ML20059H581
| ML20059H581 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/19/1994 |
| From: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059H580 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9401280144 | |
| Download: ML20059H581 (25) | |
Text
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ATTACIIMENT
- ZION NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION MARKED UP COPY OF CURRENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR PROPOSED CHANGES TO APPENDIX A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-39 AND DPR-48 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST 93-09 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE-
.FOR CRITICALITY
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LIST OF FIG RES EAga F1gure -
15 1.1-la Safety Limits, Four Loop Operation, Units 1 and 2 15A 1.1-Ib Safety Llalts, Four Loop Operation.. Unit 2 16D i-2.1-2 Flun Olfference vs. Percent Flum Offrerence 3.2-1 Spled $5tf:i trt! vs.'S :W Cr!=t 56 p
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63 3.2-8 R<d Cluster Groups 1:
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v1 Amendment Nos. ?") : f ???
-- ---- A
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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT B. k Hot Shutdown B. Hot Shutdown The shutdown margin shall be greater Baron concentration in the reactor coolant than or equal to 1.3% AK/K whenever loops and pressurizer and control rod Tavg is greater than 200"F.
positions shall be used to verify shutdown 0.2*'
lict Shutdec.
margin upon achieving hot shutdown and at least once a shift while remaining in this condition. During heatup, the boron A reacter sha!' be subcr4tical by an
-~ ant greater than er equal to the concentration in the reactor coolant loops and pressurizer shall be sampled every 4
=rgir specified in Figurc 2.21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br />. The reactor coolant loop boron
.Aenever Tavg is greater than 200 F concentration must not decrease by more than 50 ppm between successive 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> samples.
The pressurizer boron concentration must not be more than 200 ppm les coolant loop boron concen.s than the reactor tration.
Applicabic to Unit 1.
Applicable to U-it 2 at startup frc refueling cutage Z2R12.
Not applicabic to Unit 1.
?pplicable to Unit 2 until startup frc refueling cutage 22R12.
Move Sections Move Sec-tions
- 3. 7. l. C. l 4RlCI
- 3. 2. i. c. l a.
HatCI" to here_
+o hece-39A Amendment Nos.--120 and 100
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT C. Unit Startup C. Startup 1.k Imediately prior to startup, the 1.8 The Tavg boron concentration. rod position
~
reactor core conditions at which the and burnup as required to satisfy 4.2.1.c.1.a moderator temperature coefficient is shall be logged before attempting to bring a always more negative than 3.2.1.C.1.a reactor critical.
shall be established (except during low power physics tests).
1.ak The moderator temperature coefficient 1.akPrior to initial operation above 5% of Rated (MTC) shall be more negative than +7 Thermal Power. the HTC shall be determined to pcm/*F for all rods withdrawn for power be within its limits during each fuel cycle levels up to 70% Rated Thermal Power as follows:
with a linear ramp to O pcm/*F at 100%
Rated Thermal Power.
The HTC shall be measured and compared to the BOL limit of Specification 3.2.1.C.1.a after 1.bf With the'MTC more positive than the each fuel loading.
limit specifled in Spectf1 cation f
3.2.1.C.1.a. control rod withdrawal we -gese 3 gem %
limits over core life shall be established and maintained sufficient to P,,,,wos P3e( 39M as restore the HTC to within the limit.
I"dic.ted on P*ou5 Me..
These withdrawal limits shall be in addition to the insertion limits of Specification 3.2.1.C.3.
2.; " ! = diately price te startup. the 2.
The Tavg of each reactor coolant loop shall cacter cociant te perature shall be be logged before attempting to bring a c h e te b^ greater than t'e t m rature reactor critical.
above which the ederator t-perature coefficient 1: Ch:
during lex pc=r p"y: neg;the (except ysics tetts) ne A
- 2. 7 Immediately prior to startup, the resert A from Go% sing R.
reactor coolant temperature shall be Sheet under 3.2.1.c. 2.a..
shown to be greater than 500 Fr oc equal.
to 530'F.
4 g
Applicabic to Unit 1.
'pplicabic to Unit 2 at startup f c; refacling cutagc ZcT12.
^
" Nul applic6ble te Unit 1.
/vplic6ble tG Unit 2 until startup fica, refuelir.g cutagc Z2R12.
40 Amendment Nos. 13^ ; M 120
~
INSERT A 2.b Each reactor coolant system loop temperature (Tavg) shall be greater than or equal to 530' F.
APPLICABILITY:
MODbS2,7 ACTION:
With a reactor coolant system temperature (Tavg) less than 530* F, restore Tavg to within its Limit within 15 minutes or be in Mode 3 within the next 15 minutes.
1 4
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.2.1.C.3 When a reactor is approaching criticality.
4.2.1.C.3 Not Applicable.
the shutdown banks shall be fully withdrawn (per the insertion limits specifled in the COLR) in sequence (shutdown bank A.B.C.D) before any other rods are withdrawn. The control group rods shall be no further inserted than the limits specified in the COLR.
3.2.1.0 Power Operation 4.2.1.0 Power Operation 1.
When a reactor is critical, except for physics tests and control rod exercises.
- 1. Rod operation shall be verified by partial the shutdown rods shall be fully withdrawn (aer the insertion limits s movement of all rods every two weeks. Rods-COLR) and the control grou)pecified in the which have been exercised within the past two--
rods shall be no further inserted than t1e limits weeks during nonnal operation need not be verified. Control rod bank positions with specified in the COLR.
respect to its insertion limit as specified in
-2'.aI. Control bank-insertion may be further the COLR shall be verified once per shift.
restricted if the measured control rod worth of all rods. less the worth of the
- 2. Control rod bank worths shall be measured most reactive rod (worst case stuck rod).
following each refueling outage.
is less than the reactivity required to provide the design value of available shutdown margin of greater than or equal to 1.3% Ak/k.
2.5" Centrol beak inscrtica.T.;y bc furthcr
=tricted if th: =0:ured cc-trel cd aorth of all red;. Ic : the =-th cf ik
.T.est rc;ctive red n;;r;t c;;c stuck red).
is le:: than tk reactivity rcqui cd te p Ovid the design value of available chutd.= :: dc m in Figurc 3.2 1.
tyyliceble te Unit 1.
I,pplicebic tc Unit 2 at startup froa rcfueling cutage 22R12.
^^ 10t.eypliceble te Unit 1.
Ivpliceble te Unit 2 entil stortup frua, ref-elir.g cotosc Z2R12.
41 f.xr t at Nos. = :nd =
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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION.
SURVEILLANCE REQJIREMENT.
3.2.1.D.3kDuring physics tests and control rod
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4.2.1.D.3 Not Applicable.
. exercises, the insertion limits need not be observed..but the shutdown margin of'
' greater than or equal to 1.3% Ak/k must be observed except during the low power physics test-to determine total control rod worth and shutdown margin. For this
" test the reactor may be critical with all full length control' rods fully inserted. except for the predicted most reactive rod.'
M. AA FL. - _
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Amendment Nos.12 :nd 120
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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.2.1 4.2.1.
E.
Rod Bank Assignment E. Rod Bank Assignment Rod Bank Assignment shall be as Rod Bank Assignment shall be verified after delineated in Figure 3.2-8.
Except during physics tests. the sequence of each refueling outage, for the refueled unit.
withdrawal of the control banks. when going from zero to 100% power, is A. B.
C. D with control bank overlap.
F.
Boric Acid System (per unit)
F.
Boric Acid System (per unit)
One Boric Acid System shall be OPERABLE 1.
The Boric Acid System shall be per unit. The Boric Acid System shall consist of ^ 0 cf either of the demonstrated OPERABLE:
following c^-" yeti ^ar:
a.
At least once per 7 days by:
1.
A 12t Scric Acid Syste cc cisting
- 1. Verifying boric acid tank volume, cf.
0.
At le;;t
.c boric acid
- 2. Verifying the concentration of storage t=k cc-tai-i g at the boric acid solution, and least 5140 gallcas of 11.5%
to 13% by might bcric Ocid
- 3. Verifying the boric acid tank Ocluti= at a te per:ture of solution temperature -and f
- t least its dcgr:c;
- 4. "crify! g ik proper Operatica of fahr =heit. 3rd the hc;t tracing syst=.
- cciated !cca! 01 = Ord c=trcl rec =~=ciatcr. 31; Insert 6 kom folloung curveill: ce is not pplic:b!c to page (pay 43) +o 'here.
the 3.it Scric Acid Syst=.
Ensert C. From following page (pase 43') to her e.-
42 Amendment Nos. 125 and 115
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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.2.1.F. 1.
b.
f,t lent =0 0"E"^ ate bcric acid tr= fer pu p. and
- b. At least once per 92 days the boric acid.
transfer pumps shall be functionally _ tested.
nS& c. : Reinte % r*c=w t*Y C '*')
- s ' Wiceted 2,
reser+ b from fol%;ny c.
?t !c=t =c cha-c! cf M:t tracing p3e 43a. +o b e,c, ch P M ^^crati g :-d tM re aini g ch= cl ch511 M OPER^ ELE = t lent =c f1= pats 'r^- tk Mric acid ster:ge t -t te the cb gi g pu p sucti=.
2.
^ 3.it Scric ^cid Sy:t-c=:icti g ef:
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At least one boric acid storage tank 1.
containing at least 20.400 gallons of 3.2% to 3.8% by weight boric acid solution at a temperature of at least 60 degrees fahrenheit.
A At least one OPERABLE boric acid 2-transfer pump, and if,
At.least one associated flow path 3.
from the boric acid storage tank to the suction of the-charging pumps.
xnw+8s.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1.2.3.4.and7.gyf*,,+',f;Z
-. 4 3 -
. Amendment Nos. 126 and 115 i=
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e LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT ACTION:
A
- 5. 'for thc 12* "cric Acid Sy;te only; ::ith c c channel of the heat tracing syste-incperable.
c;tcre the syste-tc CPE"ABLE statu:.:ithin 7 days or be in at leas!."00E 3 berated to the cold shutde,en boren cc cc-tration tithi-the next 5 Inse,+ b on hn"rc: rettere tb-? Beric, a^cid Syste-to 0"E"J"ulE
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_x u.m.nne e Previous Pa3e
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wRMn next 20 Scurs.
E P*S* " 3}
f as indica +ed Jp With the Boric Acid System otherwise inoperable, wovs restore the system to OPERABLE status within 72 on ge hours or be in at least MODE 3 borated to the f.3 e cold shutdown boron concentration within the next 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />s: restore the Boric Acid System to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in H0DE 5 within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
^ l;e,st tracir.; ;y;tc= action; arc act applicable te m.u..,a,
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Amendment Nos. 125 = d 115
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_. - m LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.2.2.8 3.
If an indicated quadrant power tilt 4.2.2.B
- 3. Not Applicable exceeds 1.09. except for physics testing. the reactor shall-be put in the Hot Shutdown Condition: however, operation below 50% of rated power.
for testing and/or correcting the tilt shall be permitted.
C. Instrumentation (per unit) 1.
Excore axial imbalance detector system a.
The excore axial imbalance detector
- 1. Excore axial imbalance detector system system shall be recalibrated at least every three' effective full
- a. Not Applicable power months.
hecalibrationshall-bechecked each effective full power month using the INCORE SYSTEM and recalibrated if the difference is >
3%.
"Thc calibraticr. Chall bc chccked coch cffccti';c full w r =cr.th u51rjtheINCORCSYSTEtier,d reca.ibrated if the differe ce is 4:.*.
The minimum requirements per flux.
map used for the recalibration are:
1.
At least 16 different thimble traces, and 2.
At least 2 different thimble traces. per quadrant.
^
4.plicabic to Wit 1.
fp Net epplicablc to Wit 1.plic;ble t Wit 2 at :tortup freo rcfuclir.g cut;;; 22"12.
^^
?pplicable 1: Wit 2 ur;til tartup fra; rcfuclir; out;;c Z2n12.
49 Anendment Nos. 1 5 xd
. ~ -.,
^
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPiRATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.2.3.D.1 2.
If the conditions of Section 4.2.3.D.1.a shall be checked indirectly by 3.2.3.0.1 cannot be met the excore detectors and/or reactor shall be brought to at least the Hot Shutdown condition thermocouples and/or moveable incore within four hours and the detectors over shift: or after any reactor trip breakers shall rod motion of the non-indication remain open.
rod, exceeding 12 steps, whichever occurs first.
b.
During operation below 50% of rated 4.
DNB Parameters power, no special monitoring is A.
The following DNB related parameters required.
shall be maintained within the limits shown during operation.
4.A.1. Each of the parameters listed in Specification 3.2.4. A shall be verified 1.
Reactor Coolant System Tavg to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
--*- FOUR LOOP: s 567.7'F
" TOUR LOO".
- SCG.3*r 2.
Pressurizer Pressure
- 2. The Reactor Coolant System total flow 2210 ps rate shall be determined to be within
-^- FOUR LOOP: (2195 psig) p its limit by measurement at least once
=
per 18 months.
"E
' E d P3!i.u_,, m reeva pa 3.
Reactor Coolant System Total Flow Rate
-+-- FOUR LOOP: = 362.300 GPH#
TOUR LG0". t 350.000 0".
B.
With any of the above parameters exceeding its limit. restore the parameter to within its limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or reduce thermal power to less than 5% of rated thermal power within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
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.sy p increase in excess o,f l
l Includes a 3.5% flow measurement uncertainty. step increase in excess of 10% rated thermal p 55 Amendment Nos.
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1700 1400 1MO m
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BURbli COCCKlhATIO!! (PM
-4 g.
2 REQUIRED SHUTDOMM MARGIN bels+e.
Unlt 2 Figure.
3.2 - 1 Vs l
I REACTOR COOLAMT 80RON CONCENTRATION l
Figure 3.2-l**
- Applicable to Unit 2 until startup from refueling outage 72R12.
Amendment Mos.~,.m
- m. -
m 56
'=
Basesk 3.2 The reactivity control concept is that reactivity When control rods are inserted. the temperature at which changes accompanying changes in reactor power are the moderator coefficient becomes negative is lower.
4.2 compensated by control rod motion. Reactivity Therefore, with the operational control rod program. the changes associated with xenon samarium, fuel coefficient is expected ?.o be less than the limit of depletion, and large changes in reactor coolant 3.2.1.C.1.a.
temperature (operating tem)erature to cold shutdown) are compensated )y changes in the The recuirement that a reactor is not made critical when soluble baron concentration. During power operation, the shutdown groups are fully withdrawn the mocerator coefficient is more positive than the (per the insertion limits specified in the COLR) limit of 3.2.1.C.1.a has been imposed to prevent any and control of reactor power is by the control unexpected power excursion during normal operations as a result of either an increase of moderator temperature or groups. A reactor trip occurring during power a decrease of coolant pressure. This requirement is operation will put the tripped reactor into the hot shutdown condition.
waived during the low power physics tests to permit the measurement of a reactor moderator coefficient and other physics design parameters of interest. During )hysics During the early part of a fuel cycle. the tests, special operating precautions will be tacen.
In moderator temperature coefficient may be slightly addition the strong negative Doppler coefficient (2)(3) positive at coolant temperai. ores in the power and the small integrated AK/K would limit the magnitude operating range.(1)(2) The moderator coefficient of a power excursion resulting from a reduction of will be most positive near the beginning of life moderator density.
of the fuel cycle, when the boron concentration in the coolant is the greatest. Later in the cycle.
the boron concentrations in the coolant will be lower and the moderator coefficient will be either less positive or will be negative. At all times, the moderator coefficient in the power operating Insect E -from rangeisr3utredtobemorenegativethanthe limit of 3.1.C.1.a.(1)(2) The limit is M o. % shut determined during the lower power physics tests here.
for that cycle at the beginning of life of any fuel cycle with all control rods withdrawn. The BOL MTC measurement combined with the predicted core burnup MTC can be used to impose administrative limits on the rod withdrawal to ensure the MTC will always be more negative than the limit of 3.2.1.C.1.a.
^
Applicable tc Wit 1.
Applicsbic to bit 2 at :;tartup fra, rciuclirs cutagc Z2R12.
64 Amendments Nos. 1 3 ;.-d 100 z
--A
e 1
1 INSERT E The requirement that the reactor not be made critical with the reactor coolant system average temperature less than 530* F ensures that: 1) The Moderator Temperature Coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, 2) The trip instrumen-tation is within its normal operating range, 3)
The pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and 4) The reactor vessel is above its minimum RTm temperature.
If Tavg of one or more RCS loops is not within the Limit, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the unit in Mode 3 within 30 minutes. Rapid reactor shutdown can be readily and practically achieved within a 30 minute period.
9
/
s Ihlif"i*
The r h ivity control concept is that reactivity 3.2 When control rods are inserted, the temperat at which changes a anying changes in reactor power are the moderator coefficient becomes negative s lower so 4.2 compensated ' control rod motion.
Reactivity that at the temperature determined durf the physics changes associ with xenon. samarium fuel tests and with the operational contr rod program.-the depletion. and la changes in reactor coolant coefficient is expected to be nega e.
temperature (operati temperature to cold shutdown) are compensa by changes in the The recuirement that a reacto is not made critical when soluble boron concentrati During power the mocerator coefficient positive has been imposed operation. the shutdown grou are fully withdrawn to prevent any unexpect power excursion during normal (per the insertion limits spec ed in the COLR) operations as a resul of either an increase of and control of reactor power is b he control moderator temperat or a decrease of coolant groups. A reactor trip occurring du g power pressure. This uirement is waived during the low operation will put the tripped reactor o the power physics sts to permit the measurement of a' hot shutdown condition.
reactor ator coefficient and other physics design paramete of interest.
During )hysics tests. special During the early part of a fuel cycle. the opera g precautions will be taten.
In addition the moderator temperature coefficient may be slightly str g negative Doppler coefficient (2)(3) and the small positive at coolant temperatures below the power egrated AK/K would limit the magnitude of a power operating range.(1)(2) The moderator coefficient at low temperatures will be most' positive at the xcursion resulting from a reduction of moderator ity.
beginning of life of Se fuel cycle, when the boron concentration in the ccolant is the greatest. Later in the cycle. the boron concentrations in the coolant will b ower and the moderator coefficient will be e er less positive or will be negative. At al imes. the moderator coefficient is negative the power o)erating range.(1)(2) The max temperature at w11ch the moderator coefficie is positive at the beginning of' life of an control rods withdrawn,y f cycle with all CNN determined during the lower power physics t s for that cycle.
bES Not a icable to Unit 1.
Applicable to Unit 2 until startup from refueling outage Z2R12.
t l
64a Amendments Nos.-I r =d 120
---r,---r
- a a
--J
Bases [
~
The control rod insertion. limits as specified in the COLR provide for achieving hot shutdown by The rod bank assignment has been chosen to meet reactor trip any time, assuming the highest worth the reactor control requirements and to minimize control rod remains fully withdrawn, with the total hot channel factor to ensure power sufficient margins to meet the assumptions used in capability being met. Relative positions of the accident analysis.
(4) In addition. they control rod banks are determined by a specified i
provide a limit on the maximum inserted rod worth control rod bank overlap. The overlap is based on i
in the unlikely event of a hypothetical rod considerations of axial power shape control.
It ejection. and provide for acceptable nuclear is not based on safety criteria. but minimizes peaking factors. The control rod insertion limits possible changes in axial flux imbalance specified in the COLR meet the shutdown accompanying control rod motion.
requirements for Unit 1 and Unit 2. respectively.
Shutdown margin requirements vary throughout core Operation with abnormal rod configurations during life as a function of fuel de low power and zero power testing is permitted concentration, and RCS Tavg. pletion. RCS boron because of the brief period of the test and The most restrictive condition occurs at EOL. with Tavg at because special precautions are taken during the test.
no load operating temperature, and is associated with a postulated steam line break accident and rer the 12! b resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldown.
In analysis approximatel{y ucight beric acid syst=.?.670 gall of this accident, a minimum shutdown margin of 1.3% delta k/k is required to control the scatien of cric acid Orc required to ect : ccid--
shutt conditten.
Rur.
-min! u Of 5.140 reactivity transient. Accordingly the shutdown margin requirement is based upon this limiting g:llent in the beric tank 1: pec t ri~f,
condition and is consistent with FSAR analysis assumptions. With Tavg less than 200*F. the In order te ensure clution solub!!ity ct the reactivity transients resulting from a postulated bcrit scid concentration in the 12t by ucight steam line break cooldown are minimal and a 1%
boric acid system, a mini um temperature of 145'F delta k/k shutdown margin provides adequate ic required.
One of the tue channels of heat tr: civic nc--Olly Operating and 10 cufficiet to protection.
ctnt in the line te perature of 145'F.
The One reactor coolant pump provides adequate flow to cc=d ch=ncl cf he:t tracing provide: backup fer centinucer ensure uniform boron concentration. therefore. two b^-^perable. plant aperatf r den cac ch=~0 ino Should bcth ch=ncl Of heat tracing pump operation provides more rapid mixing.
=^ i^cperative. : reacter car be casily The Reactor Protection System is designed to berated before beric acid precipitation actuate a reactor trip for any anticipated tc pcrature 1: reached.
combination of unit conditions to ensure a minimum departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) equal to or greater than the applicable design limit DNBR.
Applicstric tc Unit 1.
Applicable to Unit 2 at startup from refucling cutagc Z2"12.
65 Amendment Nos: 10^ and 120
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,,,, cc Th control rod insertion. limits as specified in The rod bank assignment has been chosen to t the the provide for achieving hot shutdown by reactor ip any time, assuming the highest worth reactor control requirements and to mini e the total hot channel factor to ensure capability control r emains full withdrawn. with being met. Relative positions of co rol rod banks sufficient ma ns to meet the assumptions used in are determined by a spectfled con 01 rod bank the accident ana is.
(4)
In addition, they overlap. The overlap is based considerations of provide a limit on maximum inserted rod worth axial power shape control.
is not based on in the unlikely event a hypothetical rod safety criteria, but mini es possible changes in ejection, and provide fo cceptable nuclear axial flux imbalance ac anying control rod motion, peaking factors. The contr rod insertion limits specified in the COLR meet the utdown Operation with ab mal rod configurations during requirements for Unit I and Unit The maximum low power and z power testing is permitted shutdown margin requirement occurs a the end of a because of t rief period of the test and because core life and is based on the value us in special pr autions are taken during the test.
analysis of the hypothetical steam break ident.
Early in a core life, less shutdown margin i for t 12% by weight boric acid system.
required, and Figure 3.2-1 shows the shutdown margin equivalent to 1.6% reactivity at the ap'Dr6ximately 4.670 gallons of at least 11.5%
end-of-life with respect to an uncontrolled lution of boric acid are required to meet a cold shutdown condition. Thus, a mitiimum of 5.140 tooldown. All other accident analyses are based on 1% reactivity shutdown margin.
allons in the boric tank is specifled.
In o r to ensure solution solubility at the boric One reactor coolant pump p.ovides adequate f to acid to entration in the 12% by weight boric acid ensure uniform boron concentration, theref e. two system, a nimum temperature of 145 F is required.
pump operation provides more rapid mixi One of the t channels of heat tracing is normally operating and i ufficient to maintain the line The Reactor Protection System is d igned to temperature of 14 The second channel of heat actuate a reactor trip for any Icipated tracing provides back for continuous plant combination of unit condition o ensue a minimum operation when one chan is inoperable. Should departure from Nucleate Bo' ng Ratio (DNBR) equal both channels of heat trac become inoperative. a to or greater than the a icable design limit reactor can be easily boratec fore boric acid DNBR.
precipitation temperature is rea Not applica e to Unit 1.
Applicable to Unit 2 until startup from refueling outage Z2R12.
Deteke-(hge.
65a Amendment Nos. 10^ M 12" a
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,s O
When an Fo neasurement is taken both experimental Measurement of the hot channel factors are required as error and raanufacturing tolerance must be allcwed for.
part of start-up physics tests and whenever abnormal Five percent is the ayropriate allowance for a full power distribution conditions require a reduction of core map taken with t7e movable incore detector flux core power to a level based on reasured hot channel mapping system and three percent is the appropriate factors.
The incore map taken following initial loading allowance for manufacturing tolerance.
provides confirmation of the basic nuclear design bases including proper loading patterns. The periodic monthly "Thc rod bcw penalty (i.c.
14.0% ONO"' cn the ik incore mapping 3rovides additional assurance that the limit S:: beer climinated by taking credit for nuclear design >ases remain inviolate and identify available generic DN5" the- 01 qin: 2fch include operational anomalies which would, otherwise. affect
- (1) the design pitch reduction. (2) the the m:1 diffusion these bases.
ccefricient. (3) the desiga 0"Bo value. and (A) the de ci'icatic pcwr pike factor. For fue! with : regica For normal operation it is not necessary to measure average burnup of greater than 33.000 M/MT. credit i; these quantities continuously.
Instead it has been also taken for the pc; king facter (FL} bumdcw effect.
determined that, provided certain conditions are 7_In the specified limit of FL. there is an 8 percent observed. the hot channel factor limits will be met.
These conditions are as follows:
allowance for uncertainties, which means that normal operation of the core is expected to result in 1.
Control rods in a single bank move together with F,s 1.65/1.08.
no individual rod insertion differing by more than 15 inches from the bank demand position. An "In the s an 0 percent algccified limit cf Ek. thcrc ~i m e ce for uncerta ntics d ich cans that indicated misalignment limit of i 12 steps not nor al Operatice of the core 10 cxpected to rc ult ir including instrument error, precludes a rod FL.i1.55/1.08.
misalignment no greater than 15 inches. With maximum instrumentation error considered the actual rod misalignment is no more than 24 steps The logic behind the larger uncertainty in this case is or 15 inches.
that (a) abnormal perturbations in the shape (e.g. rod misalignment) affect F, radial power 2.
Control rod banks are sequences with overlapping cases without necessarily affecting F.,. in most banks as described in Technical Specification 3.2.
(b) the operator has a direct influence on F through movement 3.
The full length control bank m.sertion limits are of rods, and can limit it to the deslred value, he has not violated.
no direct control over FL and (c) an error in the 4.
Axial power distribution control procedures, which predictions for radial power shape, which may be are given in terms of flux differences control or detected during startu physics tests can be additional axial power monitoring and control bank compensated for in F$ y tighter axial control. but insertion limits are observed. Flux difference cocpensation for less readily available. When refers to the difference in signals between the a measurement of F is taken, experimental error must top and bottom halves of two-section excore be allowed for a 4 percent is the appropriate allowance neutron detectors. The flux difference is a for a full core map taken with the movable incore detector flux mapping system.
measure of the axial offset which is defined as the difference in normalized power between the top and bottom halves of the core.
Applicabic to Unit 1.
Applicable to Uait 2 at startup fre refueling cutage Z2n12.
Not applicabic to Unit 1.
Applicable to Unit 2 until startup frc refu^ ling cutage Z2"12.
68 Amendment Nos. !?9 rd 128
DNB Parameters: The limits on the DNB related parameters assure that each of the parameters is maintained within the normal steady state envelope of operation assumed in the transient and accident analyses. The limits are consistent with the initial FSAR assumptions and have been analytically demonstrated adequate to maintain a minimum DNBR of the applicable design limit DNBR throughout each analyzed transient.
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The limit on RCS Total Flow includes a 3.5% flow measurement uncertainty.
The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> )eriodic surveillance of these parameters t1ru instrument readout is sufficient to ensure that the parameters are restored within their limits following load changes and other expected transient operation. The 18 month periodic measurement of the RCS total flow rate is adequate to detect flow degradation and ensure correlation of the flow indication channels with measured flow such that the indicated percent flow will provide sufficient verification of flow rate on a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> basis.
A quadrant power tilt will be indicated by the excore detectors by the arrangement of the current recorders on the control board.
Four 2-pen recorders are )rovided. the pens are grouped so that. in the a)sence of a quadrant pcwer tilt. the two l
l Applicsble to Unit 1.
Applicable to Unit 2 at startup 're refuel!~; ^utage Z2R12.
70 Amendment Nos.--12" :-' 122
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.i ATTACIIMENT C ZION NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION EVALUATION OF SIGNIFIC ANT-IIAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS FOR PROPOSED CIIANGES TO i
APPENDIX'A TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES i
DPR-39 AND DPR-48 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST 93-09 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE '
FOR CRITICALITY -
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Commonwealth Edison has evaluated this proposed amendment and determined that it involves no significant hazards considerations. According to 10CFR50.92(c), a proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
1.
Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or 2.
Create a possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or 3.
Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The proposed change does not result in a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously evaluated. The probability for an accident is independent of the changes being proposed. Reactor criticality at 530 F instead of the nominal no-load T,,, of 547 F does not' affect any of the accident initiators in the analyses, but does change one of the initial conditions assumed in the Safety Analysis. However, the change in initial conditions from the nominal no-load temperature of 547"F to 530"F does not increase the probability of any of the events considered in the Safety Analysis. The proposed Minimum Temperature for Criticality specification (530"F) will be more restrictive than the current-specification which allows reactor criticality at a temperature as low as 500 F. In addition, the Action Statement will require operator response to place the reactor in a subcritical condition (Mode 3) within 15 minutes should the temperature drop below the limit for greater than a specified amount of time (15 minutes).
Likewise, the proposed change does not significantly increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated. In the reanalysis of the Zero Power accidents (Rod Withdrawal From Suberitical, Rod Ejection, Main Steamline Break, Boron Dilution During Startup, and Feedwater Malfunction) from an initial condition of 530"F. it was concluded that the results and conclusions in the current Safety i
Analysis remain valid based on the fact that the current analysis results are conservative and bounding for reactor criticality at 530"F. The LOCA transient analyses are unaffected by the proposed change since they are initiated from the limiting condition of 102% Since the full power T,,, value is unchanged by this proposed amendment, the LOCA analyses are unaffected. The proposed change will i
ensure that plant parameters are within their analyzed ranges prior to reactor criticality and appropriate operator actions are taken should the temperature drop below the temperature limit after reaching criticality.
The proposed administrative changes delete requirements which are no longer applicable and will have no affect on the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated in the analyses.
1 ZOSR-062-93 1
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' The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind
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of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The change does not involve the addition of any new or different type of equipment, nor does it involve the operation l
of equipment required for safe operation of the facility in a manner different from those addressed in the Final Safety Analysis Report. The proposed change will i
ensure that plant parameters are within their analyzed ranges prior to reactor i
criticality. The proposed administrative changes delete requirements which are no longer applicable and 'will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of i
safety. The proposed change does not affect any safety related system or component operation or operability, instrument operation, or safety system setpoints, and does not result in increased severity of any of the accidents considered in the analysis.
Operator response to a drop in temperature after reaching criticality for a specified
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period of time (greater than 15 minutes) will place the reactor in a subcritical condition which is inherently more stable than when critical below the Point of Adding Heat. The proposed administrative changes are being made to clarify Technical Specifications with no change ofintent. Therefore, the proposed changes i
do not create a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
In conclusion, based on the previous considerations, Commonwealth Edison Company believes that the activities associated with this Technical Specification amendment request satisfy the Significant Hazards Consideration standards of 10CFR50.92(c) and, accordingly, a finding that this Technical Specification amendment does not represent a Significant Hazards Consideration is justified.
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ATTACIIMENT D ZION NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT STATEMENT FOR PROPOSED CIIANGES TO APPENDIX A TECIINICAL SPECIFICATIONS FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-39 AND DPR-48 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST 93-09 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY ZOSR-062-93
This proposed Technical Specification amendment does not involve a change in the installation or use of the fhcilities or components located within the Restricted Area as defined in 10CFR20. Commonwealth Edison has determined that this Technical Specification amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and there is no exposure. Accordingly, this Technical Specification amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10CFR Section 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10CFR51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the granting of this Technical Specification amendment.
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ZOSR-062-93 1
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