ML20210S308
| ML20210S308 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 09/25/1972 |
| From: | Hendrie J US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Oleary J US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209C518 | List:
|
| References | |
| CON-#487-4996, FOIA-86-586 2.206, NUDOCS 8610080082 | |
| Download: ML20210S308 (14) | |
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vv september 25, 1972 Ifote to Jol=. 7. O' Leary L'ith regard to the attached, Steve's 7~
g essure suppression t i
_ con a n=ac schemes is an attrsceive osa in so::ic ways. IJry containments
~
have tTie notable advantage of brute simplicity in dcaling with a primary _
blowdown, and are thereby free of the perils of bypass 1cohage.
Ito. ever, the ecceptance of pressure suppression containment concepto by n)1 clcmcatn of the nuclear field, i'ncluding Regulatory and the ACRS, is firmly ir. bedded in the conventional visdom. Reversal, of this hallowed policy,Tarticularly at this time, could well be the end of nuclect power, It would throw into question the continued operation of licensed plents, vould t.aAc unlicensabic the CE and Uestin3 ouse ice condensor planto now h
in review, and vould generally create core tur:oll than 1 ~62in stand
- hinking cbout.
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8610090082 860731 PDR FOIA CURRAN 86-586 PDR f
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Note to John F. O't.cary
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TASK FORCC REVIE11 BYPASS EFFECTS IN CE PRT.SSUP.E SUPPRESSION CONTAIUMENTS NOVEMBER 9, 1971 DECEMBER 1, 1971 Ref: Mero, G. Lainas to R. S. Boyd, " Steam Bypass Problem of BL'R Pressure Suppression Contain=cnts" (November 30, 1971) (attached).
I SUBJECT DISCUSSION DECISIONS 1.
Definitien:
Bypass means a path from dry. ell to uctuell air space without passing through the water of the suppression pool and therefore without condensing the steam.
~
- 2.
Consecuences a)
Large LOCA - no problem.
b)
Stall LCCA - slou pressure buildup in drywell, bypass lets wetuell pressure follow vithout condensing steam.
This treuble cares en slculy but if the primary leak videns and the LOCA severity in-creases (the advertised course of events for a big leak -
starts small) then the big blowdown pressure vill build
-~
on the existing pressure built up slowly, and the con-tain=ent would overpressurize.
That could lose the torus water source, hence ECCS, as well as leak out fission products.
3.
Probability a)
Small prieary leak rathav probable - already had one slow blowdown (Dresden 2).
Another (Monticello) blowdown occurred through the bypass valve, then threugh a safety valve. A large.
leak is improbabic, but is supposed to be a sma'11 one first.
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//-3V OFFliCLSL.US$ ONLY
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PiLd[hb UE.Sid Udb 1.
SUBJECT:
DISCUSSION DECISI0i:S b)
CC claics two passive failures b) The CE position that this are required for trouble, but is too ieprobable to any osifunction of 12 vacuum vorry about is rejected.
reliv.f valves, not easily in-l spec:cd in the terus. over 40 years vill set up half the d,
accident, ready for trouble if a stea= leak occurs.
c)
Only a li=ited range of leak c)
Further study is required sizes gets into trouble.
,for this and other configura-Large leaks clear the vents tions, including sensitivities regardless of any reasenable and assu=ption variations.
postulated bypass.
Very s=all leaks are condensed en the drywell wall.
The attached
__ CE curve sub=itted for Hatch 2 has not been revieued very cuch by REG, shows scte trouble 0.05 - 0.5 ft 2 Other CE containecnts (s= aller, or over/
under with deeper vents, or other parameters different) have prcblems not yet calcu-lated and, in seme cases, likely to be worse than Hatch.
4.
Cures (partial) a)
Containment spray (particularly ~
a)
This 'should b studied torus air space spray) would further.
k'e cannot expect i
condense the stes= and decrease an operator en the graveyari the pressure, but at eno r=ous shitt.to sort out the pres cost (ruin equip =cnt in dry-and cons of turning on the well, esybe have to retire containment spray, thus ~
g reactor).
In.ptcsent designs ruininn his receter. to contain=ent spray vater is cope with a tractient he eniv I
diverted from the LPCIS, thus dimly understands.
A. separate torussprayshouldbeconsidered.j from ECCS.
b)
Inservice inspection of poten-b)
Check the valve stuff care-tial bypass leahage:
corrosion, fully to make sure it cracks in vent pipes, malfune-doesn't inercase (too nuch),
tioning valves. The Hatch the probability of failure.
applicant offers an claborate Push for adequate insp.ection
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scheme to indicate the positions of valves and pipes.
~~
OFFEF.EUSE ONLY 8
BO'nCAL U;il8 0ial.FO
- 1 SUBJCCT: DISCt'SSION ADECISIONS I
of the valves using redundant devices, and to allow remote testing of the valvest but nothing in the way of inspection.
I 5.
Applicatien a)
The proble= is germanc to all a)
Starting with Hatch-2, get a past and present CE pressure-commitment to study and suppression containments. About fix the problem in whatever 40 such are already approved, way is found.
For back-Hatch-2 CP is the next ACRS fitting, wait until fixes review.
are studied and problem is scoped.
b)
CE wants us'and ACRS not to b)
All safety evaluations cention the proble= publicly.
issued from now on for plants They are afraid of delaying affected will have to discuss Dhearings in progress.
the proble:. The next SE is Newbold. Hearings for CP should be satisfied with a suitable co==ittent; if they're not, caybe that's a suitable spur to GE to resolve the problem.
In any event, this is potential trouble for the Vermont Yankee and Pilgrim hearings; it will have to be faced and a real salution found.
The'H'atch-2 CP ACnS letter does
~~
not mention the probler., thus giving us a little more time.
The subject is discussed in publicly available Hatch-2 docket as an ansucr to a DRL question.
c) A program is required c) (1)
Talk to CE right away and to resolve the technical tell them about our and ACP.S question.
concern; ACRS decision that next CE OL revicu must include resolution of this problem (Next OL review is Browns.
Ferry).
(2) Tell CE and applicants that our SE's cust cention the
- problem.
~~
OMCH.AL USE ONLY n
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SUBJECT:
DISCUSS 70?!
DECISIO;;S (3)
Hake decisions on requirements for Shorehsm, Fer=i 2, Quad
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Cities, Pilgrim, Ver=ent Yankee as soon as possible.
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OFMCliAL USE ONLY
i UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS ieie e s,...sw s. aio
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...oc 20ose. <2o2,332.oeoo DIAGPAMS RELATING TO GENERAL ELECTRIC PRESSURE SUPPRESSION CONTAINMENTS AND SOVIET PRESSURE SUPPRESSION CONTAINMENTS t
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(The containment consists of the drywell and the torus which contains the pressure suppression pool.
The outer structure is called the reactor building and can be considered as a filtration system with little or no pressure retention capability.)
(Source: Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Annual Report 1977, page 20.)
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(Source: Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Annual Report 1977, page 20.)
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UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS is>6 e s..... sw s. 3io. w..si.,,... nc 2:niae. 202, aa2.ovon May 19, 1986 49 U.S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS HAVE A PRESSURE-SUPPRESSION CONTAINMENT Plant Name Site Reactor MWe Status Containment Browns Ferry 1 Decatur. AL GE 1065 Licensed Mark I Browns Ferry 2 Decatur. AL GE 1065 Licensed Mark i Browns Ferry 3 Decatur. AL GE 1065 Licensed Mark i Brunswick 1 Southport. NC GE 821 Licensed Mark i Brunswick 2 Southport. NC GE 821 Licensed Mark l Catawba 1 Clover. SC W
1145 Licensed Ice Condenser Catawba 2 Clover. SC W
1145 Licensed Ice Condenser Clinton 1 Clinton. IL GE 950 Construction Mark Ill Cook 1 Bridgman MI V
1030 Licensed Ice Condenser Cook 2 Bridgman Mi V
1100 Licensed Ice Condenser Cooper Brownsville. NE GE 778 Licensed Mark i Dresden 2 Morris. IL GE 794 Licensed Mark I
~
Dresden 3 Morris, IL GE 794 Licensed Mark i Duane Arnold Palo. IA GE 538 Licensed Mark I i
Fermi 2 Newport. M1 GE 1093 licensed Mark I Fitzpatrick Scriba. NY GE 821 Licensed Mark l Grand Gulf 1 Port Gibson. MS GE 1250 Licensed Mark Ill Grand Gulf 2 Port Gibson. MS GE 1250 Construction Mark 111 Hatch 1 Baxley, GA GE 777 Licensed Mark i Hatch 2 Baxley. GA GE 784 Licensed Mark i Hope Creek 1 Salem. NJ CE 1067 Licensed Mark l LaSalle 1 Seneca. IL GE 1078 Licensed
~~ Mark 11 LaSalle 2 Seneca. IL GE 1078 Licensed Mark 11 (over) l l
Cambribe Omce: 26 Church ste et. Cambribe. Alassachusett. 02238. (617) 517 5552
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c, Plant Name Site Reactor MWe Status Containment Limerick 1 Pottstown. P'A GE 1055 Licensed Mark ll Limerick 2 Pottstown, PA GE 1055 Construction Mark ll McGuire 1 Corne11us. NC V
1180 Licensed Ice Condenser McGuire 2 Cornelius. NC W
1180 Licensed Ice Condenser Millstone 1 Waterford, CT GE 660 Licensed Mark i Monticello Monticello, MN GE 545 Licensed Mark i Nine Mlle Point 1 Scriba. NY GE 620 Licensed Mark i Nine Mlle Point 2 Scriba. NY GE 1080 Construction Mark 11 Oyster Creek Toms River, N.I GE 650 Licensed Mark l Peach Bottom 2 Peach Bottom. PA GE 1065 Licensed Mark l Peach Bottom 3 Peach Bottom. PA GE 1065 Licensed Mark l Perry 1 North Perry. OH GE 1205 Licensed Mark lli Perry 2 North Perry. OH GE 1205 Construction Mark til Pilgrim 1 Plymouth MA GE 655 Licensed Mark i Quad Cities 1 Cordova. IL GE 789 Licensed Mark I Quad Cities 2 Cordova. IL GE 789 Licensed Mark i River Bend 1 St. Francesville. LA GE 940 Licensed Mark 111 i
Sequoyah 1 Dalsy. TN W
1148 Licensed Ice Condenser Sequoyah 2 Daisy. TN V
1148 Licensed Ice Condenser Shoreham Brookhaven. NY GE 819 Licensed Mark 11 Susquehanna 1 Berwick, PA GE 1065 Licensed Mark ll Susquehanna 2 Berwick. PA GE 1065 Licensed Mark ll Vermont Yankee Vernon. VT GE 514 Licensed Mark I Watts Bar 1 Spring City. TN W
1177 Construction Ice Condenser Watts Bar 2 Spring City. TN W
1177 Construction Ice condenser WPPSS 2 Richland. WA GE 1100 Licensed Mark 11 i
j Notes: GE General Electric (Bolling Water Reactors)
W Westinghouse (Pressurized Water Reactors) 4 MWe - Design Electrical Rating (net)
Licensed plants include those with fuel loading and low power IIcenses.
4..
PUBLIC CITIZEN Buyws Up C Congress Watch 0 Critfod Mass O Hedth & search Group Outiption Group u Tax Group May 2 0,1986 Mr. Harold Denton, Director Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Director Denton:
The catastrophic accident at the Chernobyl plant in the Soviet Union is a reminder of the inherent risks of nuclear power.
Since the Tnree Mile Island accident in 1979 there have been over 20,000 mishaps at nuclear facilities in the United States.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission itself has suggested there is almost a 50:50 chance of a nuclear meltdown in this country within the next 20 years.
Such an accident could seriously threaten the health and safety of thousands of people, especially since current evacuation plans are generally inadequate or unworkable.
In addition to safety concerns, there are several other inherent problems and dangers with nuclear power.
There is no viable method for safely disposing nuclear waste and the amount of this waste continues to grow.
Opening new plants will further aggravate this problem.
In addition, decommissioning nuclear plants will likely be extremely dangerods and expensive.
Since we have no experience with decommissioning large nuclear plants in this country, it is uncertain how expensive it will be to do so; but some studies indicate that it could cost as much as it did to build the plant in the first place.
These dangers and costs, however, can be avoided.
Many of these plants are simply not needed^because they are located in regions with significant excess capacity.
Moreover, conservation programs can provide extraordinarily cheap electrical savings by encouraging consumers to invest in new energy efficient technologies.
These savings, in turn, can " pay" for the money already invested in partially completed power plants, while simhltaneously lowering electric bills.
Any remaining demand for electricity can be supplied by the many alternative sources of energy which are readily available at a reasonable cost.
These include cogeneration, solar, hydro, geothermal, wind, biomass and purchased power.
Clearly, nuclear power is a dangerous and uneconomic power source End a non-nuclear future is in the best interests of the United States.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206, we petition l
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to immediately revoke the construction permits for all commercial nuclear power plants in the United States which have not,yet received full power licenses.
215 Peruwylmrda Am. SE O Washingto,s DC 20003 0 (202) 548 4996 i
Y QC5 $30'??"
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BEAVER VALLEY 2 Sally Stephenson Susquehana Valley Alliance 110 Tulane Terrace Lancaster, PA 17603 717-872-7803 BELLEFONTE 1 & 2 Mary Garner PO Box 1233 Scottsboro, AL 35765 205-259-2434 BRAIDWOOD 1 & 2 Nancy Gardner Illinois Safe Energy Alliance 2553 W.
Estes Chicago, IL 60695 BYRON 2 Stan Cambell Sinnissippi Alliance for the Environment 219 E. State St.
Rockford, IL 61104 815-964-7111 CATAWBA 2 Michael Lowe Palmetto' Alliance 2430 Terrace Way Columbia, SC 29205 803-799-4249 CLINTON 1 Deni Girard' 635 E. Arlington Ave.
Decatur, IL 62526 217-875-4516 COMANCHE PEAK 1 & 2 Tom Smith Public Citizen / Texas 1611 E. First St.
Austin, TX 78752
~~
512-477-1155 3
y 9
GRAND GULF 2 Scott Trotter Ratepayers Fight Back PO. Box 6030 Little Rock, AK 72216 501-666-6257 HOPE CREEK Nan Kaplan Safe Energy Alternative Alliance 57 Melrose Place Montclair, NJ 07042 201-744-7901 LIMERICK 2 Kristen Dawkins Pennsylvania Ratepayers Coalition 1217 Sansom St.,
6th floor Philadelphia, PA 19107 h
NINE MILE' POINT 2 Judi Enck Environmental Planning Lobby 196 Morton Ave Albany, NY 12202 518-462-5526 PALO VERDE 3 Myron Scott Coalition for Responsible Energy Education 315 W. Riveria Dr.
Tempe, AZ 85282 602-968-2179 PERRY l & 2 Susan Hiatt Ohio C'itizen 's f or Responsible Energy P.O. Box 22 Grand River, OH 44045 216-255-3158 SEABROOK 1 & 2 Paul GutDer Clamshell Alliance PO Box 734 Concord, NH 03301 603-224-4163 4
i
- .." s Jane Dowdy Seacoast Anti-Pollution League 5 Market St.
Portsmouth, NH 03801 603-431-5089 Phil Block' New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution PO Box 545 Brattleboro, VT 05301 802-257-0036 SHEARON HARRIS 2 Wells Edelman 718A Iredell St.
Durham,.NC 27705 919-688-0076 William Cummings Kudzu Alliance 237 McCaully St Chapel Hill, NC 27514 919-942-8289 SHOREHAM Dan Gluck Citizen Action of New York 137 Broadway Amityville, NY 11701 516-691-5565 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 1 & 2' Dan Harrison South Texas Cancellation Campaign 3400-B Lafayette Austin,'TX 78722 512-339-4844 Pat Coy Concerned Citizen's Against Nuclear Power 5106 Caso Oro San Antonio, TX 78233 512-653-0543 i
VOGTLE 1 & 2 Tim Johnson
+
Education-Campaign for Prosperous Georgia l
P.O. Box 7302 Atlanta, GA 30345 404-659-5675 l
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- FQQrE Or7mV Critical Mass; Energy Project 2 6 P. nnu h ane.e Ase. S E.washmaton D C 2000 912021 546-49 %
THE LEAST-COST SOLUTION TO NUCLEAR POLLUTION:
CANCELLING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS SO THAT UTILITIES AND CONSUMERS SAVE MONEY MAY 1986 FACT SHEET /$1.00 BY JOSEPH KRIESBERG n cities and towns across America. expensive new future costs. it should cancel plants no matter how much Iconsumers and businesses. Oser the next few years nuclear power plants are causing huge rate increases for money has been spent-even if the plant is fmished. Savings,
result from the difference between what the utility would i
more regions will face these difhculties as many of the base paid to complete and operate the plant versus the cost nearly thirty nuclear plants now under construction begin of implementing conservation programs. These savings can operating All of these plants will cost several times more then be used to reduce consumer's electric bills and to pay than originally expected and huge battles are taking place to off some, or all of the money already spent on plant construc-c'ecide who should pay: ratepayers or stockholders.
tion. As a result, both utih6es and ratepayers can Nin.*
But those conflicts can be avoided. It i[possible for both Suppose, for example, a utility has spent 53 billion on a ra'epayers and stockholders to Nin' by cancelling plant con-nuclear project that is 95% complete and which will cost an struc6cn entirely and mee6ng future demand with new conser-additional 56 billion to finish, operate and eventually close vation programs instead. Rese programs can provide extraor-down. (his is not unrealistic; operating. maintenance, decom-dinanly cheap electrical savings by encoura;ing consumen to missioning and waste disposal costs can dwarf the initial in-e inve st in new energy efficient technologies. Rese savings. in vestment.) Mee6ng electrical demand would therefore cost a tum can
- pay
- for the money already invested in partially com-total of 59 billion over the life 6me of the plant. On the other pleted power plants. while simultaneously lowering electric hand. suppose the utility could satisfy the same level of de-bills As a result. utilities
- win
- by recovering their investments mand for $500 million if conservation programs were im-l and ritepayers
- win
- because their bills are reduced
- plemented instead. The total cost under this scenario would be just 53.5 billion.De $5.5 billion in savings could then be.
HOW WOULD A " WIN. WIN" STRATEGY used to pay off the 53 billion already invested while WORKT simultaneously lowering electric bills 52.5 billion.
A Nin. win' strategy is based on the notion that consumers While this is just an example,it is realistic. In hearings do not rare about electricity per se, but rather meeting their before the Illinois Commerce Commission Amory Lovins has basic energy needs (i.e. light, heat, work). Dus, consumers testified that a
- win win
- strategy is possible for the Braid-l are equa'ly satisfied if these services are provided with less wood nuclear plant near Chicago. According to Lovins, i
electricit) by using more efficient appliances and equipment.
cancelling the nearly completed plant and investing in conscr-Utilities, h turn, can implement conservation and load vation measures instead, could save $3.2 to 7.0 billion. His management programs in order to meet electrical demand would be enough to repay all the sunk costs from the plant without building new power plants. (Load management pro.
(about $3.1 billion) while lowering electric bills for con-grams shift electrical usage from periods of high demand to sumers at the same time.'
periods of low demand)
HAVE POWER PLANTS EVER BEEN l
A*wm.-wm. strategy is possible whenever conserving elec.
tricity is cheaper than finishing a power plant under con-REPLACED BY CONSERVATION!
struction. While utilities cannot miraculously recover the Over 100 nuclear and fossil fueled power plants have been money already invested, they can reduce their expenses in the cancelled in the past decade in large part because electric de-future by cancelling plant construction and implementing new mand dropped and the costs for new plants soared. For ex-convrvation programs, Since a utility can only control its ample,in 1975 Pacific Gas & Electrie (PG&E)in California
'll.c <== rris o's %=+=* siaittyy m /eru deerloved by A*'ory Imi, forecasted 5% annual demand growth, but improved energy
./ #ser Hnrb Aloimtum instante efficiency helped cause electrical demand to grow just 1.75%
J 4 **
v e*
?
cnnually. Consequently, the need for six 1000 MW nuclear Studies done by the Rocky Mountain Institute (RMll sug '
power gylants was ehminated.8 PG&E won' by not investing gest that even these figures substantially underestimate the in unneeded power plants, and rate. payers
- won
- by not pay-potential for efficiency improvements. RMI estimates that ing for thern.
Commonwestth Edison could reduce demand by 44% for less than half a cent per kw.h.
t DON'T WE NEED THOSE PLANTS While conservation measures are getting cheaper nuclear l
P ants are becoming increasingly uneconomical. Construction UNDER CONSTRUCTION?
costs continue to escalate, and even if a plant is aircady Electric utilities generally need about a 15 20 percent finished. conservation is still cheaper than opening the plant.
resene margin to ensure reliable service,yet the United Statesj Operating and maintenance (O&M) costs for nuclear currently has a 35% reserve margin. Many regions have even -
plants are rising by 12 percent annually after inflation."
higher levels of excess capacity. New York. for example. has Decommissioning a nuclear plant (cleaning up and disposing two nuclear plants still under construction even though it of the radioactive facility after it stops operating) is likely to alread has a 40% reserve margin. Ohio has even more ex-cost much more than utilities currently project. In fact. some 3
cess capacity with a statewide reserve margin of 43%. Yet, studies indicate that decommissioning large nuclear plants several Ohio utihties still want to complete the cancelled'Zim-could cost as much as it did to build them in the first place'8 mer plant by converting it to coal at a cost of $3.6 billion. In '
short.many power plants could be cancelled without forcing Finally it will cost tens of millions of dollars to safely any shortages.
dispose of radioactive waste generated by each nuclear plant.
if indeed it is ever possible to do so safely. For example.
Of course, the utility industry argues that these large Energy Systems Research Group (ESRG) a national con-reserve margins will not last forever. Demand. they say, will sulting form estimates that disposing of the waste generated eventually catch up with supply and then the U.S will need l by the Shoreham plant on Long Island (if it opens) will cost these power plants.8 l
at least $283 million and could cost 10 times that much."
Yet industry predictions of shortages lack credibility since their forecasts of future demand were revised downward COULD A " WIN WIN" STRATEGY BE APPLIED every single year between 1974 and 1954.* Some utility TO OPERATING PLANTS?
cnalysts predict that demand will grow by as little as 12%
annually over the next several years. The Electncity Con-Yes Utilities with operating nuclear plants should. like sumers Resource Council (ELCON). which represents large uulides buildmg new plants, seek to minimize their future industrial customers recently concluded that future shortages costs-even if that means closing a multi billion do!!ar facility.
are extremely unlikely. ELCON estimates that given Cicsing a nuclear plant will save millions, and perhaps bilho'ns reasonable assumptior.s for demand growth and the develop-of dollars by eliminating addidonal operating & maintenance.
waste disposal and other costs while significantly reducing the ment of small power production reserve / margins m the year 2000 could be as high as 42%. According to ELCON,even if cost for decommissioning (which increases the longer a plant demand grows as fast as the unhty industry currently operates). In many cases these savings will be much greater predicts (an unlikely scenario) and no new nuclear plants than the cost for conservation programs and other altematives. '
come on line after 1985 there will be a national reserve For example, the Energy System Research Group (ESRG). a margm over 20% through 1993. By that time a full range of national consul 6ng firm. conservatively estimates that closing conservation programs could easily be implemented to assure the 14 year old Robinson 11 nuclear plant in South Carohna would save consumers at least $50 million.
c continued supply of affordable and reliable electncity.
t For those utilities which a e faced with rising demand and HOW COULD A " WIN-WIN" STRATEGY do not have excess capacity, a win win strategy is still BE IMPLEMENTED?
I possible because an enormous amount of cost-effective con-servation is available. For example the Electric Power I
De first step in implementing a ' win win' strategy is con-Research Institute (EPRI) (a research organization sponsored l ducting a study that examines the potential for conservation in by the utility industry) estimates that a 50% reduction in the utility's service area. This study should calculate conserva,
i lighting use is possible *without imposing any hardships on tion supply curves which illustrate how much energy can be ;
productivity, safety or estheties* simply by using more effi-t saved in each customer class at different price levels. Rese cient lighting systems.' (Lighting accounts for about 25% of supply curves can be used to directly compare the cost of con i the electricity consumed in the United States.)
serving power to the cost of supplying it with a power plant.
A 1985 study done in Texas by bwrence Berkeley
%e accond step is to conduct open hearings before the bboratories (LBL) and the Center for Energy Studies at the state regulatory commission to examine whether the plant University of Texas at Austin found significant savings to be should be cancelled Dese hearings will a!!ow the commis-technically available in residential and commercial buildings, sion to hear evidence from all interested parties,inclusling the in these sectors alone,' energy efficiency measures could general public. At the end of these hearings the commission reduce peak demand in Texas by the equivalent of 10 nuclear should decide whether conservation is cheaper than com-plants (10.000 MW) for less than $1700 per KW-one third pleting the plant. If it is, the plant should be cancelled and the cost of electricity from new nuclear plants.'
the commission should require the utility to implement cost-De Bonneville Power Administration. in the Pacific North.
effective e nservati n and load management programs to meet current and future demand.
west. estimates that conservation measures could reduce its projated demand by almost 30% by the year 2000. Dese Society can ill afford to waste billions of dollars on un-savings. costing less than 4 cents /kw h would displace the,
necessary nuclear plants. It is cheaper, cleaner and safer to need for four new coal or nuclear plants.'
simply use current electrical supplies more efficiently.--- -_-
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REFERENCES.
E I EPRifo.n.at ps. june leu.
8 Tuknami
- 3. Amory 12 vins.lsast Cont ElectrwalSen,ces as en Altermanne to she snand h,Ponennelfor Electnm! Enerav Consenenon end Peak Dr B,wduced Project.1955. Rigky Mountain Institute. PO Drawer 248.
acreons m Te. ass 8..ld,ne, Report to the Temas Pubhc Utaht cs Commission by the Center for Enern Studes. Universuy cf Old Snowmass. CO 81654 i
i Teias at Austm. March 1986 2 Art Rosenfeld. Statemeict on the Isost. Cost thuhte Plunnene insnante.
s 9-Art Roetnfeld, supra note 2.
before the llouse Subcommittee on Energy Deselopment and Apphca.
tiens.1955. LBL Enero Efhenent Buildings Group. Universey of 10 Amory Levms.supts note 1.
l Cahfornia. Berkele). CA 94720 (4154864834L Ii. Stephen Bernow. Tuo issues m Georou ker Comrame. Plannme s
3 Sns Electne Pouer Potentsalfor Shonaars m the 19m Hennncs The Econoonocr of she l'aotic Plant and The Comruny k imd before the Senare Comminn on Enern and Natural Resources. July !
Forccust,no. December 1985. Enern 5 stems Research Group.120 3
23 and 25.1955 Milk St. Busion. MA 02109. p A 3.
4.
Alan Negtt and Tula Connell. Afvth Busicrs of Demand Fortcustmp
- 12. Sally Hindman.Distmanth=4 The Afvths Abour Nuc/ car Drcommemon-Safe Enero Communicaticins Council.1609 Connecticut Ave. N.W.,
4 April 1985. Pubhc Cititsn/Endrenmentaf Action. 215 Prn+
Sune 401. Washmgton. D C. 20009. (202483 84911. s1.00.
syhania Ave SI. Washington. D.C. 20003.(202 5464 996).5500 5 Roger Naill and Roger Sant.* Electricity Markets in the 1990s Feast
- 13. Paul Raskin. long Island 5%thout the Shoreham Pouer Piant Electnce-or Fanunc?.*Puhhc Unhtice fortmuhtiv April 26.1964.
ty Cost und System Pla..,ne Concquences Ju131953. Enero S su ni 3
6 Jon Anderson. Statement of the Electnoty Consumers Resourre Comn,
Research Groep p. 56.
ni befov the Senair Comminee on Erero and Natural Resources. lu.
- 14. Paul Raskm. Electne Raic Coniconentes e/ Rctinne the Rotunwn, 2 f 25.1985 ELCON. I8281/ St N.W Suite 403. Washington. D.C. j Nuclar Puurr Plant. Janua > 20.19M. Enerm 5 sicm Rncarch Giour 3
3 20036 (2024664 666) 4
/
eO Q
O
/
. w.
a.
s
-n Publ cGittzen-i Congress Watch. Cr4 cal Mass Energy Protect. Hea':n Research Group. Langaton Group. Tax Reform Grcup For Immediate Release
Contact:
Ken Bossorg (202) 546-4996 or Bob Pollard (202) 332-0900 PRESS RELEASE (Washington, May 19) Two leading nuclear-safety experts released a set of goverrrnent internal documents today which describe a critical safety flaw in 39 U.S.
nuclear pwer plants designed by General Electric.
Daniel Ford, former Executive Director of the Union of concerned Scientists, and Robert Pollard, the group's Nuclear Safety Engineer, also disclosed that the Cherno-byl nuclear plant, contrary to earlier reports, did have a containment building.
"Indeed, the design used by the Russians," they said, " bears a strikirg resemblance to the defective design used by General Electric."
"7he Russians are not the only ones playirg Russian roulette with nuclear power," Ford stated. "The Russians are not the only ones coverirg up nuclear dangers."
Pollard, a fomer A.E.C. and N.R.C. of ficial, ex-plained that "the basic problem at G.E. plants is that their containment building might rupture - or fall down
- urder the stress of a major accident."
"Of course there are differences between the trade-mark G.E. boilirg water reactor ard the trademark Rus-sian boiling water reactor," Pollard said.
"But both these boilirs water reactors have a common family trait:
t l
they both rely on what is known as a pressure-suppres-sion contairinent system."
Ford ard Pollard said that the government had known since the early 1970s about the fundamental problerrs with the G.E. containment design but kept the informa -
tion secret. Cne 1971 A.E.C. internal report which they released was written by Dr. Stephen Hanauer, the l
A.E.C.'s top safety adviser. It said, "G.E. wants us...
l not to mention the problem publicly."
Pubic Cuen. Sune 605 + 2000 P Street N W.. Washing *on, D.C. 20036. (202) 293 9142 l
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A Another A.E.C. internal study by Hanauer proposed a
" ban" on the defective G.E. design, but this step was rejected by A.E.C. official Joseph Hendrie because it would raise too many embarrassing questions about G.E.
nuclear plants already in operation.
In a key memo that Ibrd and Pollard said the gov-errsnent had suppressed, Hendrie wrote that "the accep-tance of pressure suppression containment concepts by all elements of the nuclear field.... is firmly imbed-ded in the conventional wisdom. Reversal of this hal-lowed policy, particularly at this tir.e, could well be the end of nuclear power. It would throw into question the continued operation of licensed plants, would make unlicensable the GE and (some Westinghouse) plants now in review, arr! would generally create more turmoil than I can stand thinking about."
Dr. Joseph Hendrie, the auther of this memo, later served as Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission.
"It's time the American public is told what has been goirg on in our own nuclear program," Ford said.
" Soviet citizens - more than 80,000 of whom have had to abandon their homes in the wake of the accident
- have no say in their country's nuclear program," he added. "American citizens, if enough of them choose to exercise their rights, can have the final word."
A'liACHMENTS:
- A.E.C. internal m?.mos on safety flaws in G.E.
pressure suppression containment systems;
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- Diagrams relatire to G.E. and Soviet pressure suppression contaiments
- List of G.E. end Westinghouse reactors with pressure suppression containments.
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s-a Remarks by Joan Claybrook I'm pleased to weleme you here today to listen to im-prtant news from two of the cotntry's leading ntclear safety experts.
Daniel Ibrd, the fomer mecutive Director of the Union of Concerned Scientists, led a ten-year effort at UCS to investigate the safety hazards of U.S. ntclear plants.
In 1971, Mr. Ibrd, an econcrnist and graduate of Harvard College, working together with Henry Kendall, the M.I.T. physicist and Chairman of UCS, assembled a team of physicists, engineers, health specialists and other experts to carry out this first independent look at the safety of U.S. ntclear plants. Ral;h Nader called their investigatica of the adequacy of the mer-gency cooling systems at U.S. ntclear plants "a public service that will go down in history." mw a writer for The New Yorker magazine, Mr. Ibrd is the author of the de:initive cook on the tree Mile Island Accident and of a subsequent book, te Cult of_ the Atom, published in 1992, which estimated that the chances of a meltdown accident someWiere in the worldwide ntriear program were so high that we should expect such a calmity in ap-proximately three years. 2e C1ernobyl accident hap-pened right on Mr. Ibrd's schedule. What he has to say about our own ntclear plants, and their risk of meltdown accidents, takes on special significance.
Robert Pollard is the senior Nuclear Safety mgi-neer with the Union of Concerned Scientists. He began his career in the U.S. Navy's ntclear pwer program, where he was responsible for training naval personnel about the operation, maintenance, and repair of ntelear propulsion systens. After leaving the Navy, Mr. Pollard attended Syracuse University, where he obtained his de-gree in electrical engineering.
From 1969 until 1976, Pollard served on the staff of the U.S. Atenic mergy 4
Comission and its successor, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. He was project manager coordinating the safety reviews of 8 U.S. Nuclear plants:
Indian Point Unit 3, Catawba Units 1 and 2, Osmanche Peak thits 1 and 2, and M:Guire Units 1 and '2.
In 1976, Mr. Pollard re-signed from the N.R.C. and joined the Washington office of the Union of Concerned Scientists.
His dranatic ap-pearance on the CBS News Progran "60 Minutes" provided the nation with its first real glimpse of the way in which the f4deral government has mismanaged the ccrnmer-cial nuclear pwer progran.
Washington, D.C May 19,1986 For Immediate Release Statement by Daniel Ford:
The Russians are not the onl with nuclear power.y ones playing Hussian roulette The Russians are not the only ones with insdaquate safety systems.
The Russians are not the only ones covering up nuclear dangers.
The United States has its own grave nu-clear safety problems.
Our government has engaged in its own nuclear-safety cover-up.
The American nuclear industry assures us that the kind of major disaster that has occurred in Russia cannot happen here.
They say that American nuclear plants are housed inside containment build-ings -- a magic shield -- that will the protect us from dangerous nuclear radiation accidents.
This is a false claim.
It is wishful think-ing.
There is no magic shield at any American nu-clear plant that is designed to cope with a major meltdown accident.
What is more, at roughly forty percent of the nuclear plants in the United States, the contain-ment buildings may leak or rupture in the event of relatively minor accidents.
As evidence for these conclusions, we are making public today a set of U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission internal documents.
These official reports offer a stunning rebuttal to industry claims about present containments.
The memos in question, which Bob Pollard and I obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, re-late specifically to the defective containment structures on 39 U.S.
nuclear plants built by Genera,1 Electric.
According to these A.E.C.
internal
- reports, federal nuclear-safety regulators have knswn for at least fifteen years that General Electric made
- various bad design choices" at its nuclear plants.'
one of the design blunders involves the so-called pressure-suppression containment system that is a trademark of G.E. nuclear plants.
The problem with the G.E.
containment build-ings is that they might rupture -- or fall down --
r under the stress of a major accident, spreading radioactive debris over a wide area.
"G.E.
wants us not to mention the problem publicly," Dr.
l Stephen
- Hanauer, the top A.E.C.
safety adviser l
reported to. his colleagues in a confidential 1971 memo, when this problem was first apprecia'ted.
Dr. Hanauer recommended that G.E. no longer be allowed to build nuclear plants with a plainly de-factive safety shield.
And how did the A.E.C.
respond to this im po r-tant safety recommendation?
I'm holding in my hand a copy of the one offi-cial memo that was written on this subject.
It looks just the way Rob and I received it from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,when we asked for it under the Freedom of Information Act.
Its contents were deliberately blacked out.
We asked Congress, however, to intervene and to demand the full text of this memo.
Here is an uncensored copy of that memo.
And this is what it says.
There could be no " ban" on the standard G.E.
design, Dr. Joseph M.
Hendrie wrote, because such a step would raise too many embarrassing safety ques-tions about G.E. plants already approved for opera-tion.
In Hendrie's exact words, the " acceptance of pressure suppression containment concepts by all elements of the nuclear field is firmly im-bedded in the conventional wisdom.
Reversal of i
this hallowed policy, particularly at this time, f
could well be the end of nuclear power.
It would throw into question the continued operat' ion of li-censed plants, would make unlicensable the GE and (some Westinghouse 1 plants now in review, and would generally create more turmoil than I can stand thinking about."
Dr. Joseph Hendrie, the author of this memo, later served as Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Why do we call attention to these particular memos today?
- First, because the issue of co n ta inIn~en t buildings and their adequacy is an urgently impor-tant topic in its own right.
Second, because the Chernobyl nuclear plant,
t, contrary to earlier reports, did have a containment building.
Indeed, the design used by the Russians bears a striking resemblance to the defective pres-sure-suppression design used by General Electric.
Bob Pollard will show you some diagrams of both th,e GE pressure suppression system and the containment system that, according to the N.R.C.,
is installed at Chernobyl and a number of other Russian nuclear plants.
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POLICY ISSUE SEC 6-185_
June 23,1986 t
For:
The Comissioters From:
Victor Stello, Jr.
C/
Executive Director for Operations
Subject:
PROGRAM PLAN'FOR CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT FOLLOWUP To inform the Commission of the staff's plans for
Purpose:
force and program to follow up on the facts and implications of the Chernobyl accident.
The program consists of two phases. The first phase, to be Sumary:
done in collaboration with other agencies, is to ascertain.
the facts surrounding the Chernobyl accident, including plant characteristics, accident causes and consequences, and emergency measures. The second phase is to evaluate the implications of the facts found for U. S. nuclear regulatory policies and practices. Reports on the two phases are expected to be submitted in December 1986 and February 1987. Interim reports to the Comission are planned.
Dr. Themis P. Speis, Director of the Division of Safety Review and Oversight in NRR, will head the task force.
Background:
The plans described are responsive to Chairman Palladino's memorandum, " Task Force Group to Monitor and Study the Chernobyl Accjdent," dated May 5, 1986.
The U. S. interagency task force established in the accident's I
imediate af termath to monitor the potential environmental impact on the U. S. completed its efforts on May 14, 1986.
I To support.the interagency task force, the NRC. established l
the Chernobyl Incident Tracking Team. This team is now winding down its efforts.
I An initial coordination meeting with DOE, FEMA, and other agencies was held on June 13, 1986, to discuss comon and
Contact:
l T. Speis, NRR 49-27517 l
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2 closely related Chernobyl work items. General agreement was reached along the lines indicated in the enclosed program plan; discussions are in progress concerning detailed. subdivision of work assignments, based on the appendix to the enclosed plan as a starting point. It was agreed that NRC will provide overall administrative coordination.
A mid-to-late August 1986 1AEA meeting is being arranged for the purpose of receiving a report by the Soviet Union on the causes and event sequence of the Chernobyl accident.
Discussion:
Program Description A program plan is enclosed. Our ability to successfully execute this program will be sensitive to the extent and nature of the information that becomes available, and may have to be adjusted in light of infomation developments as necessary.
The following are sumary descriptions of the fact-finding and implications programs. More detailed descriptions are provided in the enclosure.
Fact-Finding Program The facts of interest are divided into three general areas:
- 1) Plant Characteristics and Accident Causes, 2) Radiological Releases and Consequences, and 3) Emergency Preparedness and Response. The principal responsibility for evaluating the first area has been assigned to NRR. RES has been assigned responsibility to develop the facts concerning the radiological releases, and NRR has responsibility for l
developing the facts concerning the radiological consequences.
IE is assigned responsibility for evaluating the emergency j
preparedness and response area.
The Plant Characteristics and Accident Causes area includes fact finding concerning site characteristics, design of structures, primary system enclosure, nuclear and control systems, themal-hydraulic features, refueling, safety systems, auxiliary systems, plant shielding, operations, quality assurance, operator training, loss of safe shutdown capability and the accident itself--its causes, scenario, and consequences. With respect to plant design and operations, the scope of information sought is intended to allow development of a sufficient understanding of the
=
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3 plant design and related aspects to ascertain the root causes of the accident and to evaluate it in terms of U. S.
reactor designs. A comprehensive understanding of the Chernobyl, design,(beyondtheindicatedscope)doesnot appear necessary.
The radiological release efforts will include consideration of plant features and conditions affecting accident and post-accident phenomenology and source tems. The radiological consequences aspects will seek infomation concerning meteorology, hydrology, air and liquid pathways, and individual and population doses. Dose-correlated medical treatment data on severely injured individuals and an epidemiological study of populations affected by lower levels of radiation are further needs in this area. However, they are not included in the current NRC program plan.
The emergency preparedness and response task will seek to ascertain facts concerning as to emergency plans and experience with actions actually taken, including evacuation, relocation, decontamination, and reentry.
Implications Evaluation The factual data from the fact-finding program will be evaluated for possible implications for the regulation of U. S. plants. The staff's initial judgment that no immediate actions on operating U. S. plants were warranted will be reviewed in the light of the more extensive factual infonnation.
The work is intended to identify any needs for near-term Commission action as well as any areas requiring more detailed study as a basis for possible action. The implications to be considered will include those of similarities and differences in specific plant features.
i Task Force An interoffice NRC task force has been formed to carry out the Chernobyl accident followup program. The Director of the task force, assigned on a full-time basis, is Dr. Themis P. Speis, Director of the Division of Safety Review and Oversight in NRR. Other senior staff members assigned to the task force and their principal areas of responsibility are as follows:
~
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T. Speis/B. Sheron, NRR - Plant Characteristics and Accident Causes W. Morris, RES - Radioactive Material Releases F. Congel., NRR - Radiological Consequences E. Jordan, IE - Emergency Preparedness and Response Designees of other offices will be called upon for contributions as required. These will include IP, AE00, Region I, ELD, and DEDROGR.
The task force will carry out both phases of the program (fact finding and implications evaluation) and will coordinate j
the work of other contributing agencies in the fact-finding 1
phase.
IP will provide international coordination assistance.
A senior management oversight group has been formed to guide and oversee the task force's implications evaluati m work.
Its composition is as follows:
Harold R. Denton, Director, NRR Thomas Murley, Regional Administrator, Region I Clemens Heltames, Director, AEOD James Taylor, Director, IE Denwood Ross, Deputy Director, RES Guy Cunningham, Executive Legal Director James Sniezek, Deputy Executive Director for Regional Operations & Generic Requirements James Shea, Director, IP The task force will keep the senior management oversight group advised of findings in the fact-finding phase, assist the oversight group in planning its work and help in possible identification of any urgent NRC action requirements.
Schedule Any interim findings that may indicate a need for urgent Comission action or are otherwise of unusual significance will be promptly brought to the Comission's attention.
Otherwise, the anticipated schedule is as follows:
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T. Speis/B. Sheron, NRR - Plant Characteristics and Accident Causes W. Morris, RES - Radioactive Material Releases.
F. Congel, NRR - Radiological Consequences E. Jordan, IE - Emergency Preparedness and Response Designees of other offices will be called upon for contributions as required. These will include IP, AEOD, Region I, ELD, and DEDROGR.
The task force will carry out both phases of the program (fact finding and implications evaluation) and will coordinate the work of other contributing agencies in the fact-finding phase.
IP will provide international coordination assistance.
A senior management oversight group has been formed to guide and oversee the task force's implications evaluation work.
Its composition is as follows:
Harold R. Denton, Director, NRR Thomas Murley, Regional Administrator, Region I Clemens Heltemes, Director, AEOD James Taylor Director IE Denwood Ross, Deputy Director, RES Guy Cunningham, Executive Legal Director James Sniezek, Deputy Executive Director for Regional Operations & Gt:neric Requirements James Shea Director, IP L
The task force will keep the senior management oversight group advised of findings in the fact-finding phase, assist the oversight group in planning its work and help in possible identification of any urgent NRC action requirements.
Schedule Any interim findings that may indicate a need for urgent Comission action or are otherwise of unusual significance i
will be promptly brought to the Commission's attention.
l Otherwise, the anticipated schedule is as follows:
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Mid-to-late August 1986:
IAEA meeting to receive Soviet report Sept. 1986:
IAEA report on August meetir.g Dec. 1986:
Report on fact-finding phase Feb. 1987:
NRC implications evaluation report To be scheduled (perhaps Sept. 1986 and Jan. 1987):
Interim Comission briefings To be scheduled:
ACRS reviews Both the factual and implications reports may 'lentify some areas requiring further work. (For example, followup of longer-tem radiation consequences information as it develops may well be in order, as an extension of the work described under Task 3.2.3 in the enclosed program plan.)
Resources Approximately six staff-years of NRC effort is estimated to be required, a little over half of it in FRR and most of the rest in IE and RES. An additional professional effort of approximately four person-years will be required as contract support at a cost of about $600,000, coming mostly or entirely from national laboratories. About one-half of this contract effort will support NRR; the rest, RES and IE.
~
r Executive Direc r for Operation's
Enclosure:
NRC Program Plan for Determining the Implications of the Chernobyl Accident on U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Policies and Practices I
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NRC PROGRAM PLAN FOR DETERMINING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT ON U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY POLICIES AND PRACTICES 9
JUNE, 1986 6
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Contents
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1.
Program Objective
===2.
Background===
3.
Fact-Finding Program 3.1 Plant Characteristics and Accident Causes 3.1.1 Site Characteristics 3.1.2 Design of Structures 3.1.3 Nuclear and Control System Design 3.1.4 Thermal-Hydraulic Design 3.1.5 Reactor Enclosure Design 3.1.6 Safety Systems Design 3.1.7 Refueling 3.1.8 Auxiliary Systems 3.1.9 Design Basis and Beyond Design Basis Accidents 3.1.10 Loss of Capability to Achieve Safe Shutdown 3.1.11 Quality Assurance and Operator Training 3.1.12 Operations 3.1.13 Plant Shielding 3.1.14 The Chernobyl Accident 3.1.14.1 Causes 3.1.14.2 Scenarios 3.1.14.3 Consequences 3.2 Radiological Releases and Consequences 3.2.1 Radioactive Materials Releasc.'
3.2.2 Dispersion of Radioactivity 3.2.2.1 Meteorological Conditions 3.2.2.2 Hydrology 3.2.3 Radiation Consequences 3.2.3.1 Individual Doses 3.2.3.2 Population Doses 3.3 Emergency Preparedness'and Response 3.3.1 Emergency Plans 3.3.2 Experience with Protective Actions Taken 3.3.3 Decontamination, Relocation, and Reentry l
A Contents (Continued) 4.
Coordination 4.I Industry and Other U. S. Government Agency Efforts 4.2 International Efforts 4.2.1 IAEA 4.2.2 CSNI 4.2.3 Other International Efforts 5.
Implications Assessment Program Appe.idix: A Possible Inter-Agency Work Distribution for the Fact-Finding Program.
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1 1.
. Program Objective Upon learning about' the Chernobyl accident in the Ukraine region of the U.S.S.R., the NRC established an incident tracking ham. Using the available design information on the Chernobyl plant, and the reported information about the accident, the tracking team could not identify any aspects of the Chernobyl accident with a nexus to operating U. S. plants that warranted the NRC to require imediate corrective actions to these plants.
In order to either confim this judgment or to detemine what changes may need to be made to our regulatory programs and practices, including any changes to operating U. S. plants, it is necessary to ascertain the facts concerning not only the Chernobyl accident, but also the Chernobyl plant design. Once the f: cts are established to the best of our ability, only then can the implications of the Chernobyl accident be detemined.
The objective of this plan is twofold. The first part sets forth the program which the NRC will follow to systematically detemine the facts surrounding the Chernobyl accident and plant design--facts bearing on the cause, sequence and consequences of the accident. The second part sets forth the major elements of the program the NRC will follow to determine the implications of the Chernobyl accident on U. S. nuclear regulatory policies and practices. The fact-finding part of this program will involve substantial coordination with other U. S.
organizations and agencies and will be documented as a separate report. The i
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1mplications portion of this program will address only those implications in 1
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NRC's jurisdiction; in the preparation of this report participation by other agencies will be sought as related responsibilities warrant.
===2.
Background===
At approximately 1:23 a.m. on April 26, 1986, a serious accident occurred at Unit Number 4 of the Chernobyl Nuclear Station near the city of Kiev in the U.S.S.R.
i The accident involved severe damage to the reactor and the structure that housed it. Significant radiological releases occurred as a consequence of the -
accident which were ultimately detected around the world.
In the immediate aftemath of the accident, the U. S. Government established an interagency task force to assess and monitor the accident in order to determine its potential environmental impact on the United States. This interagency task force effort was completed on May 14, 1986.
To support the interagency task force, the NRC established the Chernobyl Incident Tracking Team. This team is now winding down its efforts and completing preparation of a draft report of its efforts.
1 We still do not have much information regarding the design of the plant, nor do l
we have any hard information on the cause(s) of the accident. Because of this, i
1 implications of this accident on U. S. regulatory practices (e.g., source term implications)andpoliciescannotyetbedetermined.
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In order to evaluate the implications of the Chernobyl accident on U. S.
regulatory policies and practices, it is first necessary to ascertain the facts associated with the accident. The.first part of this pla,n describes the
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detail's of the fact-finding effort. The second part of the plan describes how
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the implications for U. S. plants will be developed.
3.
F p t-Finding Program The major regulatory concerns that arise from Chernobyl can be divided into three general areas. These are 1) Plant Characteristics and Accident Causes.
- 2) Radiological Releases and Consequences, and 3) Emergency Preparedness and Therefore, it is in these three areas that the NRC's fact-finding Response.
Each of these areas is discussed in more detail in efforts will concentrate.
the following sections. Because these areas are distinct, they also lend themselves to be evaluated by specific offices in the NRC. I have assigned the evaluation of the plant characteristics and accident causes and consequences to the Division of Safety Review and Oversight in NRR. The Division of Reactor The System Safety in RES is assigned to evaluate the Chernobyl source term.
Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response in IE has been assigned to detemine the facts associated with evacuation and emergency planning at Chernobyl. Finally, the Division of Safety Review and Oversight has been designated as the lead organization to coordinate and integrate this effort.
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4 3.1 Plant Characteristics and Accident Causes The following sections identify those aspects of the Chernobyl design that could have contributed to or influenced the course of the accident. The scope of informatior. 3ought here is intended to develop a sufficient understanding of the plant design and related aspects to understand the accident event and to evaluate it in terms of U.S. reactor designs.
3.1.1 Site Characteristics To the extent possible, an understanding of the Chernobyl site characteristics.
will be determined. This will include site geography, hydrology, meteorology, geology, seismology and demographics. This information will allow the staff to understand how the consequences of the Chernohyl accident were influenced by the site characteristics.
It will also allow a comparison of similarities to and differences from U. S. sites to be made.
3.1.2 Design of Structures The purpose of this effort is to develop an understanding of the approach used for Chernobyl in the cesign of structures, components, equipment and systems to accommodate dynamic accident, seismic, wind, tornado and flood loads. Of particular interest he. e is the containment / confinement / suppression pool structures and building foundations. This information will allow the staff to assess the response of the plant to the loads generated hy the accident.
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3.1.3 Nuclear and Control System Desjg The nuclear'and control system design appears to have played an important role in the Chernobyl accident. Therefore, this effort should be given considerable emphasis. A good understanding of the mechanical design of the reactor (including the materials of construction) and the neutronics and thermal-hydraulic characteristics of the Chernobyl plant needs to be developed.
Similarly, there is a need to understand the physics of the design (i.e., the f
various reactivity coefficients and effects) and its dynamic behavior under operational and abnormal transients. An understanding of the trip design and philosophy will be developed.
The xenon transient characteristics of Chernobyl and the interplay between the various control mechanisms employed in the plant will be investigated.
The study will attempt to provide an understanding of the control of power and temperature distributions and will, therefore, interface closely with efforts to understand the thermal-hydraulics characteristics of the plant. The study will also attempt to provide an understanding of plant control during refueling conditions.
3.1.4 Thermal-Hydraulic Design The purpose of this effort is to develop a good understanding of the fluid flow, heat ttansfer and heat removal characteristics of this pressure tube
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reactor design. This will include the basis for flow regulation, steam production, pressure control and relief. An understanding of the components and systems' involved in this' process, as well as their operation and control, is needed. The design basis for thermal-hydraulic systems will also be investigated.
3.1.5 Reactor Enclosure Design One of the major questions that has been raised about Chernobyl is whether or not the structures surrounding the reactor and primary system could be considered the equivalent of a containment structure that surrounds plants in the U. S.
This task will involve gatharing all of the information available on the enclosure design and evaluating the degree of containment or confinement it provides. This is a critical element in the comparison of accident consequences at Chernobyl to those that can be postulated for U. S. plants.
3.1.6 Safety Systems (ECCS, Suppression Pools Sprays, Etc.) Design An understanding of the design and operation of the major safety related systems must be developed. This will include design (and design bases) and operation of the suppression pool, ECC and spray systems.
In particular, the nature and spectrum of accidents these systems are designed to handle will be investigated.
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3.1.8 Auxiliary Systems (Water Cleanup. Offgas. Spent Fuel Radwaste)
This program will investigate the design and design bases for the various auxiliary water, gas 6nd radwaste systems. This will also include the design of the spent fuel storage and processing systems. Refueling itself is a separate task.
3.1.9 Design Basis And Beyond The Design Basis Accidents This effort will attempt to develop an understanding of the types of transient conditions (both operational and abnormal) for which the plant is designed.
The study will review the extent to which accidents beyond the design basis (e.g., severe or core melt accidents) are accommodated in U.S.S.R. RBMK-1000 designs. It would be of interest to determine what accidents were and were not considered in the plant's safety analysis.
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8 3.1.10 Loss of Capability to Achieve Safety Shutdown The possibility that electrii: power'to vital safety and control systems was The lost due to fire or explosion early in the accident will be evaluated.
task will try to obtain information on the initiating events and their location; the degree of separation of redundant safety systems, routing of control and power cables and associated circuits, alternate shutdown arrangements and alternative power supply sources.
(This topic relates to the implementation of numerous features of safety and control system design).
3.1.11 Quality Assurance and Operator Training One conclusion of the TMI-2 accident was the inappropriate operator reaction to a simple mechanical failure. This was ultimately attributed to management Human error has failures and lack of appropriate training of the operators.
been mentioned by the USSR as a part of the initiating event (as it was also at Windscale). This task will seek to obtain information on the training and operating procedures in use at Chernobyl, especially those related to emergencies and unusual events. Information as to the availability of simulators will be sought.
3.1.12 Operations To the extent possible, the general philosophy of operations including operating staff levels and types, on-shift maintenance activities, shift l
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9 supervisor '. administrative controls on out-of-service equipment, etc., will be investigated.
3.1.13 Plant Shielding The plant shielding design and practices will be investigated to determine protection offered to plant staff and sensitive equipment during operations and its impact on accessibility to plant areas during and after an incident.
3.1.14 The Chernobyl Accident 3.1.14.1 Causes This effort will describe the cause or causes of the accident, drawing on the above-described tasks, and will attempt to develop further insights into these causes.
3.1.14.2 Scenarios Thisworkisintendedtodescribetheevolution5ftheaccident,includingany compounding failures which contributed to its subsequent evolution and/or severity including any human errors involved.
3.1.14.3 Consequences This task will draw together information developed through other tasks concerning the consequences of the accident.
10 3.2 Radiological Releases and Consequences i
The following subsections identify information that should be obtained in order' i
to understand source terms, release pathways, and accident consequences that resulted from the Chernobyl accident. It may be possible using-severe accident analytical methods to bridge some of the gaps in available information and infer some of the basic conditions of the accident to supplement this information.
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3.2.1 Radioactive Materials Released I
e There are two bases for naking estimates of the radioactive nateriais released (source term). One uses an estimate of the inventory of radionuclides available in the reactor, a guess as to the scenario, and an understanding of the potential release from the core and confinewent structure. The other uses -
qualified data of amounts and timing of radionuclide detection downwind and an i
estimate of the meteorological conditions between the reactor and the detection site for the critical time period. The first of these source terms can be l
considered a forward estimate and the second, a backward estimate. Comparison of the two estimates at the end of the fact-finding period can shed light on the quality of either estimate.
j For the forward estimate, information that will be sought includes:
(1) power level, flux spectrum and distribution, and operating history to calculate the
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11 inventory (this calculation is in progress at Los Alamos); (2) a scoping thermalanakysisbasedoninformationfromthescenario,includingtheeffect of a reactivity insertion tra'nsient,' hydrogen burn, or graphite burn to provide release information from the fuel; (3) estimates of the chemical environment and changes in it including the burns to provide in-reactor transport information; and (4) building condition infomation, including the effects of the fires, to provide release information, particle size infomation, and chemical form information for the environmental release.
For the backward estimate, infomation that will be sought includes:
(1) qualified data on nuclides observed, including chemical form, concentrations, and timing; and (2) hour-by-hour infomation on wind' speed of direction and precipitation for'the time period of transport for the area between the reactor and the site where radionuclides were observed. Data feedback from the consequences work described.below will be utilized here.
3.2.2 Dispersion of Radioactivity The dispersion of radioactivity in the environment can be either in the air or i
in surface or groundwaters.
3.2.2.1 Meteorological Conditions i
Radioactive material released to the air will be carried by the wind, and, depending ul ion the material's characteristics, may be deposited on the ground
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12 or washed 6ut of the air by precipitation.
For an understanding of long-range transport by the winds, the meteorological conditions should be determined at all pertinent altitude regimes. The interaction of the dynamics of the radioactivity release with the meteorological conditions at various heights determines the direction and speed in which transport occurs and the degree of dilution as a function of distance traveled. It also determines the opportunities for depletion of the material by deposition on the ground or by washout by precipitation.
It appears that in the Chernobyl accident some material was initially released near ground level, and some, as a result of the explosion, was released at higher elevations where it could be transported downwind at greater speeds. Because there was little precipitation during the -
early days of the accident, there was little chance that the mix of-radioisotopes was altered much by washout.
3.2.2.2 Hydrology Radionuclides may enter surface and ground waters by washout of the plume by precipitation, by runoff transport of material deposited on the ground and on veg!!? tion, or by release to the groundwater from core material which has melten its way through the plant structure. The geohydrology of the site can be estimated from the proximity to the river, and from the news reports of the site characteristics.
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13 3.2.3 Radiation Consequences 3.2.3.3 Individual Doses This task is to determine time-dependent radiation dose rates to individuals in In thevicinity(cuttoperhapstensofmiles)oftheChernobylsite.
particular, the doses and dose rates to individuals from the passing plume via The effect of submersion and inhalation should be calculated and/or measured.
In addition, the buildings on rsducing these doses should also be established.
dose and dose rate from radionuclides deposited on the ground should be calculated and/or measured.
Where possible, physical data from individuals in the plume pathway should be examined to establish more fully the actual doses received by the population.
For example, results from examination of blood samples would be useful.
The purpose of this information is to characterize the effects that such accidents have on the local population and to learn procedures that may reduce the individual doses.
3.2.3.2 Population Doses The integrated dose to populations exposed to the released radionuclides via the pathways described above should be evaluated. Populations with integrated Consequently, populations exposures down to about 100 mrem should be included.
at great distances from the site (on the order of 1000 miles or more) rey be In addition, measures of radionuclide content of covered by this evaluation.
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foods should'be established, so that the doses due to food consumption can be calculated.
Emergency Preparedness and Response 3.3 3.3.1 Emergency Plans Attempts will be made to ascertain the extent and nature of emergency plans Some questions in this subject that were in place for the Chernobyl facility.
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area have already been forwarded to the IAEA through the State Department.
interest here is information as to what onsite and offsite aspects are included, any established emergency planning zones, any plans establishing f
decision responsibilities in the plant and offsite, any predetermined criteria for initiating protective actions, and details of any alerting and communication arrangements.
Exper unce with Protection Actions Taken i
3.3.2 We would benefit greatly from the Russians sharing the valuable, actual experience they gained from the Chernobyl event regarding the protective Some questions in this area have been sent to the IAEA actions they took.
l The U. S. medical team, other U. S. agencies.
through the State Department.
and other sources may provide additional infor1 nation.
This includes the Information on the evacuation experience will be sought.
time needed to assemble information needed for decision, the further t
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to reach a decision to evacuate, and the time needed to notify the publi
15 the decision; the number of people involved, the timeframes, transportation
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modes, and other key details; any problems encountered; and any spontaneous
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(unorderedievacuationsand'anyproblemsencounteredinconnectionwiththem, if they occurred.
Any special protective actions for workers or public, other than evacuation, would be of interest. Radiological monitoring, victim identification, and medical treatment referral approaches are additional areas on which information will be sought.
Information will be sought on Soviet guidance as to acceptable levels of radiation exposure, as well as on control room habitability during ind after the accident and how the facility was manned and how and from where the emergency was managed, with respect to plant actions and offsite actions.
3.3.3 Decontamination. Relo:ation, and Reentry Information will be sought on decontamination techniques used to achieve dose savings and to recover access to property, including any " simple" decontamination techniques reconnended to the general public for use in dealing with low level contamination.
It would be of interest to examine what criteria are being used to determine the areas that people can reenter, the areas from which people must be relocated on a long-term basis, and the areas which people may be allowed to reenter once decontamination efforts are conducted; how the contaminated l
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l materials are being handled and disposed of; and what kind of radiological monitoring program is being implemented for the contaminated, decontaminated, and disposal areas.
I 4.
Coordination 1
The accident at Chernobyl has gained the attention of virtually all l
1 organizations worldwide that are involved with the generation of power from I
nuclear energy. This includes government regulation and energy development agencies, nuclear vendors, utilities which own and generate power from nuclear plants, scientific organizations involved in nuclear research, as well as i
organizations that promote and criticize nuclear power.
Many of these organizations have scientists and engineers who are highly knowledgeable in nuclear plant systems and components, and have or could The provide valuable insights and knowledge regarding the fact-finding tasks.
following two sections will describe the coordination efforts to be undertaken both within the U. S., and internationally.
4.1 Industry and Other U. S. Government Agency Efforts Many U. S. industry organizations have Chernobyl design information available, studied available literature about the Chernobyl design and have reported on design comparisons to U. S. reactors, as well as speculated on the more likely accident inttiators and accident scenarios.
In order to effectively tap this l
17 valuable source of information,' the NRC will encourage the involvement of these
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organizations in the fact-finding program.
The DOE and FEMA in particular will have a formal program to develop the facts surrounding Chernobyl. Some information concerning the aftermath of Chernobyl is expected to come through the State Department. Close coordination with the NRC program is expected.
Some organizations, in particular national laboratories and universities, will be retained under technical assistance contracts to assist the NRC staff in certain areas of fact finding for which they have recognized expertise. Other organizations, such as nuclear, supply vendors and utility and indus'try groups will be asked to participate voluntarily, primarily in providing insights, comments, and suggestions.
In the Appendix, we have made a preliminary identification of the expected, involvement of each group for each aspect of the fact-finding program.
4.2 International Efforts In addition to domestic organizations, there are international efforts underway to ascertain the facts regarding Chernobyl. Some of these efforts are currentlyplannedtogobeyond!factfinding,andtheNRCwillbeparticipating in them. This participation will provide an excellent opportunity to obtain detailed factual information. !
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r-18 4.2.1 International Atomic Energy Agency The International Atomic Energy Agercy (IAEA) is an organization under the auspices of the United Nations. Following the Chernobyl accident, the IAEA convened a meeting to plan a series of future meetings to be held that will address specific follow-on activities related to Chernobyl.
Specifically, NRC will participate in several upcoming IAEA meetings over the next several months. The first will be a meeting, expected in July, during which the Soviet Union will report on the causes of the Chernobyl accident.
There will also be meetings in which binding international early warning and coordination agreements will be drafted. There will be a meeting of worldwide The final experts that will develop and propose ways to improve safety.
meeting will be a conference of governments convened to consider the recomendations of the experts meeting. In addition to these meetings, there is also underway a general movement to strengthen the role of the IAEA in responding to accidents such as Chernobyl.
For example, the role of the Operational Safety Assessment Review Teams will be strengthened through mechanisms such as increasing the inspection frequency. Full participation in the Incident Reporting System, including detailed reports on all reportable events, will receive renewed attention by participating countries.
We have been informed that the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, which advises the IAEA Inspector General, will also be strengthened. Finally.
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19 other U. N.-sponsored organizations, such as the U. N. Scientific Comittee on Effects of Atomic Radiation, and the World Health Organization will become more actively irivolved in responding to nuclear accidents.
4.2.2 Committee for the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI)
In addition to participation in IAEA activities, the NRC also participates in the activities of the Comittee for the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI).
This Comittee operates under the auspices of the Nuclear Energy Agency, which is an agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD is primarily made up of Western industrialized nations, and does not include Soviet bloc countries, whereas the IAEA does.
While there are no specific plans formulated yet for CSNI activities related to Chernobyl, it is ex a ted that some specific activities will be identified t
shortly. The NRC will monitor these activities and participate in them as appropriate.
Information developed that is useful to the fact-finding mission will be included in the effort.
4.2.3 Other International Efforts The NRC maintains close liaisons with individuals in counterpart organizations in many of the industrialized, western countries. Through these liaisons, we will complement our fact-finding effort.
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- 20 Implications Assessment Program 5.
The objective of the fact-finding program is to develop a factual base concerning the causes and evaluation of the Chernobyl accident, and the design The second phase of the NRC's program is the of the Chernobyl reactor.
assessment and evaluation of the factual data in order to either confirm the staff's initial judgment that no actions on operating U. S. plants are warranted, or to identify certain areas which require either immediate Commissionactionormoredetailedevaluation(e.g., cost-benefitanalysis).
In order to ensure that the implications' assessment program provides a thorough, unbiased evaluation, a steering group consisting of senior' NRC managers will oversee this effort. The proposed makeup of this oversight group is as follows:
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20 Implications Assessment Prooram 5.
The objective of the fact-finding program is to develop a factual base concerning the causes and evaluation of the Chernobyl accident, and the design The second phase of the NRC's program is the of the Chernobyl reactor.
assessment and evaluation of the factual data in order to either confirm the staff's initial judgment that no actions on operating U. S. plants are warranted, or to identify certain areas which require either immediate Commission action or more detailed evaluation (e.g., cost-berefit analysis).
In order to ensure that the implications' assessment program provides a thorough, unbiased evaluation, a steering group consisting of senior NRC
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managers will oversee this effort. The proposed makeup of this oversight group is as follows:
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21 Implications Assessment Program Senior Management Oversight Group Harold R. Denton, Director, NRR Thomas Murley, Regional Administrator, Region I Clemens Heltemes, Director, AEOD James Taylor. Director, IE Denwood Ross, Deputy Director, RES Guy Cunningham, Executive Legal Director James Sniezek, Deputy Executive Director for Regional Operations & Generic Requirements James Shea, Director, IP i
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i 22 DRAFT APPENDIX A Possible Inter-Agency Work Distribution for the Fact-Finding Program 6
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.a NUCLEAR DESIGN 1/
LEAD CONTRACTOR OTHER ORG
- Determine the magnitude of the various DOE reactivity coefficients and their variation with burnup, core configura-i tion and power.
- Determine the variation of parer and temperature distribution with burnup and core configuration.
- Deteraine the reactivity effects of j
individual fuel and control rods under various operating canditions.
- Identify the characteristics of xenon 1
transient behavior and control in this reactor.
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- Determine the dynamic behavior of the power and temperature distribution for various reactivity and coolant flow transients. 2/
- Identify any experimental data that can
'7 be used to benchmark computer codes used to analyze the nuclear design.
1/ Could require development of methodology and engineering' data.
1/InterfaceswiththeT/Hdesignactivity.
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T/H DESIGN 1/
LEAD CONTRACTOR OTHER ORG l
- Detemine the bases and methods for primary DOE coolant flow regulation, steam production and i
pressure relief.
- Detemine the static temperature distribution l
in the reactor (including the graphite) and how it varies with burnup and operating i
j conditions.
- Detemine the cooling reqitirements and characteristics for the control rod systems
- Determine the system response to overpressure and overpower events.1/
4
- Determine the system response to various l
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'Could require development of methodology and engineering data.
.[1 ' Interfaces with the T/H design activity.
I t.EAD CONTRACTOR OTHER ORG i
CONTAllmENT/CONFil#ENT DESIGN
- Detemine the boundaries for the various -
NRC containment volumes.
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- Determine the design capabilities (pressure l
and temperature) and the design bases for i
the various containment volumes.
- Determine speans and capacities for pressure relief to the suppression pools
- Determine the characteristics of the graphite
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inerting systems including leak detection.
make-up system, monitoring system, and pressure relief 1
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,4 LEAD CONTRACTOR OTHER ORG INSTRtMENTATION AND CONTROL i
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- Identify the various u clear and process l
jnstrumentationrequirementsrelevantto
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- Identify the various trip functions and l
set points.
- Determine the operating characteristics (mechanisms and movement times including scram) of the control rod systems.
- Determine if burnable poisons are used f
in conjunction with rod control
- Identify any alternate and/or diverse q
i systems to back-up rod control i
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l LEAD CONTRACTOR OTHER ORG REFUELING l
DOE l
- Identify the refueling requirements, igechanisms and procedures.
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- Detemine the couting requirements and related power and time constesints associated with refueling at Chernoby'1.-
- Identify possible failure modes that N!
could lead to reactivity insertion, voiding of the fuel channel or release of graphite inerting gas, i
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i, LEAD CONTRACTOR _
OTHER ORG ELECTRIC POWER NRC
- Identify the functional requirements for-electric power (AC & OC) including cases 1
e for abnormal, upset and emergency conditions.
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- Determine the capabilities of emergency poweratChernobyl(includingDCanddiesel power) including reliability.
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- Identify any systems shared with other 7
reactors at the site 4
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ACCIDUlf All4 LYSIS LEAD CONTRACTOR OTHER ORG i
- Identify the accidents analyzed for the ~
NRC j
Chernobyl plant.
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- Determine the design basis accidents used j
for various aspects of the design.
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- Identify any considerations and analyses l ~
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degraded or core melt accidents).
- Determine if there is any independent review l
of the accident studies performed by the designers of the plant.
If so identify the nature of the review.
- Detemine cause(s), scenario's and consequences
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s of Chernoby1 accident.
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LEAD CONTRACTOR OTHER ORG PLANT OPERATION (PROCEDURES / TECH SPEC. ETC.)
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- Determine the degree of training required l
and,provided for the operating crew at Chernobyl.
- Identify plant procedures used for operation l
j (including tech specs or the equivalent, as I
applicable).
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- Determine if simulators are available for s,/'
operator training and plant performance I
analysis j
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1 1
SAFETY SYSTEMS LEAD CONTRACTOR OTHER ORG a
4
- Detemine the functional requirements and NRC l
' design basis for the ECC systems at Chernobyl.
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- Detemine the functional requirements and design basis for the suppression pool system at Chernobyl.
4
- Identify and other safety system requirements at Chernobyl.
- Detemine the functional requirements and j
l design basis for the other safety systems l
identified above.
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- Identify the ultimate heat sink and N
detemine its adequacy i
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1 2
LEAD CONTRACTOR OTHER ORG i
i MATERIAt.S j
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- Assemble various U.S. and foreign information DOE f
on reactor graphite including structural l
properties, corrosion susceptiblitties, thermal transient response, including the Wigner Effect j
1rradiation behavior and chemical reactions over ranges of temperature and concentrations with steam and air.
- provide a similar assemblage of information on f
other materials used in Chernoby1 such as for l
control rod, reactor supports, containment structures, primary and secondary systems, and fuel.
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- For all materials used in construction, determine l
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i if construction was intended to be performed in conformance with codes and standards. Determine if such codes and standards have significant i
differences from the ASME Code,Section III, and 1
other codes used in the U.S., and U.S. quality assurance provisions.
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4 LEAD CONTRACTOR OTHER ORG 5ITE CMRACTERISTICS l
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NRC
- pewelopanunderstandingoftheChernobyl site characteristics regarding site l
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- Develop an understanding of the Chernoby1 g
s site characteristics regarding geology and seismology.
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LEAD CONTRACTOR OTHER ORG STRUCTURAL DESIGI DOE
- Develop an understanding of the approach used for thernobyl in the desipe of structures, components, equipment and systems to accommodate dynamic accident, seismic, wind, tornado and i
flood loads. This includes the containment /
I confinement / suppression pool structures and i
building foundations.
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CONTRACTOR OTHER ORG 1
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- Detemine core inventory of radionuclides at time of accident based upon power history of reactor and status.
- Establish time at which reactor began releasing radioactivity into the I
- - - - ~ environment. - - -
- Detemine the telease rate, chemical composition, and other physical i
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- Detemine the physical and chemical h
l behavior of the radionuclides issuediately after release from the reactor core.
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i ENVIROMENTAL KHAVIOR LEAD CONTRACTOR OTE R ORG l
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- Determine the radionuclide factors such NRC as plate-out and fall-out that occurred within 100 meters of the reactor.
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- Develop a model that characterizes the ore radionuclide transport within 50 miles of the site. Focus on factors that affect radionuclide plume behavior within 2 alles of site.
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- Determine long-range radionuclide behavior q
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including plume submersion, rain-out,
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fall-out, and resulting ground contamination.
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LEAD CONTRACTOR OTHER ORG DOS!pETRY/IEALTH EFFECTS l
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- Estqblish radiological doses received by mes6ers of the site workers via submersion, i
. inhalation, & ground deposition pathways.
For these same pathways, detemine doses received by members of the pubile.
Establish shielding factors afforded b;'
housing and other structures.
- Using extent and pattern of ground i
contamination, estimate long-tem food f
chain effects. Detemine uptakes and subsequent radionuclide concentrations 4
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- Establish a health registry to follom l
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the long-tem medical history of the i
exposed population. Data can be compared HHS l
to Hiroshime/ Nagasaki base.
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