ML20203B411

Investigation Rept 2-95-020.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Investigated:Alleged Discrimination Against Operations Shift Supervisor for Raising Safety Concerns About Operating Curve

ML20203B411
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	02/26/1997
From:	Dockery J, Mcnulty W NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203B366	List: IR 05000302/1995022 ML20203B362 ML20203B391 ML20203B411 ML20203B426 ML20203B463 ML20203B528 ML20203B549 ML20203B680 ML20203B781 ML20203B804 ML20203B829 ML20203B842 ML20203B850 ML20203B857 ML20203B875 ML20203B894 ML20203B933 ML20203B969 ML20203B983 ML20203C003 ML20203E066
References
FOIA-97-313 2-95-020, 2-95-20, NUDOCS 9712150030
Download: ML20203B411 (23)

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Title:

CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR PLANT:

ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION AGAINST-OPERATIONS 9 -iT SUPERVISOR FOR RAISING SAFETY CONCERNS ABOUT AN OPERATING CURVE Licensee: Case No.: 2 95 020 Florida Power Corporation Report Date: February 26, 1997 P.O. Box 219 NA 21 Crystal River, Florida 32629 Control Office: 01:RII Docket No.: 50 302 Status: CLOSED Reported by: Reviewed and Approved by:

Ct I 5% {

Y James D. Dockery, SpTcial Agent \ Wirliam J. McNulty, irector Of of Investigations - y Office oNInvestigat'ons Fi Office, Region II Field Office, Region II 4

r- .

\ W ING \ \ i l\ l '"\ \ \

\ \

\ \ ,\

19, with f \ This Report of Invedtig tion consists pf pages 1 throu

! I exhibits 1throQgh13.1Ithasinotibeenrevi d purs tt ,

j 10 'CFR 51.790(i) exemption's nor has pny exem t matertal be r i

! delptedl Qp inot disseminatb. olac6 in the' Pu lic Document , oom or

' disc'Jss! the contents to1' this reoort outside NRC withoht buthonity

/

/ 'of ;W GDDroVinQ offic"a' ONL v ofv this reDort. Qreat aQFFICIAL USE

.4 5"NOPSIS On August 31,1995.-during a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Investigations (OI) interview pertaining to Case No. 2 94 036S, the witness, a former operations shift suprvisor at the Crystal River Nuclear Plant, alleged he was terminated from employment by the Florida Power Corporation because he raised operational safety concerns about an inaccurate reactor operating curve and cited management deficiencies related to the inaccuracy.

A complaint by the alleger against Florida Power Cor> oration alleging illegal

- discriminatory treatment was determined by the U.S. )epartment of Labor Wage and Hour Division and an Administrative Law Judge to be unfounded.

The evidence developed during several OI investigations ciu not substantiate that the alleger was subjected to illegal discrimination or retaliation by the Florida Power Corporation in violation of 10 CFR 50.7.

~

1 i

Ca,se No. 2 95 020 1 I

THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK IKENTIONALLY Case No. 2 95 020 2

t TABLE OF CONTENT 3 EA90

-SYN 0PSIS.................................... .............. ............ 1 LIST OF INTF VIEWEES..................................................... 5 DETAI LS '. . I NVESTI GATI ON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Appl i cabl e Regul ati ons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Pur>ose of Investigation........................................... 7 Bac(ground...........,............................................. 7-Interview of Alleger (Exhibit 2)................................... 7 Coordinction with NRC Staff..................... ................. '9 Coordination with NRC Legal Counsel................................. 9 U.S. Department of l abor (DOL) Activity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Revi ew o f Documentati on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Allegation: - Alleged Discrimination Against an Operations Shift Supervisor for Voicing Concerns About a Plant Operating Procedure and Dissenting with Florida Power Corporation Management Over the Issue........................................................... 10 E v i de nce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Licensee's Stated Basis for Dis:1 13 Agent ' s Anal ys i s . . . . . . . . . ............................

. . . . . . . . pl i na ry~ Act i on 13 . . . . . . . . . .

Co n cl u s i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 LIST OF EXHIBITS........................................................ 19 Case No. 2 95 020 3

1 I

A THIS PAGE LEFT BUUK INTEKIIONALLY 4

1 l

t Case No. 2 95 020 4

• ~

LIST OF INTFRVIEEES <

n EXHIBIT

. BEARD. - Jr. .- Percy H. , Sr. Vice President, Nuclear.

Ope r a t i on s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 6 FIELDS, David A., (Former) Operations Shift Supervisor................ 2 FLEMING, Paul V., CRNP System Engineer................................ 10 HALNON Gregory H. , Manager, Nuclear Pl ant Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 HICKLE, Bruce J.. Director, Nuclear Power Operations.................. 7 WEISS. Robert P. , (Former) Senior Reactor Operator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 l

l i

l Case No. 2 95 020 5 l

TilIS PAGE LEFT BLM INTENTIONALLY Case No. 2 95 020 g

/ a ,.

l L -

1

. + DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION I Applicable Raoulations T10 CFR S 50,5: Deliberate misconduct'

]

10 CFR_$ 50,7i Employee protection-Purpose of inestination This. investigation was initiated (Exhibit 1) by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory . .

': -Commission (NRC), Office of Investigations-(01),: Region II (RII), on  !

. September:20. 1995, to determine whether the Florida Power Corporation ~(FPC)-

discriminated against David A. FIELDS by terminating his employment as an _ i operations shift supervisor after he raised operational safety concerns about an inaccarate operating curve at the licensee's Crystal River Nuclear Plant (CRNP).

Backaround FIELDS was considered by OI to be a witness to events under NRC scrutiny.in 01 e

investigations 2 94 036, 2 94 036S, and 2 95 0165, OI conducted an official

' interview of FIELDS relative to those investigations on August 31, 1995-

. (Exhibit 2), During the 01 interview, FIELOS-alleged that he belfeved he was ,

discharged by FPC )artially in retaliation for stating his concerns to his employer and~the NtC about the adigacy of CRNP resctor coolant system makeup tank (MUT) level / pressure operating procedures ed lack of licensee response )

to his concerns. The concerns expressed by FIRDS and other licensed reactor operations personnel and certain actions they took unnecessary and

. unauthorized manipulation of MUT level arid pressure to der:onstrate the reason for their concerns were the subject of the three OI investigations cited above.(see OI Reports of Investigation 2 94 036, 2 94 036S, and 2 95 016S).

Interview of Alleaar (Exhibit 2)

Duringthe01interviewofFIELDSonAugust 31, 1995. FIELDS testified that on the night of September 5, 1994, he was ...the senior licensed person

[o)erations supervisor] on the site." FIELDS acknowledged that it was "a>solutely" his decision to gather operational data by conducting a drain down evolution of the MUT which he " suspected" would-(and in fact did) create

, a situation wherein the reactor was operated outside the required parameter of what FIELDS believed to-be the MUT Operating Procedure (DP) 1038.. Curve 8

+

adiiiistrative limit. FIELDS further acknowle that his o)erations shift

.i de'i)erate' y.and intenticnally conducted the evoletion, iowever in

-mitigation FIELDS testified that he believed that he "...was authorized and empowered to do...":the evolution. Furthermore FIELDS only subsequently

.became aware that, rather than being an administrative limit, Curve 8 was

.actually a desian basis curve which he "... absolutely [would) not" have violated had he been aware of the curve's true significance (Exhibit 2, pp. 98 101),

Case'No. 2 95 020- 7 7 T

e --ma -

4 -

AGENT'S NOTE: Based on NRC staff and 01 findings related to the HUT evolution conducted by FIELDS' shift on September 5,1994, the licensee concurred with the NRC finding that FIELDS and members of his shift had conducted an unauthorized (albeit not deliberately irregular) HUT evolution on September 5 1994. In a letter dated May 5, 1995 (Exhibit 3), the licensee notified the NRC that FIELDS anti his direct subordinate (Assistant Shift Supervisor Robert P. WEISS) m been removed from licensed activity at CRNP based on the September 5,1994, incident.

FIELDS took exception to the licensee's May 5, 1995, letter to the NRC and generated his own letter of rebuttal (Exhibit 4) to the RII Regional Administrator after advising the FPC senior vice president of Wuclear -

Operations of his intent to do so. FIELDS testified to OI that "...after I sent that letter. I think I became expendable." FIELDS was eventually -

discharged by the licensee on August 22, 1995.

During the August 31, 1995, OI interview, FIELDS also acknowledged his involvement as the operations shift supervisor in a HUT evolution conducted by his shift on September 4, 1994. According to FIELDS the September 4, evolution was conducted for the same reason and under the same basic circumstances as the Se)tember 5 evolution: however, the September 4 evolution did not yield the data IELDS had anticipated would substantiate his shift's contention that Curve 8 was inaccurate.

In his testimony to 01, FIELDS also explained why the September 4,1994, evolution was not alluded to when he was initially interviewed by 01 in regard to investigation 2 94 036 (Exhibit 2, pp. 4 8). FIELDS did not mention the September 4, 1994, evolution at the first OI interview because the data collected on that date was " erratic" and did not support anything: OI investigators asked only about the September 5,1994, evolution and never mentioned September 4, and FPC legal counsel advised him to respond fully and completely to 0I questions but not " volunteer" additional information.

FIELDS testified that if management had asked him about the September 4 HUT evolution he " absolutely" would have told management about the event

( (Exhibit 2, pp. 12 13). FIELDS professed his belief that "...the company l

should have known about September the 4th. You know, I fully agre,.d with j that" (Exhibit 2, p. 14). There was no discussion or " conspiracy" among the members of his shift intended to hide the existence of the Sep* ember 4 evolution from management and he reiterated that he would have volunteered the information to management if asked (Exhibit 2, pp.16 & 78). He and members of his shift did discuss the results of the September 4 evolution and reached l '

i the consensus that "...it has no significance..." thus, in FIELDS' view, l

r.egating any requirement that the event be discussed with management (Exhibit 2, p. 75). Furthermore, FIELDS and his shift "...didn't feel like the events of September 4th were were that important..." and he and the other operators did not attempt to discuss the matter with FPC management because "(t)he company didn't investigate it" (Exhibit 2, pp. 16 17).

l

! FIELDS did eventually discuss the September 4 event with CRNP Plant Manager HICKLE during a meeting on July 19, 1995, two days prior to a pre decisional enforcement conference at RII scheduled to address the September 5 evolution conducted by his shift (Exhibit 2, p. 13).

l Case No. 2 95 020 8

Coordination with NRC Staff Throughout the course of OI investigations 2 94 036, 2 94 036S, and 2 95 016S.

RII Division of Reactor Safety (DRS) Inspector Curtis W. RAPP participated with 01 ir, all witness interviews and each interview transcript was made available by OI to appropriate technical staff thr6 ugh the RII Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff, At OI request, a special technical inspection was conducted at CRNP during December 11 15, 1995, and is documented in Ins)ection Report 50 302/95 22. The results of the special inspection and su) sequent enforcement action are discussed below.

Coordination with NRC Leoal Counsel This and related investigations were closely coordinated with Regional and NRC legal counsel.

U.S. Department of Labor _(Q1) Activity On February 13, 1996. FIELDS filed a complaint (Exhibit 5) with the D0L Wege and Hour Division alleging FPC had illegally retaliated and discriminated against him. A DOL com)1aint based on the same events snd fact pattern was filed jointly with FIEL)S' by his former subordinate, WEISS, who was similarly terminated from his position as a CRNP senior reactor operator on FIELDS' shift (see 01 Investigation 2 95 021). On April 15, 1996, the DOL Wage and Hour Division issued a finding that the investigation by that effice did not verify that discrimination was a factor in the allegations contained in the allegers' complaints. FIELDS' and WEISS' terminations were found by the Wage and Hour Division to be justified. Both FIELDS and WEISS appealed the Wage and Hour Division finding.

On January 10, 1997, subsequent to submission of written briefs and oral arguments on December 16, 1996, a DOL 3dministrative law judge (ALJ) issued a Preliminary Recommended Decision and Order dismissing FIELDS' and WEISS' complaints against FPC. The preliminary order documents the ALJ's finding that the complainants deliberately committed an act that caused a violation of the Energy Reorganization Act and/or the Atomic Energy Act, thereby precluding the application (bnd remedies) of Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act. The ALJ order, based on a motion by FPC for summary dismissal of the complaint, is pending final approval by the Secretary of Labor.

Review of Documentation 01 Investigation 2 94 036 concluded that:

...(t)he midnight shift operators FIELDS, WEISS. Van SICKLIN, and STLWART, on September r, 1994, deliberately violated p', ant procedures when they exceeded the allowable makeup tank overpressure and failed to take appropriate action to reduce makeup tank overpressure.

01 Investigation 2 94 036S concluded that:

...the shift supervisor (FIELDS), assistant shift supervisor (WEISS), and two chief operators on the midnight shift of Case No. 2 95 020 9

~. . - __ _ _ __ . , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _

W  ;,

September 4 and 5,1994, deliberately condur:ted an evolution, not  :

required by-plant conditions, for the specific p' Joose of..

gathering data. Furthermore. 'when the allowable WT over  :

was exceeded,- the operators-deliberately delayed taking pressure

- sppropriate action to reduce MUT overpressure while gathering that.  :

data.

3 GI Iwestigation 2 95 016S concluded theti ,

...there-is no evidence indicating that any FPC manager had prior -

knowledge of the MUT evolutions conducted.by licensed reactor operators at CRNP during September-1994. FPC management did not_ approve or  !

condone the tests in-advance. .

That investigation also noted that:- ,

FIELDS and WEISS, the two senior licensed operators involved in the -

September 1994 MUT evolutions, were discharged by the licensee in-August-1995, ostensibly as a result of their failure to make a timely disclosure of the September 4 evolution to licensee management. The fact that the licensee took the ultimate negative employment action against the operators 11-months after discovering the September 5 event makes it highly unlikely that any saember of licensee management

• authorized the prior September 4, MUT evolution or condoned such a test. -

L The special inspection conducted by NRC staff from December 11-15, 1995, concluded that the two MUT evolutions (documented in 2 94 0365) deliberately conducted by FIELDS' shift on September 4 and 5,1995, were in violation of-plant procedure because "...o>eration-of the makeup tank (was) outside the '

!. acceptable operating region w111e adding hydrogen. The evolutions conducted by FIELDS et al. were cited separately by DRS as examples of apparent u violation 50 302/95 22 02.

On July 10, 1996, in a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imoosition of Civil o Pena 1 ties, NRC RII notified FPC of Violation 50 302/EA 95 126 1.B. which cited L the licensee for violation of 10 CFR 50.59. " Changes, Tests, and Experiments,"

in that "...on September 4 and 5, 1994, [ FIELDS et al.] conducted tests not described in the safety analysis report, without written safety evaluations..." Furthermore "... operators conducted tests in that they -

)erformcd evolutions involving make up tank pressure and level, not required

)y plant conditions, to collect data. This was cited as a Severity Level III violation carrying a $100,000 civil penalty. On September 9, 1996, FPC '

accepted the cited violation and paid the $100,000 civil penalty.

A large volume of documentation generated by both the licensee and the NRC was also reviewed during the course of this investigation and, where appropriate,-

pertinent documentation is appended as exhibits to this Report of Investigation.

L- Allecation: ~ Alleged Discrimination Against an Operations Shift Supervisor for Voicing Concerns About a Plant Operating Procedure and Dissenting with Florida m er Corporation Management Over the Issue l Case No. 2 95 020 < -

- 10 i

, , - - - . -ew- s ar a , og- ,.. m _ ,w m ,.,--..-mrm *+-,w. e = ,, - 6

. Evidence

- The following individuals were _ interviewed regarding FIELDS' allegation that he was discriminated against for engaging in protected activity:

AGENT'S NOTE: The following quoted testimony has been excerpted from the original OI interview transcripts. The pertinent transcript > ages reflecting-the quotations cited are appended to this report as ex11 bits.

The entire transcript of interview for each witness is contained in 01 case file for Case No. 2 94 036S.

Interview of BEARD (Exhibit 6)

BEARD testified to 0I that when the September 5,1994 MUT evolution was first divulged, it was never the intention of FPC management to discharge FIELDS or the operators on his shift solely for that event. In fact the " questioning attitude" of the operators was commended by licensee management and the NRC.

Although the shift's "... motives may have been okay...[their] process.was wrong... And that was the total issue in the beginning until this second (September 4th) evolution came to light and the issue became an entirely

-different one. It wa.: trust and integrity." According to BEARD, despite numerous opportunities over a period of several menths 'o divulge the September 4 evolution to management, licensee lawyers and investigators and the NRC, the incident was not discussed by any shift personnel until FIELDS alluded to it immediately prior to the July 21, 1995, enforcemm.t conference with the NRC. In BF#1D's stated opinion "...that's totally irresponsible, and then it's a matter of integrity. .I can't...have shift supervisors that I can't totally trust" (Exhibit 6, pp. 3133).

In summary, regarding the Statgmber 5 HUT evolution BEARD testified that:

The initial issue with the operators was and is simply that they i did not get permission to do what they did, period. And we dealt with that in the management review panel...in what we thought was a fair and equitable way the pro >er amount of discipline, but don't send a chilling effect (Ex11 bit 6. p. 91).

However, according to BEARD, after several months had elapsed during which a great deal of managerial and regulatory attention was paid to the .Seotember 5 evolution:

...all of a sudden at the last minute to find out that they had done this before (on September 4th), now the issue is no longer...[that they] should have got permission. The issue is, as a shift manager and an assistant shift manager...[ FIELDS and WEISS] had an obligation t: come forwa-) and tell us...And on that l

basis we took further action (discharge). And that was the reason. You know. not because they raised safety

, concerns. . .that's ridiculous. It was trust and integrity...

(Exhibit 6.'pp. 92 93).

Case No. 2 95 020 11

Interview of HICKE (Exhibit 7)

HICKLE testified to 01 that sfter becoming aware of the Seatember 4 event it was his recommendation that FIELDS and WEISS, as well as t1e two chief operators involved in the HUT evolutions should be discharged by FPC for their failure to divulge the September' 4 event. The basis for his recomendation was his position that:

As a plant manager I can correct judgmental errors...(b)ut I can't correct integrity issues. And when I sense that somebody hasn't been straight or honest, which was my feeling in this case, then I felt that they really don't meet our corporate culture and they shouldn't be working there. .

And that was... strictly and solely the reason that I recommended termination was I felt they were untrustworthy. I felt...those four individuals had more than enough opportunity...to reveal thct they had performed two evolutions right from the start (Exhibit 7, pp. 77 79).

Interview of HALNON (Exhibit 8)

HALNON testified to 01 that two or three days before a FPC management review committes (conducted Seatember 15, 1994, to review the September 5, 1994, HUT evolution event) he as(ed FIELDS and WEISS to su) ply him with "...a write up of what they did..." with respect to conducting t1e HUT evolution to obtain data pertaining to OP 103B Curve 8. The resulting document entitled "0P 103B CURVE 8 VERIFICATION 9/5/94" was characterized by HALNON as a "... chronology of the event for the management review committee." The documer.t produced by FIELOS and WEISS made no reference to the HUT evolution conducted by their shift on September 4, 1994 (Exhibit 8, pp. 55 56).

According to HALNON the failure of FIELDS and WEISS and members of their shift to divulge the September 4, 1994. HUT evolution caused him to doubt the supervisors' integrity because "...there were some things that I did not know that I should have and that they had opportunities to tell me and knew they should have." HALNON asserted that based on his doubts about FIELDS

• and WEISS' integrity, he no longer trusted them to operate a nuclear plant due to potential danger involved in not abiding by rules or procedures (Exhibit 8.

pp. 89 90).

Interview of WEISS (Exhibit 9) -

WEISS testified to 01 that he thought CRNP "... engineering knew aDout the data

• from the [Se)tember 4th HUT evolution] right from the start." Because

"...(w) hen [1e) first brought the problem report to licensing [he] told Paul Fleming that we had done it (HUT evolutions) both days." It was also WEISS *

" impression" that HALNON knew about the September 4th HUT evolution but did not know "specifically" who advised HALNON of the event (Exhibit 9. pp. 42 &

43).

Interview of FLEMING (Exhibit 1Q1 FLEMING testified to 0I that when WEISS provited him with data related to the HUT evolution. WEISS "...may have, in fact. discussed that they had either Case No. 2 95-020 12

seen this before or had done a test before," FLEMING was "almost positive" that he received no data from WEISS for the September 4th event: (b)ut [he]

definitely had data for the 5th" (Exhibit 10, pp. 7 8 & 49 50).

Licansee's Stated Basis for Disciolinary Action (Exhibit 11)

At 01 request, FPC legal counsel provided 01 with additional information documenting the professed basis for the FPC employment action against FIELDS and WEISS. The licensee contends in Exhibit 11 that between September 7, 1994, and May 23. 1995. FIELDS or NEISS had at least 12 opportunities wherein it was appropriate, logical, and expected that the operators would have divulged the September 4,1994, evolution, verbally or in writing, to FPC management, corporate lawyers, NRC staff / management and OI investigators.

FPC management did not become aware of the September 4 evolution until July 1995. An internal investigation of the September 4 event was conducted by FPC during July and August 1995. The subsequert decision to terminate FIELDS and WEISS is stated to be based on their lack of integrity over a 10 month period following the Sepcember 5, 1994, evolution.

In February 1997, subsequent to the DOL AlJ recommended summary dismissal of FIELDS' and WEISS' complaints FPC legal counsel provided GI with additional documentation, including deposition transcripts, that bolsters the licensee's defense of its actions toward the allegers. (That documentation, which is voluminous, is available for perusal in the OI case file for Case No. 2 95-020.)

Agent's Analysis FIELDS, WEISS, and the other members of operations "A" shift clearly engaged in protected activity by questioning the accuracy of OP 103B Curve 8. Their stated concern to CRNP engineering and management about the accuracy of the curve was both significant and safety related. Whether the conduct of the September 4 and 5, 1994, evolutions constituted proted ed activity or a " test" prohibited by regulation has been debated but is irrelevant in this instance s'nce the operators' stated concerns predated September 4 and continued well after September 5, 1994.

The concerns of CRNP operations staff, including personnel other than "A" sh1ft, about Curve 8 were voiced to, and known by, a fairly high level of management at CRNP prior to the September 4 and 5 evolutions. The adequacy of CRNP management's response to the concerns expressed by well qualified operations personnel and eventually proven to be valid is questionable, but for purposes of this investigation also irrelevant.

FIELDS' professed belief that "...the company should have known about September 4th. You know, I fully agreed with that..." (Exhibit 2, p.14) is contradicted by his actions, as is the assertion that he would have divulged the event if asked about it. Within one week of the events of September 4 and 5, 1994, FIELDS and WEISS were tasked by HALNON to create a written "cLonology" of the events that culminated with the collection of data related to OP 103B Curve 8 on September 5, 1994. The resulting document, "0P 103B CURVE 8 VERIFICATION 9/5/94," includes a chronology (Exhibit 13) that describes Only events leading up to and including the September 5 HUT Case No. 2 95 020 13

e A evolution. The document prepared for HALNON by FIELDS and WEISS describes in detail the procedures utilized to conduct gne WT evolution during which data was plotted. The chronology of events does not allude to any HUT evolution conducted by "A" shift between the last refueling outage and Se>tember 5, 1994. If, as he testified to 01 FIELDS "... fully agreed..." tlat management should have known about the September 4 evolution, he had the clear opportunity to inform management of the event when he complied with a direct request by the CRNP Nuclear Operations manager that he chronicle events related to the September 5,1994. HUT evolution. FIELDS did not divulge the September 4 event at that time. It is asserted by various licensee managers that the September 4 event was not known to them until the evolution was mentioned to HICKLE by FIELDS, approximately 10 months after the fact and immediately prior to a formal presentation to the NRC on the issue. .

WEISS' contention that CRNP engineering ".., knew about the data from the

[ September 4 evolution] right from the start..." because he gave REDAS data to -

FLEMING is questionable. FLEMING does not recall with certainty that WEISS mentioM the September 4 event and does not believe WEISS provided him with data generated from the September 4 HUT evolution. It is illogical that data from September 4 would be provided to FLEHING (or FPC management) since both FIELDS and WEISS testified that they considered the results of that HUT evolution to be useless in supporting their contentions about the inaccuracies of OP 103B Curve 8. In any event FLEHING is merely a colleague of WEISS, not a member of CRNP management. There is no evidence, even if he was aware of it, that FLEMING ever mentioned the September 4 HUT evolution to his supervision or CRNP management.

Tne assertion by FPC management that until July 1995, only FIELDS and the i members of his operations shift knew about the September 4, 1994 HUT evolution is credible. The Sanior Vice President (BEARD), Director of Nuclear Power Operations (HICKLE) and the Nuclear Operations Manager (HALNON) each i testified that FIELDS' and WEISS

• failure to divulge the September 4,1994, l evolution for approximately 10 months caused management to conclude that FIELDS and WEISS did not display the requisite integrity they expected of licensed senior nuclear reactor operators. Consequently, FIELDS and WEISS l were discharged based on the collective management decision that they were i untrustworthy and thus unfit for employment within the nuclear operations

" culture."

OI solicited the opinion of RII management regarding the licensee's contention l

that the denial of plant access and eventual discharge of FIELDS and WEISS was -

reasonable given their rceived lack of integrity. In a memorandum dated December 24,1996 (Exhi ait '4), Albert F. GIBSON, the RII Director of DRS, advised 0I that:

l l Florida Power Corporation cencluded that FIELDS and WEISS lacked l integrity based upon their failure to disclose, for an extended period of time, the makeup tank evolution that occurred on September 4. Taking this conclusion at face value, termination would appear to have been within FPC's prerogative as an employer and would not be objectionable to the agency (NRC) or at odds with agency regulations.

Furthermore, according to GIBSON. based on the regulatory requirements articulated in 10 CFR 50.5(a) and 10 CFR 73.56, "...FPC's denial of access to Case No. 2 95 020 14

FIELDS and WEISS on the basis that they were not trustworthy appears to be

-plausible."

FPC has provided credible evidence-that the licensee's actions toward FIELDS and WEISS were reasonable, and although a direct result of the September 4, 1994 MUT evolution, would have' occurred in spite of any )rotected activity--

they had engaged in before or after Seatember 4,1994. Tw evidence does not support the contention by FIELDS and WEISS that FPC's stated reason for disciolinary action against them lack of professional integrity was pretextual.

Conclusion The evidence developed during several 01 investigations. did not substantiate that FIELDS was subjected to illegal discrimination or retaliation by FPC in violation of 10 CFR 50.7.

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Case No. 2 ' 020 16

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SUPPLEENTAL INFORMATION In the documentation provided to O! in February 1997 by FPC legal counsel, Attorney Morris WEINBERG. Jr., noted his opinion that FIELDS' and WEISS'

... deposition testimony raises' serious questions whether they deliberately provided incomplete and inaccurate testimony at their 01 interviews." The examples of potential material false statements cited by WEINBERG were reviewed by Special Agent James Y. Vorse. Case Agent for 01 investigations 2 94 036, 2 94 0365, 2 95 011, and 2 95 012, and James D. Dockery, Case Agent for 01 investigations 2 95 016, 2 95 016S, 2 95 020, and 2 95 021. All of the cited investigations were generated by the MUT evolutions of September 4 and

, 5, 1994. Comparison of the transcripts of FIELDS' and WEISS' 01 interviews with their testi.nony in DOL civil depositions resulted in a consensun by the investigating Special Agents and Field Office Director William J. McNulty that perceived discrepancies in the allegers' testimony were neither significant nor material enough to justify additional investigation as a potential violation of Title 18, Section 1001 of the U.S. Criminal Code.

Case No. 2 95 020 17

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LIST OF EXHIBITS Exhibit No. Description 1 Investigation Status fecord, dated September 20, 1995.

2 Transcript of Interview of FIELDS, dated August 31, 1095.

3 Letter from FPC Senior Vice President P. H. BEARD to RII

. Administrator Stewart EBNETER, dated May 5, 1995.

, 4 Letter from FIELDS to RII Administrator Ebneter, dated May 23, 1995.

5 Complaint by FIELOS against FPC filed with the DOL Wage and Hour Division.

-6 Excer)ted testimony from 01 interview of BEARD on Ncyem)er 28, 1995. ,

i 7 Excer)ted testimony from OI interview of HICKLE on Novem>er 30, 1995.

8 Excerated testimony from 01 interview of HALNON on '

Novem)er 29, 1995.

. 9 Excerpted testimony from OI interview of WEISS on August 31, 1995.

10 Excer)ted testimony from 01 interview of FLEMING on Novem>er 28, 1995.

11 Letter to 01 dated January 24, 1996, from FPC legal counsel WEINBERG.

12 "0P 103B Curve 8 Verification 9/5/94" chronology.

13 Memorandum, dated December 24, 1996, from RII DRS, GIBSON, to 01 Field Office Director McNulty.

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