Text

Proposed Tech Specs Using Guidance in NUREG-1431 to Produce Improved TSs
	ML20133D090
Person / Time
Site:	Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date:	01/02/1997
From:	; COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	;
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ML20133D085	List: ML20133D082; ML20133D090;
References
	RTR-NUREG-1431 NUDOCS 9701090008
	Download: ML20133D090 (109)
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MARK UP OF ITS CHANGE Conforming Changes to bring ITS Submittal up to date with current Zion license.

Implement PTLR, Amendments 177/164. Implement 10 CFR , Appendix J, Option B, to conform to Amendments 175/162. Revise the definition of F* Distance in Steam Generator Tube Inspection Program discussion,5.5.7, to conform to Amendments 174/161. Conforming changes to update ITS to amendment 173/160, incorporation of specific sections of CEN-629-P, Revision 00, ABB/CE Topical Report on welded sleeve process.

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9701090000 970102 PDR F

ADOCK 05000295 PDR

SR Applicability B 3.0 l

BASES SR 3.0.2 SR 3.0.2 permits a 257. extension of the interval specified (continued) in the Frequency. This extension facilitates Surveillance scheduling and considers plant operating conditions that may not be suitable for conducting the Surveillance (e.g.,

transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or maintenance activities).

The 25Y. extension does not significantly degrade the reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for which the 257. extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply. These exceptions are stated in the individual Specifications. An example of where SR 3.0.2 does not apply is a Surveillance with a Frequency of "in i accordance with thefcorit'ainment leakape1RateETesting ,

Prograh10 CFR 50, A;ipendix J,' h sodificd by ippr00cd l exemptions." The requirements of regulations take precedence over the TS. The TS cannot in and of themselves .

extend a test interval specified in the regulations. l Therefore, there is a Note in the Frequency stating "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable."

As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 257. extension also does not apply to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time which requires performance on a "once per..." basis. The 257.

extension applies to each performance after the initial performance. The initial performance of the Required Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some other remedial action, is considered a single action with a single Completion Time. One reason for not allowing the 257. j extension to this Completion Time is that such an action l usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diverse components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an alternative manner.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intended to be used i repeatedly merely as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals other than those consistent with refueling outages or periodic Completion Time intervals beyond those specified.

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(continued)

Zion Units 1 & 2 B 3.0-13 Rev. 00, 12/04/96 I

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Programs and Manuals 5.5 i 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.7 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Surveillance Procram (continued)

" Defect" means an imperfection of such severity that it exceeds the Plugging or Repair Limit, where applicable. l A tube containing a defect is defective. .

l l l "F* distance" is the length of undegraded tube required to l

, resist pullout. This distance is measured from the bottom of the upper hard roll transition toward the bottom of the l

tube sheet and has been conservatively determined to be 1.05 I inches. (nct including cddy current uncertei: tic:). c* i; mp'y only va!!d for ZlR!d end thrcugh Z1C15. ?The determination of_ F* Distance'.is satisfied by the: mechanical tool (rolling , l pin) used '.tolinstall: the joint having an effective length of '

greater than or equal to 1.05' inches. ~ The F*' Distance is i applicable;only to tubes thattare rerolled below the mid-plane of the tubesheet and have no degradation in the l rerolled expansion joints. The F* Distance is not l applicable to the original factory hard roll.

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"F* tube" means a tube with indications below the '

F* distance greater than or equal to the Plugging or Repair Limit, and no indications within the F* distance.

" Imperfection" means an exception to the dimensions, finish i or contour of a tube from that required by fabrication drawings or specifications. Eddy current testing indications < 20% of the nominal tube wall thickness, if detectable, may be considered as imperfections. 1

" Plugging or Repair Limit" means the imperfection depth at l or beyond which the tube shall be repaired or removed from i service by plugging because it may become unserviceable i prior to the next inspection. ;

" Repaired Tube" means a tube that has undergone a process that re-establishes its serviceability. The sleeving I process utilized shall be one of the following-

1. The Combustion Engineering welded sleeve process as described in Report CEN-331-P, Revision 1-P. The )(iklbC ! I following sections of ABB/CE Report CEN-629-P, Revision l 00, shall be implemented in conjunction with Report CEN-331-P, Revision 1-P:

1 (continued)

ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-17 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 9)

i l Programs and Manuals 5.5 l

5.5 Programs and Manuals Section 4.5.'3 - Tube Brushing-Cleaning Equipment Section 4.5.7 - Nondestructive Examination Section15.0 - Sleeve Examination Program l Section 9.3.1 - Cleaning Qualification

2. The Westinghouse Electric Corporation mechanical sleeve l process as described in Report WCAP-ll669.

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(continued) l l \

ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-18 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 9) l l

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Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals

5. 5.14 '- Containment *Leakaoe' Rate Testino Prooram - ' /7FM6 L A program shall be' established to implement the leakage, rate testing.of.the. containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10CFR 50,-Appendix J,' Option B, as modified by approved exemptions. :This-program shall be in' accordance with the guidelines contained inLRegulatory Guide 1.163, " Performance-Based Containmentileak-Test Program", . dated September 1995,-'with:the following; exception: Section 10- 2.1:of NEI 94~'01 RevisionL O,.. is not applicable to Unit 11 penetration P-16; ?This exceptionifor penetration Pyl6Lshallrexp^ ire at the completion of Unit:l outage ZlR15.

The peak calculated containment internal pressure for the design basis loss of coolant accident, P , is' 46.79 psig. The-containment 1 design pressure is 47 psig. l The maximum? allowable l containment leakage rate, L,, at P., shall be s 0.1% of containment air weight per day.

Leakage rate-acceptance criteria are:

a. Containment leakage rate acceptance / criterion is s 1.0 L,.

During the~first unit;startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria .are < 0.60 L, for the Tipe B -and C tests and' < 0.75 L, for Type A tests;

b. Air lock testing. acceptance criteria -are:

1)- Overall air lock le'akage is < 0.6 L,' when-combined with all?TypeLB and LC test results at a : test pressure of 2, P .

2)~ ;For each' door,71 eakage rate is < l.0-SCFH when tested at 1 2.5.psig and <'10 psig, or-s 4'.'75 SCFH when tested at 2 10(psig.

i The' provisions of SR 3.0;2 do not apply to the test frequencies ;

i specified in 1he Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

The. provisions of -SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Containment

! Leakage Rate. Testing Program.

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t ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-27 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 9) ,

_. - , ,-. . .- -. .- - . - --= - -. .-

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! Reporting Requirements

5.6 ;

i i f 5.6 Reporting Requirements (continued) '

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5.6.6 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS 1 REPORT (PTLR) ,

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a. RCS pressure and temperature limits for heatup, cooldown,

low temperature operation, criticality, and hydrostatic i .

testing, as well as heatup and cooldown rates shall be i

established and documented in the PTLR for the following: l 1 1 LC0 3.4.3, "RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits"; l LCO 3.4.10, " Pressurizer Safety Valves"; and LC0 3.4.12, " Low Temperature Overpressure Protection."

b. Thranalytica17meth6dflussd 'ts*detspoiWe"ths*RCS Wessure and temperatu re L 11mi ts : shalli be / those i previ ously rev t owed and'tapproved (by ' the :: NRC,0 speci ficallyithose identi fied in the following. documents:? License Amendment number 177 for Unit'1;and?164lfor Unit 2 C Th:'RCS prc::;r:':nd' ter;;r:tur li-it; f r Unit: I :nd 2 will 5: th:::

previce:ly reviewed :nd :ppr:ved in :::nd::nt: 101 :nd ?!

re:pectively. The C 1d Overpre:: r: Protecti n ::tpcint :nd cr ing torper:ture :nd RCS S:fety V:lve :pplic:bility-fee Unit: 1 :nd 2 till be th::: previce:ly revi ::d :nd :ppr:ved

, in :::nd::nt: Si :nd 51 r::p :tively, :nd ::endment: 153 :nd .

i 141 rc;p::tively. l

c. The PTLR shall be provided to the NRC upon issuance for each reactor vessel fluency period and for any revision or supplement thereto. The fir:t revi:icn to the li:-it: after initi:1 ':ple: nt: tion Of the PTLR will bc ::britted t; the NRC fer revie pri r t: Opprev:1. Sub:::;; nt revici :: will b: ::d: with: t pri:r :pprev:1.

5.6.7 P.ost Accident Monitor Report When a report is required by LCO 3.3.3, " Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation," a report shall be submitted within the following 14 days. The report shall outline the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrumentation channels of the Function to OPERABLE status.

(continued)

ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-33 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 9)

l Containment l 3.6.1 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l 3.6.1 Containment LC0 3.6.1 Containment shall be OPERABLE.

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APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 34 and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Containment A.1 Restore containment I hour inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion l Time not met. ANQ B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months t l

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l ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-1 Amendment No. (Sup. 9)

_.._..____._...__._.__..m._

Containment 3.6.1 ;

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.1 -------------------NOTE--------------------

SR 3.0.2 is not applicable. '

Perform required visual examinations and in accordance leakage rate testing, except for with 10 CFR 50, i l containment air lock testing, in accordance Appendix J, :: 1 i with 10 CFR 50,.^,ppendix J, : medi' icd by modified by i approved-exemption:the' Containment Leakage ~

approved .

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Rate Testing'. Program.' exemption: the l Containment

! The leakage rate acceptance criterion i: Leakage Rate l :: 1. 0 L,. However, during - the first 4: nit Testing Program l

startup followin; testing performed i" i

accordanse "ith 10 CFo 50, ^.ppendi" J, 2 >

l medi# icd by approved exemptions, the

! Ic0kage rate acceptance criter a are i i

' O.6 L, for Type B and Type C tests, and l

< 0.75 L, for the Type ^, te:ts.

t i SR 3.6.1.2 Verify containment structural integrity In accordance in accordance with the Containment Tendon with the Surveillance Program. Containment Tendon Surveillance Program i

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l ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-2 Amendment No. (Sup. 9) l

l Containment Air Locks i 3.6.2 l

l 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l l

l 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks '

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LC0 3.6.2 Two containment air locks shall be OPERABLE.

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l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ,

1 ACTIONS l

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1. Entry and exit is permissible to perform repairs on the affected air lock components.

2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each air lock.

3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.6.1,

" Containment," when air lock leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more ------------NOTES------------

containment air locks 1. Required Actions A.1, with one containment A.2, and A.3 are not air lock door applicable if both doors I inoperable. in the same air lock are inoperable and Condition C is entered.

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2. Entry and exit is I permissible for 7 days under administrative controls if both air locks are inoperable.

(continued) l l

l ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-3 Amendment No. (Sup. 6) l

l Containment Air Locks 3.6.2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.1 Verify the OPERABLE 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ,

door is closed in the I

affected air lock. I AND l

' I A.2 Lock the OPERABLE 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months I door closed in the affected air lock.

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l A.3 Verify the OPERABLE Once per 31 days l door is locked closed in the affected air

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lock.

(continued)

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J ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-4 Amendment No. (Sup. 6)

Containment Air Locks 3.6.2 l

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i

! B. One or more ------------NOTES------------

containment air incks 1. Required Actions B.1, l with containment air B.2, and B.3 are not l lock interlock applicable if both doors l mechanism inoperable, in the same air lock are l inoperable and Condition C is entered.

2. Entry and exit of containment is permissible under the control of a dedicated individual.

B.1 Verify an OPERABLE 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months door is closed in the affected air lock.

ANLD l

B.2 Lock an OPERABLE door 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months closed in the I affected air lock.

AND l B.3 Verify an OPERABLE Once per 31 days door is locked closed in the affected air lock.

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l ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-5 Amendment No. (Sup. 6)

Containment Air Loc!ts 3.6.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. One or more C.1 Initiate action to immediately ,

containment air locks evaluate overall l i inoperable for reasons containment leakage l other than Condition A rate per LC0 3.6.1.

or B.

AND l C.2 Verify a door is I hour closed in the i

! affected air lock.

AND C.3 Restore air lock to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OPERABLE status.

l D. Required Action and 0.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months i associated Completion l Time not met. AND I

D.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months l

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ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-6 Amendment No. (Sup. 6)

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Containment Air Locks 3.6.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.1 -------------------NOTES-------------------

1. An inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful

! performance of the overall air lock 1 leakage test.

2. Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria of SR 3.5.1.1 in l accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, i

=cdified by approved -exc=ption:

l ii@iciblefto LSRJ376fl.}h l

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. , . n. . ,. ...m+ . -yr, 4. . ., u , .

4. , _

In accordance l Perform required air lock leakage rate with 10 CFR 50r testing in accordance with 10 CFR 53r Appendix J, ;;

Appendix J, : modificd byjpproved _

modificd by exemption; thelContainment: Leakage '

^ " ~

Rate approved Testing [Pr69rani. ' ' egg pticng.the Containment The :cceptance criteria fee-44r lock Leakage testing are: Testing}(Rate.

Program

. Overall air lcck leakage rate, when cc bined with other Type B and Type C test rc;ults, i; :; 0.5 L, when tested !

at-2:-P,r

b. For cach decr with testable seals, the i Ic k;ge rate 1 ::1.0 SCFH ' hen tc ted l at ; 2.5 p;ig and < 10 psig, or :: 4.75 SCFH when tested at 2: 10 psig.-

SR 3.6.2.2 -------------------NOTE--------------------

Only required to be performed upon entry or exit through the containment air lock.

Verify only one door in the air lock can be 184 days opened at a time.

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ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-7 Amendment No. 11/96 1

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Containment B 3.6.1 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.1 Containment BASES BACKGROUND The containment consists of the concrete reactor building, its steel liner, and the penetrations through this structure which encloses the entire reactor and Reactor Coolant System. The structure is designed to contain radioactive material that may be released from the reactor core following a 9 design Bbasis Lois"dfiCoolant Accident {GBA).

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In addition, this structure pi' ovid 65' shielding from the fission products that may be present in the containment '

atmosphere from both normal and post accident conditions (Re f. 1) .

The containment is a reinforced concrete structure with a ;

cylindrical wall, a flat foundation mat, and a shallow dome !

roof. The inside surface of the containment is lined with a l carbon steel liner to ensure a high degree of leak tightness during operating and accident conditions.

The cylinder wall is prestressed with a post tensioning system in the vertical and horizontal directions, and the dome roof is prestressed utilizing a three way post tensioning system.

The concrete reactor building is required for structural integrity of the containment under Ds'51gn 7BssiR Accidsnt (DBA) conditions. The steel liner isd'it'i~penetFafi'ons~

establish the leakage limiting boundary of the containment.

Maintaining the containment OPERABLE limits the leakage of fission product radioactivity from the containment to the environment. SR 3.6.1.1 leakage rate requirements comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J,JptionlB, as modified by approved exemptions.

The isolation devices for the penetrations in the containment boundary are a part of the containment leak tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier:

a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

l 1. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic l

containment isolation signal in MODES 1, 2 and 3, ;

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! (continued)

! i ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-1 Rev. 00, 11/23/96

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Containment !

l B 3.6.1 l l l BASES 1

BACKGROUND 2. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE manual l (continued) containment isolation signal in MODE 4, or l

3. closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or '

de-activated automatic valves secured in their

, closed positions, except as provided in I LC0 3.6.3, " Containment Isolation Valves."

, b. Each air lock is OPERABLE, except as provided in l LC0 3.6.2, " Containment Air Locks." I l c. The equipment hatch is installed.

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APPLICABLE The safety design basis for the containment is that the SAFETY ANALYSES containment must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate.

The DBAs that result in a challenge to containment OPERABILITY from high pressures and temperatures are a loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and a main steam line break (Ref. 2). In addition, the release of significant fission product radioactivity within containment can occur from a LOCA. In the DBA analyses, it is assumed that the containment is OPERABLE such that, for the DBAs involving release of fission product radioactivity, release to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The containment was designed with an allowable leakage rate of 0.1% of containment air weight per day (Ref. 1). This leakage rate, used to evaluate offsite doses resulting from accidents, is defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J{0RionTB, as L,: the maximum allowable containment leak" age rate at the calculated peak containment internal pressure (P.) resulting from the limiting desigri basisHOCA DBA. The allowable leakage rate represented by LTformithe basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on all containment leakage rate testing. L, is assumed to be 0.1% per day in the safety analysis at P, = 46.79 psig (Ref. 2).

Satisfactory leakage rate test results are a requirement for the establishment of containment OPERABILITY.

The containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

(continued)

ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-2 Rev. 00,11/23/96 i

l Containment l B 3.6.1

! l l BASES (continued) l LC0 Containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to

s 1.0 L , except prior to the first startup after performing a required C6ntiinmentilsikage Rsti?TestingTPr6gFam f M-GM l'

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50 Appe nd i UTe'akage^ te s t . " At'~th ir time 't he sl eakags l l iln i t s d pes i fi ed ;..i ni t he : Con t a i neshti Liakagei Ra t s iTe st i ng 1 Program must' bel et7 1Lec "the~Eombfned"TypF B^~ahd'C^1eaka miist be' < 0.6 L., and"the'f'overall Type A leakage must be < ge l 0.75 L,.

1 Compliance with this LC0 will ensure a containment configuration, including both air locks and the equipment t

hatch, that is structurally sound and will limit leakage to those leakage rates assumed in the safety analysis.

! Individual leakage rates specified for the containment air l locks door 7 seals (LC0 3.5.2) are not specifically part of i theaccepthnc'ecr:iteriaof10CFR50,AppendixJd0pti6nTB.

l Therefore, exceeding thifihdiVidual# air lock dooriseall?

! leakage rate limits specifiediintthelC6ntainment' Leakage

! Rate? Testing' Program"only"results"in"the~ containment'being j inopdrabls'wh6rilthe~ combined Type B and C leakage rate l exceeds the overall acceptance criteria of Appendix-J specifisd16ithatjprogram.

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l APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of !

I radioactive material into containment. In MODES 5 and 6, )

! the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these l MODES. Therefore, containment is not required to be l

OPERABLE in MODE 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment. The requirements for containment l during MODE 6 are addressed in LC0 3.9.3, " Containment j Penetrations."

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ACTIONS A.1 l l l In the event containment is inoperable, containment must be I

restored to OPERABLE status within I hour. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time provides a 3eriod of time to correct the problem commensurate with tie importance of maintaining containment during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when containment is inoperable is minimal.

j (continued)

ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-3 Rev. 00, 11/23/96

Containment B 3.6.1

( BASES ACTIONS B.1 and 8.2 (continued)

If containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the unit in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. 1 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining the containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the viuml examinations and leakage rate test requirements of 10 CFR 50, ,^.ppendix J, = modified by cpproved exempt 4 ens the Containment ~ Leakage Rate Testing Program.

Failure to meet individual air lock door seal leakage limits specified in the Containment. Leakage Rate Testing Program LCO 3.5.2 does not inv'alidate the acceptability of these ;

overall leakage determinations unless their contribution to ;

the overall Type A, B, and C leakage causes that limit to be I exceeded.

As left leakage prior to the first startup after aerforming a required 10 CFR 50, ^.ppendix J, Containment Lea (age Rate ;

Testing-Program leakage test is required to be < 0.6 L, for I combined Type B and Type C leakage. ,--and l

AsTleft;leakageprior.Lto:theifirstistartup~afterperforming a required Containment: Leakage" Rate' Testing Program leakage tes.t is required to be;< 0.75 L, for overall Type A leakage.

At all other times between required leakage rate tests, the acceptance criteria for Type B and Type C leakage tests are i based on an overall Type A leakage limit of s 1.0 L,. At l s 1.0 L, the offsite dose consequences are bounded by the l assumptions of the safety analysis. l l

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(continued) l ZION Units 1 & 2 00, 12/31/96 B 3.6-4 Rev.

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Containment B 3.6.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS SR Frequencies are as required by Appendix J, :: modified by approved exc=ptiens. -Thus, SR 3.0.2 (which allcw: Frequency extencien:) dec: net apply cince the Technical Specification: can act Override the Frequency rc^uired by the regul: tion;7thifC66tiliinientFTLiikigi=Rati Teitihi Progrsm. Th'e s e'" pe' r' i od i c t'e's t i ns ~ rsdu i rein 6n t s~ib f i f v that the containment leakage rate does not exceed the leakage rate assumed in the safety analysis.

SR 3.6.1.2 This SR ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained in accordance with the provisions of Specification 5.5.5, " Containment Tendon Surveillance Program." Testing and Frequency are in general conformance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.35 (Ref. 3).

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REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 3.8.

2. UFSAR, Chapter 15.

3. Regulatory Guide 1.35, " Inservice Inspection of Ungrouted Tendons in Prestressed Concrete Containment Structures," Revision 2, January 1976.

ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-5 Rev. 00, 11/23/96

l Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 8 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks BASES t

BACKGROUND Containment air locks form part of the containment ' pressure l boundary and provide a means for personnel access during all l MODES of operation.

Two air locks are provided. The personnel air lock, used for normal ingress and egress of containment, and the emergency air lock typically reserved for entering and

exiting containment in emergency situations. The personnel .

air lock penetrates the equipment hatch. The emergency air i lock is a right circular cylinder located on the opposite side of containment at ground level. The doors in each air lock are interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening.

l During periods when containment is not required to be i 0PERABLE, the door interlock mechanism may be disabled, l allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open for extended periods when frequent containment entry is necessary. Each of the air lock doors contains double gasketed seals and local leakage rate testing capability to ensure seal integrity. To effect a leak tight seal, the air lock design uses pressure seated doors (i.e., an increase in containment internal pressure results in increased sealing force on each door). Each air lock door has been designed and tested to certify its ability to withstand a pressure in 1 excess of the maximum expected pressure following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) in containment. As such, closure of a single air lock door supports containment OPERABILITY.

The containment air locks form part of the containment pressure boundary. As such, air lock integrity and leak tightness is essential for maintaining the containment leakage rate within its limit in the event of a DBA. Not maintaining air lock integrity or leak tightness may result in a leakage rate in excess of that assumed in the safety analyses.

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l (continued)

ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-6 Rev. 00, 11/23/96 ,

, - - , . . - . - . - __ . -- - - i

r I

Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material SAFETY ANALYSES within containment are a loss of coolant accident and a rod ejection accident (Ref. 1). In the analysis of each of ,

these accidents, it is assumed that containment is OPERABLE !

such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The containment was designed with an allowable leakage rate of 0.1% of containment air weight per day (Ref.1). 44+

l 4eakage rate is defined in 10 CFP 50, Appendix Jr-es b - 0.1% cf centainment air weight per day, the ::x+ mum allew ble contai ment leck:ge r:tc :t the ':Mculated peak l centai ment intern:1 presswe-P - M.79 p;ig fc110eing a DBAr This?liikigeyrite' Tis [defiii,edMrill'OTCFR15'0?AppendiN9,:

l OptioniBh assthe maximumiallowable3 containment. leakage jate

~

ati theicalcul ated t peak' containnient finternalL pressure,; Pu

following?aadesignibasisiLOCA; This'allowsble 46.

leaks'ge 79 Epsrat i g',i f6Fms' the '~ ba s i s f6r~t h'elec ep t an c e c ri t e imposed on the SRs associated with the air locks.

l !

l The containment air locks satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

i I LC0 Each containment air lock forms ) art of the containment pressure boundary. AspartoftecontainmentEpressure.

.boun.dary, the air lock safety function is related to' control of ~ the~' containment leakage rate resulting from a DBA. Thus, i

each air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the successful mitigation of such an event.

l Each air lock is required to be OPERABLE. For the air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors

must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one air lock door of an air lock to be opened at one time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of containment does not exist when containment is required to be OPERABLE.

Closure of a single door in each air lock is sufficient to provide a leak tight barrier following postulated events.

Nevertheless, both doors are kept closed when the air lock I is not being used for normal entry into and or exit from containment.

1 (continued) i 1

ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-7 Rev. 00,11/23/96 l

Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 i

BASES (continued) l APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and.4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment. In MODES 5 and 6, the l probability and consequences of these events are reduced due '

to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES.

Therefore, the containment air locks are not required in MODE 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment. The requirements for the containment air locks i during MODE 6 are addressed in LCO 3.9.3, " Containment Penetrations."

l ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note that allows entry and exit to perform repairs on the affected air lock component.

If the outer door is inoperable, then it may be easily accessed to repair. If the inner door is the one that is inoperable, however, then a short time exists when the containment boundary is not intact (during access through the outer door). The ability to open the OPERABLE door, even if it means the containment boundary is temporarily not intact, is acceptable due to the low probability of an event that could pressurize the containment during the short time l in which the OPERABLE door is expected to be open. After each entry and exit, the OPERABLE door must be immediately closed. If ALARA conditions permit, entry and exit should be via an OPERABLE air lock.

A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, for this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each l air lock. !

In the event the air lock leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate, Note 3 directs entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1,

" Containment."

A.l. A.2 and A.3 With one air lock door in one or more containment air locks inoperable, the OPERABLE door must be verified closed (Required Action A.1) in each affected containment air lock.

This ensures that a leak tight containment barrier is maintained by the use of an OPERABLE air lock door. This action must be completed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . This specified time period is consistent with the ACTIONS of LC0 3.6.1, which (continued)

ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-8 Rev. 00,11/23/96

Containment Air Locks B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS A.1. A.2 and A.3 (continued) requires containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

In addition, the affected air lock penetration must be isolated by locking closed the OPERABLE air lock door within the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time is reasonable for locking the OPERABLE air lock door, ,

considering the OPERABLE door of the affected air lock is I being maintained closed.

Required Action A.3 verifies that an air lock with an ,

inoperable door has been isolated by the use of a locked and l

closed OPERABLE air lock door. This ensures that an acceptable containment leakage boundary is maintained. The l Completion Time of once per 31 days is based on engineering l judgment and is considered adequate in view of the low '

likelihood of a locked door being mispositioned and other administrative controls.

The Required Actions have been modified by two Notes. l Note 1 ensures that only the Required Actions and associated '

Completion Times of Condition C are required if both doors )

in the same air lock are inoperable. With both doors in the l same air lock inoperable, an OPERABLE door is not available to be closed. Required Actions C.1, C.2 and C.3 are the appropriate remedial actions. The exception of Note 1 does not affect tracking the Completion Time from the initial entry into Condition A, only the requirement to comply with the Required Actions. Note 2 allows use of the air lock for entry and exit for 7 days under administrative controls if both air locks have an inoperable door. The 7 day restriction begins when the second air lock is discovered inoperable. Contair. ment entry may be required on a periodic basis to perform Technical Specifications (TS) Surveillances and Required Actions, as well as other activities on equipment inside containment that are required by TS or activities on equipment that support TS-required equipment.

This Note is not intended to preclude performing other activities (i.e., non-TS-required activities) if the containment is entered using the inoperable air lock to perform an allowed activity listed above. This allowance is acceptable due to the low probability of an event that could (continued)

ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-9 Rev. 00, 11/23/96

- - = . . - .-.- . -. . - - - - . - - _ . . . - - - . .-

Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 1

BASES ACTIONS A.I. A.2 and A.3 (continued) pressurize the containment during the short time that the OPERABLE door is expected to be open.

B.l. B.2 and B.3 With an air lock interlock mechanism inoperable in one or

more air locks, the Required Actions and associated l Completion Times are consistent with those specified in Condition A.

t The Required Actions have been modified by two Notes.

Note 1 ensures that only the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition C are required if both doors in the same air lock are inoperable. With both doors in the same air lock inoperable, an OPERABLE door is not available i to be closed. Required Actions C.1, L.2 and C.3 are the ;

appropriate remedial actions. Note 2 allows entry into and '

exit from containment under the control of a dedicated individual stationed at the air lock to ensure that only one door is opened at a time (i.e., the individual performs the function of the interlock).

C.l. C.2 and C.3 With one or more air locks inoperable for reasons other than those described in Condition A or B, Required Action C.1 requires action to be initiated immediately to evaluate combined leakage rates using current air lock test results.

An evaluation is acceptable, since it is overly conservative to immediately declare the containment inoperable if both doors in an air lock have failed a seal test or if the overall air lock leakage is not within limits. In many instances (e.g., only one seal per door has failed),

containment remains OPERABLE, however, if the containment was declared inoperable, only 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (per LC0 3.6.1) would be provided to restore the air lock door to OPERABLE status prior to requiring a unit shutdown. In addition, even with both doors failing the seal test, the overall containment leakage rate can still be within limits.

1 i

(continued) l ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-10 Rev. 00,11/23/96

Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 l

BASES ACTIONS C.l. C.2 and C.3 (continued)

Required Action C.2 requires that one door in the affected containment air lock must be verified to be closed within the I hour Completion Time. This specified time period is consistent with the ACTIONS of LC0 3.6.1, which requires that containment be restored to OPERABLE status within I hour.

In addition, the affected air lock (s) must be restored to OPERABLE status within the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time. The specified time period is considered reasonable for restoring i an inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status, assuming that at least one door is maintained closed in each affected air lock.

D.1 and 0.2 If the inoperable containment air lock cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not !

apply. This is done by placing the unit in at least MODE 3 ;

within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed l Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating j experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full q power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. i 1

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.1 j REQUIREMENTS ;

Maintaining containment air locks OPERABLE requires !

compliance with the leakage rate test requirements of ;

10..CFR 50,j ppendix J as.medified.by approved exemptions the~ Containment Leakag,e:RateDTesting ; Program.

~ ~

This SR ,

reflects 'the~1eskage~ rate te' sting' requirements with regard I to air lock leakage (Type B leakage tests). The periodic l testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage, when !

combined with other Type B and C test results, does not ;

exceed the allowed fraction of the overall containment !

leakage rate. The Frequency is required by Appendix J, as i modif,cd by. approved.c*cmptions the:Containmentileakage Rate .

Testing Program. The~: testing requirements 1for the1. ~ ~

individualL;;doorsTprovide earlyxindication;of. .potentisl degradation that may . affect the ability to meet: overall ;

Type B leakage. criteria. '

(continued)

ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-11 Rev. 00, 11/23/96

I Containment Air Locks l B 3.6.2 1

i

~

BASES l

l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The SR has been modified by 14weeltW5 Notes. Note 1 states that an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test. This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR requiring the results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1. This ensures that air lock leakage is ever:11 liombfne' properly accounted dsTypsiBJndfC for in determining containment leakage rate.the Netc 3 : tite"thitSR"3:0:2"B net applicabic cince Technical :pecification: c:n net everride the Frequenc-y required by regulations. Thus, ; curveillance rcquency c extencien i: net permi t t-ed.

SR 3.6.2.2 The air lock interlock is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in a single air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident containment pressure, closure of either door will support containment OPERABILITY. Thus, the door interlock feature supports containment OPERABILITY while the air lock is being used for personnel transit in and out of the containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous opening of the inner and outer doors will not inadvertently occur. Due to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is only challenged when the containment air lock door is opened, this test is only required to be performed upon entering or exiting a containment air lock but is not required more frequently than every 184 days. Therefore, performance of the SR may be extended beyond 184 days (plus the allowance specified in SR 3.0.2) without violating the requirements of SR 3.0.1.

The 184 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of other indications of door and interlock mechanism status available to operations personnel.

l (continued)

ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-12 Rev. 00, 11/23/96

l l

Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Chapter 1.5.

I i

1 1

1 l

l i

l ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-13 Rev. 00,11/23/96

\

l l

t CLEAN ITS SPEC l 4

l

SR Applicability B 3.0 BASES SR 3.0.2 SR 3.0.2 permits a 25Y. extension of the interval specified (continued) in the Frequency. This extension facilitates Surveillance scheduling and considers plant operating conditions that may not be suitable for conducting the Surveillance (e.g.,

transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or maintenance activities). '

The 257. extension does not significantly degrade the I reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at '

its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance l being performed is the verification of conformance with the l

, SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for which the 257. extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply. These exceptions are stated in the j

individual Specifications. An example of where SR 3.0.2

doesnotapplyisaSurveillancewithaFrequencylof"in accordance with the' ContaininentileaksgeiRate? Testing

. .Progf am. " The requ'irements of regulations tike precedence i over the TS. The TS cannot in and of themselves extend a i test interval specified in the regulations. Therefore, i there is a Note in the Frequency stating "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable."

As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25Y. extension also does not apply to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time which i requires performance on a "once per..." basis. The 25Y.

I extension applies to each performance after the initial performance. The initial performance of the Required Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some other remedial action, is considered a single action with a i single Completion Time. One reason for not allowing the 25Y.

extension to this Completion Time is that such an action j usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diverse components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an alternative manner.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intended to be used repeatedly merely as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals other than those consistent with refueling outages or periodic Completion Time intervals beyond those specified.

(continued)

Zion Units 1 & 2 8 3.0-13 Rev. 00, 12/04/96

. . _ _ _ _ _ . ... .. ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ . . _.__ _ ___ . _ .m l

I Programs and Manuals '

5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals I l

l 5.5.7 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Surveillance Proaram )

l (continued)

" Defect" means an imperfection of such severity-that it I exceeds the Plugging or Repair Limit, where applicable. i l A tube containing a defect is defective. i l "F* distance" is the length of undegraded tube required to resist pullout. This distance is measured from the bottom l

I of the upper hard roll transition toward the bottom of the !

tube sheet and has been conservatively determined to be 1.05 i inches'.sTheTdetermin'ation'of.F*~ Distance (is'satisfiediby I the mechanical . tool .(rolling pin);used to . install . the joint '

having[anLeffective11ength;of greater;thantor. equal'to l.05 inchesk ?The?F* Distance is applicable;only to tubes that ~

arearerolled belowLthe.mid-plane'of.the.tubesheet.and have ;

no degra'dation in the rerolled' expansion joints. .The F*' )

Di' stance is not> applicable to the original factory hard '

roll. ,

l "F* tube" means a tube with indications below the ,

F* distance greater than or equal to the Plugging or Repair l Limit, and no indications within the F* distance, '

" Imperfection" means an exception to the dimensions, finish or contour of a tube from that required by fabrication I drawings or specifications. Eddy current testing :

indications < 20% of the nominal tube wall thickness, if detectable, may be considered as imperfections.

" Plugging or Repair Limit" means the imperfection depth at or beyond which the tube shall be repaired or removed from service by plugging because it may become unserviceable prior to the next inspection.

" Repaired Tube" means a tube that has undergone a process that re-establishes its serviceability. The sleeving process utilized shall be one of the following:

1. The Combustion Engineering welded sleeve process as described in Report CEN-331-P, Revision 1-P. The following sections of ABB/CE Report CEN-629-P, Revision .

00,:shall be implemented in conjunction with Report CEN-331-P, Revision 1-P:

, (continued)

ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-17 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 9)

i Programs and Manuals 5.5 l

l 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.7:' 2Steain Gen'erator? (SG F Tube ' Surveill ance ' Pi ooram (continued)

SectionL4.'.5!3 - Tube Brushi @ Cleaning Equipment i Sectioni425.71.nNondestructive/ Examination Sectioni5;0? Sleeve; Examination Program Section 9.3.1L ' Cleaning ;Qualificati.on

2. The Westinghouse Electric Corporation mechanical sleeve i process as described in Report WCAP-ll669.

3. The Bechtel-KWU Alliance welded sleeve process as j described in Report BKAT-01-P, Revision 1.

" Sleeve Inspection" means an inspection of the sleeved portion of the tube. For a Combustion Engineering welded i sleeve, this inspection will include the upper weld which

!- f'rms the new pressure boundary and the sleeve material below the upper weld. For a Westinghouse Electric Corp.

mathanical sleeve, this inspection will include the entire ,

l length of sleeve material. For a Bechtel-KWU Alliance !

l welded sleeve, this inspection will include the upper weld

! which forms the new pressure boundary and the sleeve l

material below the upper weld.

" Tube inspection" means an inspection of the steam generator ,

tube from the point of entry (hot leg side) completely around the U-bend to the top support of the cold leg. If a l l tube does not permit the passage of the eddy current inspection probe the entire length and through the U-bend; this shall be recorded and an adjacent tube shall be inspected.

" Unserviceable" describes the condition of a tube if it leaks or contains a defect large enough to affect its structural integrity in the event of an Operating Basis Earthquake, a loss-of-coolant accident, or a steam line or feedwater line break as specified above.

5.5.8 Secondary Water Chemistry Proaram This program provides controls for monitoring secondary water chemistry to inhibit SG tube degradation. The program shall include:

(continued)

I ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-18 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 9) l l

4

. ..___ ____ . . _ _ . ...m_____.____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _._.

Programs and Manuals 5.5 l

5.5 Programs and Manuals i

! I j 5.5.8 Secondary Water Chemistry Program (continued) '

a. Identification of a sampling schedule for the critical variables and control points for these variables;

. b. Identification of the procedures used to measure the values of the critical variables;

c. Identification of process sampling points, which shall t include monitoring the discharge of the condensate pumps for l evidence of condenser in leakage;

d. Procedures for the recording and management of data;

e. Procedures defining corrective actions for all off control l point chemistry conditions; and I

f. A procedure identifying the authority responsible for the interpretation of the data and the sequence and timing of administrative events, which is required to initiate corrective action.

5.5.9 Ventilation Filter Testina Program (VFTP) i A program shall be established to implement the following required i testing of Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) filter ventilation systems at the frequencies specified in Positions C.5 and C.6 of l Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, dated March 1978, and conducted in general conformance with ANSI N510-1975. The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the VFTP test frequencies.

a. Demonstrate for each of the ESF filter systems that an inplace test of the high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters shows removal capability of 2 99% of dioctyl phthalato (D0P) when tested in general conformance with ANSI N510-1975 at the flowrate specified below. Verification of the specified flowrates may be accomplished during the

! performance of SR 3.7.9.4, SR 3.7.12.3, and SR 3.7.13.5 as applicable. The PTEFS and FHBEFS are shared and as such, will be tested in the FHBEFS mode.

[

(continued) l ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-19 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 9)

- _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ . _ _ _ ~ _

\

Programs and Manuals 5.5 i

5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.9 Ventilation Filter Testina Program (VFTPl (continued)

ESF Filter System Flowrate ,

Control Room Emergency 2 1600, s 2200 cfm Fuel Handling Building Exhaust s 24,000 cfm 1

, Emergency Core Cooling System and s 48,000 cfm Containment Spray Cubicle Exhaust l

b. Demonstrate for each of the ESF filter systems that an

inplace test of the charcoal adsorber shows removal l capability of a 99.95% of halogenated refrigerant test gas when tested in general conformance with ANSI N510-1975 at the flowrate specified below. Verification of the specified l

flowrates may be accomplished during the performance of SR I 3.7.9.4, and SR 3.7.13.5 as applicable. The charcoal filters are shared by the FHBEFS, PTEFS, and ECCS and CS l CEFS and as such, will be tested in the FHBEFS alignment.

! ESF Filter System Flowrate Control Room Emergency a 1600, s 2200 cfm l

l s 24,000 cfm Fuel Handling Building Exhaust i

, c. Demonstrate for each of the ESF filter systems that a l laboratory test of a sample of the charcoal adsorber, when obtained as described in Regulatory Guide 1.52,. Revision 2, shows a removal efficiency of an activated methyl iodide ;

greater than the value specified below when tested in general conformance with ANSI N510-1975 at the temperature and relative humidity greater than or equal to that specified below.

l (continued) i l

ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-20 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 9)

t' l

^ Programs and Manuals I 5.5 l j~ l 5.5 Programs and Manuals +

l l

5.5.9 Ventilation H1ter Testina Program (VFTP) (continued)

ESF Filter System Efficiency Temp. E Control Room Emergency a 997, a 190*F a 70%

7uel Handling Building Exhaust a 95% 2 125'F 2 95%

and Emergency Core Cooling System and l Containment Spray Cubicle Exhaust and Pipe Tunnel Exhaust

d. Demonstrate for each of the ESF filter systems that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters, the prefilters, and the charcoal adsorbers is s 6 inches of water adjusted to the maximum design flowrate when tested in general conformance with ANSI N510-1975 at the flowrate specified below. Verification of the specified flowrates may be accomplished during the performance of SR 3.7.9.4, SR 3.7.12.3, and SR 3.7.13.5 as applicable. The PTEFS and the FHBEFS filters are shared and as such, will be tested in the FHBEFS mode.

ESF Filter System Flowrate l

Control Room Emergency a 1600, s 2200 cfm Fuel Handling Building Exhaust s 24,000 cfm i

Emergency Core Cooling System and s 48,000 cfm Containment Spray Cubicle Exhaust l 5.5.10 Explosive Gas and Storaae Tank Radioactivity Monitorina Proaram This program provides controls for potentially explosive gas mixtures contained in the waste gas s/ stem, the quantity of radioactivity contained in gas decay tanks ur fed into the offgas treatment system, and the quantity of radioactivity contained in unprotected outdoor liquid storage tanks. The gaseous radioactivity quantities shall be determined following the methodology in Branch Technical Position (BTP) ETSB 11-5,

" Postulated Radioactive Release due to Waste Gas System Leak or Failure." The liquid radwaste quantities shall be determined in accordance with the ODCM.

(continued)

ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-21 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 9)

l Programs and Manuals )

5.5 1 P

~

5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.10 Explosive Gas and Storace Tank Radioactivity Monitorina Proaram l (continued)

The program shall include: i

a. The limits for concentrations of hydrogen and oxygen in the waste gas system and a surveillance program to ensure the limits are maintained. Such limits shall be appropriate to !

the system's design criteria (i.e., the system is not ;

designed to withstand a hydrogen explosion);

b. A surveillance program to ensure that the quantity of !

radioactivity contained in each gas decay tank and fed into the offgas treatment system is less than the amount that would result in a whole body exposure of 2: 0.5 rem to any

individual in an unrestricted area, in the event of an I

uncontrolled release of the-tanks' contents; and i

c. A surveillance program to ensure'that the quantity of I radioactivity contained in all outdoor liquid radwaste tanks that are not surrounded by liners, dikes, or walls, capable of holding the tanks' contents and that do not have tank !

overflows and surrounding area drains connected to the i liquid radwaste treatment system is less than the amount that would result in concentrations less than the limits of 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table 2 Column 2, at the nearest potable water supply and the nearest surface water supply in an unrestricted area, in the event of an uncontrolled release of the tanks' contents.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program surveillance frequencies.

5.5.11 Diesel Fuel Oil Testina Program A diesel fuel oil testing program to implement required testing of both new fuel oil and stored fuel oil shall be established. The program shall include sampling and testing requirements, and acceptance criteria, all in accordance with applicable ASTM Standards. The purpose of the program is to establish the following:

(continued)

ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-22 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 9)

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Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 ' Programs and Manuals 5.5.11 Diesel Fuel Oil Testina Proaram (continued)

I a. Acceptability of new fuel oil for use prior to addition to l storage tanks by determining that the fuel oil has:

l 1. an API gravity or an absolute specific gravity within limits, l

2. a flash point and kinematic viscosity within limits for ASTM 2D fuel oil, and l 3. a clear and bright visual appearance with proper color;

b. Other properties of the new fuel oil are within limits for l ASTM 2D fuel oil within 31 days of addition to the storage tanks; and

c. Total particulate concentration of the fuel oil in the storage tanks is :s 10 mg/l when tested every 31 days in accordance with ASTM D2276, Method A-2 or A-3.

l 5.5.12 Technical SDecifications (TS) Bases Control Proaram 1

This program provides a means for processing changes to the Bases of these Technical Specifications,

a. Changes to the Bases of the TS shall be made under appropriate administrative controls and reviews. l

b. Licensees may make changes to Bases without prior NRC approval provided the changes do not involve either of the following:

1. A change in the TS incorporated in the license; or ii. A change to the UFSAR or Bases that involves an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59.

c. The Bases Control Program shall contain provisions to ensure that the Bases are maintained consistent with the UFSAR.

d. Proposed changes that meet the criteria of b above shall be reviewed and approved by the NRC prior to implementation.

Changes to the Bases implemented without prior NRC approval shall be provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with l 10 CFR 50.71(e) as modified by approved exemptions.

l (continued)

ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-23 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 9)

Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Frograms and Manuals 5.5.13 Safety Function Determination Proaram (SFDP)

This program ensures loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions taken. Upon entry into LC0 3.0.G, an evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety function exists. Additionally, other appropriate actions may be taken as a result of the support system inoperability and corresponding l 5.5.13 Safety Function Datermination Program (SFDP) (continued) 1 l exception to entering supported system Conditions and Required Actions. This program implements the requirements of LC0 3.0.6.

The SFDP shall contain the following:

a. Provisions for cross train checks to ensure a loss of the

capability to perform the safety function assumed in the l accident analysis does not go undetected;

b. Provisions for ensuring the plant is maintained in a safe condition if a loss of function condition exists; and

c. Provisions to ensure that an inoperable supported system's Completion Time is not inappropriately extended as a result i of multiple support system inoperabilities; i and may contain additional appropriate limitations and remedial or i compensatory actions.

A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:

a. A required system redundant to the system (s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or

b. A required system redundant to the system (s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or

c. A required system redundant to the support system (s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.

l (continued) l _.

ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-24 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 9)

l l

Programs and Manuals 5.5 1

5.5 Programs and Manuals l

5.5.13 Safety Function Determination Proaram (SFDP) (contin"qd_1 1

The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LC0 in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be l entered.

l l 5.5;14[ . LContainment Teakace' Rate Testina Proaram A~progrsm"sh'ill"be"estiblished toLimplemelit:the leakage rate testing <of theicontainmentTas required by 10;CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR-50, A exemptions.'ppendix J,-Option B,

'This program'shall beas in modified accordanceby approved with the guidelines contsined in Regulatory Guide 1.163,1" Performance-Based ,

Containment Leak-Test. Program", dated September 1995, with the j following exception: Section 10.2.l of NEI 94-01 Revision 0, is !

not applicable.to. Unit 1-. penetration P-16. This exception for l penetration:P-16lshall expire at the completion of' Unit 1 outage j ZlR15.

l 3

The pe'ka calculatsdl containment internalLpressure for1the design l basis loss 'oficcolantl accident, P., Lis"46.79 'psig. The containm'entfdesign. pressure.is"47.psig.-

The[ maximum]hilowable co'nt'ainmenti. leakage' rate, L,,. at P., :shall be s 'O.1%'of0 containment-air weight per day.

L'eakage rate' acceptance criteria are:

a. , Containment leakage rate acceptance criterion is s 1.0 L .

During:the.'first. unit startup;following testing.in accordance with this. program, the:. leakage. rate. acceptance criteria!are <LO.60'L; for the Type B and C tests and < 0.'75 L LforiType? A Ltests; '

bi Air 11ockftestingacceptancecriteriaare:

1) _0 vers 11 air lock leakage-is < 0.6 L, when combined with all; Type B;and C test results at a test pressure of 2 P. ,

2) 1.Forleach. door,.:. leakage rate isY 1.0 SCFH when tested i at;2:.21.5 psig;and?< 10 psig,.or s 4.75 SCFH when tested atg2:'10 psig.

(continued)

ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-25 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 9)

- . - -. -- - . -- . . _ . __.- . . - _ = . .

Programs and Manuals 5.5 l

l 5.5 Programs and fianuals l

l l 5.5.14' ' Containment' Leakage Rate Testina Program (continued) l The provisionsf of'SR 3.0.2 do not. apply to 'the test frequencies l specified;in'the? Containment Leakage Rate ~ Testing Program.

The1provisioiis' ~of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Containment i Leakage Rate. Testing. Program.

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i ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-26 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 9)

' I l

Reporting Requirements 4

5.6 5.6 Reporting Requirements (continued) 1 5.6.6 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) PRESSURE AND_ TEMPERATURE LIMITS :

1 REPORT (PTLR) i

a. RCS pressure and temperature limits for heatup, cooldown, low temperature operation, criticality, and hydrostatic testing, as well as heatup and cooldown rates shall be established and documented in the PTLR for the following:

1 LC0 3.4.3, "RCS Pressure and lemperature (P/T) Limits";

J J LC0 3.4.10. " Pressurizer Safety Valves"; and l j LC0 3.4.12, " Low Temperature Overpressure Protection."

- b. The?analytica14 methods used tofdetermineTthe.RCSTpressure

, and temperature?limitsishall! be' th'ose' previously reviewed

and approved' by the NRC, specifically those- identified in !

thelfollowing documents:LLicenseLAmendment'numberil77ffor

~

I Unitilsand..1641for Unite 2.' )

c. The PTLR shall be provided to the NRC upon issuance for each l

i reactor vessel fluency period and for any revision or l 8

supplement thereto. l i

5.6.7 Post Accident Monitor Report l

1 When a report is required by LC0 3.3.3, " Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation," a report shall be submitted within the l following 14 days. The report shall outline the preplanned i alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, !

and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrumentation channels of the Function to OPERABLE status.

5.6.8 Containment Tendon Surveillance Report Any abnormal degradation of the containment structure detected during the tests required by the Containment Tendon Surveillance Program shall be reported to the NRC within 90 days. The report shall include a description of the tendon condition, the condition of the concrete (especially at tendon anchorages), the inspection procedures, the tolerances on cracking, and the corrective action taken.

(continued)

ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-32 Amendment Nos. (Sup. 9)

l

[

! Containment l 3.6.1 )

i 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1 Containment l l

l LC0 3.6.1 Containment shall be OPERABLE.

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APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. )

l ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l

l A. Containment A.1 Restore containment I hour inoperable. to OPERABLE status. ,

I l

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months l associated Completion l Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months 1

l l

ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-1 Amendment No. (Sup. 9)

Containment 3.6.1 SUR'/EILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.1 -------.--...-..---NOTE--------------..-..-

SR 3.0.2 is not applicable.

Parform required visual examinations and In accordance leakage rate testing, except for with the containment air lock testing, in accordance Containment with thel Containment Leakage Rate Testing Leakage Rate Program. Testing Program SR 3.6.1.2 Verify containment structural integrity In accordance in accordance with the Containment Tendon with the Surveillance Program. Containment Tendon Surveillance Program ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-2 Amendment No. (Sup. 9)

Containment Air Locks 3.6.2 1

1.

3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3 6.2 Containment Air Locks I l

1 l

l LC0 3.6.2 Two containment air locks shall be OPERABLE. '

l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

l l

l ACTIONS l .....................................N0TES------------------------------------

l 1. Entry and exit is permissible to perform repairs on the affected air lock l components.

! 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each air lock.

l

3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.6.1,

" Containment," when air lock leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more ------------NOTES------------

containment air locks 1. Required Actions A.1, with one containment A.2, and A.3 are not air lock door applicable if both doors inoperable. in the same air lock are inoperable and Condition C is entered.

2. Entry and exit is permissible for 7 days under administrative controls if both air locks are inoperable.

(continued) i l

ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-3 Amendment No. (Sup. 9)

Containment Air Locks 3.6.2 ACTIONS l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l

l A. (continued) A.1 Verify the OPERABLE 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months door is closed in the affected air lock.

l AND A.2 Lock the OPERABLE 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months door closed in the affected air lock.

AN.[D A.3 Verify the OPERABLE Once per 31 days door is locked closed in the affected air lock.

1 (continued) l l

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l 1

I ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-4 Amendment No. (Sup. 9) l l

l t __ _ . _

)

Containment Air Locks 3.6.2 l

ACTIONS (continued) ,

1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One or more ------------NOTES------------ >

containment air locks 1. Required Actions B.1, I with containment air B.2, and B.3 are not lock interlock applicable if both doors

)

mechanism inoperable. in the same air lock are inoperable and Condition C is entered.

1

2. Entry and exit of containment is permissible under the control of a dedicated individual.

B.1 Verify an OPERABLE 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months door is closed in the affected air lock.

AND 1

B.2 Lock an OPERABLE door 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months !

! closed in the l

affected air lock. l I

AND B.3 Verify an OPERABLE Once per 31 days door is locked closed l in the affected air lock.

(continued)

ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-5 Amendment No. (Sup. 9)

i Containment At Locks 3.6.2 I

l ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. One or more C.1 Initiate action to Immediately containment air locks evaluate overall l inoperable for reasons containment leakage other than Condition A rate per LC0 3.6.1.

or B.

AND C.2 Verify a dcor is I hour closed in the affected air lock.

AjlQ C.3 Restore air lock to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OPERABLE status.

D. Required Action and 0.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met. MNQ D.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-6 Amendment No. (Sup. 9)

Containment Air Locks 3.6.2 j 1

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.1 -------------------NOTES-------------------

1. An inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.

2. Results shall be evaluated against acceptancecriteriaippilsabls}$8 SR 3.6.1.1.

Perform required air lock leakage rate In accordance testing in accordance with the ~~~~ C66tilsiiht

" ~"" "

with ths Ldaksbe{Riti]TistiinglPf65Fis. C6htiismeht..,

LeakageiRate _

Testing [ Program i

SR 3.6.2.2 -------------------NOTE-------------------- l Only required to be performed upon entry or exit through the containment air lock.

Verify only one door in the air lock can be 184 days )

opened at a time.

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l ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-7 Amendment No. 11/96

$ Containment j B 3.6.1 i

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

] 1 j B 3.6.1 Containment 1

BASES BACKGROUND The containment consists of the concrete reactor building, s its steel liner, and the penetrations through this structure '

which encloses the entire reactor and Reactor Coolant i System. The structure is designed to contain radioactive ;

j material that may be released from the reactor core :

! following a design basis Lossiof Coolaiit Accident . In !

i addition, this structure provides shielding from the fission l 1 products that may be present in the containment atmosphere {

j from both normal and post accident conditions (Ref.1). '

l The containment is a reinforced concrete structure with a I l cylindrical wall, a flat foundation mat, and a shallow dome '

roof. The inside surface of the containment is lined with a s carbon steel liner to ensure a high degree of leak tightness

during operating and accident conditions.

l l The cylinder wall is prestressed with a post tensioning

] system in the vertical and horizontal directions, and the l

dome roof is prestressed utilizing a three way post 1

tensioning system.

i j The concrete reactor building is required.for structural

integrity of the containment under Design: Basis Accident

(DBA) conditions. The steel liner and its~ penetrations establish the leakage limiting boundary of the containment.

~

3 Maintaining the containment OPERABLE limits the leakage of fission product radioactivity from the containment to the environment. SR 3.6.1.1 leakage. rate requirements comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions.

The isolation devices for the penetrations in the containment boundary are a part of the containment leak tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier:

a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either: ,

1. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic l containment isolation signal in MODES 1, 2 and 3 j l

(continued) l ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.6-1 Rev. 00, 11/19/96

i l

Containment B 3.6.1 l .

BASES l BACKGROUND 2. capable of_being closed by an OPERABLE manual !

(continued) containment isolation signal in MODE 4, or

3. closed by manual valves, blino flanges, or de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in i LC0 3.6.3, " Containment Isolation Valves."

J

b. Each air lock is OPERABLE, except as provided in LC0 3.6.2, " Containment Air Locks."

c. The equipment hatch is installed.

1 APPLICABLE The safety design basis for the containment is that the SAFETY ANALYSES containment must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate.

The DBAs that result in a challenge to containment OPERABILITY from high pressures and temperatures are a loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and a main steam line break 1 (Ref. 2). In addition, the release of significant fission :

product radioactivity within containment can occur from a LOCA. In the DBA analyses, it is assumed that the containment is OPERABLE such that, for the DBAs involving release of fission product radioactivity, release to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The containment was designed with an allowable leakage rate of 0.1% of containment air weight per day (Ref. 1). This leakage rate, used to evaluate offsite doses resulting from accidents, is defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as L,: the maximum allowable containment leakage rate at the calculated peak containment internal pressure (P ) resulting from the limiting design basis LOCA . The allowable leakage rate represented by L, forms the basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on all containment leakage rate testing. L, is assumed to be 0.1%

per day in the safety analysis at P - 46.79 psig (Ref. 2).

Satisfactory leakage rate test results are a requirement for the establishment of containment OPERABILITY.

The containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

l (continued)

ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-2 Rev. 00, 11/19/96 l

l

Containment B 3.6.1 BASES (continued)

LC0 Containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to s 1.0 L,, except prior to the first startup after performing a required Contain'ent m Leakage" Rate?Te' s ting' Program leakage test. At this ~ time 'the -leakage.Ilmits .specified in the Con.tainment LeakageiRate TestingjProgram must be met,'i.e.,

the coinbine'd Type B and C' leakage must be < 0.6 L., and~ the overall Type A leakage must be < 0.75 L .

Compliance with this LC0 will ensure a containment configuration, including both air locks and the equipment hatch, that is structurally sound and will limit leakage to those leakage rates assumed in the safety analysis.

Individual leakage rates for the containment air lock door seals are not specifically part of the acceptance criteria of'10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option'B. Therefore, exceeding the 'iridividual air lock door sealfleakage rate limits specified in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing l Program only results in the containment being inoperable when the combined Type B and C leakage. rate exceeds the overall acceptance criteria specified in thatL program.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material into containment. In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment. The requirements for containment during MODE 6 are addressed in LC0 3.9.3, " Containment Penetrations."

ACTIONS Ad In the event containment is inoperable, containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within I hour. The I hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining containment during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when containment is inoperable is minimal.

(continued)

ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-3 Rev. 00, 11/19/96

1 Containment B 3.6.1 BASES i

ACTIONS 8.1 and B.2 (continued)

If containment cannot be restored to 0PERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the unit in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining the containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of .the' Containment Leakage. Rate Testing Program.

Failure to meet indiv"idual' air lock door ' seal leakage limits specified in the Containment' Leakage Rate Testing Program does not invalidate the acceptability 'of these'overall leakage determinations unless their contribution to the overall Type A, B, and C leakage causes that limit to be exceeded.

As left leakage prior to the first startup after performing a required Containment' Leakage-Rate Testing' Program leakage test is required to be < 0.6 L,'for combined Type 8 and Type C leakage;'

As left leaka'ge prior. to the first startup af ter performing a required Containment-Leakage Rate. Testing Program leakage test' is required to be < 0.75 L, for overall Type A leakage i At all other times between required leakage rate tests, the '

acceptance criteria for Type 8 and Type C leakage tests are based on an overall Type A leakage limit of s 1.0 L,. At j s 1.0 L, the offsite dose consequences are bounded by the

assumptions of the safety analysis.

I i

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[ (continued) 1 j ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.6-4 Rev. 00, 11/19/96 i

r~ - n v = - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - = - - - - - - -

Containment B 3.6.1 l

BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1 (continuedl REQUIREMENTS l

SR Frequencies are as required by ,the' Containment Leakage l Rate Testing Program. These periodict'e stingequirements r

verify' th'at the containment leakage rate does not exceed the l leakaga rate assumed in the safety analysis. l SR 3.6.1.2 This SR ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained in accordance with the provisions of Specification 5.5.5, " Containment Tendon Surveillance Program." Testing and Frequency are in general conformance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.35 (Ref. 3).

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 3.8.

2. UFSAR, Chapter 15.

3. Regulatory Guide 1.35, " Inservice Inspection of Ungrouted Tendons in Prestressed Concrete Containment Structures," Revision 2, January 1976.

l l

4 ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.6-5 Rev. 00, 11/19/96

i Containment Air Locks I 8 3.6.2 1 8 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks i

BASES i

BACKGROUND Containment air locks form part of the containment pressure i

i boundary and provide a means for personnel access during all MODES of operation.

Two air locks are provided. The personnel air lock, used for normal ingress and egress of containment, and the l emergency air lock typically reserved for entering and j exiting containment in emergency situations. The personnel

, air lock penetrates the equipment hatch. The emergency air lock is a right circular cylinder located on the opposite

side of containment at ground level. The doors in each air 4

lock are interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening. !

During periods when containment is not required to be i 1 OPERABLE, the door interlock mechanism may be disabled, l

! allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open for I 5 extended periods when frequent containment entry is

necessary. Each of the air lock doors contains double l gasketed seals and local leakage rate testing capability to '

j ensure seal integrity. To effect a leak tight seal, the air i

lock design uses pressure seated doors (i.e., an increase in i

' containment internal pressure results in increased sealing force on each door). Each air lock door has been designed

and tested to certify its ability to withstand a pressure in 1 1 excess of the maximum expected pressure following a Design i Basis Accident (DBA) in containment. As such, closure of a j single air lock door supports containment OPERABILITY.

The containment air locks form part of the containment

] pressure boundary. As such, air lock integrity and leak tightness is essential for maintaining the containment leakage rate within its limit in the event of a DBA, Not j maintaining air lock integrity or leak tightness may result

in a leakage rate in excess of that assumed in the safety analyses.

1 (continued)

ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-6 Rev. 00, 11/19/96

Containment Air Locks l B 3.6.2 l

BASES (continued) l l APPLICABLE The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material l SAFETY ANALYSES within containment are a loss of coolant accident and a rod ejection accident (Ref. 1). In the analysis of each of these accidents, it is assumed that containment is OPERABLE l such that release of fission products to the environment is l

controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The containment was designed with an allowable leakage rate of 0.1% of containment air weight per da Re f. 1) . This l liakige7fsteli.itdefiWediiF10eCFR 50}y Ap (pendix%'OptioniBJ

! asTtheimaximum?allowableJcontainmentila.akageratefat)the ' ^ '

calbulsted peak (containmentiintern'alspressurenP2/ "

46;79?psigUfo11bsinglal design:bssisCLOCAMThis allowable t l'sakage 'ratFfoFmf ths bisis f6r~ths"YcTehtance criteria 1

imposed on the SRs associated with the air locks.

l The containment air locks satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC l Policy Statement.

1 LC0 Each containment air lock forms part of the containment pressure boundary. As part of the containment pressure boundary, the air lock safety function is related to control of the containment leakage rate resulting from a DBA. Thus, each air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the successful mitigation of such an event.

Each air lock is required to be OPERABLE. For the air lock l tn be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism

! must be OPERABLE, the air lock must be in compliance with l the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors i must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one air lock door of an air lock to be opened at one time. This l provision ensures that a gross breach of containment does not exist when containment is required to be OPERABLE.

Closure of a single door in each air lock is sufficient to provide a leak tight barrier following postulated events.

Nevertheless, both doors are kept closed when the air lock is not being used for normal entry into or exit from l containment.

l l

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f (continued)

ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-7 Rev. 00,11/23/96

Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and. 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment. In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and' consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES.

Therefore, the containment air locks are not required in MODE 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment. The requirements for the containment air locks during MODE 6 are addressed in LC0 3.9.3, " Containment Penetrations."

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note that allows entry and exit to perform repairs on the affected air lock component.

If the outer door is inoperable, then it may be easily accessed to repair. If the inner door is the one that is inoperable, however, then a short time exists when the containment boundary is not intact (during access through the outer door). The ability to open the OPERABLE door, even if it means the containment boundary is temporarily not intact, is acceptable due to the low probability of an event that could pressurize the containment during the short time in which the OPERABLE door is expected to be open. After ,

each entry and exit, the OPERABLE door must be immediately l closed. If ALARA conditions permit, entry and exit should be via an OPERABLE air lock.

A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, i for this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each ;

air lock.

In the event the air lock leakage results in exceeding the !

overall containment leakage rate, Note 3 directs entry into' i the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.6.1,

" Containment."

A.l. A.2 and A.3 With one air lock door in one or more containment air locks !

inoperable, the OPERABLE door must be verified closed (Required Action A.1) in each affected containment air lock.

This ensures that a leak tight containment barrier is ,

maintained by the use of an OPERABLE air lock door. This action must be completed within I hour. This specified time period is consistent with the ACTIONS of LC0 3.6.1, which (continued)

ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-8 Rev. 00, 11/19/96

x n ama- - - u, - L-At .,-,--,-".-a.- .

a --2+ -.J - . J- .- -:s l

Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 l I l

l BASES l

l ACTIONS A.l. A.2 and A.3 (continued) ;

l l l requires containment be restored to OPERABLE status within I hour.

In addition, the affected air lock penetration must be i isolated by locking closed the OPERABLE air lock door within l the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time is reasonable for locking the OPERABLE air lock door, )

considering the OPERABLE door of the affected air lock is l being maintained closed.

! Required Action A.3 verifies that an air lock with an incperable door has been isolated by the use of a locked and closed OPERABLE air lock door. This ensures that an acceptable containment leakage boundary is maintained. The Completion Time of once per 31 days is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of the low likelihood of a locked door being mispositioned and other administrative controls.

The Required Actions have been modified by two Notes.

Note 1 ensures that only the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition C are required if both doors in the same air lock are inoperable. With both doors in the same air lock inoperable, an OPERABLE door is not available to be closed. Required Actions C.1, C.2 and C.3 are the appropriate remedial actions. The exception of Note 1 does not affect tracking the Completion Time from the initial entry into Condition A, only the requirement to comply with

~

the Required Actions. Note 2 allows use of the air lock for entry and exit for 7 days under administrative controls if both air locks have an inoperable door. The 7 day restriction begins when the second air lock is discovered ;

inoperable. Containment entry may be required on a periodic i basis to perform Technical Specifications (TS) Surveillances and Required Actions, as well as other activities on '

equipment inside containment that are required by TS or activities on equipment that support TS-required equipment.

This Note is not intended to preclude performing other !

activities (i.e., non-TS-required activities) if the ,

containment is entered using the inopeiable air lock to !

perform an allowed activity listed above. This allowance is acceptable due to the low probability of an event that could (continued) l I

ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-9 Rev. 00, 11/19/96

(

Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2

~

BASEE ACTIONS A.l. A.2 and A.3 (continued) pressurize the containment during the short time that the OPERABLE door is expected to be open.

l B.l. B.2 and B.3 l

l With an air lock interlock mechanism inoperable in one or more air locks, the Required Actions and associated Completion Times are con::istent with those specified in i Condition A. !

l The Required Actions have been modified by two Notes. l Note 1 ensures that only the Required Actions and associated i Completion Times of Condition C are required if both doors !

in the same air lock are inoperable. With both doors in the j same air lock inoperable, an OPERABLE door is not available to be closed. Required Actions C.1, C.2 and C.3 are the )

appropriate remedial actions. Note 2 allows entry into and exit from containment under the control of a dedicated individual stationed at the air lock to ensure that only one door is opened at a time (i.e., the individual performs the function of the interlock).

C.I. C.2 and C.3 With one or more air locks inoperable for reasons other than !

those described in Condition A or B, Required Action C.1 requires action to be initiated immediately to evaluate combined leakage rates using current air lock test results. l An evaluation is acceptable, since it is overly conservative to immediately declare the containment inoperable if both doors in an air lock have failed a seal test or if the overall air lock leakage is not within limits. In many instances (e.g., only one seal per door has failed),

containment remains OPERABLE, however, if the containment was declared inoperable, only 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (per LC0 3.6.1) would be provided to restore the air lock door to OPERABLE status prior to requiring a unit shutdown. In addition, even with both doors failing the seal test, the overall containment leakage rate can still be within limits.

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(continued)

ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-10 Rev. 00, 11/19/96

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l Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 l

BASES ACTIONS C.l. C.2 and C.3 (continued)

Required Action C.2 requires that one door in the affected containment air lock must be verified to be closed within the I hour Completion Time. This specified time period is consistent with the ACTIONS of LC0 3.6.1, which requires that containment be restored to OPERABLE status within I hour.

In addition, the affected air lock (s) must be restored to OPERABLE status within the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time. The specified time period is considered reasonable for restoring an inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status, assuming that at least one door is maintained closed in each affected air lock.

D.1 and 0.2 If the inoperable containment air lock cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. This is done by placing the unit in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining containment air locks OPERABLE requires compliance with the leakage rate test requirements of the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This SR reflects the leakage rate' testing requirements with regard to air lock leakage (Type B leakage tests). The periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage, when combined with other Type B and C test results, does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall containment leakage rate.

The Frequency is required by the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. The testing requirements for the

~

individual doors provide _early . indication of potential degradation'that~may affect'the~ ability to meet'overall Type B leakage criteria.

(continued) I i i ZION Units 1 & 2 8 3.6-11 Rev. 00, 11/19/96 J

aal e-r -, + , - - -m , .&-**- 6-~n- * , + - --.a.--- 4--A--4 48 4d --:--a.--- T-4 -4m c----*------.*J & e.e . . - - . .-ab+

Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 i

BASES l ,

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SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.1 (continued) 1 REQUIREMENTS l l The SR has been modified by two? Notes. Note 1 states that

! an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.

This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is

capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR requiring the results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1. This ensures that air lock leakage is properly accounted for in determining the Eointii6fd?Tipe(BJjhdnc j containment leakage rate. l l

l SR 3.6.2.2 The air lock interlock is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in a single air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident containment ,

pressure, closure of either door will support containment '

OPERABILITY. Thus, the door interlock feature supports i containment OPERABILITY while the air lock is being used for personnel transit in and out of the containment. Periodic .

testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock l will function as designed and that simultaneous opening of the inner and outer doors will not inadvertently occur. Due to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is only challenged when the i containment air lock door is opened, this test is only required to be performed upon entering or exiting a containment air lock but is not required more frequently ,

than every 184 days. Therefore, performance of the SR may '

be extended beyond 184 days (plus the allowance specified in SR 3.0.2) without violating the requirements of SR 3.0.1.

The 184 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of other indications of door and interlock mechanism status available to operations personnel.

l (continued)

ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-12 Rev. 00, 11/23/96

Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Chapter 15.

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ZION Units 1 & 2 B 3.6-13 Rev. 00, 11/19/96

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3,\fkg,(LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION g[yq, g SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.l.7 3d . Y 3.2.3.0.1 Acolicability: Modes 1 and 2 4.2.3.D.I.a shall ha checked indirect , by m 6xcore detectors and/or /

g'A C.\ Reouired Action: If the conditions of (l -YS) bhermornunlet and/or fiii57eable - incore Section 3.2.3.D 1 cannot be the Atuttursivery shif t- r af m %

reactor shall he brouaht_ to at least the] 3.1-C ( roa motion of the n - ndicating 3433 o

Shutdownconditionwithinfourhours.) gg 4 i rod, exceeding 12 steps, which y ')

4. DNB Parameters E. l- 5 > Y'#'

L.00 3,t{ , ( b. During operation below 50% of rated A. The following DNB related parameters 4,y, c , ( power, no special monitoring is shall be maintained within the required.

limits shown during operation.

C 3.'f. I 4.A.I. Each of the parameters listed in L4 A 3,1. 1. Re y lant System Tavg Specification 3.2.4.A shall be verified 9 3,y, r,(

y s OUR L . s 567.7'F g ,7,g g to be within its limit at least once per

2. Press r Pressure 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

^ OUR LUDPD 2GTO'iis'ib q.4 ) 5d' l % I' 3 (2195 psig)* 2. The Reactor Coolant System total flow

3. Reactor Coolant System Total $g 3 % l.T rate shall be determined to be within Flow its limit by measurement at least once FOUR LOOP: ;t 362,300 GP # per 18 months.

t B. With any of the above parameters c-exceeding its limit, restore the

1. ( f : /J4 g 3 q g, y ,)o g

' Col 4 5 parameter to within its limit within '

y 4.( _2 hoursyr reauce thermal power to less than 5% of rated thermal power within the next Q f.l 3.4 -5 Lco ) 1.1 riorE

S K %H.I,l W o '

Limit not applicable during either a thermal power ramp increase in excess of 5% rated thermal power per increase in excess of 10% rated thermal power.

(jute _Includes orathermal-power- s ton uncer a 3.5% flow measurement 55 Amendment Nos.176 and 163

r LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENT

10. Repaired Tube means a tube that has undergone a process that re-establishes its serviceability.

The sleeving process utilized shall be one of the following:

a. The Combustion Engineering welded sleeve process as described in Report CEN-331-P, I t

Revision 1-P.**

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b. The Westinghouse Electric Corporation l mechanical sleeve process as described in Report WCAP-ll669. ,

c. The Bechtel-KWU Alliance welded sleeve

)rocess as described in Report BKAT-01-P, Levision 1.

istance is the len '

[ required to resist pulhthout.

of undegraded tubeis This distance s.5.1 measured from the nottom of the upper hard roll i transition toward the bottom of the tubesheet and has been conservatively determined to be !',

1.05 inches. The determination of the F* '

/ Distance is satisfied by the mechanical tool (rolling pin) used to install the joint having an effective length of greater than or aqual to i 1.05 inches. The F* Distance is applicable only t to tubes that are rerolled below the mid-plane '

of the tubesheet and have no degradation in the rerolled expansion joints. ,e '

12. F' Tube is a tube with indications below the F' Distance, equal to or grpater than 40%, and no indications within the F Distance.

55 f The following sections of ABB/CE Report CEN-629- g Revision 00 shall be implemented in conjunction with ,

s Report CEN-331-P, Revision 1-P: <

'N Section 4.5.3 - Tube Brushing-Cleaning Equipment

/ Section 4.5.7 - Nondestructive Examination I Section 5.0 - Sleeve Examination Program k 1

Section 9.3.1 - Cleaning Qualification

^

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l 74f3 Amendment Nos. 174 and 161

Bases:

3.3.1 111am Generators 4.3.1 f'~ The F* Distance will be controlled by process control. For a new additional roll expansion, the requirement will be at least 1.05 inches of S.5.3 h new hard roll. This is controlled by the length of the rolling pin used during the mechanical installation of the new hard roll joint. The distance from the original roll transition zone is also controlled by the process in that the !

t lower end of the new roll expansion is located !

approximately one inch above the original !

factory hard roll expansion. In the case of the new roll, eddy current examination will confirm that there are no indications in the new roll ,

region and that there is a new roll region with i well defined upper and lower expansion I transitions. The F* Distance is not applicable to the original factory hard roll. [

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a, 6. ( LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.10 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY foer unit) 4.10 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY foer unit)

OBJECTIVE: OBJECTIVE:

, To insure that the containment structure meets To estabitsh the testing requirements to assure its design requirements throughout plant Ilfe. containment structural integrity.

SPECIFICATION:

1. Containment Leakage Rate Testing

1. Containment Leakage Rate Testing A. Surveillance and testing of the h

A. Containment Leakage Rate shall be containment shall be perfonned as limited to: follows: s ,CN

, , y -\ t

,a 1.

Lg ,

An rateoverall integrated less than or equalleakage to that \

5,e 3 k l . \

4a a (1. The containment Type A leakage -~~

t - /

specified by the Containment rate sh all be determined in

'" 4 accordance with the Containment-(uy R ' leakage Rate Testing Program } g gy -l<eakage e Rate Testing Program'

~ ,

f 2. A combir.ed leakage rate less

\ than or equal to that specifNd

( g 11 bytheContainmentLeakageRate\

V Testing Program, for all penetrations and valves subject j to Type B and C tests, when

( pressurizedto_f, /

/

APPLICABILITY: Modes 1, 2, 3, 4 an .

)

212 Amendments Nos. 175 and 162

.i LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

\

3.10.1.A ( 7 Cont _inued) 4.10.1.A.2.

ACTIO JN - Type B and C tests (except air locktests

[33-1 with that specified by the Containment l With either (a) the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate, or (b) the measured

( 'j Leakage Rate Testing Program.

)

3. Air locks shall be tested and combined leakage rate for all penetrations and 3 O' demonstrated OPERABLE per Surveillance valves subject to Type 8 and C tests exceeding that Requirement 4.10.2. -

I i

specified by the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, restore the appilcable leakage rate to less 4. Type A, B, and C leakage rate tests A than or equal to that specified by the Containment shall be considered to be sJtisfactory l

Leakage Rate Testing Program prior to entering if the acceptance criteria delineated by MODE 4.

3 ,.g5 the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program are met.

5. Leakage from containment isolation SW valves sealed by the Isolation valve /

% Seal Water system may be excluded from j' the combined Type B and C leakage rate.

l 213 Amendment Nos. 175 and 162

1

3. 6. ( LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.10.1.A (Continued) 4.10.1.A.6 The retest schedules for Type A, 8, and C\l tests shall be in accordance with the

% Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

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$c A%) '

7. Inspection and reporting of tests shall be in accordance with the Containment Leakage G e' Rate Testing Program.

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1 214 Amendment Nos.175 and 162

zgL LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.10.2. Containment Air Locks 4.10.2. Containment Air Locks A. Each containment air lock shall be PERABLE with: -M # A. Each air lock shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

1. Both doors closed except when the air (g % lock is being used for normal entry Verify that the overall air lock leakage rate, Lg 4L and the leakage rate for each door, are less and exit through the containment, then than or equal to that specified M the at least one air lock door shall be Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

i closed, and C The air lock leakage rate shall be Verifications shall be conducted at the u,- r/t a less than or equal to that specified frequency specified by the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

by the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

APPLICA* Mode , 2, 3, 4 an 7 ACTION: #

a.) With one containment air lock d r Go#0 A inoperable: '-' 9

1. Maintain at least the OPERABLE air

.t

g ~ lock door closed and either restore 8

the inoperable air lock door to 03 ' OPERA 8LE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or

p. L lock the OPERABLE air lock door closed, u 7 7-

2. Operationmaycontinuefdhr11 eff6Biiance~bT Ihe next required verall air loc _k_ leakage _tes provided O' 3 hat ~the OPERABLE air lock door is verified locked closed at least once per 31 days,

3. Otherwise be in at least MODE 3 within C# A 3.(

the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and MODE 5 within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

O. L 214a Amendment Nos.175 and 162

i

3. c. L LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.10.2 (Continued)

C

) At least once per 6 months by verifying that

4. The prowlsions of Technical 3.6 '

only one door in each air lock can be opened at

[3. v D a time.

Specification 3.0.4 are not c) 0 -% appilcable. Q/i b.) With the containment air lock V inoperable, except as a rje ulLaf_a i ynoperable air-locLdanc/nalntain at toch C ,

least one air lock door closedf restore l 4 he-inoperable-si d urK to OPERA 8tE status ;

within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or be in at least MODE 3 i within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 5 co^^3 within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

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214b Amendment Nos. 175 and 162

6.10 Containment Leakaae Rate Testina Procram [

1.

A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the containment as required by 4s 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions. This program 5.6 shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, " Performance-Based Containment Leakage Test Program" dated September 1995, with the following exception:

Section 10.2.1 of NE! 94-01, Revision 0, is not appitcable to Unit I penetration P-16. This exception for penetration P-16 shall expire at the completion of Unit I outage ZlRIS.

2. The peak calculated containment internal pressure for the design basis loss of coolant accident, P,, is 46.79 psig. The containment design pressure is 47 psig.

3. The maximum allowable containment leakage rate, L , at P,, shall be s0.1% of containment air weight per day.

4. Leakage rate acceptance criteria are: '

i a.

Containment leakage rate acceptance criterion is s1.0 L . During the first unit startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakage rale acceptance criteria are <0.60 L, for the Type B and C tests and <0.75 L, for the Type A tests; ,

b. Air lock testing acceptance criteria are:

1) Overall air lock leakage is 50.6 L, when combined with all Type B and C test results at a test ll pressure of 2 P,. t

2) For each door, leakage rate is 51.0 SCfH ahen tested at 22.5 psig and <10 psig, or s4.75 SCfH

j when tested at 210 psig. !

5. The provisions of Surveillance Requirement 4.0.2 do not apply to the test frequencies specified in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

6. The provisions of Surveillance Requirement 4.0.3 are applicable to the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, b _

i, 326a Amendment Nos. 175 and 162l

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DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 3.1: REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS (continued)

NSHC NO. DISCUSSION i

i L-7. 32. Appropriate Required Actions and Completion Times are provided for l the Condition of more than'one rod position indicator channel per l control rod group inoperable, and for "More than one RPI per group inoperable for one or more groups." The latter condition addresses ,

the unlikely situation in which control rod position indication is l lost in its entirety. This change is consistent with Amendment 61 for Callaway Plant (requested 9-7-90, approved 2-1-91). The NRC Staff's SER for this amendment indicates that "the requested amendments correct an oversight in the licensee's existing TS that would require operation of a system (control rods) important to safety without availability of the preferred monitoring capability" (rod position indication). This same oversight exists in the old STS and in the new ITS. Both currently require a shutdown (control rod manipulation) without complete control rod position indication.

This new Condition will provide an increased time to attempt repair while limiting the likelihood of control rod misalignment during this period. The safety function of the control rods (tripability) is unaffected by this condition, and as such, control rod misalignment is the primary concern. The proposed 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months will significantly increase the probability of identifying and correcting the cause of the inoperability, while allowing time to plan alternative monitoring of control rod position should a plant l

shutdown be required. Without the change, the plant is required to initiate a shutdown in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and be in MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months . This !

is not sufficient time to notify the appropriate individuals, brief !

them in the situation and alternatives for centrol rod monitoring, l or to allow them to identi fy and correct the cause of the inoperability. Therefore, the current requirements as written will result in a plant shutdown without adequate time to address corrective actions or monitoring capabilities. The proposed Condition provides appropriate compensatory measures to continue to assure compliance with the assumptions of the safety analysis while providing sufficient time to identify and correct minor causes of inoperability, or to preplan alternative measures relative to .

monitoring control rod position during a plant shutdown. j L-5. 33. The requirement to place the reactor in Hot Shutdown and aintain the rc cter trip breaker:-epen-when the required actions associated with the Rod Position Indicator Specification cannot be met, has

.been modified to only require the plant be brought to a power level of less than 50% RTP. A shutdown to MODE 3 places the unit outside the MODE in which the rod position indicators are required.

However, reducing power to less than 50% RTP puts the core into a condition where rod position is not significantly affecting core peaking factors. Therefore, this is an appropriate action if the initial RA is not met and is consistent with the described Bases of NUREG-1431.

l ZION Units 1 & 2 3.1-9 12/04/96

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DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 3.6: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS NSHC NO. DISCUSSION i ;

A. 90. In CTS 4.10.5, the Surveillance Frequency for the verification of containment pressure has been specified as once per "12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months " l instead of the "once per shift." At Zion Station, the normal l

{ shift is 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . As a result, this change is editorial in nature.

L-26. 91. In CTS 4.10.6, the Surveillance Frequency for the verification of containment temperature has been revised to once per "24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months "

, instead of "once per shift." The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency is considered i

.i acceptable based on the observed slow rates of temperature i increase within containment as % 6 t of environmental heat I j sources (due to the large volua.c s' ontainment). In addition, J

other indications are available in the control room to alert the l j operator to an abnormal containment temperature condition. '

Ah

92. Ocleted RefeFeMes?tsfAppeddiRJ have"beenkhange'd to refArence

~

.ths1C6n't a inmentileakage t Rate . Test i ng). Program : fol l owi ng implementationloffl01CFRj50JM ppendix g r0ption'B; '

) L-28 93. This change to the requirements of the CTS 4.9.3.A.2 exempts certain automatic containment isolation valves from the 18 month 4

surveillance testing that would demonstrate satisfactory

. operation. The valves are exempted because they are locked, ,

l sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under I administrative controls. These valves do not reposition in order to fulfill their safety function, and are 2ccured in their required position to fulfill their accident function. Therefore no automatic isolation is required. This exemption is in accordance with NUREG-1431, Rev 1.

L-29 94. This change to the requirements of CTS 4.5.1.b.2 eliminates the 18 month surveillance for those required (Accident Inlet, Accident i Outlet, and Normal Inlet) dampers that have been secured in the accident position. It would be superfluous to verify the position of such dampers, and any alteration which would allow the dampers

, to be repositioned would constitute a change to the facility design.

L-A 95. SP '.S.I.e.2, vert'intien of S" #1cw tc the RCFC Ccclers, S:

! been releccted = der the Zicn !TS. It he been replcced by i perfer =ce cf ITS SR 3.'.S.I . SR 4.5.1.a.2, verification of SW e flow to the RCFC coolers, has been revised under the Zion ITS.

The flow verification (SR 3.'6.6;2) now verifies that the SW System

~

configuration is within"the assumptions of the SW System hydraulic flow analysis that was performed to verify SW System design basis.

ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-33 12/04/96

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l DISCUSSION OF CHANGES l SECTION 5.0: ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS (continued)

NSHC NO. DISCUSSION l

L-A 43. CTS requirement 4.22.1.A.4.a has been relocated to licensee control. This requirement specifies the performance of mechanical l snubber drag testing during functional tests. In light of other required testing (e.g.; activation, release rate), this testing does not provide any added data relevant to the determination of snubber functionality. This testing will continued to be performed as a " good practice" under licensee control in plant procedures. Based on the above information, it has been concluded that moving this test to plant procedures can be done without an impact on safety. Changes to these documents will be controlled ,

in accordance with plant proce:ses and practices. This change is l consistent with NUREG-1431, in that all snubber testing is relocated to licensee control.

L-A 44. CTS requirement 4.22.3 has been relocated to plant procedures.

This requirement specifies the performance of service life monitoring for snubber components. This requirement was placed into the Technical Specifications to address snubber components with limited life (elastomers), which have since been improved and replaced. Monitoring will continue to be performed under licensee i control. Changes to these documents will be controlled in !

accordance with plant processes and practices. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431, in that all snubber testing is relocated to licensee control.

A_PN_ _45'.TUdfoFaiation?phtilhi6g?tolthe~ContaihmehtRiakaige(Rate 1 Testing i

_p . . .

been4 rel ocated ? tMSpec i fi cat i on ? 5. 5 14 c~Conta i nment1 LeakageLRate

~~ '

lesti;ng grpgh @y g ~ ~ ~ ' ~~ ^ ' ~ ""

ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-19 12/04/96

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DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 3.1: REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS (continued)

NSHC NO. DISCVSSION l

1 L-7. 32. Appropriate Required Actions and Completion Times are provided for )

the Condition of more than'one rod position indicator channel per l control rod group inoperable, and for "More than one RPI per group inoperable for one nr more groups." The latter condition addresses the unlikely situation in which control rod position indication is lost in its entirety. This change is consistent with Amendment 61 ,

for Callaway Plant (requested 9-7-90, approved 2-1-91). The NRC '

I Staff's SER for this amendment indicates that "the requested amendments correct an oversight in the licensee's existing TS that would require operation of a system (control rods) important to i safety without availability of the preferred monitoring capability" 1 (rod position indication). This same oversight exists in the old STS and in the new ITS. Both currently require a shutdown (control rod manipulation) without complete control rod position indication.

This new Condition will provide an increased time to attempt repair while limiting the likelihood of control rod misalignment during this period. The safety function of the control rods (tripability) is unaffected by this condition, and as such, control rod !

misalignment is the primary concern. The proposed 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months will significantly increase the probability of identifying and correcting the cause of the inoperability, while allowing time to plan alternative monitoring of control rod position should a plant ;

shutdown be required. Without the change, the plant is required to l initiate a shutdown in I hour and be in MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months . This is not sufficient time to notify the appropriate individuals, brief i them in the situation and alternatives for control rod monitoring, i or to allow them to identify and correct the cause of the I inoperability. Therefore, the current requirements as written will result in a plant shutdown without adequate time to address '

corrective actions or monitoring capabilities. The proposed Condition provides appropriate compensatory meascres to continue to assure compliance with the assumptions of the safety analysis while providing sufficient time to identify and correct minor causes of inoperability, or to prepl an alternative measures relative to monitoring control rod position during a plant shutdown.

L-5. 33. The requirement to place the reactor in Hot Shutdown when the required actions associated with the Rod Position Indicator Specification cannot be met, has been modified to only require the plant be brought to a power level of less than 50% RTP. A shutdown to MODE 3 places the unit outside the MODE in which the rod position indicators are required. Howem educing power to less than 50%

RTP puts the core into a c o.~ ' on where rod position is not significantly affecting core peak .g factors. Therefore, this is an appropriate action if the initial RA is not met and is consistent with the described Bases of NUREG-1431.

M. 34. An Applicability for Specification 3.2.1.H has been added. This ,

Applicability is for MODES 1 and 2 and ensures that the limits on i

ZION Units 1 & 2 3.1-9 12/04/96 ;

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4 l DISCUSSION OF CHANGES

SECTION 3.6: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 4

NSHC NO. DISCUSSION t ,

' A. 90. In CTS 4.10.5, the Surveillance Frequency for the verification of i

containment pressure has been specified as once per "12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months " !

instead of the "once per shift." At Zion Station, the normal )

i shift is 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . As a result, this change is editorial in i nature.

i

L-26. 91. In CTS 4.10.6, the Surveillance Frequency for the verification of .

, containment temperature has been revised to once per "24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months " l

} instead of "once per shift." The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency is considered 1 i acceptable based on the observed slow rates of temperature increase within containment as a result of environmental heat ;

sources (due to the large volume of containment). In addition, 4

other indications are available in the control room to alert the !

I operator to an abnormal containment temperature condition.

i @ 92. RsfiFsk es[tW Apiisndi W havsibeenichangedsto &eferencetthe j Cont ai nmentRea kag'e t Rate ale s ti ng > Prog ram r foll 6wi ng l i mpl ement ati on" of{10lCFRJo@pendix1Jy0ption;BT " ~~" ~ ~ '

L-28 93. This change to the requirements of the CTS 4.9.3.A.2 exempts 1

certain automatic containment isolation valves from the 18 month surveillance testing that would demonstrate satisfactory .

operation. The valves are exempted because they are locked, I i sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under l 4

administrative controls. These valves do not reposition in order to fulfill their safety function, and are secured in their '

i required position to fulfill their accident function. Therefore l no automatic isolation is required. This exemption is in j accordance with NUREG-1431, Rev 1.

I L-29 94. This change to the requirements of CTS 4.5.1.b.2 eliminates the 18 i month surveillance for those required (Accident Inlet, Accident Outlet, and Normal Inlet) dampers that have been secured in the accident position. It would be superfluous to verify the position of such dampers, and any alteration which would allow the dampers to be repositioned would constitute a change to the facility design.

L-A 95. SR 4.5.1.a.2, verification of SW flow to the RCFC coolers, has been revised under the Zion ITS. The flow verification (SR 3!6!672) now verifies that the SW System configuration is within the~aisumptions of the SW System hydraulic flow analysis that was performed to verify SW System design basis.

Specifically, SW flow of 1500 gpm was verified to the RCFC coolers by performance of a flow analysis, given a minimum SW component alignment. The SW System alignment assumptions of the flow ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-33 12/04/96 1

l

- _ _ _ . _ - . . - - - -_ - - . - . - = .. ~. . . - _ . . . . . .-

l DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ~

! SECTION 5.0: ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS (continued) l NSHC NO. DISCUSSION l

l L-A 43. CTS requirement 4.22.1.A.4.a has been relocated to licensee control. This requirement specifies the performance of mechanical snubber drag testing during functional tests. In light of other 1 required testing (e.g.; activation, release rate), this testing i does not provide any added data relevant to the determination of snubber functionality. This testing will continued to be performed as a " good practice" under licensee control in plant procedures. Based on the above information, it has been concluded that moving this test to plant procedures can be done without an l impact on safety. Changes to these documents will be controlled '

in accordance with plant processes and practices. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431, in that all snubber testing is relocated to licensee control.

L-A 44. CTS requirement 4.22.3 has been relocated to plant procedures.

This requirement specifies the performance of service life monitoring for snubber components. This requirement was placed into the Technical Specifications to address snubber components l with limited life (elastomers), which have since been improved and !

repl aced. Monitoring will continue to be performed under licensee !

control. Changes to these documents will be controlled in accordance with plant processes and practices. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431, in that all snubber testing is relocated to licensee control.

Ai~?"4W~SINfsFWitt3WTeitsi Aingit6?thficintiiniiieht1L'eiRigE RiteITest:i ng

~ ~~

~Pr65FamTMplementedl unde 610j CFRj50MAppendifJ,20ptibnf B8hss beenWelocateditM5 JesMnggregang[pecification 5:5t14#'ContainmentdeakagetR. ate

~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~" ~ ~ " ' ' " ~~ ~

l l ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-19 12/04/96

j I

l l

l 1

1 l

l l

l NUREG MARKUPS l l

Prograus and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals (continued)

5. 5./4 1nservice Testina Procram "'E

l ua This program provides controls for inservice testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 M eert: tr.c M ir: :rr! me m s"crerte. The program shall include the following:

a. Testing frequencies spe::ified in Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as follows:

L ASMElBoileran sure) l

,Jb Vessel and j cable Addenda i Terminology for Required /requencies inservice testing for performing inservice activities testina activities !

Weekly At least once per 7 days Monthly At least once per 31 days j Quarterly or every '

3 months At least once per 92 days Semiannually or every 6 months At least once per 184 days Every 9 months At least once per 276 days Yearly or annually At least once per 366 days Biennially or every 2 years At least once per 731 days

b. The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are applicable to the above required Frequencies for performing inservice testing activities;

c. The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to inservice testing activities; and l

d. Nothing in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code shall be l construed to supersede the requirements of any TS. j l

t.O

5. 5./?

Steam Generator (SG) Tube Surveillance Procram Reviewer's Note: The Licensee's current licensie hsw' 6

[ 7 g .g.8 6

generator tube surveillance re,"5;,.nhMbe' relocated from B the CD H ir.;1uvYdTere. An appropriate administrative controls ACo

ogram format should be used.

J l IM S G P.T ll A l (continued)

WOG STS 5.0-11 Rev 1, 04/07/95 i

INSERT llA for Spac. 5.5.7: (continued) 1

" Defect" means an imperfection of such severity that it exceeds the Plugging or Repair Limit, where applicable.

A tube containing a defect is defective.

. I "F* distance" is the length of undegraded tube required to ,

resist pullout. This distance is measured from the bottom i of the upper hard roll transition toward the bottom of the I tube sheet and has been conservatively determined to be 1.05 inches. The"detarmination'of<F*,dista'ncelis satisfied lby the mech"a~nicalf too11(rolling: pin)auseds to:Liristalp theijoint having. anteffective length.ofc greaterf than or equal to 1;05 i inches;JThe:F* distance.I'sfapplicablelonlytontubesthat

~

I are rerolled :belo'w the;mid-p1ane ;of. the tubesheet:and have l nofdegradationlin:-the; rerolled expansi.on joints'. The F*' l Distance"is;not applicable;to thef original factory hard rol1~ '

"F* tube" means a tube with indications below the l F* distance greater than or equal to the Plugging or Repair i

! Limit, and no indications within the F* distance. I l " Imperfection" means an exception to the dimensions, finish I

or contour of a tube from that required by fabrication drawings or specifications. Eddy current testing indications < 20% of the nominal tube wall thickness, if detectable, may be considered as imperfections.

" Plugging or Repair Limit" means the imperfection depth at or beyond which the tube shall be repaired or removed from l

service by plugging because it may become unserviceable prior to the next inspection.

" Repaired Tube" means a tube that has undergone a process that re-establishes its serviceability. The sleeving process utilized shall be one of the following:

1. The Combustion Engineering welded sleeve process as described in Report CEN-331-P, Revision 1-P. The following:section.of AB/CE. Report CEN-629-P, Revision 00, sha'11 be implemented -in. conjunction with Report CEN-331-P,. Revision 1-P:

Section 4.5.3 - Tube Brushing-Cleaning Equipment Section 4.5.7 - Nondestructive Examination Section 5.0 - Sleeve Examination Program Section 9.3.1 -. Cleaning Qualification

2. The Westinghouse Electric Corporation mechanical sleeve process as described in Report WCAP-ll669.

INSERT ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0 11 11/19/96

INSERT 11A for Spec. 5.5.7: (continued) i 3. The Bechtel-KWU Alliance welded sleeve process as i described in Report BKAT-01-P, Revision 1.

l

" Sleeve Inspection" means an inspection of the sleeved portion of the tube. For a Combustion Engineering welded sleeve, this t inspection will include the. upper weld which forms the new pressure boundary and the sleeve material below the upper weld.

For a Westinghouse Electric Corp. mechanical sleeve, this l l inspection will include the entire length of sleeve material. For l a Bechtel-KWU Alliance welded sleeve, this inspectinn will include I the upper' weld which forms the new pressure boundary and the l sleeve material below the upper weld.

l l " Tube Inspection" means an inspection of the steam generator ,

l tube from the point of entry (hot leg side) completely l around the U-bend to the top support of the cold leg. If a tube does not permit the passage of the eddy current l

, inspection probe the entire length and through the U-bend; l this shall be recorded and an adjacent tube shall be inspected.

l

" Unserviceable" describes the condition of a tube if it i leaks or contains a defect large enough to affect its i structural integrity in the event of an Operating Basis l Earthquake,.a loss-of-coolant accident, or a steam line or l feedwater line break as specified above. ;

i i

I l

1 l

l l

l t INSERT ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-11 11/19/96 i

Prcgrams and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals (continued)

Safety Function Determination Proaram (SFDP) f 4

5.5.k

This program ensures loss of safety function is detected and 4

appropriate actions taken. Upon entry into LCO 3.0.6, an evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety function exists. Additionally, other appropriate actions may be taken as a

result of the support system inoperability and responding

exception to entering supported system Conditio nd Required 4

Actions. This program implements the requirements of LCO 3.0.6.

i The SFDP shall contain the following:

j a. Provisions for cross train checks to ensure a loss of the i capability to perform the safety function assumed in the 1 accident analysis does not go undetected;

}

} b. Provisions for ensuring the plant is maintained in a safe j M condition if a loss of function condition exists; ud 1

c. Provisions to ensure that an inoperable supported system's

, Completion Time is not inappropriately extended as a result j _ of multiple support system inoperabilities; @

db fad;;=ea c. wA adH:imM ) ,

w uppropriate limitations and' remedial or compensatory i

l _ actions.

i A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent j single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis

. cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of

!' safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:

i l a. A required system redundant to the system (s) supported by j the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or

! b. A required system redundant to the system (s) in turn ;

supported by the inoperable supported system is also l inoperable; or j

) c. A required system redundant to the support system (s) for the I supported systems (a) and (b) above is als: inoperable.

The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a

loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate CoMitions and Required Actions of the LCO in

< which the loss of safety function exists are required to be l entered.

l g,0#} @

I -

&se<+ /W { .'C A) S E 2. ITTA '/& s'.f.7[ ~

! WOG STS '

._ .0-17 Rev 1, 04/07/95 NR 4/ 4.bsw k

l l

INSERT 17B for new Sp:cification 5.5.14 l I

l 5.5.14 Containment Leakage' Rate Testina Program l

A program shallibe established to implement the leakage rate l testing of the. containment as required by.10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified'by approved exemptions. This program shall be in accordance with the I guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, " Performance-. Based ;

Containment l Leak-Test Program", dated September 1995, with the I following exce~ption: Section .10.2.1 of NEI 94-01 Revision 0, is I not applicable- to Unit 1. penetration P-16. This exception for penetration P-16 shall expire at the completion of Unit 1 outage ZlR15.

The peak' calculated containment. internal pressure for the design i basis loss of coolant accident, P., is 46.79-psig. The !

containment l design pressure is 47 psig.

The maximum allowable . containment leakage rate, L , at P., shall be(s ;0.1%.of containment air weight per day. l Leakage rate; acceptance criteria are:

~ ~ '

a. Contai~nment leakage' rate acceptance criterion ir, s 1.0 L,.

During the first unit startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria' are < 0.60 L, for the Type B and:C tests and < 0.75 L, for Type: A tests;

b. Air lock. testing acceptance criteria are:

1) .0verall air lock leakage is < 0.6 L,' when combined with all Type B and C test results at a test pressure of 1 P, .

2) For each door, leakage rate is s 1.0 SCFH when tested at 2 2.5 psig and < 10 psig, or 1 4.75 SCFH when tested at 2 10 psig.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 do not apply to the test frequencies specified in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

~

The provisions of SR 3.0.3L are applicable to the Containment Leakage Rate Testing ^ Program.

l l

l INSERT ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-12 11/19/96

_ _ __ . _ . _ . - _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _.._.. _ ._ . . _ . _ _ . _ = _ _ _ _

Reporting Requirements

5.6 i <

5.6 Reporting Requirements i

5.6.6 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS l REPORT (PTLR) (continued)

! testing as well as heatup and cooldown rates shall be established and documented in the PTLR for the following:

l .7N s fU l [The individual specifications that address RCS pressure and")

l 2.1 i s temperature limits must be referenced hera.] >

b. FThe analytical methods used to determine the RCS pressure

! 2,g,( and temperature limits shall be those previously reviewed j i i l and approved by the NRC, specifically those described in the

! g following documents: [ Identify the NRC staff approval document by date.] ; _

} c. The PTLR shall be provided to the NRC upon issuance for each j r ,

reactor vessel fluence period and for any revision or

\ w,,

z c. supplement thereto.y ^

(- -:

! Reviewers' Notes: The methodology for the calculation of the P,rT' limits for NRC approval should include the following provis, tons:

/

WCAP- 1. The methodology shall describe how the neutron fDence is 0040 calculated (reference new Regulatory Guide whe rissued).

t i 2. The Reactor Vessel Naterial Surveillance am shall y comply with Appendix H to 10 CFR 50. e reactor vessel

{# t material irradiation surveillance s cimen removal schedule

shall be provided, along with ho he specimen examinations

shall be used to update the PT curves.

\

i 3. Low Temperature Overpress e Protection (LTOP) System lift setting limits for the wer Operated Relief Valves (PORVs), f >

I developed using NRC- roved methodologies may be included in the PTLR. }

4. The adjusted ference temperature (ART) for each reactor beltline a rial shall be calculated, accounting for }

radiatio abrittlement, in accordance with Regulatory Guide

. 1.99, vision 2.

i

5. T limiting ART shall be incorporated into the calculation i 4f the pressure and temperature limit curves in accordance

! / with NUREG-0800 Standard Review Plan 5.3.2, Pressure- '

! / Temperature Limits.

e (continued)

WOG STS 5.0-21 Rev 1, 04/07/95

1 l

l INSERT 21A for Sp;c. 5.6.6.a: ,

1 l

3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits l 3.4.10 Pressurizer Safety Valves '

3.4.12 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) i \

l t INSERT 21B for Spec. 5.6.6.b: .

' l l

THEIRC575FeWiuFe? and? tsbe ratHFi!!11st ts N t he iCol d

OverpreisdresProtectionLsetpointLands; arming temperatdFe; l

ind ithel RCS : Safe tyn Val ve f;appi t c abil i ty

for : Un i t s 111and r 2 l w11.10 beithosei previossl9; reviewed) arid;sppro'ved in ' ~

~

l Mshyphti[17.7/and?164grespectivelyji; INSERT 21C for Spec. 5.6.6.b- l The first revision to the limits after initial implementation of the PTLR will be submitted to the NRC for review prior to approval. Subsequent revisions will be made without prior approval.

l l

l INSERT l ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-22 12/5/96 l

l l

i SR Applicability

' 8 3.0 j BASES i

J SR 3.0.1 Upon completion of maintenance, appropriate post maintenance (continued) testing is required to declare equipment OPERA 8LE. This includes ensuring applicable Surveillances are not failed 2 and their most recent performance is in accordance with SR 3.0.2. Post maintenance testing may not be possible in the current MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability due to the necessary unit parameters not having been established. In these situations, the equipment may be considered OPERA 8LE provided testing has been I

satisfactorily completed to the extent possible and the i

j equipment is not otherwise believed to be incapable of

performing its function. This will allow operation to proceed to a MODE or other specified condition where other j A.w necessary post maintenance tests can be completed.

.:,,g g a syff

__B10 A J )

SR 3.0.2 SR 3.0.2 establishes the requirements for meeting the i

l specified Frequency for A rveillances and any Required Action with a Completion Time that requires the periodic

j performance of the Required Action on a 'once per . . .'

j interval.

C. SR 3.0.2 permits a 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency. This extension facilitates Surveillance scheduling and considers plant operating conditions that may not be suitable for conducting the Surveillance -(e.g.,

1 j

transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or i maintenance activities). ,

l The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the l l j reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at '

its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the SRs. The exceptions to SR 3 0.2 are those Surveillances for q which the 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply. These exceptions are stated in the individual Specifications. An example of where SR 3.0.2

~~ T _~_

.s

.N does not apply is a Surveillance with a Frequency of "in

- k i dr*^ ' , .4 df* N accordance d with w .,.tt^

i c..u CZ. " 00, App...L J, a ::diff:d byThe requirement g6gg @prec=edence over the TS. The TS cannot in and of.themselve

k ',7^" extend a test interval specified in the regulations.

'm .-

I (continued) i (

~-

B 3.0-10 Rev. O,-09/28792 WOG 5T5.

2Xan onlW I.*L

l I

Containment (Atmospheric';-Subatmospheric,-Ictr Condenserr-ind-Ouel-} 4" l 3.6.1 i

g SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS -

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY o O

[g SR 3.6.1.1 Perfonn required visual examinations and -----NOTE------

ga leakage rate testing except for containment 5" . 0 .-

j. gg-u gi j air lock testing, in accordance with eppliuide. p g i

10 CF" 50, appegd h J, e5 modiTied by. - ,----------. g y, appre cd cxix.ptwiii.

55 ,/9 In accordance 3g The maximum allowable leakage rate, L,, with 10 CIR %,

gy h4 [,J]% ofjcontainment air weight per/ day at is, ! Apper. dix J, n /

/ '}

v / f l -r.cdiTied by=

,g $ U the

[P, . ca/culated / peak conta,i'nment pressure! '

appro. d- N w a: ,./ / / /

exe-n a a- s .

SR 3.6.1.2 Verify containment structural integrity In accordance in accordance with the Containment Tendon with the /

', Surveillance Program. Containment Tendon

, df Surveillance ;

/~-

N .. -

Program

\ .

1

- .. N. 1 Qy (' ~k. e ,}'je a..dnj. J. u a .

f I. lj i+- = , s C.I L

. i , ,. ..) im . ; un - .o .r -U b ';;. r mA .-:c .. u

.t .x.t.o < e .~. . M '

$: .t. t ', ' '

w-

@h !

'. /tc .: 1 . :-c + % .u c. a u .tk :- W S . . ,...; . . .i... .L .a . . r.

.. ~'i(L b a aJ 19 h derisi j i

3 gj .c. c, . 5 La %r +h Til A ]:8 }9 , l J / l

/

j

{ the Containment Leakage i

\ Rate Testing Program

\m _

/

\.?

WOG STS 3.6-2 Rev. O,09/28/92

Containm2nt Air Locks (AtmosphericT-Subatmospheric, ice Csadenscr, and Dua+)~

3.E.2 i

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY 1

3.6.2.1 Ci

SR ---................N0TES------------.- ---- if?O,

1. An inoperable air lock door does not 9 liT

I invalidate the previous successful J performance of the overall air lock

E, a

leakage test. ,

/CFIq/ /oc,h c 2 L@S '2 .

53'

/

Results shall be evaluated against to M.

3, f . / ,

[ acceptance criteria Of SR 2.5.1.1 '-

ccsid.nce !th 10 CT" SG, Ayym.J;a J.

.o@ l

+

-as -di fied by :p;~='4 - ==atNs. l "i2E" )'

5 Perform required air lock leakage rate Vi h.

, [.theContainmentLeakage] testing in accordance with 10 -Cr" 00, SRj/ . NOTE '----3 0'.2 Rate Testing Program N .";;&di: J as -d!'i:d b, .pprwed appl } cable ,

< s

---at iaas. m

'f..y...,t._.... ,

The accepte6ce u . Lei je fer air loek--

In accordance !

/ , testing are: with le C.S 00, d,;;g

\q / !' .

/

./

m. ";;;ad;a i c.A'.+J a. ::dified ;y

,sOv0A*G rail air lock'ileakag/e erataVis

,4% car tp Lfwhen tested tap N -approved-3 .% e h e C. / exempt 4 ens j For eg/ch door ((w ratelis gatjoM, tP.

P. 6 n n vi# . b. leakage j / l

/ 5 /JX1 p when tes datt.4spsigfg I

~ '

nJ 99 be s a e .e./. ? w L i& v

, m b3.6.2.2 -------------------NOTE--------------------

ibdL3'; Only required to be performed upon entry er M t'+4 %. l M -4*to- containment"Gir Et '

JJ j Verify only one door in the air lock can be 184 days

/ opened at a time. l i

I l

l l

WOG STS 3.6-7 Rev. O, 09/28/92

Containment (Atmospheric}- 'y

. 8 3.6.1 ,

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS y I B 3.6.1 Containment (AtmosphericP b o(

BASES b0

/

BACKGROUND b The containment consists of the concrete-reactor building, its steel liner, and the penetratiorys through this w h d m k.kly e structure The structure is design d to contain radioactive owes n: c-m fmaterial ~3that may be released from the reactor core nMMm L+c 1,V b,,, followingagesign sis Accident'(98Al. -AdditionaFFy, this '

ag,o 3,,, , structure provides ielding from the fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere fviising jfaxuLl 4 accident condition D M h #% W mM d d The containment is a reinforced concrete structure with a cylindrical wall. a flat foundation mat, and a shallow dome roof. The inside surface of the containment is lined with a ,

carbon steel liner to ensure a high degree of leak tightness l during operating and accident conditions. '

fl b E ca [ F4r-cent # - - * " "

h "----"'-d *--den /[he cylinder wall is prestressed with a post tensioning system in the vertical and horizontal directions, and the dome roof is prestressed utilizing a three way post tensioning sys em. ,

,pg <

The concrete reactor building is utred for structural b integrity of the containment unde conditions. The steel liner and its penetrations es a lish the leakage limiting boundary of the containment. Maintaining the containment OPERABLE limits the leakage of fission product radioactivity from the containment to the environment.

SR 3.6.1.1 leakage rate requirements comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix P=# !), as modified by approved exemptions. ,

The isolation devices for the penetrations in the yr containment boundary are a part of the containment leak '

Of g tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier:

)

a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

/h 1. capable of bein closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment iso ation system, 9t, 3

on (h0D!.C I,2. a.ad h (continued)

WOG STS B 3.6-6 Rev. O,09/28/92

Containment (A2mospharic) 8 3.6.1 BASES L Ccall<. A hunf Clokd \;l an Cf$h3lCfna n ocL conh.nmut ,d s.han Tsoena/ m mom M or 8ACKGROUND 3 J. closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or (continued) de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in zN LCO 3.6.3, " Containment Isolation Valves.'

\ a-W )

b. Each air lock is OPERABLE, except as provided in

LCO 3.6.2, " Containment Air Locks."

x C.. N1Ttos..wg3 r '

h.w.hd d ; s c. The pressurized sealing # mechanism associated with a g penetration is OPERABLE, except as provided in E$I3. "

LCO g;6'[ L/

APPLICABLE The safety design basis 'for the containment is that the SAFETY ANALYSES containment must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design' leakage rate.

The DBAs that result in a challenge to containment

.- OPERASILITY from high pressures and temperatures are a Nss jo ,w / md

@

fjectie Accit at 'of foolant CA) (Ref/ a,,ccident (LOCA)Yassteam 2). In addition, release of line b significant fission product radioactivity within containment can occur from a LOCA or-ROf. In the DBA analyses, it is assumed that the containment is OPERABLE such that, for the DBAs involving release of fission product radioactivity, release to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The conta.inment was designed with an allowable leakage rate of){0.fl% of containment air weight per day (Ref.iz). This leakage rate, used to evaluate offsite doses resulting from accidents, is defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix Mhy)', as L,: the maximum

(

I allowable containment leakage rate at the calculated peak containment internal pressure (P ) resulting from the gp ha d 1_imitingfBk. TheallowableleakageraterepresentedbyL I foms tie basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on all, cont nment leakage rate testing. L is assume g

% r day in the safety analysi,s at P, 5 psig Satisfactory leakage rate test results are a requirement for the establishment of containment OPERABILITY.

(A ni'l ^

C; , ,, , 3 The containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

QCh (continued)

WOG STS B 3.6-7 Rev. O, 09/28/92

Containment (Atmospharic) 8 3.6.1 1

1

i i

BASES (continued) 1

, LCO , Containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to

, g-.h*' , within the acceptance' criterfa of 1.0 CFR 50, Appendix J 1 (Ref. 1].I

)

.N L t _Ltrdq,i,, , ,

l i

" Compliance with this will LCO[co+h ensure a containmentaaixM n) At pa cza. / equipment hatch (h, that is configuration, including'6t'will structurally sound and tl limit leakage to those i leakage rates assumed in'the safety analysis. l 4

N : O m a Individual leakage rates sp::ified for the containment air r loc $(1.C03.0.2)(2ndpeg: v:lv:: with r silicr.t see k

%@. pg @4LCO 3.6.3)] are not specifically part of the acceptance i

wD criteria of 10 CFR AnDendiX 4 En. $I%%only result in theTherefore,4/eakag

' ereeding these i ndivid Jg b containment being inoperable when the leakage resuks--in- doe, l exceeding thevacceptance criteria Op >. b g w, a na of '.pp:ndi; i /t/ J.9 fqp_ v ,,;p

, ~ m. , - A. s a ;-i ne cos a

gufiHl-nay,9a,,,,

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a 08A could cause a release of i radioactive material into containment. In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced l l

due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment. The requirements for containment during MODE 6 are addressed in LCO 3.9 , " Containment Penetrations."

ACTIONS A.1 In the event containment is inoperable, containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within I hour. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the i problem comensurate with the importance of maintaining containment during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring containment OPERA 81LITY) occurring during periods when containment is inoperable is minimal.

(continued)

WOG STS B 3.6-8 Rev. O,09/28/92

2 Containment (A2mospheric) 8 3.6.1

! BASES e

ACTIONS 8.1 and 8.2 i . (continued) und fl%Jin

, /6 DN'Y / If containment. cannot be restored (to OPERABLE atus within j -

i h 5 s r da g b ; /l. : the required Completion Time, the-pfent-must b brought ti a r

MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To-achieve thn

! the end <a stet"s. the p!:nt ee:t b: br:ught te et leesttM00E 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and MIM00E 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed

.' Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating i experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without j challenging plant systems.

k SR 3.6.1.1 SURVEllt.ANCE

, REQUIREMENTS '

k 7 Maintaining the containment OPERABLE requires compliance ;

/ with the visual examinations and leakage rate test .

/ '

requirements of 10 CFR .50, Appendix J (Ref.1), as mo'dT(ied ',

. @ gd by,appr,oved exemptions. Failure to aget air lock [5::d ;;;rs I jg i

. valve with rn414.a+ 4-=1) leakage IJaits specifipd in /

LC0/.6.2 -[::d LCO "13 does not Jrnvalidate thaf /

' W/ d acceptability of tf ese overall leatage detemina'tions unles

,Igh i

&cc.N + L.t;,f 2., t)(eir contributieln _t vera11 Type A, 8, and C/ leakage /

,causes thatftoJxcee

!cg Qg Q <

TmTfl.QR Frequencies /are as /

' required by/ App.ndix J,fas modifieypy approfed exempt 1gns luuty,/ 1 These periodic testyng requirementstverify/that t j i /O- D"O gD containment leakage rate dges not exceed the leakage rate

(_ assumed iii the safety analysis.

l S hc k s 5.55, _

j phws / SR 3.6.1.2 -

j /For : gr;;ted, pst tensiened Londous,,t is SR\ ensures that /

j the structural integrity of the ccatainment will be jV ,

! # maintained in accordance with the provisions of e '

l Containment Tendon Surveillance Program'.' Testing and

! Frequency are consistent with, the reconsnendations of j _, Regulatory Guide 1.35 (Ref. ). _

f. LifiSeh's 5:citon 3 8 REFERENCES -1. 10-GFR40r-APPendi,x #

1,2'. O FSAR, Chapter [15h i

(continued)

WOG STS B 3.6-9 Rev. O,09/28/92

l i 3.6.1 BASES l

Please Note; Inserts 1 & 2 are the result of approved generic changes to NUREG-1431.

INSERT "1" BWR-14, C1 0 couk;u w e y y ,,y, p, te Te > h y hof r a n

...s 1.0 La, except prior to the first startup after performing a required '

10 CFP 50, (peadi4,- leakage test. At this time,gthe combined Type B and C- l leakage must be < 0.6 La, and the overall Type A leakage must be < 0.75 La. l INSERT "2" 7' co K*): Ir wih hoki f* /

BWR-14, C1 im Vue Cou t-im wee f L nfra,ye R a te Te s fi -

As left leakage prior to the first startup after performing a requ;iredPyr" N Dnystbe l d.j 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, leakage test is required to be < 0.6 La for combined Type B and Type C leakage, and < 0.75 La for overall Type A leakage. At all other times between required leakage rate tests, the acceptance criteria is based on an overall Type A leakage limit of s 1.0 La. At s 1.0 La the offsite dose consequences are bounded by the assumptions of the safety analysis.

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INSERT 3 l FOR BASES 3.6.1

. \

Maintaining the containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

)

Failure to meet individual air lock door seal leakage limits specified in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program does not invalidate the acceptability of these overall leakage determinations unless their contribution to the overall Type A, B, and C leakage causes that limit to be exceeded.

-1 As left leakage prior to the first startup after performing a required Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program leakage test is required to.be

< 0.6 L, for combined Type B and Type C leakage.

l 4

As left leakage prior to the first startup after performing a required Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program leakage test is required to be '

< 0.75 L, for overall Type A leakage. !

. 1 At all other times between required leakage rate tests, the acceptance ;

criteria for Type B and Type C leakage tests are based on an overall Type.A j leakage limit of s 1.0 L,. At s 1.0 L, the offsite dose consequences are 1 bounded by the assumptions of the safety analysis. SR Frequencies are as required by the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. These periodic testing requirements verify that the containment leakage rate.does not exceed the leakage rate assumed in the safety analysis.

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Containment Air Locks (Atmospheric, Subatmospheric, Ice Condenser, and Dual) l B 3.6.2 8ASES (continued) ;

APPLICABLE The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material SAFETY ANALYSES within containment are a loss of coolant accident and a rod ejection accident (Ref. 2). In the analysis of each of these accidents, it is assumed that containment is OPERABLE such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of containment leakage. The {

containment was designed with an allowable leakage rate of l

[0.1]% of containment air weight per day (Ref. 2), ftmr- I leek;ge ~+a 4e def'ned in 10 Cro Rn ipp=d b ] (Pc'_ !), l a s L; - 40. L}Lpas 4ay , t % -wie= 211==bla enntmia-ant l f bk;ge cete et -tM c9 c"1s+ad ped ccat9rt i-ternal pressure N = [ia a] m 41.uilos p-05A_pis allowable l

~~~ l akage rate forms the basis for the acceptance criteria l q ., me n m a g y @, imposed on the SRs associated with the air locks.

k rocN k C? 'k The containment air locks satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC y 4 m, - d(og(, Policy Statement.

c:.eMma k%e A b % cdihbA. y-tic.Gdw*# b.~) P& t ks N 3 1)

@o6 , sa c q %*c f

~ j~

.._ ___LCO

-Eachpressure containment boundary. As part of airpartlock formg@

of the containment containm 6 g,,a r.p safety function is related to control of the containment leakage rate resulting from a DBA. Thus, each air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the successful mitigation of such an event.

1 Each air lock is required to be OPERABLE. For the air lock '

to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one air lock door of an air lock to be opened at one time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of containment does not exist when containment is required to be OPERABLE.

Closure of a single door in each air lock is sufficient to provide a leak tight barrier following postulated events.

Nevertheless, both doors are kept closed when the air lock is not being used for normal entry into exit from containment. (o APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment. In F00ES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due (continued)

WOG STS B 3.6-22 Rev. O, 09/28/92

-- .. - - -. - - - - - - _ ~ - _ . -

Containment Air Locks (Atmosph9rk, Seatmospherk:,-! : Ceedenser, red 5:1)u

.e . B 3.6.2 BASES l

l

ACTIONS C.I. C.2. and C.3' (continued)

Required Action C.2 requires that one door in the affected containment air lock must be verified to be closed within the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time. This specified time period is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1, which requires that containment be restored to OPERABLE status within l 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

2d [dditionWy, the affected air lock (s) must be restored to

%PERABLE status within the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time. The specified time period is considered reasonable for restoring an inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status, assuming that at least one door is maintained closed in each affected air lock.

/hc.t./ 0.1 and 0.2 If the inoperable containment air lock cannot be restored to ener mwn b fLtd l6 m OPERA 8LE__ status within the required Completion Time, the

%be-invughi, isr'a MODE in which the LCO does not

, 3 apply. -To-acMeye-this si..tus, the-plant-aust-be breeght te

, ind tr JW ay fl9 hs _ at-leesbM00E 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and hM00E 5 within und g n 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The, allowed Completion Nees are reasonable, j ~ based on operating experience, to reach the required plan conditions from. full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

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SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.1 '

REQUIREMENTS

@ Maintaining containment the leakageair locks test OPERABLE requirements ofrequires compliance with rate :

pg ea'

. 10 CF9 50, Appendi- J_(" f.el), :: xdified by ;;regcd-exemptions. This SR reflects the leakage rate testing C"p ff g ar requirements with regard to air lock leakage (Type B 1eakage Leo tests). The-acceptance criterie were esteblished during QdiWJ,) ' Iaq) r ini+4C ei- !ock :nd cent:in=nt 0"E"A"! LIT testing. The periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock g;y,, gn.ad T _leakagesdoes not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall

. . .. / < containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by

.c,5n ernu Tk, ,3 ad L. *pp;ndi v J lo ef.1), a: -ad!' icd b, apyruvea ex dons.

l W ES N, ) Thes, SR 3.0.2 (dich allews freqvency extens-i-on - dess' net

! /N M g*he in bt ' " & %, p . s n ; repn

+c T%

-nedhs,hym.TR i n di F v ovidd M u." I t

[ ,.7; , * , o / pa b ti"I 'lFJ ve Mio " (continued) m -yaya%d rw # M li hy 'c neo f WOG STS a ve u l) 8 3.6-26 Rev. O, 09/28/92 T yj>- I5 lea kaje c ef17*d ".

t.cncanment Mr Locks (Abnosonoric, Subatmospheric, Ica Condenser, and Qual) g4 -

8 3.6.2 !

15 ~ c' l j

BASES l I.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that l

an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.

- This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is ci.pable of providing a fission product barrier in the event.

of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR requiring the '.' 2 results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria of SR 3.6.1.1. This ensures that air lock leakage is properly i

accounted for in determining theme:11 containment leakage i

rate. I$ n ,I (}

(C o n w eol ' T CLD .-

SR 3.6.2.2 The air lock interlock is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in a single air lock. Since both the l inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident containment pressure, closure of either door will support containment

' OPERABILITY. Thus, the door interlock feature supports containment OPERABILITY while the air lock is being used for personnel transit in and out of the containment. Periodic

/ testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock dor 15 3 will function as designed and that simultaneous opening of )

the inner and outer doors will not inadvertently occur. Due i

to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock, an en O, _

that the interlock mechanism is only challenged when 4Q Jp' m *D containment 41sp-trd, this test is only required to -, l door l~ Jerrormeo upon enteringgontainmentf but is not required more. b.4 l J frequently tnan every 184 days. The sue oay Frequency is tori based on engineering judgment s onsidered adequate in dl

1. N a. - _ statusview of other indications of door and nterlock mechanisa available to operations personne __ , ,

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix. J. ' I

~~~

2. FSAR, Section (6.2].

W\ i (cc(d 654

'.- JMdqc C %: s at/am 19wGd m JR 3.6.6Sf

.., I $iD+ Mu a+

. .,.. .3 'thr

. . (C{utt%k

..Ms !!*--dlI o'~

10-t WOG STS B 3.6-27 'Rev. '0, 09/28/92 l

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DOD CHANGES l1 d

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DISCUSSION OF THE DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG-1431 CHAPTER 3.0: APPLICATION l

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, 3. This change eliminates the potential confusion that may arise with respect l to the application of an unplanned event which satisfies the requirement

,' of a given SR by including a discussion in the Bases of SR 3.0.1.

l Currently, only Section 3.8 contains the Note which states that " credit !

l may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR" In addition, the '

Notes also contain a restriction on the MODE of performance such that the l

l surveillance is not to be performed in a MODE where perturbation to the I l electrical distribution system would cause a challenge to safety systems. l i The intent of the Note is applicable to any SR. The revision to the Bases !

L for SR 3.0.1 will provide the necessary clarification so that the usage of )

! this allowance can be applied consistently throughout the Technical l l

Specifications. This change is being tracked generically as TSTF-08.

4; 7101CFR? 50MAppendiRJ;e0ption"B',/ has' bee'n Limplemented, and' the correct

'referencelisinowltheiContainment;1.eakageLRateTesting. Program.

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ZION Units 1 & 2 3.0-2 11/19/96

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i DISCUSSION OF THE DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG-1431 l

SECTION 3.6: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l CHANGE l NUMBER DISCUSSION l '

17. A new LC0 and associated Bases have been added. LC0 3.6.9, " Isolation Valve Seal Water (IVSW) System," is provided to help ensure containment leakage following the worse case design basis accident is reduced to less than the maximum value assumed in the safety analysis. This LC0 is unique to Zion Station and is contained in the CTS (3.9.1). IVSW satifies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

1

! 18. In CTS 3.9.6, the requirement to limit the maximum opening of the contain-ment purge supply and purge exhaust valves to 50 degrees, and the associated surveillance requirement (CTS 4.9.6.8) which verifies the valves are limited to a maximum opening.of 50 degrees every 18 months, have been removed from the Technical Specifications Permanent plant j modifications have been made to the valve actuators which prevent the valves from opening greater than 50 degrees. Removal or alteration to the valve actuators such that the valves could open greater than 50 degrees I would constitute a change to the facility design. Changes to the facility i design must be evaluated using the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.59 to determine if the change involves an unreviewed safety question. Any l change deemed to involve a unreviewed safety question must first be submitted for NRC approval. In addition, specific surveillances prescribing a periodic verification of the system design are considered continually met by the design control process. As such, removing these requirements from the Technical Specifications does not result in a reduction of safety since the design of the containment purge supply and l purge exhaust valves ensures the valves are not opened greater than j 50 degrees. As addressed above, not including this surveillance in Zion's i ITS is consistent with the NUREG reviewers note stating that this l surveillance requirement is not required if permanent modifications have been installed limiting valve opening to less than 50%.

19. OcletedREferences: toOAppendixTJ Rhave ibeen - changed to the. ~ Containment LeakabelRateiTestingAProgram1following , implementation of ' 10 CFR . 50, Appendix l J,;; 0pti~o n'B.

20. This change to the Zion ITS exempts certain automatic containment isolation valves from the 18 month surveillance testing that would demonstrate satisfactory operation. The valves are exempted because they are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. This provision is not contained in NUREG 1431, ,

Rev 0, but it is incorporated into NUREG 1431, Rev 1. '

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ZION Units 1 & 2 3.6-5 11/19/96

DISCUSSION OF THE DIFFERENCES FROM NUP.EG-1431 CHAPTER 5.0: ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS previously approved on the Ginna docket during conversion to the ITS on the basis that it duplict.tes the ' regulations.

Q~

2 ~Fljeslipidifiiiit'166I5!5714'liipliiihtis7thil~pR5ililihiTsfE10!CFR7502%piiidis WOpt1oQ;jsJhQ]jasjMorporatedj[ifitof tMj@jjn@iyn;sslishdsplamendesnj 17.x v.'

5 w.wau 62h3

~: . /..>.1. M l

l ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-5 11/23/96

l ATTACHMENT 2

m MARK UP OF ITS CHANGE 015.1.2 - Clarification of designated Control Room SRO ITS Section 5.1.2 requires clarification in the discussion of the designated Control Room SRO, and the NOTE deleted.

Responsibility 5.1 1

5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 5.1 Responsibility 5.1.1 Station Manaaer The station manager shall be responsible for overall unit operation and shall delegate in writing the succession to this t

responsibility during his absence.

l The station manager or his designee shall approve, prior to implementation, each proposed test, experiment or modification to systems or equipment that affect nuclear safety.

5.1.2 Shift Supervisor (SS)

NOTE l A single SS may be responsible for the centrol recr cermand ,

function f-ee-both units if one er both units are in MODES- 5 or S. )

1 TheAn SS shall be responsible for the control room command function. During any absence of the designated Control' Room Command;SS from the control room while theeither unit is in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, an individual with an active Senior Reactor Operator (SR0) license shall be designated to assume the control room command function. During any absence of the SS from the control room while the unit isboth units are in MODE 5 or 6, or defueled, an individual with an active SR0 license or Reactor Operator license shall be designated to assume the control room command function.

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l ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-1 Amends'nt Nos. (Sup. 9)

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CLEAN ITS SPEC 1

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Responsibility 5.1 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 5.1 Responsibility 5.1.1 Station Manaaer The station manager shall be responsible for overall unit operation and shall delegate in writing the succession to this responsibility during his absence.

The station manager or his designee shall approve, prior to .

implementation, each proposed test, experiment or modification to '

systems or equipment that affect nuclear safety.

5.1.2 Shift Supervisor (SS)

An SS shall be responsible for the control room command function.

During any absence of the designated Control Room Command SS from ,

the control room while either unit is in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, an individual with an active Senior Reactor Operator (SR0) license shall be designated to assume the control room command function.

During any absence of the SS from the control room while both units.are in MODE 5 or 6, or defueled, an individual with an active SRO license or Reactor Operator license shall be designated to assume the control room command function.

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1 ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-1 Amendment Nos. (Sup 9)

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NUREG MARKUPS I 1

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)1 Rasponsibility l 5.1 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 5.1 Responsibility

, .. SMa Ma*%1 5.1.1. ' The [Phr.t per ; .iundwist.]7 shall s+a% a,ap be responsible for overall unit ce5 operation and shall delegate in writing the succession to this l p.t b responsibility during his absence.

shww w use r-The Flar.t Op;rir.te+[F or his designee shall approve, prior to implementation, each proposed test, experiment or modification to s stems or equipment that affect nuclear safety. .

ggg 5.1.2 TS8[ Shift pcrviser (SSMhall be responsible Sor the contro b #" d room command function uring any absence of thep{SS}S from the control room while it is in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, an dg individual with a active Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) license shall be designat d to assume the control room command function.

9,. g, i During ny absenc'e of theASS)2 from the control room while h- bo%

units MODE @ or 6, an individual with an active SR0 license or Rea Operator lic se shall be designated to assume the control room comand fu tion.

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WOG STS 5.0-1 Rev 1, 04/07/95

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l DISCUSSION OF THE DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG-1431 CHAPTER 5.0: ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS i

previously approved on the Ginna docket during conversion to the ITS on the basis that it duplicates the regulations.

l 241l'(New specificatior65.514? implements ~thel provisions *offl0 CFR 50;; Appendix i 0,40ption B. :This J wastincorporatedtintozthe Zion:/ license?under: amendment 17,5/162. , " "' ' "' ~ ~ ~~ ~' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~ ' ' ~ ~ ~ ' ' ~ '~"

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25;ZlThis' specification 11s; rewritten'to reflect ~currentoregulatory:. requirements byc one yi ndi vidual:? wi th f an)SR001 icense i assumi.ng? control o room i command responsibil1.ty ?1orp bothruni tst o Wi th o both J uni ts s inJMODES 5M 6 Eor defueled,Lan individuaFwith eitherian SR0'oRR0 license may^be designa_ted ~ ~ ~

to assume;';thell control room..commandifunction( ~ ~ ~~' ' ~ ~

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i ZION Units 1 & 2 5.0-5 12/31/96

ML20133D090

Text

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