ML20198P290
| ML20198P290 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 02/24/1982 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151H203 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-86-26, TASK-07-03, TASK-7-3, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8606060279 | |
| Download: ML20198P290 (4) | |
Text
- _ _
..?
\\
~
EVALUATION OF OYSTER CREEK REMOTE SMUTDOWN PANEL INSTALLATION DEFERMENT In a memorandum dated February 4,1982 from G. C. Lainas to L. S. Rubenstein we were asked to review a request for a deferment for the installation of a remote shutdown panel for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant until the 1984 refueling outage.
It is our understanding that this request covers only defer-ment of installation of the shutdown panel itself and does not include the deferment of any other necessary changes which may be required to meet Appendix R.
Alternative plant shutdown capability, exterior to the control room, is required by 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R, Section III.G. The alternative shutdown system must have the capability to achieve and maintain hot shutdown, followed by cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Further, Paragraph 50.48(c)(5) of Part 50 requires that any design modifications which are necessitated on the part of the licensee to meet Section III.G.3 requirements, must be reviewed and approved by NRC.
The licensee has not yet submitted an Appendix R evaluation for the Oyster
~
Creek Plant. The deadline for this submittal is July 1982.
Our evaluation of the licensee's current capability to perform a hot shutdown followed by a cold shutdown, without the benefit of a remote shutdown panel is given below.
i We assume that the reactor can be tripped from the control room before the control room is evacuated.
8606060279 860319 PDR FOIA PATTERSO86-26 PDR
~~
- ~.
. _ ~ - -
(
4 5(
44 1
4 4 4-44 44# (44 4
4 4*
'k A series of steps must be undertaken outside the control room to achieve a hot shutdown. Emergency cooling will be initiated through operation of the Isolation Condenser (IC) in conjunction with the closure of the Main St,eam Isolation Valves (MSIVs). Closure of the MSIVs results in loss of the con-denser as a heat sink. The isolation condensers use the atmosphere as the ultimate heat sink.
Two independent isolation condensers are available. Each contains a minimum of 22,730 gallons of water. Simultaneous operation of the condensers pro-vides reactor decay heat absorption for'one hour and forty minutes without repl enis hment. The isolation condenser inlet line has two motor operated valves in series which are normally open to maintain the isolation condenser at reactor pressure. The return isolation valve (which is normally closed) is capable of manual operation. Makeup water to the condensers is supplied from either the condensate transfer system or the' fire protection system.
All valves required to supply water from either makeup source can be operated in a local manual mode.
Power to the condensate transfer suppl'y pumps is provided from the plant vital buses. Alternatively, two diesel-driven fire pumps can be utilized to supply makeup water. A five man group is required by Technical Specifications to be available to perforn the required tr.uc1 operations.
Control of the isolation condenser from outside the control room provides the capability to achieve and maintain hot shutdown.
Indication of reactor pressure and level can be monitored from local stations.
I 1
_3 The ability to reach and maintain hot shutdown from outside the control room has been previously reviewed and found acceptable as part of the SEP Topic VII-3, " Electrical Instrumentation and Control Features of Systems Required for Safe Shutdown."
~.
As part of the review of this topic the staff made a finding that no procedures existed for taking the reactor to. cold shutdown from outside the control We cannot approve the defement until these procedures are in place.
room.
We will therefore find the requested deferment of the installation of a remote shutdown panel acceptable if the following conditions are met:
1.
The licensee must complete all plant modifications necessary to comply with Appendix R on an acceptable schedule, and i,
i 2.
The licensee must develop and have in place procedures for eaching cold shutdotin froa outside the control room prior to, the 1982 <efueling outage.
1 The licensee is asking for deferment on the installation >f the Class 1E qualified components, replacing three unqualified compr.ients.
The components i
are part of a 125 VDC modification which was insta11r. i during the 1978 refueling cutage and which became the redundant half of a two division DC distribution system.
At that time, there were eleven unqualified components and two others
- l which lacked doctmentation of certification.
l l
l
- . :S
- o. -
-4 The three unqualified components include two betterycharger circuit breakers and one timing relay for MCC DC-2.
The licensee has indicated that the unqualified circuit breakers presently installed are essentially the same as the qualified breakers for which documentation will be available.
Because of this and the fact that the most likely failure of a non-seismic circuit breaker during a seismic event is opening of the breaker which would leave the DC system intact with power being supplied from the battery, the deferment of the circuit breakers is acceptable.
The third item, the timing relay for MCC DC-2, failed its qualification test, and the licensee has not yet provided us the function of the relay in the DC system.
Therefore we cannot determine its importance to the safety systems and as a result cannot determine whether it is a deferable item.
I
-