ML20155D145

Proposed Tech Spec 4.2.1.F.1 Re Boric Acid Sys

ML20155D145
Person / Time
Site:	Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date:	09/28/1988
From:	COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20155D136	List: ML20155D132 ML20155D145
References
5162K, NUDOCS 8810110100
Download: ML20155D145 (5)

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. . i ATTACIMDCL1 EROFDSID_IRAliGES To APERfDIX_A IICDIICAL_SPICIIICAIIDti SECT 10tL4,.2xL L1 HORLC_ ACID _EYSIDI EagnisLMo.d111ed 43 44 East (ALAdded 11one EngelsLDeleted lione 5162K OG10110100 SG092G pg AtiOCK0*300,{U

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I LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT i t

l 3.2.1.F.1. (Continued) 4.2.1.F.1. (Continued)

I l b. One boric acid pig shall be OPERATING b. Each boric acid pump shall be .l l and the standby pump shall be OPERABLE. functionally tested weekly. 6

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. I i c. One channel of heat tracing shall be c. Heat trace for the Boric Acid Tank to l OPERATING and the remaining channel Charging Pump suction flow path shall be  !

l shall be OPERABLE on at least one flow demonstrated OPERABLE:

i pathdrors the OPERABLE Boric Acid Tank 8

to the Charging Pump suction. 1) At least once per day by:

*) ' Verifying that one channel is energized, and

, b) Verifying the redundant channel

$e as available.

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2) At least once per week by:

i a) Checking the associated local

! alarms, and b) Energizing each heat tracing I

channel.

2. During reactor operation, including recovery 2. Not Applicable:

l from an inadvertant trip, the requirements i of 3.2.1.F.1 may be modified as follows:

I j a. One boric acid pump may be inoperable a. When it is detenr.ined that one of the

! g for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> provided that the standby two boric acid pumps is inoperable, the

} l pu=p is OPERABLE. standby pump shall be placed in operation immediately.

b. One channel of heat tracing may be b. When it is determined that one of the 1 inoperable for 7 dr.ys provided that the two channels of heat tracing is j remaining channel of heat tracing is inoperable, the remaining channel shall

l OPERABLE. be placed in operation immediately. The

'I operation of the remaining channel of I heat tracing shall~ be verified once a 1 shift.

I 13090 43 TSC 88-03 e 0921A

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t j i . I LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION c

' SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT h 3.2.1.F. (Continued) 4.2.1.F. (Continued)

! 3. If these conditions cannot be met the 3. Not Applicable j reactor shall be borated to the COLD '

SHUT 00WN boron concentration within four -

hours.

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l G. Primary System Boron Concentration Changes G. Primary System Boron Concentration Changes j during COLD SHUTDOWN. during COLD SHUTDOWN. .!

l I When a boration or dilution operation *s in The operation of at least one reactor coolant i progress, at least one reactor coolant pump or pump or one residual heat removal loop shall be s ; one residual heat removal loop shall be verified before the start of a boration or

• ; OPERATING. dilution operation.

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' H. Reactivity Anomalies H. Reactivity Anomalies -

A normalization of the computed boron Reactivity anomaly evaluation! shall be 1 concentration ~as a function of burnup shall be performed following startups after shutdowr.s of compared with the actual boron concentration of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or longer duration but shall not be l

the coolant. If the difference between the required more than once if more than one such I observed and predicted steady-state shutdown occurs in a two month period.

} concentrations reaches the equivalent of one l percent in reactivity, the NRC shall be notified .

3 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and an evaluation as to the -

cause of the discrepancy shall be made and reported to the NRC within 30 days.

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! 13090 44 TSC 88-03

{ 0921A

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ATIACB m T 2 j i

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] KYMUATION of SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS cot [SIDERAIlgli ERQPDSID_CliAttGIS TO ZIotLIECHti1 CAL {

SPICIE1CAIlotLAPPEND1X A - SECTION. 4.it4L1 l

BORIC ACIILSYST111

t l I i i DES.CRIEIlm_Of_ AMENDMENT REGIEST  !

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An amendment to the Zion racility Operating License is proposed to l clarify and upgrade the surveillance requirement 1 for the heat trace system associated with Boric Acid Tank (BAT) and Charging Pump suction lines.

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BACEGEQ11HD [

10 CTR 50.92 states that a proposed amendment will involve a no l i significant hasards consideration if the proposed amendment does nots f*

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(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences [

of an accident previously evaluated; or i

(2) Czente the possibility of a new or different kind of accideat from  !

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any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The following discussion address these three criteria and demonstrates that the proposed amendment involves a no significant hasards consideration.

I i DA SI S_ EOR _R0_S I G'LI EICNIT_B AZ ARD.S_CQttSIDEEAIlotLDEIERMINATILtl j DISCUSSION ITEM _1 This change adds the surveillance requirement of verifying daily at ,

q 1 east one channel is energised and the redundant channel available. This is a  !

significant increase over the current surveillance requirements of functionally i testing 1. eat tracing operation weekly. In addition, a requirement to ENERGIZE !

j each heat trace channel weekly provides a more specific requirement rather than .

to functionally test the operation of the heat trace system and a.larm circuits  !

i weekly. The control room annunciator has been deleted from the surveillance requirements since it is not required by Standard Technical Specification and ,

is not considered necessary to ensure operability of the heat trace system.

The annunciator is neither safety-related nor reliability related. l iI

Because this proposed change involvi, the expansion and clarification of the affected section, the example (11) of 48 FR 14869 is , applicable in this instance. Example (11) reads as follows: "A change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or control not presently in Technical Specifications for example a more stringent surveillance requirement."

DISGSSI.Gi - IIDLZ This propos. A change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, since it increases the reliability of heat trace operations by requiring more frequent surveillance of system operations and removes ambiguous testing requirements.

Also, since the change does not create a change in system operation, a new or different kind of accident from those previously evaluated in the FSAR la not created.

DISGSSIQi - ITDL1 The proposed change will increase the margin of safety since the change is more conservative than is currently than is currently required by Technical Specification. Specifically, the heat trace for the Boric Acid Tanks to the Charging Pumps suction lines are verified operable daily versus weekly. Thus, this change does not involve a reduction in the margin of safety.

5162K