ML20203B680
| ML20203B680 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 12/01/1994 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203B366 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-97-313 NUDOCS 9712150126 | |
| Download: ML20203B680 (19) | |
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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
'2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 +++++
4 OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS 5 INTERVIEW 6 ----------------------------------x 7 IN THE MATTER oft 8 INTERV35'W OF Docket No.
9 GREGORY HOWARD HALNON (not assigned) 10 2 11 ----------------------------------x 12 Thursday, December 1, 1994 13 14 Conference Room 202 15 Crystal River Plant 16 6745 N. Tallahassee Road 17 Crystal River, Florida 18 19 The above-entitled interview was conducted at 20 02 13 p.m.-
@' 21 BEFORE:
5
.* 22 JIM VORSE Senior Investigator
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'n+ 23- William McNULTY Investigator i
REA 24 -CURT RAPP Reactor Engineer Ng gg
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1 APPEARANCES:
2 On Behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3 JAMES VORSE, Senior Investigator 4 Region II NRC Office of Investigations 5 401 Marietta Street 6 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 7 WILLIAM J. MCNULTY 8 Field Office Director 9 NRC Office of Investigations 10 1450 Maria Lane 11 Walnut Creek, California 94596 12 CURT RAPP 13 Reactor Engineer - NRC, Region II 14 6745 N. Tallahassee Road 15 Crystal River, Florida 32629 16 17 18 On Behalf of the Interviewee, Gregory Howard lininon 19 GERALD A. WILLIAMS, ESQUIRE 20 Corporate Counsel l
21 Florida Power Corporation 22 P.O. Box 14042 23 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 24
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3 1 P-R-0-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 2 MR. VORSEs- This is an interview of Mr. Greg 3 Halnon. We'tw at the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant, 4 Administration Building, Room 202. The time is 2:13 p.m.
5 The date is December 1, 1994.
6 Would you please state your full nane.
7 MR. HALNON: Gregory Howard Halnon, H-A-L-N-O-N.
8 MR. VORSE: And what is your title, please?
9 MR. HALNON: I'm the Manager of Nuclear Plant 10 Operations.
11 MR. VORSE: Would you describe your duties here. ,
12 MR. HALNON: My basic duties are to be the 13 senior licens_ed operator on -- on site. I'm the highest 14 level "anagement that has an SRO license. I manage the 15 operating crews and the rest of the operation support 16 shift in their efforts to maintain a safe operation of the 17 plant.
1E MR. VORSE: And how long have you been doing 19 this?
20 MR. HALNON: I assumed this job in December of 21 '1993. !
22 MR. VORSE - Where did you come from before that?
23 MR. HALNON: Before that I was the technical p n'en fo f 24 support manager for a couple of years. And part ef that I 25 was in operations on the unit before that.
i t, 4
1 MR. VORSE: It's my understanding, Mr. Halnon, l 2 that you informed the resident inspectors about this ,
3 problem with the curve of the make-up tank that occurred j 4 on September 5, 1994, several days after it happened.
5 Can you explain what led you to do this?
6 HR. HALNON: The events that took place was the 7 data was E-mailed to me by the operating crews, since 8 they're on midnights and, of course, I work day shift.
9 When I retrieved the E-mail, I looked at the 10 data, and over the next couple of days got concerned with 11 how they got the data -- not as concerned with the data, 12 but how they got it.
. 13 And I started to gather data as far as interviews 14 with the people that were on shift and the engineers that 4 15 were involved, system engineers.
16 And I went to Ross and Todd, who were the 17 resident inspectors, and was essentially going to just 18 discuss the whole issue with them in addition to the issue 19 of the operators going over to the unacceptable side of 20 the curve. And I wanted to get their thoughts and their 21 views on what information they had, what information.they 22 .needed.
- 23 They got a copy of the problem report, so they --
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24 I'was not informing them of anything they didn't already 25 know.
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1 So we were sitting down. We were just going to 2 sit down and have an information gathering session with 3 the residents. And that's when we started talking a 4 little bit more about the evolution that took p2 ace. j 5 MR. VORSE: Are there any procedutal "4al: tier.;
6 in this evolution that you know of?
7 MR. HALNON: The procedure violation encompasses 8 going to the unacceptable side of an operating curve. And 9 it's.a pretty clear procedure violation. -
10 MR. VORSE: Will you tell us what procedure.
11 MR. HALNON: It's OP-103P It's the curve eight 12 that we've been talking about.
. 13 MR. VORSE: Curt, do you have some technical 14 questions you want to ask?
15 MR. RAPP: Yeah. One of the things that came up 16 during the previous interviews was that the operators 17 stated that they did not consider this to be a test.
18 What would be the definition of a test?
19 MR. HALNON: Well, that's -- it's kind of a 20 vague term when you come down to, you know, what's an 21 evolution, what's a manipulation. You know, we can play .
22 with those words all day.
23 But if you want me to say what, in my opinion, 24 world be a test --
25 MR. RAPP: Well, by plant procedure?
J 6
1 MR. KALNON: By plant procedure?
2 MR. RAPP: Yeah.
3 MR. RALNON: I don't know if we ever defined 4 what "the test" is from the standpoint of, you know, what 5 -- in the pure sense. Like it would be nice if there was 6 a definition test, this is a test, blah, blah, blah, blah.
7 But we don't have that. We do 4ay it on the 8 supervision at the time to determine what is an evolution 9 that requires a procedure and what is an evolution that 10 does not require a procedure. And we very clearly state 11 those expectations in ou: procedures, that they are 12 responsible for determining that.
. . 13 MR. RAPP: Okay. Is there an intent -- Well, 14 is there an intent on the part of the plant now to perform 15 this evolution routinely to go back and verify this curve 16 and say, I've got a refueling outage basis or quarterly or 17 something of that nature?
18 MR. HALNON: We had intended to re-perform the 19 SP-630 that we originally got this concern out of. And we 20 even were going to revise that procedure, or at least see 21 to it that it was revised to gather the data we wanted, 22 not only to' satisfy the tech spec surveillance 23 requirement, but also to gather the data to help us work c
24 out this issue.
25_ That was already in the works to be planned for
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1_ following refueling outage. That's a refueling test. You 2 only do it during refueling outage because you have to i
3 have the head off the reactor vessel. ,
4 There was no intent to go through and do this 5 evolution that these operators did. _That was a one-time 6 evolution. And they did not intend to do'it again. In my 7 opinion, they didn't incend to do it again and we had no-8 intention of doing it again to revalidate any curves. <
-9 MR. RAPP Okay. So let me bring your attention 10 here to this definition, AI-400B, 3.1.4. Would you'say 11 that what the operators pcrformed falls under that 12 definition?
13 MR. .HALNON: (Examines document.) It is a --
14 It is -- was an operational sequence that was performed 15 once already. But the gray area will come in to where it 16 can affect the core reactivity or reactor protection 17 system.
18 You know, we'll have to talk in hindsight because 19 I was not involved in the up front part of this. The 20 . operators, in interviewing them, didn't believe it could 21 affect the core because tney didn't know it was a design 22 basis-issue.
23 If they felt it was a design basis issue, then I 24_ feel like they would have been -- and I think we heard 25 that in interviews today, that they would have. felt like
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1 1 that was not something they could do without a 50-59. i l
2- So in hindsight I'd say no. But -- You knew, in i
3 hindsight I say, no, the operators didn't feel that. But 4 I think we can say now that we do know that was a design 5 basis culve and that it could have affected the core.
6 And that is why the Management Review Board came 7 back and had them write the procedure after the fact in 8 accordance with our administrative instructions that if 9 they did an evolution that required a procedure, they 10 didn't have one, then the procedure was required to he 11 written after the fact and approved in the same approval 12 path. And we had them do that.
13 MR._RAPPt That's contained in AI-500, correct?
14 MR. HALNON: That's in AI-500. Yes.
P 15 MR. RAPP All right. What -- Concerning that 16 allowance in the procedure then, what are the 17 circumstances that that particular allowance was written 18 for?
19 That is to say, you don't have a written 20 procedure and you generate one after the fact.
-21 MR. HALHON: Well, it was really -- it was 22 really an allowance for when things were going too fast 23 and you-had to take action. Either you weren't sure there
-:24 was procedural guidance or you didn't have time to go find
- 25- it, but you knew these actions had to be taken to prevent 4
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9 1 degradation of the plant safety.
2 MR. RAPP: Okay. So that was -- That's more 3 like under the 50 -- 50.54X consideration --
4 MR. HALNON: Yeah. I would --
5 MR. RAPP: -- where you have to take prompt 6 action to protect the plant safety.
say 7 MR. HALNON: I would hesitate to 1F5cuay from 8 50.54 . It was more operational, within operational 9 limits. You know, and 50.54X talks about a broad spectrum 10 of license conditions and stuff like that.
11 But it is in that light that it is one of those
^
12 emergency or immediate-type things that you have to do.
13 MR. RAPP: So since this evolution was pre-14 planned and was somewhat controlled, then it really 15 wouldn't fit under that allowance to go back and write 16 a --
17 MR. HALNON: Classically, it didn't fit undet 18 that allowance, but we felt like it was necessary to go 19 through and review the items that they did and have them 20 do that.
21 Now, whether it was in perfect accordance with 22 that, we felt like it was the intent to get them to come ,
23 back and write that procedure, and let's review what they 24 did in detail and put it through the proper lines of 25 qualified reviewers.
3
's 10 1 MR. RAPP: Okay. Going back here to the conduct 2 of operations, the STA was -- my underctanding is was not 3 consulted or was not involved in this --
4 MR. HALHON: That may --
5 MR. RAPP: -
process. Is that --
6 MR. HALNON: That is my understanding, also.
7 MR. RAPP: That's your understanding, also.
8 Was the STA's involvement required by the conduct ,
9 of operations?
10 MR. HALNON: I'd have to look. I'm not sure if 11 that was required or not. What -- Were you specifically 12 thinking about a step in the NI-5007
. 13 MR. IU@P: Yeah. I -- If you look back in 14 closure 27 under the duties for the STA --
15 MR. HALNON: Okay.
16 MR. RAPP: Let me see here if I can find it 17 myself. I've got it marked here.
18 MR. HALNON: " Review or observe any abnormal, 19 unusual procedure operation - "
20 MR. RAPP: Right.
21 MR. HALNON: "-- that may affect - " Yeah.
22 MR. RAPP: Right. That area.
23 MR. HALNON: Right.
24 MR. RAPP: That he must be in the control center 25 for major plant evolutions, l
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- 1 -AndLthe issue on. reviewing planned 1-- So, there 2
- 'was something in_here.about_ reviewing pre-planned-3 _ activities-or something of that nature. l 4 MR. HALNON: Perform an-early review of planned; 51 activities for the upcoming shift. Considerations, i
^
6 precautions, or to make formal recommendations.to the
-7 shift supervisor.
8 And that item is what he does at shift turnover 9 time.
10 MP. . RAPP: All right. Thank you.
1 11 MR. HALNON: The other item about making --
12 " observe abnormal, unusual procedure operations," that is
-13 true. He should do that if it was perceived on the 14 operating shift that it was an abnormal, unusual 15 operation.
16 - MR. RAPP: Okay.
17 MR. VORSE: Would you consider what~ happened i- 18 with-ths curve unusual operations?
- 19 101. HALNON
- In hindsight,_yes. What we s w 'c 20 _now, I would agree.
21 -MR. RAPP: Pretty much that's about all the 22 questions at had concerning the procedural matters.
i - 2 3' :MR.'McNULTY: Greg, you were here and you were 24 able to listen to Mr. Fields, and particularly Mr.
4 25 Stewart, on the fact that when they had their meeting,
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12 1- theyIdecided thatL402 was'the' procedure that governed what 2 Lwas going to occur here. ,
3 MR. HALNON: Correet.
4 MR. McNULTY: And our reading of 402 -- And I'm 5 looking at 4.19.8 and 4.19.9, which deals with 6 establishing the hydrogen pressure in the make-up-tank.
7 Now, that's the one that refers them to curve eight of 8 OP-103B. And it says that if you refer to 4.19-8, step 9 one says refer to curve eight for the maximum MUT 10 overpressure.
11 And they didn't -- Did they do the H2 addition 12 for the bypass?
13 MR. HALNON: There'a two methods of doing it.
14 MR. McNULTY: Yeah. But do they -- Okay. So 15 they use that one, 4.19-97 16 MR. HALNON: They can do it with either --
17 either way.
18 MR. McNULTY: Okay.
19 MR. HALNON: A lot of it depends on where the 20 operating level of the make-up tank is at the time- .
21 MR. McNULTY: Okay. But it's clear that-both --
22 both -- all'three of these down below here indicate that i
23 they should refer to the make-up tank overpressure curve 24 guide. And that's curve eight.
l 25 Yet, you heard Fields say that he didn't think
13 1 they violated any procedures. How do you think he can say 2 that?
3 MR. HALNON: From what they -- When they 4 pressed up -- And this is the way they did it. They --
hyd"9n ,d4F 5 I guess they added it per the -nitrc; n- regulator, got to 6 20 pounds and pressed up to the curve. They put the point 7 on the curve. They didn't get the alarm when they pressed 8 up.
9 okay. So they followed this step right here. In 10 that instant they followed this step.
11 MR. McNULTY: Okay.
12 MR. HALNe ': Okay. And then when they went to 13 bleed the tank down, they followed that step per as it's Vcd Mk 14 written, that evEry step -- They were able to check off 15 every step, although he said they also didn't write 16 anything down because it's a frequently performed 17 evolution in the control room and they don't typically 18 pull out a procedure every time they do that.
19 But they were able to --
20 MR. McNULTY: Okay. So --
21 MR. HALNON: -- say that they performed each 22 step as it's written.
23 MR. McNULTY: Okay.
24 Mk \LNON: And the only thing that deviated 25 would be t;o pr csure response on the curve, which was
14 1 . supposed to follow the-curve down and it did not.
2 MR. McNULTY: All right. So, and I guess the 3 second-instance would be when-the annunciator, when they 4 received the. alarm. And'here you would expect them to 5' reduce pressure right away, wouldn't you, as opposed to 6 waiting for enother half -- 20 minutes for their test to 7 complete?
8 MR. HALNON: Under a normal situation if that 9 alarm came in, they would take ten, fifteen, even up to 10 twenty minutes to get somebody in the room through their 11 RWP requirements, to their dress out requirements, through 12 any climbing requirements that they have to get to this 13 valve in order to vent it off.
The fact that they had 14 somebody right there, they could have done it quicker, 15 they anticipated that possibly the alarm could come in.
16 MR. McNULTY: Is that the only way that they 17 could reduce pressure?
18 MR. HALNON: That's the only way that they can 19 redu,:e pressure. Right, p 20 MR. McNULTY: So this is something --
21 MR. HALNON: That I'm aware of.
22 MR.' McNULTY: -- they could do from the --
23 within the control-room, that --
24 .MR. HALNON: If there is a --
R 25 MR. McNULTY: -
Atkinson would have physically
a
.'l 15 1 .had to go out and --
2- MR. .EALNON: There's a manual valve they keep 3 closed in order to do that for some other' Appendix.R 4- requirements, or something to-that effect. I'm not sure 5 exactly why, but we keep the manual valve closed. There's
.6 no automatic relief valve that we can just pop open.
7 MR. McNULTY: So when they completed their test, 8 how did they get the pressure reduced to within limits?
9 MR. HALNON: I believe Jim went and vented it 10 per procedure. And I believe they had to vent six pounds 11 off, or-something to that effect. Six or less. I'm not 12 sure how much.
.- 13 MR. VORSE: Are you aware of any management --I
, 14 know that they didn't come to you, but did they -- are 15 .there any other managers that you of in the system that 16 they might have gone to and discussed this issue?
17 MR. HALNON: Prior to it being done?
18 MR. McNULTY: Yes.
19 MR. HALNON: No.
20 MR. MCNULTY: Okay. That's -- Do you have 21 anything that-you want to add to which you've talked 22 about?
23 MR. HALNON: I guess the only thing I'd like to
-24 add is I mentioned earlier that you all are going through 25 the same thing that our management have already been
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- 1-~through to gather'~all_this-data. -
-2; And I hope.that you have.the minutes of.the- ,
3" Management Review Board and look at that an'd see e.
4 =take, and realize,that we do take this very: seriously.- We
-5' did takeTit very seriously at the time'and we still do.-
l
'6 That's all I would have to add.
7- MR. McNULTY:- One other thing before we close'on
.8 this. . Fields had indicated that he felt that.the~ shift- ,
9 supervisor had a certain amount of authority to;do certain
. 10 - _ things,- and particularly -with- making declarations as to ,
11 what equipment is operable and what isn't. And we also -
12 talked about the-PMT's and some other issues with him.
11 3 As far as you -- As-the operations supervisor, l 14 did he have the authority to do what-he did, as far as 15 you're concerned?
16 MR. HALNON: To violate an operating curve?- >
17 MR. McNULTY: Yes.
18 -MR.-HALNON: -No.
19 -MR.EMcNULTY: That's it.
20- MR. VORSE:_ Now, this will conclude the 21 -3nterview of Mr. Greg Halnon. And I just need to say on 22 the record who's here.- We had myself, Jim Vorse, Bill J 23; McNulty,cboth of them-from the Offico of Investigations, .
R24 Curt Rapp, a Reactor _ Operator in NRC, Region II, and 1 i
25 Gerald' Williams with the Genera? Counsel's Officer here in >
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2 MR. RALNON: Just one more clarification. I 3 said no-under normal circumstances. Obviously the-4 emergency condition is --
5 MR. McNULTY: Under the emergency conditions.
6 MR. HALNON:
Right. There's different --
7 Different rules apply. So I just want to make sure
-8 that's --
9 MR. McNULTY: Okay. That would be an example of 10 what you talked about as far as having to take prompt 11 action and you'd have to revise your procedure later on.
-12 MR. RALNON: AI-500 clearly states that to 13 protect the safety of public let the plant degrade to an 14 unsafe condition. That's correct.
15 MR. McNULTY: But this condition wasn't present 16 the night of September 5th, as far as you're aware.
i 17 MR. RALNON: No, it was not present.
18 MR. VORSE: .Okay. Mr. Halnon, has anybody 19 forced you to attend this meeting with us today?
1.
20 MR. HALNON:. No.
21 MR. VORSE:
Okay. So we'll go ahead and l 22 conclude. The time is 2:25 p.m. And thank you very.much.
23 MR. RALNON: Okay.
24 (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at i
25 2:30 o' clock p.m.)
l
). '
C_E R T I F I-C A T E This is to certify that the attached proceedings-before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter.of: ,
Name of Proceeding: Interview of Gregory Halnon Docket Number (s): (not assigned)
' Place of Proceeding: Crystal River, Florida l were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter
.i reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of th oregoing proceedi s.
2MJ' dd S.'Hiy i ial N' -
Reporter Neal R. Gross and Co., Inc.
1
- 7 Pt
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
.2- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3~ +++++
4 OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS 5 INTERVIEW-
~6 ----------------------------------x 7 IN THE MATTER OF: .. :
8 / INTERVIEW OF : Docket No.
i 9 CHRISTINE SMITH: : (not assigned)_
10 : l 11 ----------------------------------x 12 13 W
$hr^' Wednesday, December 14, 1994 4
^
14 6 7/- f 15 Conference Room 202 16 Crystal River Plant 17 6745 N. Tallahassee Road 18 Crystal River, Florida 19 20 The above-entitled interview was conducted at 21 9:357 a.m.
22 23 BEFORE:
24 JIM VORSE Senior Investigator
- 25. CURT RAPP Reactor Engineer gg (}
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pAos. I OF lo PAGE(S) 2 _- 9 4 ' O: 36 '
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.1 APPEARANCES:
i2- On-Behalf ~of the Nuclear' Regulatory Commission
- 3. JAMES VORSE,-Senior-Investigatorl ,
3
- 4 Region II .NRC Office of Investigations. !
'5 -401 Marietta Street 6; . Atlanta, Georgia 30323
- 7 CURT RAPP 8 Reactor Engineer - NRC,-Region-Il
'9. 6745 N. Tallahasbee Road 10' Crystal River, Florida-32629-11
= 12 13- On: Behalf-of the Interviewee, Christine Smith 14 GREG HALNON 15- Operations Manager l-16 Crystal River Nuclear Plant
( 17 18 l -
g l-20 21--
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-25 ~ ;
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~1J 'P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S-
.2 9:35 a.m.
13 :MR.-VORSE:' Good morning. Today=is;the 14th of-4 December.1994. We're' going.to: interview Ms.l Christine "
5 -Smith. {
6 I would like'everyone in the room here to 7 introduce themselves and give your name and your title,-
8 please.
9 Curt, start with you.
e, 10 MR. RAPP: Yes. My name is Curt Rapp, R-A-P-P.
11 I'm a Reactor Engineer, Region II, Division of Reactor e
12 Safety.
I'm Greg Halnon, H-A-L-N-O-N.
13 MR..HALNON: I'm 14 the Maneger of Nuclear Plant Operations, Crystal River, 15 Unit III.
16 MR. VORSE: And my name is Jim Vorse. I'm an 17 Investigator with~the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 18 Office of Investigations, Region II.
.19 Christine, would you please give us your full 20 name, spell it for us.
^
21 MS. SMITH: Spell the first name too?
22 MR. VORSE: Yes.
12 3 MS. SMITH: Okay. My name is Christine Smith.
24 C-H-R-I-S-T-I-N-E, Smith, S-N-I-T-H. And I'm su 25- Assistant Nuclear Operator, Crystal River, III.,
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1 ;MR.fVORSE: Okay. _And what are your= duties'as- ;
2 -ass'stant-operator?,
i _
e 3- MS.-SMITH:e .Normally, as an assistant nuclear -
t 4 ' operator I: work-in.the Aux Building,.but I'm also.a- ,
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- 5 ' licensed _ reactor operator,--soli also-work the Main control 6- Board.
7 1MR.'VORSE:' -And what are your duties at.the, main it control board?
-9' MS.-SMITH: Normally taking log readings, 10 performing surveillance procedures and operating 11 procedures, starting up, shutting down the plant, handling 12- anything that might happen.
13 MR. VORSE:- What type of license do you have, 14 again?
15 MS. SMITH:
Reactor Operator's License.
16 MR. VORSE: And how long have you had that 1 71 license?-
18 MS. SMITH: Approximately.a year and a half.
19 MR. VORSE: Were you on the midnight shift of 20 September 5th, 1994?
H21" MS. SMITH: 'Yes,-I was.
'22 MR. VORSE: Would you tell-me who also was on 23 thatLshift.-
24L MS. SMITH: Myself, David Fields, Robert-Weiss, 25 -Mark van Sicklen,: Jack Stewart, ;and Jim Atkinson- in Aux o m.w. 3. ,,. _ _.p_ _ _ . _. ,, . . _ _ . ~ . , , , , . . , _- ..,,,_m , y, , , - . _
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l l 5 1 Building.
2 MR. VORSE: What were you doing that night on 3 that shift?
4 MS. SMITH: I was the reactor operator on the 5 board. I was the assistant to the chief, who was -- how 6 do I say it, he was senior to me and pretty much 7 directing.
I was like an assistant to him on the control 8 board.
9 MR. VORSE: Who was "him"?
10 MS. SMITH: Jack Stewart.
11 MR. VORSE: Would you describe your involvement 12 with the makeup tank curve evolution that happened that 13 night on Septembcr 5th.
14 MS. SMITH: Okay. My involvement was while Jack 15 Stewart was performing the evolution I was watching the 16 balance of the plant, to keep an eye on it and handle 17 anything else that might come in to distract them from 18 what they were doing. I was just watching the balance of 19 the plant.
20 MR. VORSE: Did you see anything unusual that 21 bothered you while you were performing your duties?
22 MS. SMITH: No, I did not. We did get the alarm 23 in for makeup tank pressure, but we knew that it was 24 because of the evolution they were performing. Other than 25 that, nothing was out of the ordinary.
.- c ,
6 1 MR. VORSE:' Did anyone on.your shift express 2_ reservations about doing this evolution,:something like 3- "this is aEproblem"?- -
- -i 4 MS. SMITH: . No.
, 5- MR. VORSE:- Did anyone say that the curve was '
6 design basis?
~.
7 MS.. SMITH: No.
4 8 MR. VORSE:- Did anyone-consult with the shift 9 technical operations advisor, that you know of?
- .10 MS.. SMITH
- I do not know.
11 MR. VORSE: Curt, do you have anything you'd 5 12 like to csk Ms. Smith?
, f;'
13 MR, 'FSPP : Yeah, let me go over a couple of 14 things.
15 Do you know what the makeup tank over pressure 16 reading was prior to performing this evolution?
j 17 MS. SMITH: I'm not -- I don't understand your 18 question.
19 MR. RAPP: What was the -- What was the makeup
, 20 tank pressure before they did this evolution? Was it 21 above or below the curve?
E 22- MS.. SMITH: Below the curve.
4 '23 MR..RAPP: Below the curve?
24- MS. SMITH: Well, it could possibly have been on 25 the curve because at the time we were being directed to
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7 1-1 runLright on the curve. 'I - I=can't reca11Lexactly. >
>2- -MR. RAPP:- '_Okay. . Al'1 - right . - -
i 3 , Is'it -- Jim mentioned the' design basis aspect 4' of this curve.' Is that typical that wnen you're given an 5 administrative limit-curve that that is also a design-
.> 6 basis limit?
9 . W '-
7 MS. SMITH: No. . This is the first case I've 2
~
8 ever heard of. I -- I never know that it was design 9' basis.
10' MR.:RAPP: When did it first come out that this 11 wasLa design basis limit?
12 MS. SMITH: Saveral months after the evolution.
4 13 MR. :;RAPP: Okay. Is this the first time that 14 the accuracy of this curve has been questioned?
- 15. .MS. SMITH:- Not that date. I know Mark van 16 Sicklen has had a concern for some time that the curve
, 17 might not be accurate.
16 MR. RAPP: Okay. And "some time" goes back to .
19 how far?-
l
-20 'MS. SMITH: I can't say. I can say 2 11 approximately eighteen months-or so. I-can't speak for
- 22- h'im . I'm-not sure exactly what point they started' 1 23 questioning.
24 MR. RAPP: Okay. That's.all I have at this 25 Ltime.
l-b_____-_______m --- -- - - -- ,-- ~ ~~ = " " - - ~ " ~ ~ ~ ~ * " " ' ' ' ~ ~'
8 1 MR. VORSE: Okay. Ms. Smith, if you had known 2
that the curve was a design basis what would you have 3 done?
4 MS. SMITH: I would have reported it to my shift 5 supervisor. I would have said, you know, this is not a 6 conservation action to operate on a design basis curve.
7 We shouldn't be anywhere close to any design basis curves.
8 And I would have strongly suggested that we stay away --
9 operate away from the curve and look into tne matter.
10 MR. VORSE: To your knowledge were any managers 11 other than your shift, or any managers above your shift 12 consulted with before this event took place?
13 MS.-SMITH: I don't know.
14 MR. VORSE: Is there anything that you'd like to 15 clarify or discuss with us?
16 MS. SMITH: No, not at this time.
17 MR. VORSE: Do you have any other questions?
18 MR. RAPP: Yes, let me review a couple of items, 19 if I may.
20 You said you were in the control room --
21 MS. SMITH: Yes.
22 MR. RAPP: -- during this evolution. And your 23 position was -- was what? What was your position?
24 MS. SMITH: A reactor operator.
25 MR. RAPP: Reactor operator, okey.
,e .
9 ,
-1 In that regard then, as a reactor operator, 2 referring to A-I-500, and the part that I have 3 highlighted, would you take a look at that.
4 (Document handed to witnesa-)
5 As a reactor operator would that also be part of 6 your duties or your responsibilities? ,
7 MS. SMITH: Yes.
8 MR. RAPP: Okay. To ensure that administrative 9 limits in the plant are not exceeded?
10 MS. SMITH: Yes.
11 MR. RAPP: Okay. All right. Thank you.
12 That's all.
13 MR.-VORSE: Okay. At this time I'd ask Ms.
14 Smith, has anyone forced you or coerced you into coming 15 here ma this room today and promised you anything?
16 MS. SMITH: No.
17 MR. VORSE: Okay. At this juncture I'll go 18 ahead and terminate the interview, and thank you very much 19 for your time.
20 (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 21 9:44 o' clock a.m.)
22 *****
23 24
-25
- . . - - . . . . , - . . . . . - . - . ....~. - - - . .
i C-E R T:I F I C A-T E This is to certify _that the.attacned proceedings .
Ibefore the Ur.ited States. Nuclear' Regulatory Commission ih I
. .the matter' oft Name of' Proceeding: ~ Interview of Christine Smith i
. Docket. Number ( s ) : (not assigned)-
Place of Proceeding: Crystal River, Florida T
were held as heroin appears,-and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States--
Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter 4
reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of th3 foregoing procee ings.
$ hh4
~
/ fV ),
'~ A eggy S. May off feial Reporter- -
Neal- R. Gross andT . , In .
.- - . - _ - -- ... ,_- . - - .