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Results
Other: 05000366/LER-1984-001, :on 840203,personnel Detected Fracture in 66- Inch Vent Header in Bay 5.Caused by Brittle Facture of Vent Header Matl.Vent Header Will Be Repaired & Addl Changes or Sys Mod Will Be Made to Improve Sys, BECO-84-150, Responds to IE Bulletin 84-01, Cracks in BWR Mark I Containment Vent Headers. Util Endorses GE Svc Info Ltr 402 Recommendations.Equipment Damage Has Not Occurred & Inerting Sys Operation Suitable, FVY-84-110, Forwards Response to NRC Request Re Actions Taken in Response to GE Significant Info Ltr 420 Concerning Hatch-2 Vent Header Crack, GO2-84-512, Discuss GE Recommendations Re Hatch Unit 2 Event Concerning Large Crack in Torus Vent Header Due to Brittle Fracture,Per GE 840214 Info Ltr 402.Only Recommendations 1 & 2 Apply,As Sys Not Yet Used to Inert Containment, ML18029A151, ML20080R767, ML20083L655, ML20083R739, ML20084L425, ML20084L444, ML20084R170, ML20091B787, ML20097E003, ML20097H269, ML20098A026, ML20098F071, ML20098F159, ML20098G674, ML20098G682, ML20198P818, NLS8400242, Submits List of Actions Taken on Recommendations from GE 840214 Svc Info Ltr 402, Wetwell/Drywell Inerting. Evaluation of Inerting Sys Design Determined That Failure of Cold Temp Shutdown Switch Cause of Problem, SNRC-1082, Submits Status of Evaluation Re IE Info Notice 84-17, Problems W/Liquid Nitrogen Cooling Components Below Nil Ductility Temp & GE Svc Info Ltr SIL-402, Wetwell/Drywell Inerting
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MONTHYEARML20080R7671984-02-10010 February 1984 Responds to IE Bulletin 84-01 Re Insp for Cracks in Mark I Containment Torus Vent Header.No Apparent Cracking or Relevant Indications Found on Unit 1.No Addl Cracking Found Beyond Original Cracking on Unit 2 Project stage: Other ML20080N5661984-02-10010 February 1984 Forwards Drywell Coating Evaluation, Technical Data Rept, Per SEP Topic VI-1, Organic Matls & Post-Accident Chemistry Project stage: Request ML20198P8181984-02-14014 February 1984 Svc Instruction Ltr 402, Wetwell/Drywell Inerting. Related Info Encl Project stage: Other 05000366/LER-1984-001, :on 840203,personnel Detected Fracture in 66- Inch Vent Header in Bay 5.Caused by Brittle Facture of Vent Header Matl.Vent Header Will Be Repaired & Addl Changes or Sys Mod Will Be Made to Improve Sys1984-03-0404 March 1984
- on 840203,personnel Detected Fracture in 66- Inch Vent Header in Bay 5.Caused by Brittle Facture of Vent Header Matl.Vent Header Will Be Repaired & Addl Changes or Sys Mod Will Be Made to Improve Sys
Project stage: Other ML20087H1481984-03-13013 March 1984 Forwards GE Repts on Metallographic Exam of Metal Samples Taken from Cracked Vent Header,Per NRC 840206 Meeting W/ Util,Bwr Regulatory Response Group & Ge.Vent Header Cracking Brittle Fracture Caused by Injection of Cold Nitrogen Project stage: Meeting ML20083L6551984-03-30030 March 1984 Submits Info on IE Bulletin 84-01, Entitled Cracks in BWR Mark I Containment Vent Headers. Primary Containment Drywell to Torus Bypass Tests Performed.Status of GE SIL 402 Recommended Actions Listed Project stage: Other ML20084L4441984-03-31031 March 1984 Analysis of Vent Header Cracking at Hatch 2 Project stage: Other ML20084R1701984-04-0505 April 1984 Comments on Status of Recommendations of GE Svc Info Ltr 402 Re Wetwell/Drywell Inerting.Evaluation of Nitrogen Inerting Sys Design Performed & Redundant Low Temp Shutoff Valve Added Project stage: Other ML20083R7391984-04-18018 April 1984 Forwards Response to GE SIL 402 Generated Due to Large Crack in Torus Vent Header at Another Operating Plant Attributed to Brittle Fracture Identified During Insp of Cold Nitrogen Into Torus During Inerting Project stage: Other ML20084L4251984-05-0707 May 1984 Forwards Analysis of Vent Header Cracking at Hatch 2. Analysis Shows That Observed Cracking Can Be Explained by Injection of Cold Nitrogen Into Containment & Any Cracking Expected to Be through-wall,detectable by Visual Insp Project stage: Other ML20091B7871984-05-23023 May 1984 Provides Status of GE Svc Info Ltr 402 Re Vent Header Cracking Incident.Recommended Ultrasonic Testing Not Planned Due to Lack of Baseline Test Data.Cracking from Injection of Cold Nitrogen Detectable by Surface Exam Project stage: Other NLS8400242, Submits List of Actions Taken on Recommendations from GE 840214 Svc Info Ltr 402, Wetwell/Drywell Inerting. Evaluation of Inerting Sys Design Determined That Failure of Cold Temp Shutdown Switch Cause of Problem1984-09-12012 September 1984 Submits List of Actions Taken on Recommendations from GE 840214 Svc Info Ltr 402, Wetwell/Drywell Inerting. Evaluation of Inerting Sys Design Determined That Failure of Cold Temp Shutdown Switch Cause of Problem Project stage: Other FVY-84-110, Forwards Response to NRC Request Re Actions Taken in Response to GE Significant Info Ltr 420 Concerning Hatch-2 Vent Header Crack1984-09-14014 September 1984 Forwards Response to NRC Request Re Actions Taken in Response to GE Significant Info Ltr 420 Concerning Hatch-2 Vent Header Crack Project stage: Other ML20097E0031984-09-14014 September 1984 Forwards Response to IE Bulletin 84-01 Re Potential for Cracking in BWR Vent Headers Using Nitrogen Inerting Sys. Nitrogen Inerting Sys Not Used at Facility.Recommendations Identified in GE Svc Info Ltr 402 Addressed Project stage: Other GO2-84-512, Discuss GE Recommendations Re Hatch Unit 2 Event Concerning Large Crack in Torus Vent Header Due to Brittle Fracture,Per GE 840214 Info Ltr 402.Only Recommendations 1 & 2 Apply,As Sys Not Yet Used to Inert Containment1984-09-14014 September 1984 Discuss GE Recommendations Re Hatch Unit 2 Event Concerning Large Crack in Torus Vent Header Due to Brittle Fracture,Per GE 840214 Info Ltr 402.Only Recommendations 1 & 2 Apply,As Sys Not Yet Used to Inert Containment Project stage: Other BECO-84-150, Responds to IE Bulletin 84-01, Cracks in BWR Mark I Containment Vent Headers. Util Endorses GE Svc Info Ltr 402 Recommendations.Equipment Damage Has Not Occurred & Inerting Sys Operation Suitable1984-09-14014 September 1984 Responds to IE Bulletin 84-01, Cracks in BWR Mark I Containment Vent Headers. Util Endorses GE Svc Info Ltr 402 Recommendations.Equipment Damage Has Not Occurred & Inerting Sys Operation Suitable Project stage: Other ML20098G5571984-09-14014 September 1984 Submits Supplemental Info in Response to IE Bulletin 84-01, Cracks in BWR Mark I Containment Vent Headers. Program Initiated to Address Concerns of GE SIL 402 & Implementation Schedule Project stage: Supplement ML20098A0261984-09-17017 September 1984 Forwards Responses to Recommendations Contained in IE Bulletin 84-01, Cracks in BWR Mark I Containment Vent Headers & GE Svc Info Ltr 402, Wetwell/Drywell Inerting. No Anomalies Indicated in Drywell/Wetwell Pressures Project stage: Other ML20097H2691984-09-17017 September 1984 Forwards Response to GE Significant Info Ltr 402 & IE Info Notice 84-17 Re Nitrogen Inerting Sys Project stage: Other SNRC-1082, Submits Status of Evaluation Re IE Info Notice 84-17, Problems W/Liquid Nitrogen Cooling Components Below Nil Ductility Temp & GE Svc Info Ltr SIL-402, Wetwell/Drywell Inerting1984-09-18018 September 1984 Submits Status of Evaluation Re IE Info Notice 84-17, Problems W/Liquid Nitrogen Cooling Components Below Nil Ductility Temp & GE Svc Info Ltr SIL-402, Wetwell/Drywell Inerting Project stage: Other ML20098F1591984-09-26026 September 1984 Submits Mods Identified for Completion Prior to Liquid Nitrogen Inerting of Containment.Low Temp Switch Will Be Replaced & Relocated to Improve Response Time & Eliminate Adverse Impact of Cold Outdoor Ambient Temps Project stage: Other ML20098F0711984-09-27027 September 1984 Responds to GE Svc Info Ltr 402 Re Wetwell/Drywell Temp. Design & Operation of Nitrogen Sys Provides Adequate Assurance That Impingement of Liquid or Extremely Cold Nitrogen Against Vital Plant Components Will Not Occur Project stage: Other ML20098G6821984-10-0101 October 1984 Responds to Verbal Questions Concerning Recommendations of GE Svc Info Ltr 402 Re IE Bulletin 84-01, Cracks in BWR Mark I Containment Vent Headers. Steps Taken to Evaluate & Implement Containment Inerting Recommendations Project stage: Other ML20098G6741984-10-0101 October 1984 Responds to IE Bulletin 84-01, Cracks in BWR Mark I Containment Vent Headers. No Evidence of Outside or Inside Vent Header & Nitrogen Penetration Cracking Found.Addl Insps & Evaluations Will Be Performed Project stage: Other ML18029A1511984-10-0505 October 1984 Forwards Responses to GE Svc Info Ltr 402 Re Wetwell/Drywell Inerting.Operating Instructions for Containment Inerting Sys & Primary Containment Sys Revised Project stage: Other ML20138A2251985-11-29029 November 1985 Summarizes 851108 Mgt Meeting at Region II Ofc Re Util Response to Recommendations of Svc Info Ltr 402 in Handling Unit 1 Nitrogen Inerting & Purge Line Crack Discovered on 841215.Summary of Topics & List of Attendees Encl Project stage: Meeting 1984-04-05
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NIAGARA' MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NIAGARA
' MOHAWK 300 ERIE BOO 4 EVARD WEST SYRACO$E,tg Y 13202 NUCLEA OP RAT ONS September 14, 1984 (NMP2L 0162)
Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Mr. Schwencer:
Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Docket No. 50-410 I.E. Bulletin No. 84-01 identified a potential for cracking in boiling water reactor vent headers using nitrogen inerting systems. Although not specifically requiring-a response for Nine Mile Point Unit 2, we are providing the attached report for your use and information regarding this matter.
Additionally, we have addressed the recommendations identified in the General Electric Service Information Letter no. 402. Each of the five recommendations in that report are addressed in the attachment to this letter.
Very truly yours, B. G. Hooten Executive Director Nuclear Operations NLR:ja Attachment xc: Project File (2) t
R:sp:nse to I.E. Bulletin No.'84 Question 1
. Plants that are currently in cold shutdown should visually inspect for cracks in entire vent header and in the main vents in the region near the intersection with the vent header. To the extent practical, the inspection should include the entire surfaces of the aforementioned components.
The inspection should be completed within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> of receipt of this bulletin.
Response
Niagara Mohawk has not utilized the nitrogen inerting system for Nine Mile Point Unit 2; therefore, the effects of the nitrogen inerting system to cause cracks does not exist at Nine Mile Point Unit 2.
At this time, we feel no inspection is required.
Question 2 If cracks are found, the containment should be declared inoperable.
Response
This section is not applicable as discussed in response to Question 1 above.
Question 3 The results of the inspection are to be reported by telephone to the NRC Operations Center within eight hours after the inspection has been completed.
A written report describing the areas inspected and the results should be submitted within seven days of receipt of this bulletin.
Response
The inspection was not performed, therefore, a written report is not required as discussed in response to Question 1.
Question 4 Although not a requirement of this bulletin, boiling water reactor plants that are currently operating which have Mark I type containment should review their plant data and differential pressure between the wetwell and drywell for anomalies that could
'a indicative of cracks. Any such anomalies should be reported to the NRC
Response
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 does not utilize a Mark I type containment nor a differential pressure between the wetwell and drywell, and therefore, this evaluation is not required. -.
l R spinse to SIL NL 402 I
Question 1 Evaluate the design of the nitrogen inerting system.
Investigate the potential for introducing cold (less than 40 F) nitrogen and the orientation of the nitrogen port relative to the vent header downcomers, or other equipment in the wetwell and drywell which may be in the path of the injected nitrogen. Assure that the temperature monitoring devices, the low temperature shutoff valve and overall system design are adequate to prevent the injection of cold nitcagen into the containment.
Response
The following paragraph will be added to Section 9.3.1.5.3 of the FSAR.
To prevent introducing cold (less than 40*F) nitrogen into the primary containment, the nitrogen temperature for normal inerting is controlled to 70*F and monitored upstream of the normal vent and purge lines. Low nitrogen temperature (55 F) is alarmed in the Control room. Should the temperature continue to fall to 40*F at the outlet of the vaporizer, an independent temperature device will trip the outlet control valve closed. The nitrogen supply to the instrument nitrogen system fed from nitrogen storage bottles and the ambient vaporizer is followed by trim heaters to hold the temperature at 70 F.
The supply is fed to an accumulator prior to any containment penetration, thus essentially precluding any cold nitrogen from entering the containment.
In addition, a temperature device sensing just downstream of the trim heater will trip the downstream valve closed if temperature drops below 40*F.
In addition, there is no equipment or piping in the direct path of the injected nitrogen in either the drywell or wetwell, and the nitrogen system is normally isolated from the primary containment.
Inerting is administratively controlled and the valves are returned to a close position after inerting.
Question 2 Review the operating experience of the inerting system to assure that the vaporizer, the low temperature shutoff valve and the temperature indicators are functioning properly.
Evaluate the plant calibration, m'aintenance and operating procedures for the inerting systems. Assure that the cold nitrogen injection would be detected and prevented.
Response
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 does not have any operating experience with the inerting system, since it has not been preoperational tested at this time.
However, as part of the preoperational test, the inerting system will be evaluated to ensure that the vaporizer, the low temperature shutoff valve and the temperature indications function properly.
Additionally, the guidance relative to plant calibration, maintenance and operating procedures will be incorporated into plant procedures to ensure that nitrogen injection would be detected and/or prevented below 40*F.
Question 3 Perform a bypass leakage test as soon as convenient to confirm the integrity of the vent system. This test should be conducted during plant operation for
_2_
e n:rmal plant procedures.
If no procedures exist, the following is a general guide for preparing your procedure: pressurize the drywell to approximately 0.75 psi above the wetwell pressure, maintain this drywell pressure and measure the pressure buildup in the wetwell. Any bypass leak area can then be calculated (and is limited by Technical Specifications on many plants) from the wetwell pressure and the wetwell pressure difference..This will provide an indication that the vent system integrity is intact and that no gross failure exists.
Response
s Niagara Mohawk has committed to perform a bypass leakage test as described in the FSAR. Bypass leakage rates will be measured as part of this test.
Question 4 Conduct an ultrasonic test as soon as convenient of all accessible welds in a nitrogen injection line from the last isolation valve to the wetwell and drywell penetrations. Also, UT the containment penetrations and the containment shell within six inches of the penetration. UT is recommended because cracks could be most likely to initiate on the inside of the pipe or on the side of the metal in contact with cold nitrogen.
Response
Since nitrogen inerting system has not been in use at Nine Mile Point Unit 2, an ultrasonic test to confirm that nitorgen has not affected metal in the area of the nitrogen injection point is not required.
Question 5 Inspect the containment during the next plant outage.
Perform a visual inspection of the vent header downcomers and other equipment and containment which might be expected to be affected by the injection of cold nitrogen. The vent header should be inspected on the outside and the inside. Also inspect the containment shell or the liner steel for at least six inches around the nitrogen penetration.
Response
Vent headers are not used in the Unit 2 design. As discussed in response to the above questions, Niagara Mohawk believes the system design and subsequent testing will ensure proper operation of the nitrogen system. Therefore, a visual inspection of the vent downcomers and equipment in the containment is not considered necessary.
,