ML20207T038
| ML20207T038 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/27/1987 |
| From: | NRC |
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| Shared Package | |
| ML20207T032 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8703230096 | |
| Download: ML20207T038 (14) | |
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REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS AS DIRECTED BY "0MNIBUS DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AND ANTITERRORISM ACT OF 1986" PUBLIC LAW 99-399 CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION Directive 2 Scope 2 Background 3 OISCUSSION Acceptability of International Physical Protection Guidelines 7 Comparative Analysis 9 U.S. Initiatives 11
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS 13 8703230096 870227 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR 1
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INTRODUCTION Ofractive Section 604 of Public Law 99-399 directed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and other specified agencies to each:
" review the adequacy of the physical security standards currently applicable with respect to the shipment and storage (outside the United States) of plutonium, and uranium enriched to more than 20 percent in the isotope 233 or the isotope 235, which is subject to United States prior consent rights, with special attentior. to protection against risks of seizure or other terrorist acts."
Each agency must submit a written report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate by February 27, 1987, setting forth the results of its review. This report con-tains the findings of the NRC's review of international physical security standards and a discussion of relevant initiatives of the United States (U.S.).
J l Scope The NRC specifically examined the physical security standards for strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) during international transport 1 and storage
'"' International nuclear transport' means the carriage of a consignment of nuclear material by any means of transportation intended to go beyond the territory of the state where the shipment originates, beginning with the departure from a facility of a shipper in that State and ending with the arrival at a facility of the receiver within the State of ultimate destination." Article 1, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
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i incidental to transport. Physical protection for storage facilities that might contain SSNM subject to U.S. prior consent rights was also considered. While the examination of international standards was the primary emphasis of this study, the NRC elected to include a discussion of how these standards are factored into the U.S. decisionmaking process relative to export application reviews. Since the Nuclear Non proliferation Act (NNPA) requires the NRC to license exports of SSNM based, among other things, on a positive conclusion about a State's in place physical protection system, the means of implementation of the standards, not the written requirements alone, are necessarily included in this review. The knowledge about how States actually implement the standards is based on (1) formal written assurances by recipient countries that physical protection afforded to U.S.-origin SSNM meets the provisions of international guidelines and (2) observations, although sometimes limited, made during in-country information exchanges at sites selected by the State being visited.
Primary emphasis of the NRC analysis was placed on kinds and amounts of SSNM of highest strategic importance (Category I) -- 2 kilograms or more of plutonium or uranium-233 and 5 kilograms or more of uranium-235 contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope. Protection levels for materials of moderate and low strategic importance (Material Categories II and III) were also addressed. (See Enclosure 1 for the international categorization of materials as set forth in 10 CFR Part 110.)
l Backcround l
l U.S. policy that SSNM exported to other countries must be adequately protected against theft or sabotage by subnational groups, including terrorists, was
established in 1974. The yardstick used for judging the adequacy of recipient countries' security was a 1972 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Informa-tion Circular (INFCIRC) entitled " Recommendations for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material" (INFCIRC/225). This document was later revised and republished in 1977 by IAEA as INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1 (Enclosure 2). These guide-lines were prepared by international physical security experts, including a representative from the NRC and other individuals from the U.S. , brought together by the IAEA. Another significant action for the physical protection of nuclear materials was the development of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)2 guidelines (INFCIRC/254, published by IAEA in February 1978), which were patterned after INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1. In NRC's view, INFCIRC/225/Rev. I and INFCIRC/254 are essentially equivalent. Because 10 CFR Part 110 requires use of the former document for NRC export reviews, this report focuses on those guidelines, although bilateral agreements for cooperation may reference either publication as an acceptable standard for physical protection.
In 1978, Congress enacted the NNPA. Among other things, with respect to the U.S.
export of special nuclear material, the NNPA required the NRC to promulgate physical security regulations no less strict than those established by 3The Nuclear Suppliers Group ',NSG), or so-called London Club, is a gathering of major nuclear suppliers which began to meet in 1974 with the objective of developing guidelines for nuclear exports. In January 1976, the Group con-fidentially proclaimed a set of guidelines to serve as minimum criteria for an individual country's export policies. Between 1976 and 1978, annexes to the Guidelines were completed, ana after certain revisions, a set of Guidelines for Nuclear Transfer was agreed on and submitted to the Director General of the IAEA. The Guidelines were published in February 1978 (INFCIRC/254). The Suppliers have not treated the Guidelines as an international agreement or as containing binding legal commitments, but rather as parallel unilateral dec-larations of national policy. Participants in the NSG, at that time, were Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and the Soviet Union.
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international physical security guidelines to which the United States subscribes.
The implementing regulations promulgated by NRC in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 110), " Export and Import of Nuclear Equipment and Material," specify that recipient country physical security measures must provide, as a minimum, protection at a level comparable to that set forth in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1. Moreover, countries must provide written assurances of their national commitment that such protection will be implemented and I-maintained country-wide for nuclear materials of U.S. origin.
The majority of countries importing SSNM have provided these assurances on a generic basis by letter or Aide Memoire to the State Department. Australia, Canada, Norway, and Sweden have chosen to incorporate these generic assurances in bilateral agreements for cooperation with the United States which have been negotiated since 1978. EURATOM (the European Atomic Energy Community) has based its assurances on the guidelines contained in IAEA INFCIRC/254 which, as stated above, NRC considers to be equivalent to INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1.
Confidence that the physical protection afforded U.S.-origin Category I nuclear materials in foreign countries is at the appropriate level is bolstered by knowledge of how a recipient country has implemented its national requirements.
l This knowledge is obtained, in part, through country information exchange visits.
l The country information exchange program, conducted by individuals who have expertise in physical protection systems, provides an opportunity for a discus-sion of a country's interpretation of INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1 and a general observa-l tion of how these guidelines are implemented at a representative site. Because l
l the visit is conducted at the invitation of the country involved and national I
! sovereignty plays an important role, it is viewed and planned in the context of l
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s an information exchange with emphasis placed on observations of selected elements of the country's physical protection program. Nevertheless, NRC believes that it is possible to draw general conclusions about a country's total physical security system based on the exchange of technical information augmented by selected observations. The team's conclusion about the physical protection program in a country is one of the factJrs used in Jetermining whether or not a proposed export of Category I nuclear mater:a1 woulc be inimical to the national security interests of the U.S.
The NRC and 00E members of the visiting team work closely together on the planning and execution of the visits, with DOE having the lead in scheduling and arranging them. This ongoing program is discussed further in Enclosure 3.
Since 1974 there have been 68 overseas visits to 41 countries by U.S. teams (Enclosure 4); and reciprocally, there have been 25 visits to the U.S. by representatives of foreign governments. Physical security reviews for nuclear materials of moderate and low strategic importance (Category II and III) are based largely upon available relevant information without necessarily carrying out exchange visits.
In 1979, government representatives from 58 countries and one organization (EURATOM) drafted the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (INFCIRC/274/Rev. 1, May 1980), which further increases the awareness of the need to adequately protect nuclear material world-wide. Each State becoming party to the Convention agrees to ensure that during international nuclear transport, nuclear materials will be protected at levels set forth in Annex I of the Convention (Enclosure 5). These guidelines are based on and are compar-able to those specified in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1. The Convention was to come into 6
effect 30 days following ratification by 21 countries. Switzerland, the 21 st country to ratify, did so on January 9,1987, making February 8,1987 the effective date. The U.S. ratified the Convention and enacted enabling legisla-tion in 1982. The NRC published, for information purposes, implementing amend-ments to 10 CFR Parts 40, 70 and 73 on March 28, 1985 (50 FR 12228) which will become effective 30 days following their republication in February, 1987. A list of the countries that have signed and those that have ratified the Convention is attached to Enclosure 5.
DISCUSSION Acceptability of International Physical Protection Guidelines The U.S. has historically encouraged the IAEA to promote international physical protection of nuclear materials, even though it may have no authority or inde-pendent capability to set standards. U.S. experts, including an NRC representative, have participated actively in all of the meetings called by the IAEA to consider the international guidelines embodied in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1. They urged adoption of physical security measures similar to those applied in the U.S. and were successful in incorporating the essential elements and framework of the U.S.
regulations. However, the international group developing the recomendations for INFCIRC/225/Rev. I resisted the incorporation of highly prescriptive criteria that would specify exactly how countries should achieve adequate protection.
Such details were believed best left to the judgment of each country, after taking into account geographical locations and each State's assessment of the current threat. Therefore, the product of these discussions, INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1, was a set of guidelines providing considerable flexibility in application, 7
stating that the design of a physical protection system for a specific facility is expected to vary, depending on prevailing circumstances in the country and the means chosen by the State to make up the physical protection system required to meet the performance objectives of the standard.
Although less prescriptive than U.S. regulations, INFCIRC/225/Rev. I has per-formance objectives comparable to those of 10 CFR Part 73.' At the same time it identifies appropriate protective measures. For example, protection of Category I shipments by road is treated in a series of more than 30 separate recommendations. Enclosure 6 discusses the provisions of INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1 in more detail, covering the protection specified for Category I, II and III nuclear materials in transport and at storage sites.
The INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1 guidelines for protection systems for SSNM in-transit and in storage have the following general components:
o Each shipment of Category I nuclear material is to be preplanned and coordinated so that it moves toward its destination with deliberate speed and with minimal exposure to the risks of theft or misdirection.
(The coordination further assures that there will be no break in the continuity of protection as the shipment moves through international territory or the territory of other States en route to its destination.)
o The shipment is to be accompanied by a security force to carry out the security measures.
o In the case of storage incidental to international transport, the shipment is to be enclosed within a system of locked barriers, with access limited to individuals who require such access to carry out their duties. (The trustworthiness of the individuals is to be determined in advanco.)
3 Generally to provide capabilities against risks of seizure and othe acts of terrorism by a small subnational group as required by 10 CFR 73.1.
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o o The barrier system is to be kept under manual surveillance or is to be equipped with an automated intrusion detection system.
o A communication capability is to be provided to enable the security force to call for assistance from a nearby response force. (The resronse force is to arrive on the scene in time and with the neces --
sary resources to defeat a group attempting unauthorized removal of the shipment.)
o Information about the detailed capabilities of the protection system and the precise shipment schedule is to be withheld from public disclosure.
Comparative Analysis NRC compared: (1) the physical protection measures called for in INFCIRC/225/
Rev. 1, (2) those required by NRC regulations contained in 10 CFR Part 73,
" Physical Protection of Plants and Materials," and (3) the protection levels for international transport called for in Annex ! of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.4 This comparative analysis is summarized in Enclosure 7. Since the NSG guidelines, mentioned previously, were based on and are less prescriptive than INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1, the NRC selected INFCIRC/225/Rev.1 to analyze rather than introducing redundancy into the report by including an analysis of the NSG guidelines. Standards for the protection of irradiated fuel against sabotage are not included since this was not a primary consideration in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1. Furthermore, irradiated fuel is generally viewed as self protecting due to the associated high levels of radiation and is not readily usable in nuclear explosive devices until reprocessed.
SAmong otner things, the Convention stipulates that each State Party shall not export nuclear material unless it has received assurances that such material will be protected during international nuclear transport at levels described by Annex !. The State Party responsible for receiving such assurances shall identify and infom in advance States which the nuclear material is expected to transit by land or international waterways, or whose airports or seaports it is expected to enter. As noted in the background section, the levels of protection set forth in Annex ! of the Convention were based on and are comparable with those in InFCIRC/225/Rev. 1.
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It is clear from examining the physical security requirements and standards outlined in Enclosure 7 that NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 73 are considerably more prescriptive than the guidelines in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1. The following are examples of the types of prescriptive measures in 10 CFR Part 73 required for Category I nuclear material shipments:
o Armed guards with specified kinds of weapons.
o A specific large number of escorts, o Hardened transport and armored escort vehicles.
o Redundant communications between transport vehicles and a communica-tion center.
o Prescribed call-in frequencies for escorts.
o Prescribed maximum permissible in-transit storage times.
With respect to the first two measures, INFCIRC/225/Rev. I stipulates that escorts or guards should ensure continuous surveillance of shipments and that appropriate arrangements should be made for armed external emergency teams to arrive rapidly enough to counter an armed attack. With regard to the third sneasure, INFCIRC/225/Rev. I specifies a specially designed transport to resist attack but no requirement for escort vehicles. With regard to the fourth and fifth measures, INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1 requires that two way radio or frequent telephone communications be provided and that periodic communications be maintained while a shipment is in-transit. Regarding permissible storage times in-transit, the international guideline is that transport times be minimized. Differences similar to those above are also evident in the measures for protection of Category I nuclear material at storage sites.
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0 Notwithstanding the differences between 10 CFR Part 73 and INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1, it it, oelieved that, on balance, the international guidelines call for appro-priate measures which, if properly implemented, will provide a level of protec-tion comparable to that required domestically by NRC regulations. Because implementation varies from country-to-country, the U.S. determines through information exchanges, including reciprocal visits with countries receiving Category I U.S.-origin material, that appropriate levels of physical protection are being applied.
The NRC analysis indicates that, at the performance objective level, the guide-lines in INFCIRC/225/Rev. I are comparable to U.S. objective statements contained in 10 CFR Part 73. Nevertheless, it would be prudent for the U.S. to encourage the IAEA to reconvene a group of international experts to review the specific provisions of the standard because of the length of time since its last revision.
In this regard, INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1 states that it is essential that the recommended measures "be reviewed and updated from time to time to reflect advances made in the state-of-the-art or the introduction of new types of facilities."
U.S. Initiatives In the judgment of the NRC staff, the following U.S. initiatives have contri-buted toward assuring that U.5-origin nuclear material in recipient countries is properly protected:
o Comprehensive and conservative U.S. physical protection regulations for transportation and storage set a worldwide example, o The 12 years of information exchange visits to other countries and reciprocal visits to the U.S. have been a positive influence in establishing appropriate levels of protection.
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o o Constant and continuing access to U.S. intelligence information by appropriate NRC personnel provides additional assurance that physical security levels are consistent with evolving threat conditions.
o The Nuclear Suppliers Group has agreed on physical protection guide-lines to be used for nuclear transfers to any non-nuclear-weapon state.
o NRC requires recipient countries to provide written assurances on the implementation of levels of physical protection comparable to INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1.
o The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material has made all countries more aware of their responsibilities to protect ;
nuclear material in an environment of worldwide concern about terrorism.
Since countries who receive U.S.-origin SSNM, in many cases, have strengthened their physical security programs from such initiatives, including U.S. consulta-tion, NRC continues to believe that physical security measures afforded all exports under prior consent rights of the U.S. meet or exceed IAEA guidelines.
Nonetheless, as was noted in a 1982 General Accounting Office (GAO) reports, the ability of the U.S. to continue assuring that adequate protection is afforded weapons grade material shipped overseas can be enhanced by reducing
- the interval between information exchange visits to some recipient countries.
It has been 10 years since 28 of the 41 countries were last visited by a U.S.
team. On the other hand, most of these 28 countries now possess less than Category I quantities of U.S.-origin SSNM. In any case, it should be noted that visits to countries possessing Category I quantities of SSNM have decreased in frequency during the last five years.
To gain broad acceptance of these visits, an increased emphasis on their recip-rocal nature, including more frequent visits by foreign teams to the U.S.,
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"" Obstacles to U.S. Ability to Control and Trick Weapons-Grade Uranium Supplied Abroad" GA0/ID-82-21, August 1982.
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n should help reduce the concerns of other countries over national sovereignty.
It could also enhance the U.S. position as a role model. U.S. team revisits should be scheduled on a periodic basis and should also be made whenever sig-nificant changes occur in a recipient country's nuclear program, when increased terrorist activities are noted, or when changes are made in a country's nuclear non proliferation credentials. Because of the length of time between visits to some countries, NRC believes a timely revisit schedule on the order of every five years should be established for countries possessing Category I amounts of U.S.-origin SSNM.
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS Pursuant to Section 604 of Public Law 99-399, NRC has reviewed the adequacy of the physical security standards currently applicable with respect to the ship-ment and storage (outside the United States) of SSNM subject to U.S. prior con-sent rights. NRC believes that, although international standards are less pre-scriptive, their objectives are comparable to the performance objectives of NRC regulations whien are designed especially to protect Category I amounts of SSNM against risks of seizure by a small subnational group of potential adversaries, including terrorists. Various U.S. initiatives have contributed to the effec-tiveness of those standards, bolstering confidence that the physical protection afforded U.S.-origin SSNM, including that produced from U.S. material, is at an appropriate level. These have included written assurances from recipient countries and reviews of corresponding foreign physical security programs (and their implementation) as considered through reciprocal overseas visits and other
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information exchanges. Overall, international guidelines call for adequate measures which, if properly implemented, will provide a level of protection comparable to that required domestically by NRC regulation. In addition, the entry into force of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is an important step toward broadening international support and cooperation to assure the security of nuclear material while in-transit.
The above conclusions notwithstanding, the NRC also believes that: (1) it would be prudent for the U.S. to encourage the IAEA to reconvene a group of interna-tional experts to review the specific provisions of INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1, and (2) it would be appropriata for the NRC, in conjunction with 00E, to conduct more timely information exchange revisits to foreign reqipients of U.S.-origin SSNM and to encourage reciprocal visits from these countries to the U.S.
Accordingly, NRC staff has prepared and intends to forward correspondence to the Department of State and to the Department of Energy requesting that they support, respectively, the review of INFCIRC/225/Rav. 1 and the reemphasis of the information exchange program.
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cd q CATEGORIZAT1001 Of IIOCLEAR MATERIAL form Category hterial I II III b 2 kilograms (kg) or more Less that 2 kg 500 g or less
- 1. Plutonium
- Unirradiated but more than but more than 500 grams (g) 15 g C b
- 2. Uranium-235 Unirradiated
- uranius enriched to 5 kg or more Less than 5 kg 1 kg or less 20% U-235 or more but more than but more than 1 kg 15 g
- uranium enriched to 10 kg or more Less than 10 kg 10: u-235 but less but more than than 201 1 kg
- uranium enriched ateve 10 kg or more natural, but less than 101 U-235 b iess than 2 kg 500 g or less
- 3. Uranitai-233 Unirradiated 2 kg or more but more than but more than 500 g 15 g
--a - All plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 801 in plutonium-238.
b - h terial not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation absorbed dose (rad) level equal to or less than 100 rad / hour at one meter unshielded.
c - htural uranium, depleted uranium and thorium in quantities exceeding 500 kg should be protected in accordance with prudent management practice. As a minimum, these materials should be kept under constant control and secured from unauthorized removal. Transport protection should include advance notification of shipment specifying mode of transport, espected time of arrival and confirmation of receipt of shipment.
d - Irradiated fuel should be protected as Category 1.11 or !!! nuclear material depending on the category of j{ the fresh fuel. Ilowever, fuel which by virtue of its original fissile content is included as Category I or 11 e tefore irradiation should be reduced one Category level, while the irradiation level from the fuel exceeds
,Q 100 rad / hour at one meter unshielded.
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