ML20210F602
| ML20210F602 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 09/20/1986 |
| From: | Carey J DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton, Tam P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210F611 | List: |
| References | |
| 2NRC-6-099, 2NRC-6-99, TAC-62897, NUDOCS 8609250259 | |
| Download: ML20210F602 (44) | |
Text
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Be r Vall No. 2 Unit Project Organization P.O. Box 328 Sept. 20, 1986 Shippingport, PA 15077 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office Of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION:
Mr. Peter Tam, Project Manager Division of PWR Licensing - A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412 Equipment Qualification Report - Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Electrical Equipment Gentlemen:
Enclosed are six (6) copies of the Equipment Qualification Report, Revision 1 which describes the Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit 2 (BVPS-2) environmental qualification program for electrical equipment important to safety. The Equipment Qualification Report was previously submitted to the NRC on May 23, 1986.
The Equipment Qualification Report has been updated to provide current str.tus and address NRC comments regarding the May 23, 1986 submittal.
This report is comprised of two parts:
1) environmental qualification of electrical equipment important to safety (Enclosed) and 2) environmental qualification of safety related mechanical equipment (to be resubmitted at time of auait). entitled " List of Specifications for Environmental Qualifi-cation Review" contains the status of EQ packages for NRC Audit. Of the total 128 EQ packages, 90 of these packages contain equipment located in harsh area environments. identifies 76 of these harsh area packages as finalized and approved by DLC for NRC audit.
The remaining packages are in various states of completion, but are not yet considered totally acceptable by DLC.
Volumes 1A, 18 and 1C of this Report contain the System Component Evaluation Worksheets (SCEWs) and associated notes for all equipment associated with the packages statused as audit ready.
The SCEWs serve as a summary of the EQ documentation and, in some cases, the entire documentation is needed to fully understand the contents of a SCEWs.
Dg h
,3 TD 7
Fact 3vo PDB-LP0ft-
United States Nuclear Regulation Commission Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Equipment Qualification Report Page 2 Appendix A to this report is the Beaver -Valley Power Station Unit 2 Project Manual 2BVM-119; Environmental Conditions for Class 1E Equipment Qualification Requirements, Revision 9 Addendum 1.
The SCEWs provided in this report have been updated to this current revision of 2BVM-119.. Attachment II provides a sunnary of the DLC responses to NRC comments on the BVPS-2 Equipment Qualification Report which were discussed during a July 1,1986 meeting at the NRC Bethesda office. These responses have been incorporated into the Equipment Qualification Report.
Appendix E of this report addresses the issue of a MSLB with release of superheated steam which was raised in IE notice 84-90.
Six (6) additional copies of Appendix E are provided in Attachment III for your use.
In support of the NRC Audit, a representative sample of the equipment will be installed and available for NRC inspection.
BVPS-2 is presently 95% com-plete and is scheduled for receipt of low power operating license by April 30, 1987.
A verification program is underway to assure the installed condition agrees with the qualified condition.
This effort is being performed concurrent with the system turnover schedule.
DLC will have available, as a minimum, a representative sample of all equipment associated with the 76 packages approved for audit.
A listing of installed equipment will be provided prior to the audit for the NRC to make their selections for audit.
DLC is prepared to support an NRC Audit of the BVPS-2 Environmental Qualification Program for electrical equipment important to safety as early as October 20, 1986.
DLC requests that the NRC review the information provided herein and schedule the NRC EQ Audit of BVPS-2.
If there are any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. E.
T.
Eilmann at (412) 393-7895.
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY By YK N1/ Carey /
Sr. Vice President KEW/ljr NR/EQ/ELEC/EQP Att ent AR/
cc: Mr. P. Tam, Project Manager Mr. L. Prividy, NRC Resident Inspector INP0 Records Center (w/o)
NRC Document Control Desk (w/o) i i
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Equipment Qualification Report - Environmental Qualification of Class lE Electrical Equipment -
Page 3 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
)
)
COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY.
)
On this 4 fM day o mIf, //9d, before me, a 7
Notary Public in and for said Commonwealth and County, personally appeared J. J. Carey, who being duly sworn, deposed and said that (1) he is Vice President of Duquesne Light, (2) he is duly authorized to execute and file the foregoing Submittal on behalf of said Company, and (3) the statements set forth in the Submittal are true and correct and to the best of knowledge.
Aas
,/
/ Notary Public ELVA G. LESONDAK, NOTARY PUBLIC ROBINSON TOWNSHIP, ALLEGHENY COUNTY MY COMMISSION EXPIRES OCTOBER 20,1986
1 2NRC-6-099 Beaver Val
- o. 2 Unit Project Organization Telecopy 41 6 00 Ext.160 P.O. Box 328 Sept. 20, 1986 Shippingport, PA 15077 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office Of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washinoton, DC 20555 ATTENTION:
Mr. Peter Tam, Project Manager Division of PWR Licensing - A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412 Equipment Qualification Report - Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Electrical Equipment Gentlemen:
Enclosed are six (6) copies of the Equipment Qualification Report, Revision 1 which describes the Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit 2 (BVPS-2) environmental qualification program for electrical equipment important to safety.
The Equipment Qualification Report was previously submitted to the NRC on May 23, 1986.
The Equipment Qualification Report has been updated to provide current status and address NRC comments regarding the May 23, 1986 submitt al.
This report is comprised of two parts:
1) environmental qualification of electrical equipment important to safety (Enclosed) and 2) environmental qualification of safety rel ated mechanical equipment (to be resubmitted at time of audit). entitled " List of Specifications for Environmental Qualifi-cation Review" contains the status of EQ packages for NRC Audit.
Of the total 128 EQ packages, 90 of these packages contain equipment located in harsh area environments. identifies 76 of these harsh area packages as finalized and approved by DLC for NRC audit.
The remaining packages are in various states of completion, but are not yet considered totally acceptable by DLC.
Volumes 1A, 18 and 1C of this Report contain the System Component Evaluation Worksheets (SCEWs) and associated notes for all equipment associated with the packages statused as audit ready.
The SCEWs serve as a summary of the EQ documentation and, in some cases, the entire documentation is needed to fully understand the contents of a SCEWs.
't.
United States Nuclear Regulation Commission Mr. Harold R. -Denton, Director Equipment Qualification Report Page 2 Appendix A to this report is the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 Project Manual 2BVM-119; Environmental Conditions for Class 1E Equipment Qualification Requirements, Revision 9 Addendum 1.
The SCEWs provided in this report have been updated to this current revision of 2BVM-119.
Attachment II provides a summary of the DLC responses to NRC comments on the BVPS-2 Equipment Qualification Report which were discussed during a July 1,1986 meeting at the NRC Bethesda office.
These responses have been incorporated into the Equipment Qualification Report.
Appendix E of this report addresses 'the issue of a MSLB with release of superheated steam which was raised in IE notice 84-90.
Six (6) additional copies of Appendix E are provided in Attachment III for your 'use.
In support of the NRC Audit, a representative sample of the equipment will be installed and available for NRC inspection.
BVPS-2 is presently 95% com-plete and is scheduled for receipt of low power operating license by April 30, 1987.
A verification program is underway -to assure the installed condition agrees with the qualified condition. This effort is being performed concurrent with the system turnover schedule.
DLC will have available, as a minimum, - a representative sample of all equipment associated with the 76 packages approved for audit.
A listing of installed equipment will be provided prior to the audit for the NRC to make their selections for audit.
DLC is prepared to support an NRC Audit of the BVPS-2 Environmental Qualification Program for electrical equipment important to safety as early as October 20, 1986.
DLC requests that the NRC review the information provided herein and schedule the NRC EQ Audit of BVPS-2.
If there. are any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. E.
T.
Eilmann at (412) 393-7895.
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY By f
W.' M/ Carey /
Sr. Vice President KEW/ijr NR/EQ/ELEC/EQP Att ent AR/ AR l
cc: Mr. P. Tam, Project Manager Mr. L. Prividy, NRC Resident Inspector INP0 Records Center (w/o)
NRC Document Control Desk (w/o)
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director.
r Equipment Qualification Report - Environmental Qualification of Class lE Electrical Equipment Page 3 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
)
)
COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY
)
On this i f M day of
&M, _ //96, before me, a f7 Notary Public in and for said Commonwealth and County, personally appeared J. J. Carey, who being duly sworn, deposed and said that (1) he is Vice President of Ouquesne Light, (2) he is duly authorized to execute and file the foregoing Submittal on behalf of said Company, and (3) the statements set forth in th'e Submittal are true and correct and to the best of knowledge.
/xs
- &N
/
/ Notary Public ELVA G. LESONDAK, NOTARY PUBUC ROBINSON TOWNSHIP, ALLECHENY COUNTY MY COMMISSION EXFIRES OCTOBER 20,1986 8
EVPS-2 ELQ List of Specifications for Environmental Quallrication Review with Status Specification ED Package Number ID Number (quipment Description Supp l ie r/
Qualification
- Manu fac t u re r 2BVS-DOI Status Nuclear Steam Supolv System AE-01 Medium Pump-Motors (Outside Conta inment)
Westinghouse Audit AE-05 Large Pump Motors (Outside Containment)
Audit ESE-01A Press Trans Qual Group A Westinghouse Audit ESE-01B Varitrak Press Trans Group A Westinghouse Audit ESt-02 Pross Trans Quai Group B Westinghouse Audit ESI-02C Tober Press Trans Westinghouse Audit ES'L-03A Dirr Press Trans Group A (Inside Containment)
Westinghouse Audit ESE-04 Dirr Press Trans Group B (Outside Containment)
Westinghouse Audit ESf-05 RIDS - RCS Bypass Manifold Westinghouse Audit ESE-06 RIDS - RCS Well Mounted Westinghouse Audit ESE-088 Two Section PWR Range
. Neutron Detector $
- Audit ESC-10 Nuclear Instr Sys (NIS) Console Westinghouse Post Audit ESE-12A Operator interface Modules We tinghouse Post Audit ESE-13 Process Protection System Westinghouse Post Audit ESE-14 Indicator, Post-Accident Monitoring Westinghouse Post Audit ESE-s6 Solid State Protecting System and Sa ragua rd Cab.
Westinghouse Post Audit ESE-20 Reactor Trip Switchgear
~
H Westinghouse Audit 5.I ESE-23A Loop Stop Valve Cabinet Westinghouse Post Audit ESE-40A riow Indicator Switches Westinghouse Audit 1 of 7
- Audit
- Scheduled to be finalized for audit Post Audit - Not scheduled for finaliza tion until af ter audit
BVPS-2 ((Q List of Speci ficat ions for Envi ronmenta l Qua li ficat ion Review wi th Sta tus Specification - ED Package humber ID f(umber Eauloment De sc rip t ion Suppl ie r/
Qualificatiun*
Ma nu fac tu re r Stag s ESE-42A RTDs - Surface Mounted Westinghouse Audit ESF-43A incore Thermocouple Westinghouse Audit ESE-43C Thermocouple Adaptor / Splice Westinghouse.
Post Audit ESE-43E
' Mini Thermocouple Connector and Potting Adaptor / Cable Splice Westinghouse Audit Assembly ESE-44A Incore Thermocouple Junction Box Westinghouse Audit ESE-478 Low Noise Source Range Preamplifier Westinghouse Audit ESE-47C Nuclear instrumentation System (NIS)
Westinghouse Post Audit Cabinet, Sources & Intermediate Range ESE-47D Bottom Inserted Source / Intermediate Range Excore Westinghouse Audit Neutron Detector ESE-47E Crisp on Triaxial Connector Westinghouse Post Audit l
ESE-53 Microprocessors Westinghouse ESE-55 Auxiliary Sareguard Cabinet Post Audit Westingho se Post Audit Est-62A Shunt Trip Attachment / Auto PNL Westinghouse Post Audit ESE-63A Plasma Display Westinghouse Post Audit l
HE-01 Sa fety-Re la ted Limi torque Motor Oper. Croup A Westinghouse Audit HE-02/5 Safety-Related Solenoid Valves Westinghouse Audit HE-03/6 Safety-Related Externally Mounted Limit Switch Westinghouse Audit HE-04 timitorque Motor Operators (Outside Containment)
Westinghouse Audit HE-07 RV Position Indicating Device Westinghouse Audit j.
2 or 7
- Audit
- Scheduled to be finalized for audit Post Audit - Not scheduled for finalization until af ter audit I
BVPS-2 EEQ List or ~Speci fications for Envi ronmental Qualification Review vith S alus
. Specification ED Package Mumbe r ID Mumber Lquipment Description
- Supp l ie r/
Qua l i r ica t iors' Manu fac t u re r Status HE-08 Conax and Littori Electric Seal Assemblies Westinghouse Audit HE-09 Carret (PORV) Solenoid Oper.
Pilot Valve & Indict.
Westinghouse Audit HE-10A Head Vent System - Target Rock (SOV) Isolation Valve Westinghouse Audit HE-108 Head Vent System - Target Rock (Electronic Control Module)
, Westinghouse Post Audit HE-10C Head vent System - Ta rget Rock (Modulating Valve)
Wes t inghoissa Audit 2BVS-10 2BV-10 Prima ry Componen t Coo l i ng Wa te r Pumps ingersoll Rand Audit 2BVS-11 2BV-11 Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps' Coulds Pumps Audit 2BVS-15 2BV-15 Recirculation Spray Pumps Bingham-Willamette Audit 2BVS-24 2BV-24 Quench Spray Pumps Bingham-Willamette Audit 2BVS-67 2BV-67 BaIi Vaives Manuai &
Motor-Ope ra ted Controsatics Audit 2BVS-76 2BV-76 Motor-Operated Butterfly Valves Henry Pratt Audit 2BvS-76A 2Bv-76A Motor-Operated Butterfly Valves Posi-Seal Audit 2BVS-77 2BV-77 Motor-Opera ted Ca rbon Steel Valves Walworth Audit 38VS-82A 2BV-82A Motor-Operated Stainless Steel Valves Anchor /Da rl ing Audit 3BVS-91 2BV-91 Motor-Opera ted Plug Va lves Turline Audit 2BVS-92 2BV-92 Feedwater Isolation Valves Bo rg-Wa rne r Audit 2BVS-94 2BV-94 Fi re-Water
- Booster Pump Coulds Pumps Post Audit 38VS-98A 28v-98A Seir cleaning Strainers Zurn industries Post Audit 3 or 7 cAudit
- Scheduled to be fina lized for audit Post Audit - Not scheduled for finalization until arter audit
CVPS-2 ((Q List or Specifications for Environmental Quattrication Review with Status Specification ED Package Supplier /
Qualificatiuu*
Number ID 9tumber
[guipment Desc & doD Manu f acture r Status 28VS-116 28V-116 Ex-Core heutron Flux Monitoring Camma Me t ric Post Audit System 2BVS-134 28v-134 Hydrogen Recombiner Rockwell Post Audit 28VS-135 28V-135 Chemical injection Pump C ra ne-Dem i ng Audit Pumps 28VS-150 2BV-150 Axial flow fans Joy Mrgr.
Audit 28VS-157 28V-157 Vent filter Assemblies American Air Post Audit filter 28VS-160 2BV-160 Refrigerant Condensing Units Ca rrie r Post Audit 2BVS-162 2BV-162 Centrifugal Fans Burrato forge Audit 2BVS-179 28V-179 Ai r Cond i t ioning Uni t s Carrier Audit 28VS-185 28v-185 Ai r & Motor-Opera ted Dampers American Warming Audit 2BVS-186 28V-186 Air Flow lodicators and Controls Ai r Moni tor Corp.
Audit 2BVS-192 28V-192 ( PNL )
Self-Contained Air Conditioning 28V-192 (MTR)
Units Ellis & walls Post Audit.
Steam Generators Auxiliary Feed Post Audit 2BVS-208 28V-208 Pumps and Drivers Ellis & Watts Audit 28VS-209A 28V-209A E/H Actuated Valve 2BV-209A (PNL)
Copes-Vulcan Post Audit Post Audit 28VS-211/211A 2BV-211/211A Main Steam Trip Valve (Actuat r)
C&W Fluid Post Audit System Div.
28VS-224 2BV-224 Service Water Pumps Byron Jackson Post Audit 28VS-225 2BV-225 (LVDT) Main Steam' Safety Valves 2BV-225 ( PNL)
Crosby Valves Audit Post Audit 28VS-230 2BV-230 Emergency Dieses Generators Colt Industries Post Audit 4 or 7 Wudit
- Scheduled to be finalized fo r aud i t Post Audit - Not scheduled for finalization until after audit
CNPS-2 ELQ List o f Spec i f i ca t i on s fo r Env i ronmen t a l Qualification Review with Status Spectrication - ED Package Muebe r iD Mumber Eauionent Descriotion Supplier /
Qualification
- Manuracture r Status 28vS-245 28V-245 Diesel Generator fuel Oil Transfer Pumps
.Coulds Pumps Post Audit 2BVS-304 28V-304 4160 V Switchgear Could-Brown Post Audit noveri inc.
2BVS-301 20V-30T 480 V Unit Substations Could-Brown Post Audit Bove ri, Inc.
28VS-309 28V-309 5000 V Power Cable (931A) f(erite Co.
Audit 28vS-310 28V-310 (ruse) 480 V MCC's 28V-310 (NCC) could-Brown Audit Bove ri, Inc.
AaNf i t 28vs-lit 2BV-311 Ma in cont ro I Boa rd York EIector Post Audit 28VS-312 28v-312 600 V Power Cable (9318)
Okonite Audit 28V-312 (Cable)
Audit 2BVS-317 281-317 Electrical Penetrations Westinghouse Audit 28vS-324 2BV-324 300 V instrument Control Cable Cleveland Audit Switchboard 28vS-326 28V-326 High Temperature Cable Rockbestos
~
Audit 28VS-328 28V-328 ASEA Relays ASEA Post Audit 28vs-337 2BV-337 isolating Regulating T rans fo rme rs Power Audit
/ Conversion 28vS-342 28V-342 130 Vdc Ba t te ry Cha rge rs Powe r Post. Audit Conversion 28VS-350 28V-350 125 Vdc Switchboards Reliance Elec.
Post Audit 2BVS-358 28V-358 125 Vdc Battery Breaker Switchgear Could Inc.
Post Audit 28VS-361A 2BV-361A Vital Bus inverter Rectifiers Elgar Corp.
Post Audit 5 or 7
- Audit
- Scheduled to be finalized for audit Post Audit - Not scheduled for finalization until af ter audit
CVPS-2 EEQ List of Soecificat ions for Envi ronmental Qualification Review with Status S;cc;Titation LD Package 89umbe r ID Number Eouionent Description Supplier /
Qualification
Systems Control Post Audit Audit 28vS-389 2BV-389 600 V Control Cable Rockbestos Audit 2BVS-509A 28V-509A Radiation Monitoring CA Pdst Audit Technologies 28VS-555 28V-555 Heat Tracing Thereon Audit 28VS-611 2BV-611 Resistance Temperature Detectors Conax Audit 28vS-635A 2BV-635A Sump Levei iransaitters and Switches Fluid Andit Components 28VS-636 28V-636 Resistance Temperature Detectors PYCD AudiL
'2BVS-648A 28V-648A Electrical D.P. T ransmi t ters Rosemount Audit 2BVS-651 28v-651 Ai r-ope ra ted va lves Masonellan Audit 28VS-666A 2BV-666A 8elow Sealed Control Valves li t flammel Audit Dahl 28VS-6724 28V-672A Chlorine Detectors Anacon Post Audit 28VS-676 28V-676 ( PNL)
Hydrogen Analyzer 28V-676 Exosensors Post Audit l
Post Audit 28vS-689 2BV-689 Temperature Switches fluid Audit Component 28vS-693
~28V-693 Flow & D.P.
Indicating Switches I T T Ba rton Post Audit 2BVS-719 28v-719 In-Line SOV's 28V-719 (MILD)
Target Rock Audit Post Audit 28VS-723 2BV-723 Analog instruments and Racks Westinghouse' Post Audit 28VS-731 28V-731 Control & Relay Panels Systems Control Post Audit 28vS-739 28v-739 IsoIation Devices Struthers Dunn Audit 6 or 7 EAudit
- Scheduled to be finalized for audi t Post Audit - Not scheduled for finalization until af ter audit
8VPS-3 EEQ List of Soecifications for Environmental Qualification Review with Status Specification ID Package leumbe r ID 88 umber f.guJ egnj Descriptigg Supp l ie r/
Qejalification" 9,tanufac tlyer Status 28VS-816 28V-816 600 V Control Cable Okonite Audit 28VS-816A 2BV-816A 600 V Shielded Control dable Rockbestos Audit 28VS-821 28V-821 1500/1600/142 leuc Series Terminal Blocks Ma ra thon Post Audit 28vS-827 28v-827 300 V instrument Cable Brand Rex Audit 2BVS-828 28V-828 600 V Power Cable Okonite Andit' 28v5-835 28v-835 Energency Distribution T rans fo rme rs Square D Audit 28vS-841 28V-841 Control Storage Batteries ~
Exide Post Audit 2BVS-847 28V-847 Ai r, Pax Ci rcuit Breakers Airpax 28vs-931 Post Audit Electrical Installation 2BV-309(931A)
- a. Kerite Splice Kits Kerite Co.
Audit 2BV-312(9318)
- b. Okonite Splice Kits'ror 600 V Power Cable Okonite Audit 28v-931(C)
- c. Raychem Splice Kits Raychem Audit 28v-931(D)
- d. Rockbestos SIS Wire Rockbestos Audit 28v-931(E)
- e. Ma ra thon 1500 DJ Te rmina l Blocks 14a ra thon s
Post Audit 28V-931(F)
- r. Westinghouse OT-2 Switches, Minalites, Group W Switches, Westinghouse Post Audit etc.
28V-931( H)
- h. Amp Terminal Lugs AMP Audit 28V-931(J)
J. Rosemount Seals Rosemount Post Audit 7 or 7
' Audit
- Scheduled to be finalized for audit Post Aud i t - Iso t scheduled for finalization until arter audit i
A Z AC F."f.'J-II i
Electrical Equipment Qualification-BVPS-2 Status of the response to NRC Request for Further Information on EEQ Report submittal as of the preaudit meeting on July 1, 1986.
(DLC response was submitted to NRC on July 1, 1986 in preaudit meeting at the Bethesda office.)
BVPS-2EQ Submittal Question Status of Section No./ Subject DLC response to NRC Letter of (1)/
This item is closed with the Transmittal No. of EQ packages following action.
Table 1-1 is being revised to incorporate the following:
a) Add EQ Packages ESE-47E and 2BV-931(J) b) Revise ESE-63B to ESE-63A c) Revise the name of the Supplier for 2BV-676 to Exosensors.
1.2.2 &
(2)/
This item is closed.
No further 1.2.3 Example of using action is required.
Arrhenius method-ology for aging calculation (3)/
This item is closed.
No further Normal average action is required.
temperature Tables 1-1, (4)/
This item is closed with the 1-2, 1-3, & 1-4 Master List following action. The model number information for harsh environment packages scheduled for audit will be incorporated in the master list before the NRC EQ audit.
Also, Tab 1-4, page 1-79, under Emergency.le Diesel Generator Sup-porting System, statement "No Class IE equipment" will be revised to say " Class IE equipment included in qualification program" for air start system.
7906-12241-B4 1
e
i BVPS-2EQ Submittal Question Status of Section No./ Subject DLC response to NRC (5)/
This item is closed.
The master Master List list will be updated as shown in the previous DLC
- response, to indicate that the level indicator is located in mild environment and is included under EQ qualification package ESE-14.
2.2.4(3)
(6)/
This item is closed.
No further (6) & (10)
Plate-out for action is required.
radiation (7)/
This item is closed.
Item (6) of Radiation EQ report section 2.2.4 will be qualification revised as indicated in the previous DLC response.
2.2.6(3)
(8)/
Analysis on the impact of HELB HELB with the revised mass / energy release has been completed.
Result of the analysis is made a part of the EQ Report as Appendix E.
2.2.7 (9)/
During the
- meeting, NRC Staff Margin wanted further information and data regarding the adequacy of margin applied for qualification testing.
But DLC review of the EEQ program still reveals that BVPS-2 have adequate margin and is in com-pliance with NUREG-0588.
Several of the BVPS-2 EQ packages are being revised to include f'urther evi-dences of margin.
This is being done by specific review and the use of calculation and/or summary statements.
This information will be available for review by NRC staff during EQ audit.
2.4(2)
(10)/
This item is closed.
No further NSSS-Time / Margin action is required.
3.3.2 (11)/
This ites is closed.
Reference to FSAR Sec. 3.11 FSAR Section 3.11 will be deleted from Appendix A (2BVM-119) 7906-12241-B4 2
BVPS-2EQ Submittal Question Status of Section No./ Subject DLC response to NRC Appendix A (12)/
This item is closed.
Clarification Table IV Adequate provided in the response will be radiation dose included in the report as a part of Appendix A.
(2BVM-119) 3.3.6 (13)/
This item is closed except IE Bulletin IE-Bulletin 86-02.
DEC will documentation provide further documentation and information at the time of NRC audit.
General (14)/
This item is closed.
No further 2BVM-114 action is required.
During the meeting with NRC on July 1, 1986, the following items were brought up by Harold Walker for further clarification from DLC:
a)
NRC question - Provide further clarification on item (2) Section 1.2.of the EQ separate submittal in regard to 'nonsafety-related electrical equipment interfering with the operation of safety-related equipment.
DLC response - As mentioned in the submittal, (page 1-2, item (2) of.
Section 1.2)
BVPS-2 does not have any nonsafety-related electrical equipment whose failure under postulated environmental conditions can prevent the safety-related equipment to accomplish the safety functions.
The BVPS-2 position regarding compliance to Regulatory Guide ' 1.75 has been reviewed and is described in Table 1.8-1 of BVPS-2 FSAR.
NRC Staff accepted BVPS-2 position on Regulatory Guide 1.75 as indicated in Sections 8.3.3.3.5,. 8.3.3.3.6, 8.3.3.3.7 and 8.3.3.3.10 through 8.3.3.3.15 of the Safety Evaluation Report dated October 1985.
Furthermore, IE Notice 79-22 has been evaluated to address the concern about the malfunction of nonsafety-related equipment due to High Energy Line Break environment.
The result of the evaluation was accepted by NRC Staff and is considered resolved as indicated in Section 7.7.2.2 of the Safety Evaluatien Report.
b)
NRC question Provide further information on Regulatory Guide 1.97 compliance as applicable to electrical equipment qualification.
DLC response - BVPS-2 response to Regulatory Guide 1.97 and Generic Letter 82-33 is documented in the BVPS-2 Regulatory Guide 1.97 imple-mentation report dated September 12, 1983.
This report was prepared based on a design basis document developed by Westinghouse specifically for BVPS-2 on Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2 and Emergency Response Guidelines.
This report is summarized in FSAR Table 7.5-1.
7906-12241-B4 3
The report and the supplemental DLC supplied information has been reviewed by the NRC/EG&G staff.
The conclusions of this review are included in Appendix G of the Beaver Valley 2 SSER 1 published May 1986.
The review concluded that BVPS-2 is in compliance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.97 except for accumulator tank level and pressure.
These remain a licensing issue for both BVPS-1 and BVPS-2.
Regarding environmental qualification, the, equipment qualified by the BVPS-2 EQ program conforms with the qualification statements made within the BVPS-2 Regulatory Guide 1.97 implement.1 tion report.
Table 1-3 of the EQ Report, entitled " Post Accident Monitoring (RG 1.97) Instrumentation that Requires Environmental Qualification" lists the equipment which is fully qualified within the BVPS-2 EQ Program.
- Moreover, there are a
few additional equipment items (Regulatory Guide 1.97 Category 2) for which qualification has been obtained as reflected in the BVPS-2 EQ Packages and master list.
Both Regulatory Guide 1.97 Category 1 and Category 2 equipment is qualified for its application consistent with the criteria-contained in 10CFR50.49.
7906-12241-B4 4
Attachment III BVPS-2 EEQ APPENDIX E Evaluation of the Effects of Superheated Steam Blowdown on Equipment Located Outside Containment Introduction NRC IE Information Notice 84-90, issued December 7,
1984, notified all Westinghouse plants of a potentially unreviewed safety question regarding the impact of superheated steam release due to steam generator tube uncovery following a postulated main steam line break (MSLB) on equipment quali-fication (EQ) of safety-related equipment. The Westinghouse Owner's Group -
High Energy Line Break /Superheated Blowdowns Outside Containment (WOG-HELB/
SBOC) subgroup was established to provide participating members, including the Duquesne Light Co.,
with the supporting documentation necessary to address the question of EQ.
Westinghouse issued a report, WCAP10961-P, to each WOG-HELB/SBOC member utility on October 21, 1985 providing detailed mass-energy release data (letter No. WOG-HELB/SB0C-018) and implementation guidelines for performing plant specific EQ evaluations on November 1,1985 (letter No. WOG-HELB/SB0C-020).
Design Basis Review Based upon the revised mass-energy release data provided by WOG, blowdown ruptured line connected to the steam side of the steam generators from a will become superheated when the steam generator tube bundle becomes un-covered.
To determine the compartments affected by the superheat release, the main steam system piping arrangement and break postulation criteria have been reviewed.
The BVPS-2 main steam lines penetrate containment into the Main Steam Valve House (MSVH), exit the MSVH into the top floor of the Service Building (SB) and then run directly into the Turbine Building. The previously calculated environments for these areas were developed from mass-energy release data without superheat.
Main Steam Line Breaks inside containment are not addressed in this evalua-tion for the following reasons.
The BVPS-2 reactor containment is main-tained at subatmospheric conditions during normal plant operations. Upon an increase in pressure due to a high energy line break, containment depressurization spray systems are activated as a part of event mitigation.
Therefore, the introduction of a superheated steam release has no impact on exist.ing HELB analyses.
FSAR Section 3.6B.2.1.2 states the criteria used for postulating high energy line break locations in piping outside containment.
All main steam system piping in the MSVH is designated a break exclusion area and fully meets the criteria described in Section 3.6B.2.1.2.1.
However, in accordance with NRC Branch Technical Position ASB 3-1 attached to NUREG 0800 SRP 3.6.1, a break area of at least 1.0 ft2 must be arbitrarily postulated in the MSVH MSS piping. To produce the limiting environment, a break location is postulated between the containment wall and the main steam isolation valve (MSIV).
8461-12241-B4 E-1
I BVPS-2 has stated compliance with this requirement to the extent that the resultant environmental effects on safety-related equipment will be evaluated.
Development of environmental profiles in the MSVH for an MSLB with a superheat release is based on blowdown of the affected steam gener-ator through the ruptured main steam line.
Blowdown from the break includes the volume of the affected steam generator and the volume added from the addition of auxiliary feedwater to the affected steam generator.
Manual isolation of auxiliary feedwater to the affected steam generator will terminate all break flow and allow subsequent actions to procedurally attain a controlled plant cooldown to a safe shutdown condition. Due to the design features stated below, the time required to identify and isolate the faulted steam generator will be no more than 10 minutes following MSIV closure.
The 10-minute isolation time represents a change from the previously assumed operator action time of 30 minutes, as stated in the BVSP-2 FSAR, Section 3.6B.1.3.4.3.
Diverse safety-related instrumentation in the form of auxiliary feedwater.
flow to each steam generator, steam generator level, main steam header flow for. each steam generator, and main steam header pressure for each steam generator, will allow the faulted loop to be identified.
Auxiliary feedwater flow can then be isolated by manually closing the two appropriate control valves from the main control room.
Review of the control room layout reveals that the annunciators identifying the onset of the accident (low steam line pressure, reactor trip, safety injection actuation), the indicators used to identify the faulted steam generator, and the control switches and indicating lights for the auxiliary feedwater-isolation valves are all located at the same section of the main control board (Refer. 12241-E-10A, E-10F, RE-25R, and RE-25V). Discussions with the plant operations personnel have confirmed that there are emergency operating procedures (EOPs) which have been developed to provide clear instructions for faulted steam generator identification and isolation.
In summary:
1.
The MSS piping in the MSVH meets the stringent stress criteria for consideration of break exclusion.
Therefore, the only event is a nonmechanistic one imposed by NRC for EQ purposes.
2.
MSS piping in the MSVH will be subjected to augmented in-service inspection throughout the life of the plant as a part of break exclusion zone requirements.
This further reduces the potential for the MSLB event.
3.
No single active failure need be postulated because a piping failure need not normally be postulated in a break exclusion area.
concurrent single active failure is assumed when Accordingly, no determining the resultant environmental effects on safety-related equipment required to mitigate the accident.
This is consistent with an internal NRC memo dated July 15, 1985.
8461-12241-B4 E-2
4.
Control room layout facilitates operator actions required for event termination.
All required information and control switches are located in the same area.
No operator actions are required outside the control room to terminate blowdown.
5.
E0Ps have been developed specifically for this event and include instructions for blowdown termination.
Outside the MSVH, the main steam piping is subjected to break postulation in accordance with NRC Branch Technical Position MEB 3-1 attached to NUREG 0800 SRP 3.6.2.
A steam line break in the SB is a mechanistically postulated event.
Therefore, the BVPS-2 design basis includes postulation of a random single failure in event mitigation and plant shutdown.
Because a MSLB in the SB will occur downstream of the MSIV, and MSIV closure in the faulted loop effectively terminates the transient, the limiting single failure for this event is considered to be the failure of that MSIV to respond to its safety signal and close.
This single failure produces the most limiting environment in the top floor of the SB and adjacent areas.
Therefore, no additional single failures need be postulated. The assumed operator action time for blowdown termination is 30 minutes for this mechanistically postulated break location.
In addition, no breaks inside the Turbine Building are assumed in this evaluation, as no equipment in that area is required to function for event mitigation or subsequent recovery.
Environmental Profile Development Revised compartment analysis has been performed using mass-energy release data provided by WOG for the superheated steam condition.
This analysis redefines the temperature and pressure profiles in affected compartments outside containment. The complete spectrum of break sizes and power levels, provided by WOG, was considered in the thermal hydraulic analyses to assure that the most limiting environmental conditions were obtained.
Calcu-lation 12241-US(B)-128 documents. the environmental analysis performed through use of the thermal hydraulic THREED computer program. The resultant envelopes are included in Project Procedure 2BVM-119 (Appendix A of the Electrical Equipment Qualification Report).
The affected compartments are the MSVH, SB el 780 ft-6 in.,
760 ft-6 in.,
745 ft-6 in.,
and auxiliary building (AB) el 773 ft-6 in.
The peak temperature produced in each EQ zone (as defined by 2BVM-119) is:
MSVH - zone HMV-773: 535*F SB el 780'-6" - zone HSB780-6: 450*F SB el 760'-6" - zone MSB760-6:
230 F SB el 745'-6" - zone MSB745-6:
120*F AB el 773'-6" - zone HAB 27-79, HAB 28-81, HAB 29-79, HAB 29-80: 265 F The pressure transient imposed in each of the above-mentioned EQ zones has been calculated and the resultant envelopes included in Project Proce lure 2BVM-119.
Introduction of the superheated steam release does not significantly alter the original pressure transients developed for each zone for the MSLB event without superheat.
Therefore, the in-place design verification programs are adequate to address the resultant pressure transient and they will not be discussed further in this report.
8461-12241-B4 E-3
O t
Required Safety Function /EQ Review Due to the redefined temperature profiles in the affected compartments, a review of c,ualified equipment has been conducted to assess any changes in qualification status.
The timing of tube bundle uncovery and resultant superheated steam release relative to equipment safety function performance is of primary importance in determining the impact of this event. The WOG report, WCAP-10961, includes results which show that for BVPS-2, all but one necessary safety function is performed well before steam generator' tube bundle uncovery for every break size considered.
These safety functions are:
Reactor trip Feedwater Isolation (FWI)
Safety Injection Actuation (SIS)
Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Steam line, isolation (SLI), actuated by low steam line pressure, is shown to occur subsequent to uncovery.
Due to the large instrument channel uncertainty environmentally induced at the pressure transmitters (2 MSS *PT474-6, *PT484-6, *PT494-6) a design change has been initiated (ACN-D-0067) to insulate the transmitters.
Further analysis in this report is based on the resultant instrument accuracy on SLI signal generation.
Review of WOG data indicates that for the limiting break size, at the time of the tube uncovery, maximum MSVH compartment temperature is 336*F.
WOG 2 at a 70-percent power level produces the data shows that a break of 0.5 ft maximum compartment temperature at the time of tube uncovery.
Analysis of the limiting break size indicates that low steam line pressure will actuate MSVH compartment temperature of 376*F.
EQ review indicates that SLI at a all components in the MSVH with a safety function other than SLI will have actuated prior to exposure to temperatures in excess of their qualified temperature.
All equipment located in the affected zones has been tabulated, the func-tional requirements defined, and the EQ 1evel determined. These components are defined to be primary components. Table I documents primary components located in the Main Steam Valve House area (MSVH) and Table II documents all components located in the Service and Auxiliary Buildings (SB and AB). Of required to perform the primary components listed in Table I, 67 are a
safety function to mitigate the effects of the MSLB and safely shut down the plant.
However, none of the primary components listed in Table II have functional requirements following a MSLB.
Loss or continued operation of this equipment has no significance to the MSLB accident.
Equipment which is designated as "not required for this event" has been environmentally qualified to the envelope curves p rovided as Figures II, VIII K, VIII M, and IX of this Appendix (taken from Revision 9 of 2BVM-119).
These curves encompass all other postulated accidents which can occur.
Twenty-eight components in the MSVH are actuated as a result of SLI signal generation.
These components include the MSIVs, MSIV bypass isolation
- valves, and steam drain line isolation valves.
In evaluating the components' performance, use was made of the equipment thermal response as 8!.61-12241-B4 E-4
s determined by thermal lag analysis.
This analysis is used to demonstrate proper operation of equipment before it is calculated to be heated beyond
,t~
its qualified temperature by the superheated steam environment.
MSIV actuation capability within qualified limits is documented in Calculation 12241-US(B)-202.
The remaining 11 components are all air-operated control valves.
The solenoid valves within each actuator are qualified to operate in excess of SLI compartment temperatures.
The operability of limit switches providing valve position indication in the control room is demonstrated by thermal lag analysis.
Calculation 12241-US(B)-206 determines the transient temperature response of the limit switch surface up to the time that the MSIVs achieve complete closure.
Thermal Lag Analysis The thermal lag calculation utilizes the TAP-A computer program and determines the input parameters as follows.
The environments from three different steam break sizes are used to envelope the entire break spectrum and the associated temperature versus time response. The superheat release for the 0.9 ft2 break is super imposed on the SLI and blowdown termination break, thereby enveloping all breaks from 0.4 to times of the 0.4 ft2 0.9 ft. The 0.4 ft2 break is evaluated to 1800 seconds, thereby enveloping 2
2 break is evaluated to all breaks smaller than 0.4 ft2 The 1.0 ft t = 600 see (blowdown termination time).
Reactor power level (70 or 102%)
has no significant impact on the temperature profiles of identical break sizes.
This method is employed in all thermal lag analyses utilized in the superheat evaluation.
The peak limit switch surface temperature is demonstrated to be well within qualification limits at the time the control valves are actuated.
In summary, with the addition of insulation protection to the main steam pressure transmitters and the use of the previously described thermal lag analyses, all components listed in Table I required to perform essential safety functions will actuate in response to their safety signal and move to their required position prior to exceeding qualification limits.
Circuit Analysis To ensure that, once actuated, all required primary components will remain in their " safe" position following continued exposure to the superheat environment, a review has been performed of the primary component elementary diagrams to determine whether spurious actuation is possible.
The elementary diagramr. demonstrate that control circuits are designed so that all solenoid valves will be de-energized to their safe position and that motor-operated and hydraulically-operated valves will remain closed.
Remote manual actuation of device control switches located outside the the main control board or local panels) is af fected compartment (i.e.,
on the only means by which to re-energize the control circuits in order to change valve position.
Therefore, the required primary components will not actuate out of their fail-safe position upon exposure to an environment in excess of the component qualification environment.
A list of secondary components was developed to determine what additional components could be af fected by loss or spurious actuation of any primary component.
The required safety functions of these components was then 8461-12241-B4 E-5
i determined.
A review of the elementary diagrams of required secondary components confirms that all of these components will not spuriously actuate out of their required positions.
Electrical Cable System Integrity The remaining EQ issue to be addressed is that of electrical cable system integrity.
Degradation of the cables or cable terminations could result in any or all of the following:
1.
Spurious actuation of primary components due to internal hot shorts within a single cable; 2.
Spurious actuation of components (not necessarily limited to primary) due to external hot shorts from cable to cable; 3.
Degradation of the IE bus.
Electrical cable types used at BVPS-2 have been qualified in accordance with lower temperature than can be experienced due to a super-NUREG 0588 to a heated steam release.
Thermal lag analysis Calculation 12241-US(B)-206 has determined the cable and terminal block resultant temperature when exposed to the superheat environment. The calculation utilized. a break environment identical to that previously discussed for limit switch components.
The TAP-A computer program modeled a 1-inch conduit containing two No. 12 conductors to provide the fastest response to the temperature transient.
The conduit inner wall was considered to be the cable surface temperature since it was determined not to be possible to preclude contact between cable and conduits.
The terminal block within the smallest identified junction box was also modeled.
Heat transfer from natural convection internal to the box was evaluated as well as forced convection on the side of the box where the terminal block was mounted.
The results of the calculation determine the maximum cable temperature to be 431 F and the maximum terminal block temperature to be 352 F.
The calculation also reveals that, at the time of SLI signal generation, the cable temperature is 336*F and that all other aforementioned safety signals are generated prior to the cable attaining a temperature of 313'F.
The cables used in both the MSVH and SB which are exposed to high tempera-ture are listed in Table III - Electrical. Other areas do experience some effects from the MSLB but the resulting environments are enveloped by present qualification testing.
These other areas are not discussed in this report.
Table III shows the pertinent information regarding cables in the MSVH and Service Building and specifies the temperatures to which they have been tested.
The cables listed have also been subjected to accelerated thermal aging and 8 rads.
The thermal aging is based upon a radiation in the order of 2 x 10 90*C conductor temperature with an ambient of 40 C.
The actual temperatures will be lower throughout the life of the cable since they are derated and do not carry amperage near the cables's ampacity.
The ambient temperature in the MSVH is usually less than 40*C (maximum normal is 120'F) which increases 8461-12241-B4 E-6
3 the conservatism of the accelerated aging. The radiation dosage within the 8
MSVH during a one-time accident (40 years) is 1 x 10 rads, which is two magnitudes less than the tested cable. The above dosage is from a LOCA-type event, which is a very conservative number for a MSLB.
The LOCA dose is composed solely of ga:ama radiation.
However, the accident dose as a result of a MSLB would be composed of both beta and gamma radiation. The beta dose to the cable would be shielded by the conduit and jacket.
The remaining gamma dose would be the only effective component.
Therefore, these aging mechanisms were tested conservatively compared to the environment the cables are in and would be in during a MSLB accident condition. The reduction of aging mechanisms increase the cable's ability to survive its environment.
The Okonite-supplied power. and control cable associated with P.O. No. 2BV-312 and Mark No. NKA-82 of P.O. No. 2BV-816 consist of EPR insulation with a bonded hypalon jacket on cach conductor.
The 2BV-312 cable has an additional jacket of hypalon over the duplex or triplex type construction.
These cables are qualified to 345 F, 2 x 10s rads (40 years of equivalent aging) based on a 40*C ambient, and chemical spray associated with a LOCA.
These cables were also tested to a peak of 410 F and survived 4.5 days with the temperature at 386*F for six hours of the 4.5 days.
Since the peak cable temperature has been calculated to be 431*F, cables of these types were reviewed to assure that they would (1) allow proper component actuation and (2) not fail in a manner which would cause component misoperation. The components involved are:
2CCP*MOV118 2CCP*MOV119 2CCP*MOV120 2 MSS *S0V102A1 2 MSS *S0V102B1 2SDS*A0V111A1, B1, C1 2SDS*SOV129A 2HVR*FN206A 2FWS*HYV157A 2FWS*HYV157B 2FWS*HYV157C The CCP motor-operated valves and FWS hydraulic valves will operate with the cable surface temperature at 313*F, as previously discussed. The HVR fan is not required to operate (see Table I).
The remaining components actuate on an SLI signal which translates to a cable service temperature of 336 F.
The qualification temperature of the cable, 345*F, is greater than the calculated temperature but with only a nine degree margin.
The additional testing done up to 386*F exceeds the margin requirements. Therefore, it can be stated with confidence that the cable will maintain its integrity to allow actuation of the components being fed with cable f rom P.O. No. 2BV-312 and Mark No. NKA-82 from P.O. No. 2BV-816.
The cables associated with the CCP motor-operated valves are motor leads.
The cables associated with the MSS and SDS orange train valves provide control power to the valve circuits.
The cables associated with the FWS hydraulic valves are unscheduled cables to the valve limit switches.
8461-12241-B4 E-7
l J
Failures due to degradation of the cables resulting from continued exposure y
to the luperheat environment, cause only: a loss of operability of ' the affected component.
Failure of the SDS and MSS power cables may cause loss of position indication in the control room.
Positive confirmation of steamline isolation can be determined by Main Steam Flow and Steam Generator Level.
Failure of the FWS valve limit switch cable may cause false or
~
unreliable valve position indication in the main control room and at local' panels.
However, positive confirmation of feedwater isolation can be determined by feedwater flow indication and steam generator. level, both of which are unaffected by a MSLB event in the MSVH.
Review of the actual cable routing shows that two of the SOV power cables are. routed together.
Postulated external hot shorts between these cables result only in a loss of component operability and indication in the main control room.
Therefore, all valves function and remain in the required position when these cables are exposed to the superheat environment in the MSVH.
The power and control cable provided under P.O. No. 2BV-828 and 2BV-816 respective, except as noted above, is qualified to 470 F, which exceeds the worst case temperature of 431*F, with margin. Thus, no further analysis is needed.
The Rockbestos control cable provided under P.O.
No. 2BV-326 and 389 has 8
been tested to a peak temperature of 440*F, 2 x 10 rads, and 40 years of equivalent aging based on a 40*C ambient.
The 431*F is, also, a peak temperature, the radiation is. two magnitudes less, and the normal ambient should be much less than tested.
The manufacturer has also performed a quick oven test which exposed the cable' to an environmental temperature in excess of 500*F for 20 minutes.
There was no significant degrading effect to the samples.
This indicates that there is no mechanism for short-term
-breakdown of the insulation.
Therefore, the cables provided under P.O.
Nos. 2BV-326 and 389 are qualified to a worst case temperature of 431 F with margin.
Vendor-supplied cable with - the MSIV assemblies is 'also Rockbestos control cable. The cable is enclosed in flexible conduit of which the smallest size is \\ inch.
The smallest size along with the minimum wall thickness insures the fastest response to the temperature transient.
Calculation 12241-US(B)-202 addresses the thermal response of this cable. At the time of MSIV actuation, the cable temperature will be 350*F, which is well below the 440*F peak tested temperature.
Therefore, MSIV actuation will be accom-plished within qualified limits.
However, during continued exposure to the superheat environment in the MSVH, the vendor-supplied cable may degrade. A review of the elementary diagrams and vendor-supplied actuator wiring diagrams for possible hot shorts and spurious operation confirms that the MSIVs will remain closed, as required.
The vendor cable to the three Category II, non-1E bleed valves is routed in separate liquid tight conduit which is rubber coated (as confirmed by field inspection), and is therefore not susceptible to external hot shorts.
Internal shorts within the cable cannot spuriously energize the bleed valves which are required to energize to open the valve.
The bleed valves remain de-energized, therefore, spurious actuation of the MSIV is prevented.
MSIV position indication may be lost or unreliabic when the cable degrades.
However, steam line isola-tion can be confirmed b;r use of both steam flow and steam generator level indication, both of which are located outside the affected compartment.
8461-12241-B4 E-8
The instrument ~ cable provided by Brand Rex via P.O.
Nos. 2BV-324 and 827 have been tested to a peak temperature of 430 F, 2 x 10s rad, 40 years of equivalent aging based on a 40 C ambient, and a chemical spray associated with a LOCA.
The cables are associated with pressure transmitters, that provide the SLI signal to the system components to go to their safe position.
The actuation occurs at a maximum temperature of 376*F in the MSVH.
The cable is in conduit, and is therefore qualified to provide an actuation signal.
The temperature continues to rise beyond the qualified temperature and it is assumed that che cable will fail.
An analysis was performed to determine if the failure of the cable would reactuate the components.
It has been determined that internal shorts and open circuit or shorts to ground would not cause misoperation.
It was also determined that hot shorts between cables was not a credible event.
Therefore, the instrument cable is qualified to perform its function and will not cause misoperation.
The Raychem WCSF-N splices with XLPE cable insulation material utilized in the instrumentation circuits have been tested to a temperature of 390*F, 2 x 10 rads, and 40 years of equivalent aging based on a 40*C ambient 8
condition and a chemical spray associated with a LOCA.
These same splices have been tested to a peak temperature of 410 F with other cable insulation material.
The splices are associated with the SLI pressure transmitters.
At the time of SLI signal generation, the MSVH compartment temperature is a maximum of 376'F. Therefore, the circuit remains intact and is qualified to provide the SLI signal.
As the compartment temperature rises above the qualified temperature, the splice is assumed to fail as was the previously mentioned instrument cable.
A similar analysis to that performed for the cable demonstrates that failure of the splice material will not cause any component misoperation. Therefore, the splices are qualified to provide the required actuation signal and the subsequent failure of the splice produces no adverse effects.
Subsequent loss of steam line pressure indication has no effect on the Reactor Protection System or Steam Line Isolation signal. For post-accident monitoring purposes, steam generator level can be used to identify the steam generator connected to the faulted loop.
For the two intact steam genera-tors, steam generator level, auxiliary feedwater flow, and reactor coolant temperature indication, which are all located outside the affected area, will serve to indicate to the control room operators that the steam generators are isolated, that level is being maintained, and that RCS heat removal is in progress.
By design, all power, control, and instrumentation circuits for components listed in Tables I and II are isolated from their IE power supplies by either a fuse or a circuit breaker. These isolation devices are all located outside of the af fected compartments.
Based on the application of single failure stated previously, the single device provides sufficient isolation to prevent degradation of the IE bus due to electrical faults occurring within the control circuits.
The Marathon terminal blocks associated with power, control, and instrument 8
cable connections have been tested to 384 F, 2 x 10 rad, 40 years of equivalent aging based on a 40*C ambient, and chemical spray associated with a LOCA.
The calculated temperature in the worst case is 282'F at the 8461-12241-34 E-9
terminal block. Therefore, the terminal blocks are qualified for the MSLB environment in the affected areas plus margin, and it is concluded they will maintain integrity of control circuits throughout the accident.
The vendor-supplied terminal blocks for the MSIV assemblies are demonstrated.
in Calculation 12241-US(B)-202 to remain within their qualified limits with adequate margin.
In conclusion, the cables and terminal blocks are qualified to perform their function to safety mitigate the MSLB in the MSVH, Service Building, and Auxiliary Building.
Some of the cable and terminal blocks are qualified to maintain their integrity throughout the MSLB incident. The remaining cable has been analyzed to assure that no spurious operations are possible due to its failure.
Conclusion All BVPS-2 equipment which is required to function to mitigate the consequences of a MSLB with a superheated steam release outside containment and to provide subsequent safe shutdown capability is qualified with adequate margin to function at its required actuation temperature.
All essential components will remain in the required position regardless of the fact that they will be exposed to temperatures in excess of the qualified limits.
Sufficient information is available to control room operators for event mitigation actions as well as for confirmation of essential safety functions.
No potential exists for degradation of the Class IE bus.
Therefore, the mass-energy releases determined for a MSLB with a superheated steam release will not compromise the safety-related design basis of BVPS-2.
References 1.
WCAP 10961-P, " Steam Line Break Mass / Energy Releases for Equipment Environmental Qualification Outside Containment," Report to the WOG KELB/SBOC Subgroup, dated October 1985.
2.
H. L. Thompson, Jr.,
memo to E. L. Jordon, "IE Information Notice 84-90, Main Steam Line Break Effect don Environmental Qualification of Equipment", dated July 15, 1985.
3.
Stone & Webster Calculations 12241-US(B)-128-8 12241-US(B)-202-2 12241-US(B)-206-0 4.
Stone & Webster Elementary Diagrams 12241-E-18DB E-11AT E-11AD E-11JX 12241-E-11ER E-11BW E-11EH E-11BW 12241-E-11AV E-11K E-6DW E-11AW 12241-E-11AS E-11AC E-11Q 5.
Westinghouse Elementary Diagrams 12241-2001.410-001-134, 135, 149, 150, 155, 156, 264, 266, 268 8461-12241-B4 E-10
g L:
. s 6
- j '.
6.
MSIV Actuator Wiring Diagrams and Elementarys 2001.280-225-446 E-11M RE-4MS
.c-i 7.
Radiation Monitor' Elementary Diagrams 12241-2001.560-509-195, 201 E
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TABII I (Cont'd)
Funotinn on
. Finset inn Q,u l 6 I i c.l E'1"_i ernt ID Function Actuation Safet d i.gnal Af ter SLI Temgt.,f f)
Remarks l
MVMilVV I'e / A-t:
ft.a i n Feritw.s t e r I.Sl Signal Close tu inulate Hemain
~190 luolation 2.Sim.Cen Ili-f ccilwa t e r Cluscal I.evel 2WS* HSV15 7Al-A4 Flain Fredwater 1.51 Signal Close to isolate Remain 390 2WS*HSV l 57 31-R4 Isolation 2.St m.Cen fli-Iccatwa te r Closcil 190 2WSallSV15 7tCl-C4 I.cve l 390 2FVS*PS157Al,A2 390 2FNS*PS15 71ll,It2 390 2WSa PS15 7C I,C2 390 2t1SS*PT474-476 Steam I.ine Cencrate None 420 2HSS*PT484-486 Pressure PLI on 420 2HSS*I'T494-496 decreasing system 420 pressurc g
2SDSAA0 Vill %I,A2 Steam Drain SLI Close Remain
- 54 0 y
2SDSASOVil141,A2 Line Isolation signal Closcal 405 h3 2SDS*A0Vi l lRI,lt2( '
Steam Dsain St.1 Close Remain 340 tn 2SilS*SOV11 till ll2 Line Isolation signal Closed 405 O
2SDS*A0VillC1,C2(
Steam Drain SLI( }
Close Remain 340 2SDS*SOVillCI C2 Line Isolation signal Closcil 405 340 405 2SDS*AOV129A.R(
SLcam 1) rain SI.!
Close Remain 84 0 2SDShSOVl294,ll I.i ne tsulation Signal Cl uscil 405 8192-12241-R4 3 os 5
NOTES To Tant.E I Gen.c e,a !
Fur those compuncuts indirated as h.s v i n g lunctional requirements, equipment actuation t imes have been c ompared to the time at whirli steam generator tube unrovery orrurs.
Wi t h the careption of steam line isolation, all rc< psi red s,if et y lunt L ions are templeted prior to tube uncovery.
Therclore, tamponcut *paa l i f i ca t ion temperature is rompared tu the maximum temperature at time of tube uncoveryt 336*F.
(1) MSVil llVAC syst ems are not required to be functional follo.ing NSt.R in the building. Post accident environmental profiles do not consider operat ion of these !!VAC romponent s.
In addition, these romponents are not qualified to operate in t he post -are ident envi ronment.
(2) Main steam release radiation monitoring is not qualified for HSI.B cnvironment. Steam generator tube rupture is not considered coincident with NSI.R accident and the maximum radiation releases have been calculated. Therefore, steam line radiation monitoring is not required.
M tIf 8
(3) St eam 1.ine Ir.nlation (SLI) is automatically generated from any of the following signals:
- ts V
(n I
al 2/3 Low Steam I.ine Pressure w
h) 2/3 Steam 1.ine Pressure High Rate of Change r) 2/3 Hi-Ili Containment Picssnic m
.O (4) Atmospheric Steam Dump capability can be manually initiated in the long term following an accident to provide a controlled release of steam for pressure reduction and deray heat removal to bring the Reactor Coolant system to Nesidual llcal Removal (RllS) initiation coiniitions. Automatic upcration el SVS valves is not rc.pii red as hot standby conditions ran he m.sintained by using the Main Steam sa fety valves, 2HSS4SV101 A-C, 102A-C, 10lA-C, 104A-C, 105A-C.
(5) Hain Steam Sa fety Valve giosit ion indicators provide input to the rad monitor (scc Note 2) and information to the operators for monitoring steam release through the MSS Salcty Valves.
Radiation monitoring vapability is not required as described in Note 2.
Steam release rate can he confirmed through use of redundant class IE stram Ilow indicators which are located inside containment.
Auxiliary feedwater flow, steam generator.' e ve l and RCS temperature can he used to confirm decay heat removal rate.
(6) Containment Isolat ion ihase A (CIA) is automatically generated f rom any one of the following signals:
a) 2/3 low steam line pressure h) 2/3 low pressurizer pressure c) 2/3 hi containment pressurc 8192-12241-H4 4 of 5
h*
(7) CCP motor operated valves are stated to be qualified to a peak temperature of 315'F.
liowever, thermal lag testing conducted by the manufacturer (Limitarque Test Report B-0027) proves that when exposed to an environment of 385*F, the valve's motor operator components did not exceed. a surf ace temperature. of 315*F.
Therefore, operation of the valves at 336*F is assured.
(8) These components are actuated on SLI signal generation.
As stated previously, SLI signal occurs after steam generator tubes becaec uncovered. At the time of SLI signal generation, MSVH compartment temperature is 376-F.
Thermal lag analysis has been performed on the MSiv components (refr. calc. US(B)-202) and the results indicate that the MSIVs do not exceed qualification ' limits prior to actuation.
The remaining components are air-operated isolation valves.
The solenoids within each actuator are qualified to operate in excess of the 376*F actuation compartment temperature. The limit switch associated with each valve which provides valve position indication in the control room is demonstrated to operate within qualification limits by thermal tag analysis.
to
)
(9) Safety injection Signal (SIS) is automatically generated from any one of the following:
r'1 un I
a) 2/3 low pressurizer pressure g
b) 2/3 low steam line pressure l
c) 2/3 hi containment pressure g'3 o
8192-12241-B4 5 of 5
=.
APPENDIX E TABLE !!
ELECTRICAL Equ!PMENT IN AREA OF MSLB - SB AND AB Function on Function Qualified Equipment ID Function Actuation Safety Signal After SLI Temp. (*F)
R_emarks SERVICE BLDG-HSB780-6 (EL. 780'-6")
2BDC*AOV103A,B BDG llELB 2/3 CV/ area Close to iso-None' Not requ'd 2BDG*SOV103A,B Isolation temp high late BDC/HELB Requ'd to operate in the cable for this vault event y
2FWS*FCV478 Feedwater Feedwater Close for None Not requ'd Y
2FVS*FSV478A,B Control Iso. Signal Feedwater Requ'd to operate N
4 2fvS?FSV479B Isolation for this g
event M
C 2FSW FCV488(, )
1 Feedwater Feedwater Close for None Not requ'd 2tVS*FSV488A,8 Control Iso. Signal Feedwater Requ'd to operate 2FWS*FSV4898 Isolation for this event 2FVS4FCV498(I}
Ferdwater Feedwater Close for None
' Nut requ'd 2FNS*FSV498A,8 Control Iso. signal Feedwater Requ'd to operate 2FWS*FSV499 8 isolation for this event SERVICE BLDG-MSB760-6 (EL. 760'-6")
2 INS *FT476,477(II Feedwater Modulate.
None Not requ'd 2)WS*FT486,487 Flow Monitoring FCVs and Requ'd to operate 2FVS*FT496,497 provide Reactor for this Protection event Input R460-12/41-114 l og $ - "
5
+
TABLE 11 (Cont'd)
Function on Function Qualified
[quigeent ID Function Actuation Safety _ Signal Af ter St.I Temp. (*F)
'Hemarks SERVICE BLDC-MSB745-6 (EL. 74Y-6")
I SO- / N NS* l SlN',All Electrical Signal 222*F isniation AUXILIARY BLDG-ilAB27-19, HAB28-81, HAH 29-79, HAB29-80 Not requ'd to.
(EL. 773'-6")
operate for this event.
2Ci:P*LTl00A,B(2)
Surge Tank Level None Not requ'd Monitoring to operate for this event.
Yk
- n e tM s
tn I.5 2iiVS*FN204A,B(
Normal SLCRS Runs Continuously None Not requ'd to g
exhaust fans operate for this event.
y 211VS a l'ilS204 A.H(
St.CHS exhaust fan None Not sequ'4l to pressure monitoring operate for this cycnt.
I' 21!VS*H00214A,B SLCRS vortex Signal from None Not requ'd to 2HVS* MOD 213A,8 dampers 2HVS*FT22A,8 operate for this event.
2HVS*lftC213A,8 2HVS* HOD 203A,B(
SLCRS system CIA Signal Open None Not requ'd to 211VS* NOD 210A,8 dampers-operate for 2HVShl.MC210A,B this event, I
B460-12241-84 2 of 5 4
6
TABLE 11 (Cont'd)
Function on Function Qualified Equipment ID Function Actuation Safety _ Signal Af ter SLI Temp. (*F)
Remarks I'
Not requ'd to 2HVS* MOD 211A,B SLCRS system CIA Signal Open None 2HVS*IllC211 A,B
. dampers operate for this event.
2HVS* HOD 212A,8(
SLCRS system CIA Signal Open None Not requ'd to 2!tVS* LHC212A,8 dampers operate for this event.
2HVS* MOD 218A,B( }
St.CRS system CIA Signal Open None Not requ'd to 2HVS*LMC218A,B dampers operate for this event.
211VS? MOD 202A,B(
St.CRS system
- 1. CIA Signal Open None Not requ'd to y
2HVS*LNC202A,B dampers
- 2. high rad operate for this event.
Md r.
M O
I 2HVS* MOD 20lA,B(3)
SLCRS system
- 1. CIA Signal Close None Not requ'il to N
2]IVS* LNC201 A,B dampers
- 2. high rad operate for t9 this event.
tM C
2ilVStCH219A,B( }
St.CRS cler heater CIA Signal F.nc rgi ze None Not requ'd to 211VS*PDS24A,B St.CRS filtration None operate for differential this event, presnure monitoring I
2HVS*FT22A,B.3I SLCRS exhaust fan None Not requ'd flow monitoring to operate for this event.
2HVS4RQ11098,C( }
SLCRS exhaust Annunciate None Not requ'd 2ilVS4RQ109 8,C D radiation monitoring alarm in to operate 2ilVS*HN109A.C.D control room for this
'2HVS*SP109 event.
2HVS*VP109 2RNS*HTR 2Rt1R*RI.202 8460-12241-B4 3 of 5
W*
t TABLE II (Cont'd)
Function on function Qualified E<gu igamen t ID Function Actuation Safety Signal After St.l.
Temp. (*F)
Remarks AUXII.IARY BIEC (EL.773' CONT'D) 2tiVR* MOD 21.22( '
Containment
- 1. Manual action Open None Not requ'd 2HVR*LMC21,22 purge dampers
- 2. high radiation to operate for this event.
7 2HVP* FT2 t A, B Exhaust fan None Not requ'd flow monitoring to upcrate Aux. Bldg.
for this event.
tzl<
M 2HVP?N0021.A,B(5)
Aux Bldg.
High Close None Not requ'd tra N
- y 2HVP*LHC24A,8 Normal radiation to operate' k
2HVPOLHO24A,B Exhaust for this Dampers event.
Q O~
21!VI" NOD 10A, B(5 )
Aux Bldg.
Signal from Maintain None Not requ'il 4
Noa m.s l 2HVl9 7ZIA,B Hodulation to operate-Exhaust for this Dampers event.
PNL*2AFCE-AB-B Bldg. Service None Not required i
PNL*2AFCE-AB-C Panels to operate for this event.
2 ASS *TEll?A,B Monitor AB Temp Actuate ASS None Not requ'd i
to isolate ASS System Isolation to operate 1
HELB event for this event.
2HVP* HOD 22A,B( }
Motor Isolating CIA
'Close None Not requ'd 2HVP*LRC22A,8 Auxiliary Building to operate i
and Solid Waste for this Handling Building event.
i i
i i
8460-12241-B4 4 of 5 l
1
. ~.,.
wg'
'w""
Nift).5 To TAnl.F. II (t) ' Valves and instrumentation provide redundant. feedline isolation capability and operator confirmation of feedline isolation. Heview of We'stinghouse Technical Bulletin NSID-TB-85-18 indirates that for MSLB event in SH, the main feedline isolation valves, 2FWS*HYVl57A-C,. located in the MSVH, provide suf ficient isolation capability..Feedwater isolation, for a NSI.B in SH, can be confirmed by valve position of 2FVS*HYVl57A-C and steam generator level, both of which are unaffected by this event.
(2) CCP level instrument ation and valves provide system leak detection capability. Since the initiating event of a MSI.B in the SH considers the single active f ailure of an MSIV in event mitigation, no single passive f ailure of the CCP pressure boundary need be considered in the long term.
(3) The SLCRS filtration system is only required to operate following LOCA or fuel handling accident events.
Site houndary doses for a MSLB outside containment do not consider operation of the St.CRS system.
(4) Containment Purge System is not required to be operable following events occurring outside containment.
tW<
tv1 1
(5) Normal Auxiliary Building Ventilation is not required following a MSLB.
Ventilation for essential Auxiliary N
l
[
Building equipment, i.e.,
CCP and CHS pumps is provided by the Emergency Exhaust Ventilation System which is Y
N unaffected by this event.
ts1 tus i
C i
t i
j i
l 8460-12241-B4 5 of 5 h
I l
i
ED ItVPS-2 EEQ Al*ltNDIX E TAR!.E Ill Elcrt rical Cable in itSvtl, SR, anel A!!
Qua l i f ical Cable Test Peak Qua l i f ical P.O. No.
itark No.
Type Function Repo_rt No.
Temperaturc Duration 2 8 tV - 'l l i NKZ-lo 2/C #12 1%wer SWitV-I I MO
- l45*F 6 hr NA7.-21 3/C #1/0 Power SWilV-IIRO 145'F 6 lir hK7.-15 3/C #12 Power SwnV-IIRO 345*F 6 hr 28tV-828 NKZ-10 2/C #12.
Power SWitV-I l82 14t*F 6 hr 558-1021 410"F 10 min NKZ-21 3/C #1/0 1%wer SWBV-Il80 145*F 6 hr tn NKZ-15 3/C #12 Power SWBV-Il82 341*F 6 hr
/a
$58-1021 470*F 10 min N
14 1
2itV-324 NKC-01 2/C #16 lustrumcutation F-C5120-1 385'F 20 min N
an.1 430*F peak m
2ltV-82 7 tM O
NkC-02 1/C #16 Instsomentation F-C'i l 20- 1
'l85"F 70 min 430*F peak NKC-05 12/C #16 Instrumentation F-C5120-t 385'F 20 min 430*F peak 2ftV-326 NKA-14 6/C #16 Control QR-2801 340*F 6 hr 400*F 6 min 440*F peak ZitV-389 NKA-03 3/C #12 Control QR-1801 346*F 6 lir QH-180R 400*F 2 min 440*F peak AY)RA-12241-il4 I of 2 f
y MIN 1y p
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l 310 -
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o.015 ' 5 1020 30 60 36 SEC SEC MIN MIN HR TIME AFTER BRE AK NOTE:
2BVM-Il9, Rev. 9
- 1. TEMPERATURE INCREASES FROM 120F TO 31of FIGURE il IN o.oS SEC. AND FROM 31of TO 327F IN Tile NEXT 5 SEC.
MAIN STEAM VALVE HOUSE PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE TRANSIENTS
- 2. BEYOND THIS P0lNT T EMPERAT URE WILL DE CONST ANT EOUIPMENT OUALIFICATION AT 120F F OR AS LONG AS THE COMPONENT MUST OPER AT E.
BE AVER V ALLEY-UNIT 2
- 3. ALL T Ft/PE R A T URE / TIME AND PRESSURE / Tit.8E a
R AMPS ARE LINE A87 j
~ ~ - ~ - -
H v ?C e*P t 01
300-200-
_ l l _10 0 S E C ta cr II D
II Y
125*F e 300 SEC ll m
I u1 110*F e 50 SEC 110*r @ 2000 SEC CL
'o 2
ll Y
$'n 10 0 -
Ii I
y ll E
IU4 I I
l 107'r e 4 000 SEC I
gl l
l I
II I
I I
ll l
l I
II I
I I
ll l
l
- : :;;ml
- ::::::l
- : ::::11l
- : ::::ll
- : ::::::l l l ::::: l
- l 16' 10 10' 10*
10' 10*
10' 10' TIME AFTER BRE AK (SEC) 2nvM-119, Rev. 9 NOTE: 1. BEYOND THIS POINT. TEMPER ATURE Wil.L BE FIGURE 32III K CONST ANT AT 107'F FOR AS LONG AS THE COMPONENT MUST OPERATE.
AUXILIARY BUILDING NODES-27,28 & 29
- 2. THE TEMPER ATURE TR ANSIENT AS SHOWN WILL BE EXCEEDED TEMPERATURE TRANSIENTS DURING A FEEDWATER LINE BRE AK OR MAIN STE AM LINE BRE AK IN THE SERVICE DUILDING AT EL 780*-6".
EOUIPMENT, OU,ALIFIC ATION NO EOUIPMENT NEEDED FOLLOWING THESE ACCIDENTS IS OR ELEV. 773 -6 IS AL LOWED T O BE LOC ATED IN NODES 27, 28. OR 29.
DE AVER VALLEY - UNIT 2
- 3. TEMPER ATURE/ TIME RAMPS ARE llNF AR.
nye-imi n
1 W
2.0 -
Ci
- 1. 8 -
NO T E: Dif f ERENTIAL PRESSURE INCRE ASES LINE ARLY G
FROM 0.0 PSI TO 0.59 PSI IN 300 SEC.
a w
1.6 -
m-30 inj
- 1. 4 -
tn 4 ta&3
- 1. 2 -
.J 34
- 1. 0 -
47 0.59 PSIG (14.95 PSI A) p rr Z-0.8 -
t tp W
v, x
%y
[a to -
U O.6 -
E' t'
kw i
- to ll 00 o,4 _
m iI O
_ I l _100
~
'SEC O.2 -
ll
! ! !lllll' l l l lllni l l l llllll O.0 -
- l l llllll ~
l l l llllll l l l llllll l l l llllll l
16' 1(i' 10 10' 10 10' 10 10 TIME AFIER BREAK (SEC)
NOT E: 1. BEYOND THIS POINT. PRESSURE WILL BE CONST ANT AT 2BVM-Il9* Rev* 9 14.36 PSIA FOR AS LONG AS THE COMPONENT MUST OPERATE.
flGURE 32III M
- 2. THE PRESSURE TRANSIENT AS SHOWN WILL DE EXCEEDED AUXILIARY BUILDING DURING A FEEDW AT ER LINE BRE AK.OR MAIN ST E AM BRE AK PRESSURE TRANSIENTS IN. THE SERVICE ButLDING A T EL. 780*-6".
NO EQUIPMENT NEEDED FOLLOWING THESE ACCIDENTS IS OR EOUIPMENT OUALIFICATION IS ALLOWED TO BE LOCATED IN NODES 27. 28 OR 29.
E L E V. 7 73'-6"
- 3. PRE SSURE / TIME R AMPS ARE LINE AR.
DEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 i
S TFt1PERATU RE/Tir1E R AM P S u
5.
AEE LINEAR t
i 350 -
34P'Fe 5SEC6.
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TIME AFTER BREAK FIGURE XI 2svn-119, Rev. 9 l
WOTE6.
( SEC )
SED.VICE ISLPG EL 780'-6" l. TEMP. luCEEA$E6 LIMEAD.LY Ft2otJ lO4* F To ~3OO* F lu o.15EC.
2.BEYOUD TMl6 PolMT TEMP. WILL BE 120* F FOR A$ LoWC3 A$
PEE 55UEE-TEMP. TD.AM6.
TuE cougoueuT uusi oee 247e.
- 3. Oli FEQEMTIAL Pr2E.%Dt2E Act2o46 EKTEQUAL WALL 4 (. I E. FLOOE.
EQUIPMEkiT QUAUFichTIOL1 4
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PsEAVER WLLEY - UMIT '2.
Y. P D.E 6 5 U Q.E. IMCl2EME6 LIMEAt2LY FIZOM 14.'3G F414 TO 2') e414 lu O OL 6EC.
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