ML20132B833
| ML20132B833 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/11/1996 |
| From: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20132B823 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-1431 NUDOCS 9612170410 | |
| Download: ML20132B833 (162) | |
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l MARK UP OF ITS CHANGE 013.7.7; Review of CC pump and flow requirements 013.7.7 revises LCO 3.7.7 BASES to address number of required CC pumps based upon CC System flow requirements.
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9612170410 961211 PDR ADOCK 05000295 P PDR
3 CC System ,
3.7.7 d
- 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.7 Component Cooling (CC) System I LC0 3.7.7 The CC System shall be OPERABLE. l i
1 APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ;
l ACTIONS l
NOTE-------------------------------------
Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE 4," for residual heat removal loops made inoperable by CC.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 4
As70neTFe(diiFsd1CC%iat A71 % "iReitoFilFedblfsd;CC 7sdhys
' "ekshangep!;inopesable to' ;
with?bothtunitsijn~ "heittexchangshli OPERABLEsstatus l
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@DE!jly11e[3g@lij I El 307diys B."]p5Elfs5{fi(]$Cble{ exchanger &inopera 8 1 ( [hsatfexchangerttoRisibfd}'fsjuiEidjCC With7oneidhit#in3M00E$ OPERABLEistatsi"
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lif2(f3? ion 245 "' i AC. One required CC AC.1 Restore required CC 7 days pump inoperable. pump to OPERABLE status. OR OR One required flow path AG.2 Restore required CC 7 days inoperable. flow path to OPERABLE status. (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 3.7-16 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 8)
CC System 3.7.7 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION ! REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME < l BD. One required CC B0.1 Restore the required 24 hours l l pump inoperable. CC pump to OPERABLE l status. ' AND OR One required CC flow l path inoperable. 80.2 Restore the required 24 hours CC flow path to , OPERABLE status. I GE. Required Action GE.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours and associated l Completion Time AND ' not met. GE.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours 03 Two required CC pumps inoperable 1 1 j SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.7.1 Verify each CC pump starts automatically on 18 months an actual or simulated actuation signal. f 4 ZION Units 1 & 2 3.7-17 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 8)
_ _ _ m .< _. - ._ ._ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - . . _.. _ -. . 4 4 CC System 4 B 3.7.7 i B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 4
- 3.7.7 Component Cooling (CC) System.
- j l BASES BACKGROUND The CC System is a shared system which provides a heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from safety related components during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient. During normal operation, the CC System also provides this function for various nonessential components, as well as the spent fuel storage pool. The CC System serves as a barrier to the release of radioactive byproducts between potentially radioactive systems and the Service Water System, and thus to the environment. l The CC System consists of five CC pumps, three CC heat ! exchangersy and-two surge tanksFind7ais6datsdWalVs5?ind jH fn..i a whic..h,. sup,p.o.-w rt u ifi~ '. T...hs..$CC9 ic mo : Sis.. ism.m.. .hn. fa, ins I re . undantwf.snsafety. Frel ated t.he.::two..w3.n..,.mth s .x. m Eflo.wtpa sny W. flowJpath,iconsists ofithe31pinglandWalVennscessaryytdippoVidkcholinglwateri i
.tdith,ei_RH.,R. 3. h. ea_t[ei. ch..shssFN a. sV_SIipum.. ph. i...s,cien.
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m thi. fugal " ~. " ' ~ charging; pump Mand ~yanERHRtpumpt jToiconsidersalfl.. owpa th' OPE'RABL E?! timuit3 betsi the rf al ignedMcip abl elo f/ bsi ns" iljdnedstf6Vits9#qifi fsdysifetydelitsd316adMand i be" ! CCtheatte supPohte'd.ibf?,M.7 q g g.g g _xchangs&.snd8a g gg nurgeitank.? sEach The five pumps supply flow to the three heat exchangers via a common header, however each pump or heat exchanger can be isolated from the others without affecting the remaining flow paths. The surge tanks in the system provide assurance that adequate net positive suction head is available. During cper:tien in MODES 1, 2, 2, :nd 4, cne pump, f! wp;th, :nd heat exch:nger per unit arc capable cf serving all Operating ccepenents. In the ev^nt cf : 10:0 cf ccclant accident (LOCA) en enc unit, One pump, flcupath, and he:t exch:nger are capable cf fulfilling syst^= requirement; for th:t unit. The ccend required pump, ficwpath, and heat exch:nger provide the required redundancy in the event cf a single active er p ::f"c f flure. Sface the CC Sy: tem f: chared betecer units, One heat exch:nger and :::cciated pcrtion; it; flew p;th, ::y be credited tc bcth unit;. Each
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ywmy wwvvmwwswwi ijswwi we wyv== iwww myw v c. w s w w w vj s ing w w w s va r signal (from it: ::cciated unit) er frc= the :sfc chutdown Ocquencer by the Lc : cf Pcwcr Dic:cl Ccncratcr Start In:tru=cnt: tion, LC0 2.3.5. Three pump: Orc normally (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-36 Rev. 00, 11/24/96
..J.
- CC System
,. B 3.7.7- 1 j BASES f
- icted with Ur,it 1 (OCC005 0C, OCC005 00, =d OCC007 OE)
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1 Td[supp6f T, =.::hiki ~ilit 'tdTE66. 6sn! FM00ESD IorJ6 ! '(eitherihbraal o fdbol ihgisn;to RHR! rjohses t#Cenchhnisriisfrequired acdi den t)Maisi'nglf? fl ow! pa t h ?c apibl e O Whenisionit"~ F
- 'i nih1 MODES!5to6 67&thfinhaber 6 "eqUiredifloW!psthsVis~'
depsod$ntionMhsinsisbeMofsFequi~ (RHRildep'sV(neededito
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L thirsni sino fridui rementi fos ths$ RHR%fi bi7 pith 45ThEfl ow" ! I ds_m.ind.. fai.s.i.di _atsd
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i 1 bb ti.etdownsheatsexchanger; sh~~~ ~ Eh XExdess%1stdoWntheatlexcK di iSealNAtsMheatieiEhahief)is@' i et,[Sp'eADfdellpobisheatfexchahiffi ! fk ?RCSfsampls?heatlexchinders? ^^ j pe !Rsactorfvesselisupp6fttcoolfng? I hQ j Wiste %asR ompfes'oFi s $and C ~ i , .i- Wd. failed~.a fuel finon. -i.torlbooling2 4 4 Thsifl3w'deinahdTass6ciit'edisith?theseR16sds?cah?be metibi j OneiCCip0mpiandli'sithi?s ~ ~ ~^'""~~ ~ "~ ~ ' ~ i pa th!de sc Fi bedia.bsss $.~"~~"qEi vsl entideinndifof?ons? R 4 -
- i. Thsisf6FF,liititilfofit6FssiCC!pumpsva rsTEledsi Fed !shunsie e l one$dnittissin;M00ESlle2P34ord4NahdstheYothirtsnitiisa 4
i M00ES?lG283R4%52br16fjAltstialiofMwo[CCihumpsjars' "in l i ! requiredssheneverione!unitiisiin? MODES 11M2l,$3;orf4 Qaid!}ihs otherjni.tfisidefdeledf [
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} EichfCC[heitiskhhangediifslieditdihindisstheliquiVslintfof t t#.fl. m -ow?.. t _._h_si _or_ntheisq6i_valeh._ttofEtwo?CCipom,ps mm . - - ,_ .. . 1. i If hsFe f6FeWiN6t sli~6f ?G6"CCihiatTixsh Ahpe rs sars ReiiGi red . i ' 1 wheneverlods7dnitiliiinIMODES51#2M3Yor44Wandithelother un i tli.s? i n- L_M00.ES -~ ii .n_2 {s3_k4M. 5 EoP 6 LJ Al t_o t al f o f. io n el C Ci hest j (continued) s I ! L ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-37 Rev 00, 11/24/96 4 l
4 CC System B 3.7.7 BASES i sichsg6 FEiiWshUffed 3 whenev6FTone[un i tii hllHTM00 ESi l M2 U 3
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;o r;4M and Me[o ths ri dfi t ( i s 1de fuel ed l Thsi;f14s7pithWpiiiipTssdihsitssiEhTEsiis ?sillindihdy requirements 7are[independentfof?r.dchfother; f Antadditionsl fA110EeiniteEiapandtan CC?pumpi'sivsquiFsdftormeetisingl%shuipedstolmsEtl additiodslECCtheatssichahgeeMihir
' single?fai10EeiprotectionicFi.teFiaQRedandancy& equirements passive forJRHRifidRpathsiareiunitJspecifidisand!dd{nottimpahtTCC' pumploriCC(hpanixchanse rirshui rsinsnts: 2AdditionaHCC oriheatfexch.angersta failures [pfjthegejeo.@poneptsyrequiredi.b 3
Es6KJidiMistbiniti EallistaFtVIsiponWecsijF6'fisisifity injectionVsighal
'shutdosMieduends;i(3bytth~eillbss?ofJPoweKDi.eiel?Genepator" r
.St'hrttinstrumsntatio.n@LC023 L3l 5k;Threefpumpsf ars Enornisily associatedintth? Unit $1s(OCC005E0COOCC006-00pand10CC007:0E) '
an'd ? tWol pisap s ka feiho rmal lyla s s oc i at 'ed ; w i thi un'i ti 2 "
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4 (0CC00340 Q s,diOCC00'4-908)). ~' - 4 Additional information on the design and operation of the system, along with a list of the components served, is
, presented in the UFSAR, Section 9.2.2 (Ref. 1).
The principal safety related function of the CC System is , the removal of decay heat from the reactor via the Residual l Heat Removal (RHR) System. This may be during a normal or I post accident cooldown and shutdown. I 1 i APPLICABLE The design basis of the CC System is for enc CC train (which I SAFETY ANALYSES include: cnc CC pump, heat exchanger, and ficw path) to remove the post LOCA heat load from the containment recirculation sump of the affected unit during the recirculation phase, and simultaneously, remove the normal shutdown heat load from the unaffected unit. l 3 The CC System is decigned te limit the CC System supply temperature t: 95'F during ncrm:1 cperatien. Mcwevery during plant cccidcen, the CC cupply temperature 1: allowed to incrc :e tc 120*F for bcut three heur to expedite plant cocidown, when the Residual Heat Removal System is first placcd in scrvicc. (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.7-38 Rev. 00, 11/24/96
CC Sy: tem i B 3.7.7 BASES (continued) l The design prevents the containment recirculation sump fluid from increasing in temperature during the recirculation phase following a LOCA, and provides a gradual reduction in the temperature of this fluid as it is supplied to the ' Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pumps. An OPERABLE CC System provides the required redundancy to ensure that the CC System safety functions can be accomplished assuming either; 1) loss of the onsite electric power system (diesel generators) assuming offsite power is available, or 2) loss of the offsite electric power system assuming onsite power (diesel generators) is available, l coincident with a single failure (a passive failure is only assumed during the recirculation phase). Passive failures resulting in a breech of the CC System fluid boundary are assumed to result in a maximum leakage of 50 gallons per minute. Further, redundant components and means of isolation are provided so that the CC System may be separated to serve each unit independently during normal cooldown and following a LOCA. APPLICABLE .The CC System also functions to cool the unit from RHR entry SAFETY ANALYSIS conditions to MODE 5 during normal and post accident (continued) operations. The time required for this cooldown is a function of the CC components and RHR subsystems operating. One CC pump and heat exchanger are sufficient to remove decay heat during subsequent operations in MODES 5 and 6. This assumes a maximum service water temperature of 80*F occurring simultaneously with the maximum heat loads on the system. The CC System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LCO In the event Of : 08,^,, one CC pump, heat exchanger and ficw path are required to provide the minimum heat removal - capability :::cmed in the ::fety analy:i: for the system to which it supplie cccling water en the affected unit. Tc ensure thic requirement is met, two pump and two flcw path; (cach with cnc heat exchanger :nd surge t nk) rust be OPER^,BLE, ::uming the worst cc:0 ingle failure. The CC Sy: tem i; normally cperated : chared sy: tem that I (continued) I
- ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-39 Rev. 00, 11/24/96 i
CC System B 3.7.7 l BASES I i prc'/ide: cccli ng to equipment in both units. A: cuch, 00 0 cc=pencnt: c:n ::tisfy require =cnt: On bet' units. Since l the CC Syste- 10 ch: red between units, One heat exchanger and :::cciated pertion its flee path, y 50 credited to I um+u... .. u..,.
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System operation with the common heat exchanger flow path shared between the two units is acceptable for the CC System. Furthermore, a heat exchanger does not need to be in :cr>icc~pilVidlih to be considered OPERABLE; manual isolation d6si^"li6t" affect OPERABILITY since the component is capable of being aligned and is not required ~until ,th,e recirculation Intaddition=Matsurge;tahk dose.nd..tEnhed. s. phase of a LOCA.t.E.l.eNi. l.Y. edf,iis?t6fbeR n p -. 4 - '3 * > + * = ' = --
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pump Mand!aniRHR:pumpifor eachfu'nitt n'i MODES 11,02,s.3,: .. dl; $w6jsupdeitahksyahd
- (continued) l l
ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-40 Rev. 00, 11/24/96
CC System l l B 3.7.7 l l BASES t r dyp%6Kli{6d![@pipfapdWilysl5j l n ; i a3isorx =.7...,4n. wTth~ythe;,.- second Forsa unit 31MM esinglesu ith. in- MODES,cl,t)2m. l O.PE_RA_B_LEs0.,0EST546ri6R~thEC,C. x . .- . - - ---..-;. .
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number of required' flow paths is dependent on the ' number of required 3.9.4 or 3,9.5.) _RH_R. lo, ops ,per, , specifications _3'.4.,7,'
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(continued) I \ ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-41 Rev. 00, 11/24/96 i i
..o ,.43 -_ ymL.s ,.AC_- ._ . i CC System B 3.7.7 i
BASES i S, which can bc chared);
- b. " rec CC pump:;
l
- c. M cciated in:trumentation and centrch required te perfer- the :sfety rchted functicn. l 3 For a single unit in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, with the second unit in a defueled condition, the CC System is required to be OPERABLE with:
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e a r
- c. M :cciated in:trumentation and centrol: required to perfer- the cafet" rehted, functien.
ThsTOPERABI LITW6 f f sisb!CCipUispii ridi sdssitheIEipa 6il i ty'~t d hutdiniticallyNnifspsniahtsatiaR6MthiflessiofsPoserI ~ Di ekelsGensFato6 Start 3InstVume'ntatidai ETh'e10PERABILITW6f , each!CCQUnipiiniM00ES$1M233id684hls6ifinc10desithe ~ ' lc ap abi.l ltyitsst art %s stomati c al lyMeinishdi red std%5 dip ~o st thsissfetfiiriject;fdnifUnhtidn!OlhisMequir;essthhtKthe '~ d i essli ghnef atodis sddi ated @i thl esch L~OPERAB LEl CCfpumpWi.
~ ~ ~ '~ " ~^ ~" ~ ~ ~ ' " ~ ~~ ~ ~
O_ P, E.R_ABL E.F.. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the CC Sy: tem is a normally operating system, which must be manually aligned to perform its post accident safety functions, primarily RCS heat removal, which is achieved by cooling the RHR heat 2 exchanger. i 1, (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-42 Rev. 00, 11/24/96
. - - .- ~~- - - . - - - . - . ~ - . - - . . - - - -- - --
CC System B 3.7.7 g BASES h-With'7bsth' CGW'itnid?M00E 5 or 6, the OPERABILITY d requiViiii6t'i~bf^thi^CC System are determined by the systems i it supportsKspscighal]$thWJCC3SystMflosjptEthithi , R$Rlheatexchangey. t L : ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note indicating that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.4.6, j "RCS Loops-MODE 4," must be entered if an inoperable CC component (s) renders an RHR loop inoperable (incapable of removing decay heat). This is an exception to LC0 3.0.6, which directs the Required Actions of LC0 3.4.6 to be taken
- in addition to the Required Actions of this LC0.
l If one CC he'at 4xch'inger'is inoperable with both' udits 'in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4,' action must be taken to restore the
- i inoperable CC heat exchanger to OPERABLE status. Sevendays are provided to restore the inoperable CC heat exchanger.
At the end of seven daysv both units must be shutdown. In lieu of shutting down both units, however, one unit may b6 } place into at least MODE 5 during the seven day period,' which allows Condition A to'be exited.,,However, Condition B
~ ~ ^
isj t1 R in ,effect 2 ,'j ~ , 4 On^e CC' hsat~'ekchanjir l's '~ableto~siippdrt' bdth"rkdundant'flos paths capable of cooling an RHR heat exchanger, an SI pump, ' a centrifugal, charging pump, and an RHR pump. Therefore one inoperable CC heat exchanger removes only the single passivs ' " " ' 3 failure protection redundancy,- The remaining,CC heat exchanger (s) have the capability of supporting all CC' flow paths. The completion time is reasonable, based on the ! i redundant capabilities afforded by OPE,RABLE CC pumps and ! l flow paths,during,this, time' period. E.11 IMBiis7CC3h"eatisidh'shgh6fI?inspiis a 61h3EitCon1FI6hsiniittlin takshiltoirsstore' 2 ! MODESil,s2W3dori4hthsniacti.onimuitybe)idays'.OWithibath t heRequ i red {CCi he atife xchange riwi thist30 uni t s ?fi n f H0 DES 91$2 R3 RbE14 Rho thEC66d i t'i onW AhW Cdndi t ibs ! BisrelsntereddhndtConditi6n untilRbnsinhitMishstdounM) Afis!theicontpoll ing%1osk' ~ Whentattleastrohitunittidi6 g((ysh]6l$ggd t t ij@f;B@sc6 mss {thd6nlyj; Appl icabli'" 1 (continued) i j ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-43 Rev. 00, 11/24/96 a 1
CC System B 3.7.7 BASES C6nd i tT6C3 f?6heVshitTis??ifdelid $theIsdinbsE~6 f;iTFsiis t Fsd CCf heatiexshingessiisitWoMss:s the(Conditions will::ino 31~onger^' bel;Wplicab]ei;with[:6nl) fond.:hea_t;t.;exchangedin; operable; ~ " Ode?CC? hsitisxchinisFBs75bl e t6?supp6rtlibith?'Fedsndahtifl 6W pathsMspablsfofJcoolingdan RHRihsatiexshsngfrMun?SI?pumR~ afcentetfdgalfcharpingipUmp? sndsaniRHRipbmp!sThsrsforel.one faildfef pr6tect' ion?PsdhndanhybThMr[emhiningiCO2 heat ^ e'xchanger(s)ThaVesthescapabil.1 tyjofdssppd' r ti~nsial y CCMidi pathk EThs/complsti66EtimelfisireasohabissbissdNEtthe"~~ redondAntMipabil i ti e si a'f fordsk bf?OPERAB L EL CCipump~nind {lpMpathQddrigthiptisperiodlg ~~~ ' ~ ^ ' " ~ "' AC.1 and AC.2 If one required CC s or flow path capsbleToffedolingLin
.RHR:lh{stieshahkef;p' an1Spump @dmp^,fal.c
e ntrifugalEchlnryindip0mpj is ' inoperable, action n:ust be tiken to andtan;RHR:ipump{ psith?V"ths requ ired pump or flow paths to OPERABLE statu within 7 days.
~
In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CC pump era coolingThd~Theflow 7 day path 4ssrs adequate Com'plstion to providebased Time is reasonable, the required on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE pumpi ahdifl6E~ pith,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurring dOFins^'thfi~"heriod. (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-44 Rev. 00, 11/24/96
1 CC System i B 3.7.7 BASES I i i ACTIONS BD.1 and 80.2 ) (continued) ' l If one CC pump and one CC flow i RHRJiisit3x'chahgeQnjSIji0mp, fi path bapsSl'e?6fC26slingish
- ang;aqRHRipumpf
- are inoperable, lsentrif0gs1Jchafgipglpusby action must bs tiken to !
restore thi CC pump or the CC flow path to OPERABLE status within 24 hours. In thi: Condition, the rc=:ining OPEPf3LE , CC pump: :nd fl:L path i 2de:;;:tc to perfor- the h :t i
' rc :v:1 functi^n. The 2' Scur C =pletien T*:0 i rc;: enable, b .cd en the redund:nt c:pabilitic: Offerded by the OPEPf3LE pump: :nd fle path, 2nd the low creb:b!'ity Of i
- DB^. Occurring during th:: period.InEthfsicoMiltidnNitifs
'sedeptibleitoicontinueloperati6hTfoR241hdhrsWithout]i~"
reddndantX CC [ pump d and iai redundant 4 flow pathMThi @i s~ becssselinithisic6nditionsthefremaining10PERABLERCCipssps and Cfl 6inpithEsFe b;sdeddats s to[provideithhyifehui red /bool i n57
- anditherefistajL1,ow[htobab11tQoffajDBA50ccurringyd.urins~'
thisperJody i GE.1 and GE.2 i u 1 If the CC component (s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status i within the associated Completion Time, or if two required CC 1 pumps are inoperable, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and in N0DE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an
- orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
4 i SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies proper automatic operation of the CC pumps
- ~ on an actual or simulated actuation signal (i.e., safety injection, and safe shutdown sequencer by the Loss of Power Diesel Generator Start Instrumentation, LC0 3.3.5). The CC System is a normally operating system that is not typically actuated as part of routine testing during normal operation.
i The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this
- Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.
Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month 1 i l ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-45 Rev. 00, 11/24/96 I l
_a a _a , _e.a. - .a_. - aw;.em -a w-w.a..- -w k e J I 4 h 4 ] r i i 4 a k 4 i I s e 4 l a i i CLEAN ITS SPEC 1 ? J 1 i I d s ( J f 4 l i 4 b a 4 d v 9 i 1
?
r
)
J. 1 4
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CC System 3.7.7 ) 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.7 Component Cooling (CC) System 4 LC0 3.7.7 The CC System shall be OPERABLE. i APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTIONS i
-------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------
i Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.4.6, "RCS , Loops-MODE 4," for residual heat removal loops made inoperable by CC. ! l i CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I
- Ah10nsifd4ditsd:CC5;hsit A?1?i"~^tRsithfEP'Fs4UfFsdiCC 71~dsj~s I
^~
! ' ~ 'e.xchunge@ operable ~~ ~ ' "hsstisxchangs;$td~' withtbothiunitsiin' ~' OPERABLE
" ' "9staths?
~ ^ ^ ;
MODESRdM3M6tj]l 1 Bif"0isifsduffidTCC0hsiti
^~ Bill .JRistiFe%ddiFed!"CC 36?dij's
'~^'~'
l l ekchahgsr ~~~~ ~~heatsixbinngi@"tI
~
- with$bnet.%inspeFable snittih? MODES . OPERABLEilitatss i
~ ~ ^ ~ ^' ~~^
1M2]Q 6R47^ ~~ ~ ~ ~' ~^ C. One required CC pump lC
^
.1 Restore required CC 7 days inoperable. pump to OPERABLE
{ status. OR OR 4 One required flow path C.2 Restore required CC 7 days , , inoperable. flow path to OPERABLE status. 4 (continued) j j ZION Units 1 & 2 3.7-16 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 8)
CC System 3.7.7 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. One required CC pump D.1 Restore the required 24 hours inoperable. CC pump to OPERABLE status. AND 98 One required CC flow path inoperable. D.2 Restore the required 24 hours CC flow path to OPERABLE status. E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND 08 E.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours Two required CC pumps inoperable l l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.7.1 Verify each CC pump starts automatically on 18 months an actual or simulated actuation signal. ZION Units 1 & 2 3.7-17 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 8)
CC System B 3.7.7 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.7 Component Cooling (CC) System BASES BACKGROUND The CC System is a shared system which provides a heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from safety related components during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient. During normal operation, the CC System also provides this function for various nonessential components, as well as the spent fuel storage pool. The CC System serves as a barrier to the release of radioactive byproducts between potentially radioactive systems and the Service Water System, and thus to the environment. The CC System consists of five CC pumps, three CC heat exchangers? two surge tanks,iand! associat'ed Lyalves:'and p'iping which support the two' unit's. "The CC:iSyst'emicontains redundantsshfety-Felstsi flowjathsijAiflow pathiconsists of:thelpipingiandivalves necessaryttoiprovide cooling water toi the RHRl: heat 7 exchanger, : a'n)SI r pump,t ai centri fugal . charging;pumph a'nd/an'RHR pump ?To? consider a1flowpath OPERABLEii ti must? befei ther) al ignsd f o6 capabl eio ff being al.igned ito fitsf required isafety-rel ated;;'l.oads,-Jand? be~ suppo..yed? rt .W byra*CC9 hsatfexchanger(andi:afsurgel ed^froin"a~sepa' tanki (Each rate"smergenEy diei5l gsnerator. The five pumps supply flow to the three heat exchangers via a common header, however each pump or heat exchanger can be isolated from the others without affecting the remaining flow paths. The surge tanks in the system provide assurance that adequate net positive suction head is available. tot siippoftSthe[cipabil i tyi tFEoo1#downVti MODES W o?i6
.(ei.therinormalfor/ post-l accident),JaisingleifloWpath capable of coolingCan!RHR heat excha'ngerfiserequiredh - When :aDunit' isfiniMODES"5 or: 6, theinumber of; required flowfpaths;is~
depsndentyon!theinumberofErequiredfRHR.? loops-(neededto maintain' MODES /51ori 6 )'per Specification 3.-4.7,? 3:.9 4,4.or 3.9;5hbuts;isyalwaystatsleastionei JWhen? a uni.tLisidefuelsd; there v i si no ire qui rement$ fore the* RHR fl ow 2 path . Thei fl ow ~ ' demand- associated.with' each; Safety Related flow;pathican!be met bylonefCCf pump per, flow pathb /Therefore, a.: minimum;of" 1 one" flow: path ?(and Leon'sequently >oneiCC ' pump)' isirequiredi for
~ ' '
e ach :l unit: tin? MODES 11,j2Q3p 4,;:(5 '; Lori 6.- , (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-36 Rev. 00, 11/24/96
CC System B 3.7.7 BASES BACKGROUND
- d. . (continued)p,._j;TKsICCESi"sfis""il'idIpFoVidi.i!Ed611s'g]tdEthe.
s ?f6113sisi'i16sds q g. g ~~~ maylbiGed..dirs,.d.s:v.od..p<.l.-'shtS.N.peratibn?^
3....N# }"# uwA- vauA4u c.
tf e- - aa.w weM y .uw.%wA%,4 .y/A-4
~'~~^
iT"^i[RiiEtiFPE661I6tWUaFj~siitdFiiihd?tEehmiliibi^ffisfi7 bL Metdodheat(exchangers ~ ~ ~ ' ~ cf JExEess!!1etdown2heatte'xchi6 difsSe'alssaten$eit4:bxthangsr}geFl " sf !;Speh't4;fuelipoollheatfexchahieF? f M iRCS/simpls)hs'adexshinssisi ~ 95 BReidtorMesselduppsrticsoliWg"7 h6 JWaits(gasjdomkessori $and f~
% j{ag ey g ue Q!!!onitiric,oolflygj ThsIfi ssidiiihd iisibEiifed$sitEthissil 6 Ads?En? bi?mitC6y onE!C'Cfiismsand01sitheSe ~ ^ ~ " ~ " ~^"' "
pat {desctibediabojsj ~ "guivalehtidemandloff one/PHR{ flow The FifoFsBiiff t"il76 fit EFEef CCipsinp sfarsTFedui Fid ? shin sve r odelun'it31s11 nim 00ESs162X3;6r o M00ESW2N!3R4d5%or:t6UfAlts$dand;(thei talsofitsof CCJpump'siars~ thardunitfislin '~' ' rsquiredJwhshevsdonefunitEisMis?M00ES51 Btheguni t@kijeled/C~~'~ ~~ ^~~~ ^~Q~ 2 & ore 4N~nd 7 the ~~
~
~
EiEkICCihist"^iichihiiFTiiEsilidIfsihihdinitheis40inliht
.t.wolflos!pathM(oMth(equivalehtsoQtsd[CCj pumps)j f'^ i'"bf Thsfef5Fi@t'un sheneverLone i tM s ; i ni MODES f l ,f 2, 03 lor 14 Na'nd Vt unit.:,issiniM00ESfin2;13d4d5lori6;1Altotalsof:onelCCsheat ashinsedisW64ui red shenever3bne
$61da.s(glsthshjhhitMsid fusisdC f uni tti' sii~~~nl M00ES
' $162M3' ' ~
Thi!fl6sThithyissmp?ihd?histFshhnifr?FsddndisEi reqdiFemantiliareXindepe6 dent.Poffeich?6thern (An:)additionil CCf puinpli @equii sd Ttolimeetis i ngl eifai llUreicri tipi a
'addi ti onal i CC i he at$ exchangerbi s b riqd ssise i rsd it o Tmeet t p s i ngl e ffail ure f prot enti on! cri t ep t aYl Reduddincylf equ 1 Femsdt 5 f6b RHR;!fl6w!patkssaf eldni tilipebi ficMand[ dot notiimpists;CC ~ ~
ors heat t exchang[ersi:are t requi red : becausefo f;"potent
~
^
' ~
f.ii l u re s[d,fs.th ese! chspjne n t si (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-37 Rev. 00, 11/24/96
l l i CC System l B 3.7.7 l BASES l l BACKGROUND (continued) Esit h 30 iip 7iTutbiisti Eal ly~st'iFt'iTsjin?FissiitT6fTaisa fE fi shutdownjsequencer(;bylthe1LosstoffPosedDiese10Gene i ' Start?InstrumentationdLC033;3;5i!Three/pumpsrareinormally. associstedWith?Unitsl:f(0CC00590CM0CC006-00gand10CC007:0E)' anditss?puApistafi$o'rmally?asidciatsdWithiunit 2*~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ ' ~ "
(pC(003E0Qand[0CC004dOB))f ~ ~ '~ ' ~ Additional information on the design and operation of the system, along with a list of the components served, is presented in the UFSAR, Section 9.2.2 (Ref. 1). The principal safety related function of the CC System is the removal of decay heat from the reactor via the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System. This may be during a normal or post accident cooldown and shutdown. APPLICABLE The design basis of the CC System is to remove the post LOCA SAFETY ANALYSIS heat load from the containment recirculation sump of the affected unit during the recirculation phase, and i simultaneously, remove the normal shutdown heat load from the unaffected unit. 1 The design prevents the containment recirculation sump fluid I from increasing in temperature during the recirculation phase following a LOCA, and provides a gradual reduction in the temperature of this fluid as it is supplied to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pumps. An OPERABLE CC System provides the required redundancy to ensure that the CC System safety functions can be accomplished assuming either; 1) loss of the onsite electric power system (diesel generators) assuming offsite power is available, or 2) loss of the offsite electric power system assuming onsite power (diesel generators) is available, coincident with a single failure (a passive failure is only assumed during the recirculation phase). Passive failures resulting in a breech of the CC System fluid boundary are assumed to result in a maximum leakage of 50 gallons per minute. Further, redundant components and means of ' isolation are provided so that the CC System may be separated to serve each unit independently during normal i cooldown and folicwing a LOCA. l ' l (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-38 Rev. 00, 11/24/96
l CC System B 3.7.7 BASES LC0 f( E5hti.h6sa)a P w~W6Fl^sTiFdlsTuiiitififM. ODESTIW2;i37?6FI4NGithithEse66sd. OPERABLE!n.it_h Lw . i, IS$jfj@[Cpy@@fj BOELhECCMitR#hihiefsIQ HTS"TisiFiduhdiht7flhuipithif f6TsipibTeisfR6dijhi?iiiiRHR
^^
sMd F adiSI4 sip al.ce#tpifu'ga14thardinf ^
~
pump-lsind f sn3 RHR? pumplforf e achsi6n t tSi n! M00ESyl82 N3 r oM4j nUmbel6(NOTE i i FoM t hslun i titha tQi s#in !M00ESi5 cfdreqdi~Fediflowlpsthstissdsjendentfonithe ~ sor,i nUmbsp@f1psqdi Eed[RHRjloop[pphpecj fi cati oisi3MIj; 319jiiog3J9y)g d.ES.,T.i.6_is_iiFssi,l_isk_'sif_an,
~ .
d, e2 '[XiiodJifidJi@g]dd?Valjes[ For a single unit in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, with the second unit in a defueled condition, the CC System is required to be OPERABLE with: , E~ r -m'. This a w e?CCWGiip'i'I;
%.%h.+.s wsv..we.........v.< )
I b??"$Ts6_7CCF_hi.lfiskEhidi.
-- - .m - m- f.s. f._s?
~
c'T"ITW6Widshdahtsf16iFpithfEipsbliE6fid66.l iiif fin}RHR ,
'hejifjpthangerMnjSIjpumpga[c ntijfugalscharging i pumpjgand;anjjHRjpumpj DOT.G6?is_rg^ei.ti6k,iW..
u.# . and (( {Aj[6d}atid[{ipihi?if(jilV @] Ths!0PERABIOTW&f6fiiEhfCC7psisi@ihdiddeiEthE?Eipilsil i ti"lts Au t omiti c al lylst a rtsujion sct0 a tioniofiths id s s f o f; P6we r l DiessifGeneratoriStirt!!nstrbmentition S The 0PERABILITYidf eadh f CCi puppli n1 M00ESij.1 ;d 2 d 3 N on4 ?aliosi hcl udes 5 the ~ '
~
capsbility'to 'startsastomatically4henfrsquireditoisuppdr't t heH a fetyEi njec ti snifunc ti ojiM Thi s tfsdU deb tha t5 the~ diessisgsn#ratorja'sssciatediwithieach;0PERABLECC
-~ ' " " '~ " ' ~"
pump ~ili'i ~~ OPERABLEi mn ,~ ,n .
, , , , ,, , c , - , , -
~ v me -.
s .f.d. . ce: .:', t .s s 4 .- e ':vx h. / > ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.7-40 Rev. 00, 11/24/96
CC System B 3.7.7 BASES APPLICABLE The CC System also functions to cool the unit from RHR entry SAFETY ANALYSIS conditions to MODE 5 during normal and post accident (continued) operations. The time required for this cooldown is a function of the CC components and RHR subsystems operating. One CC pump and heat exchanger are sufficient to remove decay heat during subsequent operations in MODES 5 and 6. This assumes a maximum service water temperature of 80*F occurring simultaneously with the maximum heat loads on the system. The CC System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy , Statement. l LC0 TheECC?systss!isih6Fmallf{6piFatsd?is?aYshifed?systsisthit ) proVides(doolingito(equipmentionfb6thiunitsMThereforedths 1 Mode sioff both ? uni t simu st : be (cons idered i fo ri determi ni ng i' the '
'~~'~ ~
r.e qu i renisn ts y fo# anIOPERABLEfCCllSys tem k System operation with the common heat exchanger flow path shared between the two units is acceptable for the CC System. Furthermore, a heat exchanger does not need to be valiTediis to be considered OPERABLE; manual isolation does
^
not affidt OPERABILITY since the component is capable of being aligned and is not required until the recirculation phase of a LOCA. In?iddiffoh',i?iis urgeEtsh k{ddisTh6tf nesd %.to
~ ~ ~ " ~ ~
bdisil yedilWl;t olbe{c6n s id6 rsd }0PERABLE;f 3 , for5both.sh;ftil]n7M00ESilM2] reggired] M be[QfERABLEiwith:j3J M M the2CCJ ystsEjis ai lFbufICC3uips bl 5Thfee[CClhistisshangersj; ci 4Tk6fridu6dshtU.1l6Fpathsstoicapabis?sfic6olihgfansRHR
'heatiexchangeMfan!SI3pumpMalcen' trifdgalichargi_ng1 ^
pu;mpyand[in::RHRyumpif6rfehch" unit 9nj.MODESQQ2,@ or;4 y di ' iTW6Ishhielt.;ahkyfind El 7Asi66iit's~dyi)WgjshdNa1Vhst (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-39 Rev. 00, 11/24/96
CC System l B 3.7.7 BASES (continued) APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the CC System is a normally - operating system, which must be manually aligned to perform its post accident safety functions, primarily RCS heat removal, which is achieved by cooling the RHR heat exchanger. Withil66tK 6f~thi~CC[istisjiMMODE 5 or 6, the OPERABILITY requirements Sfitima/edeterminedb piiEif]MD${thiiCCM95tl4sif!6[y.pathitojthMRHRjhat the systems it supports) exchanggtj. i l l l
- l. ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note indicating that the l applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.4.6, l 2
"RCS Loops-MODE 4," must be entered if an inoperable CC l
component (s) renders an RHR loop inoperable (incapable of
)
removing decay heat). This is an exception to LC0 3.0.6, which directs the Required Actions of LC0 3.4.6 to be taken l in addition to the Required Actions of this LCO. l All ICiensfCC4silTsidhiiiiFXfs%iW6piriblsWithib6thTuhiti3ih MODES 11il2 M3 Hori h actidh?mssttbeitakihitsfrestbrehth'e'
- inopsrsblefCCihsatienhshssrftR0PERABLER:stitusi!{Seienfdiyi
, arespf6VidsdMdVFsstuis:IthelinspipabisjCCibsati:e'xshingerf ' l Atd thelfehdf6ffssiehldsy@bbthiuni ts7 mdst$bsishstdown 5i $th 11esisfishGttingsd6shib6thibhiti%[howev'erDoneIUnitfasi;ib4 plaesilihtoffsteleist?M00Es57dbring thessevedidafipffiedf'
.hichfall6Wss.Condi.ti66fg6(bs];lexitedig1HoweyerMC6nditioMB w
15M tll]d E dffac % t Ohi!CC?Niit?eishi6finitifsb1 Efti6fiuppsf ti bsth?Fid6hdantX fisW
- pit hissp~ibleid ffcool i hg Eanj RHRihe atiexchingeMahtS If pump,
! ~ a ?centrifsgsl?chiffisfpuinpMind shlRHRipumpO:TheFhfofelone.. Li nope rsbl s! CC i heats exc hangerf: Theiremai rem 6ves!'o'nlylthe[h i nglfp^a fsilurefpr teetionnsddndancyQ: exchanisr(;s)5hWeflheiciphbLil ityVof2supponing1CC7 rtindfallyCCsfl6W heat ' ~~ psthshdThedhapletidnitimeMsiress6nablef bassd?onithe' " redundAnth i'pabilittis?AffoEdedibyiOPERABLEECCspump" '~~'" stand ggjagsfuf@gftsjsitiss[per.iod!.a~'~~
~
l l l-(continued) t ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-41 Rev. 00, 11/24/96 l t .
- . _ _ - ___ _ . - . -. ~ . -. . -.
CC System B 3.7.7 BASES (continued)
- ACTIONS. : Bil'
' (c. ont. inued)'
;gy.E CC?hiatlexchanysr7iLsfinbpeFabli Vithion.19?ohi[d6itiijs
. M00ESil;j23 3, for;:l:4 M then : action::must? be:itakenitoi restore ~ theTrequired:CCTheatjexchanger!withint30idays..(With both Unitstin! MODES!1p2;t3/orl4MbothiCondition:ALand1C6ndition Biareientsped .fa'n_d!Conditio.niAlijf.the:l controlling 316ckTl ~ untillohelunitlisishutdownt 1.When!at;1eastfone::unitt;is?in M00ES?5fohf6):!Conditi6niBibecomes)theio'nly?applicabls" Condi tionOIf fone suni ts i side fuel ed s ths? numbeho firehuTFid CCf heat?sxchan$sFssj sjtwohio;thelConditionswillinni be;> appl i c abl eX.wi t h {onlyfone t heatjekch ;yange ri i n o p OneFCC76biCExchihierMRlible[tbiiEppoFt? tisthirsdshdsntsfl0w pathsfespablelof co611ng ang;RH_R heatfexchsnhsenanTSI]p0mpi afcentri fugalfcharging 2 pump, ) and L an1RHR: pumpf Thereforei one i noperabl eq CC"hsate exchahgerf removes : 6nlyl thels ingl e f:' pa s s i ve failure / prot'ectioniredundancy.[Theremain'ing.CChestj exchanger (s)t havelthe;; capabil i ty:: o f. supporting 1all1CC/ flow paths O The:com61;etionitimelis? reasonable ? base'd onTthe redundant l:capabilitiesfafforde~dbyLOPERABLE;CC; pumps #nd ~ fl oppath sidu ringJ t hi's itimsipe riod ; 4 C.1 and C.2 l If one required CC pumpi or flow path dapablii6fM6611hg:?ah RHR~ heiffex6hihierkan SIfpOmpshThentrifugalichirgingspump; and!an(RHRlpumpfis"~in6peeable, action"must"bs~'talden~to^ ' ~
~
Eestore the req'uired pump or flow paths to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In t.his Condition, the' remaining 0PERABLE CC pump ahd flow path ars adequate to provide the required cooling ~ The 7 day" Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE pumps indiflo@hiath, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during t p ^s period. i i (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-42 Rev. 00, 11/24/96
CC System B 3.7.7 BASES (continued) ACTIONS 0.1 and 0.2 (continued) If one CC pump and one CC flow path dipibleloffso61thg?id RHR(hestEixch a, hgs QanJ S Gudij^centrifug al (c hirg i ng jums
~
andManiRHR:pumpg are inoperable, action must Us tiken to Fssfir5"^thi CC pum WI.. thin,24 hour.s._p or the CC flow InMS;is?E6nditi.6n p@ath to OPERABLE status t ijyidsjitible conti nue toperat i onp for524 l hours; tivi thout{ia i redundan andlaWedundint i flbw pathidThinis?becauselinthis"^~ " c6nd.iji;entthe rmaining)0PERABLE{CCfpumps;and(fl@athisFi adequateltolpr . ide the! required!coolingGandjthereli.sja41osi probabiliQofa.DBA}ccurringjpuripng]this7periodjA E.1 and E.2 If the CC component (s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, or if two required CC l pumps are inoperable, the unit must be placed in a MODE in I which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the l unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and in i MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies proper automatic operation of the CC pumps on an actual or simulated actuation signal (i.e., safety injection, and safe shutdown sequencer by the Loss of Power Diesel Generator Start Instrumentation, LC0 3.3.5). The CC l System is a normally operating system that is not typically l actuated as part of routine testing during normal operation. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit I outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint. REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 9.2.2. ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.7-43 Rev. 00, 11/24/96 i l
s ,aa 4 -- -.v' '~.e - m - , - ,-- h 0 t i I l \ I i t I l l l l r CTS MARKUPS l t t l l l l t i
3.r[7 7 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION y g- g 7,7j/y o SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT
- 3. 5.1 Ced. B 3.8 5. One accumulator may be inoperable for 4.8 5. A. 4. b.
one hour. The accumulator isolation valves , (IMOV-SI8808A, B, C and D) 3,g.33 y J B./If these conditions cannot be met 3B0 shall be stroked manually from the f the reactor shall be brought to the , control room to check the position ' hot shutdown condition within four 3.S-36 indicators and annunciators every ! 3.5-3q hours. After a maximum of 48 hours ' refueling outage. ! in the hot shutdown condition, if 3 Y'17 5. Not Applicable. 35' 3T the system is not operable the '
^[ i reactor shall be brought to the cold shutdown condition within 12 B. Not Applicable.
( hours. t
- 6. Component cooling system 6. Component cooling system j Lco L7.7 A. The following number of component A.
cooling water pumps and heat ' h. Surveillance and testi of the
.s component cooling pumps systems
~ exchangers shall be operable f 85~ b shall be performed as follows:
'~ IndicIteT t6'~bF169 The reactors ^'
(fromhotshutdownto.hotstandby1) J. / 6f' Each component cooling pump shall One unit I..._._........ I. in cold shutdown andyp be tested pursuant to g]- 12. Specification 4.0.5. one unit from hot shutdown to r hot standby: !
, ~ - ~
t y 3 pumps _and 2 heat exchangers ) 3, F32. jlg g/l 3,7,/,l ta/ dh+e
- 12. Two units from hot shutdown tol 3, /.12. '
hot standby: - _ -_ 4 pumps and 3 heat exchangers k
- 3. One unit operating and one unit from hot shutdown to hot i standby: :
4 pumps and 3 heat exchangers _ f ?.1. 65' i 175 Amendment Nos. 136 and 125 i i _ _ _ _ _ ______m .___ _ _ _ . _ _ = . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -_ _ _ _ r .-
o LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT
~
3.7.7 3.8.6 fB. Except as specified in Sections 3.8.6C 4.8.6 B. Not Applicable. K and 3.8.6D the following numbers of
) components cooling water pumps and heat .
exchangers shall be operable when the reactors are in hot standby or operating: !
- 1. One unit: 3, ;r - 6 %
3 pumps and 2 heat exchangers -'
- 2. Two units:
( 4 pumps and 3 heat exchangers C. From and after the date that two of the C. Not Applicable. P/l A.I component cooling water pumps are found or made inoperablefdurI5g~2 uniN
" f- 6f
? '
operation, reactor, operation on one unity may proceed indefinitelyf Reactor ('3. 7 - 1 operation is limited to 7 days n - ~ (bther unit profidea (nat, during those 7 QH paar cono 4 days, the remaining three pumps and the i g'g g 7 dS.% 28) preeheatexchangersareoperable. C ', , D. From and after the date that two of the D. Not Applicable. Pil 6.l,6.1 c mp nent cooling water pumps and one of the heat exchangers are found or made , . . . . _ . inoperable _JIuring 2 unit operation, r reactor operation on one unit may Loroceed indefinitely _/Teactor operation - g3 -(J l is limited to N iiours on the~5tfier unit- ^ : C3*7- 12. (provided that,diirinifTNose 24 hours, ,__ 77 g the remaining threa pumps and the tremaining 2 heat exc_ hangers are operable.g _ t 176 Amendment Nos. 144 and 133
2.~L 7 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ' SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.8.6 , (E'.'
~
' .
- If twotheseToriditions if Ins hea~t eEhangerscannMioTif are fourtd_or 4.8.6 E. Not Applicable.
( f a 'l made inope_rable a jthe7eactor(s)~~iliall be
~
/((broughTto the hot shutdown condition ~
(9; I within 8 hours. After a maximum of 48 hours in this condition, if the minimum requirements cannot be met the reactor (s) shall be brought to the cold R A C.l/t.2-shutdown condition in a period
' 3.~7- consistant with the heat removal /
' ' capability of the remaining heat " 87'3/o exchangers.
- ~ . _ _
(3.7-m 3I J 3. 3.3 /lcnord A)of .
. _ , , _ _ . - . - ~ ~ . - - - -
m 177
m- .- O O i r I DOC CHANGES i l l l l l l l 1 l l l t - l l I i l l t l l
1
- i
. DISCUSSION OF CHANGES i SECTION 3.7: PLANT SYSTEMS i (continued) l NSHC N0. DISCUSSION M. 65. In MODES 2 and 3 when inoperable MSIVs are closed and de-activated to comply with Action requirements, an additional action has been provided. This action requires verification that the inoperable MSIVs remain closed and de-activated on a periodic basis. This change provides assurance that the action requirement requiring the i inoperable MSIVs to be closed is maintained. The change represents I an additional restriction on plant operation. L-1. 66. The time specified to transition to MODE 5 with inoperable MSIV(s) has been extended from 30 hours to 36 hours. This extension is i consistent with the allowable time specified in LC0 3.0.3 to conduct ; a cooldown to HOT SHUTDOWN. This change is consistent with { NUREG-1431. 1 A. 67. The application of the " Specification 3.0.4 not applicable" statement is retained through application of the proposed l Specification 3.0.4 since proposed Condition C allows unlimited - continued operation.
]
Mk~ T68.' ' ~Tw6' i'dditional Conditlons;' Requifed 'Act1665,~' a~nd' Co41etl'o^n^ Times
" "' have been added to the'ITS. Because of th'e requirement'to have four j CC' pumps and three' CC heat exchangers OPERABLE with one unit in i MODES 1, 2, 3'or:4; and the other unit in MODES 1,' 2, 3, '4,' 5; or 6, . l two" additional Conditions >with associated Required ' Actions and l Completion Time's <have been added.' fThese Conditions address one inoperable CC heat' exchanger with both units in MODES 1, 2, 3 or 4, s
and one unit in M00ES,1, 2, 3 or 4 and the second unit in MODES 5'or
- 6. Depending; on the MODES of > the units, these Conditions are provided to cover the situation hwers' there a,re no CC pumps or, flow paths inoperable, but a CC heat exchanger is inoperable. ' As sucht this is an, addit,ional restgiction on plant operation. ,
l l ZION Units 1 & 2 3.7-15 11/24/96 i
m mm- Ah#.*m_mp.A__4lm.-nA .ssu*,- eA4 J-m._4a.m -,'*.a A..J A aLA 3 ._w A -#_iM 4ws___ah.-ara Am A.4.'s.- A4JhM42.__Q__eA.mW 9 m A M .* a. dw=_,.*-,.4vp+-..&- I O 1 1 l i l
\
H 4 W 4 i i ? i 1 I i t, i 9 4 i NUREG MARKUPS d 4 1 f 4 I i i } 4 i k i 4 b 1 I a 8 J J
CC System 3.7.7 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS l
- .la 3.7.7 Component Cooling CC ) System Q\\ LCO 3.7.7 WCff trar,s'shall be OPERABLE.
l
' Tk# V .
pv Q s APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. I. 1
- ACTIONS % j CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I g.f 0ne we .1 --------NOTE------- ec [ '
y inoperable. Enter applicable gg Conditions and D . Required Actions of 5 i
% Af "F"#8 LCO 3.4.6, 'RCS 3 moperah&- Loops-MODE 4," for
! residual heat removal ; l Aj loops made inoperable l j {by CCW.
\...........-------..a p i 9E Gfaa dD i ,gs Restore CCW t.. J do M urs i
g OPERABLE status. [.RequiredActionand /.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours i y associated Completion A
; Time 0:f C=ditiedTjo' g_ _ f not met.
os /.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours
> rwarqualcc,p m opeakh .
4 s 4 v -
~
~ --
- c. or, regaea cc d. i Reaa reet ea cc nre ,
f d puup ing ercMe. paq to OM A A R Li I A' d oc s tem s. t? O ' dad CCSlow & 9dm y p ?e a y Rake apiadce M a b QPE M LE sla M V - WOG STS 3.7-17 Rev. O, 09/28/92
. . . . . - . - . - . ~ . . - . - - . . . _ . . . . . . ~ . ~ . _ . - - . - . . . . . . . ...- ... . . . _ -
I s INSERT 3.7-17 ; l 1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I i A;z 10ne 're;qu_ ired; CC h' eat . A. l. Restore required.;CC '7 days exchangers:. inoperable heat exchanger-to l Withtboth/ units?in~ OPERABLE, status.
. MODES jl, ; 2, ' 3,;;orr 4.
I B. !0rie{ required;CCjheat B.lL Restore required ~CC 30 days i ! "bxchanger inophrable heat: exchanger;to l n OPERABLE!s'tatus ! Withione;.;unitr N00ES yl,12,J:3,;ori' ._3 1 1 l l l l l i ! Zion Units 1 & 2 INSERT for 3.7-19 11/18/96 ]
. _ - - . . - - - _ . . . - - . . ~.....- - - -. -. .. ..
, ,, l w -: ' ' , CCV System
/ 8 3.7.7 to
) 8 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS c, 66p 8 3.7.7 Component Cooling ( (CC) System CCW # 00 W_ BASES _ y --g1_s%1r a y w. qu O.) 7
- BACKGROUND The CCW System provides a heat sink for the removal of l
,4,,. process and operating heat from safety related components
! during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient. During . normal operation, the CCW System also provides this function for various nonessential components, as well as the spent fuel storage pool. The CCW System serves as a barrier to the ! release of radioactive byproducts between potentially radioactive systems and the Service Water System, and thus to the environment.
^
g l 4 j j g [f--NS6/T
,T. %(A capac'typicaTC'CW y cooling loops,System co onents.
is arranged and has isolatable Each safety related train includes a full as two nonsafety related indepen ' L-q~ g pacity oump, surge tank, heat exchanger, piping, valves, 41 pe Q' and instrumentation. Each safety related train is powered pc(6#'3 p, / from a separate bus. An open surge tank in the system
. LC - provides pump trip protective functions to ensure that ~,
g j gg sufficient net positive suction head is available. The pump in each train is automatically started on receipt of a g safety injection signal, and all nonessential components are,
-c %$ ,Qsolated.r Additional information on the design and operation of the system, along with a list of the components served, is presented in thedFSAR, Section/9.2.2)' (Ref.1) . The Wk P it principal safety ^related function offthe CCW System [fsW@0 is the removal of decay heat from the reactor via the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System. This may be during a normal or post accident cooldown and shutdown.
APPLICABLE ThedesignbasisoftheCCWSystemisforoneCCWtrainS SAFETY ANALYSES Premove Ehe post loss of coolant accioent (wt.A) heat load from the containment sump during the recirculation phase,
, with a maximus CCW temperature of [120]'F (Ref. p). The 7$ ,p
$ggp ,
' OPERABILL71 LOCA eachthemodEmergency (ECCS) LOCA and c,tntainment maximum and , imum Ci e Cooling Syst gs I tem,respectively,.yThenormal
]G3(o 5 perfo nce of the CCW temp ature of the C [80]'F, and, dur'ing unit cooldown QM00E5(T,, 296)*F), a maximum temperature of 95'F is (continued)
WOG STS B 3.7-36 Rev. O, 09/28/92
_ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ __. ._.._.___ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . ~ ._ i 1 - i e-i INSERT 836A 1 t-Th"elC'C$Syst'smilifaEshsFid?sistemshicEpFofidssialbsitisink2for I i thehemova1K6f!pFosessiand opersting> heat fromisafetyfrelated ~ ? i comp 6nentstldsrindia?Desigh? Basis!AccidentE(DBA)$orttrinslentL i Ddri hginoFmalfspefati dnh ths ~ CC; Sy st em Tal so < provi dsss thi s (funct i 6n ! fo r3a rlfou sinsne s sent iallicompondnt s RaBWel i ss ? thsTspen tifuel ' ~ i st6 fag 6poo1QThsiCCsL S istemss'ervsifasiatbardij$tditheffelease70f i i Fad i cact t wel byproductstbetween sp6tenti al 19fbidi oadfiVensis tessiaFd ' j thslSerM ys Wat M Sfstes[{ahd s husitbMhefepitf6nse W ~ ~
~'
1 { ThsFCCISfit4iiifEoKiist'si6T3fi9isCC7pUmpiKihys&ICCf huitisichandeW ~ 3 4 tsoTsurgeytanksR and? ass 6disted Walves?andipiping %hich? support ' . th'sitsd unitiESThssCC? System?bsntiins?rsdundant3safeti~y?relate flbRpathfDMfldWipithic6nsistsfofittieipipingiAnd30sl es" ~ ! nbsessi'rists?prbeide so61tnsikate ntsEthitRHRIheatiekchangi @ is i l-SI;;pJmp halcenthifdghlichsFging?pumpM an_dhan}RHRTpumpiM To ^ ~ ' con s i der? a t fl owpatht 0PERABLEs i ts mustq bei ei therdil igned f o ricapabi s relstedilbadsidandibe^~~ offbeing?aliihedsts$itsfrequiredisafstif'srgeftinks tEabh@ Ump
~
andfiss 1 sUpp'orted!bija(CCiheitssshhinge@ey?dieseligeneratorihTheLf
$0pplisdMfrom?alsEparatMsme'rgen pu.mp si suppliRfissitoithsithreej he atf exch shgsrsWi aiafc6smdn ~ "
3 hssde d howeVsdessh2psmplos heatseschingsridanibe$isolited[feom thefo theps ?wi thout5iffed t ing (ths7Fesa in i ndJfl osE ps t h s MThe Ts urde
- i. tankshinitheisystemtbrovideVassupanceithattadequatsEnatpositive "" '~ ^ ^ ^ ~
j " s ubt .i 6_n. i h.si.d_d_i..s ?h_sa i l_ab_l_eT^' ~~ '
~ -
i i i T6?iubbhFtitEsTEspibil'1t' y tt6?tsblsd6wh?t6fMODES15?oE6%(sithdr ! nbimal J os po s tisc ci dent)pfaisi ngl es fl osi ps t Ecap abl e fdfR ool i ng ?in ! RHR%eit#sxdhangedis$ req 01Fedi3Whek:5?uditsisMs!M00ESS57686I~ theinumbsrf6firedliirediflostipathhisidepsndehtidn!thetnssberiof ~ , FedsiredjRHRilbopss ! Spe c'i ficiti o nf 32427
~
31934R(diedsd bior!31905 (t Do Tma'i but!!i s d aldt'aih1M00ES;5?o waysta tsliis t?ohe i ' p! 6) $s Fj ! WheMii un i t31'sidefuel sd W thers 2i s t no deqst rement? forithel RHR i fl od" pht h MThsi f16kibsmand yais6c ia te@si f hie ac@ Sife ti;Rsl s tid s"fl oi pat @ tin!beinet3bf?dne!CCspbspfpesfTodpath! jTheFefareMa
~
i mi h imum l6 fionef fl osipith 6( ahd icon seduehily foneiCC7 pump)3i s. i
.i
.r.e,qu.~..r. e. d. s..fo...r...i..e. .s..shf,u_ n i..t s_ i...n,.1M. .O. . DES.i.i,.,M,2,,.a..,. 3, v8.,, 4 $516r! 6 I^
i-i TheIC C5 Sfit enifil sb?pfoVidss76661 155Et olthe*f6116dihg716ad siwh f c h afeinotere ] requ i rep d@qu Rs @ i red s f 6 rincei keistiony ' " dent uni t'i g~s tionQu rp6 s p s 3 bu tj
^~ "~ ~ "
4 1 i 41,b aletdo~wn~g a_'? ReiEt'dFFEB.hea. _.mttexc angeri .oli6tT..
~
~
~~m. pTm6. .t'.6'FI. ~?isditnsFmal
! El'llEscesfilstdoun(heatfexcKi6giF7 1 di iSsalfsaterthsat?exchhnge Q ~ ~ e W SpestMfdel fpsol ? heitisxchaEpEF? i ft IRCSisimp1.eiheat?eichingdrs} ^ I gi ;Rsact6rivesselssupp6rtJco61in I hs
- ~
?WasteThisRom.p,Fsssops. dsndE 'g; i
Zion Units 1 & 2 INSERT for B 3.7-36 i 4 1 I 1
- . - ~..-.-_--_. - -. - . - . . - .. . - . . - . - . . - - .
I l INSERTEB36A l j ?(continued)[ 73 ' 7FWi[ed[fss1ljnohitdrJcoelingi a f Thsf f16widsmaddiisi6d i stidMi th? this all dad s Edid? b47mst5 bif b nsi;'CC i pump and d.,i -s-sthefe..qu. i Val.ent?. demand-lo fidhs ' RHR Lf.i bw :pathi.descri. bad z ; ~ . ~ - - -. d 1 ThiFif 6 FiEAItsfil7uf {tKFei~ CC j p5mpE1FeiFs4ifi FidTshusssiFT5hs !
' Un i th s di ni MODESel R2 E3 ?od4 M and1t he #othe rlUn i thi @ i nTHODESily' l 233 R4fE5? ors 6M Af totelN6ff two? CCipunpsf afeWsq0i redrwheneVsr i
- _one~~n~ i s.n.i th.i s.._d .n .M_00E Si_l y..~25. 3 s o r.f;---
4 pind i.t hs ? ot_he. B,,u. n i t. : Sis.idsfdelsd5. I I i
~~j_sth.s5(Ar:st_he.tequh_alen,,tkof;tw)oi,CCf,ppspfk f16s .. . . . . - .
~~
BEschi shisif ThiFifirEElitsfiliufitsd?CCihia tisEhanssFifiFsl[Fi46t rid onst uni t:11sfi n i M00ES?1 M 2 si!316Fs4; f and F t hel othe rfdni thi s?i 1h263 r$4 N5 form 61 ) A ft otalj o ffonu1CCJ hsa tf ekdhingiFii s 6 resui wheneVe dsfdeled; do 4nejnitMgintM00E.Sjlh2MJforiMndithej6theriunitsis j ThsTf16s?fstliAffU~mp?aWd[HistisiEhinist?FsdshdiWEiiFiduiFiiishisiiFi
.i.ndspe'ndentI6f.ieachiotheFMAni;hdditionsl?CC/pufsp?t skrsqdf fid ito 4
meetni ngl elf a i l ure i c ri teri a ;ia'nd t an f addi ti onalf CCt he a tlexc h i is #sqntreditofmestipsisissisi6gletfailurefpfotsationsbrit'eFia C Rsdandancifreddirementsif6r!RHRifloWrpaths#apeiunitsspecifiW"and ~ do)hotsimpsdtiCCyp Add i stinalf C.C?sioMeatiekchangdrslarspump l ump?oEC6hsatiexchangedrsodi ~~ fejnintsi ' po t sn ti jlsfailu re'si6 ff thessRomponen tsT~'$sdui fsdj becidssf 6 ~ 7ElFsdC5dintif16si Wh*Esilh? pumph:a Mods"i51HW{3ETdE4}F$aniSIj ian(RHRiheatsx6hahde ehtrifug~al#chafiing pum An y add i t i 6n allCCipdepli sifiqdi fsd Kf o risi ngl ej fa i l d eelc Fi t; sri s? fo ri" t he] CCi p 0mpV6 and #sniaddi ti onalL CCi heatJexchange rsi s?requi Fsd i to~ meetyp a slsivefs t pgl eifa i l u re@o teeti d@jfi terlla [fors;t hss CCshe a t ~ ekchangersi j i Eibh? pump fiQtomitiiallyJitsFts?Upon!!Pece ipt?6 f7E75a fet9Ainjs6ti 6h i sign' ale (ff6m';bt tsfis'sociated l uni t) f orifrom5theisifelshutdoWn~ ^~ ~ " s equs hde r ibylthe do s s io f! PoWe RID i e s'el s Gene rat oF/ Stsrt" I n's t rume nia ti on M LCO13: 3 i 5 UThreeTpUmpsfafesn6Fmillijasls6ciafsd WithlUsit?lp(0CC005f0CdOCC006100$andi:0CC00730E)fanditwofpumps' a psinoFmal lyiss s oc i a t ed yi th ; Uni t12g(00.C 003[0Agandf0CC004 -08) )] Zion Units 1 & 2 INSERT for B 3.7-37
- . -. _ .- . . . - ~ .- . . . . . _ _ . . - . . . - .._ - . . . - . . .. . .
I INSERT 8368 taiTfeisbielthMIpbstTli.0CAibhitUdadi'ffsinithi7f6ntiinment ' resi rlcul'a fi oni ssapibfsthe i;af fsc tedi nni tiduri tii! t h'e WedfEEslit i6ti phaie ; iandisfeil tadsss sly 3"remoVitthini6rmahishutdostn hea til oad '
~ ' ' ~ ^ ~ ~ ~ ^ ~ ~ ' ' ' ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ " ~
.fr.o. m. (,t. h. .i..W_ii,af_f_eE..ts_d,isn_it.. n. ;.m a
i d 1 1 3 i l l i j I 1 1 l i ) $., i 1 s i e t 3 1 1! l l 1 4 l l Zion Units 1 & 2 INSERT for B 3.7-38
CCW System { 8 3.7.7
/
- BASES
, 3,k V The J(siqd _ ;- re,ckcu(o hA .
tP' j APPLICA8LE Cimnd .-) prevents the containment
- sump fluid from j SAFETY ANALYSES increasing in temperature during the recirculation phase (continued) following a LOCA, and provides a gradual reduction in the I temperature of this fluid as it is supplied to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by thg(ECCS) pumps.
l _ _ IM-M , ifhe C stem s ow2.gd te per ions _its function withh i
%' ingle ****' e of any active ca=nonent. assumina a loss of ;
*U' l $j' fu Xer 837A The CCW System also functions to cool the unit from RHR
.& aA% m&l%)
/[, '
l entry conditions 7 " ' ^" % to MODE 5 -e-d/- d
- Gac; gig d rjn,g t normal and post accident o@perations.
time required 6 coo 1# _1 - ' = - -
- is a function The
! of the number of CCW/a~n'd Rf6 48!B5 opirat ng. One CCW - cr*p#g _ sufficient to remove decay heat during subsequent operations e tn t m e R00 T This assumes a maximum !
- service water temperature f F occurring simultaneously
! P"'"P # ( with the maximum heat load on system. I heaAe4e"l") C e ooes.: -4 6, The CCW System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy . Statement. 4 )
~
j LCO l fThe that each CCil has strains' ate controls are independent and power suppliesof andeach the other t i
- f5 s operation of e does not depend on the other. In the event 4, of a DBA, e CCW train is required to provide the sinimum i i Ml1 fInJSETT
- g e 'q heat re al capability assumed in the safety analysis for 3
! b the s ens to which it supplies cooling water. To ensure l thi requirement is set, two trains of CCW aust be OPERABLE. r A east one CCW train will operate assuming the worst case i ingle active failure occurs coincident with a loss of hn d ,d offsite power.
- 4 A CCW train is considered OPERABLE when:
40 { f6 a. The pump and associated surge tank are OPERA 8LE; a'nd
- b. The associated piping, valves, heat exchanger, and i instrumentation and controls required to perform the
] . sarfety related function are OPERA 8LE. l isolation of CCW from other components or systems no
- y. c quired for safety may render those components or systems f ra '{g l ty (continued) l M j WOG STS 8 3.7-37 Rev. O, 09/28/92 i
l f 4 INSERT B37A An OPERABLE CC System provides the required redundancy to ensure ! that the CC System safety functions can be accomplished assuming l either; 1) loss of the onsite electric power system (diesel ' generators) assuming offsite power is available, or 2) loss of the offsite electric power system assuming onsite power (diesel i generators) is available, coincident with a single failure (a passive failure is only assumed during the recirculation phase). Passive failures resulting in a breech of the CC System fluid 4 boundary are assumed to result in a maximum leakage of 50 gallons per minute. Further, redundant components and means of isolation are provided so that the CC System may be separated to serve each
; unit independently during normal cooldown and following a LOCA.
l INSERT B37B 1 ThilCCHistiniTfiinoFmill$opsutidissiah haFed Tsystsmithat pioVi ds sE6ol inpito Teqdi pme n tfo'nl bo t h![un i ts . . LTh e re fore sthsi Modes off b6th?Uditiimust?bsf consideFed[for;:Ldeterminingithe3
~
regliirements
~ ' ~ " ^
fpyahf0,PERABLEi(CCjSfstini}i ' System operation with the common heat exchanger flow path shared between the two units is acceptable for the CC System. Furthermore, a heat exchanger does not need to be ValVh'd?in to be considered OPERABLE; manual isolation does not affeWOPERABILITY since the component is capable of being aligned and is not i required until the recirculation phase of a LOCA. Is?idditibnMi iuris7tinQd6sifh6tfhbeditbibsWaljsdiinit61befco;nsidered' OPERAB._LE;
- m ;
i Fo 6 b6t hTiidi Gsi n? H00ES $1M223 y^o rJ 42:t h e ; C C / Sis temii sEreddi r5d
'~~ ~
to;bsj 0PERA_B.L,EjLwith! s; E ,:T6UMCCjikspij bi ljJhFeijjCCihelatfeichangersh l V di^ sTW65rsddhdaht"flbR
~ heat /eichange@an)pithsf t67Eapable*bfM6611ng inLRH SI?puspMa(centrifussWhardinglT pumpgind;[an)RHRjpumpjfoneathiimit(iin MODESilM2@
orf 4p
- d. iTW6250tge[tl inky [and b %siMistid[pfpp{anQsljes'!
t Zion Units 1 & 2 INSERT for B 3.7-39 I
1 INSERT 37B l (continued)l?F6hfiYiihils7ssiflinIMODESW2M3R6EJ43sf tEthifiedond f Unit"lin
'M00ESi5sog6;ithelCC(Syste;mf:isYre.quiFedjtojbeJPERA.B.LEfwithi ~ ~
g 3 F ((oDB CCypsmpy bi '_.1T._hibi. _[CC?h'd. ati.es. ch..ahpe.f.. i_.b
~
I i .M. .o_7:TidIFid dddant0 fr.oW55th flt6'Idapibl el.".o f'c'o611 ncFisif RHR p ~ pump gands an i RHR.. pump ; ford eath t un i t:; i n M00ES;In2 J31 . on!4s(NOTEUF66thedunit?thatjisiin1 MODEST 5(or16,ythe ! nusberisfWeqdi red s fl osjathsii sidependentisnit he'~
- nusbeddfirequ i FedjLRHRjloop sj pe rf spe c ififca,t[on 5 [32f77j
- 3. _(9.14for~$3.t.9.
._ _15 ?) ,1
- d.T. "T._Ts..alsG.Fi_siti._hkii.. _ dan..d
, E"M..i.i6B._if.id.IjfP FT.
~ - M ihd351V.dB For a single unit in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, with the second unit in a defueled condition, the CC System is required to be OPERABLE with: ,
! g i srm y. m . . mg a_x, (. pios.reeJC.C. 0 pumpsg Qld@6[Cgj@iy@EkapgerQ E@" y'iTE6Tfiduidiht?fl6E5ithi?2iiisbleI6f?si6;116~g7ihi;RHR
'^
j hijtyexchahieFE!as$5I?psspMa.icje;6tti fubalychagi nd PuggapdiangRijR;ppspy 1 ,' ~di w STu,sififfi.67l xu. tid,._lis.?...E. shd { sT*MisBaitsd j{iii.iigjahd ?9il Vis ; 3 ThijiOPE RABI t3TY!dffii6h? CC?psinpYi nel sdisitheicip abil i tj7t6 iut6 mat i silly $taftsupbs? ictuati 6hibfitheiLo si3 of L PoWerfDisiEl GenefitsESStahtilliistrdabhtitioni JThMOPERABILITYToffsash/CC!psmp i n t M00ES flM 223? forR4 f al ioli nbl udesithe' Aut6mitibilly%heldWeihifedit6fsupp6Ftith(capabilityytofstift elsifetyiinjiction~ 4 functi.66MThiRrs4dires/thit?th"e.;dissel?generatosastodiatsd?With ^ ' ~ ' ' ' ~ ~ " ' ~ ~' ~^ "~~ eacp[0PEMBLEj.CCfp,u,mplis[0PERABLEj ~ 1 i i 1 1 4 j 4 Zion Units 1 & 2 INSERT for B 3.7-40 j i
CCW System 8 3.7.7 BASES , LC0
- b!
- 5.t dem. ,,v i .f.'cci t;,e 0"C."=ILITY cf tt: C@
, (continued) Sy:teg
- m fly c1jened J q APPLICABILITY In MODES I, 2, 3, and 4, the CCW System is i normally
' '[h operating system, which must be _ . - -_.to perform its post accident safety functions, primarily RCS heat removal, which i is achieved by cooling the RHR heat exchanger. I _ In MODE 5 or 6, the OPERABILITY requirements of the CCW j eM l ggpg] System are,det, ermined ,by the systems i_t supports. 'phc ;
- 'm gy p f & L ' vs >
- - :, A w r!: !=. M h .) y : m e,
~
l C'g$ finchack oTrsdouf i ACTIONS M i "
#"' I ' "
x i
- p. #
?? ? _ cti #
. modified by Ia Note indicating tnat (cmp-M" the applicable Conditions and Requ< red Actions of LCO 3.4.6, D7 gbb gl. cops-MODE 4,'abe entered ifjan inoperable CC' '=E -
f u:o b(, je i m di ir an HR loont This is an exception to c-d( i D , @ 'p CO 3.0.6,and erre es _e a~per acticer am teken fer t'::: h e rk l l zy Dump M (lypap
%0 M D. f M O f oneIC'd t:mi .hinoperable, action sus be taken to i &C festoref0PERA8LEstatuswithin hours. n this Condition, 4 -
- n: -rining nornant r r 7-M N :pete to perform th~e
, cc P"P "d <heatremoval-function. Th *" heer Compk tier. Time- n
- atetAcWf**
r(asonable,_. based-on-the- npant capahitttferIffoNied by
- the4PERA8tE 880EIL Tan -1A# probability of a DGA J-
+k c4 punt on fgccurring durin htrNeTiUd.
C\ca Pakf% -- pwfs ~d Fluf>th Q,N% g44
" h p h
'"d 2 g_g If the CC('tteetn)cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within th)e asscciated Completion Time
'"'9 7""1', gg placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply.
the unit must be To Q qi M achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least
'"~ g 9 MODE 3 within 6 hours and in MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operatin i t experience, to reach the required unit conditions from n power conditions in an orderly manner anLwith j challenging unit systems. [
qv%.wlW k bcc
} gj.
J ~ l CC4-f" #;$ m fas ~u M.#(c[ontinued bpn C6M!
, 09/28/92 U f"*fS WOG STS 8 3.7-38 Rev. 4 i
,wl h e - <*"
pwnA % '
4 J ) INSERT B38A 4 AE1 i 2 I f76Ei7CMhiiWei'chingiFliisisopiFablii:GithM6thiuii tisi nV M00ES ? 11 233Mopf40sctionims'st?bestikenitoiest6reithelinopeFublsTCCihe)at i exdhangestoiOPERABLEsstatssMSevenidaysinelroVidedLto;rbstore' p thelinoperable CC?heatiexchindeWAtlthefeddiofisevenfda sNboth
~
unitstmust;beishdtdown!JIn21isufofsshstt:inhTdownibeth!6nttsF ~ " i ) hossysrMons?dnitMj!bsip1 AceiintofaQ1eastiMODE25{duhing: ths t
~
s evsnYdajjpeFi6dMshichtslloss7ConditisnMitolbel::exitedOHossie'r?
" ~ " ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ^ ^ ' ' ~ "
C6n. d.i. tid,n..B,liis..ist.illst h. i. sf.fedt.#.' l { OnEiCC8 hsit7iREhindsEXi
@piblafafis60linivahfRHRihsat: ssabl s?.;$ekhhangeFMa6iSIfpssp) toFsi5cFtIb6th?FsddWdint " "
centisifussRtha?pisg$hspMahd3 ins RHRfpumpdThspe fore?oss '
- inbpipabls!CC1heatiexchangsEreis6Yssionlysthissinsle:psssise failueefpF6testiosifeddhdandyQTha?Femiinini(CCihestiexchands((s),
! h AMt he scapabi l i tyfoffshppb rti hif al R CCifl 6wTp a th sh3The" '^ l dbmpl e t i dnitieeXi sf rea sonabl eK ba s ed f6ni thsitsd und ant $cApsb i l .i t'i ss i
. affoFdsd.?b.y.iOPE_RABLETCCJpumpidsdiflowlpaths?durin.
. .m -~m m - - -
.. ~
g-lthisitime ~^ ' Bil i 4 I f?hhWLCC# hiitTsidhi6gisi s7t n6pira bl e isi thFonifJohsidhi t?f s! MODES 4 In 2 h 3 Edhli 4 N then lac ti on! ass t; beit a kinitd9e s to rilt hs hequ i red ' } CClheatlieschangerisithin?30fdais i W With[bothiunitsjih!M00ESil l i 3 ?ide?4 F bo thiC66d i tionsAf and! Cond i tiosl Bi n relen t e
~
! CodditiohjAdsitheibbhtF6111ndThldhkishti1Eodefunf thinshutddyniC Cohditi n Bibecomssiths
- onlysippii?at Whin ablesC6nditidnMIffoheisnitsis M eist%snsi0di tsi sti nt MODES l 5 ? o 1
required CC4 heat?sk hangipssih tso M sotthe? Condition!willido ~ ifngerdbsJapplj_cEb1sfwith[on1y[onsihestisichangedinopsrable# OhsfCCDjiiffskEhihji@i?ib1iftdis056FtEb6th?FsddhdintEf16Risths l capableloftdoolingranjRHR?heatiexchangerManiSI@umpfi'~ ~ ~ ~ '
- cen t r i fsgalscha rging s pump Mind ian(RHRi pUsspBThe re fo re Eins 1
ino,-c'erable.lCCihsa.tlexchangs. r, nim. sVeinn,l. ithsi..,sfdgl.e'passMi .-
~ -.
. fai ure;protectionReddndancyMThs,0rema ningtCC1heatlexchan haVeithescapabilityfoff supporti6gialRCClflowLp'athsi >The~ ^ger(s)' " ! compist16nitimelihFeasonable8basedf6n?!tneIrsdundandhapabilLi~tiss af[orded $bij0PERABL E{CC[pumpsiandifl. 6sjsthls%dsridg2th is time ^ ' ~ - Peti 6d; i 1 1 1 4
)
Zion Units 1 & 2 INSERT for B 3.7-41
INSERT 838A (continued) ; C.1 and C.2 ; 4 If ^o'ne"'reqdiFed'CC 'puinp br' flow' path ~ cap ^able of cooli'ng^ a'n RHR l heat, exchanger, an SI pump, a centrifugal charging pump, and asi RHR pump is inoperable, action must be taken to restore the required pump or flow path to OPERABLEsstatus within 7 days!' In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CC pumps and flow path are adequate to provide the required cooling. ' The 7 day Completion'" Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE pumps and flow path, and the>10w probability
^ ' ^ ' ^ ' " ' ' ^ ' ' ' "
of a DBA occurring'during'this period. l 1 1 l Zion Units 1 & 2 INSERT for B 3.7-42
1
)
i 1 1 l 1 i l i 1 l l I 1 i i p DOD CHANGES l I 1 l d l l l l l 1 i l l 1 i l l 1 l l
.- DISCUSSION OF THE DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG-1431 SECTION 3.7: PLANT SYSTEMS CHANGE NUMBER DISCUSSION
- 34. NUREG LC0 3.7.8; Proposed LCO 3.7.8 A new Condition and Required Action has been added to address the relationship between SW pump operability and SW valve and component alignment to provide for minimum flow requirements under DBA conditions.
If the SW system configuration is not in accordance with the requirement for the current SW pump configuration, this indicates that SW flow may not i be sufficient to meet design basis assumptions for the given accident i scenarios. While in the Required Action, SW configuration must meet the requirements for SW operation during a DBA with a loss of single failure capability; in this instance seven days is an acceptable time frame to restore SW configuration to normal lineup. Failure to meet the requirements for SW pumps or SW valve and component lineup represents a loss of SW function, which will require an entry into LC0 3.0.3.
- 35. Proposed New SR 3.7.8.1 A new surveillance requirement has been proposed to perform an SW valve and component lineup verification on a weekly basis. The purpose of the valve and component lineup verification is to ensure that the SW system is aligned correctly to support the most limiting case design basis accident, and still maintain correct SW flow to SW components. Specifically, minimum Reactor Containment Fan Cooler flow of 1500 gpm is required to comply with design assumptions of the containment analysis. SW configuration to meet this requirement is provided by meeting SR 3.7.8.1.
360 fThe BASESE for^ LCO!3.7.7 have .been elarified to address the. Component Cooling:(CC)CSystem cooling-flow requirements. -Potential CC; flow demands may?not be met by the current number of required OPERABLE'CC pumps. The CCf. System consists: of fivei CC. pumps, three CC heat exchangers, two RHR he'atsexchangersiper. unit, and several miscellaneous safety-related loads. Three: CCc pumps andJtwo. CC.heatLexchangers are' required operable with one unitLin M00ESs1,1.2;L3,JorE4, and the Other unit in MODES 5 or 6. Actual flowLdemandseon thef CC System consists of two RHRiheatf exchangers and
~
miscellansousjsafety-related loads, which requir_e. three: CC pumps to satisfy. "A fourth pump and a-third heat exchanger are required in order to[meetisingle ; failure ~~ criteria. With one units defueled, -only lone RHR heat exchanger is required, and therefore one less CC pump is required.
- 37. , (Two addition'al Conditions, with associated Required Actions and Completion Times,-have been added to LCO 3.7.7. They address the situation _where a CC heat' exchanger; 1s Linoperable. . The Completion Times depend on the' MODES off bothf units. qThe reason ~for a specific ' Condition- for CC -heat exchangers DisFbecause"CC(System ~0PERABILITYL requires" threeHCCVheat exchangers /(two i toihandle L design' .CC. flow,. 'a Lthird? to . prov'ide- passive single -. f ailure iprotection) . Under current ITS, there 'is no Condition whichl c~ overs <the : situation where only a single CC heat exchanger is i nope'rabl e'. l ZION Units 1 & 2 3.7-9 11/19/96 1
1 l 1 1 A'ITACIIMENT 2 I Changes to the BASES for the Operating MODE Electical Limiting Conditions for l Operation 1 l l l
)
l 1 1 l l l t l l l l I 4
\
l J l MARK UP OF ITS CHANGE OI B3.8.1 - Clarification of design basis for LOOP The Applicable Safety Analysis discussion in the BASES for 3.8.1,3.8.4,3.8.7 and 3.8.9 needs to be clarified to state that the DBA requiring single-unit LOOP is a unit-specific accident that requires SI to mitigate the consequences. l 1 l
i a o AC Sources -0perating i 8 3.8.1 1 BASES (continued) APPLICABLE The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses in the SAFETY ANALYSES UFSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 3), assume ESr' systems are OPERABLE. The AC electrical power sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability L to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems j so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems. The OPERABILITY of the AC electrical power sources is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. ForaDesignBasisaAccidentthhtSrequiresSafety. Injection ~ tE bE initiite~dLtF mitigatefthe?accidentF this results in ] maintiihihg^at'least'tko ^ unit 2sp'ecific ' divisions, powered from onsite or offsite AC sources, OPERABLE during accident , conditions in the event of:
- a. An assumed loss of &F1-offsite power er cl1 cr.
- ite ^.C pc=cr on the affected unit; and 4
- b. A worst case single failure on the affected unit. =
For a dual unit loss of offsite power withoutfal unit-specific [LOCA?this results in maintaining' power to~ the necessary equipment from the onsite AC sources in addition to a worst case single failure on one unit, j The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of NRC Policy Statement. LC0 Two qualified feeds between the offsite transmission network 4 and the onsite Class IE electrical power distribution i divisions, and separate and independent DGs for each i division ensure availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown i condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a l postulated DBA. 1 1 (continued) 2 ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.8-3 Rev. 00, 12/06/96 4
DC Sources -Operating B 3.8.4 BASES BACKGROUND The five 125 V DC batteries (111, 112, 011, 211, and 212) (continued) are sized to carry the required loads discussed in the UFSAR, Chapter 8 (Ref. 2). The batteries for each division of DC electrical power were originally sized to produce required capacity at 80*/. of nameplate rating, corresponding to warranted capacity at end of life cycles and the 100% design demand. Each division of DC electrical power has ample power output capacity for the steady state operation of connected loads required during normal operation, while at the same time maintaining its battery bank fully charged. Each battery charger also has sufficient capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge to its fully charged state within 24 hours while supplying normal steady state loads discussed in the UFSAR, Chapter 8 (Ref. 2). APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the UFSAR, 'Sapter 15 (Ref. 3), assume that Engineered Safety Feature s' .-) systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the DGs, emergency auxiliaries, and . control and switching during all MODES of operation. ! The OPERABILITY of the DC sources is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based ! upon meeting the design basis of the unit. j For a Design Basis aAccident that? requires. Safety Injection.
~
tbl.belihitiateditoimitigateithe.?accidentethis'results'in maintaining ~At"least two"DC~iources OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:
- a. An assumed loss of M-1-offsite power er a' Oncite AC pcwer on the affected unit; and
- b. A worst case single failure on the affected unit.
For a dual unit loss of offsite power withoutfat unit; spesifici;LOCA7this results in maintaining DC power to the l nehesssiy" equipment, in addition to a worst case single failure on one unit. l l (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.8-56 Rev. 00, 12/06/96
. . .. _ -- - - - - - ~ - - . - - ... . - -- -
Inverters - 0perating s B 3.8.7 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.7 Inverters - Operating BASES BACKGROUND The inverters are the preferred source of power for the AC instrument buses because of the stability and reliability , they achieve. The function of the inverter is to provide 4 AC electrical power to the instrument buses. The inverters i can be powered from one of two sources: a 480 V AC source that is stepped down and rectified to nominal 125 V DC (normally providing power), and an external 125 V DC source ("bumpless" transfer in the event of loss of the normal AC feed). This 125 V DC source ensures an uninterruptable power source for the instrumentation and controls for the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS). Specific details on inverters and their operating characteristics are found in the UFSAR, Chapter 8 (Ref. 1). f APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume 1 Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The
- inverters are designed to provide the required capacity, i
capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to the RPS and ESFAS instrumentation and controls so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not j exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6,
- Containment Systems.
The OPERABILITY of the inverters is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based on meeting the design basis of the unit. Fopas0es'isn? Basis ~ A061dsntYthaftN4qdiPesTSafethInjsstionito:befinitiated to initigatelthesaccident, 4this includes miintaininig reduirbd AC"instFdment b'uses'0PERABLE during accident conditions;in the event of:
- a. An assumed loss of al4-offsite AC electrical power ev all cr. ite AC clectrical power on the affected unit; and (continued) i-ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.8-77 Rev. 00, 12/06/96
-~ - . - _ . - _ . - -.- . - _ - - . - -- - _ . -- -. . .---
a Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9 BASES (continued) ! APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and , SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume ! 4 ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC ESF, DC, and AC instrument bus electrical power distribution divisions are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and . reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and , containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, , Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems. ; The OPERABILITY of the AC ESF, DC, and AC instrument bus electrical power distribution divisions is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. For a 40esignJ8 asis..aAccidentthat@equifes?Safetf!!djsetilonjto tigateitheLaccidentMthis ihclude's I besi g g.n i ti at sd. g K t oimi..d i's t r i bu t i dii ^si'5 t ems *0P ER , accidentconditions@intheeventof:
- a. An assumed loss of aM-offsite power er al' cr. cite
^
- ,C clectrical pcwcr on the affected unit; and i b. A worst case single failure on the affected unit.
For..a dual unit loss of offsite power wihtoutWUnit? ! specificfL0gAfthisresultsinmaintainingpower'~tothe ' necessary equipment in addition to a worst case single failure on one unit. l The distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LCO The required power distribution divisions listed in the LC0 ensure the availability of AC ESF, DC, and AC instrument bus electrical power for the systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated DBA. The AC ESF, DC, and AC instrument bus electrical power distribution divisions are required to be OPERABLE. The necessary portions of the opposite unit AC ESF and DC electrical power distribution division (s) are required to (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.8-87 Rev. 00, 12/06/96
.a. m a. -,.u- A..___._. * * - -___... ..____
a m .. .m. _. k t t d 1 4 1 4 d r l l l l
\
l 4 e l i 1 I l CLEAN ITS SPEC
' AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES (continued)
! APPLICABLE The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses in the SAFETY ANALYSES UFSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 3), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC electrical power sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment. Systems. The OPERABILITY of the AC electrical power sources is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. For a Design Basis Accident thatWeqdi'resfSafet
~
to3 blelinitiatedit'oimi tigatsitheTaccidentSthi s r'ss
^~
' y?ulInject ts ' i n 'ion -
m'aintainiiig at Test'tko'Un'it-'speuifiE~disisions, powered from onsite or offsite AC sources, OPERABLE during accident ' conditions in the event of:
- a. An assumed loss of offsite power on the affected unit; and
! b. A worst case single failure on the affected unit. l For a dual unit loss of offsite power iith3dOaTunitt
~
spbcific';LOCAlthis results in maintaining ~ power"t6"the nedesisry'egeipment from the onsite AC sources in addition to a worst case single failure on one unit. The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of NRC Policy Statement.
- LC0 Two qualified feeds between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE electrical power distribution divisions, and separate and independent DGs for each division ensure availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated DBA.
l j (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.8-3 Rev. 00, 12/06/96
DC Sources-Operating B 3.8.4 BASES l BACKGROUND The five 125 V DC batteries (111, 112, 011, 211, and 212) (continued) are sized to carry'the required loads discussed in the UFSAR, Chapter 8 (Ref. 2). The batteries for each division of DC electrical power were originally sized to produce required capacity at 80% of nameplate rating, corresponding
- l to warranted capacity at end of life cycles and the 100% -
l design demand. I l Each division of DC electrical power has ample pcwer output l capacity for the steady state operation of connected loads required during normal operation, while at the same time ' maintaining its battery bank fully charged. Each battery charger also has sufficient capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge to its fully charged state within 24 hours while supplying normal steady state loads discussed in the UFSAR, Chapter 8 (Ref. 2). t i l APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and
- SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 3), assume l that Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE.
l The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency ! DC electrical power for the DGs, emergency auxiliaries, and I control and switching during all MODES of operation. The OPERABILITY of the DC sources is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. ForaDesignBasisAccidentthitireq0ireOSafetylinjsetion tifbeli g g .nitis.gied st.oliif figste~theiaccident%th i s ' resul ts ~in ' g g . so'DC" dUh ss~0PERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:
- a. An assumed loss of offsite power on the affected unit; and
- b. A worst case single failure on the affected unit.
! For a dual unit loss of offsite power withoutca unit- ~~ l speE1lfic'LOCAsthis results in maintaining'DC powe fto the ne'ce'ss&f"edtiipment, in addition to a worst case single failure on one unit. i (continued) I ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.8-55 Rev. 00, 12/06/96 O l
l l Inverters - Operating l B 3.8.7 l I B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.7 Inverters - Operating l BASES BACKGROUND The inverters are the preferred source of power for the AC instrument buses because of the stability and reliability , they achieve. The function of the inverter is to provide I AC electrical power to the instrument buses. The inverters ! can be powered from one of two sources: a 480 V AC source i that is stepped down and rectified to nominal 125 V DC l (normally providing power), and an external 125 V DC source ("bumpless" transfer in the event of loss of the normal AC l feed). This 125 V DC source ensures an uninterruptable power source for the instrumentation and controls for the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Engineered Safety i Feature Actuation System (ESFAS). Specific details on ' inverters and their operating characteristics are found in the UFSAR, Chapter 8 (Ref. 1). 1 APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume i Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The ! inverters are designed to provide the required capacity, ! capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the ' availability of necessary power to the RPS and ESFAS instrumentation and controls so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems. I The OPERABILITY of the inverters is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses _and is based on meeting the des _ign basis of the unit. For'a Design' Basis Accidenti:thatDreqdires: Safety 1 Injection to-be initiated td mitigat,eftheaccidentfthis'includesmaintaining~equiredAC r l instrument' buses'0PERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:
- a. An assumed loss of offsite AC electrical power on the affected unit; and l
l (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.8-75 Rev. 00, 12/06/96 l
Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9 l i BASES (continued) APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC ESF, DC, and AC instrument bus electrical power distribution divisions are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems. The OPERABILITY of the AC ESF, DC, and AC instrument bus electrical power distribution divisions is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. For a ' Design Basis Accident thatfreqdirss4Sif6ty"Injsetion;:toib'e i i n iti atsdi tolmi ti gatef thefaccide'nt dt h i s^ i ncl ude's ~ ^ j inaTnt'afnihfpoWEr di'stFib0t' ion"systsms OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:
- a. An assumed loss of offsite power on the affected unit;
- and
- b. A worst case single failure on the affected unit.
For 6 dual unit loss of offsite power witho_ut alunit-specifid;LOCAlthisresultsinmaintainingpow}ertothe l riecessai7 eddipment in addition to a worst case single j failure on one unit. The distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC . Policy Statement. l l l LC0 The required power distribution divisions listed in the LC0 ensure the availability of AC ESF, DC, and AC instrument bus electrical power for the systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated DBA. The I AC ESF, DC, and AC instrument bus electrical power j distribution divisions are required to be OPERABLE. l I 4 (continued) 4 ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.8-85 Rev. 00, 12/06/96
'"s M ._. m ..g,,4s_a_,,4 a
l a i I i 1 4 i I NUREG MARKUPS l l t i l 1 4 1 k 1 1
/
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES l APPLICA8LE exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the SAFETY ANALYSES Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; , (continued) Section 3.4, Reactor._ Coolant SystenL(RCS)_* and Section 3.6, !
'h- ,
,E J s @ @ W *A d '
l
- h. Aec'M The TPERABILITY of the AC electrical power iTurfiI is consistent with the initial assumptions of tfie c ' dent v"}' *p '
[ - - analyses and is based upon meeting the desig' unit.qhis results in maintaining at least -... .::: is of the h q ((g [7*ponsite or offsite AC sourcepPERABLE during/ccident - 1 conditions in the event of.
#- ,, a. An assumed loss of-a}t offsite powerer di er.:# C y,0 ;I """ 5 on ne c.4 Cec +ed ui t )
r'Y.#p / b. Aworstcasesinglefailuref
\ 3"h#.y k.%*f The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of NRC Policy Statement.
l ( y W'\# (dyMWm.D vums) l k[,f,,{.f, /fe
?)bef/
E7 A C0 4,efs Two qualified deestes between the offsite transmission r@'2'd l h<// l network and the onsite Class 1Eglectricalfower 54and j 2L separate and independent DGs for each (ggp ensure ^ ' availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated operational occurrence g or a postulated DBA. l hh V5 __ _ A( M AD antiualifWoffsite circuitsbasis arefnr those thatJ are de p Adak4 men na rt nf the licensing the unit [@ msenfBt % In addition, one renuirM Mtic load sequencer per train A - C h Uc UFtMABLE. _ Each offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated l l pN /N frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the ESF buses p 83h .- Offsite circuit #1 consists of Saf - rds' Transfonner 8, which is supplied from S
- Bus 8, and is fed through breaker 52-3 po e ESF transformer XN801, which, in turn, po e #1 ESF bus through its normal feeder br . Offsite circuit #2 consists of the Startup OE $_ ransformer, which is normally fed from the Switchyard (continued)
WOG STS B 3.8-3 Rev. 0, 09/28/92
L y t U !' f [e j (b # 3 ~J / j J d OC Sources-Operating B 3.8.4 lh1 1 i BASES l4{ci , i
- .' a j ' fr0
! j APPLICABLE electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC l a 2q SAFETY ANALYSES electrical power for the OGs, emergency auxiliaries, and
'y (continued) control and switching during all MODES of operation.
1
'j 4i "[ sr^ The OPERABILITY of the DC sources is consistent with the N '.F l initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based I AN >
l .:2 4I U?j upon meetin maintaining &gDC thesources designOPERABLE basis of the
-M rsAincludes unit. t ;[- >~.
I i 3 ' f ;3 , h least jwa r 7 during accident conditions in the event of: ,-
- a. An assumed loss of[offsite AC power .or N' c~ite l
-lI,< 3 M %;o-wr{and fen de a.Meded unit] j'4j y k b. Aworstcasesinglefailuref l i le ). d ! " The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy i P<} Statement. } t ' I i visum i M d8'"'D l , LCO jsg;L[fThe DC electricalower , each susuperum i .
' consisting of atte ' battery charger 7 =E
' 6WR-083',497'lg3-bru f9,jm and the corresponding control , equipment and interconnecting cabling +within the tede are required to be
, do VMAW'M ' OPERA 8LE to ensure the availability of the required power to i b5 . shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition g after an anticipated operational occurrence @ or a : j -/ postulated 08A. Loss of any age 4e-DC electrical power 1 ' N "-~- does not prevent the/ minimum safety function from r ?a c. j bein'g performed (Ref. . gg r y g., An OPERABLE DC electrical power et=-? requires sM V N i (Oe assodeAel}W battergsvand respective chargerg to be !Leeeeetne
=- -
and connected to the . associated DC bus (es). e- 1 Lopfanac O _ t VZMSctT BSI8 ' j APPLICA8ILITY The DC electrical power sources are required to be OPERABLE 4 in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure safe unit operation and to i ensure that: 1
- a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant
- pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result 3
of @ or abnonnal transients; g Oid ah$) P eps hduab occwta.ca s d (continued) WOG STS B 3.8-51 Rev. O, 09/28/92
I InvGrters-Operating 8 3.8.7 8 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 8 3.8.7 Inverters dperating BASES The inverters are the preferred source of power for the AC
@ ~BACKGROUNDhash meO-utM buses because of the stability and reliability they achieve.in M a ypee r:d ' = ' h: 7 0 OC O n L g - ccs The function of the inverter is to e =ert DC :1:: tis! ! B4 }y \ Prai AM >E++: = AC electrical power #*Em E =id'ag an uninterruptible power / source for the instrumentation and I o%
L J , [/NSET SM5j controls for the Reactor Protective System (RPS) and the i Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS). l Specific details on inverters and their operatin characteristics are found in th FSAR,ChapterJR(Ref.1). I APPLICABLE The initial conditio f 0 sign Basis Accident (OBA) and j e SAFETY ANALYSES- transient analyses (in the FSAR, M**++r-f61 ID=# 4 mi-M' 84 - o 4 i -- u _. Chapter f15K(Ref. '1), assume Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The T e inverters are designed
- to provide the required capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to the RPS and ESFAS instrumentation and controls so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment l design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power l
Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems. The OPERABILITY of the inverters is consistent with'the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is/ based-meeting the design basis of the unit. 4Dns includesi'"C. ...f. i (A. maintaining required AC ntal buses OPERABLE during. accident"*"" conditions in the event of: Ninsh-am.mf] p d',7
- a. An assumed loss ofdoffsite AC electrical powehYr- #
l % ._M4-eruii.e AC electric:1 pcwer; ,kn-7 and,k dede6 ad, ) .
" ^_
- b. A worst case single failuret -
7 snrcss l-r $9 Inverters are a part of the<ggwn.d pnaar and as distrioution system, {~~60] such, satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. e (continued) WOG STS B 3.8-69 Rev. O, 09/28/92
__ _ __ .. _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . ~ . _ _ . _ _ _ . . .__ ._ _ _ I 1 o j Distribution Systems-Operating ) I % o O B 3.8.9 ; ! g <_ V Vk/
\
l ! BASES (continued) i 6 ,i APPLICABLE h7 The initial conditions'of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and v ' li a ?3 SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses Tn'the FSAR,4Wpt-r [6] (hf M mu m
!i ?', W F5 % Chapter I15h (Ref. 2), assume ESF systems are A
'i D ,i '
,. ., OPERA 8LE. The ACt DC, and ACjud*si--bus electrical power
_di stri buti ongt=; are designed to provide sufficient l IJAshuAtM J l ! ._ - < . . f capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure ! - < ; Cb v.ismM/ the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that , k.2 the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design l l V.! - limits are not exceeded. These limits are. discussed in more
.<U detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution ]
j I [# Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and J Section 3.6, Containment Systems. ins hw e f.- .
's -
l
,. - g
} The OPERABILITY of the AC', DC, and AC ndt bus el rical
-v f ~' power distributiontsm= is consistent with the initial
?- '
fkvi5 ivi I assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon ! N .50?; . meeting the design basis of the unit. /hisincludes maintaining power distribution system OPERABLE during %'
~
accident conditions in the event of: /q o 4: .h -- i Q 2l < j'- i.. . . . . . . . . .. ,
- e .J gwa. L>
~'
c offsite pow'er-cr i mmc h 4
- a. An assumed loss of
. slet m1p-r, y gg
- b. A worst case single failure?
! N The distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. 1
> =w l
- LCO _
The required power distribution 1" listed ia ; l %t LCo}-M. : -: A-i-ensure the availability of AC1 DC, c.d AC l ntat bus electrical power for the systems requireo to shut
- ggggy\ down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after p g-_anunnA.
anticipated operational occurrence M or a postulated The Ad DC, and_ACMtal. bus electrical power distributionyby*--' are requ to be OPERABLE
+/]M 5mu]
(%) j_sc: k+aa+0 _ msmer y wN,] l Maintaining the Trd.i i ed 'ri 2 AC', 'OC, anif ACh bus i electrical power distribution enap:pme OPERABLE ensures i ' that the redundancy incorporated into the design of ESF is lo:sw 'a yd , not defeated. Therefore, a single failure within any systes or within the electrical power distribution C.- will
)
j notpreventlsafeshutdownofthereactor. ,y;5,q h/ _ !Wll (continued) WOG STS B 3.8-78 Rev. O, 09/2Bir.
b ,h.- 0 0 a i 1 l 4 1 d i I 1 1
- 1 f
DOD CHANGES 1 f 4 e d a J 4 1 1 s 4 4 1 4 i 2 J
DISCUSSION OF THE DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG-1431 SECTION 3.8: ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS CHANGE NUMBER DISCUSSION associated battery. This is because the voltage level of the low voltage equalizing charge will not damage the inverters.
- 42. NUREG SR 3.8.7.1 & SR 3.8.8.1 - The requirement to check inveri.er frequency every 7 days has not been included in proposed SR 3.8.7.1 and SR 3.8.8.1 since the design of the inverters does not include installed instrumentation to monitor frequency.
- 43. Each of the Class lE AC electrical power distributien divisions is capable of being supplied by a diesel generator. NUREG 1431, LC0 3.8.10 requires the buses necessary to support required equipment to be operable in a shutdown mode. In turn LC0 3.8.2 then requires one diesel generator capable of supplying one of the buses required by LC0 3.8.10. By design Zion Station has shared systems which are powered from the opposite unit's buses. For some evolutions (e.g. handling of irradiated fuel in the fuel handling building) the required equipment may consist of systems and components powered from the opposite unit. In these cases, it would be l appropriate for the opposite unit diesels to be required.
- 44. LCOs 3.8.1, 3.8.4, and 3.8.9 have been modified to require standby AC and DC power (diesel generators and DC) for an opposite unit service water pump when credited for an operating unit. The proposed Service Water LC0 (3.7.8) will require at least one service water pump from the opposite unit to be operable to address passive failure considerations. Further, j LC0 3.7.8 may require more than one opposite unit pump based on system l configuration. Current Technical Specification LC0 3.8.7 requires three l service water pumps to be operable, and allows one pump from the opposite I unit to be shared as long as specific provisions (i.e. cross-tie valves, l open, independent AC and DC power) are met and the pump has both standby AC and DC power. available. In the current Technical Specifications this j is an option, with the ultimate requirement to have three pumps operable, ;
Based on the incorporation of passive failure considerations and recent system flow perfomance capability modeling, it has been determined that utilization of an opposite unit pump is no longer an option, but is required for system operability. As such, LCOs 3.8.1, 3.8.4, and 3.8.9 1 bave been modified to require AC and DC power for opposite unit service water pumps in order to maintain continuity with the ITS usage rules and ; i l 4 l l l l I ZION Units 1 & 2 3.8-10 11/22/96
~ . . --. - . -- - - - - - - - - - . _ . - - - .-
i - DISCUSSION OF THE DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG-1431 SECTION 3.8: ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS CHANGE
- NUMBER DISCUSSION
- 44. (continued) definition of operability. LCOs 3.8.1, 3.8.4, and 3.8.9 will require the
< AC and DC buses associated with required pumps and their associated diesel l generators to be operable. Explicitly requiring these opposite unit systems (at least one diesel, DC source, and associated distribution systems) to be operable anytime the unit is in Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4 is an ' added restriction on plant operation not contained in the current . Technical Specifications._ JFordC0F3181GN8T4M358Mindi37819Mthe
. ApRifab1E54fet9?AsilfsisYdi schs kidnB hiss bisnRei shifi sdito sinc 1 sdeithe cori estgdes igniba s i siass Umpti on s / fo D Zi o@iwhiehjjig a n L0CA?oya[s thl e.
- uniti(requiringTSMto?befinitiateditoimitigateRthelaccident)gcoincident
~
wi thlalLOOPio nghela f fec ted iun i ti
- 45. The modified completion time clock associated with Conditions A, C, and D
, have been specified as being applicable to the offsite feeds, common i diesel generator, and unit-specific diesel generators. This change is > necessary based on the proposed completion time for opposite unit diesel
- generators being 14 days. As such, the modified completion time cap of 10 j days must be exempted from other inoperabilities so that an immediate shutdown will not result for conditions which otherwise would be supportive of a limited restoration time. Similarly, proposed Conditions F and G have been rewritten to be applied to only the unit specific and.
. common diesel generators. This is necessary to limit the application of 4 short duration compensatory actions requiring restoration of equipment ! based on the inability to cope with a design basis event with or without
- offsite power.
i { 46. Condition H has been added for an inoperable opposite unit diesel
- generator. This condition is necessary based on the need to maintain at 1
- least one opposite unit service water pump operable in order to cope with I postulated active and passive failures within the service water system.
- Proposed LC0 3.8.9 requires the necessary portions of the AC and DC i distribution systems to be operable to support this function, while proposed LC0 3.8.1 will require a diesel generator in support of each required service water pump. As such, in keeping with the philosophy of t
maintaining Condition and Requir3d Action for all required equipment, j Condition H has been proposed for opposite unit diesel generators. .This 1 is a new condition, and as such is a more restrictive change. . l Condition H would allow the opposite unit DG that is required to support I at least one opposite unit service water pump to be out of service for 14 ; days. It is acceptable for the opposite unit DG to be out of service for this period of time since there is no loss of function for the SW system with only the required opposite unit DG out of service. In addition, 14 days provides operational flexibility to perform preventative maintenance on the DG without the need for a dual unit shutdown. ZION Units 1 & 2 3.8-11 11/23/96
l l l I l l l 1 ATTACIIMENT 3 Changes to the Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Filtration System Limiting Conditions of Operation and BASES 4
i l ! 0 1
#~}
l l MARK UP OF ITS CHANGE l 1 l OI 3.7.13 - FHBEFS discussion on " post-accident mode of operation" The LCO and BASES for 3.7.13 need clarification that the required mode of FHBEFS operation is the post-accident mode of operation. An additional SR has been added to verify FHBEFS will be OPERABLE during the period of time the Shield Wall is not intact. i l l
FHBEFS l 3.7.13 1 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.13 Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Filter System (FHBEFS) t LC0 3.7.13 The FHBEFS shall be OPERABLE. In addition, the FHBEFS shall be in thsjji~qsQiEcidentimodeMtjoperation during:
- a. Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling building when irradiated fuel assemblies with
< 60 days decay time are in the fuel handling building,
- b. Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in containment when irradiated fuel assemblies with < 60 days decay time are in containment and the equipment hatch is not intact,
- c. CORE ALTERATIONS with the equipment hatch not intact.
APPLICABILITY: During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling building, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in containment with the equipment hatch not intact, During CORE ALTERATIONS with the equipment hatch not intact. ACTIONS _______________..__.___.___.......N0TE------------------------------------- LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Required FHBEFS not in A.1 Place FHBEFS in ths Immediately theiTp65tiidhidEntTindds ~^~ post 4Ecidenfis6de?of 6fg6pdfiU6nT opefstion. "' OR
~~
Immediately A.2 Declare FHBEFS inoperable. (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 3.7-30 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 7)
_~ . ~ . - . _ ._ - - - . - . _ - _ . . . 1 FHBEFS l 3.7.13 ) l ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME-B. FHBEFS inoperable B.1 Suspend movement of Immediately l during movement of irradiated fuel l irradiated fuel assemblies in the 1 assemblies in the fuel fuel handling handling building. building. C. FHBEFS inoperable C.1 Suspend movement of Immediately J l during raovement of irradiated fuel irradiated fuel assemblies in assemblies in the containment. containment with the l equipment hatch not intact. D. FHBEFS inoperable D.1 Suspend CORE Immediately during CORE ALTERATIONS. ALTERATIONS with the 1 equipment hatch not i intact'. I l i l 1 i l
- ZION Units 1 & 2 3.7-31 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 7)
9 FHBEFS 3.7.13
- SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY i
SR 3.7.13.1 --------------------NOTE----------------- Only required: (a) during movement of 1 irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling building when irradiated fuel , assemblies with < 60 days decay time are in the fuel handling building; (b) during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the containment when irradiated fuel assemblies with < 60 days decay time are in containment and the equipment hatch is not intact; and (c) during CORE ALTERATIONS with the equipment hatch not intact. ! Verify FHBEFS is in thelp65PsEpidsntiinddi ~ 12 hours 6f{ operation.
.S.R._73.Y....H.. 1..3_?2.f5290~lIU. STRE..R?NOTEh. ---Vi?^GM. W4
~ ~ ~ ^ ~ ~
Walliinsis11sd7 ~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~ '
*- ? $i N M P * ' - = ~ * = h--I----
VsWf filFH8EFSYi s!OPERABLEWyishsiidini?~Ed ' 7?Tds9s Venti l afi on? fibs / path ?exi s t sifroin tthe Cbutifninb6thiin(: Fuel "1Hihdlin ~~~^'s3Bdildihy?into
' ^ ^ " '
- thstPjpesT6 rih;si f SR 3.7.13.43 Operate FHBEFS :isithsThost?hicid5Wtt:in6dd7df
~
31 days brisfati@for il5'njinutii."
'~~ ~ ~ ' '
a ~ SR 3.7.13.34 Perform required FHBEFS filter testing in In accordance accordance with the Ventilation Filter with the VFTP Testing Program (VFTP). (continued) 1 4 I ZION Units 1 & 2 3.7-32 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 7)
FHBEFS 3.7.13 1 l l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) i SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY , l i SR 3.7.13.45
~
-------------------NOTE--------------------
. NotrequiredwhenFHBEFSisintheposti l accident mode of operation. I Verify FHBEFS actuates iEtheTgi63tEidEidsiif 18 months EddeidffijisfaileWion an'~ actual ~6F~iiijiUTitid j idthati8n 'Tipnal:" , SR 3.7.13.66 Verify FHBEFS can maintain a pressure 18 months I
- s -0.25 inches water gauge with respect to '
i atmospheric pressure during the post? ; j accident mode of operation at a flow ~ rate l s 24,000 cfm. I 1 1 i i A 4 4 4 1 h ZION Units 1 & 2 3.7-33 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 7)
i FHBEFS B 3.7.13 8 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.13 Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Filter System (FHBEFS) i BASES BACKGROUND The FHBEFS is a shared system which filters airborne radioactive particulates from the area of the fuel pool following a fuel handling accident in the fuel handling building and from the containment following a fuel handling accident in containment with the equipment hatch not intact. The FHBEFS is a subsystem of the normally operating Auxiliary Building Ventilation System which provides environmental control of temperature and humidity in the auxiliary building and the fuel handling building, including the fuel pool area, ECCS and CS cubicles, and pipe tunnels. The FHBEFS is shared by the two units. The receipt of a high radiation signal initiates the postfaccident mode of operation which includes; initiation of the FHBEFS, and isolation of the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) supply by.. closing the supply damper to the FHB. TheEsupply7 amperJto d theFHBWs!spenionlyEwhenTthelFHBEFS?ventilationssystem:is 5 inithe;normaljmode)of{ operation.1 Thi?FH8EFSidohsisti?oConeitFai n Tsi tEtWoipa ral l el ? p a thi each icontai n i ng i a' . pve fil .ter #a t h i gh i::e f fi c i ency4 part i cul. afe : ai rS (HEPA}W fil ter,e andt antacti vated; charcoal! adsorber sesti oniforhemov a100 f? ga s eouWacti V i tyT(pr i ncipal ly" iodines) M F6urfchsecoa10 boo ~sti6 fanslarelinstalled 6 butE;ohi
.i s3 su ffici ent?t oiprlov i delthel FHB EFS1fl ow; requ i rement :[i n conj uncti on1 wi t hitwo ? mainielxh adst? fan s;E (~s1xV o fV thes e lare installed)L:DuctwdrkWdampersMand? instrumentation
( automat i clini ti a tion i t si. p rovi ded :tforA onel fan d only) : al so rormipart[of thelsfstem.9ThelFHBEFSjis accidentimod(e;oftoperation dufing moveme(!placedi:Insthe nt "of f6el Which^ has pos been recently removed from the reactor and during CORE ALTERATIONS with the containment equ.ipment hatch not intact. Inl:'opdsMf6EtheiFHBEFS? toff 6natibn:correctlylinEthe p6sti a cc ide ntNode s o E ope rat'ionWi t hi th si Con ta i nme n tl Sh i ~el d i Wal l removed;JaWentilationductworkJspobl?piecemustibe .
- install ed. JThihisp60li piece ?istinstall ed :linithe? Pipe iTunnel Ventil ati ontsystem Lfromj d amp'er10.POV- AV172.? to i the? topfof the '
~
Unit 11?verticalfpipei chase! orifromsdampeK0PDVdAV1737to Lthe o topoffthe; Unit 121ventflation initiates filtered vertical: pipeichasej in9the Jh.e system alsdFof operation)following receipt of a' hicjh" post accident >moradiation 's'ign (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-83 Rev. 00, 12/04/96
i FHBEFS I B 3.7.13 BASES The FHBEFS is a standby system, parts of which are also utilized by other emergency filtration systems (LC0 3.7.11,
" Pipe Tunnel Exhaust Filter System," and LC0 3.7.12, i
" Emergency Core Cooling System and Containment Spray Cubicle l Exhaust Filter System"). The FHSEFS may 21:0 be operated during ncrm:1 plant operations during which the :upply air damper te the F48 i cper Upon receipt of an actuation signal, the post 9 accident mode of operation is initiated.
The FHBEFS is discussed in the UFSAR, Sections 9.4.3 and 15.7.4 (Refs.1 and 2, respectively). APPLICABLE The FHBEFS design basis is established by the consequences SAFETY ANALYSES of the limiting Design Basis Accident (DBA), which is a fuel handling accident. The analysis of the fuel handling accident in the fuel handling building, given in Reference 2, assumes that all fuel rods in an assembly are damaged. The DBA analysis of the fuel handling accident assumes that the FHBEFS is functionai# in
; mode 3ffopedti6niand maLiritaining?alpre(ssu}the7 re[6f :s;y25"Aater post-acdiden gauge wi.t..h.drespect.it.olat.mospherf cipressure) . The accident material provided by this filtration system. The amount of fission products available for release from the fuel handling building is determined for a fuel handling accident. These assumptions and the analysis follow the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.25 (Ref. 3).
The FHBEFS is also assumed to provide filtration for fuel handling accidents inside containment if the equipment hatch isnotintactaudithelContainment[Shieldja11Eisiremoved
~
during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of~ irradiated fuel assemblies within containment. The most severe radiological consequences result from a fuel handling accident in the containment that involves damage to irradiated fuel (Ref. 2). Fuel handling accidents, analyzed in Reference 3, include dropping a single irradiated fuel assembly and handling tool or a heavy object onto other irradiated fuel assemblies. The requirements of LC0 3.9.3, " Containment Penetrations," LC0 3.9.6, " Refueling Cavity Water Level," and the minimum decay time of 100 hours prior to CORE ALTERATIONS ensure that the release of fission product radioactivity, subsequent to a fuel handling accident in the containment, results in doses that are well below the guideline values specified in 10 CFR 100. The FHBEFS satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. l (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-84 Rev. 00, 12/04/96 j
l' FHBEFS 2 B 3.7.13 l BASES (continued) ! i l 1
- LCO The FHBEFS is required to be OPERABLE to provide filtration of contamination following a fuel handling accident. In additi,on, the FHBEFS is required to be in thefpo5tTaccident l modeloftoperation to: 1) assure immediate availability o'f i filtFstTon during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in l the fuel handling building when irradiated fuel assemblies 4 with < 60 days of decay time are in the fuel handling '
i LC0 building; 2) during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies (continued) in the containment when irradiated fuel assemblies with < 60 days decay time are in the containment and the containment hatch is not intact; and 3) during CORE ALTERATIONS with the
- equipment hatch not intact. Total system failure could 1-result in the atmospheric release from the fuel handling building exceeding the 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 4) guidelines in the 3 event of a fuel handling accident.
The FHBEFS is considered OPERABLE when the individual 1
-components necessary to control radioactive releases are OPERABLE. This system is shared by the two units. The
- FHBEFS is considered OPERABLE when
i a. Any two main exhaust fans are OPERABLE (both of these may be shared by other required ventilation systems); ! b. One charcoal booster fan is OPERABLE, and either operating or capable of automatic actuation (this fan may be shared with PTEFS);
- c. HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber are not excessively 3 restricting flow, and are capable of performing their
- filtration function as determined by the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP); and Ductwork and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation
, d.
- can be maintained.
4-ater - ( J Mgaugeiwith; hf fHBEFSR isimiintB nia y pressure; respect?tolatmosph'eric; EsiUfe3 f $ 25 @during;th_ postiacci.dentimode)offoperation) 6 jN6Ii/ehi[ilitiohTf16wysth'tsistEfrbanthd7Contai6 ment andgue13 H amdl i nglBuil d i ng ii n tMt heMi ggu'nnel '. i iLMt{the!@ugmeiiF h atch"hbt"ii rit acts t heltont ai nment i (continued) 4 ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-85 Rev. 00, 12/04/96 4
1 FHBEFS 8 3.7.13 BASES , Sliisi d !Ws1Timistibe?Fsedysdj in? oFdsFif66the3 FHBEFS ! to functionicorrectlylin)thelpostiaccidentiimodelof ~ , pperatip h Equipment normally associated with either unit may fulfill the required functions. However, if the opposite-unit equipment is credited, all opposite-unit support equipment necessary to maintain OPERABILITY must also be.0PERABLE. , l l l (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-86 Rev. 00, 12/04/96 i
FHBEFS B 3.7.13 BASES APPLICABILITY During movement of irradiated fuel in the fuel handling area, during movement of irradiated fuel in the containment with the equipment hatch not intact, and during CORE ALTERATIONS with the equipment hatch not intact, the FHBEFS is required to be OPERABLE to alleviate the consequences of a fuel handling accident. In addition, the FHBEFS is required to be in thsjpostEahyfddhtimodsV there is-potential ~~for damage to irradiapffoperation ted fuel assemblieswhen with < 60 days of decay time to assure immediate availability of filtration following a fuel handling accident. The equipment hatch is considered to be " intact" when held in place by at least four bolts and at least one personnel air lock door is closed. ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note indicating that LC0 3.0.3 does not apply. The inoperability of the FHBEFS does not impact the safe operation of the plant, nor the analyzed response to operational events. Therefore, an inoperable FHBEFS is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. A.1 and A.2 With the FHBEFS not in th'sl post?icdderit?model;dff operation when it i: required tc be % ff?dt'0: ~'(~i 7 e~ , "dulFi ng movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling building when irradiated fuel assemblies with < 60 days of decay time are in the fuel handling building, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the containment when irradiated fuel assemblies with < 60 days decay time are in the containment and the equipment hatch is not intact, and during CORE ALTERATIONS with the equipment hatch not intact), action must be taken to immediately place the FHBEFS in thelp'ost:4ccidenCmode":6fJoperation. If the FHBEFS can"55t be^^placsd in^thejost3aiici'd - operation, then the system must be 1mmedia.ent? tely ' declaredmode inoperable. (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.7-87 Rev. 00, 12/04/96
\
FHBEFS l B 3.7.13 l I l BASES (continued) , l l l l l ACTIONS 8.1. C.l. and D.1 l (continued) l With the FHBEFS inoperable, action must be taken to suspend j movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling i building, and if the equipment hatch is not intact, action must also be taken to suspend movement of irradiated fuel i assemblies in the containment and suspend CORE ALTERATIONS. l These actions preclude a fuel handling accident that may result in an unfiltered' release. This does not preclude the ] movement of fuel assemblies to a safe position. l l l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.13.1 ! REQUIREMENTS Periodic verification of 44s-thsTrequired postraccidsrjt mddeidf{ operation of the FHBEFS"alsures immediate" ~ sVailab'ility of filtration following a fuel handling accident. This SR is only required during movement of
- irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling building )
l when irradiated fuel assemblies with < 60 days of decay time '
- are in the fuel handling building, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the containment when j l irradiated fuel assemblies with < 60 days decay time are in !
! the containment and the equipment hatch is not intact, and I during CORE ALTERATIONS with the equipment hatch not intact. A 12 hour Frequency is sufficient, considering the system
- indications and alarms available to the operator for monitoring the FHBEFS in the control room.
SRT 377[1312 ThiilSR)veH fi e'sV FHB E FSii n 0 PERAB L E? IfiW&i fyi niit hdr~eil s(no ventilationjflofpathi from thelContsinnie~ntfori Fus1?. Handling" Buildingito the% Pipe Tunnel.1Thissverific'ationiconsiststof ensuringethatVthe. vbbtilationT;ductworkTspo60 piece hasfbeen
.i n's tal l ed ? i n :t he : Pi pe lTunnel s to : Auxil i dryl Bu il d i ng ventilationiductsorks (Installationldfsthisispool pisce ens'urestby/ design! measure?thstWadioactiveireleaseslasfa re s ul tlo fm a? Fusl L Handl i ng ? Acc i den t si n s i de!"c6nt a i nmen tish eii the?ContainmenttShield Walllisshotiinstalledlandithei Equ i pme n t : Hatc h t i sirem6lved ;io r) rad i o ac tivs frel e a se sia s f a resultf offa1 Fuel Handling? Accident?in1thej Fuel? Handling Building when thetContainment;ShieldLWallMsf60tsinstalled ~'
areho'utsdi:thndghtthe?Auxilia'ryhBdildingicharcoalf
~ ' ""
FiltrationfUni.t.s?', " ~ ~
~
i t l, (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-88 Rev. 00, 12/06/96
- ' FHBEFS B 3.7.13 BASES SURVEILLANCE; contisdsd 3 REQUIREMENTS" ISRT3!7?l312[(1 Thii?Su_, rve
.. .. i L i)f ..
_ illance':iistmodi fiedj: 6y;, at NOTEithat' requires [:the Surveillance?whenl:;:the- ContainmentiShield!: Wall is!not . . install ed d WhehltheJH8EFS3;i s j required i toibe[0PERABL E (orfi s requi red}tolbejin? operation;j:;ini.ordertforjthe L FHBEFS. to._ funct i on! correctlyM n f the z po st9 accident 3 mode r of. cop' erat i on wi.thithefContainmentjshieldsWalEremovedOthejventilation spool:? pi ec elmu s ti be ? i ns tal l ed F i nl: the ? Aux i l l a ryu
- . Pipe 1TunnelNentil ati6niductworks 3This? is;bbca. Building Sto uselwithiths ContillnmenthSh.ieldiWall.Lremovedand)thefesipmentihAtch' removedsaspotentialfventlil.ation flow path containment;intol the. pipe. tunnel [unlelssEthc(exists:!from(th;e
- 7 Auxiliary Building"toIPipe Tunnel cventilationsspo'ol?piecelis 3
installed; lAlsoMiff theiC6ntainment0 Shield; Wal1 JiiYnot i ns tal l ed $hsn%a~ndl i ng;? i Erad i ated kfuel:11 n i thef fueb: handl i ng building fueEhandlin 6s/potentisEv ntilation(ipe tunnel {:unless1theflow! path e Ventilation lgbuildingiintojt.hejductworki s pool.@ i eceki s j in s tal l
~
SeVsdidsysikasfchos'enfas75n?ap~popriate4epiod!:'6f?ti_me(baied p uplonftheneedto:ensurefinstallation'ofthe1 r 2 ventilation spoolfpiece within!a?reas'6nabl'speri6d e e loff time priorLto moding pi rradi kt ed's fuel
- i nt;the" fuel ? handl ingibu ildi ngh m6Vi ns i rrsdi sted sfdel si nithe fcontai nmenti wi t h;L the . equi pment: hatch '~
n6tVistactM6Fperf6Fming1COREsALTERATION5!with;thi"~~ ~ equipmentthatch7n_otZintacts JCorrect? ventilation.:calignmeht i s Tveri f.i edL during s.t_he ttimelwhen? thel FHB EFS ;i s ' required 7 to be 10P ERAB L E(o rsi n c ope ra t i o n hand 1t he(C o nt a i nme n t.1S h i el d ' Wal l.
~~
isanotsinstalledi ' ' ' SR 3.7.13.33 Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. As the environmental and normal operating conditions on this system are not severe, testing the system once every 31 days provides an adequate check on this system. The system has no heaters and therefore, need only be operated for a: 15 minutes to demonstrate the function of the system. The 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliability of the equipment and the redundancy available. l i l l (continued) I ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-89 Rev. 00, 12/09/96
FHBEFS B 3.7.13 } BASES and the redundancy available. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
; JcpytJ@pdl SR 3.7.13.34 This SR verifies that the required FHBEFS testing is l
. performed in accordance.with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The FHBEFS filter tests are in general conformance with ANSI N510-1975 (Ref. 5).
The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal. Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP. , 1 1 SR 3.7.13.45 This SR verifies that the FHBEFS starts and the supply damper closes on an actual or simulated actuation signal. i Actuation signals are identified in LC0 3.3.8, "FHBEFS Actuation Instrumentation." Automatic actuation is not requiredwhenthesystemisoperatinginthepostjaccident mode of operation, hence, this SR is not required if the system is operating in the post? accident mode. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with Reference 6. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.13.56 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies the integrity of the fuel handling building
- enclosure. The ability of the fuel handling building to maintain negative pressure with respect to potentially uncontaminated adjacent areas is periodically tested to verify proper function of the FHBEFS. The FHBEFS i; designcd te - intain : : light negative prc::ure in the fuel h ndling building rchtive tc at pherc, t0 prevent unfiltered leakagc. The FHBEFS in the postfaccident mode is designed to maintain a s -0.25 inches water gauge with respect to atmospheric pressure at a flow rate of
. s 24,000 cfm from the fuel handling building. The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the guidance provided in , NUREG-0800 (Ref. 7). (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-90 Rev. 00, 12/04/96
FHBEFS B 3.7.13 BASES ! REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 9.4.3. l
- 2. UFSAR, Section 15.7.4.
- 3. Regulatory Guide 1.25, " Assumptions Used for !
Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of l a Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Handling and ) Storage Facility for Boiling and Pressurized Water Reactors," Rev. O.
- 4. 10 CFR 100, " Reactor Site Criteria."
- 5. ANSI N510, " Testing of Nuclear Air-Cleaning Systems," j 1975. <
- 6. Regulatory Guide 1.52, " Design, Testing, and Maintenance Criteria for Post-Accident Engineered Safety Feature Atmosphere Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," Rev. 2. l 1
- 7. NUREG-0800, Section 6.5.1, Rev. 2, July 1981.
I l I ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-91 Rev. 00, 12/04/96
__ A 44 a L _ ..m .A--. m. _ e e 4 d J k i i i I I l l 2 4 J 4 i I l CLEAN ITS SPEC l '! l i 4 4
l' FHBEFS 3.7.13 l 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.13 Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Filter System (FHBEFS) LC0 3.7.13 The FHBEFS shall be OPERABLE. In addition, the FHBEFS shall beinthiTp? dst 3Ebi}4htymsdeidfjoperationduring: l l a. Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling building when irradiated fuel assemblies with
< 60 days decay time are in the fuel handling building,
- b. Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in containment I when irradiated fuel assemblies with < 60 days decay time are in containment and the equipment hatch is not l intact, i
l
- c. CORE ALTERATIONS with the equipment hatch not intact. !
1 APPLICABILITY: During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel j handling building, I During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in containment with the equipment hatch not intact, During CORE ALTERATIONS with the equipment hatch not intact. ACTIONS ___________________________________._ NOTE------------------------------------- LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Required FHBEFS not in A.1 Place FHBEFS in the Immediately the7iidstTsubidsht36di ~~ post 2idcidshtimodeOf "' bf3BpsFifi'oh'.~ - bpsFAt~ihn. ~ ~ ~ ~~ O_R Immediately A.2 veclare FHBEFS inoperable. (continued) i ZION Units 1 & 2 3.7-30 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 7)
D;9EFS 3.7.13 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l B. FHBEFS inoperable B.1 Suspend movement of Immediately during movement of irradiated fuel irradiated fuel assemblies in the assemblies in the fuel fuel handling handling building. building. C. FHBEFS inoperable C.1 Suspend movement of Immediately during movement of irradiated fuel ! irradiated fuel assemblies in assemblies in the containment. containment with the ' equipment hatch not ; intact. ! D. FHBEFS inoperable D.1 Suspend CORE Immediately I during CORE ALTERATIONS. ALTERATIONS with the equipment hatch not l intact. l l i ZION Units 1 a 2 3.7-31 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 7)
. l l
1 . l FHBEFS-3 3.7.13 f SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY 1 SR 3.7.13.1
-------------------NOTE--------------------
Only required: (a) during movement of I irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel l' handling building when irradiated fuel assemblies with < 60 days decay time are in
- the fuel handling building; (b) during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the containment when irradiated fuel assemblies with < 60 days decay time are in containment and the equipment hatch is not intact; and (c) during CORE ALTERATIONS with the equipment hatch not intact.
Verify FHBEFS is in t.h.ETpis'tFibdidi.n.t? mode 12 hours SRj3W7IT.m. 372 5HT2TSMM~MESTNO.TEEMESSECw" m _m~ g.g:g:
.- ~
gggg . p g g:g:g
.-.,~-p g p$g,_En yu nn=ra _ ; -m=;m=w:
%,% . =,r. =ys ,% .m so, r, s .
33 VeHfi~FH8EFS'is OPERABLE'by ensur'ing'no 7; dais ventilation: flow path exists 'from the Containment and Fuel Handling Building into theffpeTunnel.' SR 3.7.13.3~ Operate FHBEFS Tiiitheijs6i6sdEldshtZi6ds!6f
^
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' * ' '
~
31 days ppsist;ishijfor il5^nihutssi i SR 3.7.133 Perform required FHBEFS filter testing in In accordance accordance with the Ventilation Filter with the VFTP Testing Program (VFTP). , 1 I (continued) j i ZION Units 1 & 2 3.7-32 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 7)
I l FHBEFS ; 3.7.13 j SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) i SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l l SR 3.7.13.5
-------------------NOTE--------------------
NotrequiredwhenFHBEFSisinthepostj l accident mode of operation. l ........................................... VerifyFHBEFSactuates'ihlthssphitTiEEidsdt 18 months-iii6dsioff6FEFili6n?on an"idfu~il HF~Tiiiiilifid I actuisi6n Tijdir."' i SR 3.7.13.6 ~ Verify FHBEFS can maintain a pressure 18 months s -0.25 inches water gauge with respect to atmospheric pressure during the posty accident mode of operation at a flow' rate s 24,000 cfm. l l i ( i
- ZION Units 1 & 2 3.7-33 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 7) l
FHBEFS B 3.7.13 83.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.13 Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Filter System (FHBEFS) l BASES BACKGROUND The FHBEFS is a shared system which filters airborne radioactive particulates from the area of the fuel pool following a fuel handling accident in the fuel handling ; building and from the containment following a fuel handling ' accident in containment with the equipment hatch not intact. The FHBEFS is a subsystem of the normally operating Auxiliary Building Ventilation System which provides environmental control of temperature and humidity in the auxiliary building and the fuel handling building, including t the fuel pool area, ECCS and CS cubicles,- and pipe tunnels. The FHBEFS is shared by the two units. The receipt of a high radiation signal initiates the post 2 accident mode of i operation which includes; initiation of the FHBEFS, and isolation of the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) supply by. 1 The~supp19 damper;to j closing the sup[ ply damper to the FHB. thelFHB31sispsn6nlyNhehsthe}FH8EFSjventilationisystem!is jnftheMormapsod6ofjbperations The FHBEFS consists of one train with two parallel paths each containing a prefilter, a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, and an activated charcoal adsorber section for removal of gaseous activity (principally iodines). Four charcoal booster fans are installed, but one is sufficient to provide the FHBEFS flow requirement in conjunction with two main exhaust fans (six of these are installed). Ductwork, dampers, and instrumentation (automatic initiation is provided for one fan only) also form part of the system. The FHBEFS is placed in the;. post-sccident h6ds i b'een rec {ently[of;[;l removedoperation duringand from the reactor movement during CORE of fuel wh' ch has ALTERATIONS with the containment equipment hatch not intact. int 6FdsrifoFItMI FHB EFSitd} fundt f on f correc tlysin5 thel po s ty accident
- removedap(mode [o ffope rationWi thithe[Contai.nmen ts Sh i el d:Wa ventilationtductworktspoolfpieceimust3be
~~
i ns t'all edD;Thi Vsntil'atidd Systemsispoolfp.i eteXi^sii ns t al l ed tinit he"Pi pe TTuihsl fr.omidampe#0PDV-AV1724tottheitopfof;the t Uni tis 1%ve'rtibalspi p' e[chasel orb fromS dampe r10PDV-AV173 kto tthe i top?of tthe' Unit?2? verticals pip ^erchase. ?The system als~o " iniMathsifiltEFed ventilation op,eratjonjfollowing receipt of ainEth_ej' h~idh radihtion signalost2accLideri l i l i i (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.7-83 Rev. 00, 12/04/96 i
FHBEFS ! B 3.7.13 i BASES BACKGROUND (continued The FHBEFS is a standby system, parts of which are also utilized by other emergency filtration systems (LC0 3.7.11,
" Pipe Tunnel Exhaust Filter System," and LC0 3.7.12,
" Emergency Core Coolin Exhaust Filter System"g ). System and Containment Upon receipt Spray Cubicle of an actuation signal, the postpaccident mode of operation is initiated.
The FHBEFS is discussed in the UFSAR, Shetions 9.4.3 and 15.7.4 (Refs. I and 2, respectively). APPLICABLE The FHBEFS design basis is established by the consequences SAFETY ANALYSES of the limiting Design Basis Accident (DBA), which is a fuel I handling accident. The analysis of the fuel handling = accident in the fuel handling building, given in i Reference 2, assumes that all fuel rods in an assembly are damaged. The DBA analysis of the fuel handlin assumes that the FHBEFS is functional @(inith'e$g accidentpost4ccide niddeloF6iisfatibn?andimaintainihgfaTptessus ofM25" water withTrespecttoLatmospheric1 pressure). The' accident , gaugesii~ad anal ounts^'for~ths~ reduction"in airborne radioactive l material provided by this filtration system. The amount of fission products available for release from the fuel , handling building is determined for a fuel handling ! accident. These assumptions and the analysis follow the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.25 (Ref. 3). The FHBEFS is also assumed to provide filtration for fuel handling accidents inside containment if the equipment hatch is not intact andJthe4Cohtaihment? Shield?Walliisfremoved during CORE ALTERATIONS"or" movement"b'f~iFra'di'atef fusl" assemblies within containment. The most severe radiological consequences result from a fuel handling accident in the containment that involves damage to irradiated fuel (Ref. 2). Fuel handling accidents, analyzed in Reference 3, include dropping a single irradiated fuel assembly and handling tool or a heavy object onto other irradiated fuel assemblies. The requirements of LCO 3.9.3, " Containment' Penetrations," LC0 3.9.6, " Refueling Cavity Water Level," and the minimum decay time of 100 hours prior to CORE ALTERATIONS ensure that the release of fission product radioactivity, subsequent to a fuel handling accident in the containment, results in doses that are well below the guideline values specified in 10 CFR 100. (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-84 Rev. 00, 12/04/96
je FHBEFS B 3.7.13 4 , , BASES ; l APPLICABLE The FHBEFS satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy i SAFETY ANALYSIS Statement. l (continued) - 4 LC0 The FHBEFS is required to be OPERABLE to provide filtration ! of contamination following a fuel handling accident. In I addition, the FHBEFS is required to be in theiostisi:cidsrit ! iiodET6fIoperation to: 1) assure immediate a hilability"of' filtiitTon during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling building when irradiated fuel assemblies i with < 60 days of decay time are in the fuel handling , building; 2) during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the containment when irradiated fuel assemblies with < 60 days decay time are in the containment and the containment hatch is not intact; and 3) during CORE ALTERATIONS with the equipment hatch not intact. Total system failure could result in the atmospheric release from the fuel handling building exceeding the 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 4) guidelines in the , event of a fuel handling accident.
. The FHBEFS is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to control radioactive releases are )
1' OPERABLE. This system is shared by the two units. The FHBEFS is considered OPERABLE when:
- a. Any two main exhaust fans are OPERABLE (both of these '
- may be shared by other required ventilation systems);
- b. One charcoal booster fan is OPERABLE, and either operating or capable of automatic actuation (this fan
. may be shared with PTEFS);
- c. HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber are not excessively restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration function as determined by the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP); and
- d. Ductwork and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.
< Eig$$[HBEFS@anfiiiintainTa) pre.ssureiofM25"lwater _
gaugetwithtrespectttotatmosphericipressureTduringithe i po stfaccident/ mode J6f ;oper.at i.on . ~ (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-85 Rev. 00, 12/04/96 i I
FH8EFS B 3.7.13 BASES LCO
-j..(_Eis~tisid)*
m - . ~~
~
f E~9No?IlintilatiddiflosfpsthfekistsIfrWItheiC66 tai ~hmen.t
~~
Handl i ng;; Bdi lld i sg li ntoltheMi pegurinel 9 di2@%i.th^EtheiisiliipmehtlhitshidatiihtsetWthe"COntaihbint Shi el d ! Wall imus.t:i be t remoVsd iinf orderi fon the? FHBEF5st d fuhpti6MespredtisisthMystda.cdideht;isodelof ~ " l operationkp l Equipment normally associated with either unit may fulfill the required functions. However, if the opposite-unit equipment is credited, all opposite-unit support equipment ; necessary to maintain OPERABILITY must also be OPERABLE. l 1 APPLICABILITY During movement of irradiated fuel in the fuel handling . area, during movement of irradiated fuel in the containment l with the equipment hatch not intact, and during CORE ) ALTERATIONS with the equipment hatch not intact, the FHBEFS l is required to be OPERABLE to alleviate the consequences of i a fuel handling accident. In addition, the FHBEFS is ! required to be in the7p6stsabside6timodsEnffoperation when there is potential" f6F ~dafiispi^t6~iVFidiE~ted" fuel assemblies with < 60 days of decay time to assure immediate availability of filtration following a fuel handling accident. The equipment hatch is considered to be " intact" I when held in place by at least four bolts and at least one personnel air lock door is closed. i ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note indicating that LC0 3.0.3 does not apply. The inoperability of the FHBEFS does not impact the safe operation of the plant, nor the analyzed response to operational events. Therefore, an inoperable FHBEFS is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.7-86 Rev. 00, 12/04/96
4 FH8EFS B 3.7.13 BASES TA.1 and A.2 ACTIONSI._ (continued m ). . . _ . _ . . __ With the FHBEFS not in the; post-accide.nt. ... when required (i.e., during ' movementrradiated ~ ofimodelofl fuel operation assemblies in the fuel handling building when irradiated fuel assemblies with < 60 days of decay time are in the fuel handling building, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the containment when irradiated fuel assemblies with < 60 days decay time are in the containment and the equipment hatch is not intact, and during CORE ALTERATIONS with the equipment hatch not intact), action must be taken to immediately place the FHBEFS in thelposti acMdantim6deYofToperation. If the FHBEFS can not be placed in the' post accidentimodeloperation, then the system must be i mmed i it sl y ~deelired"i n o p e ra bl e . Bi1 FC E isHdTD?! With the FHBEFS inoperable, action must be taken to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling building, and if the equipment hatch is not intact, action must also be taken to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the containment and suspend CORE ALTERATIONS. These actions preclude a fuel handling accident that may result in an unfiltered release. This does not preclude the movement of fuel assemblies to a safe position. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.13.1 REQUIREMENTS Periodic verification of thb? required pbstraccidentmode?sf operation of the FHBEFS as'sures immediate availability of
~
filtration following a fuel handling accident. This SR is only required during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling building when irradiated fuel assemblies with < 60 days of decay time are in the fuel handling building, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the containment when irradiated fuel assemblies with < 60 days decay time are in the containment and the equipment hatch is not intact, and during CORE ALTERATIONS with the equipment hatch not intact. A 12 hour Frequency is sufficient, considering the system indications and alarms available to the operator for monitoring the FHBEFS in the control room. (continued) l l ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.7-87 Rev. 00, 12/04/96 1
FHBEFS 4 8 3.7.13 BASES { , SURVEILLANCE SR2377713I2 i REQUIREMENTS
- (continued) This SR verifies FHBEFS is OPERABLE by verifying there is no i ventilation flow path from the Containment or Fuel Handling
, Building to the Pipe Tunnel. This verification consists of I ensuring that the ventilation ductwork spool, piece has bee,n
- installed in the Pipe Tunnel to Auxiliary Building i ventilation ductwork., , Installation of, this spool gii'4ce
! ensures by design measure that radioactive releases as a i result of a Fuel Handling Accident inside containment when the Containment Shield Wall'is not installed and the Equipment Hatch is removed, or radioactive releases as a l result of a Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Handling ' Building when the Containment Shield Wall is not installed i are routed through the Auxiliary Building > Charcoal , Filtration Units.
~
i j i ,
- This Surviillance is modifi'ed by a NOTE ~th'at requirsi the I i
Surveillance when the Containment Shield Wall is not ' l , installed. ,When the FHBEFS is required to be OPERABLE'or is 1 required to be in operation, in order for the FH8EFS to function correctly in the post-accident mode of, operation i with the Containment Shield Wall removed,'the ventilation spool piece must be installed in the Auxiliary Building to
- Pipe Tunnel ventilation ductwork. This is because with the
, Containment Shield Wall removed,and< the equipment hatch ' l removed, a potential ventilation flow path exists' from the i containment into the pipe tunnel unless the Auxiliary' '
- Building to Pipe Tunnel ventilation spool piece is i
installed. Also, if the' Containment Shield Wall is not , installed when handling irradiated fuel in the fuel hanoling building, a potential ventilation flow path exists from the' fuel handling building into the pipe tunnel unless the "
- 1. ventilation ductwork spool, piece is installed.
4
- Seve'n days"was' chosen 'as ari'appr^opriate' period of time based "
upon the need to ensure installation of the ventilation , j spool piece within a reasonable period of time prior to ! l moving irradiated fuel in the fuel handling building, moving i irradiated fuel in the containment with the equipment hatch not intact, or,perfor, ming, CORE ALTERATIONS with the, ' 4 d i , (continued) i i
- -ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-88 Rev. 00, 12/09/96 s
1 I
. . _ . . - . . -- . --. . - - . . = .- .__. . . .. . _ . -
l 1 sFHBEFS i BF3:7. .f.13 l j i BASEST " ga ta .E:Mx Cm i
' g;..
.. ;My v v f::ss ^ r + l
.ww w ,.v.ww.i . f s v ~
SURVEILLANCE *F j'SR1377713!2E(b6htilshid ~ l
.R.E.-QU.IREM_ENTS*
{
.ils@erifind[ddhi_ng[thektime whsinthe(FHBEFS;isfrequired;to bijj oPERABL Elory nf ope rat i on nandit he] Cont a i nme ntiShi el_djal l ;
{ is%noQgst,alledh l SR 3.7.13.3 { Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure
- that they function properly. As the environmental and normal operating conditions on this system are not severe, testing the system once every 31 days provides an adequate !
check on this system. ! ' The system has no heaters and therefore, need only be operated for 215 minutes to demonstrate the function of the
- system. The 31 day Frequency is based on the known .
l reliability of the equipment and the redundancy available. I i + SR 3.7.13.4 i i This SR verifies that the required FHBEFS testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing ) l Program (VFTP). The FHBEFS filter tests are in general i j l conformance with ANSI N510-1975 (Ref. 5). l The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal ! adsorber efficiency, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal. Specific test frequencies and 1 additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP. SR 3.7.13.5 l i j This SR verifies that the FHBEFS starts and the supply l da.nper closes on an actual or simulated actuation signal. Actuation signals are identified in LC0 3.3.8, "FHBEFS Actuation Instrumentation." Automatic actuation is not requiredwhenthesystemisoperatinginthepostfaccident mode of operation, hence, this SR is not required"if the system is operating in the postfaccident mode. The 18 month
- Frequency is consistent with Reference 6.
t i I (continued) l ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.7-89 Rev. 00, 12/04/96
l . FHBEFS B 3.7.13 BASES l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.13.6 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR verifies the integrity of the fuel handling building enclosure. The ability of the fuel handling building to maintain negative pressure with respect to potentially uncontaminated adjacent areas is periodically tested to verify proper function of the FHBEFS. The FHBEFS in the postiaccident mode.is designed to maintain a s -0.25 inches watef gauge with respect to atmospheric pressure at a flow rate of s 24,000 cfm from the fuel handling building. The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG-0800 (Ref. 7). REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 9.4.3.
- 2. UFSAR, Section 15.7.4.
- 3. Regulatory Guide 1.25, " Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Handling and Storage Facility for Boiling and Pressurized Water Reactors," Rev. O.
- 4. 10 CFR 100, " Reactor Site Criteria."
- 5. ANSI N510, " Testing of Nuclear Air-Cleaning Systems,"
1975.
- 6. Regulatory Guide 1.52, " Design, Testing, and Maintenance Criteria for Post-Accident Engineered Safety Feature Atmosphere Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," Rev. 2.
- 7. NUREG-0800, Section 6.5.1, Rev. 2, July 1981.
ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.7-90 Rev. 00, 12/04/96
1 4 .
~
,i e l r l I i ( d 4 i 1 s .e i J 4 I d
\
f ( 7 CTS MARKUPS .T i 6
I LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION . SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7.I3 , 3.3.8- .
- 3. 7. I3 3.13.2.
Protection from Damaaed Spent Fuel 4.13.2. Protection from Damaaed Spent Fuel 2.7.l3 1 ; A. ' Durina irradiated fuel movementfor crane A. The charcoal adsorber mode of operation "5peration with loads over irradiated fu (3.7- 3?d -(ln the fuel building, the fuer building of the fuel building exhaust system - exhaust system shall be: shall be demonstrated to be operable: 7
~~ 7'13. a 1. Operating [withventilationfl 5R 3.7.l3. A r
- 1. Observe and document shiftly that O l hA through th HEPA and charcoal !
N filters there is any irradiated
/~
the ventilation system is OPERATING as required by Specification y s fuel,4itoFe~ d 'in thil~ool with less j' 3.13.2.A. (_t7-
' 3p than 60 days decay tfme). - sit 3.7.13.F do+e (Q
~
- 2. OPERABLE automatic initiation i
~
- 2. When operability is required by 3.3. 8 W 6f"fldithrou he HEPA fliters ' 3g- Specification 3.13.2.A.2, the
.and_charcoa Ladsorbets upon _ . }~ ~ ;
'iletection .of. high radiation at _the _. 'ollowing shall be done at least ,
~' fuel pool 'if all irradiated fuel once per 31 days:
3.7. I,3. n. stoFed in the pool has 60 days or rg 3.7.13.3 a. greater decay time since_ Place the Fuel Building t irradiation ceased.' If automatic Ventilation System in the Fuel [
~~
actuation' is inoperable, the Handling Mode for a minimum of ; cCo 3 3 F 15 minutes. ; system shall be manually placed in en At the " charcoal adsorber mode". i APPLICABILITY: b. Verify flow through the HEPA and ! ( 6R 3 7 I3 3 charcoal adsorber train. ACTION: With the requirements of 3.13.2. A not ! 37g satisfied, movements.!yend or crane operation all irradiated witDfuel 7.f. yg } 3*7,fyj c. Verify the Fuel Building is j g /) B./ h'ippl1cible, loads ove,r irradiated maintained at 1/4 inch of water loadsfuelliftef in a safefirst, placing ' negative pressure with respect i condition. to the atmosphere. i 3 l-l& a
. LCO 3.7.I3 K A s A.I t A.2}. _
i l 244a Amendment Nos. 96 and 86
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7.13 3.13.2 B.
- 2. 7.1 3 , 3 .3. F , C 0 Ventilation filters for the fuel building 4.13.2 B. For each HEPA or charcoal filter, at l
52 3.7.G.t including _ charcoal adsorbers ghiiTthe
~
i c least once per 18 monthsfor (IT after
~
5,s 9 (automitic act'uitToTof 'thEiharcoal filter ~ 7, 9
/ ( ~systemJshall be periodically tested. F every 120 hours of charcoal adsorber operation or (2) after any structural N 3*l' N-. maintenance of the filter housings or i
(3) following painting, fire,or chemical ! f-3I release in any ventilation zone ! communicating with the system, or (4) ' after each complete or partial I replacement of the filter bank: [ surveillance will be performed per Table ! 4.17. 3,3, g _f l gg 3,7.13,5 1. Verify that on a 'high_ radiation) test signal the system automatically - i
'# 3My[)2 startsj(unlessalreadyinoperationb i
<. u unee m. iu exhaust rlow throug e ;
the HEPA filters and charcoal > h7- 4dsorber banks.J f automatic ! actuation is inoperable the system 33.8 shall be manually placed in the f-/1 A.1[E.) arcoal adsorber mode. i 3.8 A] Id L co 3 .'s. 8 R A 8 l t 245 Amendments Nos. 96 and 86
3 / 3.7.13 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION g SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
~
3.13.3 e- . Containment status Aid Containment status D A. During CORE ALTERATION, CONTAINMENT gg 3,y'g.- - A. gg g INTEGRITY shall be maintained as specified Containment,dopr,hi status shall be f t6 in section 3.9.5 except as specified in verified nce a s g ,; g 3.13.3.B. {3, g fg, 9 -l LCo B. B. Se equipment hatch or both doors on the Reactor coolant boron concentration and
- 3. US .
personnel hatch may be opened during the $81f' _ Tavg shall be verified once a shift when CORE ALTERATION ifEd the shutdown the equipment hatch is open or both - (mfgin is mal ained eoual_La_or_ gr_e doors on the personnel hatch are open. QO - ' uthan less than 10%140*F. AK/fd and Tavg ' maintained at or['
-) ,r' ' C. C. The containment vent and purge system During CORE ALTERATION the containment ~
vent and n h 'L'l-I R. and the/iTdiliitton monitors which) shall m moni, ors purge systemjaiid thTi~adi~ario dnitiate isolationlof this system t which initiate isolation of this)
.'.sys tem,J shall' be ' 0PErtARE. i be tested and verified to be OPERABLE
- l. i m 7. 7. 6 SA 5,i 31 immediately prior to CORE ALTERATION operations.
OW5 ) m ro.9.32. d** ' #
y3* g j ], I '{ 3 nonk !)ot e
" \_ . W.'),'t 3 )
... uns T[
uo n.c,
}})h LCD 3.2.13 hNC
- 3. ') </ Z. . ...M - -
AJS St. 3,7.13,a, /Jorc hdb t t 246 Amendment Nos. 96 and 86 i
l I I I J l l l 4 l l J' l l h n 4 4 1 d W P 1 i l 1 1
)
DOC CHANGES 4 1 I 4 0
i OISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 3.7: PLANT SYSTEMS j (continued) -) i NSHC NO. DISCUSSION I i i M. 39. The Applicability of the requirements for operation of the fuel i handling building exhaust filter system have been expanded from "if I there is any irradiated fuel stored in the pool with less than 60 days decay time" to "during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling building when irradiated fuel assemblies with j i < 60 days decay time are in the fuel handling building." This l i includes any time the fuel assembly is in the building (during i i- irradiated fuel movements) rather than just while the fuel assembly l is stored in the fuel pool. This is consistent with NUREG-1431 and i is an additional restriction on plant operation. (Note: This change i also restricts the Applicability to only during the movement of l irradiated fuel assemblies. Heavy loads controls for other than { during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies are addressed as !
- Relocated ("R") administrative controls in another item of this Amr.dment request.)
i A. 40. The conditions of Applicability have been clarified to describe the 1 conditions identified in the existing Specification. This change is I consistent with NUREG-1431 and is considered administrative. ' A. 41. Required Actions have been added-(Required Actions A.1 and A.2) to ! identify appropriate actions for the FHBEFS not in operation when i required. This is incorporated in accordance with current Technical I Specification 3.13.2. i l l M. 42. An additional restriction is added to assure compliance with the NRC Safety Evaluation which supported the removal of the equipment hatch ! during refueling operations and CORE ALTERATIONS. This. is an , additional restriction on plant operation. ! 3 l M. 43. ! l Net =cd. AinsWTSdrVeillancelRsqu;1Fsininti(SRJ317339)y]hsM6es ll orrectly 2 to[l.C0j3di13]toye(ifylthititheliyentilaLtion@j5temfunction11n!the pos ! jTht;siiMdonejbhveriffinnthati tilnse)thelShield a tve_nt i l at i o ns s pool spi Walljisinotjintact(11nst'a1.ledib'etween3thkAUxil ece { h a st been . Buil di'npa nd E P ipegu nnel ys uchj t hatshofjsnt;il at i orQflyyathisj g ists from!thefFHBEFShtoithsMipe;;Tunnelj;' L-9. 44. The bounding design basis fuel handling accident in the fuel storage pool assumes an irradiated fuel assembly is dropped onto an array of irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the fuel storage pool racks. The movement of other loads over irradiated fuel assemblies is administrative 1y controlled based on available analysis for an individual load. The movement of control rods over the fuel storage pool has been relocated to these existing administrative controls. ZION Units.1 & 2 3.7-10 12/06/96
. _ . . . =_ . - . . .-_.. ..._ n - -~ . . ~ . ~ . . ._ _
l
. 1 a l i
+ 1 i 1 i ' l l l 5 i I I t I
', 1 1
s e a l 1 l l l
\
1 NUREG MARKUPS l l 1 1 J
..7 4..,, -
FNBEFS
....s v(
, ,3 . >
~
3.7 PLANT SYSTEM
<- 9,4 : ,,. ..:
3 ,1, . . . . :. F Pe. I d . .- 3.7.13 Fuel *Buildi ng 'AIE- eTnW System (FRATQ P w"e c '< -e 4 h r I
,y y n- ~ -w .s >
' -rLz j;H605 - -
. ,~-
- LCO 3. 7 .1.3 c3ERLEBACS C4Bitshall_be,_0fERABLE. T., og w.., dv. FH aEfs CU ,,1., '5 T A gb p.
y c .yr i,) h .t".M">^*
,u ,e .
S t er&% s .']r '"r'e"po* red .-cc.d p, .
. ._y._ __ -
APPLICABILITY: [CES-1, 2, 3, and 4,] -- '
\C\ - During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel
'3dcorEN .buildino. - . - -- -- --
M ef., $ Qcc :: - if_AGAk/n mcuiq C w edl002E ALT 1 w/ eplp. U b ut'w h
- c. . .
w - - . . .
. . . . . _ ~ - - . ... .-
N 7" ACTIONS y l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION ,i a ,;. COMPLETION TIME
~
.s v.w w 4
kpdcej A.I %s n u n ,'s'eovat.e,. 1n.& +a t y O A. @D FBACS traup @ Testore-FBAC-5-traini 6@fiys
. rt o f .
23 'to-OPFRAR1E_ ?lats' Gno m7jZlC e abTe) U . '* Y 'A . 2. Loc* % m m + 4 . :. daul y
) 8. Required Action 8.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours n9 and associated e Completion Time of AND Condition A not met in MODE 1, 2. 3, 8.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours t
V l or 4.
- k i SE
- Two fEACS trains inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. l
-) 1 l
C. Required Action anV C.1 Place OPERABLE FBACS Innediately . o associated Comp j efion train in operation. I' Time [of Copd1 tion A]
- not met Qg movemen,daring t of irradiated .
fue1' assemblies in the C.2 Suspend movement of Immediately f fuel building. irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.
./ .
/ w. _ _
. (continued) ; i WOG STS 3.7-30 Rev. O, 09/28/92 l l
\ FBACS l 3.7.13 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME e 8. C Cl 4 0. @ FBACS t M _ D.1 Suspenpfnovement of' Innediately l pooerableJduring rirradiated fuel l )9i ' movement of irradi]ated assemblies in the l- fuelassemblipinthe. Quel [ building.Q go fuele building,. 3 c _ t. , _, , w m a m ,, _~ O as un si r s l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY n 1.Si s .z. 4. 2.alk av ,: 5 .s e g *
- r' '
SR 3.7.13.I' Operate 1@9 FBAd5 (TEEB for $ "" ' A 31 days
- p. J -[t40-cont 4nuous-hours-with the hnters
-operating-or--(40r-systems-ntMut MateW-l ; e 15 minutes}'.
./ p
,l$.
l 5. SR 3.7.13.2' Perfom required FBACS filter testing in In accordance I q accordance with theJ[ Ventilation Filter withthe[VFTPJ l TestingProgram(VFTP)R < ! u.1. t.s. t - ? Akl arc: M reid M k ernat Q c4 SR3.7.13.f VerifyDFBACS Mgr actuates E18]' months J
- y 5 actual or simulated actuation ,s.ig)on nal. an ,
.a
_ , ,. < . r.:
. e- -
v..- 4,G1. A1.C, a SR 3.7.13.# Verify q!BD FBACS (EEG can maintain a h[ months.09P pressure 5 -0.$5ffincheswatergaugewith <-f i.;Z RG (l7A A respect t k teospheric pressure during the
--- ~ ~
[postaccident mode- of operation at a flow rate s I m non; efs. l- ( I (continued) 't b M NI' 2 [ l u
,,,,..,6 [htszXWG55kclQ tIis k , Q((es _
%3pM M D d/4@ LO d # d $ $ k I WOG STS Rb O /M7 *3 Rev. O,09/28/92
FBACS 3.7.13 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY j[ - p p., v SR3.7}f.5 Verify each FBACS filter bypass damper [18} months -1 can be closed. .o
\
(..r-m -) C13 4.ls.t. A. I _ . . . . . . . - . ~. _ _ _ . _- p -
\ g g g ,,, ,3,/ ......... . g o rg . . . . . . . . . ; ;
I MLJ qJ & JJ a/ e40/y ! I Q e ca y. % e C M A LT1 4 Wh.,sor wh&. \
\
3 4_g7.-T~~
/.r ';. .
Q hoa; t]a r d ,, }= H 8 E F L h* >P e n .' > n , }
- i,
- - __l'
_l} i l WOG STS 3.7-32 Rev. O, 09/28/92 1
9' g.
; ;, j 7 ,
N r3 _.4
- -EBACS) l 7 m B 3.7.13 h m sag ~
j B 3.7 gpm s PLANT SYSTEMS -- j e-bag < B 3.7.13 Fuel ,' Building Ais Qeanup) System (FBA_C4)
' h a p. % & k lf..?.. ^
BASES i _
~
l p~ r~h ..kyu :ys % K A.) . l BACKGROUND The FBACS' filters airborne radioactive particulates from the
- , -pD area of the fuel pool following a fuel handl,inj accident. &
) A. L. .g, L mc4 dent-U.00m .; The FBACSma-conjuncti6h ! p)gf '
-- --[ doss-ofwoolant @ith-0thtp norma 4y 5piratiiipystems, :!solprovides g pg]v
- O m environmentalcontroloftemperatureand(umpityinthe= --
j
,j y((,
ue p are f *
,];({" g ,,,q ,g,; y 0
4
#..- " TheFBACSconsistsoflt_woinOsnt:nt :nd recendent3 train @
i @ch tr:in cen5ists ;F: h::ter oa prefilter3r t;;;isted, a A 3 high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, an activated -Q charcoal adsorber section for removal of gaseous activity t ( %- u3 g _ (principally iodines)sind-a fanD Ductwork, mi::: ca
- /q .,. g.n@ )
dampers, rs weil as ~demisters, and instrumentation functiwitig ralso fone part reigwe to redircrthe of tne system; yb.. l j ' QgypuJu<,d (humidity of' the' air. stream.
;follows- the adsorber'rection to coll A second bank of EPrfilters 10-- '
on fines and lprovi'de backup in case the'mai filter bank fails' The. i j ; .- -d6wnstream HEPA filt
- , serves to coU charcoalnot fines,2M anditedto backin the up_the analysis, A m.a {u,t, p'j '
upstream HEPA filter should it develop a leak.f The-Ty'stkgyoj i oed 646k initiates filtered ventilation &of the fuel handling building
/
following receipt _of a high radiat. ion._ signal. ersF The FBACS Q R ';hf', isTTtindby % ' C ~t~ system, "L partss ca of which operated during normal plant operation U on receipt of ! t etuatini.sion ja k real air discharges a the N l p, g uar jbuilding, ne fuei n ling build.ing is isola , and thy j AA_g
" /% ,eev'.
4 stream ventila ' n air discha'rges throu the syst ;
- filt trains. e prefil s or demis _s. remov ny large icles i he air, a any entra' water- plets present o prevent essive loading of the HEPA filters and e arcoal adso ers.)
TheFBACSisdiscussedinthehFSAR Sections ,{4,5r ] y[9.41, sndr[15.7.4}L(Refs.1dh hrespectively). _ j g f I 1.k ' bedif!D ! My b* 5ed 'Or--MrSe+y-46-weM-en-pvH.-aCC1oen_tj atmospheric cleanup functions..f - A tw,4 a S& Eda" s,px rawn ~ru ?Q N f gyy, _,'j,'2., ; } . a 4 m w u . m a a s ,,, ! . u.f . 1 - -- - - . ( rpfg gg s ,7j, q
; L s,.ii is d-- # - " ,
h cfss,.y ,'r2 M. 7h su n - i hMdhg[i$ed menu q W(- WOG STS B 3.7-66 ev. O, n9128/92 ?
INSERT B438 INSERT B66A FH8E.m.F5iit.s?pis.cedlii6ths.iid Th'e?.gg post..jgdidsnt.Yedh W Ww:niodsf6fl g g7 and during CORE ALTERATIONS with the containment equipment hatch not intact. If6Fde r i fd ri- ths :? FHBE FS ilt o?f u ncti on^: correhtlisinit hb
~
postsidcidsnti mode 20 ff operation;'wi thithelContainnsnt; Shield Wal1 ~ ) remsyed dQinnti.l ati'oni duc two rkiisjioolypilec e;;imu s t:Jbsi!installsd. Thi s f!s poo1(fp16cesi s 0::i n s t al l ed 9i rili t hs 3 Pi pe 1 Tunnel 4Ven ti l ati on Sistdmlfrsin;;dampir;0PDV-AV172 Ltd!theitop
^
l of the:UnitilLl vertical p ips ichaiefbF.:?f rom ' dampe r L OPOVjAV 173 lt.o.; the to p . o ff.the ; Un;i t 22 vert;ica13pj;pe'! chase; i I l I i Zion Units 1 & 2 INSERT for B3.7-43 October 26, 1996
_ ._ _ .. _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ - _ . _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
^. L . --5 TBACS~
' 3.7.13 l
BASES (continued) ' c .. j APPLICABLE The FBACSi esign basis is established by the consequences'of SAFETY ANALYSES the limiting Design Basis Accident (DBA), which is a fuel i , handling accident. The analysis of the fuel handling ] j accident, given in ReferenceJ, assumes that all fuel rods i in an assembly are damaged. JThe analysis of the LOCA K assunts ttrat Tadioactive materials leaked from the Emergency) Ti>"". Core'Coolina System (ECCSI are filtered and adsorbed by the)
- t BACS.F The DBA analysis of the fuel, handling accident - .e d u-assumes that e!!17 one train of the FBACS is functional [ dB :-ca.:
, y30-a-+i nc ie Ja i.i urs=th a t--din b isssths=nthe r=tn M The
~
~ 4-accident analysis accounts for the reduction in airborne".TT'p
radioactive material provided by F.: m r= - =g --- e ; 2 h . ! this filtration system. The amount of fission products ,f f .m . I available for release from the fuel handli_ng building is g.,..a J , 7 j.: detemined for a fuel handling accident,)nMor-a-EOGAG-{ ,y , j ._ . i
- These assumptions and the analysis follow the guidance '
j
- y. <
s g jgggy providedinRegulatoryGuide1.25(Refy. l 6 ' # '. - M The FBACS satisfies Criterion 3 of the@NRC Policy Statement.
# l j C ^.
i h fl *r W/,,;~ [ 4
") W,;f LCO Twc_ ind:;;:d::t er.d; red...J .. treins ef)fhe FBACS ser9 i
! required to be OPERABLE to eTrsgre t..eL et 'eest-cr.e_n eied a , l j
#.7#
b' ,, , , ggs % avd tr:in.!-bl , ds==ing-e-sy: seim.id ist with
.::,e-fai-lure-that-41-sabis ef effsit: en:r.[ Total t c.therl ;
- system failure could result in the atmospheric release from I i
the fuel handling building exceeding the 10 CFR 100 (Ref. $) limits in the event of a fuel handling accident. g The FBACS is considered OPERABLE when the individual rs:% components necessary to control '6Bowr. tr:165.inliw Tuel_l Q,y c@ m K3Weiia': eei!d"?)are 0PERABLEsi
. p::r. AiFFBACS
- w is consicerea UPdOWLt when its associated:
I g.,.y a. Fan i RABLE; h ' N b b. EPA filter restricting flow, and andcharcoal are' capableadsor~of perfoming er are notrexcessiv 7 L: 2 " ~ { filtration functi.on,; 'and '
.)
, c. Heater,_dem ister,/ ductwork, valves, an dampers are l l OPERABLE, and air circulation can be' maintained.
U. V
!/ -
,o (continued)
WOG STS B 3.7-67 Rev. O, 09/28/92 l
. . - - _ . -- .- - ~ . - - . _ - _ - - . - - - . - . - - .- ..
l. INSERT B438 INSERT B67A The FHBEFS is also assumed to provide filtration for fuel handling accidents inside ie'tainment if the equipment hatch is not intact i addithsiC6stainndrJt zShieldiWallsisiremoved:during CORE ALTERATIONS BF~b7Ent~6f"iFridiatEd ^ fuel"i'sssmblibs within containment. The most severe radiological consequences resulting from a fuel handling accident in the containment that involves damage to l irradiated- fuel (Ref. 2). Fuel handling accidents, analyzed in Reference 3, include dropping a single irradiated fuel assembly 4 and handling tool or a heavy object onto other irradiated fuel assemblies. The requirements of LC0 3.9.3, " Containment Penetrations," LC0 3.9.6, " Refueling Cavity Water Level," and the minimum decay time of 100 hours prior to CORE ALTERATIONS ensure
, that the release of fission product radioactivity, subsequent to a
- fuel handling accident in the containment, results in doses that i are well below the guideline values specified in 10 CFR 100.
; INSERT B678 provide filtration of contamination following a fuel handling.
accident. In addition, the FHBEFS is required to be in?the:1 post-aEcidsnt?imsdelofoperationto: 1) assure immediate availability of 1
'ffitFhti66~ddF16g movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the ;
fuel handling building when irradiated fuel assemblies with
! < 60 days of decay time are in the fuel handling building; 2) during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the containment when irradiated fuel assemblies with < 60 days decay time are in I the containment and the containment hatch is not intact; and 3) duringCOREALTERATIONSwiththecontainmenthatchnotintact.1
'd 4 1 I 1 a 1 4 i Zion Units 1 & 2 INSERT for 83.7-43 October 26, 1996 l
INSERT B438 INSERT B67C
- This system is shared by the two units. The FHBEFS is considered i OPERABLE when:
i a. Any two main exhaust fans are OPERABLE (both of these may be shared by other required ventilation systems); 1 b. One charcoal booster fan is 0PERABLE, and either operating
- or capable of automatic actuation (this fan may be shared with PTEFS);
- c. HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber are not excessively restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration function as determined by the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP); and i
- d. Ductwork and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.
. ET JThilFliBEFS;?c;ah!mit n t a i n falp res s u re Tof E 25"iwiter; gauge
- ~w ithfrespecttto.atmosphericTpressure'during the post-j ,accipent(modesof-;(operation.
fiflN6'19enii l sti onifl ow1 pithissi s t sif rom 1thsl C6n ta i nmen t ?and ndliRBuf1; ding;iintol.the]P#gyundel." , 5??"?With51th'd:{#ijshieht$ hitchin6tXistiE tidths? Cont ai nadhtJShisl d
~
" Val lleb sti be t removed finV6pdedfo rith e J FHBEFS?td j functi on" '
codehtisis;Lthe]postfaccidsntim6deioffoperation T ' ~ i Equipment normally associated with either unit may fulfill the required functions. However, if the opposite-unit equipment is credited, all opposite-unit support equipment necessary to maintain OPERABILITY must also be OPERABLE. Zion Units 1 & 2 INSERT for B3.7-43 October 26, 1996
FBACS l 8 3.7.13 BASES (continued) APPLICABILITY In MODE M 2, 3 or 4, the FBACS is r uiredtobeQPERABLEl i to provfde fission product re associated with ECCS 'f ' leaks /due to a LOCA and 1 ge from containment and on61us.
- In MODE 5 or , the FBACS is not requiref-to be OPERABLE g ,.:. j @ nce-the'ECCS is not required to M RABLE.
H'E62A [ During movement of irradia area, the FBACjLis-requ fuel ia -the-fueMatrdTing
? C tobeOPERABLEtoalleviatethej h consequences of a fuel handling accident.
l , pg. w -
-g ACTIONS A.1 4 A. 2 i g4 ,,,]
a $ f) ggt -r With b we=-w oneraniefactTon must be taken to y ), . 1, fliisture GFERABLE ai..i.us witnin TTays. During this period, G#, g the remaining-OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the I FBACS fupction. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the ! ! risk from an event occurring requiring the inoperable FBACS ' i tr 'n, and the remaining FBACS train providing the required, i tection'Qwediihly plu.o M M8E3 d'[W s .l, . .a . .e .: . D
.j B.1 and B.2 ,- , wu 4 - - ' ^
/ ;
! In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, when Required Action A.1 cannot be completsd within the associated Completion Time, or when i both FBACS trains are inoperable, the unit must be placed in l 7 l /a MODE in which the LCD does not apply. To achieve this pf status, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within 6 hours,
.- g and in MODE 5 within 36 hours. The Completion Times are
.' j reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the i required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
(.,.Lgnd C.2 When Req /uired Action A.1 cannot be completed within the Qqegu' ired Completion Time, during movement of irradiated fue assemblies in the fuel building, the OPERABLE FBACS train Laust be started inneediately. or fuel movement . suspended, 4 oms-ac-t4cn-ensur;n :::: te -0.0.a tratr, a =mm [h MGCP S eM ks. /M L ptd~, , M Og, g yg b s y 'suu.hke % ebAdy de clard &\e. . ' y
.W g *%r $.. ,
(continued) WOG STS B 3.7-68 Rev. O, 09/28/92
INSERT 8438 l INSERT B68A 1 During movement of irradiated fuel in the fuel handling area, during movement of irradiated fuel in the containment with the equipment hatch not intact, and during CORE ALTERATIONS with the l l equipment hatch not intact, the FHBEFS is required to be OPERABLE l to alleviate the consequences of a fuel handling accident. In ! addition,theFHBEFSisrequiredtobeinth( i ofe; operation when there is potential for damaglpostf e to irradisfidapcidiht!hpas fuel Eisemblies with < 60 days of decay time to assure immediate availability of filtration following a fuel handling accident. l The equipment hatch is considered to be " intact" when held in I place by at least four bolts and at least one personnel air lock i door is closed. , 1 l INSERT B688 l l The ACTIONS are modified by a Note indicating that LC0 3.0.3 does not apply. The inoperability of the FHBEFS does not impact the safe operation of the plant, nor the analyzed response to l operational events. Therefore, an inoperable FHBEFS is not l sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. 1 i t l 1 1 I I Zion Units 1 & 2 INSERT for B3.7-43 October 26, 1996 i r
FBACS B 3.7.13 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) that no undete e ailures preventin system operation wil occur, and any active failure wi 1 he readily detected. 8 If t ystem is not placed in operation, this action uiressuspensionoffuelmovement,whichprecludesafuel) , handling accident. This does not preclude the movement of J l y assemblies to a safe position. y 3.1,6.lM 2d , l " ' " ' st l When< - : - .- .1+' _" i- n ia.; M 6f ir diated fuel assemblies in the moperauUu us ..iy action fuel building, rI NSg ' nu be taken to place the unit in a condition in which th : a 6/AA[ p 0 does not apply. Action must be taken immediate1y to , _ puspend mov- -- _ . . i. v i irraniatea ruei ass--viiwa in wir sur N_'4 W a #..This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.
,,)
'J 3 I r'fJf cat 869 F SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.13.#
- d41 REQUIREMENTS l
(9 b 'k
; P c-Standby , systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. As the environmental and
" y er nonnal operating conditions on this system are not severe, testing each train once every senth provides an adequate check on this system. Floloy s fM ~ ly heater operation dries out any moisture accumulated i M 'on the charcoal from humidity in the ambient air. J[Systensl )
g byg e i w with heaters must be operated for a 10 continuous hours with) ; gp MN Y i
^^5,' .the beaters energized. Systems without heatersJneed only be !
l C % W # e n 2"4 operated for a 15 minutes to demonstrate the function of the 1 l %eebe system.-}t The 31 day Frequency is based on the' known l
=- reliability of the equipment and the two train redundancy available. !
SR 3.7.13.2 -g
/
[ This SR verifies that the required FBACS testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing ! (continued) WOG STS B 3.7-69 Rev. O,09/28/92
1-l l INSERT B43B INSERT B69A With the FHBEFS inoperable, action must be taken to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling building, and if the equipment hatch is not intact, action must also be taken to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the containment and suspend CORE ALTERATIONS. These actions , preclude a fuel handling accident that may result in an unfiltered ' release. INSERT B69B SR 3.7.13.1 Periodic verification of this required operation of the FHBEFS assures immediate availability of filtration following a fuel handling accident. This~ SR is only required during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling building when irradiated fuel assemblies with < 60 days of decay time are in the fuel handling building, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the containment when irradiated fuel assemblies with
< 60 days decay time are in the containment and the equipment hatch is not intact, and during CORE ALTERATIONS with the equipment hatch not intact. A 12 hour Frequency is sufficient, considering the system indications and alarms available to the operator for monitoring the FHBEFS in the control room.
INSERT 869C SRE337713?2 This7SOiMfiksf FHBEFSlis?0PERABL E{ byNe H ffi rig it h'efisi's ? no
~
J ventil at i oni fl ow1 p sth M f rom tthei con ta i neestiorg Fueli H a ndl i nd~ Buil d i ng tt oi the Qi pesTunnel i;jThi s pe ri fi c at i.on? cons i s ts fo f ens sri ng It h at# the! ventil a t;i on tdsctworkispoolj pli ece;ha si been installedjin{theiRipedun_neRto ductwoWI rfs til l ati o n fo ffispools thj s]Aspil pi ece:D len arylBuil di ngisriWent il a t s u re s; byldss mea.su reith at $ radi oacti ve gel e ase siast aire s ul t ?dff aT FueM Handl ng i._ Ac cidentii n si deic ont.a i nme n t} whenit hei C on t ai nme nt:; S hi el d1Wal.l ei s, sb tii ns t al l bdiand [ the? Equ i pment EHa tchli stremoved kom radi o act i ve pel eases} a sjhe sul t[ofs alFuels Handl i nh Accidentti ni the1 Fuel ~ Handling 7BQi;1 ding)henEtheiContainment1 Shield Wall?isinot i ris til l ed lirsWou t edit.nroug h lthel AUxi l i a Fyj Bu'i l d i ngjc h a rdo al Oltralign1U nite Zion Units 1 & 2 INSERT for B3.7-43 October 26, 1996 l
4 INSERT 8438 INSERT B69C (continued) i
~
Th'is;SUrVeillancejisTmodifisd by :a' NOTE: that? requires:ithe Surveillance'whenithe Containment. Shield lWalliis: not installed. Wheni:the/FHBEFSlis2 required:to be OPERABLE orl i s? required to be in
- operat'ionMinioidert for
- the FHBEFS.EtoL.functionTcorrectlyfin the post:-accident Laode- of: operation with".the ' Containment Shield Wall re'm6ve'dRthe ventilationispo61(piec'eimust?be LinstalledXini:the' Auxiliary BuildingstoiPipe Tunne15ventilationidustworki i:Thisfis becauseLwith;the ContainmentiShield? Wall; removed?andi:the equipment hatchi removed NC potential ' ventil ation: flows p ath Lex lists ;;from~: t.he
' containment':[intol th'e pipejtunnel$unless;the Auxiliary 1 Building? to Pipen Tunnelfventilition spoolYpiecslistinstalledOAls'oaif5.the~
Containment? Shield:: Wall is"not1 installed whenihandling? irradiated fuelt.in. theifuelf. handling?buildingh atpotsntiallventilation 2 flow '
~
path-exists lfrom: thel. fuel handlingtbu'ilding Linto the ipipeitunnel l unles.si:thelventilation ductworkJspoolipiece lisL instal.. led.1 SeVen'daislwasTchosen asian' approppiate ' period 'of Ltime. based upon ; the' nee'datoiensurelinstallation of the.ventilationispool . p'iece
~
withinLa reasonablesperiod of; time.: prior (to moving: irradiated fuel in' the fuel' handling building,= moving' irradiated ' fuel in' the centainment!withi the. equipment hatch not _ intact, or' performing ! CORE ALTERATIONS 1with the equipment l hatch notii'ntact. . Correct i ventilationial_ig' ment:1is;:verifled n :during (the ; time. when the FHBEFS l 1si requi redL.tolbel0PERABLE:L or.f in : operation l,f and the . containment ' Shield 1Walllis!notiinstalled;
~
Zion Units 1 & 2 INSERT for B3.7-43 October 26, 1996
I. FBACS B 3.7.13 i j BASES I SURVEILLANCE SR
,i
').7.13.1 (continued) e hM s Snd e'^~~C l
REQUIREMENTS _. Progtam (VFTP)k The FBACS filter tests are in Mccreanct f _ with i M a ter" E d: 1.55(Ref. ). The.4VFTPKincludes-1 %)51; g/0'l9gl f e:t ting HEPA filter perfonnance, charcoal adsorber
@ efficiency,- i " :ytt r f L ate, and the physical ._
2- . / properties of the activated charcoal be,.m.i u. .. . L - foHcrin; specific ei,s. Gen:). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the ! w
! JVFTPff f- ,
f Ac+aa%, ~spis are ide8d w Leo 2. .7. - ) eN. - S i A omM u ha& h o e
# hP"af42, - %qa;,d 5R 3.7.13'.3 h3 52.13whoM Ss&" Mce' C
" Q ma.ws; & sys% io,:w
- w w % M M cgA(, .
/ This SR verifies that7ggdiFBACS EER startstf :;W;tes v l M7/pdf
#I pold [ on an actual Frequency is or simulated consistent with actuation Reference signal.
- 6. 7 The g18) monthI l
! N -
. , yt.
SR 3.7.13.4. L J c) sf d. p ! This SR verifies the integrity of the fuel building *
) enclosure. The ability of the fuele uilding tn maintain negative pressure with respect to potentially uncontaminated adjacent areas is periodically testf to verify pyoper g*48.,
-~ 4, function of the FBACS. -Oe -
^^
_ f. - j -oper!!!::,/he FBACS is designed to(m:t maintain:::id:?,a_h as i *
- negative pressure in the fuelduildings to prevent'The,aFBAC unfiltered LEAKAGE. g 3
sp{-0.f25}6 inches water gau e with respect to atmospheric w,
- pressure at a flow rate o cfm to the fuel @ % %
l i h>
,c building. The Frequency of218? months is consistent with) the guidance provided in NUREG-0800, Secti-- ' M (Ref. 7).
i d This4est-h-conducted--with--the-tests-for ffTter ~ fo c, p-nenetration; thus, an [15]. month Frequency (on a 5Tabutxtu TEST 3 ASIS) is cunaisient with iieference 6.
- :h SR 3.7.13.5 !
Operating the FBACS filter bypass damper is necessary to I
-ensure that the system functions properly. The OPERABILITY (j of the FBACS filter bypass damper is verified if it can be closed. An (18] month Frequency is consistent with j
/ Reference 6.
)'
(continued) WOG STS B 3.7-70 Rev. O, 09/28/92
. FBACS B 3.7.13 BASES (continued) O REFERENCES (1. FSARHeeties [6.5.iD - _ l .,2' . (AFSAR,Section}9.4.
, 2.f.RFSAR,.Sectionf15.7.4).
3/. Regulatory Guide 1.25.
- 45. 10 CFR 100.
- 6. Regulatory Guide 1.52 ev. 2 g.y
- 7. NUREG-0800, Section 6.5.1, Rev. 2, July 1981.
ANil /Jr$,
*)
WOG STS B 3.7-71 Rev. O,09/28/92
} 4 l i i 4 1 i i E i 1 i, 4 l 1 i l i ( 4 i j i 1 4 l t i 1 MARK UP OF DOD CHANGE J f i i 1 4 I 4 i f l i i 1 1 1 3 i 4 i i l t J i (
-- - _ - . .- _ _ - - .~ .. ,
. I 4 l* DISCUSSION OF THE DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG-1431 SECTION 3.7: PLANT SYSTEMS l CHANGE NUMBER DISCUSSION l i
- 19. NUREG LC0 3.7.13; Proposed LC0 3.7.13:
The FHBEFS.is a single train system and is required to be "in the? post 2 accident'. modeof.Eoperation" under certain conditions. The SR~for auto operation.
- 20. NUREG LC0 3.7.13; Proposed LC0 3.7.13: .
- A NOTE is added to indicate LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable for this system I
! since the APPLICABILITY does not include MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. The Actions are also modified to reflect the APPLICABILITY. , l
- 21. NUREG LC0 3.7.16; Proposed LC0 3.7.15 An additional Applicability is included to address the period beginning ;
with the initial movement of fuel until the end of that movement. The NUREG-Applicability could be read.to begin at the end of the movement of fuel. Additionally, the applicability has been revised to limit application of this LC0 to Region 2 of the storage racks. This . is consistent with the analysis in that. unlimited fuel storage is allowed in i Region 1, and al so consistent with Required Action A.2.2, which is intended to exit the Mode of applicability for the LCO.
- 22. Not used.
- 23. NUREG LC0 3.7.16; Proposed LC0 3.7.15: !
The Frequency of the Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration Surveillance is . retained as 31 days as approved in February 1993 for Zion, i Amendments 142/131. l
- 24. NUREG LC0 3.7.16; Proposed LC0 3.7.15:
The allowance to store fuel "in accordance with Specification 4.3.1.1" is omitted. Zion Station does not currently have an analysis to support ' special configuration loading of fuel from the Unacceptable Burnap Domain in Region 2 of the spent fuel storage pool. This item is also omitted from NUREG Specification 4.3.1.1.f.
- 25. NUREG LC0 3.7.5; Proposed LC0 3.7.5:
NUREG SR 3.7.5.2 is reworded to more completely reflect the actual testing required. That testing is required by and performed in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program, which encompasses testing criteria in addition to the NUREG stated developed head criteria.
- 26. NUREG LC0 3.7.5; Proposed LC0 3.7.5:
NUREG SR 3.7.5.3 is eliminated. The Zion AFW System design does not include any automatic valve actuation on system initiation other than the steam supply valve for the turbine driven AFW pump. This steam supply valve actuation is adequately addressed in the NUREG SR 3.7.5.4 (proposed SR 3.7.5.3) test, and is not necessary to be a separate surveillance. t ZION Units 1 & 2 3.7-6 11/22/96
DISCUSSION OF THE DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG-1431 SECTION 3.7: PLANT SYSTEMS CHANGE , NUMBER DISCUSSION 38k EAdditi6iislEinf6Fiis&6EEEdhEFF5ihgl[thsfiEdijidblsT6peFitinhim5dsfof:sths
" F0el! Handl t hp !Bu ildi ng !Exh ansti Fil trat iodiSystes t(FHBEFS) ip p'rovidedi , JIn ordeEtoimestj theitschnicalfspsdi fi Eati osi; initheipost-accident [modejjf;Loperationg geqhfriments@hejfHBEFS mus 1
39 0 A'n'ew SufveillanE RsiiuTrement has besn added'to LCO 3.7.13 to verify that
~ ~ 'the ventilation system is.0PERABLE during the" peri'o d of time the Shield Wall or' Equipment Hatch is not intact. This is done by verifying that a l ventilation spool piece has been' installed between the Auxiliary Building )
and Pipe Tunnel, such that no ventilation flow path exists from the FHBEFS
~ '
to,,the Pipe Tunnel .3 1 l l 1 l l 1 l 1 I ZION Units 1 & 2 3.7-10 11/23/96
ATTACHMENT 4 Changes to the Containment Spray and Reactor Containment Fan Coolers Limiting Conditions for Opera. ion and BASES
MARK UP OF ITS CHANGE 01 SR 3.6.6.2 - Reinstate previously deleted SR 3.6.6.2 SR 3.6.6.2 for SW flow verification is reinstated. Discussion changed to make the SR verify SW System configuration required to support post-accident SW flow to the RCFC units, consistent with SR 3.7.8.1. l l l l
I l CS and RCFC Systems 3.6.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l l SR 3.6.6.1 Operate each RCFC at low speed for 31 days 2 15 minutes. 1 SR 3.6.6.2 Verify each RCFC cooling water flow rate 31 days I 4+s6hld); tie 2 16500 gpmunde6a66ident con.ditions. SR 3.6.6.3 Verify the diesel driven CS pump fuel oil 31 days l day tank contains a 46 gallons of fuel oil. l SR 3.6.6.4 Verify the diesel driven CS pump fuel oil In accordance properties are tested in accordance with, with the Diesel and maintained within the limits of the Fuel Oil Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program. Testing Program SR 3.6.6.5 Verify each automatic CS valve in .the flow 18 months path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal. SR 3.6.6.6 Verify each CS pump starts automatically on 18 months an actual or simulated actuation signal. SR 3.6.6.7 Verify each RCFC starts automatically on an 18 months actual or simulated actuation signal. (continued)
-ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-16 Amendment No. (Sup. 7) 1 I
i 9 CS and RCFC Systems ) 3.6.6 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.6.8 Verify the Accident Inlet, Accident Outlet, 18 months and Normal Inlet RCFC dampers that are not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in their accident position, are in the accident position. SR 3.6.6.9 Verify each spray nozzle is unobstructed. 10 years l l ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-17 Amendment No. (Sup. 7)
CS and RCFC Systems B 3.6.6 8 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.6 Containment Spray (CS) and Reactor Containment Fan Cooler (RCFC) Systems l BASES l BACKGROUND The CS and RCFC Systems provide containment atmosphere i cooling to limit post accident pressure and temperature in containment to less than the design values. Reduction of
- containment pressure and the iodine removal capability of the spray reduces the release of fission product l radioactivity from containment to the environment in the l event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA).
The CS and RCFC Systems are Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) l Systems. They are designed to ensure that the heat removal capability required during the post accident period can be attained. The CS and RCFC Systems provide redundant methods j to limit and maintain post accident conditions to less than
- the containment design values.
1 (- ! Containment Soray System The CS System consists of three separate trains of equal capacity, two CS trains in conjunction with three RCFCs can provide the required flow for containment pressure control (Ref. 1). Each train includes a containment spray pump, spray headers, nozzles, valves, and piping. Two trains are powered from separate ESF buses. The third train utilizes a i separate ESF bus for valve and control power requirements and a dedicated diesel engine to supply motive force to the pump. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) supplies i borated water to the CS System during the injection phase of l operation. In the recirculation mode of operation, one l Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump is aligned from the containment recirculation sump to the spray header of one motor driven CS pump to provide long term containment cooling. Iodine removal by the CS system is not credited in the analysis during the recirculation mode of operation. f The CS System provides a spray of borated water mixed with l sodium hydroxide (Na0H) from the spray additive tank into i the upper regions of containment to reduce the containment I pressure and temperature and to reduce fission products from I the containment atmosphere during a DBA. The RWST solution l (continued) ( ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-34 Rev. 00, 11/20/96
CS and RCFC Systems 3 3.6.6 l BASES l BACKGROUND temperature is an important factor in determining the heat
- (continued) removal capability of the CS System during the injection I phase. In the recirculation mode of operation, heat is l removed from the containment recirculation sump water by the ;
- RHR coolers. Each train of the CS System provides adequate I i spray coverage to meet the system design requirements for i containment heat removal. l The Spray Additive System injects an Na0H solution into the spray. The resulting alkaline pH of the spray enhances the ability of the spray to scavenge fission products from the
- containment atmosphere. The NaOH added in the spray also ensures an alkaline pH for the solution in the containment
- recirculation sump. The alkaline pH of the containment recirculation sump water minimizes the evolution of iodine 1 2
and minimizes the occurrence of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components exposed to 4 the fluid. One CS train can deliver enough Na0H to form the i desired solution in the containment recirculation sump when
- combined with the inventory of the RWST and the spilled reactor coolant.
The CS System is actuated either automatically by a containment High-High pressure signal coincident with a Safety Injection (SI) signal, or manually. An automatic actuation opens the CS pump discharge valves, opens the spray additive tank outlet valves, starts the three CS , pumps, and begins the injection phase. A manual actuation i of the CS System requires the operator to actuate two L Phase B push buttons and either have an SI signal present or activate a manual SI switch to begin the same sequence. The injection phase continues until an RWST low level alarm is received. The low level alarm for the-RWST alerts the operator to initiate changeover from injection to recirculation by a series of valve realignments. When the RWST low level alarm is received, two of the CS pumps and i both RHR pumps are stopped. An RHR pump can then be aligned to the CS recirculation header and restarted in order to i maintain an equilibrium temperature between the containment atmosphere and the recirculated sump water. The remaining i CS pump continues to run until the RWST is empty. Operation of an RHR pump in the CS recirculation mode is controlled by , the operator in accordance with the emergency operating procedures. i (continued) i i ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-35 Rev. 00, 11/20/96
CS and RCFC Systems B 3.6.6 BASES l BACKGROUND Reactor Containment Fan Coolina System (continued) Five RCFCs are provided (Ref. 2), three of which in conjunction with two CS trains have sufficient capacity to supply 100% of the design cooling requirement. Each fan unit is supplied with cooling water from the Service Water , (SW) System at a pressure 2: 47 psig. Air is drawn into the ! coolers through the fan and discharged to the lower areas of containment. During normal operation, the fans are operated at high speed with SW supplied to the cooling coils. The RCFCs, operating in conjunction with the Containment Ventilation System, are designed to limit the ambient containment air temperature during normal unit operation to less than the limit specified in LC0 3.6.5, " Containment Air Temperature." This temperature limitation ensures that the' containment
- temperature does not exceed the initial temperature conditions assumed for the DBAs.
In post accident operation following an actuation signal, the RCFCs are designed to start automatically in low speed if not already running. If running in high (normal) speed, l the fans automatically shift to low speed. The fans are operated at the lower speed during accident conditions to prevent motor overload from the higher mass atmosphere. The temperature of the SW is an important factor in the heat removal capability of the fan units. APPLICABLE The CS System and RCFC System limit the temperature and SAFETY ANALYSES pressure that could be experienced in containment following a DBA. The limiting DBAs considered are the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and the Main Steam Line Break (MSLB). The LOCA and MSLB are analyzed using computer codes designed to predict the resultant containment pressure and temperature transients. No two DBAs are assumed to occur simultaneously or consecutively. The postulated DBAs are analyzed with-regard to ESF System response. The basis for the safeguards performance is the loss of two fan coolers ano one spray , pump. This failure is more severe than the usual worst case I single failure (i.e.; the loss of one emergency diesel generator), since the worst case single failure would limit the available water flow to the core and thus limit the mass and energy flow from the reactor coolant system to the (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-36 Rev. 00, 11/20/96 l
. ~ . . - .. - . . - - . - - . - - - . ~ . . . - . . - - . - . . - _ _ . - . - . - - . .
CS and RCFC Systems B 3.6.6 BASES 1 I APPLICABLE containment during the reflood period. For an MSLB,'offsite SAFETY ANALYSES power is conservatively assumed available for purposes of l (continued) determining the mass and energy release to the containment. l The assumed worst case failure is a main steam check valve. The safeguards performance (two CS trains and three RCFCs) ! I is consistent with the LOCA analysis. ) i The analysis.a1d evaluation show that the highest peak l containment pressure and the highest peak containment ! temperature experienced during a LOCA or MSLB meet the ; intent of the design basis. (See the Bases for LCO 3.6.4, ;
" Containment Pressure," and LC0 3.6.5, " Containment Air Temperature," for a detailed discussion.) The LOCA containment analysis assumes a unit specific power level of 106.4%, two CS trains and three RCFCs operating, and initial (pre-accident) containment conditions of 120*F and 1.0 psig.
The MSLB is analyzed at 102% and 0% power and assumes an .. initial containment pressure of -1.5 psig which tends to maximize the peak temperature. The analyses also assume a response time delayed initiation to provide conservative peak calculated containment pressure and temperature responses. For certain aspects of transient accident analyses, maximizing the calculated containment pressure is not conservative. In particular, the effectiveness'of.the Emergency Core Cooling System during the' core reflood phase of a LOCA analysis increases with increasing containment backpressure. For these calculations, the containment backpressure is calculated in a manner designed to conservatively minimize, rr.ther than maximize, the calculated transient containment pressures in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix K. The modeled CS System actuation from the containment analysis is based on a response time associated with exceeding the containment High-High pressure setpoint to achieving full flow through the containment spray nozzles. The CS System total response time of 110 seconds includes diesel generator (DG) startup (for loss of offsite power), block loading of equipment, CS pump startup, and spray line filling (Ref. 3). I l-(continued) i l ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-37 Rev. 00, 11/20/96
. _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ . __ ___
$ n CS and RCFC Systems 8 3.6.6 4 i BASES { i APPLICABLE The modeled RCFC System actuation from the containment
- SAFETY ANALYSES analysis is based upon a response time associated with ,
- (continued) exceeding the containment High pressure setpoint to l achieving full RCFC air and safety grade cooling water flow. )
j The RCFC System total response time of 58 seconds (Ref. 3), ' includes signal delay, DG startup (for loss of offsite power), and service water pump startup times. i Containment cooling performance for post accident conditions i is given in Reference 3. The result of the analysis is that
; two CS trains and three RCFCs can provide 100% of the required peak cooling capacity during the post accident
{ conditions.
- The CS System and the RCFC System satisfy Criterion 3 of the l NRC Policy Statement.
i LC0 During a DBA, a minimum of two CS trains and three RCFCs are required to maintain the containment peak pressure and j temperature below the design limits. In addition, one CS train is also required to remove iodine from the containment atmosphere and maintain concentrations below those assumed
- in the safety analysis. To ensure that these requirements i are met, three CS trains and five RCFCS must be OPERABLE.
j Therefore, in the event of an accident, at least two CS trains and three RCFCs are available, assuming the worst 4 { case single active failure occurs.
- Each CS System includes a spray pump, spray headers, i nozzles, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure j
an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the RWST upon an ESF actuation signal. Containment spray during the recirculation phase is accomplished by aligning an RHR pump to the spray header of one motor driven CS pump. Two spray headers are required to remain OPERABLE to assure the system capability to provide containment spray during the recirculation phase following a DBA. Two headers are . required to ensure that one header will be available after a postulated single failure. An OPERABLE header includes the piping from the RHR System to the inlet of the spray header and to the spray nozzles. In addition, the necessary valves and other controls to assure the capability to align the RHR System to the recirculation mode and provide the design spray flow to the containment atmosphere are required. The (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.6-38 Rev. 00, 11/20/96
CS and RCFC Systems B 3.6.6 BASES l LC0 plant design includes two recirculation headers, as such, (continued) both headers are required to remain OPERABLE during operations in the applicable MODES. i i Each RCFC includes cooling coils, dampers, fans, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path. j 1 1 l APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of ; radioactive material to containment and an increase in i containment pressure and temperature requiring the operation of the CS trains and RCFCs. In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these i events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Thus, the CS System and the l RCFCs are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6. ACTIONS A.1 l i With one CS train inoperable, the inoperable CS train must I be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. In this I i Condition, the remaining 0PERABLE CS trains and RCFCs are adequate to perform the iodine removal and containment cooling functions. The 72 hour Completion Time takes into i I account the redundant heat removal capability afforded by , the CS System and RCFC System, reasonable time for repairs, l and low probability of a DBA occurring during this period, i l The 14 day portion of the Completion Time for Required Action A.1 is based upon engineering judgment. It takes i into account the low probability of coincident entry into two Conditions in this Specification coupled with the low probability of an accident occurring during this time. B.1 With one CS recirculation header inoperable, the inoperable l CS header must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. l In this Condition, the remaining 0PERABLE CS recirculation header performs the containment cooling function. The 7 day l Completion Time takes into account the redundant heat I i (continued) l ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-39 Rev. 00, 11/20/96 l l
CS and RCFC Systems B 3.6.6 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued) removal capability afforded by the RCFCs, reasonable time for repairs, and low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. The 14 day portion of the Completion Time for Required Action B.1 is based upon engineering judgment. It takes into account the low probability of coincident entry into two Conditions in this Specification coupled with the low probability of an accident occurring during this time. C.1 With one RCFC inoperable, the inoperable RCFC must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this condition, the CS trains and the remaining RCFCs provide at least 100% of the heat removal needs. The 7 day Completion Time was developed taking into account the redundant heat removal capabilities afforded by combinations of the CS System and RCFC System and the low probability-of a DBA occurring during this period. The 14 day portion of the Completion Time for Required Action C.1 is based upon engineering judgment. It takes into account the low probability of coincident entry into two Conditions in this Specification coupled with the low probability of an accident occurring during this time. D.1 and 0.2 If the' inoperable CS train, RCFC or CS recirculation header cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. This is done by placing the unit in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and in MODE 5 within 84 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without-challenging plant systems. The extended interval to reach MODE 5 allows additional time for attempting restoration of the CS train, RCFC or CS recirculation header and is reasonable when considering the driving force for a release (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-40 Rev. 00, 11/20/96
CS and RCFC Systems 3 3.6.6 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and 0.2 (continued) of radioactive material from the Reactor Coolant System is reduced in the lower temperature region of MODE 3. E.1 With two RCFCs inoperable, one RCFC must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. In this condition, the CS trains and remaining RCFCs are still capable of providing at least 100% of the heat removal needs after an accident, however, the total effectiveness of the heat removal capability has been reduced. The 72 hour Completion iime was developed taking into account the redundant heat removal capabilities afforded by' combinations of the CS System and RCFC System and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. F.1 and F.2 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition E of this LCO are not met, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. This is done by placing the unit in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and in MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.6.1 REQUIREMENTS Operating each RCFC at low speed for 2 15 minutes ensures that all fan units are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that-blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action. The 31 day Frequency was developed considering the known reliability of the fan units and controls, the redundancy available, and the low probability of significant degradation of the RCFCs occurring between surveillances. It has also been shown to j be acceptable through operating experience. (continued) l ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.6-41 Rev. 00, 11/20/96
CS and RCFC Systems B 3.6.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.6.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verifying the SW cooling flow rate to each RCFC unit is 2: M001500 gpm under? postulated post-accident conditions provides " assurance ~ that the ~ design ~ flow rate assumed i'n the safety analyses will be achieved (Ref. 3). This is done by ve ri fy i ngith'at O thodu rren t ; SW : Sys tem co'n fi gu r a t i on , including 30mponent and valveilineup. and number:of OPERABLE SW pumps, Lis.within :the assumptions of. the~ SW -analysis (Ref;5) performed ~ to verify SWLSystem design basis. The BASES for:dLC0 :3.7.8' contain the specific.SW System configurationstfor;the number.of-OPERABLE.SW pumps, both . assuminlg[and;in...theyabsenceofasinglefailure. Ifi.SW ' System configuration;is determined to. meet the requirements'.ofeLCO 3.7 8,1 Condition'D,7then SR:3'.6.6.2'is cons'idere'd:: to be anet.. iIf SR 3.6;6.2 :cannot:be met due .to :a
~
failurestoimeet:LC0.3;7.8, Condition 0,.then so:longgas LC0 3.7. 8,;RequiredcAction D.I:is" met, SR;3.6._6.2'can:be
- consideredimet.1 .IfeLC0 3.7.8,:: Required-Action D.I is not met,-::then>SRJ3.6 6.2 isinot. met ~and the RCFC units are be~ yond:their design bas ~is.- In:this case ~LC0 3.0'.3 applies.
e This is3eduivalent to SW to all: RCFC units bein'g inoperable, andientering LCO 3.0.3 for LC0.~3.7.8. The Frequency was developed considering the known i i reliability of the cooling water system, the redundancy available, and the low probability of a significant degradation of flow occurring between surveillances. 2 SR 3.6.6.3 1 Verifying that the diesel driven containment spray pump fuel oil day tank contains greater than or equal to 46 gallons of fuel oil provides assurance that adequate fuel is available to power the diesel driven containment spray pump for the length of time (approximately 77 minutes) it is credited. when operating in response to a design basis accident and includes a small margin for calculation conservatism (Ref. 3). The 31 day Frequency is based on the available alarm indication provided in the control room of a low level in the tank. SR 3.6.6.4 (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-42 Rev. 00, 11/21/96
.~
CS and RCFC Systems : B 3.6.6 i l l BASES j Specification 5.5.11, " Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program," specifies the' required testing of both new fuel oil and stored fuel oil in accordance with the applicable ASTM < Standards. Since the diesel driven CS pump fuel oil tank is ' typically filled from an OPERABLE emergency diesel generator storage tank, the performance of new fuel oil testing is not. required. This is because the fuel oil has already been analyzed before being added to the emergency diesel generator storage tanks. However, if fuel oil in an emergency diesel generator storage tank has been determined J to not meet the requirements of Specification 3.8.3, " Diesel Fuel Oil and Starting Air," after it has been added to the diesel driven CS pump fuel oil tank, or the fuel oil to be added is from a source other than an OPERABLE emergency diesel generator storage tank, then the new fuel oil must be tested in accordance with the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program. l l
'l 1
j l l . 1 (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-43 Rev. 00, 11/20/96
CS and RCFC Systems B 3.6.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.6.4 (continued) REQUIREMENTS Stored fuel oil degradation shows up as an increase in particulate, due mostly to oxidation. The presence of particulate does not mean the fuel oil will not. burn properly in a diesel engine. However, the particulate can cause fouling of filters and fuel oil injection equipment which can cause engine failure. Stored fuel oil particulate concentrations should be determined in accordance with ASTM D2276, Method A-2 or Method A-3. This method involves a gravimetric determination of total particulate concentration in the fuel oil and has a limit of 10 mg/1. It is acceptable to obtain a field sample for subsequent laboratory testing in lieu of field testing. , The Frequency of 31 days for testing the stored fuel considers fuel oil degradation trends which indicate that particulate concentration is unlikely to change l significantly during this period. . l SR 3.6.6.5 and SR 3.6.6.6 j These SRs require verification that each automatic CS valve actuates to its correct position and that each CS spray pump ! starts upon receipt of an actual or simulated actuation of a l containment High-High pressure signal coincident with a SI l signal. This surveillance -is not required for valves that I are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform these Surveillances under the conditions that apply during a plant outage-and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillances were performed with the reactor at power. 1 Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillances when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. SR 3.6.6.7 This SR requires verification that each RCFC actuates upon receipt of an actual or simulated safety injection signal. The 18 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment and (continued)
- 7. ION Units l'& 2 B 3.6-44 Rev. 00, 11/20/96
CS and RCFC Systems l B 3.6.6 BASES l I SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.6.7 . REQUIREMENTS l (continued) on operating experience which has shown that these components usually pass the surveillances when performed at j the 18 month frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. l SR 3.6.6.8 l Verifying the correct alignment of the RCFC accident dampers ; provides assurance that the proper flow path will exist for i l post accident RCFC operation. This SR does not apply to dampers that are fixed or otherwise secured in position, since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to being secured. This SR does not require any testing or damper manipulation. Rather it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that dampers l capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to access the l-RCFCs and on operating experience which has shown these that these components usually pass this surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. SR 3.6.6.9 With the spray header drained of any solution, low pressure l air or smoke can be blown through tett c lections. This SR ensures that each spray nozzle is unobst..ccted and provides assurance that spray coverage of the containment during an l accident is not degraded. Due to'the passive design of the nozzle, a test at 10 year intervals is considered adequate to detect obstruction of the nozzles. REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 6.5.2.
- 2. UFSAR, Section 6.2.2. -
- 3. UFSAR, Section 15.6.
l
- 4. UFSAR, Section 15.0.
Si fZ1FStatidtJhdhtedFSrHydrauliFModel? Calculation: 022S-BiOO220-525(Rev.-Ll'. l l l . ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-45 Rev. 00, 11/20/96 l l l
- a . , dr + a ._ . __ m a ..ase m .. A , m - .a
( e l I e 4 i CLEAN ITS SPEC
l CS and RCFC Systems i 3.6.6 j i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 1 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l SR 3.6.6.1 Operate each RCFC at low speed for 31 days 2: 15 minutes. 4 I i SR 3.6.6.2 Verify each RCFC cooling water flow rate 31 days GOUldsbi,4 1500 gpm UndeF! accident conditions. l i SR 3.6.6.3 Verify the diesel driven CS pump fuel oil 31 days j day tank contains 2: 46 gallons of fuel oil. SR 3.6.6.4 Verify the diesel driven CS pump fuel oil In accordance ;
, properties are tested in accordance with, with the Diesel and maintained within the limits of the Fuel Oil Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program. Testing Program i
. \ SR 3.6.6.5 Verify each automatic CS valve in the flow 18 months j
- path that-is not locked, sealed, or ;
l otherwise secured in position actuates to l the correct position on an actual or i simulated actuation signal. j
- SR 3.6.6.6 Verify each CS pump starts automatically on 18 months l an actual or simulated actuation signal.
i SR 3.6.6.7 Verify each RCFC starts automatically on an 18 months actual or simulated actuation signal.
, (continued) l 4
4 ZION Units 1 & 2 - 3.6-16 Amendment No. (Sup. 7) 1
CS and RCFC Systems 3.6.6 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.6.8 Verify the Accident Inlet, Accident Outlet, 18 months and Normal inlet RCFC dampers that are not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in their accident position, are in the accident position. SR 3.6.6.9 Verify each spray nozzle is unobstructed. 10 years l l l l l l l l l l l ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-17 Amendment No. (Sup. 7)
.. - _- ~- -- . . ~ - - . _ . . . - - - - - - . . - .- ~ . - .
CS and RCFC Systems B 3.6.6 8 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.6 Containment Spray (CS) and Reactor Containment Fan Cooler (RCFC) Systems I i BASES 1 l l l BACKGROUND The CS and RCFC Systems provide containment atmosphere cooling to limit post accident pressure and temperature in , containment to less.than the design values. Reduction of . containment pressure and the iodine removal capability of ! the spray reduces the release of fission product t l radioactivity from containment to the environment in the '
- event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA).
The CS and RCFC Systems are Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Systems. They are designed to ensure that the heat removal ! capability required during the post accident period can be i attained. The CS and RCFC Systems provide redundant methods to limit and maintain post accident conditions to less than j j the containment design values. Containment Soray System
- The CS System consists of three separate trains of equal capacity, two CS trains in conjunction with three RCFCs can provide the required flow for containment pressure control (Ref. 1). Each train includes a containment spray pump, spray headers, nozzles, valves, and piping. Two trains are powered from separate ESF buses. The third train utilizes a separate ESF bus for valve and control power requirements and a dedicated diesel engine to supply motive force to the pump. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) supplies borated water to the CS System during the injection phase of operation. In the recirculation mode of operation, one Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump is aligned from the containment recirculation sump to the spray header of one motor driven CS pump to provide long term containment cooling. Iodine removal by the CS system is not credited in the analysis during the recirculation mode of operation.
The CS System provides a spray of borated water mixed with sodium hydroxide (Na0H) from the spray additive tank into the upper regions of containment to reduce the containment I pressure and temperature and to reduce fission products from the containment atmosphere during a DBA. The RWST solution l , (continued) i i ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.6-32 Rev. 00, 11/20/96 L
CS and RCFC Systems B 3.6.6 BASES l BACKGROUND temperature is an important factor in determining the heat j (continued) removal capability of the CS System during the injection l phase. In the recirculation mode of operation, heat is removed from the containment recirculation sump water by the l RHR coolers. Each train of the CS System provides adequate l spray coverage to meet the system design requirements for containment heat removal. l The Spray Additive System injects an NaOH solution into the spray. The resulting alkaline pH of the spray enhances the ability of the spray to scavenge fission products from the containment atmosphere. The Na0H added in the spray also ensures an alkaline pH for the solution in the containment recirculation sumo. The alkaline pH of the containment recirculation sump water minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the occurrence of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components exposed to the fluid. One CS train can deliver enough NaOH to form the desired solution in the containment recirculation sump when combined with the inventory of the RWS7 and the spilled reactor coolant. The CS System is actuated either eutomatically by a containment High-High pressure signal coincident with a Safety Injection (SI) signal, or manually. An automatic actuation opens the CS pump discharge valves, opens the spray additive tank outlet valves, starts the three CS pumps, and begins the injection phase. A manual actuation of the CS System requires the operator to actuate two
- Phase B push buttons and either have an SI signal present or activate a manual SI switch to begin the same sequence. The injection phase continues until an RWST low level alarm is received. The low level alarm for the RWST alerts the operator to initiate changeover from injection to recirculation by a series of valve realignments. When the RWST low level alarm is received, two of the CS pumps and l both RHR pumps are stopped. An RHR pump can then be aligned to the CS recirculation header and restarted in order to maintain an equilibrium temperature between the containment atmosphere and the recirculated sump water. The remaining CS pump continues to run until the RWST is empty. Operation of an RHR pump in the CS recirculation mode is controlled by the operator in accordance with the emergency operating procedures.
l l (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.6-33 Rev. 00, 11/20/96 l i
_- .- - - ~ . . _ . . . . . . . . - - - - - . - - . - - . . . - . - - . . . - _ _ . - . ..- - . CS and RCFC Systems ^ B 3.6.6 i BASES i l BACKGROUND Reactor Containment Fan Coolina System (continued) Five RCFCs are provided (Ref. 2), three of which in conjunction with two CS trains have sufficient capacity to supply 100% of the design cooling requirement. Each fan l unit is supplied with cooling water from the Service Water I (SW) System at a pressure 2: 47 psig. Air-is drawn into the ' coolers through the fan and discharged to the lower areas of containment. j 1 During normal operation, the fans are operated at high speed j with SW supplied to the cooling coils. The RCFCs, operating i l in conjunction with the Containment Ventilation System, are ! l designed to limit the ambient containment air temperature { during normal unit operation to less than the limit ; l specified in LC0 3.6.5, " Containment Air Temperature." This temperature limitation ensures that the containment temperature does not exceed the initial temperature conditions assumed for the DBAs. In post accident operation following an actuation signal, the RCFCs are designed to start automatically in low speed j if not already running. If running in high (normal) speed, the fans automatically shift to low speed. The fans are I operated at the lower speed during accident conditions to prevent motor overload from the higher mass atmosphere. The i temperature of the SW is an important factor in the heat removal capability of the fan units. i APPLICABLE The CS System and RCFC System limit the temperature and l SAFETY ANALYSES pressure that could be experienced in containment following ! a DBA. The limiting DBAs considered are the Loss of Coolant l Accident (LOCA) and the Main Steam Line Break (MSLB). The LOCA and MSLB are analyzed using computer codes designed to l predict the resultant containment pressure and temperature transients. No two DBAs are assumed to occur simultaneously 1 or consecutively. The postulated DBAs are analyzed with - regard to ESF System response. The basis for the safeguards performance is the loss of two fan coolers and one spray pump. This failure is more severe than the usual worst case single failure (i.e.; the loss of one emergency diesel generator), since the worst case single failure would limit the available water flow to the core and thus limit the mass j and energy flow from the reactor coolant system to the I i (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.6-34 Rev. 00, 11/20/96
. 1 4 CS and RCFC Systems l B 3.6.6 BASES I APPLICABLE containment during the reflood period. For an MSLB, offsite j i SAFETY ANALYSES power is conservatively assumed available for purposes of ! (continued) determining the mass and energy release to the containment. l The assumed worst case failure is a main steam check valve. ; ) The safeguards performance (two CS trains and three RCFCs) l is consistent with the LOCA analysis. ' The analysis and evaluation show that.the highest peak i ! containment pressure and the highest peak containment l
- temperature experienced during a LOCA or MSLB meet the j j intent of the design basis. (See the Bases for LCO 3.6.4, i " Containment Pressure," and LCO 3.6.5, " Containment Air i Temperature," for a detailed discussion.) The LOCA
- containment analysis assumes a unit specific power level of 106.4%, twa CS trains and three RCFCs operating, and initial l' (pre-accident) containment conditions of 120*F and 1.0 psig.
The MSLB is analyzed at 102% and 0% power and assumes an initial containment pressure of -1.5 psig which tends to maximize the peak temperature. The analyses also assume a
- response time delayed initiation to provide conservative l 1 peak calculated containment pressure and temperature l
- responses. '
- For certain aspects of transient accident analyses, i maximizing the calculated containment pressure is not
- conservative. In particular, the effectiveness of the i Emergency Core Cooling System during the core reflood phase i of a LOCA analysis increases with increasing containment
! backpressure. For these calculations, the containment i backpressure is calculated in a manner designed to conservatively minimize, rather than maximize, the calculated transient containment pressures in accordance , with 10 CFR 50, Appendix K. i l The modeled CS System actuation from the containment i analysis is based on a response time associated with i exceeding the containment High-High pressure setpoint to achieving full flow through the containment spray nozzles. The CS System total response time of 110 seconds includes diesel generator (OG) startup (for loss of offsite power), block loading of equipment, CS pump startep, and spray line filling (Ref. 3). (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.6-35 Rev. 00, 11/20/96
- l. CS and RCFC Systems +
! B 3.6.6 i, j BASES i j APPLICABLE The modeled RCFC System actuation from the containment
. SAFETY ANALYSES analysis is based upon a response time associated with ,
(continued) exceeding the containment High pressure setpoint to > 1 achieving full RCFC air and safety grade cooling water flow. i The RCFC System total response time of 58 seconds (Ref. 3), includes signal delay, DG startup (for loss of offsite l ! l power), and service water pump startup times. i i Containment cooling performance for post accident conditions
- is given in Reference 3. The result of the analysis is that t two CS trains and three RCFCs can provide 100% of the i- required peak cooling capacity during the post accident j conditions.
3 ! The CS System and the RCFC System satisfy Criterion 3 of the [ NRC Policy Statement. i LC0 During a DBA, a minimum of two CS trains and three RCFCs are i required to maintain the containment peak pressure and temperature below the design limits. In addition, one CS train is also required to remove iodine from the containment atmosphere and maintain concentrations below those assumed in the safety analysis. To ensure that these requirements are met, three CS trains and five RCFCS must be OPERABLE. Therefore, in the event of an accident, at least two CS trains and three RCFCs are available, assuming the worst case single active failure occurs. Each CS System includes a spray pump, spray headers, nozzles, valves, piping, instruments,'and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the RWST upon an ESF actuation signal. ' Containment spray during the recirculation phase is accomplished by aligning an RHR pump to the spray header of one motor driven CS pump. Two spray headers are required to remain OPERABLE to assure the system capability to provide containment spray during the recirculation phase following a DBA. Two headers are - required to ensure that one header will be available after a postulated single failure. An OPERABLE header includes the piping from the RHR System to the inlet of the spray header and to the spray nozzles. In addition, the necessary valves and other controls to assure the capability to align the RHR System to the recirculation mode and provide the design spray flow to the containment atmosphere are required. The (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-36 Rev. 00, 11/20/96
e CS and RCFC Systems B 3.6.6 BASES i LCO. plant design includes two recirculation headers, as such, (continued) both headers are required to remain OPERABLE during operations in the applicable MODES. Each RCFC includes cooling coils, dampers, fans, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path. t l APPLICABILITY In MODES l', 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of c radioactive material to containment and an increase in containment pressure and temperature requiring the operation of the CS trains and RCFCs. In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Thus, the CS System and the RCFCs are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6. j l 1 ACTIONS A.1 With one CS train inoperable, the inoperable CS train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CS trains and RCFCs are adequate to perform the iodine removal and containment cooling functions. The 72 hour Completion Time takes into j l account the redundant heat removal capability afforded by the CS System and RCFC System, reasonable time for repairs, and low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. The 14 day portion of the Completion Time for Required Action A.1 is based upon engineering judgment. It takes into account the low probability of coincident entry into i two Conditions in this Specification coupled with the low l probability of an accident occurring during this time, y i With one CS recirculation header inoperable, the inoperable
- CS header must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days.
In this Condition, the remaining 0PERABLE CS recirculation i header performs the containment cooling function. The 7 day Completion Time takes into account the redundant heat l l ! (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.6-37 Rev. 00, 11/20/96 I
CS and RCFC Systems 8 3.6.6 BASES ACTIONS 8.1 (continued) removal capability afforded by the RCFCs, reasonable . time for repairs, and low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. The 14 day portion of the Completion Time for Required Action B.1 is based-upon engineering judgment. It takes into account the low probability of coincident entry.into two Conditions in this Specification coupled with the low probability of an accident occurring during this time. C.1 With one RCFC inoperable, the inoperable RCFC must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this condition, the CS trains and the remaining RCFCs provide at least 100% of the heat removal needs. The 7 day Completion Time was developed taking into account the redundant heat removal capabilities afforded by combinations of the CS System and RCFC System and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. The 14 day portion of the Completion Time for Required Action C.1 is based upon engineering judgment. It takes into account the low probability of coincident entry into two Conditions in this Specification coupled with the low probability of an accident occurring during this time. 0.1 and 0.2 If the inoperable CS train, RCFC or CS recirculation header j cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required j Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which j the LC0 does not apply. This is done by placing the unit in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and in MODE 5 within 84 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 , from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without j challenging plant systems. The extended intervai to reach MODE 5 allows additional time for attempting restoration of the CS train, RCFC or CS recirculation header and is reasonable when considering the driving force for a release (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-38 Rev. 00, 11/20/96
4 i CS and RCFC Systems l B 3.6.6 1 1 BASES l ACTIONS 0.1 and 0.2 (continued) of radioactive material from the Reactor Coolant System is reduced in the lower temperature region of M0DE 3. i i , E.1 ! With two RCFCs inoperable, one RCFC must be restored to ! OPERABLE status within 72 hours. In this condition, the CS trains and remaining RCFCs are still capable of providing at i least 100% of the heat removal needs after an accident, l however, the total effectiveness of the heat removal ! 4 capability has been reduced. The 72 hour Completion Time was developed taking into account the redundant heat removal '
- capabilities afforded by combinations of the CS System and i
! RCFC System and the low probability of a DBA occurring i during this period. 1 , j , F.1 and F.2
- If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of
- ! Condition E of this LC0 are not met, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. This is done by I 4
placing the unit in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and in - MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are l reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the l required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. I SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.6.1 REQUIREMENTS Operating each RCFC at low speed for 215 minutes ensures that all fan units are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that-blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action. The 31 day Frequency was i developed considering the known reliability of the fan units l and controls, the redundancy available, and the low probability of significant degradation of the RCFCs occurring between surveillances. It has also been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. l (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-39 Rev. 00, 11/20/96
CS and RCFC Systems B 3.6.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.6.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verifying the SW cooling flow rate to each RCFC unit is 2: 1500 gpm Under;postul. ate _d._ post 1 accident conditions provides assurance that the design ~ flow rate ~assum'ed in_ the safety analyses will be achieved (Ref. 3). This':Lisfdone;:Lby ~ vsrifyingithatLthe;cdrrent'iSW' System' configuration}
, including h6mponent?andLvalveilineupf andinumberiofl0PERABLE SW; pumps sis 1:within?the :aissumptions -off the .SW1 analysis' (Ref $5)lperformeulto(verify.SWLSystemLdesign- basis, iThe.
BASES?for/LC0i3f7:8tcontaindthetspecific SW System c6nfi gdea ti on sjfo rJthel number;:; o f! OPERABLE 2 SW1 pump sh bot h as'suminglandlinithe;abse.nceiof alsingle ifailuref ' ~~~
' ' ~
IfjSW' System 7dohfighFationlisTdetermined to meet ~ the req'uiremehthofil.C0?317.8,9 CariditioniD,: theniSRi 3.6.'6.2Lis
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consideredito.be meti If:SR13'.6;6.2.cannot bee met duelto:a failureito: meetLLC013.7.8,JCondition: 0, then so_long' as 4 LCO 3;7.8,1Re_ quired; Action lD;1Lis. met, SR'3.6.6~.2 can be considered met. ~.If LC0 3.7.8,' Required Action 0.1 is not met,1then1SRJ3.6.6.:2,is not' met and the RCFC units are beyond;their1 design basis. ;In:this case LC0 3.0.3 applies. Thisjisgequivalent;to SWeto ;all;RCFC . units' beinglinoperable, and: entering;LC0i3.0.3:for.LC0 3.7.8. The Frequency was developed considering the known reliability of the cooling water system, the redundancy available, and the low probability of a significant degradation of flow occurring between surveillances. SR 3.6.6.3 Verifying that the diesel driven containment spray pump fuel oil day tank contains greater than or equal to 46 gallons of fuel oil provides assurance that adequate fuel is available to power the diesel driven containment spray pump for the length of time (approximately 77 minutes) it is credited when operating in response to a design basis accident and includes a small margin for calculation conservatism (Ref. 3). The 31 day Frequency is based on the available alarm indication provided in the control room of a low level in the tank. (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-40 Rev. 00, 11/21/96
_ ._ . .. ___ > _ _ ._ ___ . _ _ _ - _ _ . . . _. _ . _ _ . . ~ _ _ _ i . f CS and RCFC Systems B 3.6.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) 5R 3.6.6.4 Specification 5.5.11, " Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program," specifies the required testing of both new fuel oil and stored fuel oil in accordance with the applicable ASTM Standards. Since the diesel driven CS pump-fuel oil tank is typically filled from an OPERABLE emergency diesel generator storage tank, the performance of new fuel oil testing is not required. This is because the fuel oil has already been l analyzed before being added to the emergency diesel generator storage tanks. However, if fuel oil in an
- emergency diesel generator storage tank has been determined to not meet the requirements of. Specification 3.8.3, " Diesel Fuel Oil and Starting Air," after it has been added to the diesel driven CS pump fuel oil tank, or the fuel oil to be added is from a source other than an OPERABLE emergency diesel generator storage tank, then the new fuel oil must be tested in accordance with the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program.
Stored fuel oil degradation shows up as an increase in particulate, due mostly to oxidation. The presence of particulate does not mean the fuel oil will not burn properly in a diesel engine. However, the particulate can cause fouling of filters and fuel oil injection equipment which can cause engine failure. Stored fuel oil particulate concentrations should be determined in accordance with ASTM D2276, Method A-2 or Method A-3. This method involves a gravimetric determination of total particulate concentration in the fuel oil and has a limit of 10 mg/1. It is acceptable to obtain a field sample for subsequent laboratory testing in lieu of field testing. The Frequency of 31 days for testing the stored fuel considers fuel oil degradation trends which indicate that particulate concentration is unlikely to change significantly during this period. l (continued) ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-41 Rev. 00, 11/20/96
. . - .- - __ . - - - - ~ - . _ - _ - - - . . . - . _ -
CS and RCFC Systems B 3.6.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.6.6.5 and SR 3.6.6.6 l These SRs require verification that each automatic CS valve l actuates to its correct position and that each CS spray pump l starts upon receipt of an actual or simulated actuation of a l containment High-High pressure signal coincident with a SI signal. This surveillance is not required for valves that l are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required l position under administrative controls. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform these l Surveillances under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the i Surveillances were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillances when performed at the 18 month , Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. SR 3.6.6.7 ; i This SR requires verification that each RCFC actuates upon receipt of an actual or simulated safety injection signal. The 18 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment and ! on operating experience which has shown that these l components usually pass the surveillances when performed at ! 1 the 18 month frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was i concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. SR 3.6.6.8 Verifying the correct alignment of the RCFC accident dampers provides assurance that the proper flow path will exist for post accident RCFC operation. This SR does not apply to dampers that are fixed or otherwise secured in position, since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to being secured. This SR does not require any testing or damper manipulation. Rather it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that dampers l capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. I The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to access the RCFCs and on operating experience which has shown these that ; these components usually pass this surveillance when ' performed at the 18 month Frequency. i (continued) i ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.6-42 Rev. 00, 11/20/96
CS and RCFC Systems B 3.6.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.6.6.9 With the spray header drained of any solution, low pressure air or smoke can be blown through test connections. This SR ensures that each spray nozzle is unobstructed and provides assurance that spray. coverage of.the. containment during an accident is not degraded. Due to the passive design of the nozzle, a test at 10 year intervals is considered adequate to detect obstruction of.the nozzles. REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 6.5.2.
- 2. UFSAR, Section 6.2.2.
- 3. UFSAR, Section 15.6.
- 4. UFSAR, Section 15.0.
Sw.. JZi6n}Stationjl Updated (SW:--Hidraulic!.Model: Calculation: 022S}B-00220j525QRevi(1)' ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-43 Rev. 00, 11/21/96
4 4 O I l l l \ I \ l I l \ l DOC CHANGES . 1 I I l
l -
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i l DISCUSSION OF CHANGES l SECTION 3.6: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l NSHC NO. DISCUSSION l l A. 90. In CTS 4.10.5, the Surveillance Frequency for the verification of l containment pressure has been specified as once per "12 hours" i instead of the "once per shift." At Zion Station, the normal i shift is 12 hours. As a result, this change is editorial in nature. i L-26. 91. In CTS 4.10.6, the Surveillance Frequency for the verification of containment temperature has been revised to once per "24 hours" instead of "once per shift." The 24 hour Frequency is considered acceptable based on the observed slow rates of temperature increase within containment as a result of environmental heat sources (due to the large volume of containment). In addition, ! other indications are available in the control room to alert the i operator to an abnormal containment temperature condition. l
- 92. Ocleted RifErenfe's[to?Appendi M ha e3een" changed (tofreference theTC6ntainmentilsakage? Rate 4 Testing 1Programjfollowing imp]ementationlofn10sCFRt50,gppenditJf0ption - B.'
l L-28 93. This change to the requirements of the CTS 4.9.3.A.2 exempts ) certain automatic containment isolation valves from the 18 month l surveillance testing that would demonstrate satisfactory 1 operation. The valves are exempted because they are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. These valves do not reposition in order to fulfill their safety function, and are secured in their required position to fulfill their accident function. Therefore no automatic isolation is required. This exemption is in 1 accordance with NUREG-1431, Rev 1. l L-29 94. This change to the requirements of CTS 4.5.1.b.2 eliminates the 18 month surveillance for those required (Accident Inlet, Accident Outlet, and Normal Inlet) dampers that have been secured in the accident position. It would be superfluous to verify the position of such dampers, and any alteration which would allow the dampers to be repositioned would constitute a change to the facility design. L-A 95. SP '.5.1.2.2, verificatier of SW flew te the RCFC Ccclers, has been relocated under the Zicn ITS. It 5 s beer replaced by perfor ance of ITS SR 3.7.8.1. SR 4.5.1.a.2, verification of SW flow to the RCFC coolers, has been revised under the Zion ITS. The flow verification (SR;3.6.6;2) now verifies that the SW System configuration is within the assumptions of the SW System hydraulic l flow analysis that was performed to verify SW System design t basis. ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-33 11/20/96
1
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l l
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f DISCUSSION OF CHANGES I i SECTION 3.6: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 4 NSHC NO. DISCUSSION ITS SP 3.'.S.1 i: valve 'incup verification for SW System alignment. It verific that for a given SW pump and component
- c'ignment, ;ccident SW fic. is maintained t0 all SW accident 10 ds, under li-iting DBA conditions.
- Specifically, SW flow of 1500 gpm was verified to the RCFC coolers by performance of a flow analysis, given a minimum SW component alignment. The SW System alignment assumptions of the flow
, analysis are alsb" verified as being met by performance of SR 3.7.8.1. Due to'SW System configuration and operational requirements, performing a flow verification using normal SW System alignment does not provide verification of SW flow to the i RCFC units in an accident. Verificationion_ weekly b i that the'SWialignnienttisiwithin theibounds;of athelassumptions of the
~
~
flow a'na19sistik::Tequivalentitoirealigning$SW' System configuration
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to accidentfconditions and : measuring flow. I either Survei' lance Requird chtmhthod, 49 mbm'SM10w to S"'ccmponerts under accident 60'nditionfic veri # icd. Performing tFi; ver 'ication or a weekly i b :i: byLpdrf0 Hfhg SR 3.'.S.1 i: ; more restrictive survei' lance requirdment~ thin Sa 3.5.5.2. ITSiSR(3.72811;isTa valveblineup verification 4 ~or:f SW1 System l alignment. (Itiveriflessthatifor a'given:fSWl pump:and component alignmentUaccidentSW: flow?isfmaintaine'df toxalltSW. accident l loadsWunderilimiting;DBAiconditio'ns. ISR 3.7.8. lwill ~ be~ : peFforined weekli, with an~ncsptance criteria that ensures SW flow meets accident) assumptions.' w4thir S hours, *If the SW system is outside its design basis, eM-LCO 3.0.3 appl _lesmust-be met. This is equivalent to having 'no RCFCs operable' in LC0 3. 6.6. ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-34 11/21/96
1 0 1 1 1 1 l l 1 l l l l l l l l l l I l CLEAN DOC I i l l i
a i DISCUSSION OF CHANGES
- SECTION 3.6
- CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS i
NSHC NO. DISCUSSION l l A. 90. In CTS 4.10,5, the Surveillance Frequency for the verification of l containment pressure has been specified as once per "12 hours" I instead of the "once per shift." At Zion Station, the normal l shift is 12 hours. .As a result, this change is editorial in l nature. ' L-26. 91. In CTS 4.10.6, the Surveillance Frequency for the verification of containment temperature has been revised to once per "24 hours" instead of "once per shift." The 24 hour Frequency is-considered ) acceptable based on the observed slow rates of temperature i increase within containment as a result of environmental heat sources (due to the large volume of containment). In addition, other indications are available in the control room to alert the operator to an abnormal containment temperature condition.
- 92. Rifer ledcesitofAppendiMJjhsVe:been/changsd?toireferencefthe _
ContafnmentJLeakage4RateXTestinglProgramlfollowing imp ~lementation ofjl0CFR!50,fAppendisyy0ption[BC~ L-28 93. This change to the requirements of the CTS 4.9.3. A.2 exempts certain automatic containment isolation valves from the 18 month i surveillance testing that would demonstrate satisfactory operation. The valves are exempted because they are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. These valves do not reposition in order to fulfill their safety function, and are secured in their required position to fulfill their accident function. Therefore no automatic isolation is required. This exemption is in i accordance with NUREG-1431, Rev 1. l L-29 94. This change to the requirements of CTS 4.5.1.b.2 eliminates the 18 month surveillance for those required (Accident Inlet, Accident Outlet, and Normal Inlet) dampers that have been secured in the accident position. It would be superfluous to verify the position of such dampers, and any alteration which would allow the dampers to be repositioned would constitute a change to the facility design. L-A 95. SR 4.5.1.a.2, verification of SW flow to the RCFC coolers, has been revised under the Zion ITS. The flow verification (SR 36:612)nowverifiesthattheSWSystemconfigurationiswithin the assumptions of the SW System hydraulic flow analysis that was performed to verify SW System design basis. Specifically, SW flow of 1500 gpm was verified to the RCFC coolers by performance of a flow analysis, given a minimum SW component alignment. The SW System alignment assumptions of the flow ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-33 11/20/96
I DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 3.6: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS NSHC NO. DISCUSSION analysis are alsolverified as being met by performance of SR 3.7.8.1. Due'^to^~SW System configuration and operational requirements, performing a flow verification using normal SW System alignment does not provide verification of SW flow to the RCFC units in an accident. Vedi fi'catioiiithatitheO SW ?al ignment?i s " Rithihsthe #Eo6hdi20f 'theJassumptionsloflthel flow;; an~alysi sL i s' ~ equivalentstF3rsal.igningiSWTSysteniconfiguration: to' accident conditionsjandimeasur,ingjflow. ITS(SR;3071811Si.s ?a .valvs lineup verification for SWTSystem alignments cit (serifles~that:for7a givenLSW pumpLand: component al;ignment;" accident SW flowJis niaintainedito all SW accident
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1_oads ? &nderjlimiting'0BA. conditions. lSR 3.7~.8.1 wi'll' be performed ~weeklyi'with~' an acceptance briteria that ensures SW flow meets accident assumptions'; If th_e SW system is outside its I design basist LC0 3.0.3 applies. This'is equivalent to having no
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RCFCs operable in LC0 3.6.6. I ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-34 11/21/9F
.a.w_,.. 4 - - e 4 m..de ,4seh . ..4= 4 2_(m__e*5 a_s.a J --ag4ww.w s 4, _4sz_.;saA_4145 4 4 4._m h
9 l l l NUREG MARKUPS I
.s r_
Containment Spray and--C::!i n g Systems (Atmosph ri; cad 0;;l) " 3.6.jAv SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY ) SR 3.6.6 Zl Operate each [r quired ce h enbaWg 31 days ! trai- f:.: un R for a 15 minutes. l b SFW l _. v AoFC. ! SR 3.6.6 2 Verify each [mquired}-contai= t- cooling 31 days A, 1raTn cooling water flow rate 7w..IJ he e -t100} gpop as*e um ud.d e ns co s w.: 1560
.L
~iOSdK^t SR 3.6.6 4' VerifyGiontainment sp, ray pump's In accordance
< J deve7oped head'at the jlow test point is with the /
greaner thaVor traT to the required Indervice / Test'ivrogram (Mc-g (cA, Atj - joWhea. pg ,,,3 n ,jxgg g
.hr muwe se.,fa :
q
. ,, i u . m;.n SR 3.6.hp Verify each automatic entai z nt / prey .h8fmonths 4 valve in the flow path
- actuates to the '
correct position- on an actual or simulated actuation signal. SR 3.6.k)V Verify each c'ent:in ;nt sprey pump starts [18] months 3 automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal. SR 3.6.6 T Verify each [ required}' ce hb;;at ;;;iing [18] months 6 .tMa starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal. (continued) 3 ljuSlAT . c., b WOG STS 3.6-25 Rev. O,09/28/92 l . I
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Containment-Sp~ ray and Coofing Systems (Atmospheric-and Dual.)./ 8 3.6.6A BASES SJRVEILLANCE SR 3.6.6W[M REQUIREMENTS Q p g3 apJ (continued) Operating each [ required]o conta!aent coe!iag traia fan e .it for e 15 minutes ensures that all 4ra+nsxare OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly ~. Y"c . # also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or , excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action. The 31 day Frequency was developed considering the known reliability of the fan units and controls, the -two-train redundancy available, and the low probability of significant
'7 . ,-. degradation of the coa +aia=-et c^aling tr:f r. occurring between surveillances. It has also been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
SR 3 . 6 . 6 A'11 ""
- ~
Ver'ifyi$thet ee? [rc;; ired
[M V t E nt cc:li- trainISW cooling flow rate to each ece!i-Munit is eJ700]g~Inf:i N provides assurance that the design flow rate assumed in the 3ps C, #,# i
$ safety analyses will be achieved (Ref. 3). The Frequency
, was developed considering- the known reliability of the
? C'ooling,yaterJystem, the tw t ri redundancy available,
,--- Mand the low probability of a significant degradation of flow
" occurring between surveillances.
M# SR 3.6.6A'4 3
.a b Verifying each containment spray pump's developed pead at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head ensures that spray pump perfonnan,ce has not degraded during the cycle. Flow and differential pressure are nonnal tests of centrifugal pump perfonnance required by Section XI of the ASHE Code (Ref. 8). Since the containment spray pumps cannot be te headers, they are tested,sted with flow through on recirculation the spray flow. This. test confinns one point on the pump design curve and is indicative of overall,perfonnance. Such inservice inspections confina component OPERABILITY, trend perfonnance, and detect incipient failures by abnormal performance. The' Frequency of the SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.
y (continued) WOG STS B 3.6-71 Rev. O, 09/28/92
I j 3.6.6 BASES cont' INSERT "I" , Verifying the? SW" cooling: flo%rateLto' each RCFC'unitt is 2: 1500 gpm under postulatedi post-accident,conditio'ns provides .assu_rance that the design flow ] rateiassumed::in;the safetyf. analyses will be< achieved,::(Ref. 3). This is-done ' bytverifying;that; thei current 1SWrSystem configuration, , including- component and 1 valve 31neupiand? number ofiOPERABLE SW; pumps;:is withinLthe assumptions lof:the SW?anslysist(Ref;5)derformedjto verifyjSW; System l design basis. ':The BASES?for c i.C0;317.8 ?containk. ther speci ficE;SW c Sy' stem ! configurations 1for< the ' number t of ^ 4 0_PERABLE!:SWpumpsybothiassumingfandiintthefabsenc~eifofla# single, failure.
- Iff SW
- S stemj configurationiihdstermined. to' meetithe ; requirements:'of- LCO
, 3. 7.8l:iCondition?:D,1 then ;SR/32626,2 is' considered to'be.. met. IfLSR:3.6.6.2 cannottbelmetsdueito:Lalifalldre' to meet LC0 3.7.8,? Condition 'D, then so 1ong as LC0 3;7;8L Requirbd. Action 0.17is met, SR 3.6.6.2 can'be' considered met. If l LC0;3;.7;.8LRequired Action D.1-is not met, then SR.3.6.6.2 is not met and-the i RCFCfunits are beyond;their design basis. 'In this case LC0 3.0.3 applies.
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Thisfis'equivalentL to-SW. tof all:;RCFC units being inoperable, and entering LCO 3.0.3 : fori l.C0 3.7:.8. TheiFrdquency!wasEdevelopsdionsidering7theTknown: reliability of the cooling i water system,':f thel redundancy available,-?and- the ~1ow prob' a bility of a significan.t'degradationsofzflow occurring- between _surveillances. I r 4 i s
e 9 1 1 l 1 i 1 i l l l DOD CHANGES l l l l l
DISCUSSION OF THE DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG-1431 SECTION 3.6: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CHANGE NUMBER DISCUSSION
- 21. This change to the Zion ITS eliminates the 18 month surveillance that would verify the RCFC dampers were in their accident position. The surveillance was eliminated because the dampers have been secured in the accident position. Any alteration which would allow the dampers to be repositioned would constitute a change to the facility design.
- 22. This change to the Zion ITS changes NUREG-1431 SR 3.6.6A.2,to SR 3.6.6.2. !
which has been replaced by performance of ITS SP 3.7.S.1. ITS SR 3.7.8.1 3.6.6'.2 i; ; valve 'incup vericication for SW alignment. It verifies that for' a g 'iven SW pump and component alignment, accident SW flow is maintained to RCFC unitsal' SW accident leads, under limiting DBA i conditions. Thi s ' ' i s ' ' performed monthlyweekly, and ' is ' similar to SR l 3.T.8.1, which is performed weekly. 'ith a requirc~m ent to ensure flev. I mect accident assumption: itF:- S hours, er SW ;ystem is outside it l design baci; and LCO 2.0.3 must be met. This is equivalent to having no 1 ROFC: Operable i- LC0 3.5.5. Specifically, SW flow of 1500 gpm +s-was verified to the RCFC coolers by performance of a flow analysis. The assumptions of this flow analysis are verified as being met by performance of SR 3.6'.6.23.7.3.1. ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-6 11/21/96
am- , - A 4--4-- -- - ,a ,,,2 a- _ ,,., _ 4 4 1 l 1 1 1 1 l l 4 l l l l l 1 1 CLEAN DOD l 9
DISCUSS 10N OF THE O!FFERENCES FROM NUREG-1431 SECTION 3.6: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CHANGE NUMBER DISCUSSION
- 21. This change to- the Zion ITS eliminates the 18 month surveillance that would verify the RCFC- dampers were -in their accident position. The surveillance was eliminated because the dampers have been secured in the accident position. Any alteration which would. allow the dampers to be repositioned would constitute a change to the facility design.
- 22. This change to the Zion ITS changes NUREG-1431.SR 3.6.6A 2,t'o SR '326.6.'2.
ITS SR 316f6'.L2've ifies that for a given SW pump and component ~aligriinenti accident ~SW~fl ow is maintained to RCFCPldnits, under limiting DBA tions , Thi r n similarjojSR2 3'.7 ;8. l', gon.dil which i siperfo mes , diweek s pe , formed monthly
~a~'^,
d@ low of 1500 gpm was.. verified i to the RCFC coolers by p.ly. fSpecifically, erformance SW f The assum.ptions of of a flow analysis. this flow analysis are verified as being met by performance of SR 3.6.6.2. J ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-6 11/21/96}}