ML20198P858
| ML20198P858 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom, Salem, Indian Point, Oyster Creek, Pilgrim, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 11/02/1984 |
| From: | Kister H NRC |
| To: | Starostecki R NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151H203 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-86-26 NUDOCS 8606060403 | |
| Download: ML20198P858 (200) | |
Text
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j NOV0 21964 1
1 MEMORANDUM FOR:
R. W. Starostecki, Director, DPRP FROM:
H. B. Kister, Chief, Projects Branch No. 2, DPRP
SUBJECT:
STATUS OF FLANTS IN EXTENDED OUTAGES As you directed, enclosed is the monthly status report of p The status contains the utilities' best estimate of the startup date estimate, and comments regarding the difference between the two estimates or
, our best items which could have a major effect on the schedule.
h.
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' Projects Branch No. 2
Enclosure:
As Stated cc w/ enc 1:
)
T. E. Murley J. M. Allan T. T. Martin N. J. Young v /
t Branch Chiefs Section Chiefs i
8606060403 860319 PDR FOIA PATTERSDB6-26 PDR B-ll
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Projected Projected Outage Utility NRC Evaluation /
l Plant Started S/U Date S/U Date Comments l
Oyster Creek 2/11/83 10/1/84 10/15/84 Refueling and iso-lation condenser maintenance.
The delay is due to no single problem.
SRI feels more time will be needed to accomplish final wrap-up of work.
EXTENDED OUTACE STATUS August 21, 1984 d;
Projected Projected Outage Utility NRC
[ valuation /
Plant Sta rted S/U Date S/U Date Comments Unit is currently restarting af ter a 20-month Oyster Creek 2/11/83 q
maintenance and modification outage. With-drawn s or control rods sta rted 10/29/84 Unit is currently operating at 90% arter a Indian Point 2 6/2/84 q
4-month refueling and maintenance outage.
9 Criticality was achieved 10/17/84.
E Peach Bottom Unit 2 4/28/84 3/24/6, 3/24/85 Rerueling and reci rculating pipe replacement.
Work progressing as scheduled with considerable work still ahead.
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Pilgrim
_L 2/25/84 11/24/84 12/1/84 Refueling and reci rculating pipe replacement.
Resident inspector feels that approx. I week additional time may be needed due to delay in 4
ruel loading.
3-9" Presently operating at 80% arter a 8-month Salem Unit 1 2/25/84
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refuel ing and generator repai r outage.
n Sainm Unit 2 10/4/84 Indefinite Indefinite Major generator repa i r. No projected sta rtup date by the utility.
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g' fY M NEECEG O Ummorandum Suome:
T.F. Recom.enei. tion n 0/
. - iu a Replacement
!i'Y I8' I984 Date:
HC-8 4-From:
G. R. Capodanho Location:
Parsippany Fluid Systems Ulrects Tc.
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Smi th Plant Enginetring Diactc.
REF:
GE Report AE 4bO '.84 DTF C51-00054, OCNS Evaluation of Cracked Dry Tubes for Continusd Sorvice, April 1984 Purpose and Backcrouad
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The purpose of this uemory.ndun is to present Tech. Functions recomendations for corrective actions PG;ated to the recently discovered degradation of instrument dry tuoes.
It was reported during visual inspection made on March 23,1984, that 4 IRM and 1 SRH dry tube assembitos showed evidence of cracking in their upper regions just below the guide platec in the core barrel of OCNGS. A more thorough inspection donc t:ith Machanical Components and Nuclear Fuels direction (on lisrch /9,1004) ravaaled 7 IRll and 1 SRf1 were cracked seriously enough to be concidensd facturod.
There are a total of 8 IRM and 4 $RM dry i
tube assembiics in the plcnt. Review of IRIVSRit drawings allowed the identification of the crack locations.
These were in the thin-wall tube
, i surrounding the conpestion spring which facilitates installation, location and removal of the dry tubcs by ensuring the engagement of an upper locattng plunger with : pocket in the intersections of the guide plates. This is a 7
non-pressuro Ktainin poti-ion of the dry tube and all cracks were in the vicinity of nore strc es re iic'.'ad walds. The two most severe breakages occurred ncar the lorice ei th.- t'. e :c idt 1.t.dG to the spring tube.
Just below this weld is the uppermeet ei the pccure boundary welds which prevent reactor coolant l) from inn uding into the tuoes carrying the flux monitoring instrument.
_ Courses of AC L Q Four coursos ei action prcscnt thomselves in handling this problem:
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r:utin in service at least until the next refueline tu bgc.
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2)
Repite a on.y th r..c Wactured dry tubes imediately and allow the ren;inda.o ct, m esevice at least until the next refueling outage.
3)
Repiscs al eight cry tubes exhibiting cracks imediately and allow the remainder tc thy in service at least until the next refueling outye.
4)
Immediatal:' rep. ace 511 twelve dry tubes.
- To support hny ei die itur patin; identified, it should be noted that General Electric is providing a speciti removal tool capable of extracting (and, for even the most severely fractured dry tube. Additionally, OCNS has ordered the majority of itcas, received) sufficient parts to support replacement of all twelve dry tubes. Caneral Electric has already comitted to a failure analysis of til dry tubes recoved from the reactor.
G.E. Recommendation General Electric, as tht desigacr and fabricator of the dry tubes, has put forward an analysis of ine situttion and proposed plan of action (Ref.1) which may be summarized ;c follows:
)
- 1) The two frictured dry tubes have severely reduced ability to return to straightness if deflected, and therefore are a risk during fuel h andling. This is sufficient reason to remove these units imediately.
- 2) The clearances around the dry tubes in the loaded core are sufficiently ciecc te precluds large loose parts migration; small loose parts constitute t very minimal risk.
3)
Instrunent insertion is unlikely to be affected in the ten tubes ~
retti.ii ne s tat i f..t.
4)
The princip&1 structur61 support of the dry tubes is via contact with the fuel channels; the inpact on the tubes caused by motion due to byp:cs im. svoend Gsneral Electric fuel elements is minimal and has net neuced darsee to date.
- 5) The iatci cavckonent F t 360', through-wall crack in a tube during i
pitn. ope.uien ti; i nei substantially change the preceding evaluation nor increasa ee i.e fuel channels.
6)
Crsc..; p, opagati,p.nte the pressure boundary would confront cour-uriv: sti e e iitt Wou?f arPest their growth.
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- 7) " A defir.it :ve sni:. ant about the probability of future cracking in tne priuary pressuca boundary cannot be made".
- 8) Leakage dus to tube severance would at worst cause a plant shutdown by noiTial pro 00durcS.
- 9) The dry tubes hove enduced fourteen years of service without difficulty.
10)
Crackir.; is likely to become more extensive with time; therefore all craded tunes should be replaced no later than the next refueling outage.
Safety Concerns The Safety Analysis End Plant Control section of Tech Functions has estimated the plant response to a dry tube severance and indicates that a single tube break causing a small break LOCA would result in an automatic scram on high drywell pressure approximately 30 minutes after initiation. The leak would pass 60 gpe, v hich is trithin uake-up capabilities, given feedwater or CRD pump availability.
One isolation condenser on line would provide reactor cooling.
i The flow rate into the dryvell would exceed the sump pump removal rate by at Toast 10 gpn, causing the accumulation of reactor coolant in the drywell (approximately 300 gallons before detection and scram).
This small break L%A would introduce steam into the dryWell and would raise the drywell temperatures fairly swiftly to 2600 - 2700, approaching the point (2810F) when containnent spray would be initated. A loss of off-site power during the course of tnis LOCA would preclude the use of the drywell coolers to f oreste.ii spray usa as well as put complete reliance on CRD flow for makeup water since the main feedwater pump would be lost if loss of of f-site pouw is assui..ed. The attainment of saturation conditions in.the drywell would sovely tast the Qualification limits of all electrical equipment inside it; additionally, approach to RPV water level reference leg flash point must be considcred. Without off-site power, the only mitigating i
action lef t to opaators is ECCS initiation (Procedure EMG-3200.02 - DW/T-3) j An additional visual inspection of the fuel channels near both fractured dry tubes and one uncracked dey tube was ordered by Nuclear Fuels Group and p erf ormed or li.y 7, 10b4. Three of the four fuel dannel corners facing one of the fraczuced dry tuimc during the last cycle showed discernable
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indications of contact; one of the three exhibits a severe wear indication at an elevation appronica.cly that of the break in the dry tube. Consultation with Bab:ocL E Uiiccx indicctos that zircalley wears first when impacted or rubbed by scainices staeh no other evidence has been uncovered that would discount the possibility that this dry tube broke in service and interacted aggrc ssivei;'. iiL th i im ! channel.
Perforation of the channel at the elevation observed would have negliable effect on bypass flot, this t:ould render further attack on the fuel pin behind the sheath 1ng at undetectable however. The possibility of attack on the fuel cladding raises ths chance of release of fission products into containment as uail as in; ding to higher coolant activity levels.
Basis for Disposicion Representatives of !!aci.anical Components, Nuclear Fuels Risk Analysis, Engineering M2chanics, and Material Engineering / Failure Analysis have reviewed and confirmed this information and find it inpossible to, justify leaving all the dry tubes in place in their current condition. The interaction with fuel channels, the possibility of pressure boundary failure and the consequences of such a failure wholly usigh against assuming such a risk. Therefore, GPUN and General Electric tre in acreemant as to the imediate removal of the two broken tubes.
Regarding the rem: lining tubes, however, GPUll and G.E. opinions diverge. The basis and conclusions of the G.E. analysis are unacceptable on several ccunts:
1.
Departure from tube straightness is a reasonable indication of the fort of tube strength due to cracking; the converse is not necc.ssarily true, ibst of the crading observed is 3600 in extent and the ability of the tubes to recover from deflection due to bending in scevice is c;ucstionable.
The ingsction results of the fuel channel corners still leaves op(as 2.
en the distinct possibility of tube failure during normal operation opposed to failure caused by recirculation pump operation without tha core installed) and consequent channel damage, with the potential for fuel clac damage.
3.
The assurance scovidad by the compressive stresses in the dry tube wail from c::tsrnci prassure is minimal; a crack initiated in such a stress field can still be opened by the applied stresses of bending in sonice.
4.
The concern raised by General Electric of " radiation-enhanced" embrittlement introduces a threat to the pressure boundary that the fact er 14 yam er sc. vice only makes more tangible. The BWR opa.u ng on'!ironrent historically has produced failure mechanisms uiih lor.E initiciIon periods, especially in sensitized austenetic steniess :: tee,, harcc the probability of failure increases with time.
5.
The eids produced during fabrication of the dry tubes are not in a stress-relieved or solution-annealed condition. Accordingly, stress com osion cracking of the weld-sensitized metal must be considered as a potential cause of the damage observed.
The driving of crads by the banciing loads would be as probable for the pressure-retaining weide d ?or thoca currently exhibiting cracks.
, a tube pressure boundary failure, while probably 6.
The consequences 01 The capable of mitigstion uithout ECCS initiation, are severe.
saturation and accumuistion of liquid and saturated steam in the drywell would create an extremely hazardous environment in which leak Such a small break LOCA is not arrest 5 ould nava to oa effected.
isolabla and repair activities would involve significant exposure No approach oayond depressurization and manned entry presents levels.
itsclf as a way of stopping the continued drainage from the vessel.
The congested nature of the work area precludes the installation and The operation of remotely handled cofferdams or catch equipment.
consequent accumulotion of water in the drywell or in radwaste presents a potentially significant processing problem with its attendant costs.
The possibility of agressive interaction between a fractured (but leak 7.
tight) drytube and fuel diannels and pins makes accepting the risk of tube breakage outside the pressure boundary undesireable. The potential for fuel damage and release of fission products into containnent cannot be ignored.
8.
Even a completely safe and controlled vessel depressurization in handling the small break LOCA resulting from drytube severance is 4
The Reactor Vessel at.
undesirable from a vessel usage standpoint.
OCNGS is alraacy running in advance of planned 1ressure/ temperature cycle s; additional cycling can only decrease t1e margin of safety in operations.
9.
The retentica cf the fractured and cracked drytubes must be considered to increase the likelihood of an analyzed but nonetheless hazardous accident.
The decision to accept or reject the risks of a possible plant shutdown of course goes beyond Furel:' those technical safety issues.
Re commendatier.
Accordingly, the recoruei ded course of action is the imediate replacement of all twelve dry tubec.
In the event of unavailability of sufficient parts to encompassing only these tubes exhibiting visible cracks (8)plished support tnis recomendation, a limited removal may be accom In this case it must be underrtood that the results of the material failure analysis to be perfomad by Convai Electric on the reuoved tubes may expose a hazard sufficient tc raquire i.ht ramoval of the remaining four tubes. The timing of this removal ':111 hele to railect the estimate of the spread of continuing dey&dation.
m i
em m iraadiate arrangement for sufficient parts to support thit remets : i: consicerad to be prudent.
MM G. R. Capodanno Fluid Systems Director GRC/TR:pa
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Bond, G. R. - hacleEr luialysis & Fuels Director cc:
Broughter., T. G. - Director - Systems Engineering Croneberger, D. K. - Director - Engineering & Design De!tuth, R. - Matericlt Engineering !!anager - Parsippany Giacobbe, F. S. - innager, IE/FA Goddard, K. - lianagc..' Ri sk Analysis Lee, R. B. - itntger 00 Fuel s Project Le shnoff, S. D. - Erig ineer Molnar, J. - Core Fbangar Piascik, T. - Engineer Pwu, L. C. - Ei.ginccr Radvansky, M. - tian6ger Technical Functions OC Site Rone, A. - ibnager - Operations Engineering Von Nieda, G. E. - Chemistry /ltaterials Director 4.
O e
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T.ENuclear momerendum
Subject:
Review of Chem Lab /P.A.S.S.
Date:
June 25, 1984 From:
P. R. Kennedy Location:
Oyster Creek M&C Outage Manager 0A100-84-0076 To:
Distribution:
j The purpose of this meeting is to fire up action ituis, recognize the I
individual responsible, and assign firm completion dates for each item.
Although weekly meetings have been held for the last several months, satisfactory progress is not being made to meet the outage or licensing commitment required completion dates.
The following personnel are required to attend this meeting which will be held on Wednesday, 6/27/84 at 1:00 p.m. in the M&C Conference Room, Trailer 300.
P. R. Kennedy M&C J. Mancinelli T. F.
R. Baker CAT G. Morgan CAT B. Briggs CAT B. Shumaker Chemistry J. J. Bishop SU&T A. Simeone CAT J. Chardos T. F.
M. Zane CAT D. Fanok P.E.
D. Roche CAT W. Pitts SU&T J. Zelaya CAT C. Hager P.E.
J. Shorte D. Pysher M&C M6C It is expected that the attendees come prepared for this meeting with firm commitment dates for all open action items assigned to them as documented in Catalytic memo dated June 20, 1984.
Additionally, the following items will be reviewed:
1)
An overall Level 1 Schedule review 2)
Review of detail job schedules 3)
Review material shortages by job for all jobs - A shortage sheet must be provided for each job that has outstanding material 4)
Review of all outstanding FCRs/FQs by job for each job Finally a review of the various WAs included in the Chem Lab and P.A.S.S.
bas was done with Catalytic on 6/25/84 and outstanding items have been included on the attached pages.
These items will be reviewed at Wednesday's meeting.
b 1t-P. R. Kennedy PRK/jb M&C Outage Manager cc: Attendaes Brownridge, T.
Good, S.
Popow, W.
B-9 Pysher, D.
Accoo648 s-83
Pago.1 of 2 Rasp:noible/ Data t
Parsen /Assignsd Item r
Chem Lab A-30038 Chem Lab Vent & Expcasion ' Mech 1,
Green procedure is available 2.
Material is being pulled and verified by the job supervisor - will-complete 3.
On hold for Mobile Chem Lab (C-30038) & Laundry (G-30048) 4.
~ Review list of outstanding FCRs/FQs B-30038 Chem Lab ventilation & expansion,(Elec.)
1.
Green procedure is available 7
2.
Material was verified and shortages havq been ordered See status sheets'- dampers, indicating a.
lights and switches 3.
On hold for Mobile Chem Lab (C-30043) & Laundry (G-30048) 4.
No outstanding FCRs/FQs C-30b38 Mobil'e Chem Lab 1.
C-30038.1 -completed CAT port ion a.
3 additional IWL Items Submersible pump & elec. LED rtadout on purifier, ECPA filter has been added to a new WA (H-30038)
(1) Need Phase I CAT estimate (2)
Steve C is planning on a shoce form (3). Material is available (4)
Funding is available add work is assigned to Catalytic D-300382-C., Lab - Vent & Expand " civil work Install On hold.for mobile ches lab and laundry a.
b.
Material sust be verified c.
Procedure is green d.
Reviewour(tandingFCRs/FQs
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7-30038 - Chem Lab - Hot Inst Shop /vs SU&T Support
-1.
Verify proper title w/ Eldridge 2
Assigned to HAH G-30038 - Relocate laundry facility 1.
95% complete 2.
Dampers are installed 3.
FCR received 6/25 on balancing 4.
Geo. Morgan must 103 procedure 5.
HAH portion - no outstanding material or FCRs 6.
CAT portion 4 or 5 outstanding FCRs/FQs a.
b.
Material shortages - identify and status for W'd. - Morgan e
NNCR on weld due to missing weld slip c.
(Morgan).
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Pegn 2 of 2 Resptnsiblo/ Date Parson /Assigntd Itsm P.A.S.S.
B-30048 P.A.S.S. Phase I - Elect. DW Simeone 1.
MNCR dispositioned rework & now in progress - for connections from pent. 12 to DW valve, continuity and 4
maggar 2.
Start work 6/25.
Closecut package w/ SU&T - working i
C-30048 P.A.S.S. Phase I - Mach DW s
3.
Accepted by SU&T 6/25 D-30048 Not a real job - must be deleted from IWP (CAT)
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l D-G1048 - P. A. S.S. Phase II - Nach Rx Bldg. - Outage 1.
Must revise procedure to include HVAC 2.
In production - must be listed'on IWP 3.
Material Problems - need list & status 4.
Five open FCRS:
- need promise dates i
25641 - written & given to T.F.
26727 - written & given to T.F.
26728 - written & given to T.F.
To be written by Catalytic:
- interference @ atmospheric sample line 3
- anchor bolt HGR #74 & 75 DG2048 - P.A.S.S. Phase II Mach Rx Bldg. - Non-outage 1.
In production - must be listed on IWP 2.
No outstanding FCR or material problems 3.
Must revise procedure to include HVAC _ Who/When?
Also need award for contractor service for HVAC syst.
balance 1.
must do an air flow measurement from P.A.S.S. room to TIP Room 2.
Who will award - Will a separate WA charge number be established?
E-30048 - P. A. S.S. Phase II - Elect. - Rx Bldg.
1.
Outage portion is complete a)
FQs on ER 19 issued by SU&T must be resolved FQO23877 - issued 6/22/84 promised FQO23897 - issued 6/12/84 promised FQO23898 - issued 6/12/84 promised FQO23864 - issued 5/15/84 promised 2.
Heat Trace modification (Atmos Sample lines) - CAT revise procedure - When?
F/G/H-30048 - P. A.S.S. HVAC - cancelled / deferred J-30048 SU&T Support P.A.S.S.
l 1.
Add to IWP i
2.
Verify that charging is proper K-30048 P.A.S.S.
IWL
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