ML20210C017
| ML20210C017 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1987 |
| From: | Dukakis M MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210B991 | List: |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8705060067 | |
| Download: ML20210C017 (20) | |
Text
e i
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL S. DUKAKIS Having been duly sworn, I hereby depose and say as follows:
- 1. I am Michael S. Dukakis and I am the duly elected Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
- 2. On September 20, 1986, I announced my decision not to submit to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (" FEMA") or to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") radiological emergency response plans for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for the Seabrook Station emergency planning zone. (EPZ).
- 3. My decision not to submit plans for the Commonwealth was based on careful review of draf t radiological emergency response plans for Seabrook that were prepared for the Commonwealth with the help of the utility. The plans were reviewed by myself, my staff, and several outside consultants with expertise in the area of nuclear power and safety.
8705060067 870428 gDR ADOCK 05000443 PDR
- 4. Based on that careful review, which took a period of many months, and thousands of hours on the part of my staf f, I determined that no radiological emergency response plan for the Seabrook Station emergency planning zone can be devised which "in the opinion of the state (is) adequate to protect the health and safety of its citizens living within the emergency planning zone." 44 C.F.R. S. 350.7(d). I refer the reader to my statement of September 20,1986 (attached).
- 5. The Plans entitled "Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Response Plans for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts" that New Hampshire Yankee submitted to the NRC on April 8,1987, are not the plans of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
- 6. All Seabrook emergency preparedness planning has been concluded by the Commonwealth. Appropriate state and local agencies have been so notified.
Because of the fundamental conclusion reached in my September 20 statement regarding the inherent and irremediable inadequacy of emergency planning for Seabrook Station, no radiological emergency response plans for the Seabrook Station emergency planning zones have been or will be submitted to FEMA or to the NRC by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, nor will the Commonwealth enter into any tests, drills, exercises, training, or planning.
1 1
1 l
Signed under the pains and penalties of perjury this twenty-eighth day of April, 1987.
l l
Ab/a.,-
Governor. hael S. Dukakis Then personally appeared the above named Michael S. Dukakis and made oath that the above statements are true.
~
k -
Notary Public l
l My Commission Expires On:
l _
/ff l
r
". i
. . $s 5$ 0 GOVER'.!OR MICHAEL 5. DUKAKIS REGAR3!!!G TFE SEABROOK ?!UCLEAR POWER STATIC!!
Secter.ber 20, 1096 Under federal statutes and regulations I am called upon as Governor of Massachusetts to play a particular role in the
- icensing process for the proposed Seabrook Nuclear Power
/
Station. After lengthy and painstaking review of all the pertinent information, and careful analysis of the applicable standards, I have reached a decision, which I an announcing today.
The Historical and Reculatory Context The Commonwealth's involvenent in the licensing of Seabrook actually extends back very far. In 1975, when the construction license for Seabrook Station was under consideration, Attorney General Frank Bellotti, appearing in o,cposition, issued warnings that have proved prophetic. F first told the federal regulators and then the federal courts that siting a nuclear power plant at Seabrook ignored considerations of public safety. Pointing to the proposed plant's proximity to the crowded beaches at the New Hangshire and Massachusetts border, the Attorney General argued, as he has for nearly twelve years, that the lack of shelter for the beach population and the inadequate highway system in the area made protection of the public in the case of a serious accident a near impossibility.
To prevent huge financial resources from being irretrievably committed to a plant that might never be licensed, he urged the federal authorities not to proceed. Despite the commonwealth's strenuous argument that the choice of site was a monumental e
error in judgment, construction was permitted.
At the time, prior to the 1979 nuclear accident at Three Mile Island, the local health and safety concerns raised by'the Attorney General were, at best, peripheral factors in the federal licensing equation. Three Mile Island, however, bec-7h t a long overdue, rude awakening. It became clear that
' federally mandated planning for an emergency was wholly inadequate, and that health and safety were being seriously jeopardized.
One outgrowth of the accident was reassessment of the prospects for nuclear energy itself in light of the risk. No new plant has been soproved for construction since Three Mile Island. Only the few plants already in construction in 1979~ ,
of which Seabrook is one, remain to be considered for final operational licensure. It is by now beyond question --
given the escalation in cost and controversy -- that if we were to be given a second chance to avoid construction altogether, no prudent person would in hindsight choose seabrook.
For those plants already in operation and those approved for . construction, the federal government responded to Three Mile Island by making off-site emergency planning a primary 4
statutory requirement. On this issue, the ir.portance of state e
and local participation was explicitly acknowledged by Congress with the requirenent that "there cust exist a state, local or utility plan which provides reasonable assurance that public health and safety is not endan.: red by the operation of Ehe facility."
In the words of the ::uclea r Regulatory Commission, "no operating license . . . will be issued unless a finding is made that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." Federal agencies look first to the state through its Governor to make this determination. I must judge whether a plan can be devised which "in the opinion of the state is adequate to protect the public health and safety of its citizens living within the energency planning zones" -- a radius typically of ten miles -- by providing " reasonable assurance that state and local governments can and intend to effect appropriate protective neasures offsite in the event of a radioloaical eneraency." The standard for the Governor, is
_4-it should be, is thus not only one of intent but of the feasibility of - proposed protec- re measures.
The Applicable Standards i
Tc assist in a state's approach to emergency planning, federal agencies responsible for nuclear plant licensing have set forth comprehensive standards and guidelines. It is those rules that I am obliged to follow in exercising my judgment' as c ernor. To begin with, it is clear from the guidelines that several factors which have a significant relation to health and safety are beyond the purview of the Governor. Such on-site factors as design of the reactor, strength of the containnent vessel, quality of management, and quality of reactor operator training are all important to protection of the public.
Nonetheless, under federal law these are questions exclusively for the ?!uclear Regulatory Conmission. My judgment is not to se influenced by the evidence on these issues. Indeed, the, statistical probability of a serious nuclear accident as distinguished from the adequacy of the response is not a proper part of the state's deliberations.
Instead, I am nandated to base my judgnent regarding health and safety on several assunptions stated in the federal guidelines. As a general matter I am directed that no single specific accident sequence should be isolated as the one for which to plan because each potential accident could have
4 different consequences. Rather, as the guidelines state, "th?
tange for planning purposes is very large, starting with a zero i
point of requiring no planning at all . . . to planning for the worst possible accident, regardless c' its extremely low N
likelihood."
tiithin this mandated spectrum, federal guidelines
. direct Governors to assume among other things that an accident could occur with offsite release within thirty minutea, j reaching a. radius of five miles within two hours. tihile the seriousness of the release to be assumed is not specifically stated, the assumptions appear to include a release of radioactive material similar to that at Chernobyl, without regard to the particular cause of the release.
f J
n summary, the central tenet of emergency planning is that an accident can occur. My limited role in the federal process i
is to attempt to devise emergency response plans to deal with such an event if it does happen.
}
. Chernobyl l This in general terms is the context for my review and for l state planning. Last spring, with the assistance of the 1
Attorney General, I was within a few weeks of reaching a l
decision on submission of offsite emergency plans. Then, on April 26, 1986, an accident occurred at the Chernobyl Nuclear l Pouer Station in the Soviet Ukraine, which constituted the i
1
- -- - . = .- - - _ _ - - ..
~
power
'world's first. actual nuclear catastrophe, with substantial loss of. life, widespread exposure to radiation, and serious danage to the environment. We have learned that the o'
-radioactive release at chernobyl was several million times e
greater than Three . Mile Island. Until Chernobyl planning and-judgmant relating to major accidents were essentially based on 1
computer models and mathematics. Chernobyl represents real experience, a test of the experts' predictions and an i
opportunity to derive potentially important lessons about planning for Seabrook.
l I asked Dr. Albert Carnesale of Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, President Carter's nominee to a head the !!uclea r Regulatory Commission, to analyze the Chernobyl accident, and to advise me regarding the applicability of the Chernobyl experience to Seabrook.
Dr. Carnesale"has devoted several months, without compensation, 1- to this task. All citizens of Massachusetts owe him a debt of i
gratitude for his careful objective analysis.
As it turns out, there are fundamental lessons to be
{ learned from Chernobyl, directly applicable to my decision on seabrook. As Dr. Carnesale has told me, in a field as intensely studied as this, what is to be learned is not entirely new, but tends to tell us more directly than cocputer i
f.
models ever could which factors could prove pivotal in la accident and where emphasis must be placed in planning.
It has been debated as to whether Chernobyl offers any e
lessons for design of nuclear plants, in light of the fact that the Chernobyl reactor reflects a design philosophy far -
/ different fron and inferior to those used in this country. But
- under federal guidelines, that debate is not relevant to .y decision. It is the aftermath-of the accident -- the impact of the radioactive release ar.3 the hunan response to it -- that we must analyze for guidance. And i,n this realm Chernobyl has
'much to say. As Dr. Carnesale has put it, the cident confirms beyond question that adequate offsite planning is essential and must be taken very seriously.
The overriding characteristic of the Chernobyl accident is that, as bad as it was, it could ha*/ been f ar worse. Firsg the geographical and weather conditions at Chernobyl reduced _
'he threat to life by dispersing the release over a remarkably large area, extending in diffuse form to places remote from the plant, rather than depositing lethal concentrations in population areas close to the plant. The flatness of the Ukrainian plains where Chernobyl is located, and the hot, dry climatic conditions prevalent in that area tended to keep the I
radioactive debris aloft for relatively long periods of time.
_ ,Second, the nature of the explosion and the thermodynamic effects of a graphite reactor fire as occurred at Chernobyl meant that the altitude reached initially and thereafter maintained by debris coming out of the reactor was quite great, about 4,000 feet. This contributed independently to the subsequent dispersion of radioactive raterial over a wide i
a m r e ,a .
Because graphite is absent from its design, ik is
, expected that serious releases f rom a plant like Seabrook will
~ . _ . _ , _ _
l rise to and be maintained at lower altitudes and therefore be s
I deposited over a smaller area, even under favorable geographic and weather conditions.
Third, the combination of clear, constant weather and a 7 -
high altitude release permitted Soviet authorities to predict the direction of the radioactive plume and to execute a
~
well-timed, coordinated usage of sheltering and evacuat1g i _
135,000 residents within 18 miles that would prove virtually impossible in circumstances where time is short and the path of the plume uncertain.
Chernobyl makes absolutely plain that adequate sheltering is essential to emergency planning. The 45,000 residents living in the immediate vicinity - within two milbs received relatively low dosages of radiation because of the
_9 superior protection providad by the concrete block construction of their homes, during the hours that- authorities were i
monitoring the p ::hway of the plume and mobilizing their forces for efficient evacuation. Some area residents who were not so
, ~ . _ ,
fortunate to live in the concrete block con.:ruction of Pripyat, even though farther away from the accident, suffered far ' higher dosages, at levels considered unacceptably high for planning purposes by f ederal agencies. Thus, even in the dvent of a catastrophic accident we learn fron Chernobyl that immediate evacuation may not be a proper response, particularly where the path of the plume is unpredictable. What may well be needed is temporary sheltering throughout the emergency d
planning zone, followed by evacuation away from the plume.
perhaps the nost humbling lesson of Chernobyl is that the human _ factor defies logic and computer modeling. Despite3e time available to mobilize for evacuation, and despite the 4
totalitarian ef ficiency with which the evacuation was executed (the town of Pripyat was evacuated in two and a half hours) it nonetheless took up to a week to evacuate thousands of persons within a radius equivalent to the federal emergency planning zones, because authorities had not counted on people's j unwillingness to leave their farms and livestock and their refusal to cooperate despite the risk.
t
,w..,,,,.,. ----,---,,n--,--w-., e--,.,-ev., , -----..,--,--r-,
There are other useful dimensions of the Chernobyl experience, but these in particular help light our way. The single overriding lesson is that only ad.quate emergency e
planning and response can avoid human catastrophe. Virtually every element of the offsite emergency response called for in federal regulations was utilized at Chernobyl, and most of them proved effective --
whether by luck or by good plann'ing.
Nonetheless, despite the quality of the response, it was only because of the additional natural or fortuitous circumstances such as weather, geography, and altitude of the plume, that note extensive imme late and long term injury was avoided.
Chernobyl was in many ways a "best case scenario" for emergency response.
Nonetheless, even under these conditions, thousands of residents within five miles of the plant suffered radioactive ,
dosages at least eight times greater than the threshold set forth in federal guidelines for immediate evacuation and 200 times greater than norma. annual background exposure. Also, the mitigating circumstances that accompanied the accident and its immediate aftermath did not spare the countryside arouni Chernobyl fron distressing long-term effects. Evidence suggests that areas comprising hundreds of square miles may remain uninhabitable for four years. The inpact of such depopulation on public health and safety, not to mention the
area's- economy- and its basic co :munity fabric, are beyond calculation.
Seabrook
. -s
',. Turning to Seabrook, the questionj iwhether, taking into account conditions of nature and other related conditions over which we have no control, __o u r emergency response could, if
_ executed competently, prove adequate to avoid serious and'real I
endangerment of the surroundi_ng population. . Certainty on this '
score is, of course, impossible. He must make 6ur best ,
judgment on the available evidence.
Conditions at Seabrook, viewed through the Chernobyl lens, compel me, to conclude that, under the federally imposed assumptions, adequate plans cannot be devieed. At Seabrook, we w
need not speculate about weather conditions. They are at the
~
other end 6f the spectrum from Chernobyl. tiinds are not constant, but rather constantly changing, influenced by land and sea.- Winds are generally prone to change direction in less than an hour at any time. Moreover, the climate is nct dry, but marked by extended periods o- precipitation during the year. Since, as Dr. Carnesale advises, we can expect a much lower plume altitude than occurred at Chera.obyl, the exposure of the immediate population foreseeably could be far higher, _
and rather than moving out quickly, the plume foreseeably could
churn in the immediate area for a substantial time. In rainy conditions the situation could only worsen and among other things make evacuation itself very difficult.
o i
The changing weather takes its toll not only in immediate exposure to radioactivity but also in the difficulty of monitoring the plume, in predicting its course and in executing evacuation plans so as to move the population away from the plume rather than into it. Thus, it can be foreseen that, as we wait to determine proper evacuation pathways, exposure will be heavy in the immediate area. Yet if we evacuate quickly to avoid that heavy exposure, we may well make matters worse.
! These factors combine to suggest that staying within the emergency planning zone nay, on balance, prove less harmful 4
than evacuating, at least for a period of several hours.
Taken together, these considerations could well require us i to place great reliance on temporary sheltering in the immediate vicinity, just as was done at Chernobyl. Yet it is
- very I clear that the extent and quality of sheltering is I
i inadequate at Seabrook. Whereas the concrete block residences -
in Pripyat were apparently ideal, the woodframe residences that are typical around Seabrook are far from ideal. This, in my View, presents a serious problem year rc.nd. However, sheltering is beyond question inadequate in the summer r.onths, l
l i
when the extensive non-resident beach population comes eithin the emergency planning zone. For them the absence of shelter is disastrous, f .- ---
T e
-All these factors make particularly important expert-testimony prepared by Attorney General Bellotti which shows l l
that if a major release occurred at low altitude and under weather conditions common to the Seabrook site, and if evacuation time were over five hours, many persons within two
't miles of the plant could suffer exposure to life-threatening
, dosages of radiation as they sat in their cars, and widespread exposure to such dosages could occur in a radius extending beyor i four miles.
Under favorable conditions it is estimated that evacuation of the Seabrook emergency planning tone wo*_.3 in fact take ov five hours at a minimum, during which time potentially lethal j radiation exposure would be occurrtng, and sheltering would be inadequate. If underlying conditions were less favorable and evacuation faltered, the toll could only worsen. This in my
- view is not a hypothetical worst case, but a foreseeable a
situation under the initial set of assumptions I am told to make.
1 l
v w myw ,.w-.-,,--,-----.-..--,-.-----,-v- -r .,,v
- w,,~_ --,ewwr,--.w--..-gy -~4----r--m,v.,,,. .,,w, ,-,,-------e~,--- .- r-,
Mention must also be made of the human factor. Certainly, the reluctance of many Ukrainians to be evacuated by e authorities after Chernobyl has no immediate parallel at Seabrook. But in a general sense it underscores how important cooperation is if we are to translate plans into actual operation. On this score it is relevant that the towns in
!!assachu set ts within the emergency planning zone are against x -
licensing, for reasons which even proponents of licensing nust respect as honest and sincere. I have cont'.nually taken the view that these residents' views must be considered. I have also made clear that if adequate plans could be developed, I would feel myself obligated to submit then despite local opposition. However, such plans rely on previously trained local residents and nunicipal employees working efficiently and with detailed knowledge of their assigned roles in the evacuation process. In circumstances where I an in serious doubt about whether adequate plans are possible, these doubts are only compounded by questions about whethet the necessary singleminded execution, which is absolutely essential for even marginal success of the best of plans, can be achieved at Seabrook. The unpredictability of the human factor in this instance weighs against the ability to achieve an adequate plan. It leads me to a belief that apart from all other problems, efficient evacuation is not likely.
l Conclusion Ultimately, the questions of whether reasonable assurances t can ~be given is a natter of judgment. I must nake my best
, judgment based on knouledge and good conscience. In due course the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will make its judgment, and alnost inevitably, whatever the Commission's decision, federal judges will be called upon in some manner as well. All ,the evidence I cossess tells ne that while there is room for.
reasonable disagreement on details, the unshakable fundamental truth is this: if a serious accident occurs as I am told to assume it would, the combination of conditions at Seabrook --
including principally weather, inadequate sheltering and exit routes, and the altitude of the radioactive plume --
either individually or more likely in combination create a foreseeable likelihood of high dosages of radioactive intake, against which emergency planning and evacuation cannot adequately protect.
Under such circumstances I do not believe I as Governor can responsibly submit emergency plans, since they could not l constitute appropriate protective measures adequate to protect i
j the public health and safety in the e'ent of a radiological I emergency, as federal law requires. I therefore do not intend i
to do so.
1 i
Future Energy Needs The decision I have made today is based, as a natter of federal law and regulation, on one factor alone --
my I
assessment of the adequacy of emergency plans for the Massachusetts portica of the Seabrook emergency planning zone.
Nonetheless, having made my decision, I cannot ignore the concerns which the potential non-licensure of the Seabronk station may pose for the future of its owners and investors, the energy picture in New England, and our region's economy.
tiassachusetts stands ready to assist the owners of Seabrook and the State of New Hampshire to explore fully and creatively the option of converting either of both Seabrook units to a fossil fuel base. Such conversions are now well into the
, planning stage at the Midland plant in tiichigan and the Zimmer plant in Ohio. Without question, serious issues of economic feasibility and accessibility of fuel supply would face any Seabrook conversion. But preliminary indications are that the engineering itself is feasible, and the potential resource of 1500-3000 megawatts is well worth the ef fort to fully determine its overall feasibility.
. _ . - . . , _ _ . . _ . . _ _ _ . , , . _ . _ _ ...-,_.,,_._--__r _ . . . _ , . . _ _ . . - _ . - _ . _ . , .,_ - .-
e e.
9 Moreover, as Chairman of the tiew England Governors, I have je .ned my colleagues in a full review and update over tc.e past '
,e nine months of energy forecasts and policies for our six-state region. It is our intention to produce, as early as our meeting of this coming December, a comprehensive plan for !:ew England's energy future. Within that approach I expect that we will emphasize such power sources as the purchase of additional power from Canada; the building a of number of smaller, gas-fired generating plants; the creation of new power through cogeneration and so-called "small power" facilities; conservation and land management; and the retrofitting of existing facilities currently slated for retirement.
I am confident that, working together, the economic and governmental leadership of !!ew England will build a strong energy future that need not rely on the operation of Seabrook as a nuclear generating station.
2120r