ML20203B549
| ML20203B549 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 10/17/1996 |
| From: | Schin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Casto C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203B366 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-97-313 NUDOCS 9712150085 | |
| Download: ML20203B549 (3) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMissl0N UMrTED STATES 8
neemNN wt murTTA sTaarT. N.W., SumE 2000
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{e, ATLANTA. OsDMNA 30554100 s,*****
October 17. 1996 i
HEMORANDUM T0:
C. Casto. Chief i
Engineering Branch. DRS f.
FROM:
R. Schin Reactor Inspector. DRS
SUBJECT:
CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR PLANT: ALLEGED COVERUP 0F FUEL HANDLING INCIDENT (CASE NO. 2 96 033/Ril-96-A 0177)
I reviewed the 01 transcr1 pts of interviews with Crystal River personnel to determine if the explanations given by the interviewees were credible: to identify any safety concerns that may have been expressed by the individuals:
and to identify issues that may be worthy of Ril inspection along with the w
JPAP recomendation for further inspection of fuel handling.
1.
Credibility in my opiniori, explanations given by the inte:'Vlewees were credible, with two exceptions:
a.
There were apparently conflicting statements with respect to the
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frequency / number of fuel handling underloads during an outage.
Mr. Jones stated on p. 11. line 1:
...an underload condition is something we frequently see and it represents the element contacting something.
And typically it's contacting another fuel element."
Mr. Weaver stated on P 27. line 8:
"... during a normal refueling my estimate is that you get an underload 5200 times on different assemblies.
However:
Mr. Culver stated on P. 20. line 21:
"We had very few hang ups.
And, in fact, the thing I talked about where one fuel assembly hits the edge of another. I don't recall that hap)ening at all in refuel ten.
It may have once or twice, w1ereas normally it happens a lot after refueling."
b.
There were apparently conflicting statements with respect to the fuel handling mast underlotd cutoff setpoint and consequent potential for fuel or control cod damage:
Mr. Atkinson stated on p. 15. line 15:
..it would apply no more than 600 pounds pressure before the cutoffs quit moving the mast downward..."
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Hcwever:
Mr. Weaver stated on p. 13. line 17:
"The limits thatwehavetopreventanydamagetothefggreallyfor tn5E 110.
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these girth footstraps. And that limit is about 500 pounds, but we set our bridge to abcJt 350 pounds so we won't meet that limit.
Also:
Mr. Culver stated on p. 18. line 9:
- So you're looking at providing they had it in the heavy switch 4
position - 300 pounds that would have been applied to that rod. Well. I confimed again today to make sure I was right, with Dennis Baumgartner, and he said that a control rod mast when you're inserting a rod in the > art of the weight of the mast is set on the rod is in tie range of 200 and 250.
So we're locking at 50 pounds difference.
Not a significant amount."
2.
Safety Concerns There were scme safety concernt raised by the interviewees:
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a.
Ms. Smith stated on p. 9. line 23:
..I did just find something out this morning. that I had heard that one of the non licensed operators had found a valve mispositioned sometime recently and they just restored it to where it was going and did not report it because they were afraid that management was going to blame them for it."
b.
Ms. Smith stated on p. 11. line 2:
..I have heard that it has happened before in the past (a fbel assembly being lowered on top of another fuel assembly)."
Also Mr. Atkinson stated on p. 17. line:
...there are >robably shift supervisors and above now that say, well. this has lappened before.
And I can't prove it.
I don't know of it happening.
But
-they say it has.
(lowering a fuel assembly onto another) c.
Mr. Weaver stated on p. 24. line 15:
"And we didn't have a video camera (to see the fuel handling underwater)." We tried to buy one last time and our management... didn't buy the camera because we didn't have the funds to do it."
...without the camera, Also, Mr. Weaver stated on p. 26, line 1: - "
that is a very hard thing (for the refueling supervisor) to determine (that the fuel assembly being lowered is properly aligned underwater so as to not hit other fuel)."
3.
Other Fuel Handlina Issues That May Warrant Insoection a.
Mr. Weaver stated on p. 26. line 4:
"The procedure said that he (the refueling supervisor) should verify it, not that he must (the underwater alignment of fuel being lowered into the core).
You know. It's usually 'must* 15 a requirement procedure violation
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'shMd' is a recommendation."
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c Are procedure requirements and compliance in this area adequate?
b.
Mr. Culver stated no p. 25 line 3:
(procedure FP 203)...
section 3.1.3, the refuedog log it gives you an idea of the type of things that should. and.+ is a should and not a @A M c that should be included in step 3.'A.'t.2. which include date. names of refueling personnel, fuel assenbHes moved, final iocatim of fuel assemblies, transfer carriage running times causes of deiars in moving fuel, and changes to refueling procedures, it does not specifically call out exact tt.ings that should be recorded.
it is not considered Quality documentation..."
l Are procedure requirements and compliance in this area adcate't c.
Mr. de Montfort stated on p. 8. line 17:
"...a bigger pictuM.
which I ncw see is the number of errors and the safeguards that we had in place, which had to break down...
And we have a lot of m safeguards:
the tag board, the spotters, repeating of the fuel location, the move sheets.
...all those had to break down at the same time."
Are procedure requirements and compliance in this area adequate?
For example, a previous event at St. Lucie revealed defic 1encies in the required review and approval of move sheets and enanges to
'k' move sheets, and quality status of move sheets.
Also. St. Lucie procedures and practices for refueling supervisor duties.
including fuel movement verification, did not implement TS requirements.
At (rystal River. are fuel handling underload / overload setpoints correct and are they overly relied upon?
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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U oFHCE oF seNtsinGATsoNS HELD oFF6CE, REGloN 11 l
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December 4,1996 MEMORANDUM TO:
Robert P, Schin, Reactor inspector Division of Reactor Safety s'
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FROM:
William J. McNulty, Director
\\ j ke.'.
s Office of Investigations Field Of gion ll
SUBJECT:
CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR PLANT: ALLEGED COVERUP OF FUEL HANDLING INCIDENT (CASE NO. 2-96433/Ril 96-A C177)
Thank you i<t your prompt review of the six transcripts provided in our October 3,1996, memorandum. Although there was no concem about fuel assembly damage, we need to know if there was a regulatory requirement for the incident to be reported to the NRC and if s
so, what is the appropriate regulatory cite.
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