Mechanical Fenetration Room a - No.1 Penetration Rose i

- Fuel Fool Area l

' ^ - Componest Cooling Water Pump sc.d Heat Exchanger Room-1

' - Diesel Fire Pump Room l

- Elevation 623 Purge Roon

- Cable Spreading Room Access Area from RAfA

- Control Room

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C Indiana and Michigan Power Company ATTN: Mr. John E. Dolan, vice Chairman -

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New York, NY 10004 '

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k Gentlemen: ..

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This refers to the routine safety inspections conducted at the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, during the period June 1 through August 13, 1981.

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The results of these inspections indicate, among other things, serious week-

nesses in the sanagement of your fire protection program and conduct of contain-E

" ment leakage tests as evidenced by the significant number of violations of IE  ?

regulatory requirseents. Our concerns deal with three principal areas; 5

F (1) inadequate implementation of the fire protection program including failure I Ih to implement the inservice testing requirements for a number of systems; -'

_B (2) eaterial falso statements; and (3) failure to maintain containment integrity. -

a y

In regard to the first concern, numerous instances were identified wherein ]

h timely tests and inspections were not conducted to assure acceptable per-

> formance of fire protection components. For example, timely tests and

inspections were not performed on spray and sprinkler systems and on fire __

E - detection supervisory circuits to assure that they were operable and on fire "'

i_

doors in fire barriers to verify that they were functional. This is a matter F of special concern in that your failure to perfore timely tests and aaka the -

e necessary inspections posed questions as to the operability of the spray and E

sprinkler systems and the fire detection supervisory circuits and whether the s 4

fire doors in the fire barriers were functional. '

k m E In regard to the second concern, estarial falso statements, the NRC staff, dur-ing a review of your fire protection program, sent four letters to you requesting g specific information. In response to these letters it was stated that various p zones and areas were equipped with lirhour and 3-hour rated fire doors and adeinistrative esasures had been established to control storage of combustible estarials in the vicinity of safety related systems. However, the zones and E

areas were not equipped with the appropriately rated fire doors and there were -

no procedures to control the storage of combustible materials in the vicinity E of safety related systees. In May 1978, the Indiana and Michigan Power Company a

. Csdans sluil penalties were proposed for material false statements with Q respect to the tasting of electrical penetrations and instrument cable. j g J s

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j h CERTIFIED Mall, 3[]t{t + / [ ~ ' Y 9

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EIUup IEEGLIPT REQUESTED -

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i E American Elastric Power 5ervice Corporation

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s l Your reSDonse, dated June 15, 1978, to the NRC Nou ce o' Violation described l

( corrective act ons to assure the unerring accuracy of submittals to the NRC. -

Your correct 1<e actions were found to be acceptable. The material false i l

• statements cited in Appendix A to this letter occurred prior to the eaterial falso statements for which you previously were cited. Inaccurate information E could result in decisions which adversely affect the health and safety of the P public. Therefore, it is imperative that licensees exercise the utmost care E in verifying the information furnished the NRC.

I The third area of concern involves an incident in which containment integrity T

[ was not maintained while the facility was in hot standby and hot shutdown.

F For a period of approximately 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> containment integrity was breached in i that a containment sensing line plug which was removed to install a test '

i instrument was not replaced following completion of an Integrated Leak Rate Test. While the incident had limited safety significance, we are concerned about the inadequacy of your test control procedures which failed to assure -]

that the technician used the correct point to test the systes and restare the i j system following conoletion of the test. Although you did subsequent 1v g ntify p -

the containment breach, you failed to notify or report the incident to ,. j Consission on a timely basis. Similar events involving failure to assure the g __

operability of safety systees following surveillance testing or maintenance -

were discussed with you during an enforcement conference on January 13, 1981, q X

b The safety significance of the above satters together with other itees of non-y

! compliance discovered during the inspections were discussed on August 4, 1981, "_

7 during an enforcament conference in the Region l'.! of fice t'etween you and members of your staff and Mr. J. G. Keppler and others of the NRC staff. -,,

L i

h Accordingly, in order to emphasize the importance the NRC places on adequate F sanagement control and followup on satters such as these, we propose to impose -

E civil penalties in the ctaeulative amount of Eighty Thousand Dollars for the -

3 itses set forth in Appendix A to this letter. These violations occurred under =-

, both the old and new enforcement policies. Those violations that occurred -

E undertheoldpolicyhavebeenevaluatedusingfactorsidentifiedinthe '

" Criteria for Deteretning Enforcement Action, which was sent to NRC licensees -

e on December 31, 1974. These violations that encompassed both the old and new policies or occurred completely under the new policy have been categorized at 3

- the level described in accordance with the Interie Enforcement Policy published 4 in the Federal Roeister 45 FR 66754 (October 7, 1980). The base value for i f

Severity Level LI Violations, such as the fire protection program violation _

or the containment integrity violation, is normally $40,000. Because you ji a could have reasonably been expected to have implemented measures te avoid the f

[ ,

containment integrity violation following our enforcement conference on l

January 13, 1941, an increase in the base value to $50,000 is appropriate. "i However, after considering all the circumstances of this violation including

l your self-identification, we are reducing the adjusted amount ($50,000) of the y 4 a q civil penalty to $40,000. -3

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1 The inspections also identified certain safety significant activities which deviate from commitments to the NRC and from applicable codes approved by the NRC. The deviation is identified irt the Notice of Deviation enclosed herewith ..

M as Appendix 8 and is an additional example of the breakdown in the management .

~,

of your fire protection program. m6 Youarerequiredtorespondtothisletterandshouldfollowtheinstbactions in Appendices A and 8 when preparing your response. Your reply to this letter - ,'

and the results of future inspections will be considered in detarsining whether .h go further enforcement action may be appropriate. .u F-In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosures .

will be placed in the NRC Pubile Document Room. ,t

..D The responses directed by this letter and the enclosed Appendices are not sdject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget, as ,

(

required by the Papensork Reduction Act of 1980 PL 96-511.

Sincerely, >. .

D I41 M 1 !.. n ; ,' $.

E. C. Deta=y ,

Richard C. DeYoung, Director -

Office of Inspection and Enforcement l

,  ? '-

Enclosures:

1. Appendix A - Notice of Violation and = n Proposed Ispositior, of Civil Penalties -

e

2. Appendix 8 - Notice of Deviation 1.-

cc w/encls:

D. V. Shaller, Plant Manager

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Distribution Department of Public Health POR CP Sook APuglise, CON L-316 ATTM: Mr. Donald E. VanFarowe, Chief E. N5IC '

' E! Acading File 01 vision of Radiological Health

• LPOR ACR$ E00 Read Mi File P.O. Box 30035 SSCY SMiner, luts:05-1 Lansing, MI 48909 i

. CA SVarga, NRR:048-1 e

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V5te11o, DED40GR RCDeVoung, IE Office of the Attorney

=3 J5aiezek, IE ATTN: Hon. Frank J. Kelley I s Adessmen, IE Attorney General a-5F T3rockett, IE 7th Floor, Law 81dg. 3 -

=

FIngram, PA Lansing, MI 48913

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g Jturray, ELD ,

- JLiebernen ELD Public Service Commission --

g I. RCyr, ELD JCrooks, AE00 ATTN: Mr. Daniel J. Deslow Chairman 3

= JJCuneings, CIA Long Commerce Park _

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01 rector,El Staff P.O. Box 30221 j J RI, RII, RI!!, RIV, RV Lansing, MI 48909 -

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APPEN0!X A NOTICE OF VIOLATION i

AND PROPOSED IMPOSITIOK"5F CIVIL PENALTIES American Electric Power Service Corporation Docket Nos. 50-315 50-316 Indiana and Michigan Power Coecany Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 EA 82-03 As a result of inspectio.is conducted during the period June 1 through August 13, 1981, at the Donald C. Cook Muclear Plant near Bridgman, Michigan, it appears that breakdowns have occurred in the control of your licensed activities.

Numerous violations demonstrate that the licensee failed to adequately implement its fire protection program. The inservice testing program for various fire protection systees was not implemented, certain tests and inspections were 'not conducted on a timely basis and the accuracy of information provided to the Commission regarding the fire protection program was not assured. Also, adequate control over surveillance testing procedures to assure that such testing did not affect the operability of systems important to safety was not maintained.  :

Consequently, the performance of a leak rate test resulted in a breach of containment integrity for approximately 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br />. This failure to ensure '

operability of safety systems following surveillance testing had been previously identified to the licensee.

Because of these breakdowns in implementation of and centrol of licensed activities, the Nuclear Regulatory Comeission proposes to impose civil penalties in the amount of 580,000 for these satters.

Itses 1.A., I.B., I.O., I.E., I.F., II.A II.8, III.A., III.B., and III.C have been categorized at the level described in accordance with the Interim Enforcement Policy 45 FR 66754 (October 7,1980). In categorizing Items I.C. , I.G. , I.H. , and I.I. , the factors identified in the "Critaria for Determining Enforcement Action," which was sent to NRC licensees on December 31, 1974, have been taken into account. These penalties are proposed pursuant to section 234 of the Atomic Energv Act of 1954, as amended ("Act"), and 10 CFR 2.205.

CIVIL PEMALTY v!0LATIONS I. A nuter of violations involving the implementation of your fire pro-taction program were identified. The total of the proposed civil penalties for this failure to properly implement your fira protection program is $40,000.

A. Technical Specification 3.7.10 for Units 1 and 2 requires that all penetration fire barrie?; protecting safety related areas shall be functional at all times. With one or more of the above required penetration fire barriers non-functional, a continuous fire watch

( shall be established within one hour. u

i l 4:penc . A (;ontinued) ,

I e chnical Specification 4.7. M 'or w ts 1 and 2 states, in part,

'Eacn of the above required ::eaetration fire Oa-r'i.-5 sr.al! D's veri-

"ac to ee functional by a visual ins::ection. .at ' east once per 13

---tns.

...-:-iry to the above:

1. As of June 4,1981, the licensee had not serified by visual >

inspection that certain penetration fire barriers (fire doors and fire dampers] protecting safety related areas .ere functional since the requirement became effective on January 12, 1978, for Unit 1 and on December 23, 1977, for Unit 2.

2. Lighteen fire doors protecting safety related areas (including the auxiliary feedwater pump rooms and containment cabling and piping penetration areas) were not functional for the following . ,

reasons:

a. Sixteen doors did not have the required fire rating.

~ "

b. Two fire doors were obstructed fres closing.

c. Six fire doors had inoperable closure and/or latching mechanisms.

3. On June 4,1981, when the NRC inspector informed licensee man-agement that the visual inspections were overdue, the licensee failed to implement the provisions of the action statement of Technical Specification 3 7.10 and thereby satisfy the limiting condition for operation.

This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement 1).

(Civil Fenalty - $10,000).

B. Technical Specifications 3.3.3.7 for Unit 1 and 3.3.3.8 for Unit 2 state, in part, "As a minimum, the fire detection instrumentation for each fire detection zone...shall be OPERA 8LE...With the number of OPERA 8LE fire detection instruments less than requirea...Within one hour, establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the Zone (s) with the inoperable instrument (s) at least once per hour. . ."

Technical Specifications 4.3.3.7.2 for Unit 1 and 4.3.3.8.2 for Unit 2 state, "The NFPA Code 720 Class 8 supervised circuits super- J vision associated with the detector alarms of each of the above  ;

required fire detection instruments shall be demonstrated OPERA 8LE l at least once per six months." l

O o

Accendit A (Continued) 3- ,

,trary to tne above:

As of June 3,1981, tne fire cetector suce visory circuits had act teen demonstrated OPERABLE s:nce . e ec. e'e,ts cecame ef'ective on January 12, 1978, for Unit 1, 2nc on Decester 23,

'977. for Unit 2.

2. Four fire detector supervisory circuits re not CPERABLE due to malfunctioning relays. This resulted in a degraded mode of ooeration for the fire detection instrumentation for those four Zones.

i 3. On June 4,1981, when the NRC inspector informed licensee manage-sent that the OPERABILITY datenstrations were overdue, the licensee failed to implement the provisions of the action statement of Technical Specification 3.3.3.7 for unit 1 and 3.3.3.8 for Unit 2' and thereby satisfy the limiting condition for operation.

This is a Severity level III violation (Supplement !).

l (Civil Penalty - $5,000). E

\

C. Technical Specification 3.7.9.2 for Units 1 and 2 states, in part, "The spray and/or sprinkler systems located in the areas shown in .

(

Table 3.7-5 shall be OPERA 8LE...Whenever equipment in the spray /

sprinkler protected areas is required to be OPE ABLE...with one or more of the above required spray and/or sprink'ar systems inoperable, establish a continuous fire watch with backup fi re suppression equipment for the unprotected area (s), within cre hour..."

Technical Specification 4.7.9.2 for Units 1 and 2 states, in part, that each of the above required spray and/cr sprinkler systems shall be demonstrated to be OPERA 8LE at intervals of 12 months and 18 sonths, in accordance with specified test requirements.

Contrary to the above, until January 3,1980, the spray and sprinkler systees listed in Technical Specification Table 3.7-5 had not been '

comonstrated OPERA 8LE since the requirement became effective on January 12, 1978, for Unit 1 and on Decencer 23, 1977, for Unit 2. ..

This is an Infraction.

, (Civil Penalty - 54,000).

O. Technical Specification 3.7.9.1 for Units 1 and 2 requires that the fire suopression water system shall be OPERABLE wi+.n two hign pressure l

- pumps. With the fire suppression water system otherwise (noperable a backup fire suppression water system shall be established within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

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Appendix A (Continuec) .

• e csnical Specification 4.7.9.L.1 states, 5 cart. 'The fire suoores-on . ate- system shall be emonstratec W E9ABLE. .At least once per

.: months cy performing a system funct: oral test .nica incluoes

, mulated automatic actuation of the system treougnout its ocerating secuence, and... Verifying that each hign pressure pump starts (secuentially) to maintain the fire suppression ater systes pressure

> 100 psig.

Contrary to the above, the fire suppression water system was due for testing on Novemoer 5, 1980, Out was not tested until April 7, 1981.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

(Civil Penalty - 54,000). ,

E. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V requires that a:tivities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented procedures and shall be accomplished in accordance with these procedures. Procedures shall l include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria. .

I Plant Manager Instruction, PMI 2010. " Plant Manager and Department Head Instructions Procedures and Associated Indexes," implements these requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. PMI 2010 states, in part, " Acceptance criteria shall irclude the specific requirements that must be obtained before a P ::edure can be con-sidered as having been properly completed."

Contrary to the above, Operations Head Procedu e 1-OHP 4030.STP.120, Data /Signoff Sneet 6.5, " Auxiliary Building Water /COs Flow Path verification, did not include acceptance criteria for determining the proper completion (s/ the procedure employed for testing of fire protection systes comp:nents. Consequently, the procedure was approved as being sati'sfactority completed on Feoruary 27, 1981, when the test data showed pressures that were far in excess of the system capability during a f1rw obstruction test.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

(Civil Penalty - 52,500).

F. Technical Specification 6.8.1.e for Units 1 and 2 requires that written procedures shall be establisned, implemented and maintained covering the Emergency Plan iglementation.

The Donald C. Cook Emergency Plan which is contained in Section 12.3.1 of the Final Safety Analysis Report was amended in December 1977 (Amendment No. 80) to include a requirement in Part IX.F.4 tnat fiae brigade mem ers participate in quarterly fire drills.

Contrary to the above, written procedures were not establisned to implement this requirement. Consequently, the aequi ement .as cet

. satisfied on four occasions as follows:

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Appendix A (Continued) ,

'he Operating Shif t A Fire Brigade did not participate in a fire ort 11 in the second quarter of 1979.

2. The Operating Shift C Fire Brigade did not participate in a fire drill in the third quarter of 1979.

3. The Operating Shift 8 Fire Brigade did not participate in a fire drill in the third quarter of 1980.

4. The Operating Shift 0 Fire Brigade did not participate in a fire drill in the fourth quarter of 1980.

This is a Severity t.evel IV violation (Supplement I).

(Civil Penalty - $2,500).

G. As part of the NRC staff review of fire protection at the D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, the staff requested, by letter dated Septencer 30, 1976, that the licensee prepare a fire hazards analysis -

of the facility. The licensee's response dated March 31, 1977,

' " Fire Hazards Analysis Units 1 and 2," stated that ten specified fire zones were provided with 12 (Underwriter's t.aboratorias approved)

Class 8 doors.

Contrary to section 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the state-ment in the licensee's March 31, 1977 response 's a material false i statement. It is false in that none of the 12 soecified doors had any fire resistance rating. This false statement is r.aterial in that the staff relied upon it in reaching its conclusions regarding the acceptability of the licensee's fire protection program.

(Civil Penalty - $4,000).

H. The NRC staff requested by letter dated July 11, 1977, that the licensee provide information concerning unprotected openings in the l auxiliary feedwater pump rooms. The ifcensee's response dated November 22, 1977, stated, in part, "The four feedwater pump rooms are equipped with (Underwriter's taboratories approved] three hour rated fire doors..."

Contrary to section 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the statement in the licensee's November 22, 1977 response is a material false statement. It is false in that it was determined that none of these doors had a fire resistance rating. This false statement is material in that the staff relied upon it in reacning its conclusions regarding the acceptability of the licensee's fire protection program.

(Civil Penalty - $4,000).

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Appendix A (Continued) ,

e NRC staf f requested Dy letters dated 'uly 16 and 30,1976, that N I.

t e licensee make a comparison of the 0. C. Cook Nuclear Plant fire '

a otection program with the positions in Appendix A to 8 ranch Techni-  ;

cal Position APCS 8 9.5-1, " Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear power Plants Occketed Prior to July 1,1976." One of the positions h in Appendix A states, in part, " Effective administrative measures ~5 j

should be implemented to prohibit bulk storage of concustible eaterials inside or adjacent to safety related buildings or systees during 3 operation or maintenance periods ..." The licensee's response dated W January 31, 1977, stated, in part, " Administrative esasures have been B established to control the storage of combustible materials and to prohibit their storage in the vicinity of safety related systees."

Contrary to section 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the statement in the licensee's January 31, 1977 response is a material false statement. It is false in that it was determined during an NRC d inspection that administrative measures had not been established at 9 the time of the licensee's January 31, 1977 response and they were ,.

not estaby*shed until July 28, 1977. This false statement is asterial in that ' . , staff relied upon it in reaching its conclusions regarding the acceptability of the licensee's fire protection program.

3 (Civil Penalty - $4,000).

The following violations relate to the degradation ',t.containment integrity 7 II. J and failure to make a timely notification of the eve The total of the proposed civil penalties for these violations is $40,000.

A. Technical Specification 3.6.1.1 requires that primary containment integrity be maintained during power operation, startup, hot standby and hot shutdown (modes 1, 2, 3 and 4). If primary containment integrity is lost, it is required to be restored within one hour or -

the plan'. be placed in at least hot standby within the next six hours and in cold shutdown wit' tin the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. j Contrary to the above, primary containment integrity was not maintained _

from about 10:45 a.m. on May 10, 1981, to 10:30 p.m. on May 12, 1981, 4 (a period of about 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br />) while the Unit 2 reactor was in hot standby and hot shutdown (modes 3 and 4) in that a containment s sensing line plug, removed to install a test instrument, was not "

replaced following completion of the Integrated Leak Rate Test. The calculated leakage rate free the sensing line with the plug removed 4 exceeded the limits allowed by Technical Specification.

5 This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I).

(Civil Penalty - 530,000). g N l d

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secea: 4 s (Continued) - -

3. -4c nica! 5cecification 6.9.1.3 eM es *. at WC oe actified of a-tain events witnin 24 nours :y te' eor.cre ano .* n a ritten 9 'awuo recort itnin 14 days. One event inat requires reporting

. ntag 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is. " Personnel error or procedural inadequacy .nich oaewents or could prevent, by itself, the fulfillment of the functional aequirements of systems required to come with accidents analyzed in

ne SAR.

10 CFR 50.72 requires the notification of the NRC Operations Center as soon as possible and in all cases within one nour by telephone of tne occurrence of " Personnel error or procedural inadequacy which, during normal operations, anticipated operational occurrences, or accident conditions. prevents or could prevent, by itself, the ful ,

fillment of the safety function of those structures, systees, and '

components i.nportant to safety that are needed to (i) shut down the reactor safely and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or (ii) remove residual heat following reactor shutdown, or (ill) limit the release of radioactive material to acceptable levels or reduce the .-

potential for such release."

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Contrary to the above, telephone notification was not made of the l l event described above in Item II. A and a written report was not submitted within 14 days. The event was identified by t=e licensee on May 12, 1981, but was not reported to the NRC until Ju:/ 15, 1981.

Nis is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I).

(Civil Penalty - $10,000).

I!!. VIOLATICNS NOT ASSESSED A CIVIL PENALTY A. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria III and XVII require, respectively, that:

" Design changes, including fleid changes, shall be subject to design control measures consensurate with those applied to the original design."

" Sufficient records shall be maintained to furnish evidence of activities affecting quality."

Contrary to the above, a 1/2 inch valve and associated section of piping on Unit 1 containment penetration CPN-30 .as not subjacted to i design control seasures commensurate with tnose acp1'ed to tne '

original design. In addition, no records were sain'.iined t3 f arnish  !

evidence of activities affecting quality.  !

This is a Severity t.evel IV violation (Sucolement I).

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Appead4 s A tContinued) 5 4

3 'ec M' cal Specification 6.5.1.5 reauires tnat tne Plant Nuclear Safety "

eview Committee (PNSRC) be responsiole 'oa review of all orocedures e

J red by Technical Specification 6.8 ano enanges tnereto.

"eenical Specification 6.9 incluces requirements to have surveillance

'est

. procedures.

ontrary to the above, survei11ance test Procedure 12THP4030 STP.202, Revision 3, was enanged in that the isolation valves for contair.nent oressure transmitters PPA-310 and PPA-311, .nicn were not addressed in =

the procedure, were c'osed during tne Integrated Leak Rate Test with- t out review by tne PNSRC.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I). .

C. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, requires that Type C tests be performed during each reactor shutdown for refueling but in f.o case at intervals greater than two years.

Contrary to the above, the valve installation described in Item 8  ;

3 Dove, which was installed prior to the last shutdown for refueling

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nad not teen Type C leak tested.  ;

this is a Severity Level IV violation (Supp'ement I). -

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, American Electric Power Service -

Corporation is hereoy required to submit to this office within tnicty days of _

the date of this Notice a written statement or explanation, including for eacn -

alleged violation; (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation; (2) the _

reasons for tne violation if admitted; (3) the corrective steps which have been "

taten and the results achieved; (4) the corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations; and (5) the date when full Ccmpliance will be achieved. -

Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. -

under the Authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, tnis response shall be suceitted under oath or affirmation.

Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201 American Electric Power Service Corporation may pay tne civil peralties i

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in the cumulative amount of Eighty Thousand Dollars or may protest imposition of the civil penalties in . hole or in part by a written answer. Shoald American Electric Power Service Corporation f ail to answer witnin the time specified, this of fice will issue an Order imoosing the civil penalttes in tre amoun _

proposeo above. Should American E!ectric Power Service Corporatton elect to e file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting tne civil penalties, such ans.or say: (1) deny the violatiens listed in this Notice in =nale or in a part; (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances; (3) snow error in :n's Notice:

or (4) show other reasons wny the penalties should not ce imposed. h 3Co'EfJn T to protesting the civil penalt es in enola wr in part, sach ins.er may ethest i

remission or mit'gatton of t=e oeealties, any arseee :n ic:3r:3 ace attn

'O CFR 2.205 snou M oe set fart- tecaratelj from the statement or e'olicit'49 3

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1 Acce+ i A '.Cantinued) .

, -e: . . .-s ua a t *.o ?O CFR 2.201, but may ' cor: este :f 3:ecc t'erence

(+_; , . g : age anc :aragraon nimcars) to avoic repet' tion. American Elec.- : :-er Service Corporation'. attention is cirected t: t.ae t.er previ-I s;ces af '.] 0FR 2.205, regarding t..e pr:cecure for imposing a ci eil ::enalty.

tcon 'ailure to ::ay any ci <il ;:enalties i.e nhic'1 have been subsequently deter-mined in acc:rdance wita :ne a;:olicacle provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, tnis satter may se referred to tne Attorney Ger.erti, and tne cenalties, unless compromised, remittec, or sitigated, may ce collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of tne Act. 42 'J.5.C. 2292.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY CC M ISSION,

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fRicnardC.CeYoung,Dir}ector

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• Of fice of 'nscection and Enforcement Cated it Bethesca. Maryland tnis 30tn cay of Cecerce ,1981.

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i Accendix 3 NOTICE OF OEVIATION 1 American Electric Power Service Corporation Docket Nos. 50-315 Indiana and Michigan Power Company 50-316 Based on the results of the NRC inspection conducted on June 1-4 and August 13,- .

1981, one of your activities appears to deviate from your commitment to the "

Commission and has safety significance as indicated below: ,

" Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Response to Appendix A to Branch Technical .-

Position APC58 9.5-1 for Units 1 and 2," submitted to the NRC on January 31 1977,Section11.0.1.jstates,inpart,"Allcoors...(EnclosingseparatedfIre areas)... carry UL Class A (three hour) fire rating." , .'

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" Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Fire Hazards Analysis," subaltted to the NAC on March 31, 1977, describes the fire protection seasures which are taken in all *1 areas of the plant. Concerning the method of fire containment for the Unit 1 y and Unit 2 Diesel Fire Pump Rooms, the " Fire Hazards Analysis" states, "Well*,, I floor, ceiling; all reinforced concrete and in excess of 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rating. Class A -

(3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />) door, no dampers." g Contrary to the above, at the time of this inspection, the Unit 1 and Unit 2 5 -

Diesel Fire Pump Rooms fire doors did not maintain their Underwriter's hboratories Class A (three hour) fire rating due to inoperable latching "

sechanisms.

Provide this office within thirty days of the date of this Nctice written l

-comments including a description of corrective actions that have been or will I

' ce taken, corrective actions which will be taken to avoid further deviations, and the date your corrective actions will be completed.

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