ML20198L088

Discusses NRC Consideration of ASLB Decisions as Possible Proper Interpretation of 10CFR50.55(e).Adoption of Board Position for Generic Use Inappropriate.Position Details Encl

ML20198L088
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	05/22/1986
From:	Bernsen S BECHTEL GROUP, INC.
To:	Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
References
QAS-86-107, NUDOCS 8606040207
Download: ML20198L088 (5)

Text

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QAS-86/107 Bechtel Power Corporation Engineers - Constructors 15740 Shady Grove Road Gaithersburg, Maryland 20877-1454 301 - 258-3000 May 22, 1986 James M. Taylor Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

10 CFR 50.55(e)

Reference:

NRC F01A-85-836 I recently came across some correspondence which indicated that the NRC staff is considering the South Texas project ASLB decisions as a possible proper interpretation of 10 CFR 50.55(e). We do not wish to question the ASLB decision with respect to the specific circumstances found on the South Texas project, however, we believe it is not appropriate to adopt the Board positions for generic use.

Further, we believe that an effort by the staff to draw such new and radical interpretations should be treated in accordance with the recently issued NRC regulation on backfitting (10 CPR 50.109). The attachment to this letter provides details for our position.

We would be pleased to discuss this matter either with you or members of your staff at your convenience.

Very truly yours, S. A. Bernsen Quality Assurance Manager SAB/DCK:ajj

Attachment:

South Texas Project Decisions Regarding Possible Interpretation of 10 CFR 50.55(e)

L B606040207 860522 PDR ADOCK 05000498 A PDR ((s{(g

Attachment to S. A. Bernsen ltr. to J. M. Taylor, dated May 22, 1986, QAS-86/107 South Texas Project Decisions Regarding Possible Interpretation of 10 CFR 50.55(e)

Through a review of the reference NRC Freedom of Information Act (F01A) response, we note that the NRC staff is considering the South Texas Project ASLB decisions as a possible proper interpretation of 10 CFR 50.55(e). Specifically the issues addressed include reporting deficiencies in the quality assurance program absent a deficiency in a design not yet complete, the timing of such reportability decisions and the need to consider the significance of " generic" findings apart from, and in addition to, specific findings. We do not wish to question the ASLB with respect to the specific circumstances found on the South Texas Project, however, we believe it is not appropriate to adopt the Board positions for generic use. The following paragraphs outline the reasons for this position.

Deficiencies Found Prior to Release or Completion of a Design 10 CPR 50.55(e) addresses activities associated with the design and construction of a nuclear power plant. Historically the design has been an iterative process with many interactions among various engineers and disciplines leading to a completed product (design output) such as a drawing, specification or instruction from which an item is produced. The design process has also been an evolutionary one, responding to changing requirements and standards of practice. Methods of assuring acceptability of design output vary and generally consist of many checks and reviews before the design product is completed.

While it would appear to be economically desirable to perform each design step correctly, in sequence and right the first time, this is not always the most practical and efficient process. Many items are designed in parallel; in fact design tools and analytical methods may also be under development simultaneously with the design itself.

Under such circumstances, it is not at all unlikely to find deficiencies and errors in inprocess design work. The existence of an error or deficiency that could adversely affect safety cannot be firmly established until a design product has passed through the entire design process, including any planned reviews that the design organization intends to perform.

That is why the NRC and industry have generally interpreted 10 CPR 50.55(e) as applying to a significant deficiency in a design output document released by the design organization for construction (or procurement as the case may be). Thus a

" deficiency in the design" does not exist until the design is completed (or at least the specific design output document is sufficiently complete that the responsible design organization i deems it releasable for construction). Clearly public health and safety of the facility in question is in no way jeopardized j by a preliminary piece of incorrect paper, nor in fact would it be jeopardized until the product of the design output is built and placed in operation.

9 l The existence of 10 CFR 21 removes concern over the possibility of an inprocess defect affecting safety of some similar product the design organization may have produced or delivered to another plant. The failure to follow a specific prescribed path to perform individual design steps, absent a deficiency in a design released, should not be reportable. The designers in t an organization may in fact have just discovered a better way to produce an adequate product.

NRC staff guidance (as outlined in NUREG-0302, Rev. 1) and sub-I sequent practices in interpretation of this aspect of 10 CFR 50.55(e) is abundantly clear and correct -- a deficiency in design that could adversely affect safety rust exist combined with one of the four specific tests in the subparagraphs of 50.55(e), which include a significant breakdown in a portion of the Quality Assurance program. In the proposed rulemaking, '.

4 July 27, 1970, (35 F.R 12076) the NRC gave examples of deficiencies which were all end product related. These were eliminated in the final rule, as stated in 37FR6459, to avoid making "the reporting requirements appear more complex than was

- actually intended." In context of the statement of considera-tions we believe it is clear that the term deficiency is used

to define specific product errors and omissions and not in the

! context of program weaknesses. Design errors and omissions could be a result of a significant program breakdown or not.

If not, they could still be reportable under the three other subparagraphs of 50.55(e). Clearly, if an applicant finds a QA 4 program breakdown, he is not constrained from foregoing the

search for deficiencies in the design product. Nor is he pre-i vented from reporting it as a condition that may affect the adequacy of design. In most instances he would do so under the voluntarily adopted " potential reportability" practice encouraged by the staff and would then proceed to investigate

! the consequences before a final reportability determination is i made. But this practice should not be treated as required by the rule.

l Timing of 10 CFR 50.55(e) Reports i With respect to timing of the report, it appears absolutely irrational to require a report based only on preliminary j information known to the applicant within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of initial

identification of a possible condition. This level of

}

reporting is not even required by 10 CFR 21 although the defects covered by this part could, in fact, affect operating j facilities. Applicants should have an opportunity for timely

and realistic assessment of the nature of a condition. Clearly 4

in the case of program breakdowns which would appear to be

! project specific, the argument that URC needs prompt l

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o notification of reportable items of generic industry significance would have no merit. The ASLB position appears to be the result of a narrow literal interpretation totally inconsistent with the spirit or intent of the rule and not addressing a specific need of the Commission in carrying out its public health and safety mission.

Generic Vs. Specific Deficiency Issue We believe that the " generic" versus " specific" deficiency position has been shown to be without substance in the specific and unique case of the Quadrex report through testimony in the South Texas Project hearing. It is also without merit in a more generic context for the following reasons.

A generic finding can only be formulated from evaluation of specific findings. If each specific finding is without merit, then obviously the generic finding is similarly of no significance. If some of the specific findings are of such significance that they require reporting, then the Rule (10 CFR 50.55(e)) combined with Criterion 17 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B requires an investigation of cause and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. If the cause of the condition resulted from a QA program breakdown and this has occurred or is occurring in other design activities, then the corrective actions taken would be incomplete if the condition is not fully resolved. Thus the reporting of each deficiency as required by 10 CFR 50.55(e) and the associated corrective action requirements should assure that QA breakdowns in one or more portions of the program would be identified and corrected.

I This leaves the case where a significant generic problem could exist even though there are no single significant deficiencies found. It is difficult to conceive of such a situation occurring because the " significance" of programmatic deficiencies is generally measured by their effect on the product; most programmatic breakdowns are discovered through the evaluation of specific deficiencies. (This was clearly the representations made concerning the Quadrex report.)

Presumably most of the issues that might be classified in this category would include multiple cases of:

o Use of incorrect, but conservative design input or analytical methodology.

o Failure to check design analysis or design output, but no significant errors exists.

o Violation of some administrative requirement of 10 4 CFR 50, Appendix B but no significant design 2 deficiency exist.

In all of the above, the applicant's QA program is required to identify, remedy, and investigate to determine cause and take action to preclude repetition. These actions must be

documented and are normally carefully controlled and scruti-nized by the applicant's QA organization and reviewed by NRC Inspectors, thus providing a high degree of confidence that the consequences of the program violations are fully examined. As noted previously, some applicants might elect to report these conditions as "potentially reportable" but upon a finding of no safety impact, would most likely not proceed to submit a formal report. Others would elect to investigate the safety impact of such a programmatic deficiency first and should be permitted to do so, consistent with the current general interpretations of 10 CFR 50.55(e).

In none of the above cases does it appear that the objectives of 10 CPR 50.55(e) would fail to bt achieved if they were not reported. These are understood to be:

o Assurance that generic problems found on one facility are promptly reported to NRC so that others affected can be notified.

o Assurance that significant physical defects in manufacturing and construction are promptly identified and controlled so that satisfactory corrective actions can be achieved.

There is another type of problem that might be considered in this area as well; however, it is somewhat outside the scope of

, the " generic" vs. " specific" finding reportability issue. This would be a case where significant deficiencies are found in intermediate products of the design organization that could, if undetected,' result in a reportable deficiency in the ultimate design output documents. These could be classified as resulting from a QA program breakdown. Two conditions may exist. In one, the design organization's review and verification process would be expected to detect these deficiencies before completion of the design process. This condition should not be reportable as discussed in our comments under the first issue.

, In the other, the subsequent steps are not likely to find the problems. For this condition, a strong case can be made for reporting it, since, by definition it would have resulted in a significant deficiency in the final design output and advance notice to the NRC would be prudent. In both instances, internal corrective action would be indicated. Also note that both of these result from specific identified deficiencies in a design product, not from a generic condition that has not yet produced a reportable physical condition.

We hope that the above observations may prove useful to the staff in clarifying the intent of and guidance for addressing 10 CPR 50.55(e).

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