ML20198P818
| ML20198P818 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 02/14/1984 |
| From: | Allred D, Bates R, Stancavage P GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151H203 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-86-26 SIL-402, TAC-54150, NUDOCS 8606060397 | |
| Download: ML20198P818 (35) | |
Text
-
l JITt Tl 1
mu mmum NUCLE AR SERVICES OPERATIONS e
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNI A 95125 February 14, 1984 SIL No. 402 File Tab T Category 1 WETWELL/DRYWELL INERTING A recent event at an operating BWR/4 resulted in a large crack in the vent header in the torus which was attributed to brittle fracture caused by the injection of cold nitrogen into the torus during inerting.
Since failure of the containment's suppression system during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) could result in containment system overpressurization, this Service Information Letter is being issued to recommend actions that can be taken to prevent this type of event and to help ensure containment system integrity.
Backoround The containment inerting system injects nitrogen into the torus or wetwell and/or the drywell to limit oxygen concentration to less than approximately 4% by volume.
This inerting system is used at'high capacity only when a plant starts up after the containment has been deinerted, ie, filled with air.
Nitrogen is supplied from a liquid nitrogen storage tank, vaporized in a heat exchanger and injected into the containment through penetrations in the wetwell or in both the wetwell and drywell.
There is typically at.least one valve in the injection line between the vaporizer and the containment to shutoff the line in the event the nitrogen is too cold.
If there are failures in the vaporizer and the shutoff valve, it is possible 'to inject nitrogen into the containment at low enough temperatures to cool materials below their nil ductility temperatures and potentially cause equipment or structural damage.
Discussion During a routine visual inspection of the vent system at an ocerating EWR/4, a large crack was observed in the vent header within the torus.
Metallographic examination of the crack indicated that it was due to brittle fracture.
The cause is attributed to cooling of the carbon steel vent header by nitrogen injected through a wetwell penetration aoproximately seven feet directly above the area of failure.
8606060397 860319 PDR FOIA PATTERSOB6-26 PDR GENERAL h ELECTRIC
r
~.
SIL No. A02 Visual inspections'of the vent headers of several other Mark I BWRs showed no indication of cracks.
The cause of the failure, cold nitrogen injection, limits the concern to Mark I and II plants which use liquid nitrogen as the source for inerting.
SWRs with Mark III containment systems are not affected because the'y are not inerted.
Recommendations General Electric recommends, based on information available at this time, that the following actions be taken by all BWR owners with Mark I or Mark II containment systems to confirm that equipment damace has not occurred, that inerting system operati.on is proper, and so that damage will nbt occur in the future.
Decommendations 1 and 2 apply to all Mark I and II BWRs.
Recommen'a-d tions 3, 4, 5 apply only to those BWRs which have used their liquid-nitrogen-based inerting systems.
1.
Evaluate Inerting System Desion Evaluate the design of the nitrogen inerting system.
Investigate the potential for introducing cold (less than 40'F) nitrogen and the orientation of the nitrogen port relative to the vent header, downcomers, or other equipment in the wetwell'and drywell which may be in the path of the injected nitrogen.
Assure that the temperature monitoring devices, the low temperature shutoff valve, and overall system design are adequate to prevent the injection of cold nitrogen into the containment.
2.
Evaluate Inerting System Ooeration Review the operating experience of the inerting system to assure that the vaporizer, the low temperature shutoff valve and the temperature indicators have functioned properly.
Evaluate the plant calibration, maintenance and operating procedures for the inerting system.
Assure that cold nitrogen injection would be detected and prevented.
3.
-Test for Drywell/Wetwell Bypass Leakace f
Perform a bypass leakage test as soon as convenient to confirm the integrity of the vent system.
This test should be conducted during plant operation following normal plant procedures.
If no proce-dures exist, the following is a general guide for crecaring your Dracedure: pressurize the drywell to aaproximately 0.~5 psi above the wetwell pressure, maintain this drywell pressure and measure the pressure buildup in the wetwell.
Any bypass leak area can then be calculated (and is limited by Technical Soecifications on many plants) from the wetwell pressure and the drywell-wetwell pressure difference.
This will provide an indication that the vent system.
. SIL No. 402.
d.
Inspect flitrocen Injection Line Conduct an ultrasonic test (UT) as soon as convenient of all accessible welds in the nitrogen injection line from the last isolation valve to the wetwell and drywell penetrations.
Also UT the containment penetrations and the containment shell within 6, ld inches of the penetration.
UT is recommended because cracks wou be most likely to initiate on the inside of the pipe or on the side of the metal in contact with cold nitrogen.
5.
Insoect Containment During the next planned outage, perform a visual inspection of the vent header, downcomers and other equipment in the containment which might be expected to be affected by the injection of cold nitrogen.
The vent header should be inspected on the outside and the inside.
Also inspect the containment shell or steel. liner for at least 6 inches around the nitrogen penetration.
This has been prepared in support of the BWR Regulatory Response Group (RRG) and with its concurrence.
For additional information, please contact your local General Electric Service Representative.
Prepared by:
P. P. Stancavage O _/ $ Z'r.
'. ' COW Approved by_:
,t c(
.4 Issued by:
c _/ -
D.L. Allred, Manager R.E. Bates, Specialist Customer Service Information Service Communications Product Reference T23 Containment System 748 Inerting System 1
ENCLOSURE 2 TO BE FILLED OUT BY PROJECT MANAGER AND RETURNED TO ORAB BY COB, MARCH 21, 1984 Plant Name:
Fro,iect Manacer:
Has your licensee responded to the GE SIL-4027 If so, return a copy of the licensee's response to ORAB with this form.
If not, does the licensee intend to provide a re nse to the Commission?
Yes No
- Will the response be oral or in writing?
Oral Written If so, when?
Date L
INFORMATION IEITER 1
l NUCLEAR SERVICES OPERATIONS S
SAN JOSE, CALIF ORNI A 95125
~J
//
g%.
. fl ' Q 6 'm Februiry 14, 1984 SIL No. 402 File Tab T Category 1 WETWELL/DRYWELL INERTING A recent event at an operating BWR/4 resulted in a large crack in the vent header in the torus which was attributed to brittle fracture caused by the injection of cold nitrogen into the torus during inerting.
Since failure of the containment's suppression system during a loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) could result in containment system overpressurization, this Service Information Letter is being issued to recommend actions that can be taken to prevent this type of event and to help ensure containment system integrity.
Backaround The containment inerting system injects nitrogen into the torus or wetwell and/or the drywell to limit oxygen concentration to less than approximately 4% by volume. This inerting system is used at high capacity only when a plant starts up after the containment has been deinerted, ie, filled with air. Nitrogen is supplied from a liquid nitrogen storage tank, vaporized in a heat exchanger and injected into the containment through penetrations in the wetwell or in both the wetwell and drywell. There is typically at least one valve in the injection line between the vaporizer and the containment to shutoff the line in the event the nitrogen is too cold.
If there are failures in the, vaporizer and the shutoff valve, it is possible to inject nitrogen into the containment at low enough temperatures to cool materials below their nil ductility temperatures and potentially cause equipment or structural damage.
Discussion During a routine visual inspection of the vent system at an operating BWR/4, a large crack was observed in the vent header within the torus.
Metallographic examination of the crack indicated that it was due to brittle fracture.
The cause is attributed to cooling of the carbon steel vent header by nitrogen injected through a wetwell penetration approximately seven feet directly above the area of failure.
GENER AL h ELECTRIC g
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4 I
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. Visual inspections of the vent headers of several other Mark I BWRs showed no indication of cracks. The cause of the failure, cold nitrogen injection, limits the concern to Mark I and II plants which use liquid nitrogen as the source for inerting.
BWRs with Mark III containment systems are not affected because they are not inerted.
Recommendations General Electric recommends, based on information available at this time, that the following actions be taken by all BWR owners with Mark I or Mark II containment systems to confirm that equipment danace has not occurred, that inerting system operation is proper, and so that damage will not occur in the future.
Recommendations 1 and 2 apply to all Mark I and II BWRs.
Recormenda-tions 3, 4, 5 apply only to those BWRs which have used their liquid-nitrogen-based inerting systems.
1.
Evaluate Inerting System Design Evaluate the design of the nitrogen inerting system.
Investigate the potential for introducing cold (less than 40'F) nitrogen and
,1 the orientation of the nitrogen port relative to the vent header, downcomers, or other equipment in the wetwell and drywell which may be in the path of the injected nitrogen. Assure that the temperature monitoring devices, the low temperature shutoff valve, and overall system design are adequate to prevent the injection of cold nitrogen into the containment.
2.
Evaluate Inerting System Operation Review the operating experience of the inerting system to assure that the vaporizer, the low temperature shutoff valve and the temperature indicators have, functioned properly. Evaluate the plant calibration, maintenance and operating procedures for the inerting system. Assure that cold nitrogen injection would be detected and prevented.
3.
Test for Drywell/Wetwell Bypass Leakage Perform a bypass leakage test as soon as convenient to confirm the integrity of the vent system. This test should be conducted during plant operation following normal plant procedures.
If no proce-dures exist, the following is a general guide for preparing your procedure: pressurize the drywell to approximately 0.75 psi above the wetwell pressure, maintain this drywell pressure and measure the pressure buildup in the wetwell. Any bypass leak area can then be calculated (and is limited by Technical Specifications on many plants) from the wetwell pressure and the drywell-wetwell pressure difference. This will provide an indication that the vent system integrity is intact and that no gross failure exists.
s N
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l ', SIL No. 402
)
4.
Inspect Nitrogen Injection Line Conduct an ultrasonic. test (UT) as soon as convenient of all accessible welds in the nitrogen injection line from the last isolation valve to the wetwell and drywell penetrations. Also UT the containment penetrations and the containment shell within 6 inches of the penetration.
UT is recommended because cracks would be most likely to initiate on the inside of the pipe or on the side of the metal in " contact with cold nitrogen.
5.
Inspect Containment During the next planned outage, perform a visual inspection of the vent header, downcomers and other equipment in the containment which might be expected to be affected by the injection of cold nitrogen. The vent header should be inspected on the outside and the inside. Also inspect the containment shell or steel liner for at least 6 inches around the nitrogen penetration.
This has been prepared in support of the BWR Regulatory Response Group (RRG) and with its concurrence.
For additional information, please contact your local General Electric l
Service Representative.
Prepared by:
P. P. Stancavage
'k Approved Issued by:
e D.L. Allred, Manager R.E. Bates, Specialist Customer Service Information Service Communications 4
Product Reference T23 Containment System T48 Inerting System
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oq'o, UNITED STATES I'
~ j, NUCLEAR REGULATO'RY COMMISSION
'T.
t WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 o
E s.,
/
FEB 121985 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response, IE FROM:
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing, NRR
SUBJECT:
BWR VENT HEADER CRACKING Enclosed is a report prepared by ORAB detailing the industry's response to the GE SIL No. 402 of February 1984.
It is evident that the appreach we took including the attempt to get voluntary responses from the industry was not as successful as initially envisioned. We anticipate that this experience will l.
provide useful insight into how to handle similar issues in the future.
We believe that there is a need to conduct follow-up inspections at each facility to verify completion of the recommended SIL actions. Therefore, we recomend that an inspection procedure be developed based on the. Information in the enclosed report. We ere prepared to assist in developing this procedure, 4
as necessary. Inspections should be conducted at all affected Mark I and II BWRs during FY'85 to close-out the staff's action on this issue. A copy of each of the licensees' letters relativa to activities and comitments on this subject is also enclosed for your use.
/
Darrel
.ki hut, Director Division of Licensing, NRR
Enclosures:
b-1.
Close-out of Vent Header Cracking 2.
Licensees' Responses 35WWO4NM.
7 A/I69
77 L
CLOSE-0UT OF DIVISION OF LICENSING TASK ON VENT HEADER CRACKING IN MARK I AND II
~
. BOILING WATER REACTORS I.
Backoround On February 3,1984, Georgia Power Company reported a through-wall crack almost completely around the vent header within the containment torus of Fatch Uni.t 2.
Later that day IE Bulletin 84-01, " Cracks in Boiling Water Reactor Mark I Containment Vent Headers," was issued for action to the licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I containments that were in cold shutdown. The bulletin required inspection for cracks in the containment vent header and in the main vents in the region near the intersection with 4
the vent header. The inspections by the licensees revealed no cracks.
The bulletin also suggested that the operating BWR plants with Mark I containments should review their plant data on differential pressure between the wetwell and drywell for anomalies that could be indicative of cracks. The licensees who performed the review reported no anomalies.
The Regulatory Response Group (RRG) of the BWR Owner's Group (BWROG) met with the NRC on February 6,1984, and presented the preliminary results of their investigation into the cause of the Hatch 2 crack. The RRG discussed recomended actions for each Mark I and II licensee to complete in order to satisfy the concerns raised by this event. The meeting resulted in the agreement that the industry would voluntarily perform the necessary measures to present this type of event, therefore precluding NRC action.
On February 23, 1984, the RRG met again with the NRC and presented additional results of the Hatch 2 investigation and details of GE SIL No. 402 that was transmitted.to the BWROG representatives on February 17, 1984. The large crack in the Hatch 2 vent header was confirmed to be the result of brittle fracture caused by the injection of cold nitrogen into the torus during inerting. The crack represented a failure of the containment suppression system which could cause containment overpressur-ization during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). The SIL contained recomended actions to prevent this type of event and to help ensure containment system integrity. The recomended actions for all Mark I and II BWRs, included evaluation of inerting system designs and operation, dryvell/wetwell bypass leakage testing, and nitrogen line and containment inspections for BWRs which have used their liquid nitrogen-based inerting systems. The cover letter contained the direction that the licensees should contact their NRC project managers to indicate the expected corpletion date for each SIL recomendation.
It was agreed on during the meeting that this comunication would take place within the following two weeks.
2 On' March 5,1984, IE Information Notice 84-17, " Problems with liquid Nitrogen Cooling Components Below NIL Ductility Temperature," was issued to all holders of OLs and cps. The notice advised the licensees and applicants of potentially significant problems with the use of liquid nitrogen that could cool vital components below the nil ductility temper-ature (NDT) of associated materials susceptible to brittle fracture.
The Notice suggested that licensees who have used liquid nitrogen or b
other pot'entially very cold fluids in applications where the fluid could i
come in contact with safety-related components subject to brittle fracture should consider inspecting these components for possible indication of cracks.
]
By March 20, 1984, the NRC had not been contacted by the licensees.
]
Therefore, the Director of the Division of Licensing provided guidance to 4
all Project Managers on surveying their licensees by March 23, 1984 on i
their plans for responding to the GE-SIL. By March 29, 1984, of the 32 lI requested responses, 7 facilities comitted to respond in writing; 11 stated they did not intend to respond, and the rest either were uncertain about their type of submittal or committed to respond orally. Ten facilities responded in writing; five responded orally by June. On August 9, 1984, the Deputy Director of the Division of Licensing informed the Chairman of the BWR Owners Group on the industry's response to the SIL. The Chairman suggested that a requirement from the NRC would be the most effective measure to resolve this issue in a timely mar.ner.
II. CRGR Review The NRR and IE offices worked together throughout this period of time in developing an IE Bulletin on this matter. Management decided to move forward and meet with CRGR on sending the bulletin. Representatives from the Division of Licensing and IE presented their position to the CRGR on September 5, 1984. CRGR recomended that the staff make another effort in contacting those licensees that had not responded to the SIL to elicit a response. NRR orally comunicated with these licensees.
Each utility was advised of the need to respond to the GE SIL by COB September 14, 1984 CRGR recomended that those utilities not responding within 10 days after being contacted by the NRC should be sent an'IE Bulletin. By September 24, 1984, the following facilities had not responded: Brunswick 1 and 7-Fitzpatrick; Susquehanna 1 and 2; Limerick 1; and Fermi 2.
Senior management of each of these facilities were contacted by the appropriate Division of Licensing management on September 25, 1984. By October 1, 1984, all of the affected facilities responded to their respective Project. Managers that they had implemented the recomendations contained in the GE SIL.
Therefore, NRR and IE concurred that the IE Bulletin not be issued.
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I III. Industry Resoonse to GE SIL Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 show in matrix form the industry responses to the GE SIL reccmendations. Table 1 lists each facility showing its type of response for each recommendation; Table 2 shows for each recomendation the plants which responded adeouately; Table 3 shows future comitments; Table 4 shows inadequate responses; Table 5 shows responses of nonapplicability of the recomendat:en with justification. The SIL recommendations 3, 4, and 5 were not applicable to those units which had not used their inerting equioment. Those units are shown in the table' with a double asterisk (**).
However, some facilities chose to address those recomendations; their reporting is included for infonnation only. A number of facilities did not believe that ultrasonic testing of the' nitrogen injection line was an applicable measure for them to follow. They did inspect their lines using other means; this is denoted by a single asterisk (*) in Tables 1 and 5.
In order to provide a more complete evaluation of the licensee's responses to the GE SIL, specific actions for each recomendation were identified and reviewed as shown below. The responses were characterized as:
(1) adequate response to the recomendation, (2) comitment to future response to the recomendation, (3) inadequate response to the recomendation, and (4) not applicable including justification. An inadequate response was determined if it did not include sufficient information, or contained only a general statement, or was not addressed.
1.
Evaluate Inerting System Design a.
Evaluate inerting system design:
19 facilities either adequately responded or comitted to implement the recomendation; 15 facilities submitted an inadequate response, b.
Investigate potential for cold nitrogen injection and orientation of injection port relative to components in drywell/wetsell:
18~facilitits
~
either adequately responded or comitted to 1
implement the recomendation; 16 facilities submitted an inadequate response.
c.
Evaluate adequacy of temperature control system:
22 facilities either adequately responded or committed to implement the recomendation; 12
, facilities submitted an inadequate response.
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- 2.. Evaluate Inerting System Operation a.
Review operating experience of temperature control system:
17 facilities either adequately responded or committed to implement the recommendation; 13 inadequately responded; 4 provided justification that the recommendation
,was nonapplicable, b.
Evaluate maintenance and operating procedures for inerting system: 26 facilities either adequately responded or emnnitted to implementing the recommendation; 8 submitted inadequate responses.
3.
Perform Drywell/Wetwell Bypass Leakage Test Nineteen facilities either submitted an adequate response or committed to implement the recommendation; one facility inadequately responded; five provided justification for nonapplicability of the recommendation.
4.
Inspect Nitrogen Injection Line Six facilities either submitted an adequate response or committed to implement the recommendation; three inadequately responded; 16 provided justification for nonapplicability of recommendation and 9 of these used other measures than those recommended.
5.
Inspect Containment a.
Perform visual inspection of components which could be affected by injection of cold nitrogen:
16 either provided an adequate response or committed to implement the recommendation; 6 inadequately responded;.3 provided justification for nonapplicability of the recommendation, b.
Inspect inside and outside of vent header and nitrogen penetration:
15 provided either an adequate response or a connitment to implement the recommendation; 7 inadequately responded; 3 provided justification for nonapplicability of the recommendation.
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IV. Conclusions We believe that there are no further reporting reouirements by the industry since the CRGR recommended that an IE Bulletin requiring a response to the GE SIL be sent only to those utilities that had not provided a formal response by a specific time. All affected licensees had submitted a formal response by October 1,1984 Therefore, this review ci,oses out the responsibilities in this matter by the Division of Licensing. However, we recommend that these facilities be inspected to ensure actions were performed as reported.
It is especially important to do an indepth inspection of all those facilities submitting either a commitment to future implementation or insufficient information or only a general statement on the issue. Those that provided a response that the recomf2ndation was not applicable to the facility should be uniquely inspected as to meeting the intent of the recommendation.
9 l
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, Inadequate Response to Recommendation 51" Adequate Coninitment to
{1 Response to Future Response Insufficient General Not Not Applicable i'
Plsnt Recommendation to Recommendation Information Statement Addressed with Justification
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Nine Hi. Pt. I 1.a. c 1.b 2.a. b 5.a 3
4 5.b Oyster Creek 2.a 1.b 1.a. c 4
3 2.b 5.a. b P2ach Bottom 2 1.a. b, c 2.b 4*
2.a 3
5.a b LEGEND 1.
Evaluate Inerting System Design a.
Evaluate inerting system design b.
Investigate potential for cold nitrogen injection and orientation of injection port relative to canponents in drywell/wetwell c.
Evaluate adequacy of temperature control system 2.
Evaluate inerting System Operation i
a.
Review operating experience of temperature control system l
b.
Evaluate maintenance and operating procedures for inerting system 3.
Perform Drywell/Wetwell Bypass Leakage Test I.,
4 Inspect Nitrogen in.icction Line 5.
Inspect Containment Perfonn visual inspection of components which could be affected by in.iection of cold nitrogen a.
b.
Inspect inside and outside of vent header and nitrogen penetration i (';
- Method of inspection prescribed by Sil was not performed, but another type of inspection was.
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TA81E 2
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l ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO RECOD94ENDAT10N t
I
- 1. EVALUATE INERTING SYS. DESICH
- 2. EVALUAIE INERilNG SYS. OPERAIN.
- 3. PERFORM DRfWELL/
- 4. INSPECT H
- 5. INSPECI CONIAINMENI Inertinn%ys.b.foldN[oratn. Inject./ c. Temp. Contrl
- a. Temp. Contrl
- b. Maint./Opertn.
BYPASS LEAKAGE INJECTID$
- a. Visual Insp. b. Inside/Outside a.
Design Port Sys. Adequacy Emperience Procedures TEST LINE of Components of Vent lleader i
Browns Ferry-1 Browns Ferry-1 Browns Ferry-1 Browns Ferry-1 Browns Ferry-1 Browns Ferry-1 Monticello Browns Ferry 3 Dresden 3 Browns Ferry-2 Browns Ferry-2 Browns Ferry-2 Browns Ferry-2 Browns Ferry-2 Browns Ferry-2 Mn. Hl. Pt. 1 Dresden 3 Quad Cit. I
{
nrowns Ferry-3 Browns Ferry-3 8rowns Ferry-3 Browns Ferry-3 Browns Ferry-3 Brunswick-1 Oyster Creek Fit: Patrick lla tch-1 l
Orunswick-1 Brunswick-1 Feral-2 Brunswick-1 Brunwsick-1 Brunwsick-2 Paigelm-1 Hatch-l llatch-2 nruntwic k-2 Brunwsick-2 listch-1 Brunswick-2 Brunswick-2 Cooper fla tc h-2 Mn. Mt. Pt.-l 1
quid Cit. 1 Quad Cit. 1 Hatch-2 Dresden-2 Dresden-2 Dresden-3 Honticello Oyster Creek quad Cit. 2 Quad Cit. 2 H. Mt. Pt. 1 Dresden-3 Dresden-3 quad Cit. 2 Oyster Creek Peach 8tm. 2 Fe ral-2 Feral-2 Peact. Sta. 2 Hatch I Quad Clt. 1 Duane Arnold Peach 8tm. 2 Susque. I flatch I Honticello Peach 8tm. 3 Hatch 2 Quad Cit. 2 Hatch 1 Pilgrim 1 llatch 2 Peach 8tm. 2 Hope Creek 1 Monticello Feral-2 Peach 8tm. 2 Susquehanna 1 Hunticello Peach 8tm 3 llope Creek 2 Oyster Creek Pilgrim-1 Peach Sim. 3 Mn. Mt. Pt. 1 Vermont Yankee Nn. Mt. Pt. 2 Peach Sim. 2-Pilgrim-1 i
P2ach 8tm. 2 Hope Creek 1 Susque. 1 Peach 8tm. 3 Vermont Yankee Psach 8tm. 3 Hope Creek 2 Susque. 2 WMP-2
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Susquehanna 1 Susquehanna 2 18 Units 14 Units 14 Units 14 Units 11 Units 13 Units 4 Units to Units 8 Units 3
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TA8tE 3 C00NIINENT TO FUTURE RESPON5E TO RECOPMENDAll0N t
I
- 1. EVALUATE INERilNG SYS. DESIGN
- 2. EVALUATE INERTING SYS. OPERAIN.
- 3. PERF0llM DRYWELL/
- 4. INSPECT N
- 5. INSPECT CONTAINNENT
- a. Inerting Sys. b. Cold N, Inject./ c. Temp. Contrl
- a. Temp. Contrl
- b. Maint./Opertn.
BYPASS LEAKAGE INJECil0$
- a. Visual Insp. b. Inside/Outside
- y Deslan Port locatn.
Sys. Adequacy Empertence Procedures TEST LINE of Components of vent pleader p
Millstone-1 llatch 1 Brunswick-1 Duane Arnold Duane Arnold Dresden 1 Dresden 2 Dresden.2 Dresden 2 llatch 2 Brunswick-2 Mllistone-1 Fit Patrick Quad Cit. I Dresden 3 Duane Arnold Quad Cit. 1 I
Hillstone-1 Fit Patrick Mn. Mt. Pt. 2 Hatch 1 Fit:Patrlck Millstone-I Ouane Arnold Dyster Creek Millstone-1 Hatch 2 Hatch 2 Peach Ste. 3 Nillstone-1 l,
Monticello Mllistone-1 Oyster Creek laSalle 1 LaSalle I f~
1:
Limerick-1 Montleello Nn. M 1. P t. 2 **
LaSalle 2 tasalle 2 Linerick-2 Peach tie 2 Susquehanna 1 Peach Sta. 3 I
Shoreham reach Ste. 3 Shoreham**
{.1 Hope Creek 1 Hope Creek 2 LaSalle-I l.j LaSalle-2 Mn. Mt. Pt. 2 Shoreham WNP-2 1 Unit 4 Units 8 Units 3 Units 15 Units 6 Units 2 Urlts 6 Units 7 Units LEC(NO
- Licensee did not have to implement Recommendations 3. 4. and 5 since it did not use inerting system yet, but chose to report.
(Not included in unit totals).
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1 TABLE 4 INADEQUATE RESPONSE TO RECONMENDAll0N
- 1. EVALUATE INERTING SYS. DESIGN
- 2. [VALUAIE INERTING SYS. OPERAIN.
- 3. PERFORM DRYWELL/
- 4. INSPECT N
- 5. INSPECT CONTAINMENT
- c. Inerting Sys. b. Cold N[ocatn. Inject./ c. temp. Contrl
- a. Temp..Contrl
- b. Maint./Opertn.
8YPASS LEAKAGE INJECIIO$
- s. Visual lnsp. b. Inside/Outside Design Port
_!rs. Adequacy Emperience Procedures TEST LINE of Components of Vent Header i
i Cooper Cooper Cooper Cooper Cooper Millstone 1 Cooper Brunswick I Browns Ferry 3 Drssden 2 '
Dresden 2 Dresden 2 Quad Cit. 1 Nn. Mt. Pt. 1 quad Cit. 1 Brunswick 2 Brunswick 1 I
trasden 3 Dresden 3 3resden 3 Quad Cit. 2 Oyster Creek Quad Cit. 2 Cooper Brunswick 2 Duane Arnold Duane Arnold Quad Cit. 1 FitaPatrick Vermont Yankee Quad Cit. 1 Cooper F itaPs tric k F itrPatrick Quad Cit. 2 Mn. MI. Pt. 1 Susquehanna 1 Quad Cit. 2 fit: Patrick Oystar Creek Nn. MI. Pt. 1 Duane Arnold Pilgrle 1 Susquehanna 2 Nn. N1. Pt. 1 Monticello i
Pilgrie 1 Pilgrim 1 Oyster Creek Vermont Yan.
Limerick 1 Vermont Yan.
Vzrmont Yankee LaSalle 1 Pilgrim 1 LaSalle 1 Limerick 2 i
Lc52Ile 1 LaSalle 2 Vermont Yankee LaSalle 2 ts5 lle 2 kn. Mt. Pt. 2 LaSalle 1 Susque. 1 i
No. M1. Pt. 2 Susquehanna 1 LassIIe 2 Susque. 2 I
Limerick 1 Susquehanna 2 WMP-2 Limerick 1 Limerick 2 Limerick 1 Limerick 2 Shorchas Limerick 2 WNP-2 Shoreham WNP-2 15 Units 16 Units 12 Units 13 Units 8 Units 1 Unit 3 Units 6 Units 7 Units 1
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TABLE 5 NOT APPLICA8tE INCLUDING JUSTIFICATION I
- l. EVALUATE INERTING SYS. DESIGN
- 2. EVALUATE INERIING SYS. OPERATN.
- 3. PERFORM DAYWELL/
- 4. INSPECT N
- 5. INSPECT CONIAINMENT f
- e. Inerting Sys
- b. Cold H, Inject./ c. Temp. Contrl
- a. Temp. Contrl
- b. Maint./Opertn.
SYPA55 LEAKAGE INJECil0d
- a. Visual Insp. b. Inside/Outside 4
Design Port tocatn, Sys. Adequacy Empertence Procedures IEST tlNE of Components of Vent Header Forel 2 Browns Ferry 3 Browns Ferry 1 Browns Ferry 1 Browns Ferry 1 Hope Creek 1 Monticello Browns Ferry 2 Browns Ferry 2 Browns f erry 2 Ilope Creek 2 Nn. Mt. Pt. 1 Browns Ferry 3 Vermont Yank.
Pilgrim 1 Shoreham LaSalle 1 Brunswick 1 Mn. MI. Pt. 2**
Hn. Mt. Pt. 2**
LaSalle 2 Brunswick 2 Shoreham**
Shoreham" Duane Arnold
- FitrPatrick" i
Hatch 1*
Hatch 2*
Millstone la i'
Peach Ste. 2" Peach Ste. 3*
l Vermont Yank."
LaSalle 1 LaSalle 2 Mn. M1. Pt. 2 Susquehanna 18 Susquehanna 2**
Shorehas**
4 Units F Hntts 16 Units 3 Units 3 Units ifGEND 3 e % d of Inspection prescribed by SIL was not performed, but another type of Inspection was.
M
- Licsnsee did not have to laplement Recommendations 3, 4, and 5 since it did not use Enerting systen yet, but chose to report.
(Not included in unit totals).
.