ML20205F398
| ML20205F398 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/20/1987 |
| From: | Baldwin T, Keller J, Kowieski R ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY, Federal Emergency Management Agency, IDAHO NATIONAL ENGINEERING & ENVIRONMENTAL LABORATORY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205F350 | List: |
| References | |
| OL-5, NUDOCS 8703310154 | |
| Download: ML20205F398 (181) | |
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FEMh, Mardi 30, 1987 IBIITED STMES OF JGERICA NUC[ EAR Rl!!IKATGE CDFISSIGT Before the Atcanic Safety ard Licensingr Board In the Matter of )
IGIG ISIAND LIGEING CX3G9dE ) Docket No. 50-322-OIr5
) (EP Ebcarcise)
(Shareham Nuclear Power )
Staticm, Uhit 1) )
i DIRECT TESTDOE OF 'DEMAS E. BAIDlIN, JOSEPH H. RELIER AND ROGER B. ICHIISKI 031GENING EMEIEENCY PIAMIING EXIIRCISE 4
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8703310154 870320 PDR ADOCK 0S000322 O PDR E_,_.-- .
FEMA, March 20, 1987 4
INITED SDGIS OF AMERICA NUC2AR RBIEATGE CCI9tISSICH Before the Atcanic Safety and Licensirn Board '
- In the Matter of )
l IGIG ISIAND IIGEEENG CCMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-CL-5
) (EP Exercise)
(Shereham Nuclear Power )
Statiert,13 hit 1) )
DIRECT T251'IENY OF 'DE3thS E. BAIININ, JOSEPH H. RELER AND ROGER B. ICHIESKI CXMCERNING EMEIGENCY PIANNING EXERCISE a
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'Ihe Federal Emergency c-a - , a. Agea:A ard the )Raclear - V t Regulatcry N4==irwt entered into a Harrerrhp of _
l Urh.aruling (ICU) on April 17, 1965, Mildt defines <
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inter-agency respcnsibilities with rae@ect to amargnncy l preparedneau. Included in that ICU is an agreement Anoreby ,
j FDR would evaluate meercises of offsite drergency response l plans. Requests for findings are usually rden 'af the )GC -
to FE7A to assist the NIC staff in tl:eir ptassatations during the licensing process. i
.- l By the terms of the 100, FM is also romput::ible for ',
providing "egert witnesses" on its ar.alysis< to ,tastify before the Atanic Safety Licensing Boards, c s
- I On June 20, 1985, NRC rtquested FM pureurmte5c the tarum ,
of the ICU to evaluata ait meercise of Revisiat 5 of 'the T: rim Transitica Plan idlicts had been s*mitted by thei' licensee applicant, the Ieng Island Mr**Lg Ocupony, to the NRC. On October 29, 1985 the Associata 6 h ', Stata [i f and Iocal Programs Support Dizei h [. M , m A , agreed to evalusta an meercise giving NRC several cotione. This is explained fully in the Ptrt FJoercise Anansmanat ('naratter, 5 ti Pl!A Report) dsted April 17, 1986. The NRC selectcdthe j full-scale meercise cption and FM prepared for ard evaluated the February 13, *1986 :Meercise. The PBA Repcet was transmittad to NRC on April 8,198'.i. . A copy of the PUt ,
Report is being esperately authenticated and entered into , ,
l the record as FM Deercise ExhSit' @. [ l l
The standards e in reviewingI.he emuise exe included ,
in the joir.t NRC/FDR guidance &nzent entitlai, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluatiert of Ruliological Energancy Response Plans arx1 PreparadrAss in Support Of Nuclear power Plants", NUREG-0654/FDR REP-1, Rev.1 and Guida!ce Memorandum 17. g -
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b' 'The par.p of this testimony is to address the contentions I b relating to offs'ite preparednese at the Shoreham Nuclear Power S:ation,' as admitted.by Board Oth of October 3,1986, and as ;
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supplemented by the Board order'of nanamber 11, 1986.
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, Q.l. Please state your name and business address?
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h A. Shceum'E. Maldwin - Argonne National Iaboratory,
- f. 277 Main Street, Second Floor Port Washingtm , NY 11050 i
I e A. Joseph H. Keller - Idaho National Engineering i
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P.O. Box 4000 Idaho Falls, ID 83401 f
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- A. Roger B. (c.71aski - Federal Emergency Manary===rit Agency 26 Federal Plaza New York, NY 10278 1.
Q.2. Do you have statcients cf professiculal gnalifications?
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[ A. Yes. Our statements of professional qualifications are 1
l attached to this testinony.
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r-I l '.s L, Q.3. 181en did Shomns Baldwin first hamrna involved in l N W Planning?
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A. Dr. Baldwin harma involved in radiological emergency planning in February, 1982 under a contract for support
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! to the Federal Eimu.p.y Mius,
- d. Agency entered into I ,by his suployer.
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Q.4. Mien did Thcanas Baldwin first h involved in a review -
of emergency planning as it relates to the Shoreham Itaclear INuer Station?
- A. Dr. -Baldwin became involved with the review of the Shoreham Nuclear Pcuer Staticm radiological amorgency respace plan when.he received a letter frtat Mr. Frank P.
Petrone, Dirw^ws. FENA Region II, dated October 4,1983. A s
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Q.5. Please describe the nature of that involvement up to the .
present time.
A. Dr. Maldwin was originally requested to review Revision 1" of the plan. si ny--a.ly he received and reviewed Revisions 2 throtagh 5, 7 and 8. On February 13, 1986 he evaluated the Shoreham ameriise and participated in- ,
l- preparation of the FEMA PEA Report.
Q.6. Mien did Joseph Keller first h involved in emergency pl=-dng? 1 l
l A. Mr. Keller h involved in radiological emergency planning in August 1979, when a wa.1.act for support to i the Federal Intes..fucy Task Force on offsite E -1.p ry Instrumentation for Nuclear Incidents was entered into by \
I his employer. He was assigned the responsibility of <
{. principal investigator en the ocntract.
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Q.7. Itian did Joosph Kaller first h involved in a review of einergency plannirq as it relates to the Shoreham
. l Nuclear Power Station?
A. R. Kaller ham == involved with the review of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Statiat rmiialagimi emergency reopense plan when he received a letter fran Frank P.
Petrone, Director FM Regicri II, dated October 4,1983.
Q.8. Please describe the nature of that involvesnent up to the 4 y A at time.
i A. - W. Keller was originally requested to review Revision 1
- of the plan. 9* :y- >Lly he received and reviewed l
l Revisims 2 through 8 of the IIICO plan. On February 13, 1986 he participated in the evaluatial of the Shoreham azercise.
Q.9. Itien did Roger Kowieski first harma involved in energency planning?
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A. W. Kowieski first hamma involved in emergency planning in 1978 as Regional Dem Safety Cocedinator. In 1981, W.
Kawieski was appointed by the Regional Director as the Niman, Regialal Assimbus Cannittee (RAC),
responsible for the REP Pr q am. Since that time he managed the REP program and Dam Safety activities in FM, Regian II until his reassiw-it to the Civil Engineer position on June 20, 1986.
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6 Q.10. Men did Ibjer Fowieski first harv== involved in emergency planning as it relates to the Shorehma Nuclear R:mer Statim?
A. Mr. Kcwieski first harmna involved in a diminairrt of the mergency planning iseum in 1982, at a meeting with t nu._ :- Aatives of Suffolk Count.7, NRC, New York State and M!NA in Hicksville, New York.
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1 Q.11. Please describe the nature of that involvement up to the present time.
- A. Sinos m*=immion of the IIIID Transition Plan an October l- 4,1983, Mr. Fowieski cocedinated the review of this plan by Regional Assistanos canonittaa, including Revisions 1 l
through 5 and the Fl!NA Region II internal review of l
Revision 6..
i At the time of the exarcise, Mr. IGowieski was the principle technical Fl!MA regimal official in the l Radiological Emergency Fu-,-zdsr-- (REP) program. He was in charge of all technical Fl!NA regional activities related to the exercise prior to, during, and after the exercise until June 1986.
Huse activities included oversight on: exercise objectives , exercise scenario, exercise evaluation plan, M!NA centroller plan, Fl!NA sintlator plan, exercise evaluator assignments, p;ptics of exercise evaluation critique forms, preparatier of par +1r ignts critique, preparation of public critique (with the exception of the Regional Directcr's Statanant), ard the preparation of ,
the FEMA t w i. On June 20, 1986 Mr. IGowieski was reassigned to the civil Engineer position.
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7 Q.12. Mmt other h=arits have you relied m in your evaluatica of the February 13, 1986 exercise of the T. Tim Transition Plan for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station?
A. We have used NUREG-0654, Pl!NA-REP-1, Rev.1, Critaria for Pr=nara+ im and Evaluai-im of Padinlmir al 7---- - a Rascense Plans and Precaredness in Succort of Nuclear Power Plants, published November, 1980, in preparing our i review of the T:rrm Transition Plan , and FEMA Guidance Memorandum effective at the time of the exercise.
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CCamNTICli EX 34 ISSUE: Em enarcise demonstrated that IEIO was unable to prwida ya.wL notification to the public in the I
event of a siren failure or failures.
ANSWER: 911s issue has been addran=ed in detail in the i
response to C m aition EX 21A.
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9 CGEENTIN EX 40 CDEEEEIN EX 40.A.
ISSUE: Traffic miinian were not di g 4 M in a timely manner so that they would be able to perform their duties in - w1. the ,1an.
ANSWER: 'Iha dispatd1 of Traffic miriam occurs fram three staging areas and the following response will address the evaluation of performance of personnel .
di-yi4M frcst endt staging area.
'Ihm evaluaticzi of the anarcise involved the demonstration of the implementability of the plan. I
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'Ihm ability to staff the Staging Areas was evaluated
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s under encarcise objective SA 2 for endi of the three Staging Areas (see also response to CatmNTICH EX 21.E). 'Ihis objective was evaluated as being met at all three staging Areas.
'Ihm timeliness of the establishamnt of access l wuvl point by Traffic Guides was evaluated under anarcise objective FIEID 6. 'Ihis objective was evaluated as being met for the Port Jefferson Staging Area and partly met for the PaWM and Riverhead Staging Areas. Only for the Riverhead Staging Area was there any reference to the urtin=1y dispatd1 of the Traffic Giiriam.
With respect to the specific times and p.1.wdoges referenced within the ocntention, FDR has no additional information cut whidt to base any opinion of the accuracy of the statsmarras.
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) CXNIENTIW EK 40 (contimed) v CXND!NTIN EX 40.A (continued)
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Insofar as the ecmtenticri asserts that the i par e ini-sts followed the plan, and it is the planning basis whidt r=M the asserted problem, it i is PBa's position that this issue is a planning issue. PD E and other parties testified on this issue in 1984. 'Iha ASIB in its danision (see pages
- f 120 and 121) found no plaming defect and concluded that IIIID had taken roastmable steps to minimize l the ambllimatics times for 1230 emergency workers.
For a cxapleta die-ir=1 of the Board's decision
, see Mir=1 IV.B.
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ex CCNIENTION EX 40. OCNTINUED CD EENTIN 40.B.
ISSUE: Although IERO Traffic Guides were dispatched in accordanos with the plan, they were not at their assigned posts to assist evacuation traffic in a timely manner.
ANSWER: Insofar as the contention asserts that the parHa rants followed the plan, it is FDR's position that this is a planning issue. For additional information, see respcmse to CONIENTIN EX 40.A.
p With the exception of the Traffic G11rias dispatched
\ ftta the Riverhead Staging Area, FDR has no i knowledge as to the specific times that the Traffic Giiriam arrived at their assigned posts. FDR also l has no specific knowledge of the times at which the
, dispatch of the Traffic Guides were otspleted at the l various staging areas.
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CCNIENTIN EX 40. CCNfINUED 1
CCNIENTIN 40.B.
As stated in the PEA Report (page 56):
Dispatd1 and directics of field warloers from the 14:rt Jefferson Staging Area was i well organized (SA 9) . Under the direction of the Staging Area Cberdinator, the Bus Dispatcher was responsible for sending cut Transfer Point Occedinators ;
and Bus Drivers, and the Imed Traffic L
Guides were responsible for dispatdling
{ Evacuation Route E-At----, Routa Alert Drivers, Traffic midas, and Reed crews.
l Prior to dispatdl, all parecenal were
- systematically briefed en dosiostry and en their paz+4m1- assigrusents. 'Iha ,
1 i briefings were clear and tharcucjs. For example, the Traffic Guides were briefed en radio r h , traffic guidance
, r.- tives, iih ifdcrt with police, l dosiastry and dose call-in points, and use j of protective clothing.
In the PatM= Staging Area the dispatd1 of field l
workers also went well, except for Bus drivers (page ;
1 62 of the PEA).
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13 02 M NTION EX 40. C N TINUED 00tm NTION 40.B. (omtiraaed)
Perse nal were to be dispatched to the field from the staging area for general m 1ation bus evacuation, school evacuation, evacuation of the mobility-impaired, route alerting, traffic control, and removal of traffic 194%. 'Ihe Bus Dispatcher and Imad Traffic Guida closely oversaw the dispatch of indivir*=1= under their omtrol. 'Ihmee emergency worloors were briefed m dosiastry, were issued dosimeters, and were issued instructim paciosts for their assignments prior to being dispatched to the field.
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14 l CI2fHNfICN EK 40 (otmtirmed)
CI3fMNFIC3i EX 40.E.
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- ISSUE
- 'Ihe plan danges in Davisiert 7 and 8 of the plan do not remedy the pechless asserted in subsections of ,
l this ocmtention. i ANSWER: It is FDR's position that this is a plaming
- issue. As stated in the exercise et, an l exercise inadequacy was identified, ei& was i evaluated as a Deficiency, (see Table 4.4, D#1)
I did pertains to an excessive time in dispatching ;
4 Traffic Guides fma the Riverhead Staging Area. In !
! its reopense to Fa m's reocamandations, LIIco i
indicutted that: ,
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!; Traffic Guides will be p W for
! 4Mimte dispat& for the 2-mile EPE. An l
! additional pereen will be assigned to !
r i assist with equipment distrLh*4rm.
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L n= Izno y a-- have been modified to reflect .
I j the above dange and have been reviewed by the RAC :
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l in its review of Davisions 7 and 8 of the plan. 'Ihm f effectiveness of any plan danges would have to be evaluated at an exercise er drill.
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15 GMHNI'IW EK 41 GNNNI'ICN EX 41.A ISSUE: 'Iha dispat& of IERO Road Crews frtal the Staging Areas to the field ides not timely, and in accordance with the Plan.
ANSWER: OPIP 3.3.3 provides that Road Crews are nctified to begin reporting to the Staging Areas at a Site Area Emergency ECL. As indicated in the not:e to Figure 3.3.4 of the Plan, scans indiv44=1= assigned to Road Creus are p1W cn standby status at that tias.
Using Figure 2.1.1 (p. 3 of 4) of the Plan and Attachment 8 of ORIP 3.6.3 as the basis, FEMA a-w in its evaluaticm of the exercise that the j following numbers of Road Crew personnel idould be avai1=h1e for dispat & to the field fzcalthe Staging Areas then an evacuation reocuamendation 1sas made.
i '!his table indicates that IERO assigns two people to each preassigned road crew field staticm.
i Road Crews Preassigned Iccations j Stagincr Area (personnal) Tow Trucks Gas Tank Trucks i Pctt Jefferson 14 4 3 I
WM 14 4 3 Riverhead 10 4 1 Total 38 12 7 i
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d 16 CCtEENTICE EX 41 CDFrl!NTICN EX 41.A No problems were identified by Fl!NA cn the day of the exercise regarding I2!BD's ability to acbilize, ,
staff and dispatcti Boed Crews fitzt the Staging Areas. Sinoa the Road Crews e d.ly have two (2)
IEIO personnel assigned to each unit, Fl!NA would not require full mobilization of a ocuplete first shift for purposes of an maarcise; nor would this be
! WM given the nature of the Road Crew .
l function. For additional iri-t.icn related to this ocattention ses also the respcomes to
! 03rrl!NFICMS EX 21.F and 42.F.
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c 17 CI2fT]!NTIN EX 41 (continued) 1 CCNIENIIW EX 41.B ISSUE: IJiBO personnel innre ir- ; hle of iWJirg to either of the two " free play" svacuation route imparH=arit problems that were intMM durirg the exercise. 'Dn hisues to be dealt with under this subpart of CCNIENTIN EX 41 are as follous:
25 Delay between IJiBO's attempt to verify one
, of the evacuation invari4=artts (i.e., fuel truck problem) and dispatch of a Route We frtat the Port Jefferson Staging Area; 29 J4,1.va.u.iata personnel and equipment were not dispatched to clear the Sin 11ated Gravel Truck wiM iWimartt.
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! ANSWER: 'Ihis issue has been addressed in Flim's response to Cantantion EX 21.F.
18 O) CINIDTTIN EX 41 (ocntinued)
CCNIDFFIN EX 41.E ISSUE:- 'Iha proposed addition of a Traffic Engineer to the BOC staff is not an WW =4dve action to address the deficiency PB E identified regarding IEIC's inability to deal with evacuation i W i==nts.
1 ANSWER: It is PER's position that the exercise was a deurmstraticm of the inplementation of Revision 6 of the LIIID Transition Plan for Shorehan W11ch did not contain reference to a Traffic Engineer at the EOC.
As stated in the exercise 1=yw.i., an exercise iWwy was identified, W11ch was evaluated as a Deficiency, (see Table 4.1, D#1) a:d pertains to
-ive delays in responding to two (2) evacuation 4 W i==nt free play W . I2IID in its response to FEMA's zw=nandation indicated that:
(p]r M ires have been reviewed and revised to ensure infonnation en l
4 W i==nts is s w Lly passed to all relevant personnel and a ocordinated response implemented. In addition, a Traffic Engineer has been added to the IZRO EOC staff to assist in evaluating and developing alternate routing.
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\ CINIENITCN EX 41 (contirmand)
CCNTENrICH EK 41.E i i i a
Die revised rh have been zwiewed ard
- addressed by the RAC in its review of Revisions 7 l and 8 of the plan. Die adequacy of plan changes is
, a plaming issue. Die effectiveness of any plan !
changes would have to be evaluated at an exercise or .
j drill.
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( CINHNfIW EX 41 (ocntillund)
CKNTENTIN EX 22.I (Not separately abitted but to be dealt i
with under CXNTENTICN EX 41) i ISSUE: FDE's evaluation of only two traffic IWimants 1 ,- E too small a sample to be able to draw conclusions w s uing IERD's ability to handle
. potential traffic 4= rad 4==nts.
i ANSWER: 'Iha evaluation of IEBO's ability to handle traffic impediments has been dime in the FDR response to contentions EX 21.F and 41.B.
! With regard to the number of iWi==nts evaluated, the anaerties within the ocutantion support FBa's reasoning for the insertion of two free play invadi==nt problems. 'Iha data supplied in the omtention idicates that on average there were 4.64 l traffic accidents per day Wildt required the assistance of one or more tow trucks (65 accidents in a 14-day period). 'Iha evacuation tima estimate in the plan is on the order of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> or 25% of a day. 'Iharefore the data would suggest that one accident requiring one or more tow trucks would cocur during the evacuation time period. 'Iha two invad4==nts injected therefore account for the
- potential for additional accidents due to increased evacuation traffic.
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21 CI2mNfIW EX 22.
OttmNFIN EX 22.A ISSUE: 'Iha meercise was in conflict with est4@lished facts regarding use of the Nassau County Colisetua as a Roomption Center.
ANSWER: During the February 13, 1986 meercise, the Nassau County Colisetan was desenstrated and evaluated es a Reception Omntar in accord with the LIICO plan, Revision 6. 'Iha evaluation of this facility and the monitoring and registration function desenstrated are KwW in Section 2.9 of the PEA Report.
'Iha cxxitantim that evaluations of Otrjectives EOC 16 h and Field 9 were invalid is not supported by the facts. An orderly evacuation does not depend on the specific location of a reception center (s) to whidt evacuees are directed. Any receptim contar is required to be bayend the 10-mile EPZ and therefore, the evacuses have already evacuated the risk zone before they would arrive at the reception center.
'1ha evaluations of Objectives Field 17,19, and 21 were based on the situation ac *he time of the meercise (i.e., the reception umter located at Nassau Coliseum).
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I 22 l Q3MNFIM EX 22 (acrtirnaad) r 4
- . CONMfrIN EX 22.A (carttimed) i
- Since the exercise, FBR has been rutified that {
there have been changes in the situation ard that ;
the Nassau Ocunty Coliseum is no longer availahle to l IIII0 for use as the Reception Center. Within the [
body of the ocntention, the point is unde that the I the Coliseum became unavailahla en JWie 16, 1986. .
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l Otis taas four months after the exercise and two j - unnths after the PR Report was issued. 1hs ;
l exercise m i accurately reflects the evaluation l
! of est oocurred earing th. rcise. na shifting
! situation has nothing to do with the results of the l l exercise. See also FBR's response to CONTDFFIN EX !
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1hs new situation is not an exercise issue. It is a !
planning issue atd has been addressed in the RAC f f l
review of Revision 7 and 8 of the IIIc0 plan. In l l addition, the Roosption Osntar iseum is the subject l l of the reopened reoced under CONIBfrIW 24 before i I the OIe3 ASIA. !
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23 4 CIMENTIM EX 22. (contimad) 1 1
CIm m NTI N EX 46 i i
l ISSUE: During the February 13, 1986 esercise, the p Iw-u. of IIIC Roosption Center perscrmal as l inextricably tied to the use of the Nassau Colisate as the n-+w cent.r.
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AlWWER: As discussed in the response to CNTENTIN EX 22.A, l the meercise evaluation as bened m Revisicn 6 of i i the LIICO Plan. At the time of the esmecise, the j Nassau Coliastaa me availahla for use as the l WW Osnter and the IERO perscrmal ocerectly directed (simulated) evemames to that facility. -
l Also as stated in the m response to CX3mlNTIW EX j 22.A, m was notified after the meercian (emphasis
, added) the Nassau coliseta beamme unavailable for use by LIICO as a Reception Center. Since a reception omnter(s) is required by the provisions of l NUIWG-0654, m would expect the LIIco plan to be ;
l revised to acocunt for the fact that the Nassau l coliseum was no longer available as a r%dm r center. 'Ihese plan danges were sutsaitted by LIIco i and were reviewed by the RAC in its' review of j Revision 7 and 8. As stated in the m response to camNTIN EX 22.A., the reception center issue is
{ the subject of the re-opened hearings before the
! orca noard.
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24 CIMENTIGi EX 36.
ISSUE: 1E10 parecenal made Protective Actiert Roccesondations (PARS) W11d1 were withcart basis, failed to consider alternates, or were
- i..,,y ,iate. .
) ANSWER: Based cn the information availahla to FB R it is FB a's position that . ,y y late PAR's were made by f the IERO personnal. As shown in Table 1.2 of the j esercise swi, the hinim was anda on the first sva uation PAR at 1010 ard the mim lated ABB notice r
i of this hinim was initially broadoest at 1024.
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l 911s PAR was pm*imary at the time of the
- hinim and was based en plant status information i
and the A.iial for doses.in excess of the PAG's.
i 9m PAR made was based on the established wm l that PAR's will be made on a " keyhole" - w . In l this case, because of the plant status, the
] evacuation keyhole was to a 5-mile radius and to i 10-miles in the three dcunwind sectors. Due to the 1
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w4 of planning sees and the requirusent in the
! plan that if any part of a zone is considered for a l protective action, the whole zone is considered for l the PAR, the decision and M :7- t EBS message
( states zones A - M and Q and R ehould be avecuated.
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GMEMPIGt EK 36 fantimad)
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A anacrut himitus was anda en additional evacuations i
at 1146 and the simulated - becadcast was anda at l L 1200. mis amound reoc.a.ndation m w on the
- ,=c eoemd wind shife m ie was to oocur lat. ,in the l i
j afterncan and was also r*4 % n ithat regard. mis emocnd PAR added the remaining senes
- in the 1(Haile M. S e position in the ocntention >
l vis-eMris the M mammages being aired (simulated)
, fttui 1206 to 1544 is not in agressant with the i
1 infatuation available to FINK. Based on the r
! emmecies report, it is FEBOL's position that M l mannages aired after 1200 contained the instruotiona l
that all of the 10-mile M should evaounta (aan l h ble 1.2).' (
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26 s Q3f!WIEN EX 47.
l Issus: 1he exercise did not demonstrate IIRD's ability to register, monitor and decantaminste A.dal eveauses face special facilities do would have been #
transported to receptian centeau other then the i Nassau coliseum. l 3
ANDER: The esercise ctrjectives did not include arly demonstrations of rdMim, acnitoring or l decontmaination of evacuses feca rial facilities l who would have been transported to reception centers j other then the Nassou colisman. This issue has been i t
addressed in the rempanes to 03f!ENTIM EX 15.K. l I
With regard to the two objectives cited,.there seems to be - misunderstanding of the exercise t
- cbjectives. @jectives FIIID 13 and FIELD 21 are related to two distinct P ilities. @jective
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! Field 21 specifically limits the evaluation to the l " Reception Center" whidt was at the tias of the j essercise, the Nassou onliseum. FENk's evaluation of ;
that objective was addressed in the response to l I CONIENTION EX 22.A. @jective FIELD 13 pertains to l
( the daeanstration of resources -ry to effect l an orderly evacuation of the institutionalised l l
mobility-impaired indivi& mis within the 10-mile j l
EPE. FINK's evaluation of that objective was ;
i I addressed in the response to CCHIENfIW EX 21.D. !
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l CEMNNFIM EX 47 (ocritirmand)
V 4
CI35ENTI N EX 47.A. - E.
] ISE!Et 1his at:ritettimi asserts that plan W pixipceed by Luco are inadequats to correct iseums regarding I'
the monitoring and registration of v4=1
! n=1*ims. She following issues are reised in the subparts to this ocntantient 1
j 47.A only cna monitor is assigned to each v4=1 i facility reception center;
! 47.B W i=1 Wildim evacuses are to be monitored l as they disenhark fecm the vehicles in 6
( they were L eW.
l 47.C 1he drivers of vial n'1= tion evacuation i vehicles will register (i.e., make a list) people en their vehicle.
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i 47.D Ocntaminated persons are to be L wM to i the Reception Centar (Nassau Coliseus).
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! 47.E There are no monitors assigned to school l
reim cantare.
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QMIENTIM EK 47 fotntirmand)
GWHNfIN EX 47.A. - E. (ocritirmand)
! ANBWER: It is FD R's position that the assertions made in all of the parts of this ocntention are plamirq issues and are not related to the February 13, 1986 i
exercias. It should be rated that all of these issues related to the zwim contare are before 4 the otr-3 ASIB. In fact, in each part of the i ocntention there is a referenom to Revision 7 of the 4
- IIIID plan. Clearly the contentions are based en j assertions --idrg a version of the plan which i
was not exercised. It should also be rated that the i mest current revision of the plan is Revision 8 not f Revision 7. '!he ocntentions are therefore based en a version of the plan Wiich was not in effect on the day of the exercise.. FBR's position on the issues
- raised in the parts of this contention are presented l in the RAC review of Revisica 7 & 8 of the IIIID l plan. 'Iha effectiveness of any plan changes would l -
have to be evaluated at an exercies or drill.
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29 C3m!NfIN EX 49 It is FDR's positiert that imanen K yarding evacusa reitwt oorstars are currently under rwiew in appeals of AIAB 855. Also, the OI,-3 ASIB has reopened the recced on this issue. Desponses to this m.i . tion and its stay.u.t should therefore be part of the OIe3 Board hearings. Nevertheless, FDR has provided responses to the stay it of this ocntention below.
i CW1 ENFIN EX 49.A.
ISSUE: 'Iha exercies daeanstrated that I230 permannel, at the Par =*iat Center, were not capable of monitoring the number of evacuses ar+ir ipated by the IIIID Plan.
ANSWER: 'Iha exercise twi. states that facilities at the Reception Centar were PMe of handling the thirty-two thousand (32,000) avacuses within the required 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> time limit. 'Iha activities observed resulted in an exercise itwiatriary whidt was evaluated as an Area Requiring cal.-tive Action ,
(see Table 4.9 ARCA 1). Ocntrary to the assertion in the ocntention, the t w t states that en several occasims, not frequently as asserted, the monitoring of sinulated evacuses took 4 to 5 mimtes. In fact, during FDR's observation of the monitoring of the w h tely 100 simulated i ava< m aa, the only occasions on which the monitoring personnel took more than the w A taly 90 seconds, whidt is the plaming assumption, was when the individual being monitored was a FDR evaluator.
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! C*A M NTI M EX 1!.. -.
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ISSUE: Sha 1290 parecrael atithw Roospden Centat* andd adjustaantsJtio the avecusa annitoring approacts as 3 J
cslied for in the plan when they wre notifid t'at . ,
ww-i=*=1y 100,000 evaczanes should be monitend.
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t AIEMiR: See the respcmse to CCNITifIN EA 49 A with respect. -
to the time riqitisd to vanitor esciev'aczen. In '
addition, IEnd perscenal receptized tha nasid to toe' ,
l the alternate method described in the Plan to '
acnitor . arriving peasanger-cars a[d drivers in'thri ,
j event tant acts than 32,000 persors are sospected.to ~ ,
arrive at the Deception Corf.ac. '
t i , ,
j 1hs PFA Report erhates that the alts/: rata netNd ten
- dimmmad by the Supervising Decontmairv
- cion landr ,
and his staff. Since the implementation of the _
i alternata ph um mt an momecire objecfdve,
- it was of=ilated and therefore, tlwre was zu '
l evaluation of that s ucidare. !
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u 31 CNIENI' ICE EK 49 (continued) t A.
CNIEIEICN DC 49.B.
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ISSU5; Provisions ocntained in the LIICO plan for obtaining d
additional monitoring resources were not
- c. '
demonstrated during the exercise.
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r ANSNER: 216; exercise was not designed to actually
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4 don'.t' strate the capabilities of other agencies.
g 1 Howemer, the IEIC EOC did ocntact the DOE at the Brookhaven Area Offica and request additional trasistance. Die DOE personnel made telephens
, n, , centacts with the w, late DOE facilities arr]
obtained estimates of the time of arrival of this additional assistzuios. Diere was no actual movement i of paraennel or equdgment in response to these re;uests. Die 1.n i. states that other support +
organizations, such as INPO, also provided estimated 1
i times of arrival for requested assistanos.
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32 CXNIENTICE EX 38.
CCNB!NITCN EX 38.A.
J ISSUE:. 'Iha activation time for the DIC unreasonably delayed g the timely dissemination of r====avy emergency information.
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ANSWER: 'Ihm PEA Repcktt does not state the exact time at wttidl the Dic was hlared cparational (see Table 1.1), althcytt Mim 2.4 (see p. 52) states that the activLtion of the ENC was dcma very well. ,
I During the exercise, the DIC personnel were activated after the Alert ECL hlavation in accordanos with the Plan. Ittile it is true that the first press briefing in the DIC was not held until agawinately three (3) hours after the cmsite initiating event, the primary maars of giving
! :====ary emergency inf d. ice to the public, i.e. '
the EBS system, was activated (rimalated) nearly two 3 (2) hours before the first press briefing. -
l FDE ocncluded that the DiC activation r - - two ,
ocntained in the IIIID plan and used at the Shoreham exercise was W =ta and consistant with those used at all aparating sitas in Regimi II.
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4 33 CERMNTIN EK 38.
CCtmNTION EX 38.A. (continued)
Assuming that the times stated in the cantantim are accurate, it is FB R's position that a press '
briefirxJ within 15 minutes of the ENC being activated is adequate. DurinJ that time, tim I2B0 Coordinator of Public Infconstim, as required by a the plan (OPIP 3.8.1), ocmferred with the I230 Director of Iccal Respcmse. 211s g - t.nu would increase, not diminish, the accuracy of the information prwided at a press briefing.
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CNIENTIN EX 38 (CXNfINUED)
CCNITNIIW EX 38.B.
ISSUE: '!he timing of the release of IEIO News Release No. I was unreascnable ard it tw*aited outdated information.
ANSWER: 'Iha PEA Report ard supporting evaluator critique materials do not omtain any informaticn en the news release times. However, it is true that the ENC reonived the notification of the hlaration of the Site Area Emergency ECL at 0819. It is unreasonable to ==t that the cocedination required by the plan and dieh in the response to ON!3!NIIN EX 38.A.
L and the preparation of a hard copy news release could possibly be acocsplished within two (2) mimtes, the time between the ECL notification and l
distribution of IERO News Release No.1. It is FEMA's position that the distributicm of this News Release, before the INC was fully activated, was ihr pi.able. '!he fact that cmsite scenario events ovw.wcA the efforts of the IERD ENC persmnal
^-
- thereby making ird-Licn contained in the News Release technically outdated is not considered by FEMA to be a serious problem.
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35-CNIHFFICN EX 38 (contirmed).
CXN11!NTIN EX 38.C.
. ISSUE: 'Iha distributim of IERO News Release No. 2 to the media in the 11NC was unreasonably delayed.
I ANSWER 'Ihm Pl!A Report and supporting evaluator critique ,
materials do not ocmtain any informaticn cm this issue. It should be noted that, as dieiaamd in the respones to CCNI5!NTICN EX 38. A., the primary means of getting rurmanary emergency information to the public is via the EBS system, not by way of News anleases distrih_*d to the media in the Dic. EBS l messages serVB as the primary means for providing j' essential emergency information and clear instructiG1s to the pihlin. 'Iha purpose of News 1 e.1. m pp1_em inf_e_ -
in EEEi mammaryan and there are no established =4=4'a=
I time frames within infnicit they mast be issued. 'Iha m i-ition asserts that the EBS mammarya (sin 11ated) was aired within the required 15 minutes after a decision was mada en a Protective Action. It would be helpful if hard copies of the News Releases, which contain the same information as the EBS message, would be available to the nadin as soon as possible after the the EBS maaameja is brmanaat.
However, in a real emergency the EBS brrudnaat would l
have provided this information to the madia in a I
timely manner.
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j CGENTICN EX 38 (CMrINUED) ;
CElmNTICN EX 38.D.
ISSUE: 'Iha lack of ability to provida hard copy of EBS w ard News Releases delayed the distribution of information to the media in the INC.
ANSWER: As stated in the PEA Report, part of the basis for one of the anarcise Deficiencies, (see Table 4.4 INC Deficiency #1) was the fact that there were insufficient ocpyirg capabilities to produce hard copies of EBS messages for distribution to the ENC staff and to the nadia. 'Ihere is no mention in the PEA Report of this same issue with regard to News
!' Releases, sinoa there is no tim requirement for the distribution of news releases to the inadia.
However, the inability to provida hard copies of informatica to the nadia at the ENC would also apply to news releases.
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! 37 4 OctGNTICN EX 38 (continued)
CCNHNTION EX 38.E.
ISSUE: 'Ihm lack of maps ard d4 T lays in the DiC inadia br4= ring area hindered the ability of IERO personnel to brief the media on anergency actions. Also, IERO personnel provided omfusire and unclear information to the media.
ANSE R: As stated in the PIA Report, an Area Requiring Cumm-tive Action, (See Table 4.4 I!NC ARCA' #1) involved the lack of maps and di T ays l at the ENC.
An EPZ map should be d4 T layed in the media briefing area idlich tracks protective actims and the plume exposure pathway. A status board providing ECT.s and times hlared would be beneficial to madia personnel. However, FDR dimarpnes with the assertion in the wi-idcm that IERO personnel di====inated ocmfusing and unclear information to the media. As stated in the Pf!1 Report (see page 53), six (6) news briarings were ocnducted during the exercise. 'Ibese briefings provided requested infennation and answered questions presented by 4
madia t wa iatives.
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38 Q 03MNTIN EK 38 (ocntinued) 03MNTIN EX 38.F.
ISSUE: Copies of EBS messages, whidt were available to the media, contained extraneous infconstion, which would have caused confusion.
ANSWER: As stated in the PEA Report, an Area Requi%_
Catwtive Action (See Table 4.4 ENC ARCA #2) involved the EBS W provided to the inadia.
Ocntrary to the assertion in the ocntenticm, tha topw.t states that the extraneous material in the hard copies of the EBS mammaryna was clearly marked for deletion. Housvar, it was felt that this material could lead to noosible (esphasis added) ocmfasion. 'Iha rar-nandation was made in the
+
O supw.t that the extraneous material should be actually deleted and not just marked as deleted to avoid any possible ocnfusial. FDR is not aware of
, any situation where hard copy of EBS mammarpes I provided to the media were inocmsistent with information brmarmat (sinnslated) over the radio.
'Ihare were no =&=1 radio brr=rirmats of EBS mammarjaa during the exercise.
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39 O CCNTENTIW EX 38 RINTINUED)
CCNrfNTI N EK 38.G ISSUE: 'Ihm times for the distrih*icn of I220 News Releases No. 3 to 7 were unreasemably lata arx1 theon News Releases were inaccurate ard in ocnflict with other data in the =hlic <hnain by the time they were provided to the inadia.
ANSWER: 'Iha PER Pl!A Report ard supporting evaluator critique materials do not give any informatica en the times at whid1 these News Releases were distributed to the media. 'Iha times of distribution of News Baleases Number 3, 4, 6 ard 7 are, as stated in the ocntention based m IIIc0's response to the Governments Second Set of Int =.wtw.las January 5, 1987, at page 4. As stated in the response to l previous ma J.ims, the primary means of providing my suergency inCddon to the public is via the EBS system not by News Releases that are intended to reinforos the EBS W. 'Ihare appears to be an inconsistency within the cxxttention. If informaticm was already in the public <wnain, there should not be any omfusion caused by ocnfirmaticn of that information via hard copy to the madia; even if these hard ocpy materials were distributed after the fact.
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CCNr!!NFICH EX 38 (ocntinued)
Ottm!NFICE EX 38.H.
t i ISSUE: 'Ihare was a delay in the ENC in infonairxJ the media about the decisicrt to add the remaininJ zones in the 10-mile EPZ to the evacuatim rarrmanaridation.
ANSWER: It is Fl!NA's position that (1) the EBS aired ,
l- (sinnilated) information K yuding the second evacuation PAR within 15 mimtes of the decision '
l f made by the IERO Director of Iocal Respmse and (2)
{ there was in the 1!NC, a means of numitoring the EBS bermdr mats. 'Iharefore the media would have been
- inftwend of this in cenation when the EBS ====arja I was benademat. As stated in the respmaa to N Cw6d.icn EX 38.D, insufficient e=nahilities to prt
- xhaos hard copies of EBS ====arfan for distributicr1 to the ENC staff and the media were idar+1fied as a Deficiency. FEMA has no recced of the time that l
I hard copy of this EBS ====arja was distrih*=d to the
. =adia in the ENC. As stated in the PEA Report (see Mirrt 2.4, p. 54), maps and dian1=ys in the nadia br4=fing roan were insufficient and this was I identified as an Area Requiring Cvuddve Action.
[
Fl!NA rar-naridad that:
'Ihm following dianlays should be posted in an area easily visible to reporters:
o An EPZ map whidi tracks protective actions and plume pathway.
o A status board which provides ECEs and their times of declaraticri.
If the above dianlays were available and effectively used by IERO persmnal at the INC, these would t
facilitate the cxzeunication of information to the i ardia.
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l 41 O CCREENTIN EX 38. (CCtEINUED)
CCtmNIIN EX 38.I.
ISSUE: 'Ihare was a delay of infocaincJ the media at the ENC that IEEC emergency wodcers were instructed to take RI. Honom the public and the mariin would refuse to obey IIIID ranr-nanciaticms in an actual energency.
ANSWER: Fl!MA has no basis en whickt to foca an opinicm as to whether the assertions in the ->^-,' don are either true or false.
'Iha T:rTm plan does not me ;4=to the use of KI
- for the general public. 'Ihis is in ocaplete accord l with the New York Stata plan for other nuclear power plants within its borders. It is therefcze O unr=na==avy and irweiata that informatics which is of no direct value to the mhlir should be di====4nated via the mariin.
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, CWIENI'IW EX 38 (continued)
CNIENIIW EX 38.J.
ISSUE:- IERO personnel at the ENC were not able to r+d satisfactorily and accurately to questims about evacuation and traffic conditions that were posed during the press ocnferences.
4
! ANSWER: 'Ihm PEA Report states that six (6) news briefings were ocnducted during the exercise and that the briefings provided requested iiew.dden and answered questions ac-_; i by media or - -- -_ aatives. Fl!MA has no additional information with r-prd to the assertims made in the uni-> Lim and has no basis en whidt to form an opinim as to l accuracy of those assertions.
Fl!MA is not aware of any bridges or tunnels m the evacuatimi routes idiids would require any maripower.
'Ihm situatims with regard to Marketing Evaluations, Inc. has been addressed in FDR's response to cui- stimi EX 16.E. It is Fl!MA's position that since the sirens were not activated during the I
exercise, there was no reason to evaluate the performance of Marketing Evaluations, Inc.
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OttmiNTICN EX 38. (OCNTINUED) 02m!NTIOT EX 38.L.
ISSUE: I2BO i s-.. l at the ENC did not have accurate infonnation - tuing the gravel truck iWi=1t.
ANSWER: FEMA has no informatim regardirq the assertions made in this mai.=>i.icn and has no basis on idhicts to form an opinicri as to the accuracy of thcoa
, asserticos. However, the handliry of both 4Wi-rit problems irwolvire the gravel and gasoline trucks,idas identified as a Deficiency (See
, Table 4.1 EOC Deficiency 1) . Since the Dic is not l an originator of this type of informat.im and since all amargency information is fed to the Dic by the EOC, it is reasonable to a - n= that li w s t.
infoonation idas available to I2Bo personnel in the
. ENC.
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-b CNIEtEIW EX 38 (continued) l l
1 02El!NITN EX 38.M.
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ISSUE: I2!BO persamel at the ENC were unable to r+mi to questions w.muire the ?-11_ rut truck i=ad4==rit '
durirq the 1348 press brimeirg.
ANSWER: FEMA did not make any rific not:ations with
- respect to this issue other than the statanant prwided in response to 02m!NIIN EX 38.J. Also, the response to CCNDINI'IN EX 38.L. is applicable to the i== in this ocntention.
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CMIENTICN EK 38 (ocntinued)
CCtM NIIW EK 38.N.
ISSUE: I230 personnel at the ENC frequently mim.pnied facts and provided inaccurata infonnation during
- . press briefirgs (e.g. *1araticri of site Area Emergency, etc.).
ANSWER: Blis issue has been addressed in the response to CINHNTIN EX 38.J. With 4. pa61 to the r ific asserticos in the wa iian, FDR has no basis on drich to form an opinion as to their accuracy.
However, it should be noted that the asserted dimpcy of four (4) airutas between the e=1 hlaration of the Site Area E pcy and that M11ch was announced by the IERO ENC personnel would have no mananvable and practical inpact cut the overall effectiveness of ENC.
.- .-= . . -. .
3 46 CCNTENTIN EX 38 (ocntinued)
CGENFIN EX 38.0 ISSUE: LIIID Press Baleases Numbers 4 and 5 were not rway distributed to the media in the ENC.
ANSWER: FDR has no information regardirq the assertions made in this contention and has no basis cm which to form an opinion as to the accatracy of those assertions. Based cm the T:rrm's response to the Goverrunents' Second Set of Intmykles of Jamary 5,1987, there is apparently no record of the tima at inihich the I2 ICD Press Releases were d4Mh_*=d to the media. See also FEMA's respcmse l ) to C3ENTIN EX 38.C.
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CCNIENITCN EX 38 (CXNfINUED)
CCNIENITCH EX 38.P.
ISSUE: 'Ihm Rumor control %.t.icn was ineffective.
ANSWER: 'Iha PEA Report identifies the operation of Rumor Control as an exercies irwiarymry whids was evaluated as a Daticiency (See Table 4.4 ENC Deficiency 1). '!he Rumor Otmtrol personnel were unable to answer questims reosived fra the public h==== they were not given accurata ugM:o-date ;
ele due to the slow distr _ih*ien of EBS messages to rumor wikul fremt the IERO PIO. 'Ihis problen was remari by insufficient copying capabilities in the ENC. Fifirally, during a test call to a rumor wikul ci ..tcr, current dahilm -A uing evacuated Zmes were not available. 'Ihis call was anda at 1319 following the airing of an EBS mammarp
! at 1206 which announced that the entire EPZ had been r=rm -wided to evacuate. 'Iha infcznation available to the rumor ocntrol operator was outdated, in that it identified only Zones A-M, Q and R for evacuation.
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k CWrENTIN EX 38 (ocntirmed)
OCNH NfIW EX 38.Q ISSUE: '] h e raial actions proposed by r:rrm are rot
, adequate to a& tress the issues raised by the exercise with regard to IERO's ability to prwide int tion to the media.
ANSWER: It is FBE's position that this is a plarming issue. I2 Loo in its response to Fam's
! rarv===1daticr1 on rumor ocntrol operation indicated ;
that ocpying madlines in the BOC are being evaluated for upgrade and 1 g12-- A. as tw =amary. In addition, the plan and r h have been zwised. Essential energency information will be put in ===avy form and simultaneously transmitted via ccuputer to the ENC and all rumor control i
locations.
l
'nia rwised r.--.t.wes have been rwiewed and addressed by the RAC in its rwiew of Revisicxis 7 and 8 of the plan. 'Iha WM of these plan changes is clearly a planning issue. 'Ihm I
effectiveness of any plan changes would have to be evaluated at an exercise or drill.
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(d CCtmNTICH EX 39 CNTENITCH EX 39.A ISSUE: The Rumor Otmtrol operators at the LIIID District offices ard call Boards did not have consistently
^
correct informatica u.i udng the emergency and responses thereto.
ANSWER: The FEMA evaluation of Rumor control operations during the exercise consisted of observations of the central location for rumor ocntrol in the ENC as -
Wfled in Revisica 6 of the plan. In additicm, at least cme test call was nada.to a rumor ocmtrol number to observe the mwncy of information available through the rumor ocmtrol operators. The i
results of this call have been addressed in the respcmse to CCtmNIIW EX 38.P.
Fl!NA has no basis to form an opinicm as to the accuracy or lack thereof of the assertions in the various subparts of this contantion. Sinoa the exercise evaluatica did not include the direct aboarvation of the Rumor Control function at the District Offices or Call Boards, Fl!MA did not evaluate the responses iwLad cm legs used as support for the assertions pertaining to those locations.
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d CONrfNTION EX 39 (continued)
CWrfMIION EX 39.A (continued)
It should be noted that many of t's asserted inaderywima are in part artifacts of an exercise.
In the exercise, all EBS W ats were simulated whereas in a real amargency, these W ats would be made. 'Ihm District offices and Call Boards would therefore have - to infatuation in real time by monitorirq the EBS stations. In the exercise, the infcznation which would have been Wat over EBS had to be distr Ai*ad by other means.
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l 51 CCNITNTICN EX 39 (CQG'DETED r'
CCN11!NTIN EX 39.B ISSUE: The responses to sina11ated public inquiries to the District offices and Call Boards were unreasonably i
delayed. I f
ANSWER: As stated in the response to CIN11!NFIN EX 39.A,
- Pl!Mk did not evaluate the Rumor Control function at either the District offices or Call Boards with the W _ ion of a test call. Pl!Mk has no basis on idiidt to foca an opinion as to the accuracy of the 4
asserties in the m Wiicn.
i If the facts assertad are reasonably accurata it would appear that the rumor control system functioned as designed in the plan. The plan states that if the rumor ocntrol operator does not have an answer, the inquiry should be logged along with a i
telephone raaber for a respanne. The rumor mAwl 4
cperator is to forward the inquiry to the ENC for ;
].
forna11ation of an answer and to return the call to the scuros of the inquiry when the answer is available. It would appear that the systemt functioned as designed. There appears to be
!. question of the timeliness of the responses. A correct respczise even though delayed is far better i than either no response or an irmi.ct response given inmediately. However, it should be noted that Pl!Mk judged the overall operation of Rumor Control to be inadarriata as dimimmad in the respmse to CCN11!NTICH EX 38.P.
. i i-
52 -
CQMNTICH EX 39 (CQfrINUED)
CMIElfrIGT EX 39.C i
ISSUE: '!he respcmses given by rumor ocntrol operators desastrated poor judgment or unreasemable advisa. .
ANSWER: As stated in the response to CCRMNTION 39.A, HMA did not review or evaluata operation of the District Offices or call Boards with regard to rumor w h ul operations nor did it review the logs maintained by thana IERO pers mnel. FEMA therefore has no basis to form an opinien as to the -m, or lack thereof, of the facts assertad in the ocntention.
l If the facts asserted are true, HMA's position en the ocnclusions for each subpart are given below.
i (i) 'Ihm respcmma given at 0820 to the 0751 inquiry was a correct and accurate response at that time. 'Ihare was no way, short of having
] prior - to the somnario, that anyctm in I
the IERO EOC or ENC could estimate that i
evacuations would be zw-nanded or in what specific area they would be r=m===nded.
l
k 53 C3MNTIN EX 39 (CCNFINUED) l CXNTENTIN EX 39.C. (CCNIINUED) {
l (ii) 'Ihm response at 1228 to a call p1W at i 1130 was ocerect and accurate. If the call was p1 d at 1130 inquiring about lobsters caught
~
l that morning on the Shoreham jetty it is 4&ihle that the lobster could have been i
contaminated by a release of r Mi e lvity ,
W11d1 began inplant at 1130. It is true that a
! . mince release of radi-tive material had begun earlier in the morning, however, there was no 4
measurable offsite effects of this first release. In addition, both releases were ,
min-_.- - releases and there was never any indication that any abrrwuni amounts of radioactivity were released throutjt the liquid
- affluents frua the plant. 'Iharefore, the lobsters pr=munably taken fram the waters of j Iaig Island Sound, could not have been ,
ocntaminated.
4 (iii) It is true that by 0845 the plant status had datarierated further and that additional l
emergency actions had taken place. As stated '
in respones to Otmtention EX 39.A, at least part of the problem with not having uNte 1
- information was an muercise artifact. Had the EBS. 7 actually been W =t, it would seem that a news organization as highly r - + M -
l as the New York Times, would also have arv'a==
l to the EBS benade==ts.
! L
4 54 03fIENTIN EX 39 (CXNTINUED)
CCND!NFIN EX 39.C. (03fTINUED)
(iv) The response at 1515 with information as of 1300 is an example of the lack of u@te information whidi resulted in the evaluation of a Deficiency as di e w previously in
- respese to CCND!NFICN EX 38.P. -
- (v) Ittile the reopense given would have been an unreammable one for an ordinary citizen, the inquiry was reputed to have besti made by Dan
, Rather of GS News. The nous nadin would l clearly be interested in covering an event of the magnitude of that used in the enarcise scenario. The advice was good, "We de't adviss going to the plant". In the int 4% of being responsive to the media the r+h then gave directims to the plant.
i l (vi) The call asserted in this part of the l &a.icn is very audi like the call to Rumor l Control &.yw i.mi in the PEA Report en page 53.
The fact that the rumor ocntrol operator gave I the MINA evaluator ir-& cfw- information was part of the basis for one of the anarcism I Deficiencies (Sea Table 4.4 BC Deficiency 1).
- (vii) If in fact a member of the public had l
l called the correct rumor control rumber and had l
reonived a recceded M as asserted in this subpart of the contention, this would be ocnsidered as a breakdcun in the rumor control <
function.
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C3 m NFI N EK 39 (ocntinued)
CG E NTI N EX 44.
ISSUE: 2 ere would have been a substantial evacuation shadow or voluntary evacuaticn by the public as a result of LIIID's inability to pewide accurate and ini m "14r+1m Lii m Licn.
! i ANSWER: It is M!MA's position that this is a plamirg issue and not an meercise issue. ITMA and other parties t
, testified cm shadow y-------- s in 1984. Se NRC Atanic Safety Licensirg Board in its Partial Initial i Decisim en Emergency Plamirg concluded:
2a Board concludes that the w- L of ov= &- *4rwt in an emergency is a ocnsequence of the plamirg process wherein plamars or observers hida a priori, or durity an emergency, or 3
, posteriori,idnt an -au. e lata public responsa should be. Members of the
- =h14c, however, indivirkmily conduct a reasoned assessment of their situatims, based on available iricreation, and decida for thammelves what their responses will be. Se evacuation shadow y ---- s therefore 4 ,_
- _ in a difference of opinion between planners and researchers m the me hand, and individual manhav1s of the public cm the other, as to what the magnitude of hazard durirq an emergency actually is and what the responsa should be. Mus, although overresponse can
( occur, it is not founded on irrational thou@lt. Tr.1479-80 (Sorenson); Tr.
1994-98 (Dynes); Octdaro gt 31., ff. Tr.
1470, at 17-19 (E)u =yLii frcus page 21) .
i 56 l l
1 i
CCN11!NTIN EX 39 (contirmand) i l
CINHNFICN EK 44 (ocntirmand) l 1
Ratberums, the Board stated.
l
' Die Board can hardly i'negine that anyone would evacuate in a radiolevrir=1 emergency i unless fear of radiatica preerinted as part of the ocaman knowledge. However, we
, ocmclude that :cessonable people need and l will seek irivu atial en idtidt to base l their actions, par +4m1=vly in the urgent ocmditions of emergency. If the information is inadequate or conflicting, ,
they may act i.wup.lately. If it is ocuplete and consistent, they will w i.
it and uma it as intended. ,
i
- 'Iha evidonom from natural and i technological disasters swL. a
. conclusion that inJuu. tion given to the public during a radiological emergency f that is vific to the developing situatica will influence the p.1seinant public respcome. Id. at 61. '!he Board riinarpees with suffolk County witr====
who would have us believe that the public l will disregard informatial that is essential to cope with a current developing situation and instead rely on preeri_= ting generic information (Excerpt fram page 251).
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02miNTIN EK 39 (contirmed) 02m!NTIN EK 44 (ocritimed)
Finany, the Board ocmcluded:
'Iha evidonom is o==114rxJ that wlations of pecple are both rational and diverse in th'v** and acticri. . 'Ihus, thousands of individual rational analpues perfewmad at the time of an amidarit will not lead to an ur. broken unity of opinion at the best course of action to foncw.
l We therefore W a diverse wL.ua of populatica response in a radiolcrrim1 emergency. Sans will refuse to evactata l
idhan advised they should. Some will taka l time to be convinced and win evacuate l
l later than advised. Many win fonow I
instructicris, and mana win evacuata idhan not advised to do so. Our finding of
- rationality, bewever, r= =1= the l
conclusicri that the public win consider the infoonaticri it receives and win react ghtely in a manner that is consistent with the advice given (E h yi.m from page 37).
! 'Ihe Board's position en evacuaticut shadow phencananen -
I is contained in the nar imicas,Section I.A. 'Ihe NRC rules state that there is no requirenant that there be public participaticri during an exarcise.
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T 1 CGMNIIW EK 39. . fC 2TDMllD1 -
CWHNTIN EK 22.F. 1 l
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ISSUE: In its evaluation of ramaraut mercise objectives, .
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Fl!MA =====-9, given the ac.cilwit scomrio dirirq the l
1 mean,ise,
- armi given the -wraponse of tpe I2BD 1
. ~
par +inipants, that,thers 1cubi be no voluntary ~
evacuatiert or the that there wuld be no evacuation activity prior to 1024.
i ANSWER:. It is Fl!MA's position that this contartien is the '
same as CCNHNIIW EX 44 and that both parthin to plamirq issues not emar,ise issues. With regani to
j 6 l the Fl!MA evaluation of the objectives cit:txi thei g
+
b emarcise as a ishole was a demonstratien of the .
?.
inglementation of the plan assi as sucit, the evaluation tdes based at the demonstrated ability of s
? . : , ,
d rt:gemi to any,ap==+1r=w other than the scenario ,
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- 02m!NTICE EX 39 (continued) 1 J.
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02miNTICN EX 42.A.
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IJIBO's resghais to the two free play messages 139)E:
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.k v. w dng road 4Wi-rits were untimely,'
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1 ineffective and descmstrated IERD's inability to
, y deal with bot:h unexpected situatims.
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'n,s ANSWER: , 'Iha PFA Bapert states that the response to the road
' '. 4 i
4Wi= It messages is i&sitified as an scarcise i j* <
l' Deficiency itsee Table 4.1 EOC Deficiency 1) . 'Ihis f
issue has already but addressed in detail in FDR's response to CCNH!NEICH EX 21.F.
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CNIENTIN EX 39 fam1tinued) 1
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CCtmDEICH EX 42.B. 'l
, , l ISSCE: LHOO failed to resperd adequately, welately or l in a timely numner to a free play ma==arja requestirg IERO L-wLation assistance in evacuatirg 40 children from the Ridge Elementary Sd'a31.
i i-ANSWER: Fl!NA evaluated two parts to the responsa. 'Ihm frea play ma==ary= was injected at the EOC where the evaluation was considered un.ier objective EOC 20.
'Ihm field inglementation in response to the fraa !
, play message was evaluated under objective Field 16
( at the Patd== Staging Area. 'Ihm PEA Report states the following i A IERD's response in h providing assistance to evacuata school children:
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. ~ . . . _ _ _ _ .. _ _ _ _ . .. _
-61 COMNFICN EX 39. (CCNFINUED)
CI2MNTICN EX 42.B. (CMTINUED) o Since schools would already have been closed, an actual demonstratim of the organizational ability nar, mama y to effect an orderly evacuatica of schools within the 10 sile EPZ could not be observed at the I2B0 EOC (EOC 20) . However, this exercise objective was met as demonstrated in respcmse to a free play maaaaga inserted to demonstrate this activity. A free play message requesting school bus resources to ammint in LwWdng forty l
(40) children frtat Ridge Elementary School was given to the Evacuatico Coordinator by the Exercise Controller at the LERO EOC at w uginately 1030. In a 1041 mamanga the pertinent informaticn was ocumunicated to the W ial Population Bus Dispatcher at the PaWM Staging Area, requesting l
that a bus be picloed up at the United Bus Ocapany. Coordination was effected with the sWntendent of the Longwood Central School District, in which Ridge Elementary W1 is located, to confirm arrival of
, the bus. Arrival was ccrf4 W at about 1323 but it was noted that the bus had not yet arrived at the Reception Center. 'Iha
\
l Receptim Center was contacted and l
- requested to inform the Public School l Coordinator at the IERO EOC when the bus i
arrived (PEA Report, p. 20) .
All of these acticms were appropriate.
I
62
( C3mNI'ICN EK 39. (CCNIINUED) 03MNITCH EX 42.B. (CCNIINUED)
With regard to the field implementation of s2 col evacuation assistance, the swL states:
o 'Iha objective of demonstratirq a sample of resources pannamag to effect an orderly evacuatica of schools within the 10-mile EPZ was partly met at the Pa W =-
Staging Area (Field 16). 'Iha Bus Dispatcher at the staging area auarW for me (1) bus to sinnilate the evacuation of forty (40) children to the Recepticn Center, based en a IERO EOC request. 'Iha driver was f==414=v with his function arxi follcued his directims very well.
However, the staging area took forty (40) minutes to dispatch the driver after the request was reonived. It is ramenanded l that the Bus Dielder be provided with I
trained staff support so that Bus Drivers can be dispatched in a more timely manner (PFA Report, p. 66).
l Based on this demonstration an Area Requiring
! Cvu.ctive Action (See Table 4.6 Patchogue Staging Area ARCA 9) was identified due to the slow dispatch of Bus Drivers from the Staging Area.
l 63 O V EtMNTICE EX 39. (CCtEINUED)
CGENTIN EX 42.B. '(CCREINUED)
IDE rHearpnes with the assertions made in the contention reganiing the delays in dispatching and arrival of the bus at varicus locatim s. Below is the listing of the times obtained fram the FDR's record and those listed in the atritanticn:
A. TION EB E's REOCRD CMHNTION Request for a bus was 1030 1030 l given to the Evaluaticn l Coordinator l
I Massage requesting a bus 1041 Nd given ocumunicated to the Fi=1 Pcpulation Bus Dispatcher at paw =
Staging Area i
Driver was dispatched 1120 Not given fmn the Staging Area l Driver arrived at the bus 1145 Not given M
l l
l Driver left the bus 1205 Not given l
.i l
l 64 -l f l CWIENTIN EX 39 (ocritirnaad)
CCNIENFIN EX 42.B (ocritirmand) i I
ACTIM FEMIL's RE03tD CCNIENIIW Driver arrived at the 1217 1323*
, school Ikas arrival was 1323 Not given confined with Is..fiOOd 1 Sdacol District Superird i" d. ,
Driver arrived at the 1350 1623**
Reception Center itiat appear to be significant delays in confiming the arrival of the bus at certain locations are, at j least in part, esercise artifacts. If a School District were actually in need of additional bus resources for the evacuation of its students (the
- prestime of the free play message), and if the requested resources were delayed in arriving, it is j reasonable to assuna that follahMap m11= would ba l placed to the IERO EOC. The free play ====arja did
! not include cxmtrollar instructicos to initiate i
i thoes follcze-up milm if there were delays in IERO's l
) 6' l
- Cantantion inplies that this was the time when the bus arrived at Ridge Eleusentary School.
- Contention inplies that the bus had not arrived at the Reception Center by 1623.
__. _ _ _ . _ _ . - . . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - ~ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ . _ . _ _ _ . . _ - _ . _ _ . . . _ -
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65
\
CGENTIN EX 39 (ccritinued)
CGFIEEIN EX 42.C.
ISSUE: IERO penKmnal responsible for rumor control functions are ir==hle of r+alirg effectively in W ai situations.
ANSWER: 'Ihis issue has been addressed in the response to CGENTICNS EX 38.P, 39.A, 39.B, and 39.C.
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CCtMNTIN EX 39. (CCNTINUED)
CNIENTICH EX 42.D.
ISSUE: 'De IERO penKrinal serving as Traffic Guides did not respond adec[uately to the questions Insed by the {
Fl!NA evaluators.
ANSWER: 'Ihis issue has been addressed in the response to CElmNTIN EX 21.E.
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'67 CCNE]!NTIM EK 39 (ccritinued)
CCNDINfI N EX 42.E.
ISSUE: 'Ihm IERO personnel servirq as bus drivers did Int rwd Mately in carryirg out their assigranents during the exercise. .
ANSE R This issue has been addressed in the respcmse to CCNDINFIN EX 21.B.
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68 CNI'ENI'ICN EX 39 (ocntinued)
CNITNI'ICN EX 42.F.
ISSUE: IERO perso:1nal did not r+-d w,Iately and in a timely me:1ner to the scenario events as they I
unfolded.
ANSWER: Many of the issues rniami by this part of the ocmtention have been addressed in the respcosas to other contentions as follows:
o Rauta Alert Drivers -
Ocntantion EX 21.A o Bus Drivers -
Contentions EX 21.B, C and D l
I o Traffic Otidaa -
Contention EX 21.E o Road Crews and
- Route Spotters -
Ocntention EX 21.F i
I l
l
69 CCNfliNTICE EX 39 (continued)
CXNffiNTICH EX 42.G.
4 ISSUE: IJilRO perscainel did not resperd in an adequate inanner to inedia questions.
ANSWER: 'Ihis issue has been addressed in the respcmse to CCNI]!NIIW EX 38.
4 4
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i
i 70 CG M!NTI N EK 40 (continued) l l
l CCtm!NYIN EX 40.C.
i l
ISSUE:' Finlaading statements were nada in EBS ====ary== with ,
1.yu:d to Traffic miid== being at their posts on ,
evacuation routes.
ANSWER: 'Iha p--2 ::*=d EBS messages contained in the IIICO j Plan indicate that the palin should W to be giid=d by Traffic miid== tdus would be at their posts l- thrr- hr=R the evacuation. 'Ihis was not the case I demonstrated at the exercise as dimi===d in the 4 response to 02m!NFICN EX 21.E. It is FD R's.
position that misleading ina Lica should not be distributed to the public. 'Iha EBS ====ary== should be ruwerdad to include statasants to the effect that
- Traffic miidas are being dispatx
- hed to assist evacuation traffic. However, FD R notes that the plan contains two evacuation tima estimatest ena
- with traffic control posts staffed and a second with 7
these posts unstaffed. 'Ihm additional time required I
to evacuate the 10-mile EPZ with unstaffed Traffic Control Posts is estimated in the plan to be 1.5
( hours.
1
l I
l 71 l
' CNITNI'IN EX 49 (continued)
CCNHNI' ION EX 49.C.
ISSUE: IERO oculd nct %mtaly handle the monitorirq of sut t.uitially more em- than the 100,000 instzucted to 1%t to the Reception Center.
ANSWER: It is FDR's position that this issue is currently being addressed by the OIe3 ASIB. Insofar as is cwnu.unu. lata, the response to CCNIEN1'ICllS EX 49.A, 31 and 49.B address the alternate methods and means to be used in arranging for personnel and agiirmunit to assist in the acmitoring of em- in numbers greater than those assumed in the plan.
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._ , p 4we,i .=- a a _ _ _ . _. + e - .m-72 CatmMIIN EX 50.
ISSUE: 'Iha exercise results demonstrated that IERO emergency persmnal had zwt been %=taly trained. F ifically the governments contend that IERO workers had not; been adequately trained in:
50.A Responding to unanticipated or unzehearned situations; i
50.B Following and inplementing the inm plan; 50.C Ccomunicating pannamary and sufficient data (includes ia=== raised in CNIENTIN EX 23 reporting skL@ted dose data as actual innamnunants) ;
50.D Following directions of supervisors; 50.E Exercise good judgment afri use ocaman sense in dealing with emergency situaticos and innla=artting the inm plan; I
, 50.F Dealing effectively with the nadia in providing timely, accurate, consistent and rgwiflicting informaticm; 50.G Non-inm workers have not been adequately trained.
l 50.H Eunupcy worker radiological exposure wikul measures includirg dosimetry and the use of KI (includes issues raiaad in CNTENTICNS EX 27 and 28).
9 i
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. 73 CGE!!NTIN EX 50 (otmtinued)
ANSWER: 'Ihm Pila Report states that most of the meercise i
inadarrw ima id11d11dere identified and evaluated as either Deficiencies car Areas Requirire cm 4dve Action,1dere attrLh*=hle to breakdowns in the LIICO trainirq program. 'Iha acercise dancmstrated that many of the par +4a4=nts 1 sere adequately trained in their roles in the event of an emergency. However,
) in the instances idare the par +4ni=nts demonstrated inadequata actions, it is Miam's position that the effectiveness of the training program naast be
! enhanced to assure that emergency response personnel will be able to carry cut their assigned roles j
within the framewedt of the plan.
l-With regard to the various subparts of this
- ocutention, it is N 's position that in sofaras the contentions accurately reflect the ocntents of i the acercise twL, no response is required for j subparts A - H and EX 23, EK 27, and EK 28, sinos all of these subparts cita various Deficiencias or ARCA's directly freut the Pl!A Report. 'Iha listing of i the various issues in Tables 3.1 to 3.11 (and in the body of the report) ocntain the FDR r=mr=narxlation for better training for many of the iaan-tabulated. 'Iha remainder of the subparts to this
- ocntantion are addressed below.
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- - . , . . _ . _ _ _ . - . . _ , . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ ~ . _ _ _ _ _ _ __- _
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74 CXNIENI'IW EX 50 (contirmand) i CDm!NI'IN 50.I.
- ISSUE: LHCD's pA for undifyirg the trainity program do not adequately address the trainirq issues 4 identified by FEMA in the PEA Report.
l
! ANSWER: It is FEMA's position that emergency workar trainirq involves two issues. In the RAC review of Revision 4 7 and 8 of the plan, FEMA states its positicut on the j evaluation of the LHoo respcmse to trainirg 4====
raised in the PEA Repart. FEMA has not been able to verify if the actions proposed by LHID have been
=v===Nily otsqdeted. 'Ihm effectiveness of LUID's emergency worker trainirq program is an issue of emergency r ,=r C -- that would have to be evaluated at an exercise or drill.
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l m 75 U C2fE!NFICE EK 45
. 1 03mNFICN EK 45.A l
ISSUE: Casamications p@l- observed on the day of the
- exercise affected IIID's Mility to rempord to A
the e m *ir=1 impari4=arit messages.
f i
ANSWER: As indicated in the response to ocntention 21.F, l FDR identified a deficiency at the EOC resultirq l
fran IEID's delayed response to the imperiimarit L a M messages. This deficiency was caused by a lack of internal ommastication and failure to inform the Evacuation Cocedinator of impari4=arit problems in a timely unnner. In addition, pertinent information was not included on scais message forms used in ;
l relaying information to field respcmders. These
! casamication problems clearly affected IERO's field l j response to the simulated impartinarits as well as l l FDR's ability to evalusta that response in the j field. IERD's field reopense to the fuel tank truck
{ 4= par 44=arit could not be evaluated; and the lack of j l appropriate iriornation to r + -4 to the gravel '
l truck imperiimarit resulted in an Area Requiring C tive Action.(1) i 1
1 To the best of FDR's knowledge, based on observations at the EOC, IERO followed the l Plan and relied upon Evacuation Deute Spotters to relay route 45=ri4 ==rit i information to the EOC. Since the impartinarit W were injected at the EOC rather than in the field, FDR judged I that the failure to provide appropriata 1 equipment to the one impar 44=arit response that was evaluated in the field, would l have been facilitated by the tqward flow of information fram the scene.
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s 76 ,
J CINIENTIW EK 45 (ccntimed)
CINIENTICN EK 45.B 6
ISSUE: IEC perscrmal at the Patchogue Staging Area did not foll w CEIP 3.6.5 in processing a request freut the EDC to dispatch a bus and driver to assist in L +dng children fma the Ridge Elementary School. .
AlWWER: '1his issue has been addressed in the HNk response to CXNIENTIN EK 39 subpart EK 42.B.
As stated in the PEk Report (see pp. 66-67), it took f
l- forty (40) nimtes fma r-4p_ of a =====ya from
! the IIIC BOC to dispatch a bu's driver fmn the
! paw = Staging Area to simlate the evacuation of I
children fma the Ridge M1% S&ool.
Accceding to CEIP 3.6.5, the Bus cocedinatcr at the BOC is responsible for the ocueunication of iriwdden to the Fini Pcpulation Bus Dispatdar l
j at the Pa N M Staging Area. To the best of l FilMA's knowledge,1230 personnel followed the rh set forth in OPIP 3.6.5 and thus this problem was classified as an Area Requiring C=4dve Action, rather than a Deficiency. As the j Repcet indicates, it was cheerved that dispatch of f the Bus Driver fma the Staging Area was not
! timely. FEMA I N that the Bus Dispatcher (i.e., Fial Population Bus Dispatcher) should be pewided with trained staff at the Patchogue Staging Area so that the Bus Drivers can be dispatched in a tissly manner. 'Ihis is a rescurces, training and logistics issue rather than a ommuunication problem.
GNHNfIW EK 45 (otatirmand)
G N HNTIM 45.C ISSUE: IEIC did not follow eve Azza CFIP 3.6.3 of the Plan in - r@ the Federal Aviation Jdninistration (FAA) and the Icng Island Railrced (I2RR).
ANSWR: As stated in FB R's PEk Report, there was same confusion dring the meercise regarding the proper asthod of -.M4 the FAA. Althou$1 the FAA did not per+irt=*= in the February 13, 1986 meercise, Revision 6 of the Plan ot:1tained provisions for l direct notification of the FAA by IERO. On the day '
of the meercise, the responsible individual did not
{
i i
have a specific point of ocntact for the FAA. '!he j I2RR was not notified during the esercise h==
l there were no pvw. lares in the Plan for audi notification. As a result of these problems, FDR identified two Areas Requiring Gn.i idve Action and
! made the following N tions:
1 4
l o 'Ihm IERO puw 12res should be reviewed and revised as par ===aq to ensure that points of centact with the FAA and 12RR have been i
designated; and that the means for i
- notifying the I2RR are in place.
1 j o IZRD EOC staff should be trained in the
( appropriate puc.iares so that the FAA and ,
I2RR can be notified in a timely menner.
TJim's responses to these issues have been reviewed as part of the RAC review of Revisions 7 and 8 of i the Plan.
I 78 i GMHNfICM EK 45 facetimed) ;
GNNNTICH EK 45.D .
M l Issue: 'Ihere were cassunications breakscans in the haniling of technical data regarding real and projected does l
rates, distanone at Wdch -=usents were made,
- and distinction between Luco end DOE monitoring data.
j ANSWER: 'Ihm PEA Report (see p. 40) identifies three (3)
Areas Requiring Corrective Action relating to the
{
! ocusamications and handling of does assemament data j at the I5 0 EDC. 'Ihe 74fic Areas WMng ,
l Corrective Action and rwi== proposed by LHID are l
- l. as follows:
l
,i o 'Ihe dose assessount status board in the ;
i r I
accident assessment area (of the IERO BOC)
- had to hte both DOE RAP and LHID l field monitoring data. 'Ihere were not I enough columns on the board to keep the two (2) ocurces of data separated (NUREG-0654, II, I.10) . LHIO has agreed
! to modify the dose assesmeent status board i to h te data fremtboth DOE-RAP l teams and LHC0 teams. 'Ihe effectiveness ,
, of these plan modifications and training
! of the IERO does =W staff to meka l use of the modified status board would
! have to be evaluated at an exercies.
i I
i 4 1 :
I L
~,-,,-w.a pem,,,--,,.w
.=. - __ . -. _ _ _ - .--. . _ _. . .. . - - . .- _,.
I i
79
! CIMHNI'IGT EX 45 (ocritirmed) l CXMHNTICN EK 45.D (ocntimed) 4 o 'Ihe dcunwind distance of a 1manitoring ansple was ir- 4dy iwM as 7000
- matars instand of 700 asters for one of j
' the thyroid doses s wa by a IXE-RAP -
! field acnitoring tema. 'this arrer was i
caused by a himal point m4=p1==4 during the conversion of the distance units and a
asent that the initial calculation of thyroid does based on this measuruummt was 9000 mReuVhr at 4.3 miles downwind instead i
of 9000 manuVhr at about 0.5 miles downwind. Abcut five (5) minutes elapsed l before this arrce was found and corrected (NUREG-0654, II, I.10, F.10.d). LIIID has i modified Procedure CPIP 3.5.2, Section 3.5
, to specify that all distances i yu tad by
) IXE-RAP teses are to be recceded in miles by the does mW staff at the llDC.
'Iha effectiveness of this plan change l would have to be evaluated at an encarcise.
ll 6
j
)
i i
k i
a I
i
O 80 V
CC3mlNTICN EX 45 (ocntimed)
CX3mlNTICN EX 45.D (ocntimed) o During the repceting of the initial DOE-RAP thyroid doses, only ano field usesurunent, the 1400 neum/hr namenwament nede at about 1204 at two (2) miles frt:m the plant, was available.
1his value was used at the IER3 EOC to
& u.yulate doses at other distances. 'Ihese
^
^
w u ywlated data were i w W as actual
- 6 at other distances rather than as projected data on the does assessment status board. It took two and one half (2.5) hours to identify and correct this error (NUREG-0654, II,I.10). LIIco has modified Mim 3.6 of
- OPIP 3.5.2 to require that idian field data is j reesived by the does assessment staff at the EDC it be identified as an actual measurement or as w m. ,ulated data. Based on this diange,
^
all &^m. ,ulated data are to be posted under
- the section of the dose =W status board l labeled " projected data." The effectiveness of l this plan change would have to be evaluated at l an exercise.
l The revised rue.dares have been evaluated by the i RAC in its review of Revisions 7 and 8 of the Plan.
The adequacy of plan changes is a planning issue.
l
[
l t
81 d CNTENTICN EX 45 (continuedi CCtmNTIN EX 45.E ISSUE: The maicnal absence of the IERO Director frun the EOC ev= nard roca and the lack of key events or evacuation status boards in the ev=nand rean substanHally inpaired the ability of u mard personnel to perform their duties under the Plan.
ANSWER: As detailed in the PEA Report (see p. 42), two Areas Pur-nanded for Inprovement were identified durirg the exercise that relate to the availability and handling of information in the erd roca of the IERO EOC. (1) There was no key events or evacuation status boards posted in the ocenand roca and; (2) there were several timaa when the Director was not in the v.m==rd roca to take calls over the RECS telephcme or the dedicated telephone. While these problems were hrved during the exercise, it was detarmined that they would not inpair the ability of ccanand personnel to perform their duties and would not adversely inpact public health and safety.
Based cm the Federal evaluators' observations, FDR made the followirs r+_-- =-daticms toward enhancing the availability arrt harxiling of information in the comand area:
1
82 GMENTIM EK 45 facritimed)
OCNHNTIN EK 45.E (contimed) o IEey events and evacuation status boards should be posted in the causnd roca.
i.
l o Any paraennel responsible for answering the telephone W an the Director's i responsibilities require his presanos outside the ocumand rocza should be trained to take the message in writing and then carry it to the Directce lamediately upon i
71Mim of the transstission.
i I
i i
i
}
l t
}
}
)
%)
CCNI!!NTICN EK 45 (ocntimed)
(INTENTICH EX 45.F i
ISSUE: 'Ihere were manerous breakdowns in the handling of emergency information in the BfC by Public Information and ance control personnel. .
1 ANSWER: FDR has prwided answers to this ocntenticut in response to the issues raised in CXN111NFIG4B EX 38
! and 39. A key point, however, is that FDE identified insufficient ocpying capabilities at the Dec that resulted in delays in the distrih*im of l information to the media and rumor ocntrol personnel as a deficiency. In response to this deficiency, IIIID has made the follwing anMfications to the Plan:
l o An additional 12R0 spokespersmi and additional support staff have been added to the DIC staff to facilitate the coordination of information at that i facility; ard o Procedure C.'IP 3.8.1 has been changed to provide for the electronic transmission of information to the Rumor Centrol District offices ard call boards using oceputarized I. time sharing equipment.
nw revised r.--.t= deve been evaluat.d by the RAC in its review of Revisions 7 and 8. 'Ihe adequacy of plan changes is a plaming issue. 'Ihe effectiveness of any plan change would have to be evaluated at an esercise or drill. t
.l l
84 CX3mlNTIN EK 45 (contimed)
^
CX3m!NTICN EX 45.G ISSUE: IEIID personnel at the Staging Areas did not follow I'
the Plan in obtaining, r h aing, transmitting and acting upcm emergency information.
i ANSWER: As detailed in the PER Report, three Areas Requiring m.mv. e -1.d .ah
- ocssmanications at the Staging Areas. 'Iha vific l ccmourns and LHCO's proposed solutions are as
- follows
'o Instructicms for the driver of the ncm-instituticmaliM mobility-iW bus to rM to the Wim cantar i
( . ore not properly given to the bus driver at the Brookhaven National Laboratory l
l Transfer Point. Instand of being directed I to the Wim Center by the Transfer Point coordinator the Bus Driver .ns
, directed to the amargency worker i Deca 1tamination Nility (llNN). 'Ihis was despite the fact that a ====arra frtaa the Bas Dispatcher at the Patchogue Staging Area at 1145 had been transmitted to all l Transfer Point coordinators requesting all
- bus drivers arriving at a Transfer Point
[ before 1600 be directed to the Reception center (see pp 65 and 67 of the Pl!A j Report). LIICD's respones that the l Transfer Point coordinators' training will
( be modified to ensure that they relay
! instructions to frtaa the Staging Area i coordinators to the Bus Drivers.
85 g3E!NTIN EK 45 (ocntinaad)'
L Cx2m!!rrIN EX 45.G (otmtirmand) o 'Ihm Patdxque Stagirq Area has Dispatcher ande repeated statements with a bullhorn '
emphasizirg only that general ~~1= tion evacuation route nas Drivers were to call in if a rendirq of 3.5 was reached on their direc, reedirq dosiaster (IRD) . He did not give the units mammiated with the
- 3.5 raaber rnr did he mention the use of the 0-200 EGaa IED whidt is supposed to
- trim the first call-in at a readirg at or above 200 neus (see pp. 68 ard 69 of the PEA Report). LIICD's response that trainirq of Imad Traffic mid== and Bus Di.n MA. (assigned to the Stagirg Areas) will emphasize the need for givirg l
precisa exposure mhul briefirgs to l
emergency field wodcers.
1 o 'Iha status board at the Riverhead Stagirg Area was updated per4Mir=11y; but the time was not always facluded when new information was postal (see pp. 72 and 73 l of the PEA Report). TTim's response that Stagirq Area personnel training material will be Wi1' led to ensure that the time (s) information bootees available will be posted on status boanis.
- _. . . . - . . ~ . - . . -- . - - . . - _ _ _ - -.
. . m. ;
. /,
, ; / 86 \
4 s
.s / ,
t CCNIENFIM EX 45 focntirud) '
' +
33 1 L g
cx:NIENFIN EX 45.G (contirmied) s
, e s 'i v
s , ;
na roundial acticm. prepc s by Luco eices s
resulted in the plar: charges have been evalua6d by y
!- the RAC in its review c% Revisions 7 and 9. l Die ,
adeg moy of @tn chargra is a plannirq issue. 9m l s.
effectiverness of any plan modifications wcLGd have I i.
to be evaluated at an exercise or drill. . l
/.
i 4 ,
'N )r><
r .\?'
l In addition to the above ocnouns, several Arues I Roccomended for Ingsmoment were identified with < r respect to ocamunications at tim Stasc'rq Am. ,
Usam do not require a reopense on the part of LUDO 11 and no responess have been receival for review by the RAC. ':hese ocusaripirwt issuen were as follows:
4 o Ctamunication with Traffic Gu! des in the N l i .
field,was sometimes difficult dat t.o poor I radio recasticn at the Pert Jefferacts '
i i Stagirq Area. R<a noisy trancmissions !
alw ocasionally interfered with tras i '
ocnversations of other personnel in the ( !
Port Jeffersxt ocerunicaticrt roca (see pp i i
56 and 57 of the PEA Repor:). FBOL has
! rM that ocmsideration be given to (
l ingxroving the radio syster. by use of a !
i sakp @ N El M M operator to an adjacent room to cxvitrol the noise.' ,
L
. - . - .- - - = - - - _ -_ _ _ _ _ _
. -- -- . ~ _ . . . - -.- .. . . . _ _ -
i . t
-i _
! b g . gy O i GSMNFIN EX 45 (ocntimed) i
)
s (
,,,m, OCIENTIN EX 45.G (contimed) v h
o the Bus Di-y Mer at the PudM=
.t
\/ f y , s Str4 1my Area was not well enou$1 versed in
'; f' 7 tha meaning of the inf6 he
\
ocesunicated to the staff during '
( D briefings. Also, Mims were not i
>, s!
w alicited fma the staff (see pp. 61, 62 N' and 63 of the PEk Report). FBik has g reoassended that persons car -dng out
{
N briefinga should be sufficiently trained about the meaning of tares associated with
! >y plant omiditions and wind direction so I that they can 7 =in 1 these in terum l ,
tmderstandable to the staff.' The briefing j proomes should also include e tanities j
for the staff to have questims answered.
t
. s j k l o only one briefing was actually conducted l- in person during activatim of the i Riverhead Staging Area. Although
- l. additional briefings were given throughout the day over a public address system, p
? there was no e tunity for staff to ask
- s l questions or to dim == the cocedination I
of activities Wien the information was transmitted over the public address system (see pp. 72 and 73 of the PEA Report).
I i
g FBik has roomenanded that same of the I'
s briafings at the Riverhead Staging Area should be conduced in person to enable
, j ,. ' ,
staff to ask questions and dimma the
't O! coordination of activities.
E ?
') i
.f
(' 88 s.
a CQMINFICH EX 45 (crmtinaad) l CCPmlNFIQf EK 45.H
. l dng the ISSUE: Consistant and accurate inf ticn - !
, possible assistance fram the Suffolk County Police
%64. ims not eas: hanged bet: Ween the IZRD BOC
, and the Stagirq Areas.
f $
)1' ANSIGR:- FIIFA has no direct infocmaticr1 -Auing the a11Pir*1s made in this G i=a.icn. 1herefore PD E J has no opinion about these statements except that they appear to be based at least in part on l: ,
incommaticm ocmtained in the +i-14,= sutaitted as i
i IIIco's' first request for achiamirwtUin this r --- # 4'ig. It should be noted that the County (and' state) sinalators were instructed not to offer assistance during the meercise. However, as stated i
, in the PEA Report (see p. 31), near the ani of the meercise the county (simalator) ande county police assistance avaflahle to assist with the staffing of 3
various access points arcinid the Mphary of the '
10-mile EPZ tc pnnent reentry.
A e i
l t
l l
89 ,
U CCtm NPI W EX 15 AND 16 t
ISSUE: But meercise did nct include demonstrations or evaluaties of major partions of the LIIID Plan and the meergency roepmse e==hil4 ties of many pa:scos, czganizations and entities relied upon to implement the LIIID Plan.
ANSWER: With the pihlit'atice of the final FDR rule, 44 CER 350, en September 28, 1983, and the Nuclear Regulatcry miami,wt (NRC) final regulation,10 CPR 50, on July 6,1984, it has beatne necessary to clarify same of the requirements ocntained in these rules and FD9VNRC cxzenan guidance criteria hW, NURBG-0654/FDOL-REP-1. On October 4, 1985 FDUL issued Guidance Mamonndum PR-1, Policy on NUREG-0654/FDUL-REP-1 and 44 CFR 350 Periodic Requirements Wiich prwided int-reation and n1=Hfication m periodic planning and maazcise ,
i activities and other requirements affected by the biennial exercise frequency. Guidance Mancrandum ,
PR-1 states:
I l
I i l
l 90 1
\ CGmlNTIN EK 15 AND 16 (ocntirmand) ;
Scenarios for WMin meercises should be sufficiently varied so that all of the major elements of the plans ard preparedness of offsite organizations are tested within a six-year period. 'Jhs major elements of plans and preparedness are ir - ^ ' in the 35 meercise objectives entained in the August 5, 1983, memorandum: " Procedural Policy on
- Padinlogical Emergency L ,--E dr- Plan Reviews, Encarcise Cheervations and Evaluations, and Interim Findings."
With regard to the Shoreham maarcise, on Jtnia 20, 1985, NRC requested Fl!MA to schedule as full an acercise of the r:rrm Iocal he cy Respmee Organization (I2!ao) plan as feasible, to test offsite emergency r ,--r.di-- at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.
However, NRC suggested that Fl!MA emphasize evaluaticrt of the functicrial areas of emergency j preparedness related to the demonstration of '
responsa r-ah414 ties within the plume exposure (10-mile) he y Planning c Zone (EPZ).
2 It should be noted that during tha depositiczi of the FH"A witness panel, a tahilaticri showing 3ts Fl!MA standard objectives was r a id for witness connants. 'Ihis tabulatice was marked l Attachment 1 G( 17. 'Ihis revision, including the =ndified objectives, was a draft version circulated for n==nant only. 'Iha mndified objectives have not been accepted at this time. 'Iharefore, there are only 35 standard FI!NA objectives Wildt must be considered over the six-year cycle.
i
t-91 03EENIT2T EX 15 AND 16 (cmitirued)
In its October 29, 1985 response to NRC, FEMA rar-maridad two (2) opticos for exercisig the Iccal Beargency Response Organizaticr1 (IERD), idlich relies ,
upon utility employees, contractors, private organizatims and the U.S. Departaant of Energy (DOE). 'Diese two optiens were as follows:
1 i
o Option 1 - proposed that FEMA set aside all functions and exercise objectives related to i== nam of legal mi_*hewity and State and local participation.
o optica 2 - propcmed an scarcise of all functions and prweal moorcise at:rjectives.
'ntis option would meercise the current version of the IERO Plan. Boarcise whv11ers would sinallate the roles of -
)cey State and local officia1= unable or unwillirs to participate. !
FEMA emphasized in its October 29, 1985 letter to
! NRC that "the reluctance of county and State officials to participate in such an scarcise ...
would place = pan 4=1 pra_b., en its conduct."
FEMA stipulated that "[a]ny ecarcise without participation by State and local goverranents would not allow ... sufficient demonstration (for FEMA] to reach a finding of reasonable assurance" that l
! aa vriate protective naannus can be taloon offsite in the event of a radiological emergency. FEMA added that "[o]bviously, the value of such an I exarcise in the licensirs process is a determinatim which can only be made by NRC." On November 12, 1985, NRC requested that FEMA conduct the exercise in armrdance with parameters described in option 2.
On November 21,1985, FD9L submitted the p. ,-W l exercise objectives to NRC for use by T rim exercise planners.
l 1
.._._________.-_.___.________.,..__fm.__.. . _ _
,2.I - - _ . , _ _
- - ~
n-- .u. . .. . . . .._. . .
92 CCNNNTIN EX 15 AND 16 (ocntinued)
As stated in the munary of the Post Exercise Assessaant (PEA) Report, the February 13, 1986 maarcise was evaluated in accord with the general provisions of the seccmd v4rm g---::M for the mourcise to NRC by N . 'Ihis option g---:::' an ,
j
! enarcise of the current version (i.e., Rev: 6) of
!! the LERO Plan idlich 1muld anarcise all functicms and m1 emarcise objectives. Exercise ocntrollers-were to siiailate the roles of key state and local officials if they were unable or unwilling to participate in the azarcise.
N made every attenyt to ensure that preparation for and evaluation of the February 13, 1986 exercise of the T.TTm Transition Plan for Shoreham was ocmsistent with the peu t.u.. and process establiahad for other full scale Padiml_ngirml E 1.if=cy Fu ,--r.di---- (REP) emarcises evaluated by
! N Region II. 'Ihm Region designed the anarcise objectives to ensure that the anarcise would be of sufficient scope for N to evaluate the following:
! o All functicms - i.e., N would l
be able to evaluate T:rTm's and IJRO's integrated capability to W=tely aaaaaa and respond to an w idarit at Shoreham.
o Norum1 exercise objectives -
i.e., N would be able to evaluate major nhaarvable l portions of the IERO Plan.
. .- , . ., ,- - . , . . - - , . . ~ . _ , . . .. . - -
93 N Unn:ai1M EK 15 AND 16 focntir13ed)
'Ihis initial set of proposed anarcise objectives included most of PBE's standard objectives (3) that had been keyed to the varicus locaticns (i.e.,
EOC, Field Activities, Brockhaven Area Office, staging Areas, hwg worker Decentamination Facility, DC, and EOF) where they would be evaluated. 'Ihm first meeting was held with utility -
1.r - Aatives on November 25, 1985 to dimma the exercise process. SubseqJant to that first meeting the proposed exercise objectives were revised prior to the exercise ===nt to engoing plannirg dimmaims with Luco representatives.
(
3 'Ihm following standard ebjectives were not included in the initial set of objectives prrTr=ad for the exercise:
o Evaluaticn and implementaticm of iWim pathway svwdvs actions (3 abjectives);
I o Ability to make the decision whether to issus KI to emergency workers; o Evacuation of ensite p.u.-uisl; o Ability to identify and request Federal assistance; o Ability to relocate and operate ,
an alternate EOC and/or EOF; and I
o Evaluaticn and inplementation of recovery and re hy (2 objectives);
, , =, ::_ - . .= ? ;. . . ::. : .. =-- . a ...:. :_ --
- .
- : ^ -
94 s
03m!NI'ICN EX 15 AND 16 (centirnaad)
'Ihm followirq list correlates F1!MA's standard exercise otrjectives with specific objectives that were evaluated durirq the February 13, 1986 Shoreham exercise. Objectives evaluated during that maarcise are listed under the statament of each standard objective. Mare a standard objective was not evaluated, this is so indicated. Daarcise objectives affected by the legal =*Mty issue are marked with an asterisk (*).
- 1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities s w ily.
j EOC 2 ED 2 Dic 1 SA 2 BfDF 1 FIEID 17, 18
- 2. Darmstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock. ,
- j. FIEID 19, 20 L
.=- .:- - - . = - . : _ ._.- 2 . a . . -.. ~..::n.; =.::.:-.- --.....
95 OCN11!NTICE EK 15 AND 16 (carttimed)
- 3. Desuzistrata ability to mka hiaiens' ard to cooniinata einergency activities..
EOC 8*
SA 8
- 4. Demonstrate W =ry of f eilities ard di T ays l to support amargency operatials.
BOC 4, 6*, 7 EOF 1, 2 3 HD 4, 6, 7 1!NC 6, 7*
SA 4, 6*, 7
- 5. Deersistrata ability to ocamunicate with all weinta locaticais, organizations, and field p u.=nu=1.
EOC 1, 5*, 7, 11*
HD 1, 5, 7, 9 SA 1, 5, 7, 10
- 6. Demonstrate ability to mobilize and deploy field monitoring *aa= in a timly fashion.
l FIEID 2
. , .. ...n., ., - . . . . . . , -
c... .. . __ . ..
96 CCem!NTICN 15 AND 16 (ocntimed)
- 7. Descristrate wuriate equipment and wh for Waminirq ambient radiation levels.
FII!ID 3
- 8. Demonstrate wuriate agiipnant and g - etnins for inaamirement of aid u- radioiodine ocmountrations as low as 10-7 uci/oc in the presenoa of noble games.
9 FII!1D 4
- 9. Demonstrate wuriata egiipnant and
- s. - *tivins for collection, L--yus.t.
and analysis of SSEples of soil, vegetaticn, snow, water, and milk.
Nota: Ingestian pathuny otrjectives were not evaluated during the 2/13/86
- ex rci.e.
[- 10. Dentmstrate ability to project W to the public via plume avenaire, based cm plant and field data, and to derarmine wuriata protective naamnins, based on IEs, available shelter, evacuaticn tima estimates, and all other appuriate factors.
HO 10 1
--.--.~,---w-weAm er,e - , -~w-
l t-97 m
C3m!NI'ICN EX 15 AND 16 (otmtinued)
- 11. DEKmstrate ability to prUject W t to the public via ingestim pathuey exposure, based on field data, and to der ambs aan.vriate gui ctive maasntres, based on PAGs and other relevant factors.
i Note: Ingestimi pathuey objectives were not evaluated during the 2/13/86 maarcise.
- 12. DWacnstrate ability to implanant gui ctive actions for ingestian l- g pathway hazards.
l Note: Ingestion pathway objectives were not evaluated during the 2/13/P6 exercise.
- 13. Dancmstrate ability to alert the
- public within the 10-mile EPZ, and dissaninate an initial instructional manaage, within 15 mimtes.
Eoc 13*, 14*, 15*, 21*
l
[
- 14. Demonstrate ability to formt1 ate and distribute aau.vglate instructions to the public, in a Hmaly fashion.
Boc 15*, 21*
i
. . -. .,m . -
w w J. -r 3w-w a- 4ms---w-er-- w-- -- =v---m-rm w w -- - y +--*iv-yew---w-w w- w ------'m + r -- F- - - -*" s ~F
98 O
V O2mNFIN EX 15 AND 16 (centinued i
- 15. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources pamaamay to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.
4 EOC 16*
FIEID 9
- 16. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources -7 to deal with 4==44-sts to evacuaticm, such as inclement whether or traffic obstructions, t
EOC 17*
FIEID 10*
- 17. Demonstrata the organizational ability and resources pamanaag to whul amaaa to an evacuated area.
EOC 19*
FIEID 6*, 11*
i
)
l 1
-w---- --- w y v- cy. ye-y,- - - ,y9-w-swy-,--e-w4-,y g -p,,-.---s ew,-w-m---%- yey- www-rw--w
. . _ . _m _ _.
99 s
CCNIDTfIGT EX 15 AND 16 (ocntinued
- 18. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources - w to effect an orderly evacuation of acbility-iW indivM=1= within the pluma EPZ.
FIEID 13, 14 i
- 19. Deermstrate the organizaticmal ability and rescurons -q to effect an orderly evacuation of m 2cols within the pluma EPZ.
EOC 20*
FIEID 16
- 20. Demonstrata ability to continuously acmitar and ocotrol emergency worker exposure.
l FIEID 1 FIEID 8 l
- l. z, . . ' - - . - - _ . . . . . . _ . . - . . - _ - _ _ . _ . - - _ _ . _ - . _ _ . . _
i 100 l' _
CINIENTIN EX 15 AND 16 (ocntimed
- 21.
Dear:
1 strate the ability to au0cm the i
decision, based on pt*mmined '
critaria, whether to issus KI to l emergency warloers and/or the general !
l population.
Nota: Demonstration of the ability to nedce the decision regarding the use ,
of KI was not included in objectives to be evaluated haranaa PDE developed the initial set of exercise objectives before the tedinical ,
= ----t- - of the somnario had been I
sz _ :=4 by T:rTm for FDR's review l
and approval. It is New York Stata policy that KI will not be zm'r-nanded for use by the general population. With r== =t to 3
emergency workers, IEBO rwv=nanded KI ingesti:rt based on technical amaamamarit of the wih t t geted in the scenario. 'lha w ur iaten us of that r=v=nandation was obsenM by Federal evaluators at the IEBO EOC en the day of the exercise.
l
?
l l
l l
l
. . _ . . ~ . . . - . . . . . . , . . _ , . . _ . -..-...,--,..._,__,;_..,-..-.___.,._..._., _ _ . . . . _ . .. - _ _ _ . . . . . _ . , _ . _ _ _ . . . _ _ , , - , -_
101 GNITNFICN EX 15 AND 16 (ocntinued)
- 22. Demonstrate the ability to supply and i
administer KI, anoe the decisim has !
been made to do so.
FIET.D 7 i
- 23. Demonstrate ability to effeEt an I orderly evacuati m of ensite puma.maaisl.
l Note: evac 2atim of cnsite personnel was not evaluated at the 2/13/86 i exercise.
I 24. Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate ani timely manner. L ENC 3 t
- 25. Demcmstrate ability to provide l advance ocordination of information released.
EOC 13*, 21*
ENC 4*
l l
9
-e-- TT" W 77T--mr-- y + -p epeP TN-m7+-mtW-Tw-rww w e qeeg w 'w me h aem y-e-+---m,5- %4 =mw-+--wemweew-mee---' e m* ----- * --"*-
102 CCNI'ENI'ICN EX 15 AND 16 (ocntinued)
- 26. Demonstrate ability to establish and operate rumor ocmtrol in a cocatinated fashion.
Dic 5
- 27. Demonstrate Wmey of g - twins for registration and rMinlogical Bonitoring of S W 1am8E.
FIEID 21 l
l t
- 28. Deersistrate Wmey of feilities for mass care of ev='saan, i
l FIEID 22
- 29. Demormtrate Wmte agiimarit and sv inlis for decantamination of emergency workers, agiir==1t and vehicles.
l-i DfDF 3*
- 30. Demonstrate adarymey of ambulance facilities and g.cettres for j handling contaminated indivirhmla.
1 FIEID 23 l
l l
i
f 103 d GimmdIM EK 15 AND 16 (contirEJed)
- 31. - Dammstrate miarymey of hospital facilities ard g - tires for
, hardling ocntaminated irdiviam1m.
1 FIEID 24
- 32. Dumonstrate ability to identify need for, request, ard obtain federal assistance.
Note: This was not vifir=11y listed as an objective to be.
l evaluated during the exercise. It N was however an = M of the demonstraticms hawma IERO requested ard received radiological acmiterirq assistance frtet DOE RAP Team at Brookhaven National h.L.u.y.
i
- 33. Deer 21 strate ability to relocate to ard operate alternate EOF /EOC.
Note: This objective is DEC anolicable since both the IDF and the EOC primary facilities are outside the 10-stile EPZ.
- 34. Demonstrate ability to estimate total population exposure.
Note: Recovery ard why considerations were not evaluated during the 2/13/86 exercise.
, .. - . . . . . - _~ - -. - -
I 104 f.
OWENITCN EK 15 AND 16 (ocntirmed) i
- 35. Demonstrate ability to datmuina and inplemorst wuys.iata lamaantres for ocntrolled recovery and rehy.
Note: Recovery and w h y considerations were not evaluated during the 2/13/86 exercise.
In addition to PDR's standard objectives, the following objectives were also evaluated at the February 13, 1986 Shoreham exercise:
i EOC 9* Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the emergency responsa with county and State officials. (Bole of Stata and/or county officials simlated by FDR designated i =. . 1) .
EOC 10* Descristrate the ability of the designated l official to determine the need to obtain Stata assistance. .
EOC 18* Demmistrate the organizational ability l nanaamai'f to effect an early dismissal of schools within the 10-mile EPZ.
r
, SA 9* Demonstrate the ability to dispatch to and I
direct emergency workers in the field. ,
FIEID 5* Demonstrata the ability to provide backup public alerting, if m 7y, in the event of partial siren failure.
-e vv'--**h -P=----'wr-ge- pww c--rg4 e ey .-e--y--,e-g.- .w ww,g--qw%w,,-w-p3--y g www , --+--g - --
105 03m!NITGi EX 15 AND 16 (ocntimed)
FIEID 12* Demmstrate the adarytary of evacuation bus
< transfer points incindirq access and parkincytransfer areas.
- l FIEID 15 Demonstrate a sample of resources par =maavy to effect an early diamianal of acticols within the 10-mile EPZ (to be slaulated out of sequence, if weiate) .
It is Fl!NA's position that the above exercise l objectives required mobiliution of LIICO's Terwl l
Emergency Response Organizatim (IJiBD), its l
- pamewmel and resources in sufficient number to verify the reah414ty to respond to an widant l scenario. Furtbarw5re, the February 13, 1986 emarcise enabled Fl!NA to evaluate the integrated
<==hi14ty and a majce portion of the basic elements existincJ within IIIDO Transitics Plan and IERO organizaticn. 'Iha Shoreham amorcise was equal or greater in scope otspared to any other full-scale exercise evaluated by Fl!NA Region II to date. While FI!NA desires the fullest possible ocap14ance with the criteria of NUREG-0654/Fl!NA-REP, Rev.1, our objective is to foster the development and enharvwnant of radiological emergency plannirg and preparedness as fillly and rapidly as possible within the m -Lcaints of Federal, State, and local capabilities and resources. 'Iha objective of swiama that involve stata and local participation is for Fl!NA to be able to make determinations en the adarytary of offsite preparedness on the basis of reasonable assurance, not absolute certainty.
. a -. . . . . _ . --_ _ _ _ - - - . - -
]
(
106 i m L T
- d C3m!NTION EX 15 AND 16 foontinued)
!- 03m!NTICH EX 15.A l
ISSUE: Public notification capabilities of irrim includirg sirens, the IIICO EBS system, and Wh1K Radio, were not tested, used, demonstrated, or involved in the anarcise. 'Iha immina identified in the =hw and additional subparts of this oczitantion are as follows:
1 16.C Walk radio did not participate in the azarcise; l 16.D No other radio stations participated l in the exercise; 24 'Iha siren system was not e=11y l activated during the exercise.
i ANSWER: Actual testing of public alertirq and notification systems was limited since most activities including activaticri of sirens and tone alerts, airirq EBS maaaagna, and other public information initiatives were either shulated or not deemstrated. Prior to l the anarcise, IIIco mar-p=arit made the himicri that the siren system would not be sounded as part of this exarcise. Activation of the siren system needs to be actually tested in the future (frta FENA PEA e t, p. 34).
E .... _ _ . _ .__._ ... .- _ __.._ - _ _ __ _ .___ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ .=- _ __ _.. _ ____ ____ _ . -
J 4-a ->Me - m- n-~ a- - 6 6A mv +-- A b b +4 a 4-e 107 O
Q2rmdiM EX 15 AND 16 (ocntimed)
CCNEFFIN EK 15.A (omtimed) i WhIK radio did not participate in the February 13, 1986 esercise. MaM cn activities cheerved durirq the meercise it was debamined that all EBS messages l
were prepared and cocedinated in accordanon with the
- Plan. OPIP 3.3.4, Mirm 3.1, requires that activation of the p.4 notifistien systemt est talon place within fifteen (15) milmtes of a decision m the specific protective acticzi zNtims that are to be put to the pihlir' via EEE
====ary== . In all cases the sim lated siren soundirq occatrred within fifteen -(15) mimtes of the rkimiczi by the Dir-tuir. of Iocal Response (fra FEMA PEA repcet, Table 1.2, p. 26) .
As stated in FEMA's amended answers to Suffolk County's First Request for Maiamiens filed January 27, 1987, other radio stations relied upczi as part of the EBS Systemt did not participate in the meercise. FEMA evaluated ev=iination of EBS messages with MAIK Radio as the primary insert station. FEMA Regien II does not as a matter of practica require the participation of nor does it evaluate the perftwmance of the secondary stations l
in an EBS network for other nuclear power plants in t
l New York and New Jersey. 'Diis is consistant with the practice of other FEMA Regions thrrw*vu* the l
country. It should be noted that the use of NAIK Radio as the primary EBS insert station was reveiwed l
and approved by the RAC in its review of the plan that was in effect en the day of the exercise.
l
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l l
i i 108 C3rmRIM EK 15 AND 16 (ocntinued)'
C3m!NTIN EX 15.B I
ISSUE: PWnus for rutifin=tirut of the p2hlin in the water partica of the EPZ were excluded fma the l
j exercise in that the U.S. Coast Guard did not
! participate in the exercise (other than W the receipt of one or more telephcme malls). 'Iha absence of U.S. Coast Guard participation in the exercise is C3m!NTICN EX 16.B mih==ad herein.
ANSWER: Prwwtwas for notification of the pihlin in the water portion of the EPZ were implananted during the exercise by the U.S. Coast Guard. FDOL's evaluation ,
- of thsee activities on the day of the exercise was limited to the observation of IERO's communicatims with the U.S. Coast Guard from the EOC and telephone intsrview of the Coast Guard officials in New Haven i by the Federal evaluator. FDUL's dar'imien to limit r I
the cheervaticn to these ocamaInications was based en ranr=nandation of the DDT RAC mamhar who stated:
l i
Cannander Iycn plans to participate with cme boat (fundim and other comrational couanitments allowim) in the exercise.
l Additionally, of course, ha plans to participate in the tv==and and control and nemminicatims part of the exercise. i
--. . =. a. = . = . = - = .---._.._.-.... . = : - . - - - - - - = - = . c = . _ :- . = = - -
109 i
CGENfIW EX 15 AND 16 foontimed) cgm!NFIN EX 15.B (certtimed)
I believe thema * ., .Li should be a more than adequate for tha' exercising of
. the plan with respect to actions regarding the star part of the EPZ. 'Ihai w Lust thing is to mourcise the -=le=tions -
link to the Coast Guard and to memiinata operatim s with thma. 'It is not important to have the Coast Guard move cna of its boats, which they do contiramily in rrimal operatims.
Since actual dispatch of the U.S. Coast Guard's
' patrol boat as ocnditimal, coupled with the DDT RAC mamber's advice, Pl!Mk decided not to evaluata ,
the notification of the pihlin en the water partion of the M. <
During the searcise, the Fl!MA evaluator directly [
obearved ammunications fram the noc between Izno and the U.S. Coast Guard both by telephone and by radio. Additionally, during the azarcise, the FEMA observer verified, with the Coast Guard that the Coast Guard took er similated prctactive actions for i the pihlic notification in the star part of the EPZ. 'Iha Cbast Guard similated the establishing of a Maritime Safety Zone for the water part of the EPZ and similated making emergency radio brmdemats to all ahiming on the distress frequencies. 'Iha Coast l
l Guard also d4apatched a patrol boat to the water part of the EPZ for amaaa u.=da.vl at 1020. 'Iha boat was en scene 1127, reported the area clear at 1151 and returned to New Haven at 1736.
~~'
- . . . . - . - ._.--... _ _. . - z _ ---.-,..-...... . ::*.L. w . . i-' L ---- - _ - -
l l
l 0 cgm!NTIN EX 15 AND 16 (ocritimed) i 03mNTIN EX 15.H ISSUE: The <==h414ty for implementing gvWdvs acticn rur-mardations for the public en waters ard transients en beaches ard in parks was excluded frcat i the exercise. Share was no demonstration of the ability to evacuate the water particn of the EPZ.
The absence of U.S. Coast Guard participation in the 1
exercise is CCtm!NTIN EX 16.B mihannart herein.
t ANSWER: @jective EOC 16 required descristration of the l craanizational ability (emphasis added) to manage an l orderly evacuation of all ce part of the 10-mile EPZ including the water partion. 1his involved evaluation of IEIC's ability to cocedinate f notification of the imh14c and access ocmtrol in the l Water partion of the EPZ with the U.S. Coast Guard diich was satisfactorily daarnistrated (see Response to 03m!NTIN EX 15.B) . @jective EOC 16 also would I require the coordination of activities to notify and implement svwdve acticms for transients in parks and on beaches within the 10-mile EPZ which is not wifically menticmed in FDR's Pl!A report. l However, it is Fl!NA's ui-A. Zing, based on in= par +4r=1 of the siren coverage map, that the siren systant is capable of providing audible alert signal throughout the 10-mile EPZ including beaches and parks.
l I
i
111-
- N ENI'ENTICN EK 15 AND 16 (continued) n GNH!NTICE EX 15.H (continued)
Cbjective Field 9 required dearmstratim of a sanple of rescuroes rw=amary to inglement an cederly l
evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile EPZ. As l described in Secticn 1.7.3 of FDUL's PE3L report (see pp.19-23) this did not involve an evaluatim of the -
ingleanentation of prot: active actions for transients m beadies and in parks or demonstration of the ability to evacuate the water partim of the EPZ.
However, FDUL notes that the acercise scenario was -
for a winter weekday (i.e., February 13) when very few transients would be expected on the bendies, in parks or en the water partion of the 10-mile EPZ.
f 'Iherefore, in light of the circu-.6s sununarized I \ above, the impleunentation of isut=Yden actions on beaches, in parks and m the water was not evaluated during tha exercise. 'Ihm inplementatim of these
- activities would have to be evaluated at an maarcise
{ that would involve different weather ocoditions as required by NOREG-0654, II, N.1.b (Exir:r iaan should be conducted under various weather ocmditims) .
__.h_..
.-,
- _.a--, ,--,..,,-_?', --
r I
112 i O CthumHM EK 15 AND 16 (ccritimed) ,
i CCHIBEIN EX 15.C i
1
'Iha meercise did not include the evaluati al of ISSUE:
M ndin dimasmination of infonnation.to the public.
ANSWER: '!he RAC in its revist of Revision 5 of the T rim Transition Plan found the NURBG-0654, evaluation criteria G.la-d, related to a ocordinated
( dinamminaticn of isi dat to the FN in to be adarymte. In addition, in 1984 the FD R panel i
reviewed the public iri t.ica brecture and the -
mw-ire 1984 issue of T rim's newsletter, "Keepirg l
current" and tastified cm this issue before the ASIB r
(CGEDEIGIS EX 16 and 18) . ,
It is FDR's Urdw. Jing that at the tinha of the j February 13, 1986 meercise, LIICO had not distributed the informational material called for in the plan to the general public . Sinoa the public infcenation broctures had not been distributed, it wx11d have been irw e iate to evaluate distribution of that material or to sample public awareness. It should be noted however, that it is FDR's position that the public information material nust be distributed prior to full power operation of i
the plant.
l l
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--e -v v To w N- e-- c. y , ---g , .pw-7% -p-,-c .wwgmec ,y-q.--w,,y_.,,,g.~y-g,e---e.%--m---e e-w+, ..m _ E,w
L 5
113 02m!NTIW EK 15 AND 16 (ocntimed) 02m!NTIN EX 15.D i
ISSUE: 'Ihm p - inus for evacuation of heepitals within
[ the 10-mile EPZ was not evaluated d2 ring the exercise. 'Ihn issues identified in the =ih===4 s4t. of this whd.im are as follows:
16.H 'Iha hospitals in the 10-mile EPZ did not participate in the exercise;.
16.I 'Ihn nursing and adult homes in the 10-mile EPZ did not ptrticipate in the exercise; 16.J Apar'i=1 f eility receptist centers outside the 10-mile EFZ did not par +1r irate in the anarcise.
l ANSWER: FENA testified en this issue before the ASIB in 1984. In response to the planning 00t011!NTICH 72.D, Fl!NA stated:
'Iha plan does not intend that evacuatim l
would be rarv=manded for these hospitals.
As stated in PImarknu OPIP 3.6.5, page 1, sheltering will be the primary protective actim rarv==anded for John T. Mather, St.
Charles, and Central suffolk Hospitals.
'Ihm following sectim is taken fran the above referenced page.
-. - L._. - . . . . _ - . - _ -. _ - _ . . _--_.____:-_. .
n,r 7 .. - - -. ;.c - - - - . - - . . .
7- I
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.s 1
g .
.g _, .l i: 114 s .
?(}
.Q s CCNN2ffIW EX WAND 16 (centinued) ,
3 ;
u r4
'tN ]!X 15.D (corf.1:2W) i \
i l
}gyIE 4 i I
c
=
SHE22! RING WILL BE 'HE PRIMME i 1- PKm!)CIIVE ACTICH RECCMENDATIN PtR MMHFR, ST7dIMtLES, AND <
1 NYM -
+EYA
, t M IO >
.5 W5& M
- s
' SymnTNG AFKEiED BY 'IHI!3R $ ,
SHEJClut!!lS. IF AN EWGA2'ICt1 IS
\
G!lCHtED BY 'IHi!3R AIMINISHtA2GIS l KR ATL CR PAIE OF 'DEIR PATII!NP roWIATIW, ARRANCEDE!NIS WIIL BE g
s 'HA!E IJSING AVAIIJREE RESOURCES." x s ,s a
i ,
i-Also, based on the RAC review of the plan, NUREG-0654 element J.10.tI wous founi to be , s adequate. '!his was due to the fact that the hospitals in Firwt are.imar the boundary of the 10-mile'EPZ. 'Ihe ASIB in' its ,ta,imica concluded (p.
291, XI.B.5): ,
' 4
'Ihe 'E.c$rd apeau ulth IELD and FDR that nursery schools,, adult hcmos, nursing
! hcmes, and at: hor vial feilities within the EPZ are not inpport organizaticms within the meaning of NUREG-0654, S=t+ ion 1 ,
l II.A.3. 'Ihese feilities have no assigned Lule to support the overall amargency e ,
response effort. 'Ihe only actions t expected of these organizations is to act P
i 1
theseselves frcst radiation by either t i sheltering or evacuation.
i
.- _ __._ _.. _ _ ! ! ._____._.__..-______a_____
1 ng:.
ic ,
}.
f
, 115
>: m
- v. .
<[
,a k 02mlNTICN EX 15 AND 16 (contimed) ji f ~
f "
02m!NIIGT EK 15.D -(contimed)
I Ptzrthernrwe, the Board also stated (page 307):
/&
4 ,
3 We conclude that LIICO's Plan for svWdve actions for hospitals is a .
reasonable one. The planned actims are not in violatim of NRC's regulatims or i
guidance en aimorgency planning.
- 3 For the reasons stated above, the dancmstration of s suc.&2res for evacuation of EPZ hospitals and 2' s' i nursing er adult hmes with relocation to similar s
perial farilities outside the 10-mile EP3 was not
- s. 3 an objective of the exercise. Since hospitals and other v 4=1 farilities have no assigned role to support the overall emergency reopense effect, FBR does not, as a matter of policy, evaluate their evacuatimi plans as part of the REP program. The i
o miarey of these sub-level plans end their l < = =hi14ty for implementation are reviewed by state
__ , ._- agencies that are directly responsible for the i certification and/or licensing of those facilities.
FDR Regicn II does not as a matter of practica require hospitals to participate in REP azarr'iama,
%L as 1w ru.s a to medical drills as required l by NUREG-0654, II, element N.2.C. 'Ihis is consistent with FDR's practice in other regions I
- thrmghout the country.
jv.
.- . . - - ~ . . . - . - _. _ . . - . .
/' , .c 6
.116 M CGMNTIGT EX 15 AND 16 (ocntimed)
,,Y >
f.; <
l'4 '.
' 'C C3mNFIGT EX 15.E ,
i ISSUE: PWnw for the shelterirq of school children pg were ncrt evaluated durhg the meercise. ?
O
' ~
ANSWER:
- In 1984, ITE 'Mied before the ASIB that sdx)ol officials would b'e espected to take svwdve nt, actions for students under their supervision similar 4 ';[ to those -xiad for the general m1= tion.
m' - '
Annistirg and supervising school children is part ,of
- & the scbnnla' Ivw=al functicm, although specific l
l- acticos differ with the type of energency. c,,.
t i
w/ 'Ihe Board agreed with FDR's position and stated:
'Iha Boazd finds that LIICO need not obtain writtan sp. - - - d. with schools, and that the written amargency plans required by New York State are adarrate to provide
! reascmable assurance that adarrata l- protective naamnus can and will be iBplSDented in the event of an emergency o
at the Shoreham plant.
l r For the reasons stated above, the demonstration of g
- s. -*-twas for the sheltering of children at h1 was not an objective of the exercise. FDR, Reg $cn l II did not as a matter of policy, evaluate school emergency plans as M of the REP program.
Maquate s%1 emergency plans are required by the State Board of Education as part of the school certification process.
L
?
I
-,L.-,,..Y,..- , 5 : , . n . -- . an- . d.- .:..,..,__,,..s..----:----._..----,- . . , - . . . - - - - , - - . ~ . - - -
t k
117
\ U.uwmdiM EX 15 AND 16 (ocatinued)
CCtm!NFIGT EX 15.F ISSUE: PBE did not observe any duecmstratice of the 1 ceganizaticmal ability panammary to effect an early d4=m4==al of schools within the 10-mile EPZ nor was the iglemorrtation of early dl==4mmal g - - t nw n\-
cheerved durirg the exercise.
ANSWER:' As stated in FDR's PEA Report (see p. 38), a
~
demonstraticn of the organizational ability i
n=n== mary to afrom an early d4=miemm1 of schools within the 10-mile EPZ (objective EOC 18) could not be observed at the I2!BO EOC. 'D11s was h1==
officiala of both public and private schools were sin 21ated to have been ocntacted by the responsible IERO school coordi-Lu. fran their homes prior to caning to the EOC. In these contacts the officials were advised not to oper. their schools due to the emergency situation.
'Ihe aau.4 used during the exercise is ocnsistent with ans of the provisials of the LIIc0 Transition Plan. Appendix A provides as follows fc,r early diamianal or ncrM:pening of schools in the event of a radiological emergency at the Shoreham Nuclear i
Power Station :
ll
. . - - . -. - ._ ._ _ - .___:.__ .-. = _ = . .- - - . _ , , . - _ . _- _ _ .
118
- OCNFENTICN EX 15 AND 16 focmtimed)
OCNENTICN EX 15.F (ocatimed) f If school is not in session and an Alert or b4M emergency classificatica is declavut, school offin4=1= will be advised to cancel cla- for all s: tools in the EPZ until the amargency is terminated.
I FENA's evaluations in the PEA iwt (see pages 43 and 66) regarding observatics of the r - tnas to implement an early diamiaaal or an cederly evacuation of schools (objectives FIEID 15 and 16), -
t l were haaad on interviews with school officiala and O bus ocspany personnel responsible for the l h Studs ;Liing River School District and actual
<+=vvatics of one school route ocupleted for the Ridge Elementary School (Icrxjview School District) using I2SO resources. As noted in the PEA i w L cmly the Stuas ;Liing River School District participated in the February 13, 1986 exercise.
Prior to the exercise, T.TTm maparyamant made the
[
daciaion that other school districts were not to be included in the exercise. FINA ramunanded that in the future all schools m st be included in all Federally evaluated exerciaaa and drills.
l.
l l
l l
l l
t l
l . .
119 h
omHNTIN EX 15 AND 16 (certtinued)-
CCNHNTICN EX 15.F (ccritinued)
Based on interviews with Studs ; tiling River perscainel and e=1 observation of IEIO resources dispatched to the Ridge elementary adx)ol. 'Iha PEA Report states the follwing:
- o Stuas ;Liing High School - seventeen buses were dispatched (simlated) for isaampus6ticr1 of students back to their hcznes. 'Iha riimmianal acticms were inplemented by the Superint-iA.L of the i school district. 'Iha bus ocupany, whidi is under ocntract to the school district and available at any time, was notified and dispatched two bemes to the high school. Drivers were given detailed maps of routes to follw and instructions to 1 pust back to the bus depot upon ocupletion of their routes (see PEA, p.
43).
I i-
. , , .,._._.a___;_..,_._-..--__
r 120 O ummunM EK 15 AND 16 (contimad)
COm!NI'IW EX 15.F (continued)-
o Ridge Elementary School - sinoa schools would already have been closed, an actual demonstratim of the organizational ability z=mmaman to affect an orderly evacuaticm of schools within the 10-mile Egg em1ri not be observed at the IEE40 EDC
, (EOC 20). '!his exercise objective was met
- as dammstrated in respcmse to a free play
=====ga inserted to demonstrate this activity. A free play ====aga reqtating i school bus resourons to assist in L-@@ forty children fra Ridge Elementary School was given to the Evacuation Coordinator by the Exarcise Centroller at the IEE40 EOC at
! w A taly 1030. In a 1041 ====ag= the pertinent information was tv=mt'.icated to the F 4=1 Populatim Bus Dispatcher at the paw = Staging Area, requesting that a bus be picked up at the United Bus l Ocupany. Coordination was effected with the Superintendent of the Imgwood Central i
School District, in which Ridge Elenantary School is located, to confirm arrival of the bus. Arrival was confimari at about 1323 but it was noted that the bus had not yet arrived at the Reception Center. 'Iha l
l Reception Centar was contacted and
( requested to inform the Public School l Coordinator at the IERO EOC when the bus arrived.
_ _ . . ._.m_.
. _ _ . - . ._...,.._u.=__________.. . . _ . . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ . _ . _ . . _ . _ .
121 (m GGrn# FIN EX 15 AND 16 (carttimed) 02m!NI'ICN EX 15.F (ocritinued)
'Ihm Bus Dispatcher at the staging area rut-.pd for cna bus to aimlate the ,
evacuation of forty children to the Recepticzi Center, based on a IElO EOC rec [uest. 'Iha driver was familiar with his function and followed his directions very i
well. 'Ihm objective of descristrating a sample of resources par,mamary to effect an orderly evacuaticri of schools within the 10-mile EPZ was partly met at the PatM_= Staging Area . (FIELD 16) (See PEA, p. 66). 'Ihis was hacanaa the staging area took forty mimtes to dispatd1 the driver. Fl!NA r='r-aridad that the Bus Dispatcher be provided with trained staff support so that a s Drivers can be dispatched in a more timely manner.
i ,
s
.. a , m. _.. ., & > _ e . . _ . . m -
l 122 C 1
. \s CNIENFIN EK 15 AND 16 (ocritinued) l i
ONIENIICN EK 15.G J
ISSUE: Prnewknas for the evacuaticn of schools were not evaluated by FDR during tha' enarcise. 'Iha 4 ====
identified in the = h w and not separately admitted stiLyau.t of this mi idon are as follows:
16.F Only a limited number of St u.d.= ;W River School District personnel participated in the azurcise; 26 other school districts both inside and cutside the 10-mile EPZ did not .
participate in the anarcise;
- 30. T.TTm was unable to provida
. supplementalw' .aimipw.tatial needs for a school evacuation in a timely -
i nenner.
{
l 16.G Only two bus drivers fran the St u.dsr i'c.iing River School District participated in the emarcise.
I t
I l
l l
J
- _. -_ . ... _ .2 , u ;-._-.__. _ _ .- _ ..._..._. ...u _ __,._, _ _____,_ _ n .. ___._______- _ .. _ __
r e
123 c.
O V CCNH!NFICN EX 15 AND 16 (ocntinued)
CCNIENTICH EX 15.'G (ocntinued)
, ANSWER: As stated in FEMA's response to wi-siian 15.F, l
since schools would have already been ciceed when an evacuation FiMdve Action Mcm (PAR) was taken, I2!BO's organizational ability to effect an orderly evacuation of schools oculd not be observed at the EOC MM cn exercise events. Also, only the Ku,.as 1. ling River School District par +1mirated in the February 13, 1986 exercise and FEMA N that in the future all schools inast be included in l
all Federally evacuated exercises and drills. I1!NA Region II did not, as a matter of policy, evaluate school (i.e., sub-level) amargency plans as part of the REP program. Nevertheless, school participation l is rarv==aridad so that FEMA can evaluate IJ!BO's I
! coordination of PAR implanantation with the responsible acticol officiala.
l .
As stated in r+w to CQF11!NTICN EX 15.F, FINA's evaluation of the ability to demonstrate a sample of resources r=namaag to effect an orderly evacuation of edicols (FIl!ID 16), was M*M en IERD's response to a free play manaaga. Nhen the general populatica evacuation PAR was immM, this free play mamange was inserted whicit required IERO resources to assist in l
the evacuation of a school.
I l
l 124 dmizif1N EX 15 AND 16 (ocntinued) 03mN1'IW EX 15.I .
ISSUE: Prneminu for dekemining, immiing and implementing Lut.c'dve Action Par ==andations in the ingestion
- pathway were not evaluated during the maarcise. 'Iha i==== iriar*4 fled in the =+===i and not separately admitted =.h-+-t. of this contention are as follows:
16.A Cuu - ?ia_t did not participate in the scarcise; 37- IZlO failed to inplement ingestian pathway protective actions as follows:
37.A No raramandations were made beyuxi 10-miles;
, 37.B No rur==andations were made for animala other than dairy animalm; 37.C No rarv==endations were nada j fruits, vegetables, drinking water, etc.; and l
37.D 'Iha Ground Depositicm Calculation Worksheet was not ocupleted.
i 1
I
(
l ;
..-..-..a.-..-.-.._-._-.=._..__.--.-. _ . . = - - - - . = -
125 CNI1!NTIN EX 15 AND 16 (ccntinued)
CCam!2TTIN EK 15.I (ocritinued)
ANSWER: As stated in FEIR's.respcmas above, the testirq of all major plarmirq and s ,--14-- elements ir-gated in the 35 exercise objectives is mt; required in every full scale exa cise. FEIR's policy permits that all exercise objectives be daarmstrated within the sise-year cycle. It should be noted that idian NRC requested FDOL to sctiedule an l exercise they suggested that FDR emphasize evaluation of the functional areas of energency s ,-rc-- related to the dammstration of respcmse <==M14 ties within the plume exposure (10-mile) Energency Planning Zcme. Consequently, FDa and InCO agreed that ingestion pathway objectives would not be a part of this exercise.
211s is entirely in accord with past FDGL practice.
As of this date, the State of New York has not participated in e full-scale exercise of ingestion exposure y=U. miry for any of the three operating sites located within its borders. The sounario which was developed by IECO, and approved by FDR, I
!. was one which did not require the implementation of ingesticn pathway PAR's. If ingesticn pathway objectives had been selected as part of the exercise development, an entirely different scenario would have been rwuamary.
126 b C3m!NTIN EK 15 AND 16 (ccritinued) 03mNr1W EX 15.I (omitinued)
In the scenario used, the release pattany selected was an indirect path to the erwironment whereby the released rad 4Wvity passed through both HEPA filters and a charcoal adh bed. 'Ihese affluent
.' treatment systems essentially aliminated any pare irulate radinar+1vity and adanrhad nVially all of the depositing chaminal ferns of M inin44ne. It is these species which enter into
- the ingestian pathway to any w =iable extent.
i i-l 0:risiderinJ that there were no ingestion pathway objectives and that the scenario was developed and I approved on that basis, the participation by the State of Cu.-Iirnt whicti was limited to ocaemnications was reasonable and appropriate.
i l_
'Iha IERO parkininants did not, so far as FINA nacertained, extend par's beytaid the 10-mile EPZ.
l Nor did I2!E rarv=nand PA's for animala other than chiry cattle (either within ce beyond the 10-mile FPZ), ranr=nand PA's for water or other foods, or ocuplete the " Ground Deposition Calculation Worksheet for Particulate Radianuclide Relaaama".
- 4 I i
i l
l
.. . .. .. - , , . . . . , .-. . . -. - . .. . . = . - - - - -
..----.~,
127 O
CCNIHfrIN EX 15 AND 16 (continued)
CCNHNTIN EX 15.K.
ISSUE: Prrv'ertnus for monitoring ard decentamination of vial feility evacuses were not evaluated during the anaercise.
ANSWER: 'Iha daeanstration of g -- tnus for monitoring and decantamination of v ial facility evacuees was not an objective of this ecorcise. 'Iha process of monitoring and deocntaminaticn, if nandad, is the same regardless of the location of the acnitoring site. As stated in the RAC review of the LIICO l plan, the locatics of the r% Lion centers for many
- j. of the v ial feilities has not baan designated in the plan.
! It has been a stardard operating g ---twu of FDIA Region II, ragotiated with and agreed to by the State and affected counties, not to activate all feilities (this applies to reception centers as well) ider*ifIed in the plan during an moercise.
Instead, FDik has evaluated a sangle of feilities .
j at eacts ecorcise, on a rotating basis, to assure
! that all facilities identified in the plan (including reception contars) azu evaluated within a
! six-year period. 'Ihe process used during the Shoreham exercise is ocmsistant with the one that l FDR Region II has baan using in all full scale acercises held up to this date. As stated in Section 1.7.3 of the exercise report, the only reception contar evaluated durirq the exercise was the Nassau County Colisunnn.
i t
---.. . ,. ,. ,n. ~ ..---,.r + . . - ~ - . .. u - . r : - , _ _a a,- : :-. a = : . . - : -- . ...:- :. : 2 ~--- " : . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - :-----
.e 128 i
GGrelilui EK 15 AND 16 (certtimed)
~
t C N ENITCN EX 15.M.
ISSUE: Procedures for, and activities related to, the implementation of recovery and ranky were not evaluated during the maarcise.
ANSWER: As stated above, recovery and r .Ly activities were not objectives of this scarcise. 'Ih a F D R evaluation of p ,---4-- around nuclear power sites involves the evaluation of the 35 standard Fl!NA objectives over a six year cycle. There is no requirement that all 35 abjectives be evaluated in l
any one maarcise. Per NBC suggestion, FEMA
. amphasized evaluation of the functional areas of amargency r ,--rC^- related to the dancmstration of respanse <--hilities within the pluma exposure (10 mile) Emergency Planning Zma. Further, the r Envirmaantal PrtW*4m kjency guidance on recovery l
r and rwidy activities is in draft fcca and has not been WM for inglementation. 'Ihm csaission of recovery and r h 4 ebjectives is consistent with
^
other FDR full-scale scarcises in Region II.
i i
1 l.-------,m,-,,,r.,,.,,,--_, ..w,,,-.m,_,,,w,,m.m.m,,,_,m,_.._-,#._,,,._._.m4a.m.,,a:.A:, ._;.__.__,__,.
, , 7, _ _ _ . _ . ,
129 ,
4 CCBEENIIW EX 15 AND 16 (ocntimed)
CI2m!NTI N EX 16.E.
ISSUE: Das participation of Marketirq Evaluations, Inc. was not evaluated durirq the meercima.
L
[ ANSWER: LIICO made the decision prior to the maarcisa not to activate the y w; rx*4fi*ian system Dizens were not to be soundsd) at any time charirq the meercise.
! Acacedirq to the plan, one of the treo functicais assigned to M M i's Evaluations, Inc. is to 4
conduct a survey of residents to establimb if a f par +im1=v siren or sirens failed to sound when activated. Sinom there was to be no siren activation, there was no reason to evaluate the performance of MarketiIg Evaluations, Inc.
In additicm, Marketirq Evaluations, Inc. is assigned '
- the responsibility of makirg randcat telephone enlla I l to assess the progress of any evacuation that has baan rM. Sinoa the public did not ach=11y evacuata durirg the anarcisa, the evaluation of this activity was also ir-ey # iata.
I i
4 I
i l
- ~-v-~ er w sm ~my , y w,e ymm e e-- w w , , m rp- -www,,-_ y w,rm w.we -m--m m-,-
_ , + _- .. - . . . . . . - - . . - . . = . . . . ~ . - . . . . . . _ - . - _.- . _ - - . -_
k 130 O
CCIm!NFIN EX 15 AND 16 (ocntimed) i CIRm!NFIN EX 16.K.
ISSUE: Sama bus ocupanies listed in the Plan did not 1
participate in the anarcise.
ANSWER: Fl!E does not require that all L.-Wstion resource suppliers listed in the plan be involved in i
any ana Federally evaluated amorcise. As stated in i NUREG-0654, II, N.l.a, an anarcise is an event that tests the integrated capability and a major partion of the basic elements existing within emergency p ,--1.di - - plans and organizations. It has been a f standard operating ph of Fl!M Regicri II to evaluate a sample of bus ocupanies listed in the plan at any full-scale anarcise. However,
=W=1t exercises should test a sample of the remaining bus ocupanies in an effort to evaluate all resources identified in the plan within a six-year cycle.
i i
i i
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n i
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i
%---- , -gmyc-w -M h 7- ,, , _ w w w,_,%[ , n.h -w %nw - - _ . _ - - - - _
4 131
\
GamlNFIN EX 15 AND 16 (contimed)
OC3mlNFIN EX 16.K (contirmand)
In ceder to evaluate IEIC's lifw.ied capability to gewide bus rescurons in the event of an seargency, IllMk independently selected a representative ramber ,
of bus routes to be run an the day of the auszeise.
Ei@rt of fortyh transit dependent general y=1*im bus routes were selected for demcmstration. Ras drivers to drive those routes were piM at randcan by a PEMk avaluatce from the large number of bus drivers at each of the stagirq Areas. 'Ihm routes to be demonstrated were selected on the basis of two 1cuy critariat (a) the -
-- -f im, based on 711Mk's review and analysis of the scenario that at lasst amargency plaming zones i A - J would be affected by an evacmantion raccamendation, and (b) demonstration of the routes
- would require the activaticm of four of the eleven I Transfer Points listed in the plan. (4) ,
i 4 It should be noted that zones A - J involve twenty bus routes that would
! require activation of up to four Transfer l Points (see OPIP 3.6.4, attachment 5, Rev.
5) l 1
t l
l
[
?
.t AA _A-
1 I
)
i 132 O
V' CGtBINFIN EX 15 AND 16 focntintaed)
OCNDINFIN EK 16.K (ocntiraand)
Bias 2xmite free play ====arpm= were insertad at the Transfer Points. It is i yu 6 A. to note, that the
. free play message w w used by FilMA Region II was reviewed and endorsed by GAO in their Report to the
! congrees entitled "Marther Actions Needed to Improve Ilhargency Preparedness Around Nuclear Power Plants" dated August 1, 1984. On page 31 of that ei, under "Doercises Are Not Uhannounced" the GAO stated:
I n a federal emergency y g-z C ---
criteria states that ses escarcises should be unannounced; however, this has not occurred har== of difficulties in obtaining participatim fra the responsible states, local govemments, and l volunteer grcLgs. nar== stata and local goverments prepara somnarios, sans federal sacercise observers have questioned the effectiveness of escarcises in testing response m=h414 ties. Mayobjectto l those being tested designing the scenarios and believe that at a minima escarrie==
f i should include surprise events. Saen ,
Regional Assistance omstittee members believe that FINA's introduction of surprise events in acercises would be an acomptable substitute to unannounced
! exercises and would allow for a response
! more closely ressabling that of an actual accident. Se Director, FDIA Region II, 1
l agreed. He said that the region began introducing surprises in exercises more than a year ago (late 1982).
133 h CX3m!NTICai EK 15 AND 16 (ccritimed)
CramNfICN EK 16.K (ocntimed)
Surprises have been related to bus eveauation and traffic control and have h=1r=4 assure that state and local governments acre fully test their onpability to respond to an - idartt.
Further, en page 40 of the m i., GAO endorsed the
- 4 of introducing free play =====ry== at the exercises by stating:
We believe that if state and local governments are permitted to ocntime preparing scenarios, MIMk and NRC should j
be introducing surprises into moorcises to ensure that state and local govemnants are able to respcmd to tum
. events. Surprise elements would not necessarily add more time to the enarcise, l as Pennsylva mia suggests, h = they l op. tid replaos other programuned activities.
l Also, we do not believe surprise anarcises
! would disrupt state and local govemnant a
i operations. Although the ocntents of anarcisms would be a surprise, the dates would be announced. State and local I
goverraments that are prepared for the maarcise should do well and ingtuve not only response capebility but public l confidame as well, t
1 L - -
i 134 4
CCMHINns EK 15 AND 16 (contimed)
)
CCNIENTIN EK 16.K (carttimed) t I
Bus resources that are availahla to I230 are l docusanted in the letters of agressant that IIIID has with various 9 - 14= =. Based on FilMM s l following w "-- :---ding of the plan, a
- .,___ _htive mauber of bus routes was selected and IIIID agreed to insure that sufficient buses would
- j. actually be deployed to run those routes cm the day of the anarcise:
o Bus availmhility is ascertained by the Bus Coordinator at the EOC 1dm is responsible i for <w11ing bus cxupanies (with whidt IIIID has an agreement to supply vehicles), requesting vehicles, and
- allocating them to the w , lata Transfer Pcints; i
i
! o 'Iha bus ocupanies will provida vehicles to i
l IJIBO drivers 1dm are responsible for Picking them up at the bus ocupeny yard (s) and driving them to the Transfee Point '
! where they have been instructed to go by i the Staging Area Bus Dispatcher (s);
i i
i o Evacuation route maps are supplied to Bus ,
i Drivers at the Transfer Points by the l Transfer Point Coordinators who dispatch buses to the various routes in accordance
! with the bus schedule for the zone (s) to l
l be evacuated. With the use of maps l supplied to them, the Bus Drivers are i l responsible for driving any route that may
{ be assigned to them. '
-,.---;i-L_n.._..-- . ~ , . , , . _ - _ _
135 Ocan-ilui EX 15 AND 16 (ocritinued)
CINrl!NTIGT EX 16.K (ocntinued)
In addition to the alcpt general population bus routes that were evaluated, two other bus routes l were evaluated that required the use of two additional IElO buses. Cna bus was dictd,Ed to i demonstrate the evacuation of ch pick up of non-institutics=14-5 mobility inpaired persons frcst i
the F ht--7= Staging Area. Another bus was used to demonstrate the evacuation of a school (i.e., Ridge Elementary School) requesting (similated) LERO 8
assistanos. It is FEMA's 1. E--L=miing that T: rim contracted with the bus ocupanies for more than the tan bus shes required cm the day of the exercise and that these additicmal vehicles were also used by IERO during the anarcise although they were not i
evaluated by Fl!NA.
i As noted in Fl!NA's PEA report (see p. 35), the Bus '
coordinators began en11ing bus ocupanies to determine the potential number of buses available as l marly as 0805, before the receipt of the utility r==naridation for rianlaration of the Site Area +
Emergency ECL.
I.-_-_2_.____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ __ . . _ _
1 136 03fBINTIN EK 15 AND 16 (ccritirmand) 4
- CCtfHNTIN EK 16.L.
ISSUE: Some anh11ation ocapanies did not participate in the
. exercise.
ANSWER: As stated in the respotles to 02m!NTIN EK 16.K,
) MINA does not require that all ^u--yw.^wt.icn j resource suppliers listed in the plan be involved in L
- eacti Federally evaluated exercise.
j In order to evaluate IEIC's integrated capability to provide amhilarios and ambulette resources to vial Health Care Facilities (i.e., ham 4W Facilities, Nizrsing/ Adult Hcmes, and Hospitals),
FilMA selected two of the sicAt Health Care Facilities identified in CPIP 3.6.5 using a free play sw, as recpiring IERO L.--yw.^dtion resources. See also Fl!MA's response to CCRmlNTIN ,
l EX 16.K 1 3.miing the GAO position on introducing ,,
l surprises (free play ==== age = into exercises) .
[ These facilities were selected based on FJ!MA's review and analysis of the scenario that at least ,
einergency planning zones A - J would be affected by an evacuation roccessendation.
l l
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--w-- e rw-ww.r.w,m- .w_,e + - - _ _ *w,-,---,- wwe- ,.w - b er ,.*-va,w e we - s= e
137 G2EENIIW EX 15 AND 16 (ocntimed)
L CCNIENIIW EX 16.L (ocatimed)
Based art 711Mk's s "----t-- tirig of the plan and analysis of the scenario to be used in the acercise, two free-play w were introduced requiring the I actual deployment of vehicles to ends of the j feilities listed as requiring thema resources in the plan.(5) Mien these free-play =====g== were injected, they were handled Pitim=1y by the
( IERO EOC staff. Both =====g== went frtat the special t l Facilities Evacuation Coordinator to the Health Facilities Wi>1 ster to the A=hilarica coordinator Minig to ya. ~-tives defined in the Plan (see PFA Report, p. 36) . It is FEMA's t. *----L=. ling that LIICO contracted with the ==hilarica ocspanies for more than the two health care vehicles required for demonstration en the day of the exercise. As stated ;
in the PEA Report (een p. 43), FEMA evaluators observed that six ==hilarices and six asbulettes were activated and all were dispatdied to pick up mobility-inpaired indivirhm1m.
l l 5 Only two Health Care Facilities of the six listed for eastgency planning zones A - J are identified as requiring IERO L .syw.tation resources in Attadunent 2 of OPIP 3.6.5. 'Ihema were the two facilities selected for demonstration to whidi ena ==hilarica and one anbuletta were to be riispatched on the day of the exercise.
O
i l
138 l l
CXMNNfIW EK 15 AND 16 (acatimed)
~
CXN NNFI N EX 18.C.. ;
I 4 ISSUE: 2ny of the organi'm+4ms and perscrmel listed in the plan did not ptrticipate in the exercise.
Rzrthemerre, the par +4n4=+1m of other organizations was so limited that the exercise did '
not deurmstrate the perscrmal of those participating organizations are familiar with their duties.
i ANSWER: PDOL's evaluation of IJIBO's integrated om=hilities to implement the men Transiticn Plan using a
non-IEB0 czganizations and personnel have been j discummed in the answers to previous contentims as i
follows:
o Bus ocupanias - see the answer to :
t
- CCNIENTIN EX 16.K il! o Mhilaw cxmpanies - see the answer to l CCNIENTICN EX 16.L I
- o U.S. Coast Guard - see answers to CCNTENIIQ4S EX 15.B and 15.H o Sthuns %31ng River School District - I see the answer to CXNHNTIQlS EX 15.F and I
15.G
,--, a.-- -_,-_L- - . . . - _ . - - . - - _ -.. - ._ .
139 O
CCNHNTICN EX 15 AND 16 (ocritimed) -
t 0:NI!!NTICM EX 18.C (contimed)
With r=W to the participatics of American Red Crees (ABC) 1..p _- .Ldives, Fl!NA cheerved that at least ame representative of the Nassau County
& ;2= of the ARC participated at the EOC
' throughcat the anarcise to cocedinata ARC activities with IEIC. Se ARC Cocedinator maintained omttact
~
with the Wlen Centar and Nassau County ARC c ;2 =r EW in Mineola (see PEA Report, p.,
, 32). Fl!MA also observed that several ARC c representatives participated at the Nassau Coliseum
~
to direct persens to Otmgregate care Osnters as set forth in the Plan. Regarding ARC participation at the two Congregata care Centers activated for the marcise, the following results are h=artted in Fl!MA's PEA Repert:
t I
o U.S. Marine Corps Brigade, Garden City, NY (see p. 82) l l
D e ability to maintain 24-hour staffiry was demonstrated by the ARC.
- 2 a Shelter Manager was aware of how to get any required assistanos or l support; these would be acquired through the ARC Coordinator in the 1 IERO EOC.
a 140
.GIEItfEEILEK_.11 RID _lft_Leatimm@.
CCNHNFIGT G 18.C. (centirmand) o IIIDO offica mildig, Mineola, NY (see
- p. 32 and pp. 82-83)
'nure was limited per+iairim by -
ABC volunteers drirq the anarcisa 1 due to personal work-related car # 4 e+s. ' Die capability to staff
! the facility on a 24-hour basis was
+
demonstrated throutf1 the presentation of duty rosters.
l
'ma Sheltar Manager knew to request rescurons and applies through the IElO BOC (i.e., ABC Coordinator) and the Eastern Regional Office of the ABC. l
\
i e i With respect to specific contacts between IERO and Nassau County, FDR understood that actual telephona l ocntacts were to have taken place crt the day of the l exercise. Acacedirq to I2Ico's detailed timeline, the Diz Luz of Iocal Response first ocntacted i
I~
Nassau County at 08:20 followirg notificaticr1 of the l Site Area Emergency ECL at 08:19. (0) Fellowirq 4
the decisica to activata the Reception Center 1
[
e* 7-it to notification of the General Energency ECL at 09:39, the Nassau County Pelion Depas. 6 .L :
was notified by the Decentamination Coordinator at 09:50 that the Reception Center had been activated.
'Ihis is in keepirq with OPIP 3.1.1, Section C.8 of the Plan. '
i l
l :
6 FEMA notas that OPIP 3.1.1, Sectial D.3 indicates that the Director of inm1 Response will brief organizations, including Nassau County, on the status of IZIO emergency responsa operations as appropriata.
i
. - _ _ . - - _ , _- _ _.m.m_ _ - - - - - , . - _ _ , _ - - -
i 141 L
03 M NTIN EX 21 OttmMFIN EX 21.A.
i i-ISSUE: FilMil's ocnclusims with respect to the route alert
. objectives are without hamia and are invalid. The
, sample of route alert drivers was too small and the times pac ===ary to brief, deploy and drive the rautas were -ive.
4 1
6 ANSWER: FEMil selected three of the eighty-nine siren coverage areas for the demonstraticr1 of back-cp route alerting Th414 ties during the mourcise.
One siren coverage area was selected friat and of the three staging Areas, and of W11& has twenty drivers and vehicles assigned to carry out back-up route alerting in the event a siren fails. This is ocrisistant with Pl!MA's praction for other Region II meercises. (7) i i-
! 7 It should be notati chat this evaluation of back-up rcute alerting (where such a system is i used as backup to the primary alert syntam; .
i i.e., sirens) is separate fran and in addition to the initial alert and notificaticm test required for approval of the system prior to initial licensing. The moorcise evaluations of back-up 2 tnt: alerting capabilities are also saperate fztu 31!MA's ongoing annual reviews of Stata/ licensee cFrability +ts to confirm that testing has coen ocepleted in accordance with approved s h and that the siren operability remains at or above 90%. There is to attempt as part of FDDL's biennial exercise effort to correlate the rehnt of rautas to be demonstrated at these exercises with siren operability (i.e., up to 10% failure of siren units) .
_ _.,.~._,,_a__...,__._._e_.__an.__._
_ g,. _. _ _
.+.
.-,7 - , . . . . _ .
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- .1
(.
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s( 142 >
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l hp EK 21 (ocntimed) ,
- f4 \
h' p/ p
( CGEDE'IG( .. EK 21.A (contirmand) -! h, 1
n 3- 4, ,
- '( F \ t ( i
' Emv)1 on add 0her' evaluated durire ,tbc esercise, . Jh ,;
o, c 9,. n ~ v
\ )*
. t .
FEBfs:cheesNed the following elspend pih fremt the )
r s1 p... , s e ,4 t
[ h TIM M4E ' TIM % ir h Of TIM %. tI I%
j given siMalatidjairen failures watil back-up public j
[ alertirg was acopleted: ', ) ;
s -
g g i I I
' ' J Siren Stagirq Arda t Elapsed tima [@
- .js - h p ihla i W i
' din Ei!EItes) t
, h s N> 'M
- s s .x t
% '\
! l 26 Port Jefferf .'
'90(8) .
t 1 .
ri
's ,
sy L.H i \s .
l ;
45 'c s - Patetingua s
)\ 70 ,,
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i- As r.Q in the PEk Repcet,,h,ies pp. 58, 66, and 75), '
'l FEMA concluded that theme' elapsed times omstituted j,,'
^
Areas Roccessended for Improvemnt Mid roccamanded f l that plars 'for backup route alerting thould be
, I
- rwiewed ard zwised as necessary to radiaos the time -
I i
! needed for routs alerthig. 'Ivi determination of 6.
l route alerting times as' Areas Moocusj uided for '
l Improveenant is'1M, 4 clariticaticarof alert and i notification polir.y guidance in1und 1 4r HMk '
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Headqumh.e muiNearem frim Rchert WM to i 4 b,r
- Roger KoWieski datedn Je;ril'Q,'1986 whis statast - g
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143 4 \ C3m!NPIM EX 21 (ocntimed) 03mlNTIN EX 21.A (ocntimed)
N
'!his is to clarify criteria for evaluating the Mary of redundant route alerting l (::' . ,
systems at nuclear power plant exercises.
\ e O
'!hese systems are designed to be put into
% y.'
.. effect only Wien primary systems, v4=11y sirens, fail. 'Ihare is no
'-[i
! , "hard and fast" tima requirement for the redundant route alerting systems. Primary i rauta alerting nost be done within 45 mimtes in the 5 - 10 mile portion of the
- f. I : Emergency Plaming Zone -(EPZ), and within L
15 mimtes in the 0 - 5 mile partien of
}
, '{
the EPZ. However, there are no such tima framas for redundant rauta' alerting.
\
In an exercise, if the m lation of a route for redundant route alertirq takes x '~
more than a reescnable amount of time, t
< crtly an " area reocrzanded for improvement" l designaticri should be made. Sinoa there l
I are no miniEum tima fraEms, no wa.m-t.ive actions may be IRQu1End.
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< 144 GN11NTIM E 21 (cxmtirmand) i 1
CX2 m M HCN EX 21.B.
ISSUE: PIMM s conclusions with respect to evacuation of the ,
transit-dependent evacuation objectives are without basis and are invalid. 'Ihis is har=:ma of (a) the ,
sample of resources evaluated W11ch was too amall, 1 and (b)lunsatisfactory results of the performance of :
bus' drivers dispat&md frtat the Patchogue and Riverhead Staging Areas to complete their transit-de[ Ad. general ==12 tion routes properly or in a timely manner. )
i ANSWER: As described in the respones to CCNIENTION EX 16.K, ei$1t of forty-three transit-dependent general c
s populatica bus rautas were selected for i
l demonstration by IERO cn the day of the exercise.
'!he rautas to be demonstrated were selected on the basia of (a) PD9L's assumption that at least 1
esorgency planning zones A - J would be affected by an evaczaation rWcm and (b) the desire to evalusta activities at four of the eleven Transfer Pointis listed 'in OPIP 3.6.4 of the Plan.
PD9L evaluated the transit-dependent general
~
population evacuation routes (objective FIET.D 9) at each of the Staging Areas fran which Bus Drivers were dispatched. 'this w n is oceparable to the
[
, process used by PD9L Region II where counties have
[ been evaluated separately with respect-to their respcmsibilities for bus deployment (usiry ' 2 ocntractor-supplied vehicles and/or drivers) and i population pick-up. Based cm this approad, the IeRults of the ganaral M Ation 1 bus evacuation ,
I were as follows: l
. z. . = : : . - . . - . . . _- . r L .: . . -_ ::. :: : :: .- , . .- .- .-. .--.-. . . _ L .
145 CCNI!!NTION EK 21 (ocritimed)
CCNrf!N17CN EK 21.B. (continued) o PnW= Staging Area 'Ihree of the four {
bus drivers dispatched fra the paw _=
t Staging Area were either unable to; (a) pick up their buses and gM to their <
assigned Transfer Point in a timely manner or (b) follow their assigned rauta as defined cri the map provided to them. ' Ibis unsatisfactory performanos was reported in the PEA Report as a deficiency (9) (m
- p. 66) and 71!NA r=-anded additional Bus Driver training as well as revision of OPIP 3.6.4 that would require the
() Transfer Point Coordinator to verify Bus ,
Driver dispatch forms to assure that they have arrived at the proper Transfer Point.
9 90 : 1--nt. to issuance of the PEA Report, Fl!NA and the RAC reviewed additional liim.-t.icri supplied by IIIID regarding this issue and dmi.f4 the original rating
- in the s ymt. from a Deficiency to an Area Requiring Cm&wtive Acticrt. FI!NA recognizes that there is no requirement within the plan to dispatch bus drivers fra the Staging Area within two hours of a Site Area Bnergency. 'the buses evaluated on the day of the esercise were able to ocuplete their routes within the tima frames set fetth in the plan.
However, it is Fl!NA's judgment that the dia: patch of the bus drivers fra the Staging Areas e st be expedited so that buses will be available for diapatch frm the transfer points to ocuplete their evacuation routes within the 3A lbed tima frames in all scenarios.
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146 03nr.unM EX 21 (ocritinued)
CI2m!NI'ICH EX 21.B. (ocntinued) o Port Jefferscri and Riverhead Staging Areas 'Ihm four transit-dependent general population bus routes dispatched fremt the Port Jefferson Staging Area (2 routes) and Riverhead
. Stagirg Area (2 routes) were perfnmari satisfactorily. All four drivers were able to travel to the required locations including the bus ocassany yard, the Transfer Point, the general population evacuation rauta l
with return to the Transfer Point, and then r : hi to the Reception Cantar and the Emergency Worker l
ha inatics Facility at the IEIO EOC.
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147 m
(INTENTION EX 21 (ccntirmed)
CX2MNTIGT EX 21.B. (ocntirmed)
It should be Inted that the exercise objectives EOC 16 and FIEID 9 are related to two distinct m,mh414 ties. FENA evaluated the oraanizational ability to manaae (emphasis N) an orderly evacuation of the EPZ at the IERO EOC (i.e.,
objective EOC 16). 'Ihis involved, in part, the evaluation of activities r-ty to coordinate the inplementation of bus evacuaticn of the transit-Gip =.LuL general pop 11ation that was h vved at the Stagits Areas and in the field (i.e., objective FIEID 9). As stated in the PEA N Report (see p. 35), the Trarsiipv1.Laticn Support l Coordinator and Bus coordinators worked well trvyt*har and detamitied the runhat of buses achially rwuriati at each Staging Area. 'Iha system for allocating the available buses (detmmitied through talaphrvie m11a to the bus supply ocupanies) worked well and the responsible Eoc staff dentmstrated that they were fa=414av with the w us iate r winus.
Based on these observations as well as others hn=1ted in the PEA Report, FENA concluded that IEIO met objective EOC 16.
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148' s CINIHfrICN EX 21 (contirmed) ,
CI2fIENTIGT EX 21.C ISSUE: HMA iimum-tly concluded that the objectives daalinJ with IERO's ability to effect and iglement school protective acticn options (i.e., early diamianal and evacuaticn) were ast.
ANSWER: 'Ihis mad.icn has already been answered in part by FEMA's respcmse to CI2fIBFIICNS EX 15.F. and 15.G.
In additicn to the answers provided there, the following infcatmaticn is also relevant to this contention.
o A representative of the Bus culpany that is responsible for the Stau.ds "Liing River School District was interviewed durirxJ the exercise. 'Ihis individual stated that drivers were given detailed i maps of routes to follow and instructions to lopw.t. back to the bus depot upon mlation of their routes (see p. 43).
o No children were L.cu=ym.ted in the school buses used for demonstration during the exercise. 'Ihis is ocnsistent with the practica used by FEMA at other exwiana in Region II and throughcut the country.
It is also ocnsistent with the NRC rule that public participaticn is not mandatory in exerriman, l
t
- - , _ - . - _ _ , . - , - . - - . . . . _.u t, ~ , _ _ . _ - - - . . _ - - - - - - - - - - - - , - - - - - _ . -
h i
149 CX2emulW EX 21 (ocritimed) cgm!NTICN EX 21.C (oct*LW) o The FM evaluator rode the entire bus route fmn the paw _= Staging Area to ,
the Ridge Elementary School and to the Par =+irm Center with return of the vehicle to the atited Bus Ctapeny yard..
Cantact with officia1= of the Iongwood central School District was not observed in the field. As stated in the PEA Report (see p. 38) ocardinaticzt with the
-Mt-iea. of the Iongwood school District was evaluated at the LERO EOC based on telephone calla observed to omfirm arrival of the bus at the Ridge Elementary School. This o m clusion was based cm analysis of IERO mammaryn forms, o As stated in response to cgm!NFICN EX L 15.F, an early dismiaaal of schools within the 10-mile EPZ was mlished by the
! responsible IERO school coordinators frca e
their hcmes, prior to ocaing to the EOC.
FD a does not evaluate contacts made by r w h s at their homes, at very early stages of an exercise, before familities are activated. The r -M was whereby FDR evaluated IERO's ability to inplement I
school evacuaticn are consistant with the evaluations done at other REP exercises.
, _ . _ . , _ _ . _ _ . . . _ _ _ . . . - - - . - , . . . , . . - . _ , . _ ~ . , , ,s
150 b
\ CCNTENTIN EX 21 (otmtinued) i-OCND!NTIN EX 21.C (ocntinued)
Based cm evaluation of response to a free play ma==arra inserted cut of sequence during the exercise, FDR concluded that IERO school Bus Drivers were not dispatdad fremt the Patchogue staging Area in a timely manner. In response to FDR's rar-maridation, LIICO has revised the plan to provide additional staff to support the Bus Dispatcher in the deployment of Drivers. 'Ihis change has been ah in the RAC review of Revision 8 of the Plan.
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151 O CGmNiiM EX 21 (ocritimed) ;
l j CW5tEIN EX 21.D l
i ISSUE: FDR's conclusicris that the objective (s) riaalinJ with the evacuation of institutimali M mobility -
inpaired irdiviamla were met are not justified.
! 'Ibers was an insufficient sanple of anhilances and
- ambulettes to justify FDR's generalization about l all anhilance and ambulette drivers.
ANSWER: 'Ihis whd.icn has already been answered in part by FDR's response to CMIDEIN EX 16.L. Raamri cr1 the evaluaticri of acbility-inpaiM evacuation routes, FDR ocncluded that the objectives to demonstrate evacuation of (a) institutimali-M mobility impaired individialm using an awhilance (FIELD 13) ard (b) non-institutionalized acbility inpaivind individialm using an ambulette were both met.
It should be noted that the exercise objectives EOC 16 and FIELD 13 are related to two distinct l' Thilities (see response to CMIEtEIN EX 21.B) .
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,_-,m.- - , _ _ _ . . - - . _ - _ _ _ . _ _ . . - _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _
l 152 ,
CXNNFICN EX 21 (ocntimed) l COND!NTICN EX 21.E i
ISSUE: FI!MA's conclusims with respect to the traffic and
- ocntrol objectives were rot justified.
l l
ANSWER: 'Ihe sample size selected by Fl!Mk was ocagarable (equal or greater) to that used at any other exercise evaluated by FEMA Region II. It has been a i standard operating g -- two of Regim II to evaluata sggy a sample of resources listed in the plan. 'Ihm goal is to have all feilities evaluated within a six year period. 'Ihis w e is
- ~ omsistant with 44 CPR 350, NUREG-0654 and Guidance l
j ,
Memorandum PR-1. See also FI!NA's g J e to
! CCND!NIICMS EX 15 and 16.
As irdimtad on pages ix and 3 of the PEA Report, the Report emotitutes Pl!MA's evaluation of what was I actually done during the course of the azarcise.
End of the various objectives specified for the February 13, 1986 Shoreham anarcise was observed and evaluated separately. Witnin that context, FEMA l
provides the following answers to end of the issues rniaarl in of this contenticn:
i i
! o 'Iha time between deployment of Traffic Guides from the Riverhead Stagirq Area and their arrival at 'ICPs was -ive and ranged between fifty and seventy mimtes, apprcocimately thirty minutes of which was spent distributing field kits and 3.-wtwas to the Traffic Giirk. 'Ihis was identified as a deficiency in the Pf3 i
Report (ces p. 75) .
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153 b
V omrENTIN EK 21 (ocntimed)
ONIENrICN EX 21.E (ocntimed) o only ena Traffic Guida cut of the fourteen dispatched fran the Patdvma Staging Area who were interviewed at nina 'ICPs knew the locaticn of the Receptim center. One of these Traffic Giidan me=v** that the general public was to be directed to the En u.pcf Worker D6 wiAtion Facility (EWT). 'Ihis was identified as an Area P=<=' iring Cw.Mdve Action and FEMA r=,r-nanded that all Traffic Giidan should be trained to advise motorists with questions to tune to the EBS station for the latest infconation cm all matters related to the emergency, including the ;
location of the Reception cantar to whicts the general public would be sent (see p.
67 of the PEA Report) .
o Radio evimminicaticms frca the Port Jefferson Staging Area to Traffic Giidan at 'ICPs were scanariinaa difficult due to poor reception at the Staging Area.
Althoncf1 the noisy radio Larsinaicos also w aaionally interfered with the conversations of other pm.hu l in the ev=minicaticm rocan, this was n:t considered a problent that would require wu..ctive acticm. FEMA rarv=nanded as a j
suggested inprovement, the use of a baadaat to cut down cn noise frca radio kmsianicos or relocation of the radio operator to an adjacent recan.
- - - - - - - . - - - . = - . . - - _ . ...-....---,.---.._-:-_-__.._-_.
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h O- coNrE4 rim EK 21' (ocntinued) cCNIBfIIW EX 21.E (continued) i o PSOL acknoteleckJed in the PEA Report (see l p. 57), that the +4=al 4rass of 'ICP setup oculd not be evaluated fee Traffic Guidas dispatched frtet the Port Jeffernen Staging Area. Moreover, FDDL ar*icimtad that this would be the case in planning for the
- anarcise, sirca me field evaluator was assigned the responsibility for cheerving three field activities; (a) route alerting, (b) field response to an evacuation in-riimarit problent and (c) threa 'ICP clusters. 'Ihis same sequence of assignments was given to ana field observer for both the Port Jefferson and PmW= Staging Areas. Only in the case 1 of Traffic midam dictdwi frtet the Riverhead Staging Area, did FD9L ==='t to be able to observe the setup of 'ICPs. As indicated above, the delayed setup of thcee 'ICPs was identified as a deficiency haamri en slow diapatch frtet the Riverhead l Staging Area. It.shculd be noted that during the REP exezriana, FDOL does not require the actual set-up of cones and l barriers which would i=='ia the traffic flow or interfere with the normal life of 1 the residents.
i l l
155 s
ONrl!NTIN EX 21 (ocntirmand)
, 02m!NTICH EK 21.F
', ISSUE: FER's conclusions with respect to the i==iimarits to evacuation objectives were not justified.
i ANSWER: As detailed in its Pl!A Report, Ff29L evaluated the assessment and response to two free play evacuation inpariimarit mammaryna at the IERO EOC (objective EOC 17). In additicm, FHOL attempted to evaluate the field response to these i==i4==1t problems by resourte fra the Port Jefferson ani F=hl 1f_=
Staging Areas. Both i==i4==rit prchlaans were
, intentionally situated at the conf 1tance of traffic l
o along najor evacuation routes and wre designed to entirely block the route, including both shoulders
[
of the roads where they occurred. 'Ihase i==iimarit problems were designed (1) to s a4L realistic types of probless to oceedinators and ,
M =irwMankers at the EOC, (2) to require field evaluaticn lv IERO evacuation Route SwLW., and (3) the =+=1 dispatd1 of Road crews with ;
apsylate amargency vehicles to the scene, as Swrifled in the Plan. '!he i==44=mt problems were not designed to entirely cut off traffic flow frca all of an affected emergency planning zme(s), and IERO's ability to reroute traffic using secondary roads or other means was to be taken into consideration by the FDUL evaluators on the day of the exercise. -
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156 x
CNIENTIM EX 21 (contimed)
CWIENTIN EX 21.F (contimed)
As a result of delays in K+-ding to the two evacuatim i==94=1t free-play messages and the lack of internal mienniicatim in response to the probless saa.ed, FENA 4'iar*1fied a deficiency at the IERO IDC (see PEA twt., p. 39) . 'Ibese ocasunicatim problems clearly affected IEIO's field response to the sinnilated i==ii-its as well as I
FEMA's ability to evaluate that respaise in the field. FEMA's field evaluator oculd not link up l with the IERO K-,yc -e-r(s) to the fuel tank-truck wiriarit i==44-st problem. As a result, Port Jefferson Staging Area objective FIEID 10 m11ri not be evaluated. FEMA's field evaluator was delayed in
( evaluating IEIO's respczise to the gravel truck problent when IEIO personnel at the EDC failed to L.mai it the entire message with the result that the Road Crew oculd not locate the evaluator. Also, the Road Crew was not properly infamari that the 4==ii=1t was a multiple vehicle wiriarit and the tow truck dispatdied would have been irwia'*=te to -
clear the route. FEMA identified this issue as an Area Requiring Cw.&=fdve Actim and ram-navided l
that peu. . l at the Patdiogue Staging Area should l
be trained to request more information fran the IEIO EOC when 4==44=arits to evacuation are indicated.
It should be noted that the exercise objectives EOC 17 and FIEID 9 are related to two distinct l capabilities and were evaluated separately - see FENA's response to CNIENTIN EX 21.B.
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t 157 9
cgm!NTIN EX 21 (ccritinued) 4 CWH!NTIN EX 15.L.
ISSUE: 2e availability and W=y of Cuw-pM Care Centers (CCCs) were not evaluated durirq the exercise.
ANSWER: As stated in Section 2.1 of the PEA Report and in response to 18.C, two CcEw.gete Care Centers (CCCs) were activated and evaluated durirq the exercise.
Se sample size selected by Fl!NA (two CCCs) was m- able to that used at other full scale exercises evaluated by Fl!MA Regist II. It has been a standard operating in. - Awe of Regicn II to evaluate only a sample of congregate care centens '
listed in the plan. S e goal is to have all '-
fmilities listed in the plan evaluated within a
, si m period. This w w.ch is ocnsistent with 1
44 CIR 350, NUREG-0654 and Guidance Memorandum, ,
PR-1. S e PEA Report clearly states that the two Centers evaluated were not included in the version of the plan which was being ameriW (Table 4.10, CCC ARCA #1) . While there were ime= identified in the i-yw.L which would ingrove the response at the Cu,.pte Care Centers, the only issue identified wtJ.ch requires wu..ctive action concerns the above ARCA.
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158 CCIMNFIN EX 21. (cxmtinued) 02mNfIW EX 32.
ISSUE: ' At the time of the meercisa, G g..pta Care Centers were not identified in Revisicn 6 of the LIICO plan.
ANSWER: 'Iha meercism was a daarnistration of the inplementation of Revision 6 of the LIICO Transitimi Plan. 'Iha copy of Revision 6 of the LIICO plan whi& was sukanitted to Fl!NA ocntained in Appendix B, a letter fran the Na==ati County Chapter of the American Red Cross with enclosures whi& irvihted that the American Red Cross would open G.g..pta i care Centers for the 'wcuy housing of emiaaa in the event of a radiological emergency at the Shoreham plant. As stated in the Pl!A Report, the
! two G,.pta care centers activated and evaluated at the acercism were not included in Revision 6 of the LIICO Plan. 'Ihis issue was identified as an Area Requiring Cw.4d.ve Action (see PEA Report, p.
83). ,
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i 159 i N CCNfENPIN EK 21. (ocntinued) l CDm!NFIN EX 22.K.
ISSUE: The exercise was based on the false a-=+4rrus that facilities to be used as CE.:p..:, ta care Centers would be available and that the American Red Cross would operate these centers.
2 1
Answer: As stated in the responses to CX2m!NFICMS EX 15.L.
and 02EENFIN EX 32, it is FEMA's position that at the time of the acercise there was an agreement with the Na==an County &-p =r of the American Red Cross Wildt in turn had imp. -- A. with various facility owners. FDIA has also stated that the two
( CL.g..:, ta Care Centers demonstrated during the meercise were not en the list ==1M with the latter of agreement which was ocx*ait=1 in Appendix B of Revisicx16 of the LIICO Plan.
FEMA is aware that subsequent to the exercise a nsw latter was L.--isitted to LIICO fran the Naaman Chapter of the American Red Cross which inp1ies that the prwious <=nitment is no longer in effect.
This new situation, has been addressed in the RAC review of Revision 7 and 8 of the r: rim Plan.
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s 160
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CINfENTIOti EK 21. (ccmtinued)
CX2MNITCN EX 16.N.
ISSUE: 'Iha CW,@te Care Centers evaluated during the exercise were not listed in the versicn of the Plan (Rev 6) in effect at that time.
ANSWER As stated in the responses to COGNITCHS EX 15.L and EX 32., the only two CJ,@te Care Centers evaluated during the exercise were not included in the listirn of facilities with which ths Na==an County Chapt:ar of the American Red Cross had letters of agreement cm the day of the exercise.
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f7 t )
THOMAS E. BALDWIN
'O Environmental Systems Engineer Energy and Environmental Systems Division (EES)
Argonne National Laboratory (ANL)
Garden City, New York Education Background Ph.D. 1973, Human Ecology and Demography, University of Cincinnati M.A. 1969, Sociology and Human Ecology, University of Cincinnati B.S. 1967, Sociology and Biology, Missouri Valley College Professional Experience 1983-present Environmental Systems Engineer, EES, ANL, Garden City, New York As Northeastern Regional Manager for support services provided by ANL under contract to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Dr. Baldwin is responsible for the scheduling and management of services furnished to the FEMA's
) Region I and II offices in Boston and New York City. He is experienced in reviewing V state and local radiological emergency response plans and evaluating their capabilities to protect populations living in the emergency planning zones surrounding commercial nuclear power plants. Dr. Baldwin frequently served as a Federal observer and team leader at off-site radiological emergency preparedness exercises. He is responsible for the preparation and technical review of post exercise assessment reports detailing the results of these exercises.
1982-1983 Senior ' Demographer / Economist, Energy and Environmental Analysts, Inc. (EEA), Environmental Consultants, Garden City, New York Responsible for analyzing the demographic, economic and social aspects of energy and industrial projects. Consultant to the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, New York Public Development Corporation and Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner and Smith, Inc., in assessing the economic feasibility of a satellite telecommunications facility for New York. Consultant to Argonne National Laboratory, in the review of state and local off-site radiological emergency response plans for commercial nuclear power plants in New England, New York, and New Jersey. Responsible for expanding EEA's base of clients who require assessments of economic return and the socioeconomic impacts associated with metropolitan development projects.
O 1 i
THOMAS E. BALDWIN 2 Professional Experience (Cont'd)-
1981-1982 Manager of Economics, Dravo Van Houten, Inc. (DVH),
Consulting Engineers, New York, New York r
Energy Economics - Managed marketing and project evaluation analyses of the oil and gas industry leading to corporate investment decisions. These studies were prepared both for internal use by Dravo Corporation and for clients of DVH.
Industrial Development Economics -
Developed proposals for the financial / economic feasibility of marine engineering projects that ranged in size from limited, privately financed projects to large foreign regional development programs.
Reviewed and evaluated cargo forecasts and projections of regional economic growth used to obtain World Bank fina. icing for container and bulk handling facilities proposed for the Port of Montevideo, Uruguay. Analyzed forecasts of the economic return from agro-industrial facilities proposed for the Port of Conakry, Guinea.
1979-1980 Senior Economist, PRC Harris, Inc., Consulting Engineers, Lake Success, New York I Energy and Environmental Studies -- Analyzed the demand for low pressure gas reserves in rural upstate New York based on demographic trends and economic forecasts of future residential, commercial and industrial growth. Conducted the cost-benefit analysis of erosion protection measures for the U.S. Corps of Engineers project to protect commercial and residential developments along the Indian River Inlet in Delaware. Evaluated existing socioeconomic impact models for use by the Corps of Engineers Passaic River Basin Study Group. Analyzed the economic benefits of l improving the channel to accommodate larger fishing vessels in the Woodeleft Canal at i Freeport, Long Island.
( Industrial Development Economics -- Project Manager for Terminal Construction l Corporation's site / financial feasibility study for the development of a wholesale food I
distribution center in the Hackensack Meadowlands, New Jersey. Directed regional
- planning and socioeconomic analysis of growth related to the proposed development of a l large 'agro-industrial port planned for Damietta, Egypt. Technical responsibilities to l these studies included the determination of optimal phasing and evaluating the economic return on investment from the proposed projects.
l 1972-1979 Social Economist, EES, ANL, Chicago, Illinois Socioeconomic Impact Assessments - Responsible for demographic, economic l and sociological analyses undertaken as part of a variety of research projects sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). These studies examined the socioeconomic
, ) impacts of changes in employment, population size and demographic composition that are d associated with the construction and operation of large-scale energy projects.
l l
(q v; THOMAS E. BALDWIN 3 Professional Experience (Cont'd)
Responsibilities required in-depth experience with regional economic and demographic project techniques, including export-base, input-output, and cohort survival methods.
The construction of social surveys, use of population sampling methods, multivariate regression techniques and statistical analysis of population composition were also an integral part of this work.
LDC Energy Assessments -- Developed the socioeconomic component of Argonne National Laboratory's role in the International Energy Development Program sponsored by DOE. Prepared detailed, country-specific energy assessments for a number of countries. Specific responsibilities included the identification of socioeconomic issues and problems, policy analysis, the development of research methodologies and interaction with foreign representatives. Experience with the application of econometric models to planned and subsidizad economies. Knowledge of specific econometric methods for estimating fuel-specific energy demand as a function of price elasticities was also used
- in this research.
Environmental Pollution Damages - Joint Argonne National Laboratory /
University of Chicago, Department of Economics project sponsored by the National Science Foundation (NSF) to analyze relationships between environmental pollution and the regional economy. Several studies were completed. These included: a survey of Chicago coal users to determine the costs of conversion to other fuels, an inventory of building materials to estimate the costs of soiling due to air pollution, and a multivariate regression residuals analysis that displays the geographic distribution of relationships between socioeconomic characteristics of the population and air quality in the Chicago SMSA. Experience developed in the course of these studies included survey construction
- and sampling, economic cost-benefit analysis, and the use of air quality display models.
l Professional Society Activities f American Association for the Advancement of Science American Sociological Association Population Association of America i
i Publications: Journal Articles and Book Contributions Stenehjem, E.J., and T.E. Baldwin, A Framework for Detailed Site-Specific Studies of Local Socioeconomic Impacts from Energy Development, in Progress in Socioeconomics:
1977, E. Allen and A. Crawford, eds., Ann Arbor Science Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan (1977).
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THOMAS E. BALDWIN. 4 Publications: Technical Reports Nagle, J. and R. Whitfield, Indian Point Nuclear Power Station: Verification Analysis of County Radiological Emergency _ Response ' Plans, Argonne National Report, ANL/EES-TM-228 (May 1983). T.E. Baldwin was responsible for the management and technical review of this report.
Baldwin, T.E., et al., Economic and Demographic issues Related to Deployment of the Satellite Power System, ANL/EES-TM-23 (October 1978).
Baldwin, T.E. and Roberta Poetsch, An Approach to Assessing Local Sociocultural Impacts Using Projections of Population Growth and Composition, ANL/EES-TM-24 (August 1977).
Baldwin, T.E., et al., A Framework for Detailed Site-Specific Studies of Local
' Socioeconomic Impacts from Energy Development, ANL/EES-TM-8 (December 1976).
Baldwin, T.E., A Socioeconomic Assessment of Energy Development in a Small Rural
. County: Coal Gasification in Mercer County, North Dakota, ANL/AA-5 (August 1976).
Baldwin T.E., et al., Allocating Projected Emissions to Subcounty Areas, Vol.13 of i- Guidelines for Air Quality Maintenance Planning and Analysis: U.S. EPA Report EPA-450-4-74-014 (November 1974).
Kennedy, A.S., et al., Air Pollution / Land Use Planning Project: Phase il Final Report, Vol.1-3, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Report EPA-450/3-74-028 A, B, C (May 1974).
Norco, J.E., R.R. Cirillo, T.E. Baldwin, and J.W. Gudenas, An Air Pollution impact t
Methodology for Airports and Attendant Land Use, ANL/ES-22 (January 1973).
Publications: Conference Papers (speaker's name is underlined) l
' Baldwin, T.E., Commercial Nuclear Power: Emergency Plans, the Regulators and the Public, paper presented to the New York Chapter of the American Institute of Chemists (September 18, 1985).
t Stena. ; em, E.J., T.E. Baldwin, and J.E. Metzger, Local Socioeconomic Impacts of Coal i
Deveh pment in the Midwest, Paper 12.2, Proc. 5th National Conference on Energy and the Environment, Cincinnati (October 1977).
s Baldwin T.E., J.C. Bosch, Jr., and R.R. Cirillo, Projecting Regional Air Pollution Using
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Traditional Planning Variables, Proceedings of the APCA Specialty Conference: "Long-j Term Maintenance of Clean Air Standards"(February 3,1975).
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( THOMAS E. BALDWIN 5 Publications: Conference Papers (speaker's name is underlined) (Cont'd) .
Baldwin, T.E., Objectives and Decisions: How Do We Draw the Lines?, Paper presented at the Regional Seminar on Land Use Issues sponsored by the Bi-State Metropolitan Commission, Geneseo, Illinois (January 15, 1975).
Baldwin, T.F., Community Structure and the Adaptation of Municipal Finance, paper presented at VIII World Congress of the International Sociological Association, Toronto, l
Ontario (August 26, 1974).
Kenncdy, A.S. and T.E. Baldwin, The Feasibility of Predicting Point Source Emissions Using industrial Land Use Variables: A Path Analysis, Paper 74-145, Proc. 67th Annual Air Pollution Control Association Meeting, Denver (June 1974).
Kennedy, A.S., and T.E. Baldwin, Clean Air Through Urban and Regional Planning, Proceedings of the Third International Clean Air Congress, Dusseldorff, Germany (October 1973).
Croke, K.G., -A.S. Kennedy, and T.E. Baldwin, Research Problems and issues in the 7 Application of-Land Use Controls to Environmental Protection, Proc. Interagency Cong.
on the Environment, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, U.S. AEC Report CONF-721002, pp.153-157.
Internal Reports to Sponsors (unpublished)
Baldwin, T.E., E. Tanzman, A. Smith, W. Gasper, P. Becherman.- K. Lerner, Post Exercise Assessment, February 13, 1986, Exercise of the Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan, LILCO Transition Plan for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station at l Shoreham, New York, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II (Draft; March 7, 1986).
Gasper, W., T.E. Baldwin, A. Smith, Post Exercise Assessment, November 13, 1985, Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans of the State of New York and Oswego County for Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation's Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Station at Seriba, Oswego County, New York, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II (Draft; January 10, 1985).
l Gasper, W., T.E. Baldwin, Y. Klein, A. Smith, Post Exercise Assessment, September 26, 1985, Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans of the State of New l York, Monroe County and Wayne County for the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station, l Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II (December 16, 1985).
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THOMAS E. BALDWIN 6 >
internal Reports to Sponsors'(unpublished) (Cont'd)
Baldwin, T.E., G. Kaszynski, F. Kay, Post Exercise Assessment, June 5,1985, Exercise'of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans of the State of New Jersey, Ocean County and Ocean County Municipalities for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, j Federal Emergency Management Agency,' Region II(August 22,1985).
i Rospenda R., T.E. Baldwin, Post Exercise Assessment, April 23,1985, Remedial Exercise
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of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans for the State _of New Jersey, Salem .
County _and Six Localities for Public Service Electric and Gas Company's Salem Nuclear Generating Station Hancocks Bridge, Salem County, New Jersey, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II(June 19, 1985). ,
, Baldwin, T.E., Review of the Massachusetts Radiological Emergency Response Plan for the Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant, revision dated October 1984, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region I(June 18, 1985).
Baldwin, T.E., A. Smith, Post Exercise Assessment, April 10,1985, Remedial Exercise of
- the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans of New York State and Westchester, I Rockland, Orange and Putnam Counties for the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station,
(- ] Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region !! (May 10, 1985).
Baldwin, T.E., Review of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan for.
, the Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant, revision dated December 1984, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region !(March 26,1985).
Baldwin, T.E., P. Becherman, S. Curtis, W. Gasper, R. Rospenda, Post Exercise Assessment, November 28, 1984, Exercise of the Radiological Emergency _ Preparedness
- Plans of New York State and Westchester, Rockland, Orange and Putnam Counties for ,
the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region
!! (February 27,1985).
1
-Rospenda, R., T.E. Baldwin, S. Curtis, Post Exercise Assessment, October 23, 1984 Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans of the State of New Jersey, Salem County and Sir Localities, and Cumberland County and Two Localities for Public Service Electric and Gas Company's Salem Nuclear Generating Station: Hancocks Bridge, Salem County, New Jersey; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II (February
- 19, 1985).
Baldwin, T.E., Review and Analysis of Population Estimates for the Boothbay Harbor Region, Maine for the Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, Wiscosset. Maine; Federal Emergency Management Agency Region I (January 7,1985).
[ Baldwin, T.E., Review of the LILCO Transition Plan for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. Rev.1; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II (September 7,1984).
r I THOMAS E. BALDWIN 7 O
Internal Reports to Sponsors (unpublished) (Cont'd)
Levenson, J., A. Smith, S. Curtis, and Y. Klein, Post Exercise Assessment, October 26,
- ' 1983. Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans of the State of New Jersey, Salem County and Six Localities, and Cumberland County and Two Localities for Public Service Electric and Gas Company's Salem Nuclear Generating Station near Penns i Crove, Salem County, New Jersey; Federal Emergency . Management Agency, Region 11 l
(February 6,1984).
Smith, A., T.E. Baldwin, J. Levenson, and J. Opelka, Post Exercise Assessment, i September 28, 1983, Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans of f.he State of New York and Oswego County for Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation's Nine
. Mile Point Nuclear Station at Scriba, Oswego County, New York; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II, (December 23,~ 1983).
Baldwin, T.E., Review of the LILCO Transition Plan for the Shoreham Nuclear Power i Station Rev. 4, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II (November 4,1983).
South, A., Y. Klein, T.E. Baldwin, and P. Becherman, Post Exercise Assessment, August 24-25, 1983, Exercise of the State of New York Radiclogical Emergency Response O Interim Plan for Emplementing Compensating Measures for Rockland County for the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II (September 26,1983).
~
- Klein, Y., A. Smith, T.E. Baldwin, and J. Tatar, Post Exercise Assessment, May 24,1983, Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans of the State of New Jersey,
- Ocean County and Ocean County Municipalities for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating l
Station: Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II(September 16,1983).
l l Klein, Y. and T.E. Baldwin, Post Drill Assessment, August 23,1983, Federal Emergency 1- Management Agency Observed Drill of the Westchester County Bus Evacuation Procedures for the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II (September 15, 1983).
Smith, A., T.E. Baldwin, and Y. Klein, Post Exercise Assessment, June 22,1983, Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans of the State of New York, Monroe County, and Wayne County for the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II(August 30 and October 12, 1983).
Klein, Y and T.E. Baldwin, Post Exercise Assessment, May 24, 1983, Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans of the State of New Jersey, Ocean County and Ocean County Municipalities for th9 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region !!(August 5,1983).
THOMAS E. BALDWIN
' v)
'g 8 Internal Reports to Sponsors (unpublished (Cont'd)
Baldwin, T.E., Y. Klein, et al., Post Exercise Assessment, March 9,1983, Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans of New York State and Westchester, Rockland, Orange and Putnam Counties for the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II(April 14, 1983).
Barisas, S., K. Lerner, C. Saricks, T. Baldwin, J. Opelka, D. Hulet, Review of the Orange, Putnam and Westchester County, New York Radiological Emergency Response Plans for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II (April 6,1983).
Opelka, J., D. Poyer, and E. Levine, T. Baldwin, Post Exercise Assessment, Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans of the States of New Jersey and Delaware and County and Local Jurisdictions Affected by the Salem Nuclear Generating Station; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II(February 28,1983).
Baldwin,' T.E., and G. Kaszynski, Interim Findings, Joint State and Local Radiological
- Emergency Response Capabilities for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Vernon, Vermont; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region I (September 27, y 1982).
Baldwin, T.E., and G. Kaszynski, Final Exercise Report, February 18, 1982 Joint State and Local Radiological Emergency Response Exercise for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Vernon, Vermont; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region I (August 23, 1982).
Baldwin, T.E., and G. Kaszynski, Final Exercise Report, February 6,1982, Joint State and Local Radiological Emergency Response Exercise for the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Station, Haddam Neck, Connecticut; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region I (August 1982).
Baldwin, T.E., Review of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan;.
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region I(June 1982).
Baldwin, T.E., Review of the Vermont Radiological Emergency Response Plan; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region I(June 1982).
i Baldwin, T.E., Outlook for Engineering Services in the Oil and Gas Market; Dravo Van Houten, Consulting Engineers (June 1981).
Baldwin, T.E., A Qualitative Assessment of Economic Change in Queens County, New York; Citibank, N.A. (March 1981).
\
l THOMAS E. BALDWIN 9 Legal Testimony Testimony before the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Atomic Safety and
, Licensing Board in the Matter of Emergency Planning of Long Island Lighting Company for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Docket No.
50-322-O L-3. Preparation of written testimony April 17, 1984 and August 7, 1984; Depositions June 29, and August 9,1984; Oral cross examination July 10-13 and August 14-16, 1984.
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, COSEPH H. IGIZER '
h PROFESSIQiAL'GMLIFIchTICHi , j
& i v
( i Educatim:
t.
C- ;a"g ,
Bachelor of Science'in Chemistry, WashingtaiCollege, '
w Chawtertown, MD, 1956. ,
e !
Master of Scianos in Incopanic Chinistry, Pennsylvania State University, University Park,. PA, <1958.
Graduate Assistant in Cheunistry, Pennsylvania Stnte University,'
Thtiversity Park, PA,- 1958-61.
Professional Positions: 1961-1966 _
Assistant Professor of h4=+2y at Idaho State Uhivvrsity, . !'
Ibcatello,' ID. Responsibilities included teachity courses in freolusan hi=try, W3tive analysis, instrumental analysis, I advanced imn.v dc chemistrf and laboratory radiodumistry. . .
s l ,
8/66 - 10/73 , , , _
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Engloyed at the Idaho National Engineering Iaboratory in Idaho '
Falls, ID (then called the National Reactor Testing Statim) .
The site is gew_A. owr **. and administered by the Department of Energy Research and Development Agency. I was employed by one of the operating sx1 tractors, initially Idaho Nuclear Corp. ,
followed by Allied O=mir'al Corp. My position was a technical '
me in the research and developmmt area of fissicaproduct behavior and g uy ties.
l l 10/73 - 6/74 Euplayed as research scientist by Nuclear Envirtzmental Services division of SAI, Inc., Idaho Falls, ID. respmsibilities included ocntract support m performance <Ja-a rad wate s i
processing vi ==1t! in a BR arvi analysis of scuroes of inplant '
radiation exposure to workers. *
\
6/74 - 12/78 1
i Euplayed as scientific and engineering supervisor by Allied Chemical Cuyu,.ation at the Idaho National Engineering Iaboratory.. Pfasponsibilities included supervision of a raaaamh laborau:my involved with analysis of fiscion product levels in irradiated nuclear fuel vimaris and analysis of the , fission product omtent of sanples of the worlds lat known natural fissim reactor and the supervision of an analysis labv&atory for envircrimental sanples. Conducted cmtract raaaamh in'empport of NRC.
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',' 12/7s - present
- '> , Employed as-scientist by A114=a o==4r=1 camp., Docan Nuclear
,, Idaho oo., Inc., (after 7/3/79), ard Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear
'N ocepany, Inc. (after 3/1/84), at the Idaho National Engineering i , Laboratory. Respm1sihilities include researds and developnent ocsitract support to NRC and FEMk.
s, ,
Attended Falk orientation training ocurse cal Padinlogical
- ,[
- . Emergency Prepatw21ess Planning for DOE contract Personnel.
j-,4 l Experience:
3 i i Prove axister.ce of previously tau.wdzed min- us radioiodine
- i species'to be'bypniewh= acid.
y2 1 x
- Developed ===nling device to differentiate varia_= dismical forms
, & of'nirborne radiairviina.
A \
Q, Des 1W 1-,.vorde ad=rwi=it to retain ain zus radiciodine.
(
llc Measuped giiisecus fissica products in affluents and process 1 }[, s strands,in 5 HPR's staticais.
l } .
Perfomed affluent and envircrmental --wenents to assess irvii 4. y - s ; i:Lc dose pat wf at 56t's.
t Made affluent and envirarsnental maaeniements of radiciodine at a w
phamar=*ical plant to a===== envirmeental 4==r+.
l
- Analyzed fuel aper imaris to datamine accurately the fission l g yields in the fast flux region of the neutron wL.om.
i y
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Analyzed fuel apar'imaris to establish breeding or ocmversion ratio in 21-U fuels frtan the light water breeder program.
g ,,
Developed a naspling device for airborne 14 C and3H in nuclear plant affluents and process streams.
e participated in envircreantal program to maamwe movement of radionuclides through prnmaan equipment in IHR's so that the predictive undala can be evaluatti,
./s'N \
l
's Respaisible for technkal eva,luaticn of ev==an::ial EHR off-gas systems.
s i
i Evaluated applicability of off-site, real-time instrumentation to I datamine the magnitude of umaanitored releases in accident
-, situations.
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1 liduated soil to vegetation transfer of stable casim and strmtium. i .
Reviewed cazrrent state of knowledge cri scaverging in the envi2xrument mie_us radiciodine by rain or snow.
Testified as FliMA witness at Indian Ibint' and Shoreham ASIB hearing./
Adjunct facility member at Fl!MA Emergency Marmryanarit Institute.
Publicatims:
J. H. Kaller, F. A. Duca, and F. O. Cartan, "Retentim of Iodine m Selectai ParH,mlate Filters and a Porous Silver Membrane i Being Otmaidered for the IDFT Maypack", IN-1078, Mhy '1967 ep W. J. Masak,n D. T. Ponce, and J. H. Keller, "A Highly Efficient t Inceganic hierniw for Aihis Iodine Species (Silver Zeolite) ,
- Development Studies", IN-1224 October 1968 s
'R. L. Nebekar, J. H. Haller, L. T. Iakey, D. E. Black,-
o W. P. Palica, and R. E. Schindler, "Ocntairunent Behavior of Xenon and Icdine Under Sina11ated Ioss-of-Coolant Smith =1t Canditicra in the contamination-Doocr.tamination Wr= 4=1t", IN-1394, June 1971 B. Weiss,P.G.Voilleque,J.E.Keller,B.Kahn,H.L.Kgger, A. Martin, anff C. R.1*111imi, "Datailed Measuresnants of I in Air, Vegetation, and Milk Around 'Diree Operating Reactor Sitsa", NUREG-75/021, March 1975 W. J. Nasc'c, F. W. Sprakte4' R. L. Trap, and J. H. Keller,
(_ " Analytical Results, parvemaded Nuclear Constants and Suggested l Correlatione for the Evaluation of OKI.O Fissim Product Data", at l IAEA International Synposium en the Oklo Phenomenon, Liberville, l Gabon, IAEK-SM-204/2, June 1975 l
W. J. Maeck, W. A. Emel, L. L. Dickersal, J. E. Del 2nore, and R. L. Trump, " Dis.a..y.,rcies and J. H. Keller,
. 46 RegardingE. A.2p,'Ibarmal Pu Fission Yields and the Use of as a Burntp Manitor", ICP-1092, narwaw- 1975 N. D. Dyer, E. B. Naiscinnidt, J. H. Keller,- and B. G. Notes, l
',l .,
"Prmarhwes Source Term Measurement Procream", 'IREE-1178,
! October 1977 1
N. D. Dyer, J. H. Keller, R. L. Bunting, B. G. Motes,
- l. S. T. Crmey,; D. W. Akers, C. V. WTaman, T. E. Cox, R. L. Kynaster., S. W. Duce, D. R. Underwood, J. W. Tkachyk, "In-Plant Sourm Term Measurements at Ft. Calhoun StatictH3 nit 1", NUREG/CR-1040, July 1978 l0
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I O J. - L. W, S. W. Duce, ani J. H. Kaller, "An AP- ,- Wic 1
Trititan and Carbon 14 ManitorincJ Systen", NUREG/Qt-0386, Va=har j 1978 ,
l N. C. Dyer, J. H. Kaller, R. L. BuntincJ, B. G. Notes, i S. T. Cr m my, D. W. Aloers, C. V. W Teaar', T. E. OcK, !
R. L. Ryiis-hui, S. W. Duos, D. R. Uhderwood, J. W. Tkachyk, "In-Plant Scurom Tena Measurements at Zimi Statial",
NUREG/QL-0715, February 1979 J. J. Kaller, L. W. McClure, M. Hosa, A. L. Ayers Jr., R. Io, and L. W. Barrett, "BoilirxJ Water Reactor Off-gas fq1stens l Evaluation", NUREG/CR-0727, June 1979 R. W. Benedict, A. B. 01ristensen, J. A. Del Debbio, J. H. Keller, and D. A. Ehedit, " Technical and Econamic Feasibility of Zeolite Erv'==m1= tion for Krypton-85 SL -ge", DIICO-1011, V a=har 1979 J. H. Kaller, B. G. Notes, D. W. Akers, T. E. Cox, S. W. Duca, and J. W. Tautryk, " Measurement of Xa-131, C-14 and Tritium in Air and I-131 hpLiian and Milk Around the Quad Cities Nuclear Power '
Station", NUREG/CR-1195, DiIC: . ~ 23, Mardi 1980 J. W. Mandler, S. T. Crmey, N. C. Dyer, C. V. WTamar',
s" A. C. Stalker, B. G. Notes, LT. H. Faller, T. E. Cox, D. W. Akars, J. W. Tkachyk, and S. W. Duca, "In-Plant Souros Term Measurements L at Turkey Point Station - Units 3 and 4", NUREG/CR-1629,
>~ Seg*==har 1980 ,
P. G. Voilleque, B. Kahn, H. L. Kreiger, D. M. Mcx*a==avy, J. H. Kaller, and B. H. Waism, guation of the Air-Vegetatimi-Milk Patlway for I at the Quad Cities Nuclear PcWer Statial", NUREG/CR-1600, NovenLe? 1981 W. J. Maeck, L. G. Hoffman, B. A. Staples, and J. H. Kaller, "An i
Assessment of Offsite, Real-Tima Dase Measurement Systems for l Emergency Situations", NUREG/CR-2644, ENICI)-ll10, April 1982 L. G. Hoffman and J. H. Kaller, "Charar+@mtion of Soil to Plant L Transfer coefficients for Stable Cesium and Strontium",
- JREG/CR-2495, DIICO-1105, June 1982 P. G. Voillaque, L. G. Hoffman, and J. H. Keller, " Wet Deposition Prmamaan for Radiciodines", NUREG/CR-2438, ENICD-1111, August 1982 B. J. Salmannen, L. G. Hoffman, R. J. Hankus, and J. H. Kaller,
" Guidance on Offsite Edmu.p.y Radiation Measurement Systems -
Ihase 2 - Milk Pathway", WINCO-1009, April 1984
l 1
o b W. J. Nasck, R. J. Hos1kus, J. H. Kaller, arx1 P. G. Voilleque, "IEL.'wi.y Measuresnants of Parameters affectirq Wet Deposition of .
Methyl Iodide", NURB3/G-4041, WIN 00-1003, Se[#amhat- 1984 )
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B. J. Aalurwison, L. G. Hoffinan, R. J. Hankus, arx1 J. H. Feller,
. "mtiriatica en Offsite Emergency Parilatim Measuresnent Systmas - i Phase 3 - Water and Non-Dairy Food Pathway", WIN 00-1012, '
October 1984 l
B. J. Ralmerison, R. J. Hankus, and J. H. Kaller, " Guidance en Offsite Energency Radiation Measureinant Systems - Phase 1 -
Ai h ,e Release", FDOL-REP-2 (Rev.1), WIN 00-1029, nar,nmhat- 1985 Papers:
F. O. Cartan, H. R. Beard, F. A. Duce, and J. H. Kaller, " Evidence for the Existence 'of Hypoidous Acid as a Volatile Iodine Species PW'mi in Water Air Mixtures at Tenth AEC Air Cleanim Conference, New York, NY, August 1968, CENF 680821 J. H. Kaller, F. A. Duce, D. T. Pence, and W. J. Maeck, "Hypoidcus Acid: An Ai h e Inorganic Iodine Species in Steam-Air Mixtures at Eleventh AEC Air Cleanirxr Conferenos. Richland, MA, V*r 1970, CCNF 700816 J. H. Faller, F. A. Duce, and W. J. Masck, "A Selective Adsorbent Sanplirq for Differentiating Aihas Iodine Species at Eleventh t AEC Air Cleanim Ccmf.-a , Rid 11and, NA, SeE*=mhar 1970, CCMF 700816 J. H. Kaller, T. R. 'Ihanes, D. T. Pence, and W. J. Maeck, "An Evaluation of Ma+=riala and Tactniques Used for Manitoring Air-Borne Radiciodine Specd.es at 'IWelfth AEC Air cleanim Conference, Oak Ridge, 'IN, August 1972, CINF 720823 c J. H. Kaller, T. R. 'Ihcanas, D. T. Pence, W. J. Maeck, " Iodine Channistry in Steam Air A*----;-2--
- . at Fifth Annual Health Mwsics Society Midvaar Synoosium, Idaho Falls, ID, Novesaber 1970 J. H. Faller, L. L. Dickerson, F. W. Spartkas, and W. J. Maeck, Determination of the Natural Abuh' of Krypton in the Ah- -;2 -1 at Am. Cham- W. N+1 ear ma=4atrv and 'Dar+nolcav Division Meetim, Newport Beach, CA, February 1973 J. H. Kaller, " Iodine Species Measurements", invited paper at i
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center h h en Icdine Relaaaaa in Reactor Accidents, Palo Alto, CA, November 1980 gG.VoillegueandJ.H.Keller," Air-to-VegetationTransportof I as Hypoiodaus Acid", Health Physics 40, p 91-94, 1981
J. H. Kaller and L. G. Hoffman, "E --:_-_ -i Federal Guidance on h e y Monitoring c in the Milk Pathway", at 13th Annual National Otmference on Radiation Control, Little Rock, AK, May 1981 J. H. IGeller, "Updata cm Radioicdine Mcmitoring", at the 14th Anrmal National Conference on Radiation Ocntrol, Portland, MA, May 1982 J. H. Kaller, " Iodine Sanpling Under hpcf Canditions",
invited paper at IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium, Orlando, FL, November 1984 c ,
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. ROGER B. K0WIESKI f%
( PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS
. Roger B. Kowleski is employed at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region II, New York. Mr. Kowieski is currently serving as Civil Engineer in the Natural and Technological Hazards Division.
Mr. Kowleski. holds a Masters-Degree in Environmenta1' Engineering and a
' Professional Engineer License from the State of New Jersey.
Mr. Kowleski began to acquire skills in management, planning, and design while working for the private sector. From 1971 to 1973, Mr. Kowieski worked for Louis Berger Associates where he was involved in design of interstate highways and water resources projects. In 1973, Mr. Kowieski joined USR Corporation as a Project Manager. In this capacity he was responsible for planning, design, and management of various projects in water resources and environmental fields including flood hazard identification studies, flood control, sewage treatment plants for. hazardous waste, instrumentation, and Environmental Impact Statements.
Mr. Kowleski began his federal services in 1977 with the Federal Insurance Administration (FIA) in the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
As an Assistant Director for Engineering with FIA (1977-1980), he was '
l primarily responsible fro the management, administration and implementation of l
all Flood Insurance Studies, Dam Safety. Program activities and other flood plain related activities in the Region.' In-this capacity, he monitored, supervised, and coordinated the work of approximately 25-30 private engineering consultants and federal agencies conducting work in New York, New
, Jersey, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. He also provided technical assistance to State and local officials on various flood damage mitigation t techniques and flood warning methods designed to increase the public awareness and to reduce future flood losses.
Appointed by the FIA Administrator to the Task Force comprised of national l experts in hazard mitigation, he assisted the Administrator in analysis l evaluation and re-direction of external and internal operations of FIA programs (1978).
In 1978, Mr. Kowleski was also named as Regional Dam Safety Coordinator l
responsible for the management and successful implementation of the Dam safety Program within the region. In this position, he was involved in emergency action planning for dams and reservoirs. This involved the evaluation of emergency olanning in the event of dam failure, delineating the inundation areas, and preparing notification and evacuation plans.
In 1981, Mr. Kowleski also served as Acting Director of the Insurance and Mitigation Division responsible for the management and planning of all activities related to the NFIP and hazard mitigation.
With the realignment of the Regional Office in November 1981, Mr. Kowleski was named Acting Chief, Technological Hazards and Engineering Support Group and Chairman of the Regional Assistance Committee. In this capacity, he was l
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responsible for managing and administering all engineering activities t pertaining to the NFIP, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Programs, Dam
) Safety Program, and hazardous materials program.
, As Chairman of the Regional Assistance Committee, he dealt with those j representatives of the Governor responsible for the REP program, the .
. Department of Health, the legislature, and emergency services agencies. In this capacity, he provided a high level of technical assistance to State and local government utilities in preparation of plans required to meet federal regulations. During the exercises, he lead a federal observer team (approximately 30-55 individuals) consisting of experts from federal and state agencies and private contractors. This team evaluated the capability of the offsite. response organizations (represented by approximately 500 to 1300 participants) to implement their radiological emergency plans an procedures in response to a simulated radiological emergency. In December 1982, Mr.
! Kowieski was promoted to Project Officer, Natural and Technological Hazards i Division. In this capacity he assisted the Chief of the Division in managing
! ~the activities of the division, including Radiological Emergency Planning i programs, National Flood Insurance Program, and the Dam Safety Program. He also served as the Agency's expert witness before the Atomic Safety Licensing Boards for Indian Point and Shoreham. In recognition of his exceptional professional achievement, and a valuable contribution to the agency's REP program, Mr. Kowleski was presented with several achievement awards including the Meritorious Service Award in 1984. In June 1986, Mr. Kowleski was reassigned to the Civil Engineer position, a position which he still holds.
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00tKETED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA h NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 87 mR 25 NO 47 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD or nusuAM 00CKt.itHG & SERV!cf.
BRANC!!
In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " FEMA's Prefiled Testimony dated March 20, 1987" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, or as designated by asterisk hand served, this 20th day of March, 1987:
John H. Frye, III, Chairman
- Fabian G. Palomino, Esq.
, Administrative' Judge- Richard J. Zahnleuter, Esq.
Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Special Counsel to the Governor U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Executive Chamber Washington, D.C. 20555 State Capitol
-Albany, NY 12224 Oscar H. Paris
- W. Taylor Reveley III, Esq.*
Administrative Judge Hunton & Williams Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 707 East Main Street
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 1535 Washington, D.C. 20555 Richmond, VA 23212
! Frederick J. Shon* Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esq.
i Administrative Judge New York State Department of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Public Service U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Three Empire State Plaza Washington, D.C. 20555 Albany, NY 12223 I
[h(j..
Stephen B. Latham, Esq.
John F. Shea, III,'Esq. Herbert H.. Brown, Esq.*
Twomey, Latham & Shea- Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.
' Attorneys at Law Karla J. Letsche, Esq.
P.O. Box 398 -
Kirkpatrick & Lockhart 33 West Second Street 1800 M Street, N.W.
Riverhead, NY. 11901 9th Floor Washington, D.C. 20036-5891 Atomic. Safety and Licensing Board Panel Joel Blun Esq.
U.F. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Director, Utility Intervention Washington, D.C. 20555 NY State Consumer Protection Board Suite 1020 Atomic Safety and Licensing 99 Washington Avenue Appeal Board Panel Albany, NY 12210 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Monroe Schneider North Shore Committee P.O. Sox 231 Docketing and Service Section Wading River, NY 11792 Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Philip H. McIntire Washington, D.C. 20555 Federal Emergency Management Agency 26 Federal Plaza l Spence Perry, Esq ** New York, New York .10278 General Counsel, Rm. 840 Federal ~ Emergency Management Agency 500 C Street, S.W.
l Washington, D.C. 20472 Robert Abrams, Esq.
Attorney General of the State Gerald C. Crotty, Esq. of New York Ben Wiles, Esq. Attn: Peter Bienstock, Esq.
Counsel to the Governor Department of Law.
Executive Chamber State of New York State Capitol Two World Trado Center
! Albany, NY 12224 Room 46-14 New York, NY 10047 Anthony F. Earley, Jr., Esq. MHB Technical Associates General Counsel 1723 Hamilton Avenue Long Island Lighting Company Suite K f
250 Old County Road San Jose, CA 95125 Mineola, NY 11501 Hon. Peter Cohalan Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq.
Suffolk County Executive Suffolk County Attorney County Executive / Legislative Bldg.' H. Lee Dennison Building Veteran's Memorial Highway Veteran's Memorial Highway
- Hauppauge, NY 11788 Hauppauge, NY 11788 i
l
/N Mr. Jay Dunkleberger Ms. Nora Bredes (V) New York State Energy Office Shoreham Opponents Coalition Agency Building 2 195 East Main Street Empire State Plaza Smithtown, NY 11787 Albany, New York 12223 Ellen Blackler Mr. Robert Hoffmnan New York State Assembly Ms. Susan Rosenfeld Energy Committee Ms. Sharlene Sherwin 626 Legislative Office Building P.O. Box 1355 Albany, NY 12248 Massapequa, NY 11758 Brookhaven Town Attorney George E. Johnson, Esq.
475 E. Main Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Agencyg Patchogue, NY 11772 7735 Old Georgetown Road Bethesda, MD 20814 ff f, Fl1111am R. Cumming r 22::
Federal Emergency Management Agency
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