ML20082E067
| ML20082E067 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 11/23/1983 |
| From: | Mcgarry J DEBEVOISE & LIBERMAN, DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8311280032 | |
| Download: ML20082E067 (20) | |
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.R UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,,
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ~
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BEFORE THE COMMISSION 7;77
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In-the Matter of )
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DUKE POWER COMPANY, et al. )
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Docket Nos. 50-413
) 50-414 (Catawba Nuclear Station, )
Units.1 and 2) )
APPLICANTS' RESPONSE TO COMMISSION QUESTIONS On November 15, 1983, Duke Power. Company, et al.
(" Applicants"): filed.with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission a request for a stay of rulings issued in this proceeding by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
(" Board") and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board
(" Appeal Board") on November 10, 1983 and November 14, 1983, respectively.1/ On November 17, 1983 the Commission issued an order which deferred ruling on Applicants'
. request, stating:
We defer action on Duke's request until the commission can consider responses to Duke's
. motion and issue a decision on the issues raised. In the interim the orders are not stayed and may_ remain in effect. (Order, p. 1) 1/ The' factual background relating to these rulings is set forth in " Applicants' Motion for Stay of Orders Issued by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board," pp. 2-4.
' 8311280032 831123 DR ADOCK 05000 O
F s .
In its order, theLCommission requested that all parties respond - to four questions relating to the.
Commission's consideration of the motion. Applicants' responses to these questions are set forth below.
- 1. 1s there an attorney-client i relationship between Applicants' attorneys and its witnesses, and if :so, why?
Applicants submit that there is clearly an attorney-l client relationship between counsel for Duke Power Company and the employee witnesses affected by the rulings of the Licensing Board and Appeal Board. The witnesses covered by the Boards' orders are employed by Duke Power Company
( Duke) at the Catawba Nuclear Station as Quality Assurance (QA) welding inspectors or as these inspectors' first-line supervisors. All of these individuals agreed at the request of Duke to testify in this proceeding, and pre-filed testimony was submitted for them 2 / before the hearing began. The interests of these witnesses have not been'shown to be inconsistent with those of Applicants, nor have they been shown to be consistent with those of Palmetto Alliance. Indeed, their interests are consistent with Duke's,-since each employee witness's pre-filed 2/ Pre-filed testimony was not submitted prior to the hearing for several of these individuals because Applicants had not planned to call them as witnesses.
Intervenor requested that they testify and at Applicants' request they have agreed to testify.
Pre-filed testimony has subsequently been filed for each of those additional employee witnesses.
s testimony states .that the Quality Assurance program at Catawba has functioned adequately to assure that the plant is safely built.
The Licensing Board's ruling creates some confusion as to Whether an attorney-client relationship exists between Applicants' counsel and these employee witnesses by erroneously adopting the " control group test" for determining Which corporate eaployees should be considered
" clients" Whose communications with their corporate legal counsel are privileged by virtue of this relationship. In the Licensing Board's view, the QA welding inspectors and their supervisors Whom Intervenor seeks to contact are not part of the corporate control group, and, therefore, the attorney-client privilege does not extend to them.3/
The application of the " control group" theory to determine Whether these witnesses are covered by the attorney-client privilege was improper because this test 3/ The Board stated:
The company is claiming a right to be able to instruct all the Duke Power Company employee witnesses not to discuss the case with counsel for Palmetto during the hearing. Legally the claim rests basically on the attorn[e3y/ client privilege. It is said to be an aspect of that privilege.
The Board accepts that claim as to executive level employee witnesses . . . . However, we reject the claim being made by the company with respect to employees at the site, and more particularly welding inspectors and welding inspector supervisors. [Tr.
6644-45].
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,. was clearly rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Upjohn Co. v.-United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981).4/
In Upjohn, the Court considered Whether or not corporate
- employees' responses to questionnaires distributed by in-house' counsel in connection with a legal. investigation, and these employees' statements during subsequent 4
interviews with in-house-counsel, were protected by the attorney-client privilege. The lower court had ruled that ,
this privilege did not apply to the extent that the communications were made by " officers and agents not l responsible for-directing Upjohn's actions in response to legal advice . . . for the simple reason that the 4/ Prior to Upiohn, several U.S. Courts of Appeal had I
also rejected the " control group" principle. For 4 example, in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decxer, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd. per curiam by equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971), the Court of Appeals stated: ,
We conclude that an employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his communication to the corporation's attorney is privileged where the employee makes the communication at the direction of his
' superiors in the corporation and Where the subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is; sought by.the corporation and dealt with.in i
the communication is the performance by the
< employee of the duties of his employment. [423 F.2d at 491-92]. 1 See also Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 53T, 609 (8th Cir. 1977), where the control group test was also rejected.
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l communications were not the ' client's.'"5/ In so ruling, l
the Court of Appeals applied the " control group test" ;
adopted by the Licensing Board and Appeal Board orders in this case. l l
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court on this I
issue, explaining: ;
The control group test adopted by the court '
below thus frustrates the very purpose of the l privilege by discouraging the communication of '
relevant information by employees of the client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client corporation. [449 U.S. at 3923 The Court criticized the control group test, stating:
Such a [ test], we think, overlooks the fact that the privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice. [449 U.S. at 390].
Frequently, the Court stated, it is those employees beyond
, the " control group" who will possess the information needed by the corporation's lawyers:
Middle-level -- and indeed lower-level --
employees can, by actions within the scope of their employment, embroil the corporation in serious legal difficulties, and it is only natural that these employees would have the
- relevant information needed by corporate counsel
! if he is adequately to advise the client with respect to such actual or potential difficulties. [449 U.S. at 3913 5/ United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1225 (6th Cir. 1979).
_ . = . . - . ~ _ _ . - ~ , . .
The Upjohn Court recognized that an attorney-client relationship exists with those employees, who, in many
[ ' respects, are most in need of the protections afforded by the attorney-client privilege:
The attorney's advice will also' frequently be more significant to noncontrol group members than to those who officially sanction the advice, and the control group test makes it more difficult to convey full and frank legal advice to the employees who will put into effect the client corporation's policy. [449 U.S. at 3923 Based upon Upjohn, an attorney-client relationship does exist between these witnesses and Applicants'
.I counsel. Here, as in Upjohn, it is the communication of information by these Duke employee witnesses to their
corporate counsel, as well as "the giving of professional advice" to these witnesses by DPC's legal counsel, which Applicants seek to protect from disclosure. The instant situation is also similar to that in Upjohn in that it involves the assertion of attorney-client privilege on behalf of " middle-level" or " lower level" corporate employees whose role in this proceeding stems from
( " actions within the scope of their employment" -- i.e.,
their job as QA welding inspectors and supervisors at the Catawba Nuclear Station. It is precisely these welding inspectors and supervisors who possess the " relevant
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information"oon the OA welding inspectors' complaints which is needed by corporate counsel in order to litigate the contention in question. (See 449 U.S. at 390-391).5/
The existence of an attorney-client relationship is further confirmed by an application of the~ factors set forth in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., supra, 423 F.2d at 491-92. First, these employee witnesses' communications with corporate counsel are being made at the direction of their superiors, who have asked the inspectors and supervisors to testify in the licensing hearings. In addition, the subject matter on which corporate counsel's advice was sought by Duke and which was discussed in these attorney-client communications involved "the performance by the employee of the duties of his employment. " 423 F.2d at 491-92. These employees are presented by Duke to testify about their duties and responsibilities within the company, and more specifically, their role in assuring that the Catawba Nuclear Station is safely built. These witnesses have met with Applicants' attorneys on a number '
of occasions regarding their duties and responsibilities, 1/ It should also be noted that Upjohn's rejection of the
, " control group test" for determining the scope of the attorney-client privilege within the corporate context is not confined to the facts of that case, which involved the company's response to an IRS investiga-tion.- On the contrary, the holding in Upjohn has been applied in various other contexts. See, for example, In Re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, etc., 658 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1981).
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actions they have taken that might be the subject of attention during the hearings, and their testimony on the OA contention.
It should be understood by the Commission that these discussions have' entailed communications between Applicants' counsel and their client witnesses which were presumed to be privileged. The thoughts, impressions, views and trial strategy of Applicants' counsel (all protected by the attorney work-product doctrine) have been discussed during these meetings, as have communications made by these witnesses to their attorneys in the course of obtaining legal advice, all with the reasonable expectation that an attorney-client relationship exists.
The fact that the Appeal Board modified the Licensing Board's order to prohibit inquiry into the nature of the witnesses' consultation with Applicants' counsel does not alleviate the violation of the attorney-client privilege created by the Licen91ng Board's order. While this modifying language was apparently intended to preclude inquiry by Palmetto Alliance's counsel into privileged communications, as a practical matter Applicants' counsel will have no way of determining whether such inquiry is being pursued, even if unintentionally, since they will not be present. This constitutes a clear denial of the right to counsel and an infringement of the attorney-client relationship.
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- 2. .Are Applicants' witnesses a " party" in the context of ABA Disciplinary Rule 7-104?
Each of Applicants' employee witnesses is a " party" in'the context of DR 7-104 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Ibnit'ed numbe_ of cases which have interpreted DR 7-104 have construed the term " party" broadly. In United States v. Jamil, 546 F.Supp. 646, 651-654 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 707 F.2d 638 (2nd Cir. 1983),l/ the court determined that an unindicted target of a grand jury investigation who is l
represented by counsel is a " represented party" within the meaning of DR 7-104(A)(1) 8/
. In rejecting a strictly literal interpretation of the term " party," Judge Weinstein explained in Jamil that:
A person Who retains counsel to protect him when he is a target of -a grand jury investigation is, within the definition of DR 7-104(A)(1), a 1/ The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the only contacts were made by nonattorney informers without the prosecuting attorney's knowledge. The prosecutor did not violate DR 7-104 since the in-formers acted on their own initiative and thus were not the alter ego of the prosecuting attorney.
8/ The fact that Jamil was a criminal case does not affect the guidance it provides for interpreting DR
[ 7-104 in civil proceedings such as those before the NRC. In fact, in Jamil there was an additional hur-die to clear, the sixth amendment, which is of course inapplicable to civil cases. The government argued unsuccessfully that because Jamil had not yet been indicted, his sixth amendment right to counsel had not yet attached, and there was no attorney-client relationship for the purposes of DR 7-104. The court rejected this additional impediment and found there to i
be an att.orney-client relationship Which had been breached in violation of DR 7-104.
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_ , . , , " represented- party." Any more exclusive defin-
~'.. -ition of a party-as a person or c -ity by or against Whom a proceeding has' beer. s ,.menced is not serviceable for purposes of construing the ethical rule. [546 F.Supp. at 653].
The " application [of DR 7-104] depends upon the existence
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hb of the attorney-client relationship, not upon the exis-
tence of a pending lawsuit." Id.
Thus the status of these nc7kq i Duke employees as parties or nonparties (i.e., whether
-3 - e, there is a.pending proceeding in which they are " parties")
is irrelevant for the purposes of DR 7-104.
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Elaborating on the reasons for applying DR 7-104 to
^
3 one other-than an actual " party" to an action, the court in Jamil further noted:
4' A contrary view cannot be based on the fact that DR 7-104(A)(1), dealing with communications, uses the term ' represented party' while DR 7-
- q 104(A)(2), covering advice, employs the term J ' represented person.' Ethical Consideration 7-g}1,
,,a 18 itself eschows the formalistic distinction in favor of an admonition to the attorney not to
' communicate on the subject matter of the
',' representation of his client with a person he knows to be represented in the matter.'
(Emphasis added.) [546 F.Supp. at 653].
In another case refusing to distinguish between parties and nonparty witnesses under the canons of ethics, In re Russell, 59 N.J. 315, 282 A.2d 42, 43 (1971), an attorney representing the target of a grand jury invest-igation was held guilty of unethical conduct because he
. contacted-and gave advice directly to grand jury witness-
~~ es-Who were. represented by counsel. The witnesses had already been advised by their own counsel to testify
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fully, - but the ' target's ' counsel convinced them to "take the.Fifth." The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the argument.that these. witnesses, . who were not parties to any pending or subsequent proceeding, were therefore not parties within;the. meaning of-the Canon.s of-Ethics:
Respondent argues that his conduct did not specifically violate any of the ethical canons. ,
But as we have observed, '[t]his Court's dis-ciplinary power is not confined to the area covered'by the canons.' [282 A.2d:at 43.]
In its opinion, the court " cal 1[ed] attention to" DR 7-104 of the newly' enacted ABA Code of Professional Responsibil-Lity as apparently also sustaining discipline of the attor-ney'for contacting nonparty witnesses. See id. at 43 n.l.
In State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n. v.
- Hollstein, 202 Neb. 40, 274 N.W.2d 508, 517 (1979), the Supreme Court of Nebraska determined that it was improper for an attorney advising a property owner in a nonlitigation setting to contact a lienholder who was
. represented by counsel-to discuss subordinating her lien.
The attorney was not disciplined because counsel for the g - person who was contacted consented to the direct contacts.
The court's analysis in Vega v. Bloomsburgh, 427 F.
'Supp. 593-(D. Mass. 1977) is also consistent with this broad interpretation of DR 7-104. In Vega, the government agency being sued took the position that under DR 7-104 plaintiffs' attorneys could not speak directly to defendants' employees because all of the agency's
employees were represented by the Attorney General. The court rejected this argument on grounds that the defendant employer failed to show that the employees whom plain-tiff's counsel sought to contact were represented by an attorney in the litigation, or that their interests were adverse to those of the plaintiffs, or that they were consistent with those of the plaintiffs. 427 F. Supp. at 595. Had this showing been made, however, contact with these employees would have been prohibited pursuant to DR 7-104 even though these individuals were not actual parties to the litigation.
Applying-the factors used by the Vega court, it is clear that in the present case the employee witnesses should be considered " parties" for the purpose of being protected from contacts by Intervenor's counsel under DR 7-104. First, these employee witnesses have been and continue to be represented by Applicants' counsel.9/
E/ The fact that Applicants are providing counsel to their employees in this proceeding does not alter the nature.of the attorney-client relationship. In an (footnote continued)
, =Second, their int,erests-are not adverse to those of Applicants and third, their interests are not consistent with those of the Intervenor. These last two points are illustrated by the fact that not a single one of Applicants' witnesses asserts in his testimony that there L are. systematic deficiencies in the QA program indicating a threat to public health and safety, which is the focus of
-Intervenor's contention. Rather, each-witness indicates that the Catawba OA program has been adequate to assure that the plant is safely built.10/
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(footnote 1 continued from previous page) analogous situation, involving the relationship between the attorney for the named class representative and the unnamed class members in a class action, the court observed:
[The defendants'] contention that the lawyer-client relationship is lacking because it did not-arise through the initiative of the class members is supported neither by the cases it cites nor -- more importantly -- by DR 7-104 itself (or by the purposes underlying the DR).
Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n. 95 F.R.D. 372, 377 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
10/ See also Ceramco, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510
.F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1975), wherein plaintiff's attorney telephoned. employees in the defendant company's order department without the knowledge of defendant's counsel to obtain jurisdictional facts, allegedly in violation of DR 7-104. The defendant moved to disqualify the plaintiff's counsel for ethical misconduct, but the Court of Appeals rejected that argument, stating:
Im examination of the circumstances of this case convinces us that while counsel's behavior is not to be commended, it is not the kind of conduct which should result in disqualification of counsel or nullification of prior proceedings . . . . [I]t (footnote continued) 3-
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3.. Does the validity of the Board's order depend on Whether the witnesses are " clients" or " parties"?
The validity of the Licensing Board's order turns upon whether an attorney-client relationship exists
-between Applicants' employee witnesses and Applicants' corporate counsel. As demonstrated in Applicants' response to Question 1, above, such a relationship does
-exist. Moreover, under Upjohn, these employee witnesses are considered " clients" for the purpose of being afforded the protection of the attorney-client privilege. In addition, as discussed in Applicants' response to Question 2, above, these individuals are considered " parties" within the context of DR 7-104. Once the attorney-client relationship exists, the wltnesses are " clients" and (footnote continued from previous page) would be too harsh to rule that.the action of counsel in telephoning defendant's employees to obtain non-privileged, relevant, and accurate
. information as to jurisdiction and venue constituted actual wrongdoing. Ceramco's inquiries were limited in scope to those items of information necessary to ascertain Whether suit could be instituted in the chosen forum and there is no l
suggestion that counsel sought any unfair advantage by his inquiries. This is the kind of misconduct, if it is misconduct, which is technical in character, does no violence to any of the fundamental values which the canons were written to protect and certainly falls far short of justifying a grant. of the relief requested. [510 F.2d at 271 (emphasis added)].
l Intervenor's proposed inquiries go well beyond the i discovery of jurisdictional facts permitted in Ceramco.
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" parties".within ,the protection of the attorney-client
. privilege.. Accordingly, the Board's~ order, Which fails to recognize this relationship, is invalid .
- 4. Are there any circumstances under Which Applicants' witnesses, Who are-also its employees, simultaneously can be Intervenor's witnesses? If.so, are these circumstances present in this case, and.What effect does this have on the validity of the Board's orders?
Applicants can think of only one instance Wherein their employee witnesses can simultaneously be Interven-or's witnesses. This situation would arise Where the wit-ness is called by the Intervenor to testify on an issue
. separate and apart from the issue on Which Applicants have called the same employee as a witness. However, this sit uation'is not present in the instant case since the
- l' employee witnesses Whom Palmetto Alliance seeks to contact and-to-call as its witnesses are being called by Inter-venor to. testify on the same issue -- i.e., quality assur ance at Catawba -- on Which they were called to testify for Applicants.
In this regard, both the Intervenor and the Licensing Board have raised a "strawman" in their discussion of Palmetto Alliance's request -- i.e., the argument that
, Intervenor's subpoenaing of Applicants' employee witnesses l
should entitle Intervenor to access to such witnesses.
This is' simply incorrect. Simply calling a person as a t
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witness or reques. ting a subpoena to compel his testimony does not destroy or diminish an existing attorney-client relationship.
1
.The issuance of a subpoena requires "the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of evidence."
10 C.F.R. 52.720(a). A subpoena simply compels testimony.
It says'nothing about the party for Whom the person is a witnessll./ and does not establish or destroy relation-ships.. The Licensing Board made it clear during an exchange with counsel on the subject of subpoenas that witnesses presented under subpoena could be cross-examined p as hostile witnesses'by Intervenor [Tr. 1578, 1580].
f' These employee witnesses are hostile because their interests are adverse to those of the Intervenor. -
To be clear,-Applicants do not dispute that .
Intervenor is entitled to access to relevant information from~ witnesses. Such access was provided to Palmetto Alliance during discovery. During trial, however, this
-access is available only through examination of the witnesses when they testify. To hold otherwise renders the discovery process a nullity and causes disruption of the actual litigation of the case. In this proceeding, for example, Intervenor took no discovery of the employee
.witneses'in question, even though it had ample opportunity 11/
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su bpoenaing him as a witness. arty does not State E.g., make one
- v. his witness merely by Tilley, 239 N.C. 245, 79 S.E.2d 473,'477 (1954).
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to do so.12/ Rather, Palmetto Alliance waited until the eve of the hearing to seek subpoenas for Duke employees who had already been designated as Applicants' witnesses.
Now, six weeks later, Intervenor suddenly claims that these subpoenaed witnesses are its witnesses, from whom it should be able to obtain a rush of discovery information months after discovery has closed. Moreover, Palmetto Alliance is allowed by the Boards' orders to conduct such discovery outside the presence of counsel, who would have been involved in discovery. Intervenor would then seek to raise these new matters at trial, matters of which Applicants would be unaware and thus not properly prepared to address. Adherence to the Commission's discovery rules, which are designed to prevent surprise at trial, would cure the harm created by the orders under review.
k-
'12/ Palmetto Alliance has known the names and telephone
- numbers of all of Applicants' Quality Assurance l
employees since April, 1983, and has had a more than ample opportunity during both an initial and an L expanded discovery period (granted expressly to allow Intervenor to conduct discovery on OA allegations related to welding) to contact these employees, to
- interview them and take their depositions, and to i obtain facts to prepare its case. Palmetto Alliance did not do so.
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Accordingly, Applicants ask this Commission to uphold its discovery rules and reverse the Boards' orders.
Respectfully submitted,
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- J. Michael McGarry, III '
Anne W. Cottingham DEBEVOISE & LIBERMAN 1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
/
Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 857-9833 Albert V. Carr, Jr.
Ronald L. Gibson DUKE POWER COMPANY P.O. Box 33189 Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 (704) 373-2570 Attorneys for. Duke Power Company, et al.
November 23, 1983
- . . ~ . , _ _ . - . . . - - . . - _ _..._.........~..._,_...-...._,..,____......_.....;_....-.
r; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION B2 FORE THE' COMMISSION In the Matter of-- )
.)
~ DUKE POWER COMPANY, et al. ) Docket Nos. 50-413
) 50-414 4 (Catawba' Nuclear Station,- )
Units 1 and 2) )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Applicants' Response to Commission Questions" in the above captioned matter have been served upon the following by deposit in the United States mail this 23rd day of November, 1983.
- Nunzio J. Palladino Alan S. Rosenthal Chairman Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atomic Safety and Licensing Commission Appeal Board Washington, D.C. 20555. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Frederick M. Bernthal Washington, D.C. 20555 Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Thomas S. Moore Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, D.C. 20555 Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
- James K. Asselstine Commission
. Commissioner Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear-Regulatory i Commission Howard A. Wilber Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board
- Victor Gilinsky U.S. Nuclear Regulatory l Commissioner Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 Commission Washington,.D.C. 20555 James L. Kelley Chairman
- Thomas M.-Roberts Atomic Safety and Licensing l Commissioner Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555
[
Dr. Paul W. Purdom Jesse L. Riley.
235 Columbia Drive -
854 Henley Place Decatur,. Georgia 30030 Charlotte, North Carolina 28207
.Dr. Richard F. Foster Carole F. Kagan, Attorney P. O. Box 4263 Atomic Safety and Licensing Sunriver, Oregon 97702 Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Chairman Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing '
. Washington, D.C. 20555 Board Panel-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Karen E. Long Commission Assistant Attorney General Washington, D.C. 20555 N.C. Department of Justice P. O. Box 629 Chairman Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board
- Scott Stucky U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Docketing and Service Section Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 George E. Johnson, Esq.
Office of the Executive Legal. Don R. Willard Director Mecklenburg County U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Department of Envirommental Commission Health Washington, D.C. 20555 1200 Blythe Boulevard Charlotte, North Carolina 28203 Albert V. Carr,-Jr., Esq Duke Power Company
- Martin G. Malsch P. O. Box 33189 Deputy General Counsel and Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 Acting General' Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Richard P. Wilson, Esq. Commission Assistant Attorney General Washington, D.C. 20555 State of South Carolina P. O. Box 11549 Columbia, South Carolina 29211 Robert Guild, Esq Attorney-at-Law P. O. Box 12097 '
Charleston, South Carolina 29412 3 // ~ .. " '
J. Michael McGarry, III ,
Palmetto Allicane 2135 1/2 Devine Street Columbia, South Carolina 29205
- Designates those hand delivered