ML20206F026

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Proposed Tech Specs,Expanding Containment Isolation Valve Listing,Removing Guidance Involving three-loop Operation & Incorporating Guidance Contained in Rev 4 to NUREG-0452
ML20206F026
Person / Time
Site: Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date: 04/09/1987
From:
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20206F019 List:
References
RTR-NUREG-0452, RTR-NUREG-452 NUDOCS 8704140077
Download: ML20206F026 (29)
v • d • e


Text

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ATTACHp5NT 1 PROPOSED CHANGES TO APPENDIX A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTIONS 3.9 and 4.9 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEMS Pages Modified:

111 203 viii 204 ix 205 x

206 xi 207 200 208 201 209 202 210 211 Pages Added:

199a 207a 199b 207b 205a 207c 2901K g4140077sMy9 ADOCK O 295 p

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Table of Contents (Continued)

LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENT PAGE

~

3.1 Steam Generator Emergency Heat Removal 4.7 156 3.7.1 Steam Generator Safety Valves 4.7.1 156' 3.7.2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump System 4.1.2 158 3.7.3 Auxiliary Fgedwater Supply System Bases 4.7.3 159a 3.8 Omergency Core Cooling and Core Cooling Support 4.8 164 3.8.1 Centrifugal Charging Pump System 4.8.1 164 3.8.2 Safety Injection Pump System 4.8.2 168 3.8.3 Residual Neat Removal Pump System 4.8.3 170 3.8.4 System Testing of Centrifugal Charging. Safety 4.8.4 173 Injection, and Residual Heat Removal Pump Systems 3.8.5 Accumulator System 4.8.5 174 3.8.6 Component Cooling System 4.8.6 175 3.8.7 Service Water System 4.8.i 178 3.8.8 Hydrogen Control Systens 4.8.8 100 3.8.9 Equipment for Evaluating Post LDCA Bases 4.8.9 184 3.9 Containment Isolation Systems 4.9 197 3.9.1 Isolation Valve Seal Water System 4.9.1 197 3.9.2 Penetration Pressurization Systems l

3.9.3 Containment Isolation Valves 4.9.2 198 4.9.3 199a 3.9.4 Main Steam Isolation Valves and Bypasses 4.9.4 200 3.9.5 Containment Integrity Bases 4.9.5 201 3.10 Containment Structural Integrity 3.10.1 Containment Leakage Rate Testing 4.10 22 4.10.1 212 3.10.2 Containment Air Locks 4.10.2 214a 3.10.3 Containment Tendons 4.10.3 215 3.10.4 End Anchorages and Concrete 4.10.4 217 3.10.5 Containment Pressure 4.10.5 219 3.10.6 Containment Temperature 4.10.6 219 Bases 3.11 Radioactive Liquids Bases 4.11 222 3.12 Radioactive Gases Bases 4.12 230 0827t iii 03864

Tabh 1.1 Operational Modes f

6b 1.2 Surveillance Frequency Notation 6c 3.1 -1 Reactor Protection System-Limiting Operations Conditions and Setpoints 30 3.1-2 Reactor Protection System Instrument Numbers '

33 3.3.2-1 Zion Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Toughness Data 88 3.3.2-2 Zion Unit 2 Reactor Wessel Toughness Data 89 3.3.4-1 In Service' Inspection Program 106 3.3.5-1 Reactor Coolant Systems and Chemistry Specifications 122 3.4 -1 Engineered Safeguards Actuation System-Limiting Conditions' on 129 Operation and Setpoints

3. 4 -2 Engineered Safeguards System Instrument Numbers 132 3.7 -1 Neutron Flux High Trip Points with Steam Generator Safety Valves 160a Inoperable - Four Loop Operation 3.7-2 Neutron Flux High Trip Points with Steam Generator Safety Valves 160b Inoperable - Three Loop operation 3.8.9-1 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation 192a 3.9-3a Containment Isolation Valves - hhase A 205 3.9-3b Containment Isolation Valves - Phase 8 206 3.9-3c Containment Isolation Valves - Manually Operated 207 3.9-3d Containment Isolation Valves - Other 207b 3.9 -4 Containment isolation Valves - Main Steam Isolation Valves 208 3.11-1 Maximum Permissible Concentration of Dissolved or Entrained Noble 226a Gases Releases from the Site to Unrestricted Areas in Liquid Effluents 0827t LIST OF TA8LES

-viii 0386A

Table Page 3.11-2 Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 228 3.12-1 Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 236 3.14-1 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation 251 3.15-1 Equipment Requirement with Inoperative 4KV E.S.S. Bus 268 e

i 3.15-2

)

Equipment Inoperable with Inoperative 4KV E.S.S. Bus 269 j

3.16-1 Zion Standard Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program 279 i

3.16-2

]

Reporting Levels for Radioactivity Concentrations in Environmental Samples 279c il

)

4.1-1 Reactor Protection System Testing and Calibration Requirements 35

4. 3. 8-1 Minimum Number of Steam Generators to be Inspected During Inservice 741 Inspection 4.3.8-2 Steam Generator Tube Inspection i

7.j l

4. 3. 6-1 i

Primary Coolant Specific Activity Sample and Analysis Program 124b q

4. 4 -1 Engineered Safeguards. System Testing and Calibration Requirements 134 4.4-2 Engineered Safety Equipment Actuation Test 136 4. 5-1 Containment Fan Cooler Components i

148

4. 6-1 Containment Spray System Components 153 l
4. 7 -1 Steam Generator Safety Valves, Set Pressures, Orifice Sizes l

160 and Steam Flows j

4.7-2 Auxiliary Feedwater _P_ugt System I

161 4.1-3 i

Auxiliary Feedwater SuDDlv System 1618 i

4 08271 List of Tables (Continued) 0386A ix r

I i

4

?

Table tant 4.8-1 Centrifugal Charging Pump System 185 4.8-2 Safety Injection Pump System

~

186 4.8-3 Residual Heat Removal Pump System 187

4. 8 -4 Accumulator Tanks i

i 188

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4.8-5 Component Cooling Pump System

_189 f

4.8-6 Service Water Pump System i

190 i

4.8-7 Hydrogen Control System 192

~

4.8.9-1 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements 192b j

4.9.

Isolation Seal Wat.er System I

203 4.9-2 Penetration Pressurization System 204 4.11-1 i

Radioactive Liquid Effluent Sampling and Analysis l

227 Surveillance i

4.11-2 i

Radioactive Ligt.id Ef fluent Monitoring Instrumentation surveillance 228b i

4.12-1 Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Sampling and Analysis Program 238

}

4.12-2 Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 240 i

Surveillance 4,

i 4.14-1 l

Plant Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance 253 4.15-1 4160-Volt Engineered Safeguard Bus Main, Reserve, and 270 Standby Feeds j

4.16-1 Maximum Values for the Lower Limits of Detection (LLD) 280 1

List of Tables (Continued) 0827t 0386A i

8

~

_ ~

1-Table P,a!Le -

4.17-1 Charcoal Filters 284

.4.17-2 HEPA Filters i

285 4.19-1

.FalJed Fuel Monitoring Instruments I

295 4.21-1 Fire Protection Instruments

.295p 4.21-2 Fire Suppression Water' System 295r i

4.21-3 Sprinkler Systems 295s 4.21-4 CO2 Systems 295t'

]

4.2: 5 Fire Hose Stations 295u 6.6-1 Special Reports 323 6.8-1 4

Boundary Doors for Flood Conditions 3

328 4

I I

I' ll

)

List of Tables.(Continued) i 0827t 1

0386A XI

A.

The containment isolation valves 1:e specified in Tables 3.9-3a, 3.9-3b, A.

The containment isolation valves 3.9-3c, and 3,.9-3d* shall be OPERA 8LE.

specified in Tables 3.9-3a, 3.9-3b, 3.9-3c and 3.9-31 shall be demonstrated APPLICA8ILITY:

Modes 1, 2, 3.-4 and 7 OPERA 8LE:

i ACTIDh.

With one or more of the isolation valves 1.

Prior.to returning the valve to specified in Tables 3.9-3a, 3.9-3b, 3.9-3c service af ter maintenance, repair.

and 3.9-3d* inoperable, maintain at least one or replacement work is performed on valve OPERA 8tE in each affected penetration the valve or its associated j

that is open and either:

actuator, control or power circuit, by performance of a cycling test.

i Restore the inoperable valve (s) to a.

' At least once per 18 months by:

2.

OPERA 8LE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or a.

Verifying that on a Phase A b.

Isolate each affected penetration within i

4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one containment isolation test deactivated automatic valve secured in signal, each Phase A isolation the isolation position, or valve actuates to its isolation position.

c.

Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one closed b.

Verifying that on a Phase 8 4

manual valve or blind flange, or containment isolation test signal, each Phase 8 isolation d.

Se in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the valve actuates to its next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within isolation position.

2 the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

c.

Verifying that upon a i

containment vent isolation i

signal,'each containment vent

  • Those valves identified with a & are valve actuates to its considered to be dual function valves (ECCS isolation position.

or ESF/ Containment Isolation). For the purposes of this specification they are considered to be OPERABLE if they are capable of being manually or locally closed.

0827t/0829t 0386A/0376A 199a

LIMITING CON 01110N FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.9.3 4.9.3.A.2 (Continued) d.-

Verifying the closing time of each power-operated valve.

listed on Table 3.9-3a and 3.9-3b is equal to or less than 60 seconds, except for those valves noted as otherwise.

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0827t/0829t 199b 0386A/0376A

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.9.4 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES & BYPASSES 4.9.4.

MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES & BYPASSES A.

The Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)

A.

Surveillance and testing of the Main specified in Table 3.9-4 shall be OPERABLE.

Steam Isolation Yalves shall be i

performed as follows:

B.

The Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass Valves specified in Table 3.9-4 shall be

' Test Frequency OPERABLE or closed.*

1.

Partial valve Monthly closure (3-1/2 APPLICABILITY: Mode 1, 2, 3, and 7 inch minimum)

ACTION:

2.

Full valve closure Refueling (5 sec. maximum) outage MODE 1:

B.

Surv'elllance and testing of the Main With one MSIV inoperable but open, POWER DPERATION may continue provided the Steam Isolation Valve Bypass Valves will inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE be perforned as follows:

status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; otherwise be in MODE 2 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 3 within Test Frequency the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

1.

Full valve closure Quarterly MODES 2, 3 and 7:

With one MSIV inoperable, subsequent operation in MODES 2, 3 or 7 may proceed provided:

a)

The isolation valve is maintained closed. Otherwise, be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

b)

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

t' 0

If a bypass valve is inoperable, it will be left closed and testing is not required.

0827t/08291 200 0386A/0376A

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.9.5.

CONTAINNENT INTEGRITY 4.9.5.

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY A.

The CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall not be A.

Not Applicable violated whenever a nuclear core is installed in the reactor unless the reactor is in the COLD SHUTDOWN condition and the shutdown i

margin is > 1% Ak/k.

l 8.

The CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall not be B.

Not Applicable violated when the reactor vessel head is removed unless the reactor is in the COLD j

SHUTDOWN condition and the shutdown margin is

> 10% Ak/k.

C.

Positive reactivity changes shall not be made C.

Not Applicable i

by rod drive motion when the CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is not intact except for rod drop tests and rod disconnecting and reconnecting.

i provided the reactor is initially subcritical by at least 10% Ak/k.

f D.

Positive reactivity changes shall not be made i

D.

Not Applicable by boron dilution when the CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is not intact unless the reactor is maintained subcritical by at least 10% ak/k.

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Ij 0827t/0829t 0386A/0376A 201-

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COMPONENT NAME COMPONENT NUMBER i

Isolation valve Seal IWOO1 Water Tank Isolation Valve Seal IWO31-1/2"-ER Water Header #1 1

Ipolation Valve Seal IWO64-3/4"-X1N i

Water Header #2 Isolation Valve Seal IWO11-3/4"-AAR Water Header #3 Isolation Valve Seal

'IWO63-1/2"-EN j

Water Header #4 Isolation Valve Seal IWO13-3/4"X-1R

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Water Header #5 j

t Seal Water Header #1 IWO192 i

Isolation Valve i

Seal Water Header #2 IWO194 i

1, Isolation valve Seal Water Header #3 IWO190 Isolation Valve Seal Water Header #4 IWO193 j

isolation valve l

i Seal Water Header #5 IWO191 j

isolation Valve ISOLATION SEAL WA1ER SYSTEM-TABLE 4.9-1 i

0827t 0386A 203 i

COMPONENT NAME-COMPONENT NUM8ER Penetration Pressurization 1PP001-#1 Air Compressor #1 Penetration Pressurization OPP 001-#0 Air Compressor #0 i

Penetration Pressurization 2PP001-#2 Air Compressor #2 d

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Penetration Pressurization System TABLE 4.9-2 08271 0386A 204

s, VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION A0V-BD0001 Blowdown from Steam Generator B I

ADV BD0002 Blowdown from Steam Generator B ADV-BD0003 Blowdown from Steam Generator D A0V-BD0004 Blowdown from Steam Generator D A0V-BD0005 Blowdown from Steam Generator C A0V-BD0006 Blowdown from Steam Generator C A0V-800007 Blowdown f rom Steam Generator A i

ADV-BD0008 Blowdown from Steam Generator A FCV-BD17 Common Steam Generator Blowdown Line A0V-CC9437 Cooling Water Return from Excess Letdown Hx A0V-DT9157 Nitrogen.to Reactor Coolant Drain' Tank *-

A0V-DT9159A & B Reactor Coolant Drain Tank to Gas Analyzer l

A0V-DT9160A & B Reactor Coolant Drain Tank to Waste Gas A0V-DT9110 &

i LCV-DT1003 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Pump Discharges t

FCV-FP08 Fire Protection to Containment i

FCV-1A01A & B Instrument Air Supply to Containment *-

FCV-PR19A & B Reactor Vessel Leak Detection Sample FCV-PR20A & B Reactor Vessel Leak Detection Sample FCV-PR21A & B Reactor Vessel Leak Detection Sample j

FCV-PR22A & B Reactor Vessel Leak Detection Sample FCV-PR23A & B Reactor Vessel Leak Detection Sample FCV-PR24A & B Containment Air Particulate & Gas Monitor Inlet

  • SOV-PR25A Containment Air Sample
  • SOV-PR26A Containment Air Sample
  • i SOV-PR258 Containment Air Sample
  • i SOV-PR26B Containment Air Sample
  • j SOV-PR250 Containment Air Sample
  • j SOV-PR26C Containment Air Sample
  • j SOV-PR25D Containment Air Sample
  • SOV-PR26D

' Containment Air Sample *-

Indicates that Type C Local Leak kate Testing is required.

TABLE 3.9,3a CONTAINNENT ISOLATION VALVES i

PHASE "A" j

0827t 05 j

0386A i.

v VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION A0V-RC8025 & RC8026.

A0v-RC8028 & RC8029 Pressurizer Relief Tank to Gas Analyzer Primary Water to Pressurizer Relief Tank A0V-RC8033 Nitrogen to Pressurizer Relief Tank

A0V-RV0003 & RV0004 Containment Purge Exhaust *#

'A0V-RV0005 & RV0006 Containment Vent Isolation #

FCV-RV111 & RV112 Heating Water Supply to Containment FCV-RVll3 & RV114 Heating Water Return from Containment FCV-SA01A & B Service Air Supply to Containment A0V-518880 Nitrogen to Accumulators

FCV-SSO4 Steam Generator Blowdown Sample FCV-SSOS Steam Generator Blowdown Sample A0V-SS9354A & B Pressurizer Steam Sample A0V-SS9355A & B Pressurizer Liquid Sample' i

A0V-SS9356A & B Reactor Coolant Hot. Leg' Sample.

i A0V-SS9357A & 8 Accumulator Sample -

MOV-VC8100 RCP Seal Water Return 2

MOV-VC8105 & VC8106 Charging to Regenerative Heat Exchanger A0V-VC8152 & VC8153 I

Letdown from Regenerative Heat Exchanger FCV-VN02A & 8 FCV-VF01A & B Aux. FW Pump Steamline Drain f rom Containment i

Hydrogen Recombiner Return to Containment FCV-WD17A & B Discharge from Containment Sump Pumps l

i Indicates that Type C Local Leak Rate Testing is required.

Indicates a required valve closing time of less than 7 seconds.

I s

i i

TABLE 3.9-3a l

CONIAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 4'

PHASE "A" (Continued) 0827t 0386A 205a l

i

VALVE NUM8ER FUNCTION MOV-CC9413A & 8 Cooling Water Supply to RCPs MOV-CC9414 Cooling Water Return From RCP 011 Coolers MOV-CC9438 & CC685 Cooling Water Return From RCP Thermal Barriers j

i l

5 i

4 i

i 1

i TABLE 3.9-3b

. CONTAINMENT' ISOLATION VALVES PHASE

'8" 08271 206 0386A i

i VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION BD-0009 Blowdown From Steam Generator B-j BD-0010 Blowdown From Steam Generator B BD-00ll Blowdown From Steam Generator D BD-0012 i

Blowdown From Steam Generator D 8D-0013 Blowdown From Steam Generator C-BD-0014 4

Blowdown From Steam Generator C BD-0015 Blowdown From Steam Generator A-BD-0016 Blowdowa From Steam Generator A CC-94B6 Cooling Water Supply to RCPs (Check)

CC-9500 Cooling Water Supply to Excess Ltd. Hx (Check)

CS-0005 Containment Spray Header Isolation (Check)*

CS-0009 Containment Spray Header Isolation (Check)*

CS-0013 Containment Spray Header' Isolation (Check)*.

CS-0037 Containment Spray Pump A Recirc*

i CS-0038 Containment Spray. Header Drain

CS-0041 Containment Spray Header Drain

CS-0044 Containment Spray Header Drain

  • CS-0052 Containment Pressure Sensor Isolation CS-0053 Containment Pressure Sensor Isolation CS-0054 Containment Pressure Sensor Isolation CS-0055 Containment Pressure Sensor Isolation j

CS-0056 Containment Pressure Sensor Isolation CS-0057 Containment Pressure Sensor Isolation j

CS-005B Containment Pressure Sensor Isolation i

CS-0059 Containment Pressure Sensor Isolation

~

i DW-0030 Demineralized Flushing Water to Containment DW-0038 Demineralized Flushing Water to Containment Nitrogen to Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (Check)*

O i

DT-9158 e

Indicates that Type C Local Leak Rate Testing is required.

IABLE 3.9-3c.

CONIAINMENT ISOLA 110N VALVES i

MANUALLY OPERATED

!08?71 207

!n, ann

VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION 9'

PP-0101 Penetration Pressurization Header Isolation PP-0102 Penetration Pressurization Header Isolation PP-0103 Penetration Pressurization Header Isolation PP-0104 Penetration Pressurization Header Isolation PR-0029 Containment Air Sample Return (Check)*

PR-0030 Containmen Air Sample Return

  • j RC-0002 Pressurizer Dead Weight Calibrator RC-8045 Nitrogen to Pressurizer Relief Tank
  • RC-8019 Relief Valve Header to Pressurizer Relief Tank (Check) i SF-0010 OSF-001'l(Ul)

Purification Pump to Refueling Cavity Refueling Cavity to Purification Pump OSF-0012(U2)

Refueling Cavity to Purification Pump SF-8767 Refueling Cavity to Purification Pump SF-8787 a

Purification kump to Refueling Cavity 2St-0003(U2)

SIS Test Line Grab Sample Stop 1PI-933 Root Valve (U1)

Root Valve (Ul) SIS Test Line Press. Inst. Root 51-8933 Nitrogen to Accumulators (Check)

SI-8957A & B Residpal Heat Loop Return (Checks) l SI-8961 Accumulator Test.Line Isolation SI-9032 BIT Cold Leg Injection (Check)

VC-8224 Reactor Coolant Loop Fill Header (Check)

VC-8246 Charging to Regenerative Heat Exchanger (Check)

VC-8369A RCP Seal Water Supply VC-8372A RCP Seal Water Supply VC-83698 RCP Seal Water Supply VC-83728 RCP Seal Water Supply VC-8369C 1

RCP Seal Water Supply l

VC-8372C RCP Seal Water Supply

}

VC-83690 RCP Seal Water Supply l

VC-8372D RCP Seal Water Supply

}

VC-8368A RCP Seal Water Supply.(Check) i VC-83688 RCP Seal Water Supply (Check) l VC-8368C RCP Seal Water Supply (Check).

i VC-8368D RCP Seal Water Supply.(Check)

VC-8480A'&.8 Reactor Coolant Loop Fill Header Indicates that Type C Local Leak Rate Testing is required.

i TABLE 3.9-3c CONTAINNEN7 ISOLATION VALVES i

MANUALLY OPERATED (Continued)-

0827t 201a 0386A

-- - - - - - - ~ ~ - ~

~ - ~

~P VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION MOV-CS0002 Containment Spray Header Isolation MOV-CS0004 Containment Spray Header Isolation MOV-CS0006 Containment Spray Header Isolation MOV-FWO0l6 Feedwater to Steam Generator 8 MOV-FW0017 Feedwater to Steam Generator C MOV-FW0018 i

Feedwater to Steam Generator A i

MOV-FW0019 Feedwater to Steam Generator D MOV-FWOOSO Aux Feed to Steam Generator B l

MOV-FWOO51 Aux Feed to Steam Generator B MOV-FWOOS2 Aux Feed to Steam Generator C MOV-FWOO53 Aux Feed to Steam Generator C

{

MOV-FWOO54

. Aux Feed to Steam Generator A MOV-FWOO55 Aux Feed to Steam Generator A

l Aux Feed to Steam Generator D MOV-FWOOS6 MOV-FW0057 Aux Feed to Steam Generator D

+MOV-MS0005 Steam to Auxiliary Feedwater Pump

+MOV-MS0006 Steam to Auxiliary Feedwater Pump

+MOV-MS0011 Steam to Auxiliary Feedwater Pump MOV-RH8701 Residual Heat Loop Outlet

+MOV-RH9000 Hot Leg Safety injection

+MOV-518801A & B' Boron Injection Tank Discharge

+MOV-SIB 802 Cold Leg Safety injection

+MOV-SIB 809A & B kesidual Heat Removal to Loops

+MOV-S19011A & B Hot Leg Safety Injection

+MOV-SW000)

Service Water to Fan Coolers

+MOV-SW0002 Service Water to Fan Coolers

+MOV-SWOOO3 Service Water to Fan Coolers

+MOV-SW0004 Service Water to Fan Coolers Indicates that Type C Local Leak Rate Testing is required.

4 8

TABLE 3.9-3d i

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES I

01HER 1

08271 0386A 207b

1 VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION

+MOV-SW0005 Service Water to Fan Coolers

+MOV-SW0006 Service Water to Fan Coolers

+MOV-SW0001 Service Water Return From Fan Coolers

+MOV-SW0008 Service Water Return'From Fan Coolers

+MOV-SW0009 Service Water Return from Fan Coolers

+MOV-SWOO10 Service Water Return from Fan Coolers i

+MOV-SWOO11 Service Water Return from Fan Cooler,s i

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TABLE 3.9-3d a

i CONIAINMENT ISOLAT!DN VALVES

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3.9 The isolation valve seal water system interposes water inside the penetrating line between two nolation po l

located outside of containment.

The water is introduced at a pressure of at least 50 psig which is slightly coolant system past the first isolation point is thus prevented by assuring i

be f rom the seal water system into the containment.

l The system includes one 160 gallon seal water tank for each unit which is capable of supplying the total I

requirements of the system.

l with air from the Penetration Pressurization header.The tank is filled with water from the primary make-up water system of make-up water for the tank is provided by a connection to the service water system.To ensure an adequa l

nitrogen supply used to provide a backup source of pressure in the seal water tank does not require any extern The high pressure power source to maintain the required driving pressure.

4 The low limit of 10 gallons is based upon having an initial supply of water prior to make-up.

68 psig is based on a pressure of 50 psig between the isolation valves.

The low limit of 4

l in the control room.

Low tank level and pressure are alarmed i

The function of the containment penetration and weld channe'- pressurization system is to prevent leakage of containment air through penetrations and liner welds under all conditions by supplying air above the containment post accident pressure to the positive pressure zones incorporated in the penetration and weld channel design i

Flow sensing devices are connected to each quadrant header of a pressurization system and to the main header Pressure sensors are also connected to each quadrant header.

Flow is recorded from each quadrant and the main l

header, and is elarmed in the control room.

Low pressure is also alarmed. A leak would be expected to build up slowly and would therefore be noted before leakage became excessive. (2)

}

l In the unlikely event of a loss of coolant accident the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the j

environment by the use of isolation valves and other barriers for all pipelines which penetrate the containment unless such lines are required for service during the accident.

pouvided with two barriers so that no single failure will prevent isolation.All lines for which isolation is required are l

Automatic isolation is initiated by a safety injection signal.No manual operation is required for immediate isolation.

(3)

In lines where two automatic isolation valves are required, each valve operator will be actuated by an independant signal.

Each valve operator is also supplied from a separate emergency supply. (3) i 08271 209 i

The main steam isolation valves serve to limit'an excessive Reactor Coolant System cooldown rate and resu reactivity insertion following a main steam line break accident.

i

.Their ability to close fully shall be verified at each refueling outage.

A closure. time of 5 sec. was selected since this is the closure time assumed in th safety evaluation.

(4)

The partial valve stroke test will take place to verify the freedom of the valve disc to function as required.

and slamming the valve shut during in-service testing.A limit switch in the test circuit prevents the valve dis I

6 The main steam bypass valves and lines are sized so that the reactor will. remain subcritical af ter reac for a spurious opening of a bypass valve or a double-ended rupture of a. bypass line. (4) 1 Containment integrity requirements are based on reactor coolant system conditions.

steam will be formed and hence there would be no pressure huildup in the containment if the reactor coolant, cold sh system ruptures.

I i

The shutdown conditions of a reactor are selected based on the type of activities that are being carried out When a reactor head is not to be removed, the specified cold shutdown margin of 15 AK/K precludes critic I

under any occurrence. During refueling a reactor is subcritical by 10% AK/K.

)

This precludes criticality under any circumstances even though fuel is being moved or control rods withdrawn.

motion from an initial 10% AK/K subcritical reactor condition precludes criticality because the reactor wouldPositive j

be substantially subcriticali even if all control rods were completely withdrawn.

boron dilution may be required or small fluctuations may occur during preparation for, recovery fromPositive reactivi refueling, but maintaining the rector subcritical by at least 10% AK/K precludes criticality under any

, or during circumstances.

(5) t l

(1)

FSAR Section 6.6.5 (2) FSAR Section 6.6.6 (3) FSAR Section 6.6.1 (4) FSAR Section 14.2.5 (5) FSAR Table 3.2.1-1 l

1 I

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08271 210 i

g,.

' Basis:

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4.9 during normal operation; abnormal condition within the systems are alarmed in th 3

conditions within the systems are checked monthly to determine long-term The limiting headers are pressure checked following maintena.nce to ensure system integrity.

Periodic testing of containment isolation valves assures their continued operability.

channel checks result in increased reliability.

More frequent instrument In addition, valve movement is timed to ensure proper closure times.

The main steam isolation valves are functionally tested on a more frequent interval to establish freedom of movement of the valve disc.

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j 08271 211 l

. ~.

r ATTACMpWNT 2 DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED CHANGES Pages lii, viii, ix, x, xi These pages update the Table of Contents and List of Tables.

Pages 199a, 199b These pages-update the existing guidance of the Zion Technical Specifications regarding_ containment isolation valves. The proposed guidance is consistent with that contained in the Standard Technical Specification NUREG-0452, Rev. 4.

Page 200 This page updates guidance regarding main steam isolation valves

-with guidance consistent with the standard Technical Specifications as discussed above.

Page 201 This page capitalizes the defined term, CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, as discussed in Section 1.0 of-the Technical Specifications.

In addition, this page deletes the guidance that was previously contained in Section 3.9.4.C.

This section provided for the option of 3-loop operation following the failure of an MSIV. Section-2.C.4 of theLZion Composite License prohibits operation with less than 4 reactor coolant loops above P-7 (approximately 10%

reactor power). Thus, the guidance previously contained in Section 3.9.4.C conflicted with this license requirement.

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Page 202 This page is blank due to repagination.

l Page 203 This page involves a correction of a minor error and incorporates a revised format.

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. 1 Page 204 This page has no substantive changes.

It merely incorporates a revised format.

Pages 205, 205a, 206, 207, 207a, 207b, 207c, 208 These pages contain revised and expanded' lists of Zion Station's containment isolation valves. These tables are divided into Phase A, B, manually operated and "other" containment isolation valves.

Page 208 This table explicitly defines the main steam isolation valves and their bypasses.

Pages 209, 210, 211

-These pages provide the revised bases for the proposed changes discussed above.

I l-l l

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v ATTAC15ENT 3 EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION PROPOSED CHANGES TO ZION TECHNICAL

-SPECIFICATION APPENDIX A - SECTIONS 3.9 and 4.9 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEMS DESCNIPTICN OF AMENDMENT REQUEST An amendment to the Zion Facility Operating License is proposed to

-expand the containment isolation valve list, correct minor errors, and incorporate the guidance of NUREG-0452, Rev'. 4.

BACKGROUND f

10 CPR 50.92 states that a proposed amendment will involve a no significant hazards consideration if the proposed amendment does not:

(1) -Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or i

(3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

In addition, the Commission has provided guidance in the practical i

application of these criteria by publishing eight examples in 48 FR 14870.

I-The discussion below addresses each of these three criteria and demonstrates that the proposed amendment involves a no significant hazards consideration.

BASIS-POR NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Does the proposed amendment l

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

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2-F DISCUSSION - ITEM #1 An amendment to the Zion Facility Operating License is proposed to update.the listing of the containment isolation valves for Zion Station and to correct minor ~ errors within Sections 3.9 and 4.9.

This proposed change does not affect the operation of Zion Station's containment isolation systems. The expansion and updating of the containment isolation valve list for Zion Station will allow for better administrative control over this system.

The incorporation of the guidance contained in the Standard Technical Specification NUREG-0452, Rev. 4, provides needed clarification and guidance to Section 3.9 and 4.9 of the Zion Technical Specifications.

The formalization of the prescribed actions and allotted time periods constitute revised and clarified constraints on the operation of Zion

^

Station.

Since the improvement in the Zion Technical Specifications described above has no effect on the physical operation of the containment isolation system, this proposed amendment has no effect on any accident that has been previously evaluated.

In addition, this proposed change has no effect on 1.

any other Zion system or structure. Therefore this proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability of or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

DISCUSSION #2 The clarification of the requirements of Sections 3.9 and 4.9, the-incorporation of the guidance contained in NUREG-0452, Rev. 4, and the expansion of the containment isolation valve list has no effect on any.of Zion's systems or structures. There will be no change in the normal operation of Zion's containment isolation systems. Thus, there can be no potential for any previously unanalyzed malfunction or component failure.

L The containment' isolation system is intended to contain any postulated release of radioactivity from the reactor coolant system within the containment structure. Thus, the containment isolation systems performance is essential during any postulated accident sequence that may involve.the release of radioactive material to the containment environs.

The analyses for these accidents contained in Zion's FEAR have been i

i reviewed. Based on.the lack of system interaction discussed above, the proposed amendment of the Zion Technical Specifications will not affect any of these preexisting accident sequences.

I Thus this proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a

. new or different kind of accident from those previously evaluated.

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, W DISCUSSION #3 The incorporation of the guidance contained in NUREG-0452, Rev. 4, and the_ expansion of the containment isolation valve list.will not affect the. safety function the containment isolation system. The containaent isolation system will remain continuously available to perform the intended safety function.

Since the containment isolation system's ability to affectively contain any postulated release of radioactivity inside of the Zion contain-ment structure will be unaltered by this proposed change, there will be no change in the margin of safety.

This proposed change involves the expansion of the containment isolation valve list, the expansion and clarification of the prescribed actions, the correction of minor errors, and the deletion of conflicting requirements. Thus, examples (1) and (ii) are applicable in this instance.

Examples (i) and (ii) read as follows:

' (1). A purely administrative change to Technical Specifications:

for example, a change to achieve consistency throughout the Technical Specification, correction of an error, or a change in nomenclature.

(ii) A change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or control not presently included in.the Technical Specification:

for example, a more stringent surveillance requirement.

Therefore, since the application for amendment satisfies the

~

criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.92 and is similar to examples for which no significant hazards consideration exists, Commonwealth Edison Company has i

made a determination that the application involves no significant hazards consideration.

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