ML20197D025
| ML20197D025 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 11/17/1978 |
| From: | TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197D015 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7811210310 | |
| Download: ML20197D025 (149) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:______ _ _ _ _ ._. .. _ - .. . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT Amendment 57 Instruction Sheet The following instructional information and check list is being furnished .to help insert Amendment No. 57 into the Sequoyah Sheet Plant SAR. Since in most causes the original FSAR contains information printed on both sides of a sheet of loose leaf paper, a new sheet is furnished to replace sheets containing superseded material. As a result, the front or back of a sheet may contain information that is merely reprinted rather than changes. Discard the old sheets and insert the new shee ts , as lis ted below. Keep these instruction sheets in the f ront of Volume I to serve as a record of changes. Remove Insert (Front /Back) _( Fron t / Bac k) List of Amendments /--- List of Amendments /--- Remove from Volume 1 Insert into Volume 1 through Volume 11 through Volume 11 xiii/xiv xiii/xiv ( xv/--- xv/--- xvi/--- xvi/--- 15.4-1/15.4-2 15.4-1/15.4-2 15.4-3/15.4-4 15.4-3/15.4-4
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15.4-5/15.4-6 15.4-5/15.4-6 15.4-7/15.4-8 15.4-7/15.4-8 15.4-62a/--- 15.4-62a/--- 15.4-67/--- 15.4-67/--- 15.4-68/--- 15/4-68/ -- 15.4-69d/--- 15.4-69d/--- 15.4-69e/--- 15.4-69e/--- 15.4-69f/--- 15.4-69f/--- 15.4-69g/--- 15.4-69g/--- 15.4-69h/--- 15.4-69h/--- 15.4-691/--- 15.4-69i/--- 15.4-69j/--- 15.4-69j/--- ___/___ 15.4-69k/---
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Figure 15.4-2a through Figure 15.4-2a through Figure 15.4-22/--- Figure 15.4-22/--- Chapter 16 16-i/--- Technical Specifications 16-1/--- O ---/---
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q15.17-1/--- Q15.18-1/--- 78?12 M 3Idd
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57-i November 17, 1978
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SEQUOYAH NUCl2 R PLANT Amendment 57 Instruction Sheet Continued _ Remove Insert (Front /Back) iFront/Back)
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Figure 15 . 4 . 2 4 - 1/ --'-
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Figure 15.4.24-2/--- Figure lS.4.24-3/--- l 1 1 0 57-11 November 17, 1978
i l-Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 i
; SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT LIST OF AMENDMENTS t
4
- Amendment 57 Revision to Section 15.4 Deletion of Chapter 16 1
i i ! l e i e t 1 4 $ l i ! i I i k s i J l 4 1 i E J 1 4
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Section Title Page 14.2.3 PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND AUTHORITIES 14.2-3 14.2.4 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS 14.2-3 15.0 ACCIDENT ANALYSES 15.1 CONDITION I - NORMAL OPERATION AND OPERATIONAL TRANSIENTS 15.1-1 15.2 CONDITION II - INCIDENTS OF MODERATE FREQUENCY 15.2-1 15.3 CONDITION III - INFREQUENT INCIDENTS 15.3-1 15.4 CONDITION IV - LIMITING FAULTS 15.4-1 15.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 15.5-1 15.5.1 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED LOSS OF A.C. POWER TO THE PLANT AUXILIARIES 15.5-1 15.5.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED WASTE GAS DECAY TANK RUPTURE 15.5-3 15.5.3 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED ,\- LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 15.5-4 15.5.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED STEAM LINE BREAK 15.5-20 15.5.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 15.5-22 15.5.6 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT 15.5-24 l 15.5.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED R0D EJECTION ACCIDENT 15.5-25 15.
5.8 REFERENCES
15.5-29 APPENDIX 15A DOSE MODELS USED TO EVALUATE THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 15A-1 ! APPENDIX 15B SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF LOCA DOSE CALCULATIONS 15B-1 16.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS See separate document. 57 A U xiii November 17, 1978
4 e T 4 1 i 6 1 I 1 u i J + 5 i 1 1
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i I I t. i 1 i 57 e 1 1 1 1 i s i 1 k i 5 a i e i i f O i i l xiv November 17, 1978
SNP-20 e 0 (,,/ TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Section Title Page i I 57 4 4 4 4 17.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE i 17.1A QUALITY ASSURANCE DURING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 17.1A-1 17.1A.1 ORGANIZATION 17.1A-1 17.1A.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 17.1A-14 17.1A 3 DESIGN CONTROL 17.1A-15 17.1A.4 PROCUREMENT DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1 A- 18 l20 17.1A.5 INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES, AND DRAWINGS 17.1A-19 17.1A.6 DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1A-20 17.1A.7 CONTROL OF PURCHASED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, AND SERVICES 17.1A-21 I
.17 .1 A . 8 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF MATERIALS, PARTS,
'AND COMPONENTS 17.1A-23 17.1A.9 CONTROL OF SPECIAL PROCESSES 17.1A-23 17.1A.10 INSPECTION 17.1A-24 17.1A.11 TEST CONTROL 17.1A-25 17.1A.12 CONTROL OF MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT 17.1A-27 HANDLING, SYORAGE, AND SHIPPING 17.1A-27 20 17.1A.13 17.1A.14 INSPECTION, TEST, AND OPERATING STATUS 17.1A-27 J7.1A.15 NONCONFORMING MATERI ALS, PARTS , OR COMPONENTS 17.1A-27 17.1A.16 CORRECTIVE ACTION 17.1A-28 17.1A.17 QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORD 17.1A-28 17.1A.18 AUDITS 17 .1 A-28
\_)
i November 17, 1978 xv'
l l
' S NP- 55 I TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) l l
Section Title Pace I 1 1 17.1B QUALITY ASSURANCE DURING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 17.1B-1 i 17.1B.1 ORGANIZATION 17.1B-5 17.1B.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 17.1B-11 1 17.lB.3 DESIGN' CONTROL 17.1B-11 l 17.1B.4 FROCUREMENT DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.13-16 17.18.5 INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES AND DRAWINGS 17.15-19 17.1B.6 DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1B-20 17.1B.7 CONTROL OF PURCHASED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES 17.1B-24 17.1B.8 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF MATERIAL, PARTS AND l COMPONENTS 17.1B-29 17.1B.9 CONTROL OF SPECIAL PROCESSES 17.1B-31 17.1B.10 INSPECTION 17.13-34 17.1B.11 TEST CONTROL 17.1B-37 17.1B.12 CONTROL OF MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT 17.1B-39 17.1D.13 llANDLING, STORAGE AND SHIPPING 17.1B-41 1 17.1B.14 INSPECTIONS, TESTS AND OPERATING STATUS 17.1B-43 l 17.1B.15 NONCONFORMING MATERIAL, PARTS OR COMPONENTS 17.1B-44 i 17.1B.16 00RRECTIVE ACTION 17.1B-47 17.1B.17 QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORDS 17.1B-49 17.1B.18 AUDITS 17.1B-50 17.1B.19 REFERENCES- 17.13-55 17.2 0UALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM FOR STATION OPERATION 17.2-1 55 O xvi July 28, 1978 i
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Section Title Page 14.2.3 PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND AUTHORITIES 14.2-3 14.2.4 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS 14.2-3 15.0 ACCIDENT ANALYSES 15.1 CONDITION I - NORMAL OPERATION AND OPERATIONAL TRANSIENTS 15.1-1 15.2 CONDITION II - INCIDENTS OF MODERATE FREQUENCY 15.2-1 15.3 CONDITION III - INFREQUENT INCIDENTS 15.3-1 15.4 CONDITION IV - LIMITING FAULTS 15.4-1 15.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 15.5-1 15.5.1 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED LOSS OF A.C. POWER TO THE PLANT AUXILIARIES 15.5-1 15.5.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED WASTE GAS DECAY TANK RUPTURE 15.5-3 O 15.5.3 15.5.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 15.5-4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED STEAM LINE BREAK 15.5-20 15.5.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED STEAM. GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 15.5-22 15.5.6 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT 15.5-24 15.5.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED ROD EJECTION ACCIDENT 15.5-25 15.
5.8 REFERENCES
15.5-29 APPEND 1X 15A DOSE MODELS USED TO EVALUATE THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 15A-1 APPENDIX 15B SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF LOCA DOSE CALCULATIONS 15B-1 16.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS See separate document. 57 O xiii Novemb e r 17, 1978 i
l l l l 1 1 1 1 l l Ol1 t I
\
l l xiv November 17, 1918 l 1 l l
SNP-20
/3 P 1 \m ,/ TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Section Title Page 57 i l l l b')
\J' 17.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE 17.1A RUALITY ASSURANCE DURING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 17.1A-1 l 17.1A.1 ORGANIZATION 17.1A-1 !
17.1A.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 17.1A-14 i 17.1A.3 DESIGN CONTROL 17.1A-15 l 17.1A.4 PROCUREMENT DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1A-18 l20 17.1A.5 INSTRUCTIONS, PR9CEDURES, AND DRAWINGS 17.1A-19 17.1A.6 DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1A-20 17.1A.7 CONTROL OF PURCHASED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, AND SERVICES 17.1A-21 17.lA.8 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF MATERI ALS, PARTS , AND COMPONENTS 17.1A-23 17.1A.9 CONTROL OF SPECIAL PROCESSES 17.1A-23 17.1A.10 INSPECTION 17.1A-24 17.1A.11 TEST CONTROL 17.1A-25 17.1A.12 CONTROL OF FEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT 17.1A-27 20 17.1A.13 HANDLING, STORAGE, ant SHIPPING 17.1A-27 17.1A.14 INSPECTION TEST, AND OPERATING STATUS 17.1A-27 17.1A.15 NONCONFORMING MATERI ALS, PARTS, OR COMPONENTS 17.1A-27 17.1A.16 CORRECTIVE ACTION 17.1A-28 17.JA.17 QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORD 17.1A-28 17.1A.18 AUDITS 17 . l A-28 g D November 17, 1978 xv
SNP- 55 9
) TABLE OF' CONTENTS (Continued)
Section Title Pace 17.1B QUALITY ASSURANCE DURING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 17.18-1 17.1B.1 ORGANIZATION 17.1B-5 17.1B.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 17.1B-11 17.1B.3 DESIGN CONTROL 17.13-11 17.1B.4 PROCUREMENT DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.lB-16 , 17.1B.5 INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES AND DRAWINGS 17.1S-19 17.1B.6 DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1B-20 17.1B.7 CONTROL OF PURCllASED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES 17.13-24 17.1B 8 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF MATERIAL, PARTS AND COMPONENTS 17.1B-29 17.1B.9 CONTROL OF SPECIAL PROCESSES 17.1B-31 ; 17.18.10 INSPECTION 17.13-34 ) i 17.1B.11 TEST CONTROL 17.13-37 l l 17.18.12 CONTROL OF MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT 17.1B-39 ; 17.1 B .13 HANDLING, STORACE AND SHIPPING 17,1B-41 l 17.1B.14 INSPECTIONS, TESTS AND OPERATING STATUS 17.1B-43 l 17.18.15 NONCONFORMING MATERI AL, PARTS OR COMPONENTS 17,1B-44 17.1B.16 CORRECTIVE ACTION 17.1B-47 17.1B.17 QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORDS 17.1B-49 17.1D.18 AUDITS 17.1B-50 17.1B.19 REFERENCES 17.13-55 l 17.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM FOR STATION OPERATION 17.2-1 l l 55 xvi July 28, 1978
l I i l f-~ ( TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) l Section Title Page l l 14.2.3 PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND l l AUTHORITIES 14.2-3 14.2.4 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS 14.2-3 l l 15.0 ACCIDENT ANALYSES 15.1 CONDITION I - NORMAL OPERATION AND OPERATIONAL l TRANSIENTS 15.1-1 l 15.2 CONDITION II - INCIDENTS OF MODERATE FREQUENCY 15.2-1 l l 15.3 CONDITION III - INFREQUENT INCIDENTS 15.3-1 15.4 CONDITION IV - LIMITING FAULTS 15.4-1 l 15.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 15.5-1 i 15.5.1 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED LOSS OF A.C. POWER TO THE PLANT AUXILIARIES 15.5-1 , 15.5.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED I , f. WASTE CAS DECAY TANK RUPTURE 15.5-3 l
- I i 15.5.3 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED ,
4
\/ LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 15.5-4 !
15.5.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED l STEAN LINE BREAK 15.5-20 l 15.5.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED l STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 15.5-22 15.5.6 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSIULATED l FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT 15.5-24 l
; 15.5.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED l ROD EJECTION ACCIDENT 15.5-25 15.
5.8 REFERENCES
15.5-29 APPENDIX 15A DOSE MODELS USED TO EVALUATE TFE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 15A-1 APPENDIX 15B SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF LOCA DOSE CALCULATIONS 15B-1 16.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 1 See separate document. 1 57 (h V xiii November 17, 1978
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I I 1 I I . 1 e i I I i 1 , 57 l l 4 i i I f l 8 1 i e T .il .n i e xiv November 17, 1978
SNP-20 (V TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Section Title Page 57 1 17.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE
.L 17.1A QUALITY ASSURANCE DURING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 17.1A-1 l 17.1A.1 ORGANIZATION 17.1A-1 )
17.1A.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 17.1A-14 17.1A.3 DESIGN CONTROL 17.1A-15 17.1A.4 PROCUREMENT DOCUMENT CONTROL 17 .1 A- 18 l20 17.1A.5 INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES, AND DRAWINGS 17.1A-19 17.1A.6 DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1A-20 17.1A.7 CONTROL OF PURCHASED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, AND SERVICES 17.1A-21 17.1A.8 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF MATERIALS, PARTS, AND COMPONENTS 17.1A-23 17.1A.9 CONTROL OF SPECIAL PROCESSES 17.lA-23 17.1A.10 IN9PECTION 17.1A-24 17.]A.11 TOST CONTROL 17.1A-25 17.lA.12 CONTROL OF MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT 17.lA-27 17.1A-27 20 17.1A.13 HANDLING, STORAGE, AND SHIPPING 17.1A.14 INSPECTION, TEST, AND OPERATING STATUS 17.1A-27 17.1A.15 NONCONFORMING MATERIALS, PARTS, OR COMPONENTS 17.1A-27 17.lA.16 CORRECTIVE ACTION 17.1A-28 17.1A.17 QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORD 17.1A-28 17.1A.18 AUDITS 17.1 A-28 O V November 17, 1978 xy
SNP- 55
- CONTENTS (Continued)
Section Title Page } 17.1B QUALITY u DURING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 17.1B-1 . 17.1B.1 ORGAN. N 17.1B-5 ' 17.1B.2 QUALIT s 1R. " PROGRAM 17.1B-11 17.1B.3 DESIGN CO. lL 17.13-11 17.1B.4 PROCUREMEN1 DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1B-16 , 17.1B.5 INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES AND DRAWINGS 17.15-19 l i 17.1B.6 DOCUMENT CONTRCT. 17.1B-20 l 17.1B.7 CONTROL OF PURCHASED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND ) i SERV 1CES 17.1B-24 l 17.1B.8 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF MATERIAL, PARTS AND I l COMPONENTS 17.1B-29 l 17.1B.9 CONTROL OF SPECIAL PROCESSES 17.1B-31 l l 17.1B.10 INSPECTION 17.13-34 ! 17.1B.11 TEST CONTROL 17.1B-37 17.1B.12 CONTROL OF MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT 17.1B-39 17.1D.13 ilANDLING, STORAGE AND SHIPPING 17.1B-41 1,.1B.14 INSPECTIONS, TESTS AND OPERATING STATUS 17.1B-43 17.1B.15 NONCONFORMING MATERIAL, PARTS OR COMPONENTS 17.1B-44 17.1B.16 ODRRECTIVE ACTION 17.1B-47 17.1B.17 QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORDS 17.1B-49 . 17.1B.18 AUDITS 17.1B-50 17.1B.19 REFERENCES 17.13-55 17.2 .QUALITY ASSUR ANCE PROGRAM FOR STATION OPERATION 17.2-1 e 55 xvi July 28, 1978
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Section Title Page 14.2.3 PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND l AUTHORITIES 14.2-3 l 14.2.4 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS 14.2-3 l 15.0 ACCIDENT ANALYSES 15.1 CONDITION I - NORMAL OPERATION AND OPERATIONAL TRANSIENTS 15.1-1 15.2 CONDITION II - INCIDENTS OF MCDERATE TEEQUENC/ 15.2-1 15.3 CONDITION III - INFREQUENT INCIDENTS 15.3-1 j l 15.4 CONDITION IV - LIMITING FAULTS 15.4-1 l 15.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 15.5-1 15.5.1 ENVIRONFENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED LOSS OF A.C. POWER TO THE PLANT AUXILIARIES 15.5-1 15.5.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED l WASTE GAS DECAY TANK RUPTURE 15.5-3 I / '\ 15.5,3 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED
-- LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 15.5-4 15.5.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED STEAM LINE BREAK 15.5-20 15.5.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 15.5-22 15.5.6 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT 15.5-24 15.5.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED ROD EJECTION ACCIDENT 15.5-25 15.
5.8 REFERENCES
15.5-29 APPENDIX 15A DOSE MODELS USED TO EVALUATE THE ENVIRONFENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 15A-1 APPENDIX 15B SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF LOCA DOSE CALCULATIONS 15B-1 16.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS See separate document. 57 (D %.) xiii November 17, 1978
k i 4 i O i a l f f i h ? 1 i e i i I i i i i 1 i - 1 9 i a s j s 0 b i 5 4 i s 4 i G xiv November 17, 1978
I SNP-20 l (~')s (s , TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Section Title Page l l 57 l 17.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE 17.1A 0UALITY ASSURANCE DURING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 17.1A-1 17.1A.1 ORGANIZATION 17.1A-1 17.1A.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 17.1A-14 17.1A.3 DESIGN CONTROL 17.1A-15 17.1A.4 PROCUREMENT DOCUMENT CONTROL 17 .1 A- 18 l20 17.1A.5 INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES, AND DRAWINGS 17.1A-19 17.1A.6 DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1A-20 17.1A.7 CONTROL OF PURCHASED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, AND SERVICES 17.1A-21 17.1A.8 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF MATERIALS, PARTS, AND COMPONENTS 17.1A-23 17.1A.9 CONTROL OF SPECIAL PROCESSES 17.1A-23 17.1A.10 INSPECTION 17.lA-24 17.1A.11 TEST CONTROL 17.1A-25 17.lA.12 CONTROL OF FEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMEKI 17.1A-27 20 17.1A.13 HANDLING, STORAGE, AND SHIPPING 17.1A-27 17.1A.14 INSPECTION, TEST, AND OPERATING STATUS 17.1A-27 17.1A.15 NONCONFORMING MATERI ALS, PARTS, OR CO?tPONENTS 17.1A-27 17.1A.16 CORRECTIVE ACTION 17.1A-28 17.1A.17 QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORD 17.1A-28 17.1A.18 AUDITS 17.1A-28 November 17, 1978 xv
~ . _ _
SNP- 55 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Con t i n ue d) Section Title Pay 17.1B QUALITY ASSURANCE DURING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 17.1B-1 17.1B.1 ORCANIZATION 17.18-5 l 17.1B.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 17.1B-11 17.1B.3 DESIGN CONTROL 17.1E-11 17.1B.4 PROCUREMENT DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1B-16 17.1B.5 INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES A'!D DRAWINGS 17.15-19 17.1B.6 DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1B-20 17.1B 7 CONTROL OF PURCHASED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES 17.13--24 17.1B.8 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF MATERIAL, PARTS AND COMPONENfS 17.1B-29 17.1B.9 CONTROL OF SPECIAL PROCESSES 17.1B-31 17.1B.10 INSPECTION 17.1B-34 17.1B.11 TEST CONTROL 17.13-37 17.1B.12 CONTROL OF MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT 17.1B-39 17.1 D .13 IIANDLING, STORAGE AND SHIPPING 17.1B-41 17.1B.14 INSPECTIONS, TESTS AND OPERATING STATUS 17.1B-43 17.1B.15 NONCONFORMING MATERIAL, PARTS OR COMPONENTS 17.1B-44 17.1B.16 CORRECTIVE ACTION 17.1B-47 17.1B.17 QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORDS 17.1B-49 17.1B.18 AUDITS 17.1B-50 17.1B.19 REFERENCES 17.1R-55 17.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM FOR STATION OPERATION 17.2-1 1 55 xvl July 28, 1978 . _ - _ . . - _ _ ~ ._ - . _ . _ _ _ _ _ -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
rs
\s,) TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Section Title Page 14.2.3 PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND AUTHORITIES 14.2-3 14.2.4 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS 14.2-3 15.0 ACCIDENT ANALYSES 15.1 CONDITION I - NORMAL OPERATION AND OPERATIONAL TRANSIENTS 15.1-1 15.2 CONDITION II - INCIDENTS OF MODERATE FREQUENCY 15.2-1 15.3 CONDITION III - INFREQUENT INCIDENTS 15.3-1 15.4 CONDITION IV - LIMITING FAULTS 15.4-1 15.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONS,EgUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 15.5-1 15.5.1 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED LOSS OF A.C. POWER TO THE PLANT AUXILIARIES 15.5-1 15.5.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED WASTE CAS DECAY TANK RUPTURE 15.5-3 D 15.5.3 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 15.5-4 15.5.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED STEAM LINE BREAK 15.5-20 15.5.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 15.5-22 15.5.6 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT 15.5-24 15.5.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED ROD EJECTION ACCIDENT 15.5-25 15.
5.8 REFERENCES
15.5-29 APPENDIX 15A DOSE MODELS USED TO EVALUATE TtE ENVIRONIENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 15A-1 APPENDIX 15B SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF LOCA DOSE CALCULATIONS 15B-1 16.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS See separate document. 57 l xiii Novemb e r 17, 1978 l g n , - , - -
l l i O l 1 l l 1 I I i 1 57 9 ! 1 l O xiv November 17, 1978 l
d SNP-20 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Section Title Page 57 i d 4 ? p 17.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE G 17.1A QUALITY ASSURANCE DURING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 17.1A-1 17.1A.1 ORGANIZATION 17.1A-1 17.1A.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 17.1A-14 17.1A.3 DESIGN CONTROL 17.1A-15 17.1A.4 PROCUREMENT DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1A-18 l20 17.1A.5 INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES, AND DRAWINGS 17.1A-19 17.1A.6 DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1A-20 l 17.1A.7 CONTROL OF PURCHASED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, AND 17.1A-21 SERVICES 17.1A.8 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF MATERIALS, PARTS, AND COMPONENTS 17.1A-23 17.1A.9 CONTROL OF SPECIAL PROCESSES 17.1A-23 17.lA.10 INSPECTION 17.1A-24 17.1A.11 TEST CONTROL 17.1A-25 17.1A.12 CONTROL OF MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT 17.lA-27 20 17.1A.13 HANDLING, STORAGE, AND SHIPPING 17.1A-27 17.1A.14 INSPECTION, TEST, AND OPERATING STATUS 17.lA-27 17.1A.15 NONCONFORMING MATERI ALS , PARTS, OR COMPONENTS 17.1A-27 17.1A.16 CORRECTIVE ACTION 17.1A-28 17.1A.17 QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORD 17.1A-28 17.1A.18 AUDITS 17 .1 A-28 A. U November 17, 1978 xv
l SNP- 55 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Section Title Page i 17.1B QUALITY ASSURANCE DURING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 17.1B-1 l 17.1B.1 ORGANIZATION 17.18-5 17.1B.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 17.1B-11 17.1B.3 DESIGN CONTROL 17.1B-11 17.18.4 PROCUREMENT DOCLP!ENT CONTROL 17.18-16 17.18.5 INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES AND DRAh'INGS 17 .1 F,-19 17.1B.6 DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1B-20 17.1B.7 CONTROL OF PURCilASED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES 17.13-24 17.1B.8 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF MATERIAL, PARTS AND COMPONENTS 17.1B-29 17.18.9 CONTROL OF SPECIAL PROCESSES 17 .1 B-- 31 17.1B.10 INSPECTION 17.1B-34 17.1B.11 TEST CONTROL 17.13-37 17.1B.12 CONTROL OF MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT 17.1B-39 17.10.13 IIANDLING, STORAGE AND SilIPPING 17.1B-41 17.1B.14 INSPECTIONS, TESTS AND OPERATING STATUS 17.1B-43 17.1B.15 NONCONEORMING MATERIAL, PARTS OR COMPONENTS 17.1B-44 17.18.16 CORRECTIVE ACTION 17.1B-47 17.1B.17 QUALITY AhJURANCE RECOP,DS 17.1B-49 i 17.1D.18 AUDITS 17.15-50 17.1B.19 REFERENCES 17.13-55 17.2 QUALITY ASSURMCE PROGRAM FOR STATION OPERATION 17.2-1 55 xvi July 28, 1978
E l TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Section Title Page
)
14.2.3 PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND l AUTHORITIES 14.2-3 14.2.4 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS 14.2-3
- 15.0 ACCIDENT ANALYSES 15.1 CONDITION I - NORMAL OPERATION AND OPERATIONAL TRANSIENTS 15.1-1 15.2 CONDITION II - INCIDENTS OF MODERATE FREQUENCY 15.2-1 15.3 CONDITION III - INFREQUENT INCIDENTS 15.3-1 15.4 CONDITION IV - LIMITING FAULTS 15.4-1 15.5 ENVIkJOIENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 15.3-1 15.5.1 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED LOSS OF A.C. POWER TO THE PLANT AUXILIARIES 15.5-1 15.5.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED WASTE CAS DECAY TANK RUPTURE 15.5-3 O 15.5.3 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 15.5-4
, 15.5.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED STEAM LINE BREAK 15.5-20 l 15.5.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED l STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 15.5-22 ' 15.5.6 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQU'dNCES OF A POSTULATED FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT 15.5-24 15.5.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED ROD EJECTION ACCIDENT 15.5-25 15.
5.8 REFERENCES
15.5-29 APPENDIX 15A DOSE MODELS USED TO EVALUATE THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 15A-1 APPENDIX 15B SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF LOCA DOSE CALCULATIONS 15B-1 16.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS l See separate document, j 57 ~ m V xiii November 17, 1978
T I 1 i I t 1 I O i 1 a i 1 4 l i i i 4 i Y t I i i 1 1 i a ! 57 4 6 I e i 4 I i i i I i i i 1 d i 4 e j 4 4 I i O xiv November 17, 1978
SNP-20 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Section Title _ Page 57 17.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE 17.1A QUALITY ASSURANCE DURING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 17.1A-1 , 17.1A.1 ORGANIZATION 17.1A-1 17.1A.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 17.1A-14 17.1A.3 DESIGN CONTROL 17.1A-15 17.1A.4 PROCUREMENT DOCUNINT CONTROL 17 .1 A- 18 l20 17.lA.5 INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES, AND DRAWINGS 17.1A-19 17.1A.6 DOCUMENT CONTROL 17 1A-20 17.1A.7 CONTROL OF PURCHASED MATERI AL, EQUIPMENT, AND j SERVICES 17.1A-21 { 17.1A.8 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF BMTERI ALS, PARTS , AND C0KPONENTS 17.1A-23 17.1 A. 9 CONTROL OF SPECI AL PROCESSES 17.1A-23 17.1A.10 INSPECTION 17.1A-24 17.1A.11 TEST CONTROL 17.1A-25 l 17.1A.12 CONTROL OF MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT 17.1A-27 20 17.1A.13 RANDLING, STORAGE, AND SHIPPING 17.1A-27 l 17.1A.14 INSPECTION, TEST, AND OPERATING STATUS 17.1A-27 l 17.1A.15 NONCONFORMING MATERI ALS, PARTS, OR COMPONENTS 17.1A-27 17.1A.16 CORRECTIVE ACTION 17.1A-28 17.1A.17 QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORD 17.1A-28 17.1A.18 AUDITS 17. ] A-28 i O November 17, 1978 xv
l S NP- 55 ' b> TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Section Title Pajf; 17.18 QUALITY ASSURANCE DURING DESIGN AND_ CONSTRUCTION 17.1B-1 17.1B.1 ORGANIZATION 17.18-5 17.1B.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 17.1B-11 17.1B.3 DESIGN CONTROL 17.1B-11 17.1B.4 PROCUREMENT DOCDLENT CONTROL 17.1B-16 17.1B.5 INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES AND DRAFIINGS 17.13-19 17.1B.6 DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1B-20 17.1B.7 CONTROL OF PURCHASED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES 17.1B- 2 4 17.1B.8 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF MATERIAL, PARTS AND COMPONENTS 17.1B-29 17.1B.9 CONTROL OF SPECIAL PROCESSES 17.1B-31 17.1B.10 INSPECTION 17.13-34 17.1B.11 TEST CONTROL 17.13-37 17.1B.12 CONTROL OF MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT 17.1B-39 17.1B.13 llANDL ING , STORAGE AND SHIPPING 17,1B-41 17.1B.14 INSPECTIONS, TESTS AND OPERATING STATUS 17.1B-43 17.1B.15 NONCONFORMING MATERIAL, PARTS OR COMPONENTS 17.1B-44 17.18.16 CORRECTIVE ACTION 17.1B-47 17.1B.17 QUALITY ASSUPANCE RECORDS 17.1B-49 17.18.18 AUDITS 17.1B-50 17.1B.19 REFERENCES 17.1B-55 17.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM FOR STATION OPERATION 17.2-1 55
\
xvi July 28, 1978
I TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 1 Section Title Page 14.2.3 PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND 14.2-3
~
AU1 ORITIES 14.2.4 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS 14.2-3 l 15.0 ACCIDENT ANALYSES l 15.1 CONDITION I - NORMAL OPERATION AND OPERATIONAL TRANSIENTS 15.1-1 15.2 CONDITION II - INCIDENTS OF MODERATE FREQUENCY 15.2-1 15.3 CONDITION III - INFREQUENT INCIDENTS 15.3-1 15.4 CONDITION IV - LIMITING FAULTS 15.4-1 15.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 15.5-1 l 15.5.1 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED LOSS OF A C. POWER TO THE PLANT AUXILIARIES 15.5-1 15.5.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED WASTE GAS DECAY TANK RUPTURE 15.5-3 I 'T 15.5.3 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED l k- l LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 15.5-4 15.5.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED STEAM LINE BREAK 15.5-20 15.5.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 15.5-22 15.5.6 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT 15.5-24 15.5.7 ENVIRONtiENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED ROD EJECTION ACCIDENT 15.5-25 15.
5.8 REFERENCES
15.5-29 APPENDIX 15A DOSE MODELS USED TO EVALUATE THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 15A-1 APPENDIX 15B SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF LOCA DOSE CALCULATIONS 15B-1 16.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS See separate document. 57 O v xiii November 17, 1978
l l l O 1 I l l 57 9 ) t
~.
1 l O i l xiv November 17, 1978 l
l SNP-20 l O TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) ,
\_,/ l
.Section Title Page I l
l 57 l l l l i i l l 17.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE (} 17.1A QUALITY ASSURANCE DURING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 17.lA-1 17 lA.1 ORGANIZATION 17.lA-1 17.lA.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 17.lA-14 17.lA.3 DESIGN CONTROL 17.1A-15 17.1A 4 PROCUREMENT DOCUMENT CONTROL 17 . l A- 18 l20 17.1A.5 INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES, AND DRAWINGS 17.lA-19 17.1A.6 DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.lA-20 17.1A.7 CONTROL OF PURCHASED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, AND SERVICES 17.1A-21 , 17.lA 8 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF MATERI ALS, P ARTS, I AND COMPONENTS 17 lA-23 17.lA.9 CONTROL OF SPECIAL PROCESSES 17.1A-23 17.lA.10 INSPECTION 17.lA-24 17 1A.11 TEST CONTROL 17.1A-25 17.1A.12 CONTROL OF FEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT 17.lA-27 20 17 lA.13 HANDLING, STORAGE, AND SHIPPING 17.1A-27 17.lA.14 INSPECTION, TEST, AND OPERATING STATUS 17.lA-27 17.1A.15 NONCONFORMING MATERIALS, PARTS, OR COMPONENTS 17.lA-27 17.1A.16 CORRECTIVE ACTION 17.1A-28 17.lA.17 QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORD 17.lA-28 17.1A.18 AUDITS 17.1A-28 O V November 17, 1978 xv I 1
S NP- 55 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Section Title Page 17.1B Q_UALITY ASSURANCE DURING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 17.1B-1 17.1B.1 ORG ANIZATION 17.1R-5 17.1B.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 17.1B-11 17.1B.3 DESIGN CONTROL 17.1B-11 17.1B.4 PROCUREMENT DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1B-16 17.1B.5 INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES AND DRAWINGS 17.1E-19 17.1B 6 DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1B-20 17.1B.7 CONTROL OF PURCHASED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES 17.1B-24 17.1B.8 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF IMTERIAL, PARTS AND COMPONENTS 17.1B-29 17.1B.9 CONTROL OF SPECIAL PROCESSES 17.1B-31 17.1B.10 INSPECTION 17.1B-34 17.1B.11 TEST CONTROL 17.1B-37 17.18.12 CONTROL OF MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT 17.1B-39 17.1D.13 HANDLING, STORAGE AND SHIPPING 17.1B-41 17.1B.14 INSPECTIONS, TESTS AND OPERATING STATUS 17.1B 17.18.15 NONCONFORMING MATERIAL, PARTS OR COMPONENTS 17.1B-44 l i . 17.1B.16 CORRECTIVE ACTIO" 17.1B-47 17.1B.17 QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORDS 17.1B-49 17.1D.18 AUDITS 17.1B-50 17.1B.19 REFERENCES 17.13-55 ) 17.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM FOR STATION OPERATION 17.2-1 1 55 l l l l xvi July 28, 1978
4 a i O k,,) . TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Sectioc. Title Page i ! 14.2.3 PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND 14.2-3
~
AUTHORITIES i 14.2.4 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS 14.2-3 4
- 15.0 ACCIDENT ANALYSES 15.1 CONDITION I - NORMAL OPERATION AND OPERATIONAL
$ TRANSIENTS 15.1-1 15.2 CONDITION II - INCIDENTS OF MODERATE FREQUENCY 15.2-1 i 15.3 CONDITION III - INFREQUENT INCIDENTS 15.3-1
- 15.4 CONDITION IV - LIMITING FAULTS 15.4-1 1 15.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 15.5-1 15.5.3 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED ;
i LOSS OF A.C. POWER TO THE PLANT AUXILIARIES 15.5-1 1 , 15.5.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED i WASTE GAS DECAY TANK RUPTURE 15.5-3 O! g 15.5.3 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED N- LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 15.5-4 l 15.5.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATLD STEAM LINE BREAK 15.5-20 15.5,5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED i l STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 15.5-22 l 15.5.6 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED ! FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT 15.5-24 15.5 7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED l ROD EJECTION ACCIDENT 15.5-25 15.
5.8 REFERENCES
15.5-29 i l 3 APPENDIX 15A DOSE MODELS USED TO EVALUATE THE ENVIRONMENTAL l 1 CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 15A-1 APPENDIX 15B SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF LOCA DOSE CALCULATIONS 15B-1 16.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS See separate document. 57 l l I I l l xiii November 17, 1978
l l 1 1 1 4 l I i l l i ' 1 I I 4. 1 i i i i l < i J 4 d .t l 57 i i e l ! 1 1 e t l 1 a J 4 4 s 4 .l .1 4 1 i O t xiv November 17, 1978 v ., . . .
i SNP-20 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Section Title Page a 4 5 3 57 N 3 J () 17.1A 17.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE 17.1A-1 QUALITY ASSURANCE DURING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 17.1A.1 ORGANIZATION 17.1A-1 l 17.1A.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 17.1A-14 l 17.1A 3 DESIGN CONTROL 17.1A-15 i 17.1A.4 PROCUREMENT DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1A-18 l20 l 17.1A.5 INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES, AND DRAWINGS 17.1A-19 l 17.1A.6 DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1A-20 17.1A.7 CONTROL OF PURCHASED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, AND SERVICES 17.1A-21 17.1A.8 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF MATERIALS, PARTS, AND COMPONENTS 17.1A-23 17.1A.9 CONTROL OF SPECI AL PROCESSES 17.1A-23 17.1A.10 INSPECTION 17.1A-24 l 17.1A.11 TEST CONTROL 17.1A-25 7' 1A.12 CONTROL OF MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT 17.1A-27 17.1A-27 20 17.1A.13 RANDLING, STORAGE , AND SHIPPING 17.1A.14 INSPECTION, TEST, AND OPERATING STATUS 17.1A-27 17.1A.15 NONCONFORMING MATERI ALS, PARTS , OR COMPONENTS 17.1A-27 17.1A.16 CORRECTIVE ACTION 17.1A-28 17.1A.17 QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORD 17.1A-28 17.1A.18 AUDITS 17 .1 A-28 (~T l (~ / l November 17, 1978 xv l
4 SNP- 55 ) TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) j Section Title Pace 1 l I 17.1B QUALITY ASSURANCE DURING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 17.1B-1 l i 17.1B.1 ORGANIZATION 17.1R-5 l 17.1B.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 17.1B-11 a 17.1B.3 DESIGN CONTROL 17.13-11 l 17.1B.4 PROCUREMENT DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1B-16 17.1B.5 INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES AND DRAWINGS 17.1E-19
- 17.1B.6 DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1B-20
, 17.1B.7 CONTROL OF PURCHASED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES 17.1B-24 17.1B.8 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF MATERIAL, PARTS AND COMPONENTS 17.1B-29 17.1B.9 CONTROL OF SPECIAL PROCESSES 17.1B-31 1 17.1B.10 INSPECTION 17.1B-34 17.1B,11 TEST CONTROL 17.1B-37 17.1B,12 CONTROL OF MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT 17.1B-39
- 17.1B.13 HANDLING, STORAGE AND SHIPPING 17.1B-41 17.1B.14 INSPECTIONS, TESTS AND OPERATING STATUS 17.1B-43 17.1B.15 NONCONFORMING MATERIAL, PARTS OR COMPONENTS 17.18-44 17.1B.16 CORRECTIVE ACTION 17.1B-47 17.1B.17 QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORDS 17.1B-49 17.1B.18 AUDITS 17.1B-50 17.1B.19 REFERENCES 17.1B-55 17.2 .QUALITY ASSUR ANCE PROGRAM 70R STATION OPERATION 17.2-1 l l
1 l l 55 xvi July 28, 1978
--~
f'\ () TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Section Title Page 14.2.3 PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND AUTHORITIES 14.2-3 14.2.4 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS 14.2-3 l 15.0 ACCIDENT ANALYSES 15.1 CONDITION I - NORMAL OPERATION AND OPERATIONAL TRANSIENTS 15.1-1 15.2 CONDITION II - INCIDENTS OF MODERATE FREQUENCY 15.2-1 15.3 CONDITION III - INFREQUENT INCIDENTS 15.3-1 15.4 CONDITION IV - LIMITING FAULTS 15.4-1 15.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 15.5-1 15.5.1 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED LOSS OF A.C. POWER TO THE PLANT AUXILIARIES 15.5-1 15.5.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED WASTE GAS DECAY TANK RUPTURE 15.5-3
/~' 15.5.3 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 15.5-4 15.5.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED STEAM LINE BREAK 15.5-20 15.5.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 15.5-22 15.5.6 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED l FUEL EMNDLING ACCIDENT 15.5-24 l 15.5.7 LNVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED 1
ROD EJECTION ACCIDENT 15.5-25 15.
5.8 REFERENCES
15.5-29 APPENDIX 15A DOSE MODELS USED TO EVALUATE THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 15A-1 APPENDIX 15B SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF LOCA DOSE CALCULATIONS 15B-1 16.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS See separate document. 57 O xiii November 17, 1978
l i e f O f A k i i i A i 1 57 i 1 0 xiv November 17, 1978
SNP-20 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Page Section Title M
- 57 4
j i b G 17.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE l 17.1A QUALITY ASSURANCE DURING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 17.lA-1 17.1A.1 ORGANIZATION 17.1A-1 17.1A.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 17.1A-14 17.1A 3 DESIGN CONTROL 17.lA-15 ! 17.1A.4 PROCUREMENT DOCUbENT CONTROL 17 .1 A- 18 l20 17.1A.5 INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES, AND DRAWINGS 17.1A-19 17.1A.6 DOCUMENT CONTROL ' 17.1A-20 17.lA.7 CONTROL OF PURCHASED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, AND SERVICES 17.lA-21 17.1A.8 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF MATERIALS, PARTS, AND COMPONENTS 17.1A-23 17.1A.9 CONTROL OF SPECIAL PROCESSES 17 lA-23 17.1A.10 INSPECTION 17.1A-24 17.lA.11 TEST CONTROL 17.1A-25 17.1A.12 CONTROL OF MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT 17.1A-27 20 17.1A.13 RANDLING, STORAGE, AND SHIPPING 17.1A-27 17.1A.14 INSPECTION, TEST, AND OPERATING STATUS 17.1A-27 17.1A.15 N0NCONFORMING MATERI ALS, PARTS, OR COMPONENTS 17.1A-27 17.1A.16 CORRECTIVE ACTION 17.1A-28 17.1A.17 QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORD 17.1A-28 17.1A.18 AUDITS 17 . lA-28 O Novemb er 17, 1978 l xv i
SNP- 55 n TABLE OF CONTE:'T,5 (Continued) Section Title Pace 17.1B QUALITY ASSURANCE DURING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 17.1B-1 17.1B.1 ORGANIZATION 17.lR-5 17.1B.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 17.1B-11 17.1B.3 DESIGN CONTROL 17.1B-11 17.1B.4 PROCUREMENT DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1B-16 17.1B 5 INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES AND DRAWINGS 17.1S-19 17.1B.6 DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1B-20 17.1B.7 CONTROL OF PURCHASED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES 17.13 24 17.18.8 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF MATERIAL, PARTS AND COMPONENTS 17.1B-29 17.18.9 CONTROL OF SPECIAL PROCESSES 17.1B-31 17.18.10 INSPECTION 17.13-34 17.1B.11 TEST CONTROL 17.1B-37 17.18.12 CONTROL OF MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT 17.1B-39 17.10.13 llANDLING, STORAGE AND SHIPPING 17.1B-41 17.1B.14 INSPECTIONS, TESTS AND OPERATING STATUS 17.1B-43 17.1B.15 NONCONFORMING MATERI AL, PARTS OR COMPONENTS 17.1B-44 17.1B.16 CORRECTIVE ACTION 17.1B-47 17.10.17 QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORDS 17.1B-49 17.1B.18 AUDITS 17.1B-50 ) 17.1B.19 REFERENCES 17.1B-55 17.2 . QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM FOR STATION OPERATION 17.2-1 55 xvi July 28, 1978
l I TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Section Title Page ! j 14.2.3 PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND AUTHORITIES 14.2-3 14.2.4 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS 14.2-3 15.0 ACCIDENT ANALYSES I l 15.1 CONDITION I - NORMAL OPERATION AND OPERATIONAL l TRANSIENTS 15.1-1 l l 15.2 CONDITION II - INCIDENTS OF MODERATE FREQUENCY 15.2-1 15.3 CONDITION III - INFREQUENT INCIDENTS 15.3-1 15.4 CONDITION IV - LIMITINC FAULTS 15.4-1 l 15.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 15.5-1 15.5.1 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULAfED LOSS OF A.C. POWER TO THE PLANT AUXILIARIES 15.5-1 15.5.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED WASTE GAS DECAY TANK RUPTURE 15.5-3 15.5.3 Gi ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 15.5-4 15.5.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED STEAM LINE BREAK 15.5-20 15.5.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 15.5-22 15.5.6 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT 15.5-24 15.5.7 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED ROD EJECTION ACCIDENT 15.5-25 15.
5.8 REFERENCES
15.5-29 APPENDIX 15A DOSE MODELS USED TO EVALUATE TIE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 15A-1 APPENDIX 15B SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF LOCA DOSE CALCULATIONS 15B-1 16.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS See separate document. 57 O xiii Novemb e r 17, 1978
f i 4 ! I f i s ) i i l l 1 O i t i t i i 1 i l h. l i 1 l 57 , l I i 1 8 t a i 2 s i s i 4 4-i i W d l 2 9 f. . xiv November 17, 1978
..-... . . _ . . _ _ . ~ . . _ . - , -._ _. _. _ _ . _ _ . . _ . . .
1 SNP-20 l ( ~) (_) TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 1
- Title Page !
_S_e_c. t i o n l l 57 l l i l i l I / 'T 17.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE l
\~s) l l
17.1A QUALITY ASSURANCE DURING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 17.1A-1 l ) 17.1A.1 ORGANIZATION 17.1A-1 l 17.1A.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 17.lA-1% 4 17.1A.3 DESIGN CONTROL 17.1A-15 17.1A 4 PROCUREMENT DOCUKENT CONTROL 17.1A-18 l20 17.1A.5 INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES, AND DRAWINGS 17 lA-19 17.lA.6 DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1A-20 17.1A.7 CONTROL OF PURCHASED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, AND SERVICES 17.1A-21 17.1A.8 IDEN1IFICATION AND CONTROL OF MATERI ALS, PARTS, 4 AND COMPONENTS 17.1A-23 17.lA 9 CONTROL OF SPECIAL PROCESSES 17.lA-23
- 17.1A.10 INSPECTION 17.1A-24 17.1A.11 TEST CONTROL 17.lA-25 17.1A.12 CONTROL OF HEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT 17.1A-27 20 17.1A.13 FANDLING, STORAGE, AND SHIPPING 17.1A-27 17.1A.14 TNSPECTION, TEST, AND OPERATING STATUS 17.1A-27 17.lA.15 NONCONFORMING MATERI ALS, P ARTS, OR COMPONENTS 17.1A-27 17.1A.16 CORRECTIVE ACTION 17.1A-28 17.lA.17 QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORD 17.1A-28 17.1A.18 AUDITS 17 . l A-28 O
V Novemb er 17, 1978 xv
SNP- 55 f i
- ; TABLE OF CONTENTS (Conti aued)
Section Title Pace
- 17.1B QUALITY ASSURANCE DURING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 17.1B-1
! 17.1B.1 ORGANIZATION 17.1B-5 l 17.1B.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 17.1B-11 l 17.1B.3 DESIGN CONTROL 17.1B-11 l 17.1B.4 PROCUREMENT DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1B-16 ,
- 17.1B.5 INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES AND DRAh'INGS 17.1B-19 l 17.1B.6 DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1B-20 l
g 17.1B.7 CONTROL OF PURCHASED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND j SERVICES 17.1B-24 - l 17.1B.8 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF 11ATERIAL, PARTS AND I ! COSTONENTS 17.1B-29 I i 17.1B.9 CONTROL OF SPECIAL PROCESSES 17.1B-31 ! 17.1B.10 INSPECTION 17.1B-34 } 17.1B.11 TEST CONTROL 17.1B-37 4 17.1B.12 CONTROL OF MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT 17.1B-39 j 17.1B.13 HANDLING, STORAGE AND SHIPPING 17.1B-41 i 17.1B.14 INSPECTIONS, TESTS AND OPERATING STATUS 17.1B-43 l 17.1B.15 NONCONFORMING MATERIAL, PARTS OR COMPONENTS 17.1B-44 l 17.1B.16 CORRECTIVE ACTION 17.1B-47 l 17.1B.17 QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORDS 17.1B-49 ' 17.1B.18 AUDITS 17.18-50 17.1B.19 REFERENCES 17.13-55 ' i l 17.2 QUALITY ASSUR ANCE PROGRAM FOR STATION OPERATION 17.2-1 I i i i I 55 1 l I l 4 xv1 July 28, 1978
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Section Title Page 14.2.3 PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND AUTHORITIES 14.2-3 14.2.4 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS 14.2-3 15.0 ACCIDENT ANALYSES 15.1 CONDITION I - NORMAL OPERATION AND OPERATIONAL TRANSIENTS 15.1-1 15.2 CONDITION II - INCIDENTS OF MODERATE FREQUENCY 15.2-1 15.3 CONDITION III - INFREQUENT INCIDENTS 15.3-1 15.4 CONDITION IV - LIMITING FAULTS 15.4-1 15.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 15.5-1 15.5.1 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED LOSS OF A.C. POWER TO THE PLANT AUXILIARIES 15.5-1 15.5.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED WASTE GAS DECAY TANK RUPTURE 15.5-3 15.5.3 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED O LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 15.5-4 15.5.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED STEAM LINE BREAK 15.5-20 15.5.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 15.5-22 15.5.6 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT 15.5-24 15.5.7 ENVIRONMLNTAL CONSEQUENCES OF A POSTULATED ROD EJECTION ACCIDENT 15.5-25 15.
5.8 REFERENCES
15.5-29 APPENDIX 15A DOSE MODELS USED TO EVALUATE THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 15A-1 APPENDIX 15B SEF9ITIVITY ANALYSIS OF LOCA DOSE CALCULATIONS 15B-1 16,.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS See separate document. 57 O xiii November 17, 1978
l i i l 8 l l 1 - l l 0\ 1 l l l l t J 4 d 1 I e t l 4 i i 1 1 4 i 1 l i 1 a 1 i 1 4
- 57 i
4 5 1 4 J l l , l 4 l 1' 1 4 1 l 1 l l l 1 .,i 4 ] 1 1 l l i i xiv November 17, 1978 l
SNP-20 A . k_,) TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Section Title Page I l 1 l 57 , l l l l l I'T 17.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE O 17.1A 1UALITY ASSURANCE DURING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 17.1A-1 17.1A.1 ORGANIZATION 17.1A-1 17.1A.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 17.1A-14 17.1A.3 DESIGN CONTROL 17.1A-15 17.1A.4 PROCUREMENT DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1 A- 18 l20 17.1A.5 INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES, AND DRAWINGS 17.1A-19 17.1A 6 DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.]A-20 17.1A 7 CONTROL OF PURCHASED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, AND SERVICES 17.1A-21 17.1A.8 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF MATERIALS, PARTS, AND COMPONENTS 17.1A-23 17.1A.9 CORfROL OF SPECIAL PROCESSES 17.lA-23 17.1A.10 INSPECTION 17.1A-24 17.1A.11 TEST CONTROL 17.1A-25 17.1A.12 CONTROL OF MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT 17.lA-27 20 17.1A.13 RANDLING, STORAGE, AND SHIPPING 17.1A-27 17.1A.14 INSPECTION, TEST, AND OPERATING STATUS 17.lA-27 17.1A.15 NONCONFORMING MATERI ALS, PARTS, OR COMPONENTS 17.1A-27 17.1A.16 CORRECTIVE ACTION 17.1A-28 17.1A.17 QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORD 17.1A-28 17.1A.18 AUDITS 17 .1 A-2 8 ( November 17, 1978 xy l
SNP- 55 TABLE OF CO:ITENTS (Continued) Section Title Page 17.1B QUALITY ASSURANCE DURING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 17.1B-1 17.1B.1 ORGANIZATION 17.1B-5 17.1B.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 17.1B-11 17.1B.3 DESIGN CONTROL 17.1B-11 17.1B.4 PROCUREMENT DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1B-16 17.13.5 INSTRUCTIONS, PROCEDURES AND DRAh'INGS 17.15-19 17.1B.6 DOCUMENT CONTROL 17.1B-20 17.1B.7 CONTROL OF PURCilASED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES 17.13 24 17.1B.8 IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF MATERIAL, PARTS AND COMPONENTS 1/.1B-29 17.1B.9 CONTROL OF SPECIAL PROCE SSES 17.1B -31 17.1B.10 INSPECTION 17.13-34 17.1B.11 TEST CONTROL 17.1B .' 17.1B.12 CONTROL OF MEASURING AND TEST EQUIPMENT 17.1E-17.1D.13 HANDLING, STORAGE AND SHIPPING 17.1B-17.1B.14 INSPECTIONS, TESTS AND OPERATING STATUS 17.1P 17.18.15 NONCONEORMING MATERIAL, PARTS OR COMPONENTS 17.1' 17.1B.16 CORRECTIVE ACTIO:; 17. / 17.1B.17 QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORDS 17. ,9 17.1D.18 AUDITS 17.1B-50 17.1B.19 REFERENCES 17.13-55 17.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM FOR STATION OPERATIE 17.2-1 55 6 l xv1 July 28, 1978
1 SNP-57 15.4 CONDITION IV - LIMITING FAULTS Condition IV occurrences are faults which are not expected to take place, l but are postulated because their consequences would include the potential 57 l l or the release of significant amounts of radioactive caterial. These are ' the most drastic which must be designed against and thus represent limiting design cases. Condition IV faults are not to cause a fission product release to the environment resulting in aa undue risk to public health and saf ety in excess of guideline values of 10 CFR Part 100. A single Condition IV fault is not to cause a consequential loss of required functions of systems ; needed to cope with the fault including those of the Emergency Core Cooling System and the containment. For the purposes of this report the following f aults have been classified in this category:
- 1. Major rupture of pipes containing reactor coolant up to and including double ended rupture of the largest pipe in the Reactor Coolant System (loss of coolant accident).
- 2. 11ajor secondary ejetam pipe ruptures.
- 3. S team generator tube rupture.
- 4. Single reactor coolant pump locked rotor.
- 5. Fuel handling accident.
\s / 6. Rupture of a concrol rod mechanism housing (rod cluster control assembly ej ec t io n) .
The analysis of thyroid and whole body doses, resulting f rom events leading to fission product release, appears later in the Safety Analysis Report. The fission product inventories which f orm a basis f or these calcula tions are presented in Chapter 11 and Section 15.1. The Safety Analysis Report also includes the discussion of systems interdependency contributing to limiting fission produc t leakages f rom the containment following a Condition IV occurrence. (D U November 17, 1978 15.4-1 tva-40
SNP 57 15.4.1 HAJOR REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PIPE RUPTURES (LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT) The analysis specified by 10CFR50.46 " Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light Water Nuclear Power Reac tors", is presented in this sec t ion . The re sults of the loss of coolant accident analyses are shown in Tables 15.4-4c and 15.4-4d and show compliance with the Acceptance Criteria. The description of the various aspec ts of the LOCA analysis is given in Re fer-ence 33. The differences between the approved non-UHI Appendix K model and the model used for these analyses are re por te d in WCAP-8479, Revision 2. 37 Additional model changes as specified in the Staff SER on UHI ECCS Evaluation Model are also available. The boundary considered for loss of coolant accidents is the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) or any line connected to the system up to the first closed valve. Should a major break occur, depressurization of the Reactor Coolant System results in a pressure decrease in the pressurizer, Reactor trip signal occurs when the pressurizer low pressure trip setpoint is reached. A Safety Injec-tion System signal is actuated when the appropriate setpoint is reached. The se countermeasure s will limit the consequences of the accident in two ways:
- 1. Reactor trip and borated water injec tion complement void formation in causing rapid reduc tion of power to a residual level corresponding to fission product decay heat.
- 2. Injec tion of borated water provides heat transfer from core and prevents excessive clad temperature.
At the beginning of the blowdown phase, the entire Reactor Coolant System contains subcooled liquid which transfers heat f rom the core by forced convec-tion with some fully developed nucleate boiling. After the break develops, the time to departure f om nucleate boiling is calculated, consistent with Appendix K of 10CFR50[l . Thereaf ter the core heat transfer is based on local conditions with transition boiling and forced convection to steam as the major heat transfer mechanism. 57 When the Reac tor Coolant System pressure falls below approximately 1250 psia the upper head injection accumultors begin to inject borated water directly into the reac tor upper head region. Th is wa t e r is direc ted from the upper head directly to all but 8 peripheral assembly in the core via the RCC guide tubes and UHI support co luran s . This flow provides additional core cooling during the blowdown phase of the transient. 1 i 1 1 0 15.4-2 November 17, 1978
I SNP- 57 1 1 l A When the Reactor Coolant System pressure falls below 400 psia the cold leg l () accumulators begin to inject borated water. The conservative assumption is made that accumulator water injected bypasses the core and goes out through ( the break until the termination of bypass. This conservatism is again con- ; sistent with Appendix K of 10CFR50. 15.4.1.1 Thermal Analysis l 15.4.1.1.1 Westinghouse Performance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Syst_em l 50 j The reactor is designed to withstand thermal ef fects caused by a loss of cool-ant accident including the double ended severance of the largest Reactor Cool- ( i ant System pipe. The reactor core and internals together with the F.mergency l Core Cooling System are designed so that the reactor can be safely shutdown and the essential heat transfer geometry of the core preserved following the I accident. I The Eme:gency Core Cooling System, even when operating during the injection mode with the severe single active failure is designed to meet the Accep-tance Criteria i 15.4.1.1.2 Method of Thermal Analysis ' The description of the various aspects of the LOCA analysis is given in WCAP-8339l333 This document describes the major phenomena modeled, the interfaces n among the computer codes and features of the codes which maintain compliance Q wi h the Acceptance Criteria. Dynamic steam cooling is inc1tded in the LOCTA-IV 38]. Calculation and all the differences between the approved Non-URI 57 i Westinghouse Appendix K Model and the model used for these analyses are reported in WCAP-8749, Revision 2. The thermal analyses reported in this section were performed with an upper head fluid temperature based on T accumu-eold, lator pressure set point ensures UHI actuation prior to upper head fluid flash-lug. 15.4.1.1.3 Containment Analysis The containment pressure analysis is performed with the LOTIC code. The transient pressure computed by the LOTIC code can be input to the WREFLOOD code for the purpose of computing the reflood transient. For the analyses presented in this report the containment backpressure used is given in Table 15.4-4g; except for the 0.6 DECLG 57 IMP mix break which utilized the containment pressure transient shown in Figure 15.4-17. The containment data used in the containment pressure analysis to determine the ECCS backpressure is presented in Tables 15.4-2 and 15.4-3. 15.4-3 November 17, 1978 p () i l l l
SNP- 57 l l l l The mass and energy release rates used for the containment backpressure cal-culation as a function of time during blowdown, is given in Table 15.4-4 l l 15.4.1.1.4 Results of Large Break Spectrum l l The following 4 breaks were investigated in this analysis: 1.0 double ended cold leg break (C = 1.0) , imp mix D 0.6 double ended cold leg break (C = 0. 6) , per mix ! D 0.4 double ended cold leg break (C = 0.4) , imp mix D 0.6 double ended cold leg break (C D
= 0.6), imp mix ]
Figure 15.4-1 depicts the SATAN control volume scheme and can be utilized as a reference for the transient results. The transient results are presented in Figures 15.4-2a through 15.4-15d for the 4 breaks as listed above. The following nomenclature applies: per mix - perfect mixirg in upper head during UHI imp mix - imperf ect mixing in upper head during UHI i I pressure in el 1 - core pressure ) l Z - flow rate in el 1, ? - flowrate at lower half and midplane of core l 50 l Z - flowrate in el 3, 4 - flowrate at upper half and top of core 1c. pha. void in el 1, 2 - void fraction in lower half of core l 1c. pha. void in el 3, 4 - void fraction in upper half of core 1 Z - flowrate in el 43, 44 - flowrate from cold leg and UHI accumulators. l The time sequence of events for the analyses described below are shown in , Tables 15.4-4 a-b, Tables 15.4-4 c-d present the peak clad temperatures and l 57l bo t spot metal reaction for a spectrum of large break sizes. l The SATAN VI analysis of the loss of coolant accident is performed at 102 per-cent of the core licensed power. The core thermal transient is also performed 57 at this power level. The peak linear power, the peaking factor of the license application power level, and core power used in the analyses are given in Table 15.4-4 e and d. Since there is margin between the value of the peak linear power density used in this analysis and the value expected in op-eration, a lower peak clad temperature would be obtained by using the peak linear power density expected during operation. l l l l 15.4-4 November 17, 1978
I i 1 l SNP- 57 l l k The plant parameters used in this analysis are listed in Table 15.4-4h. The f I net effect of these input parameters is conservative for the LOCA analysis for the following reasons: I t i 1. Initial system conditions are chcsen so as to maximize stored energy in j the RCS and fuel, i
- 2. Cold leg accumulator parameters are selected to minimize the rate of 57 l l
ECC delivery and maximize the period of steam / water mixing AP during l reflood, f 3. UHI volumes are selected to maximize the upper heac'. reheat time for the ! perfect mixing case and minimize the UHI system's contribution to core cooling for the imperfect mixing case. i I 4 i 1 i } . i 1 l 1 i i J i i l 1 i 4 l i 15.4-4a November 17, 1978 i k 4 l h 1 s l
, e . - - - - - - - . , . . . , - . - < - - . - w,.- , .~.-'.,,-.~'.-v -..-.,-e,-..--..,-.--.--w-ww-=---.m.-w -.--.,w--.--...-+,..-*---r- *w,rw-,--enw-v
4
- SNP- 57 I
l () For the results discussed below, the hot spot is defined to be the location of maximum peak clad temperature. This locatian is given in Tables 15.4-4 l c and d for each break size analyzed. Figures 15.4-2a through 15.4-16d present the transients for the principal para-I meters for the break sizes analyzed. The following items are noted: 1 Figures 15.4-2a The following quantities are presented at the clad burst I through 15.4-4d location and at the hot spot (location of maximum clad tem- 50 l
- pcrature) both on the hottest fuel rod (hot rod)
- 1. fluid quality
- 2. mass velocity
- 3. heat transfer coefficient.
The heat transfer coefficient shown is calculated by the LOCTA IV code. Figures 15.4-Sa The system pressure shown is the calculated pressure in the l 57 through 15.4-9d core. Core flowrates, and core void fraction are also pre-i sented. Figures 15.4-10a These figures show the hot spot clad tenperature transient 50 through 15.4-12d and the clad temperature transient at the burst location. () 4 The fluid temperature shown is also for the hot spot and burst location. The nodal notation of the figures is de- {
's ' fined in Table 15.4-4f.
Figures 15.4 13a These figures show the core reflood transient. l 57 through 15.4-13d i Figures 15.4-14a These figures show the Emergency Core Cooling System for all l 57 l through 15.4-15d cases analyzed. Both UHI and cold leg accumulators flow rates l are included in the figures. As described earlier the cold leg accumulator delivery during blowdown is discarded until l the end of bypass is calculated. Cold leg accumulator flow, + however, is established in refill reflood calculations. The i cold leg accumulator flow assumed is the sum of that injec-ted in the intact cold legs. 50 { j
- Figures 15.4-16a These figures show the total cold leg accumulator mass injec-through 15.4-16d tion prior to end of bypass, accumulator nass spilled out
, break, calculated bypass deficit, and vessel inventory. 4 l C 15.4-5 November 17, 1978
l SNP-57 l 57 l The containment pre ss ure transient for the worst case (Cp = 0.6, impe r fec t mixing) is presented in Figure 15.4-17. This curve verifies that the back-pre s s u re as given in Table 15.4-4g is indeed conservative for the cases 57l applied. Figure 15.4-18 shows the heat removal rates of the lower compartment heat sinks; the heat transfer model used is described in Reference 37. Figure 15.4-19 gives the flowrate exiting the ice condenser drains. Figure 15.4-20 presents the te mpera t ure transients in both the upper and lower compartments. l Figures 15.4-21 and 15.4-22 illustrate the heat removal rates by the sump and the ice condenser drains. The total heat removal rate in the lower compart-ment is the summation of the rates given in Figures 15.4-18, 15.4-21 and 15.4-22. The results of the break spectrum show that the double ended cold leg guillo-57 l tine break, with a discharge coe f ficient of 0.6 and imperfect mixing in the upper head is the worst break in terms of peak clad temperature. Due to the variances in UHI accumulator volume delivery as outlined in Table 15.4-4e, the worst break (Cp = 0.6) was subsequently run with a difference in volume delivery between the per fec t (1056 f t3) and imperfec t mixing case (930 ft3). The band applied in the Sequoyah ECCS analysis is developed as a l bound to the possible variation in the total UHI water delivered. Variation in total delivery is postulated to result from two causes: variation which results f rom measurement error and the uncertainty associated with system per formance and variation which results from a single failure in the UHI 57 system. t Each source of variation in total UHI delivery and its associated volume uncertainty is given in Table 15.4-4e. These are applied to the nominal set-l point to obtain maximum and minimum delevery values. The volume variation associated with single f a ilu re results from a postulated system malfunction ! and is ap >1ied direc tly to the nominal setpoint. The remaining sources of volume uncertainty are the result of system uncertainties. It is therefore appropriate to consider a statis tical treatment for their application. These uncertainties are combined statistically by applying a Monte Carlo evaluation of the five remaining volume variations listed in Table 15.4-4e. Cases pre-sented herein provide the results of a conservative application of this range of values. In addition, UHI volume deliveries for each case presented herein will differ somewhat due to variation in UHI flowrate during the time of iso-lation valve closure and be dependent on discharge coefficient assumed. The imperfect mixing case was run utilizing the information of Table 15.4-4e to develope a low delivery volume since the upper head drains earlier in the transient and subsequently voids the lower plenum and core, thereby represent-ing a conservative case. The imper fec t mixing case was also run at a higher pressure (1300 psia) than the perfect mixing case (1200 psia) to allow for a +_ 50 psi, uncertainty in accumulator setpoint pressure. Similarly, the high p re s s u re for the imperfect mixing case represents the most conservative case since the smaller accumulator volume would be delivered in a shorter amount of time and earlier in the blowdown transient, thereby providing for a longer core heatup time. O 15.4-6 November 17, 1978
SNP-57 /\ 15.4.1.1.5 Conclusions - Thermal Analysis V For cases considered, the Emergency Core Cooling System will meet the Accep-tance Criteria as presented in 10CFR50.46. That is:
- 1. The calculated peak fuel element clad tempera ture provides margin to the requirement of 22000F, based on an Fq value of 2.25. l 57
- 2. The amount of fuel element cladding that reacts chemically with water or steam does not exceed 1 percent of the total amount of Zircaloy in the reactor.
- 3. The clad temperature transient is terminated at a time when the core geo-metry is still amenabic to cooling. The clad oxidation limits of 17 per-cent are not exceeded during or after quenching.
- 4. The core temperature is reduced and decay heat is removed for an extended 50 period of time, as required by the long-lived radioactivity remaining in the core.
The time sequence of events for all breaks analyzed is shown in Table 15.4-1. / i N l v i 15.4-7 No 7embe r 17, 19 78
! l a \ SNP-50 ( ) i G 8 Pages 15.4-8 through 15.4-34 I l (Intentionally left blank) 1 i t .f i l I i l l I l O l l O 15.4-8 January 31, 1978 _ - . , . , - - ..\
SNP-57
- 37. Hsieh, T., and Raymund, M., "Long Term Ice Condenser Containment LOTIC Code Supplement 1, "WCAP-8355 Supplement 1, May 1975, WCAP-8345 (Pro- 50 prietary), July 1974.
- 38. Eiche1dinger, C., " Westinghouse ECCS Evaluation Model February 1978 Version," WCAP-9221, February 1978, WCAP-9220 (Proprietary), February, 57 1978.
N 15.4-62a November 17, 1978
4 i Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 O (,,,) TABLE 15.4-2 SEQUOYAH CONTAINHENT DATA REQUIRED FOR ECCS EVALUATION ICE CONDENSER CONTAINFENT I. Conservatively High Estimate of Containment Net Free Volume The distribution between upper, lower and dead ended compartments should also be given. I. CONTAINMENT VOLU!E IN FT Upper Compartment 651,000 l l Lower Compartment 271,400 Ice Condenser 181,400 l Dead End Compartments (Include all accumulator rooms, both f an compart- ) ments, instrument room, pipe tunnel) 129,900 1,233,700 ( II. Initial Conditions A. Lowest Operational Containment Pressure -0.1 PSI B. Highest Operational Containment Temperature for 110
- F UC the Upper, Lower and Dead Ended Compartments 120 F LC 120*F DE C. Lowest Refueling Water Storage Tank Temperature 60'F -
D. Lowest Service Water Temperature 37'F E. Lowest Temperature Outside Containment 5F F. Lowest Initial Spray Temperature 60 F G. Ice Condenser Temperature Max.+15*F H. Lowest Annulus Temperature 40 F
- Maximum operational temoeratures (minimum air mass and minimum peak air pressure).
i 15.4-67 i' ~
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 TABLE 15.4-2 (Continued) (% (,,) III. Structural Heat Sinks A. For Each Surface
- 1. Description of Surface
- 2. Conservatively High Estimate of Area Exposed to See Table 2,3,4 Containment Atmosphere
- 3. Location in Containment by Compartment B. For Each Separate Layer of Each Surface
- 1. Material
- 2. Conservatively Large Estimate of Layer Thickness See Table 3
- 3. Conservatively High Value of flaterial Conductivity See Table 3
- 4. Conservatively High Value of Volumetric Heat Capacity See Table 3 IV. Spray System l l
A. Runout Flow for a Spray Pump ***(Containment Spray) 7700 gpm p,, B. Number of Spray Pumps Operating With No Diesel Failure 2/ Unit l C. Number of Spray Pumps Operating With One Diesel Failure 1/ Unit D. Fastest Post Accident Initiation of Spray System 0 secs. V. Deck Fan Fastest Post Accident Initiation of Deck Fans 10 mins. B. Conservatively High Flow Rate Per Fan 42,000 cfm VI. Conservatively Low Hydrogen Skimmer System Flow Rate 100/ea efm
*** Runout flow is for a break immediately downstream of the pump.
Or k,- - 15.4-68 i
"- -* - -- *+ = - ,, . . . . . _ , _ - _ _ , . , , _ , _
k l Revised by Amendment 5 7, November 17, 1978 TABLE 15.4-4 ) /~'N MASS AND ENERGY RELEASE RATES l \,) . C = 0.6 IMP MIX d i time in e j (sec) (1b/sec) (BTU /SEC)
- 0. .9894E+04 .5282E+07
.20C0E+01 .4945E+05 .2661E+08 i .40C0E+01 .3442E+05 .1886E+08
- .6001E+01 .2905E+05 .1656E+08
, .80C0E+01 .2620E+05 .1504E+08
.1000E+02 .2148E+05 .1275E+08
.1200E+02 .1738E+05 .1052E+08
.1240E+02 .1738E+05 .1052E+08
.1400E+02 .1640E+05 .9703E+07
.1500E+02 .1483E+05 .8756E+07
.1600E+02 .1344E+05 .8085E+07
.1700E+02 .1270E+05 .7539E+07
.1800E+02 .ll67E+05 .6966E+07 l
.1900E+02 .1064E+05 .6331E+07
.2000E+02 .9579E+04 .5704E+07
.2100E+02 .8325E+04 .4925E+07 i .2200E+02 .6786E+04 .3746E+07
.2300E+02 .5807E+04 .3027E+07
.2400E+02 .3866E+04 .2199E+07
() f-~~
.2500E+02
.2600E+02
.3591E+04
.3193E+04
.3102E+04
.1948E+07
.1670E+07
.1539E+07
- .2700E+02 4
.2800E+02 .3449E+04 .1524E+07
.2900E+02 .3695E+04 .1532E+07
.3000E+02 .4131E+04 .1528E+07
.3100E+02 .4776E+04 .1631E+07
.3600E+02 .3687E+04 .9513E+06
.4100E+02 .3385E+04 .8172E+06
.4600E+02 .1301E+04 .2421E+06
.5100E+02 .8392E+03 .1365E+06
.5600E+02 .8146E+03 .1314E+06
.6100E+02 .7940E+03 .1278E+06
.6600E+02 .7825E+03 .1348E+06
.6921E+02 .1930E+03 .5404E+06
.6966E+02 .2075E+03 .2412E+05
.7016E+02 .2070E+03 .2348E+05
.7051E+02 .2041E+03 .1969E+05
.7081E+02 .2070E+03 .2343E+05
.7111E+02 .2060E+03 .2214E+05
.7395E+02 .2102E+03 .2753E+05
.8082E+02 .2194E+03 .3940E+05
.8857E+02 .2023E+04 .2406E+06
.1008E+03 .2199E+04 .2605E+06
.1211E+03. .5792E+03 .1940E+06
/N .1398E+03 .6010E+03 .1653E+06 (ss) .1894E+03 .6199E+03 .1872E+06
.2508E+03 .6306E+03 .1745E+06 15.4-69d
j-l. I' Deleted by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 a i 4. 1 !O i l TABLE 15.4-4 (Continued) l i l i f i 1 1 a i i i i I i0 I I l i i 0 15.4-69e 1
--,_..,._m...-,,-. . . ~ - - - . ...m. . . , . . . . - - . . - . , . . . . . - . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . - _ . _ - . . . ._.-._____.______..--..-.___.i
O O O Revised by Amendment 57, Novecher 17, 1973 TABLE 15.4-4a LARGE BREAK TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IMPERFECT MIXING DECLG (C ' D
~
D D (Sec) (Sec) (Sec) START 0.0 0.0 0.0 Reactor Trip Signal 1.75 1.74 1.76 S. I. Signal 4.7 4.8 9.0 Acc. Injection (Upper Head) 1.82 1.82 2.79 End of Blowdown 66.9 71.8 22.6 Bottom of Core Recovery 66.9 71.8 82.6 Acc. Delivery Completed (Upper Head) 20.1 23.1 26.1 Pump Injection 29.7 29.8 30.0 Acc. Injection (Cold Leg) 15.7 19.9 25.7 End of Bypass 47.9 48.0 62.0 Accumulator Empty 114.4 120.2 129.5 (Cold Leg) 15.4-69f
1 Revised by Amendmerit 57, November 17, 1973 i TABLE 15.4-4b LARGE BREAK ] TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS l l PERFECT MIXING I . DECLC (C D
= 0.6) j (Sec) !
- j. !
, START 0.0 t Reac tor Trip Signal 1.74 l S. I. Signal 4.8 Acc. Injection (Upper Head) 2.62 End of Blowdown 128.0 Bottom of Core Recovery 128.0 ' .Acc. Delivery Completed (Upper Head) 26.3 Pump Injection 29.8 Acc. Injection (Cold Leg) 19.4 i End of Bypass 58.0 Accumulator Empty 128.9 , ! (Cold Leg) 6 l I i 9 i 15.4-69g
D
)
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 TABLE 15.4-4c LARGE BREAK IMPERFECT MIXING DECLC (C " * * ~ D D D Results Peak Clad Temp. F 2116 2190 1641 Peak Clad Location Ft. 7.5 7.5 7.0 Local Zr/H O2 Reaction (max)% 5.694 7.634 0.768 Local Zr/H2 O L cation Ft. 7.5 7.5 7.5 Total Zr/H O2 Reaction % <0.3 <0.3 <0.3 Hot Rod Burst Time sec 58.7 65.2 Burst did not occur Hot Rod Burst Location Ft. 6.0 7.0 Burst did not occur Calculation Licensed Core Power (Mwt) 102% of 3411 Peak Linear Power kw/ft 102% of 12.5 Peaking Factor (At License Rating) 2.25 Accumulator Water Volume (Cold Leg) (Nominal Value) 1050 FT (per accumulator) Accumulator Water Volume (UHI, Nominal Volume) 900 FT I 15.4-69h
O O O Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 TABLE 15.4-4d LARGE BREAK t PERFECT MIXING DECLG (C ' D Results Peak Clad Temp. F 2111 Peak Clad Location Ft. 7.5 Local Zr/H 2O Reaction (max)% 4.067 Local Zr/H2O Location Ft. 7.5 Total.Zr/H O Reactor % <0.3 2 Hot Rod Burst Time sec 72.8 Hot rod Burst Location Ft. 6.0 Calculation Core Licensed Power (Mwt) 102% of 3411 Peak Linear Power kw/ft 102% of 12.5 Peaking Factor (At License Rating) 2.25 Accumulator Water Volume (Cold Leg) Available (Nominal Value) 1050 FT (per accumulator) Accumulator Water Volume (UHI, Nominal Volume) 1056 15.4-691
1 l l Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 o s 1 i TABLE 15.4-4e l l UHI WATER VOLUFE Source Associated Volume ft l Single Failure Train Failure +55 One Valve Closes Prematurely -51 l Tank Level Instrumentation Accuracy 1 2.2 l Tank Volume Tolerance + 19. . Instrument Setting Tolerance 1 2.0 Hydraulic Isolation Valve Stroking Time 1 12. , l l
/"'g Tank Level Reading Accuracy l 1 11. l Total Error 198.4 Total Error at .95 Probability 156.
b V 15.4-69j
l
/dded by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 TABLE 15.4-4 f
+
NODAL REPRESENTATION OF CORE TRANSIENTS Elevation from Elevation from
" Node" Bottom of Core ( f t. ) " Node" Bottom of Core (ft.)
1 0 11 6.75 ; 2 1.5 12 7.00 3 3.0 13 7.25 , 4 4.0 14 7.50 1 1 5 5.0 15 7.75 6 5.5 16 8.00 7 5.75 17 9.00 8 6 18 10.5 9 6.25 19 12.0 10 6.50
+
Applicable to the term " nodes" in following figures
-O 15.4-69k
Added by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 TABLE 15.4-4g BACKPRESSURE TRANSIENT USED IN AN4 LYSIS (all breaks except 0.6 DECLG IMP) Time (Sec) Pressure (Psia) 1
- 0. 16.1 130. 15.5 l 180. 15.8
^ 500. 15.8 i 1 4 6 1 l 15.4-69L
Added by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 ("' t TABLE 15.4-4h , PLANT PARAMETERS USED IN LOCA ANALYSIS l Cold Leg Accumulator , Pressure 400. psia Minimum Water volume 3@ 1050. ft Nominal Temperature s 70. F. Minimum Line resistance 23. Nominal calculated i i j UHI Accumulator 3 i 1 Water volume delivered 900 - 1056 ft
- 1 Delivered water temperature 100. F Minimum l Line resistance 23. Nominal calculated i
j
% Initial Core t
[Y , J. flowrate 37270. Ib/sec Minimum 1 l Tempera ture (inlet) 548.1 F Maximum 1 l Pressure 2280. psia Maximum i i i }
~
i j.
*This range of delivered wator volume covers the variance of injected volume j listed in Table 15.4-4e. S 1ght variation in delivery volume between break canes is due to variations in L'HI flowrate during the isolation valve
/ ' closure' time.
2 V} 15.4-69m
Revised by Amendment 57, Novemtier 17, 1978 l l l I 3.s2 I -I i <
'v' l
l l l 1.25 I.00 -- C 5 M
$ 0.75 --
9 3 u. l'D 5 g 4 0.50 --
%d C
~
's o
0.25 - f 0 ! ! - 0 100 200 300 TIME (SECONOS) (3s.) Figure 15.4 2a. Fluid Quality - DECLG (CD = 1.0) , at? Mix Burst Node 8, Peak Mode 16 1
[i Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 1.25 1.00 rr - 7-u ),
$ I' .
S. a E 0.75 ;- f ! d , b i .
,]-
p
]
0.50 -
\
.f,
!s ! I o f 0.25 -
0 l I 0 100 200 300 TIME (SECONDS) Figure 15.4-2b. Fluid Quality - DECLG (C =0.6), Per Mix D Burst Node 8, Peak Node 14
_ ._. _ _. . . _ _ . ~ . . _ . _ _ _ Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 ( 3.b2 l -3 O l' l.25 1.00 ~ P 1 5 ' M i
$'0.75 --
l e 3 u. u [0,50 -- O R e d a ' O.25 - 0 l l 0 100 200 300 TlHE(SECONDS) l Figure 15.4-2c. Fluid Quality - DECLG (CD = 0.6), Imp Mix Burst Node 12, Peak Node 14 1
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 l l 3.52 l -4 fQ \b! l l l 1.25 l l 1.00 - - l l d
$ 0.75 I
o - l l u_ l (g'g o 0.50 --- ' c d E 0.25 -- l 0 l l l 0 100 200 300 TIME (SECONDS) i rm \ U Figure 15.4 2d. Fluid Quality - DECLG (CD = 0.41, EIP Mix Node 16, Peak Mode 12
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 9 13.52i-5 200 100 - I l C u'
/
% o i _
Y
$ I d.
C
/'T S Q @ -100 --
a E l l
-200 --
l l 1
-300 1 0 l00 200 300 TIME (SECONDS) e" %
Figure 15.4 3a. Mass Velocity - DECLG (CD = 1.0), IMP 'tix Burst Node 8, Peak Node 14 i l
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 l l l 200 100 - l d m
"b 5 e
{
$ 0 k - - ~
Y_ E 8 d g -100 - I
~ I 0 100 200 300 TIME (SECONDS)
Figure 15.4-3b. Mass Velocity - DECLG (CD = 0.6), Per M h Burst Node 8, Peak Node 14 I O l _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ _ - - 1
Revied by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 O 200 l00 - -
- )
is O n t 2 d. Os g -100 - G S W
<n y -200 -
-300 l l 100 200 300 TlHE(SECONDS)
O Figure 15.4 3c. Mass Velocity - DECLG (CD = 0.6). Irnp Mix, Burst Node 12, Peak Node 14
. Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 ym g i !3,521-e O 200 l G 100 - y l d ) c
- 3 h
s A - _ o E T/r . O s T W
$ -100 -
i -200 ! ! , 0 100 200 300 4 TlHE (SECONDS) 1 i l l
/N b
Figure 15.4-3d. Mass Velocity - DECLG (CD = 0.4 ) , IMP Mix Node 16, Peak Node 12
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 1 13.521-9
/~N l U '
1 4 10 - 5 - Er - l
% 2 -
l t , E co lO3 l
~
- i
> .=._
d 1 5 -- , w . I
< 2 ---
s i o 102 g;_ 2: _ W 5 s o - 1 ( <
- - 1 4
C/ b - g 8 a 2 - i e M m _ g 10' _ _ _
~
~
5 14 m ( 2 - 0 10 '
! l 0 100 200 300 TlHE(SECONDS)
{)N (, Figure 15.4 4a. Heat Transfer Coefficient -- DECLG (CD = 1.0) nro
, - J>. ix Burst tiode 8, Peak Node 14
l Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978
/N, I 3. $21 -10 l ku l 1
104 _
- =
4 g k5 ~
~
- u. -
N R m 2 - 14 3m 10 3 3 'Z v> 5 p __._ E 2
$ 10 2 S ,
b 5 - ys 0 - ' u cr _ ) i 2 12 \ M s i0' __ L H - 5 x 5 2 - 0 ' ' 10 0 100 200 300 TIME (SEC0Hos) Figure 15.4 4b. Heat Transfer Coef ficient - DECLG (CD = 0.6), Per Mix Burst Node 8, Peak Node 14 1
4 Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 s i 13.521-1i O
- 1 l
l C IO* o - ' g -
< 5 '
E 1 I 5 2 ' I 5 3
?a 10 ~
E w 5 ~ i M w 2 8
- e 2
n 10 5 O U 5 12 E
&a 2 ee -__ __ '
b 10' y 5 ' 2 10 0 l I l 0 100 200 300 400 TlHE (SECONDS) l l l Figure 15.4 4c. Heat Transfer Coef ficient - DECLG (C D - 0.6 ), imp Mix l Burst Node 12, Peak Node 14
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 I 1.4.521 - 2 f3
\
G' 10" __
=
~
5 ! E,
*;L. 2 _
tt 3
$ 10 :
I b 5 'I < w -- 2 -
$5 I
I02 =. l $ 2 i E 5 2 l v - ( c _ b g 2 - D g 10l _ r 5 = ; W 5 _- s _ z 2 ---- t i 100 I I O l00 200 300 \ TlHE (SECONDS) l { l l l n } (] Figure 15.4 4d. Heat Transfer Coef ficient - DECLG (CD = 0.4), IMP Mix Node 16, Peak Node 12
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978' I3.S21 ,j r J
'%J J
4 4 2500 i 2000 - 1 I I 1500 d 5 C E
,,,1 5
1000 - - %) e
- l 500 1
T i 0 50 75 100 0 25 TIME (SECONDS) e
<^s s) Figure 15.4-Sa RCS Pressure - DECLG (CD = 1.0) l
~
IlllfIl IllIl!l ;
? {-1 E Eo2@oy, : U 5s?ro C. 4 O Fn7I 0
5 1 5 I-2 1 x Mi r 0 e I- 0 P 1
),
6 0
=
D
)
S C ( D N G 5 E O C C L I 7 S E O ( E T M I D e r u s s e r P S C 0 R l 5 b 5 - 4 5 1 e r u ig F l 5 2
- - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 5 0 5 O 2 2 1 1 W80E I11
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 l I
.<.w->
I I O l l 1 1 l l 2500 4 2000 - 1 i w a t0 x o 500 - 0 25 50 75 100 0 TIME (SECONDS) r tj Figure 15.4 Sc. RCS Pressure -- DECLG (CD = 0.6), Imp Mix
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 1
'l% ) 13,521 16 1
i l l l l 2500 2000 - 1500 W 8 O b V h 1000 - 500 - 0 ! ! 0 25 50 75 l00 TIME (SEC0HOS) O
\vl Figure 15.4 Sd. RCS Pressure - DECLG (C D - 0.4) i I
i t
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 13.521-i? O i 00 i 0.75 - 0.50 - o 0.25 - x t g o - _ l I
-0.25 -
-0.50 -
-0.75 -
-l.00 ! l 0 25 50 75 TlHE (SECONOS) f] Figure 15.4 6a. Flow Rate - DECLG (CD = 1.0)
Lower Half of Core
~ - - ,,e- , ---
- ,, - . , , , + -n , - , , , > - , , e w r- e-,v,.,,,-. -~u.- . -
i -
-r t
1.00- ! -0.75 - 1 ? 1 !- 0.50 - i ~ i 4 ' i
, 0.25 -
o_ i l w C - _ _~ fu _ _ - - ,- - ,_=:. , - :: - m r -
- x-o .
8 a . LA *
' N
-0.25- -
t
-0.50 -
m -
< l
. s-- !' i = a - c.
- -0.75 -
e M i' l i :' N, i
-1.00 l ' l ' is C
- 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 8
- s f
i TIME (SECONDS) u u .
#4 i
- z. ,
e o ,. Figure 15.4 6b. Core Flow Rate - DECLG (CD = 0.6). Per Mix y % > 9
,x w s Lower Half of Core o 4 n ;
, M
=
Y W \ 4 . M
- 2 CD
' tv _m _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _
, . . ~ l Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 i 13.521-19 i i 1.00 a.
- 0.75- -
J 0.50 -
)
. , 0.25 o i x l l cr 0 y - - i t d l 4 -0.25 - I t f, -0.50 - v , -0.75 - 4 1
-1.00 !
i 0 25 50 75 TlW (SECONDS) l 4 i ) l $~ e 4 Figure 15.4-6c.. Core Flow Rate - DECLG (CD = 0.6), imp Mix Lower Hall of Core 4 h
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 ; I l l i3.S21 20 a i i
- I i !
- l
} f 1
)
i ! ! 1.00 0.75 - 1
/
l l l i } 1 0.50 -{ 1 l , 0.25 ' )-I
- 9 I
- W D I k - - ---- I h sm
.-k4 h ;
i ; 4 -0.25 - l .y
-0.50 - ,
l l 2 -0.75 - 1 2 d I I I
-1.00 0 25 50 75 l00 TIME (SECONDS)
O , Figure 15.4 6d Core Flow Rate - DECLG (CD ~ 0,41 Lower Half of Core
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 4 s 'r 13.521 21 i
- l.00 0.75 -
1 l l 0.50 -.- 1 1 4
, 0.25 --
o id 0 --h l O ; u.. 1 4: pr 4 -0.25 -
-0.50 -
-0.75 -
-l.00 l l 0 25 59 75 TlHE (SECOND5)
O Figure 15.4-7a. Core Flow Rate - DECLG (CD = 1.0) Upper Half of Core
O O O l.00 - L 0.75 -- O.50 - - u
, 0.25- - -
- 9. k
- 0 -
V F
*^
A yW y A A bl* - a a vj v ~ v - u. a N
-0.25 -
- n i m
,- -0.50 - t m
- o-w
-0 75 - M I
m + i 5.
- 1. 'X) l l f l 0 25-50 75 100 125 150 m
~ ,
- TIME (SECONDS) -' '
z o m i g w w Figure 15.4-76. Core Flow Rate - DECLG (CD = 0.6), Per Mix 'y
- Upper Half of Core 4
C i W w
~
03 I
! Revised by Amendment 57,- November 17, 1978 i 13.521-23 l 1 l< 4
- .l.00
- 1 I 0.75 -
i i l 4 1 O.50 - i f j , 0.25 4 2 j- x. l W 0 , k ^- ._ i N l l L j N -0.25 - , l I . i a ! -0.50 - l
-0.75 -
i
-l.00
'O 25 50 75 TlHE (SECONDS) i l
E Figure 15.4 7c. Core Flow Rate - DECLG (CD = 0.6). Imp Mix Upper Half of Core l 1 l
, , , . _ , - _ . _ _ .- -_...-..._.l
, j 1 Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978.
. \
O 13.521-i4 t I i l I 1 l I.00 3 l l 0.75 -- 0.50 -
}
J g 0.25 U- ,
\\
x \ i
< 0 1 O ' l \
)W{- = _
N 0.25 - !
.-0.50 --
[ l I
-0.75 - f 1
-l.00 ! ! !
0 25 50- 75 100 l TIME (SECONDS) l l i i I d- Figure 15.4 7d Core Flow Rate DECLG (CD = 0.4) Upper llalf of Core l
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 I3.521-25 i O i 1.25 E l I.00
'-{ - - -Q u
9 0.75 -f p S , U d E i N 0.50 '- i O.25 0 l l l 0 25 50 75 100 TlHE (SECONDS) l Figure 15.4 8a. Void Fraction - DECLG (CD = 1.0F ( l Lower Half of Core 1 l
L 1.25 1.00 - - i 9 0.75 o 4 r CL i 5 0.50 - 1 k x a 0.25 - E' a c-M .i 0 l l l l l 2 E. 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 3
- s
, TIME (SECONDS) . v i M 4 z i e o Figure 15.4-8b. Void Fract.on - DECLG (CD = 0.6), Per Mix o
~ 9 m e Lower Half of Core m
< n i >-. M q < e N
'l i
4
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 } 3.521-27 O 4 1 i 1.25 4 1.00 - l
- l c 0.75 0 :i 3 0.50 - -
0.25 - 0 ! I 0 25 50 75 100 TlHE(SECONDS) Figure 15.4 8c; . Void Fraction - DECLG (CD = 0 6) IMP Mix Lower Half of Core
4 Revised by - Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 1 4 l I 3.521 -2 e i O l l 1 l l i l 1
- 1
! I l.25 i i 1 1.00 4
-2 s 9 0.75 j -
e 9 j ! V O d c-i . l S 0.50 - - - . i 4 ? i 0.25 --l i 4 l 0 I ! ! 4 0 25 50 75 100 TlHE(SEC0HOS) i 4 2 i l , Figure '15.4-8d. Voia Fraction - DECLG (CD = 0.4) Lower llalf of Core i
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 I3.521-29 f ( L l.25 1.00 N e S 0.75 -- 0 a. [ 5 Le 0.50 - 0.25 - 4 I ' 0 0 25 50 75 TIME (SECONDS) q V Figure 15.4 9a. Void Fraction DECLG (C D 1.0) Upper llalf of Core l
~T b) v
/^g V
1.25 1.00 - 9 0,75 - 4 2
-i i
s 0.50 -
?
O.25 - s' 8. E i 0 ! ! ! ! I 0 25 s 50 75 100 125 150 E n TIME (SECONDS) w Figure 15.4 9b_ w g Void Fraction - DECLG (CD = 0.6), Per Mix g m Upper Half of Core h; G s
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 13.51a-3# (v) l.25 1.00 T
}J 9 0.75 -
8 d E 4 O $ 0.50 , U l 0.25 - g 1 i
' # l 0
0 25 50 75 TIME (SECONDS) l Figure 15.4 9c. Vout F raction - DECLG (CD 0 6). Imp Mu J
; Upper Half of Core l
)
Revised by Amendmc 57, November 17, 1978 13.521.32 i.25 l < l.00
?
l I e 0.75 , l 3 4 1 E ' Oci o 8o - 5 0.25 - 0 l 1 l l 0 25 50 75 100 TIME (SECONDS) Figure .15.4 9d. Void Fraction - DECLG (CD = 0. 4 ) l Upper Unif of Core
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 l l 13.52 -33 i
- O -
)
i i l l l 3000 i i 2500 - o' 14 7 sa-2000 -
/ .
l s 4 9 4 l N l
- B
<r l 4
$a.
1500 - l x O # l i, v m e 1 l , <x i 5 1000 l o 3 v 9 4 500 - 1 4 1 l 0 l l 1 , 0 100 200 300 l TlHE(SECONDS) 1 1 1 1 1 Figure 15.4-10a. Peak Clad Temperature - DECLG (CD -10) Burst Node 8, Peak Node 14
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 13.wi-34 O I 3000 2500 - o 8" 2000 - 2 10 /[ 5x U
- E "g 1500 b
1000 G a
$o 500 0
200 300 0 100 TlHE (SECONDS) (3
^
Figure 15.410b. Peak. Clad Temperature DECLG (CD - 0.6) Per Mix Burst Node 8, Peak Node 14
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 I3.521-35 10 3000 F 2500 -
- gn 8
x y 2000 -
'u E
W 1500 3-0 $
@ 1000 a
3 500 - 0 0 100 200 300 400 I TlHE(SEC0HDS) t d Figure 15.410c, Peak Clad Temperature "- DECLG (CD 0.6 ) . Imp Mix Burst Node 12, Peak Node 14
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 u . s 2 \ - n. O 3000
- 2500 -
O v 8x 2000 - 12 W B E 1500 - x O W 2 y 1000 o 3v 500 0 100 200 300 0 IIME(SECONDS) O Figure 15.410d. Peak Clad Temperature - DECLG (CD = 0.4) Node 16, Peak Node 12
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 g i3.52i-37 ( l l l 2500 l I l 2000 - 1 C L W 1500 - l B ! g 1 ,. E \ h (]3 g 1000 - g p a / n x
/ n M
500 q j
% \
l J b 0 0 100 200 300 TIME (SECONOS) O l k Figure 15.411a. Fluid Ternperature - DECLG (CD = 1.0) i Burst Node 8, Peak Node 14
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 u .sz < -n (3
~.)
2000 o' 1500 - tu 5
$x y 1000 -
W o 8 5 LY
/)
V 500 0 100 200 300 TIME (SECONOS) O Figure 15.4 l it). Fluid Temperature - DECLG (CD = 0.6), Per Mix Burst Node 8, Peak Node 14
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 l3.62I 39 (O) 2000 1500 - C f w / ,14 , s 1000 - l 5 ? l 5 , i g !J _1 i v) ( 500 e , o I d " ~ 0
-500 l l l 0 100 200 300 400 l TIME (SECONDS) l l
\
l l l l l [) U Figure 15.4-11c. Fluid Temperature - DECLG (C D Burst Node 12, Peak Node 14
- 0. 6 ), Imp Mix l
l l l
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 13.521-40 I v l 2000 l I r 1500 - W E 3 1000 - F w V O s / e 5. - O O ! 0 100 200 300 TIME (SECONDS) Figure 5.4 1 1 d. Fluiri Temperature - DECLG (C D 0.4) Node 16, Peak Node 12
1 Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 1 1
~) I3.521-4 (U
1 I 1 l i 17.5 T 30WNCOME R LE vf L 12.5 - p Q IO.0 b D e a 7.5 - N 5,0 - CORE LEVE L 2.5 - 0
-]_., I l 0 l00 200 300 TlHE (SECONDS)
O I t
%)
Figure 16.412a. Refload Transient - DECLG (CD - 1.0)
.- T- T
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 g 13.521-42 G 20.0 17.5 - 00WNCOMER LEVEL 1 l l l 12.5 - ' C w 10.0 - 5 R M 7.5 - CORE LF y[ L l 5.0 - l 2.5 - 0 I 1 ! 0 100 200 300 TlHE(SECONDS) l l Figure 15.4-12b. Reflood Transient DECLG (CD = 0.6), Per Mix l
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 i 13.521-43 , i
\,s
= I i 1 l i 17.5 i l I DOWNCOMER LEVE L 15,0 -
+ i l
12.5 - j l P d 10.0 - i
.b '
R S 7.5 - i sJ I i 5.0 - CORE LEVE L i 2.5 - 1 W 0 i l l 0 100 200 300 TIME (SECONOS) d e P .
.4 12c. Reflood Transient - DECLG (C D 06) Imp Mix i
l Revised by Amendment 57; November 17, 1978 l 13.521-44
]
i i 2 , ! l
- . 1
- l I s
- 17.5 ,
i l i i ! r I DOWNCOMER LEVfL i- 15.0 - i l l i I2.5 - 1 1 t i C i- . w w . 10. 0 i Lt. . l - o ! N -1
- . o 7.5 -
s 1 1 N i i \' J $ 5.0 - 1 CORE-lfv[t i 2.5 - 1 i 0 l l l 4 j 0 100 200 300 TlHE(SECONDS) ) l 4 i f Figure 15.412d. Reflood Transient - DECLG (CD - 0.0 4
- - , . . -- , - . - . , - , . .--:,...,,-w.. -
..,,e.. ,,e.-#,-%.*--wv.. = ,
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 b 13.521 45 11 . 0 3.5 - 3.0 - 2.5 - G
~- z 2.0 -
O f l.5 - 1.0 - I 0.5 - l I 0 200 300 0 100 TIME (SECONDS) o s. Figure 15.413a. Reflood Rate --- DECLG (CD - 1.0)
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 13.52! '46 O l l 4.0 l l 3.5 - 1 3.0 - 2.5 - G d s
$ 2.0 1
\O >
~
x 1.5 - I.0 - 0.5 - 0 l l 1 0 100 200 300 TlHE(SECONDS) V(% Figure 15.413b. Reflood Rate - DECLG (C D 0.6), Per Mix i l
\
j
l l l l Revised by /.mendment 57, November 17, 1978 l j 13 521-47 V , 1 ti .0 1 3.5 - 3.0 - 2.5 - U M 7 A) ( z 2,0 - 2 l.5 - I.0 - 0.5 - 0 l 0 100 200 300 TIME (SECONDS) { < \_/ Figure 15.413c. Refloort Rate - DECLG (CD = 0.6), Imp Mix
Revised by Amendment 57, November' 17, 1978
- 13. 521 -u O
ll . 0 3.5 - 3.0 - 2.5 - U M s i 2.0 - C ; x O 's - 1.0 - 0.5 - 0 l l 0 100 200 300 TIME (SECONDS) Figure 15.4-13d. Reflood Rate DECLG (CD = 0.4)
1 Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978-O I3.521-49 l l 7000 6000 - l 5000 - i G M D L1000 - UHi ACC d 25 6 3000 - d (a CL ACC 43 2000 - - 1000 - -
)
0 J " I 0 25 50 75 IO0 TlHE(SECONDS) i O N/ Figure 15.4-14a. . Accumulator Flows - DECLG (CD = 1.0) l l
. . . _ . . . . . , . . . - - . . . - . ~ - - - ~ . - - - -
l (J (~~)
- s. (m3 7000 6000 -
5000 - M
'm 3 4000 -
W unt Acc x 3 3000 -
'43 2000 -
y ct Acc N.
=
1000 x k i O i i $ l I il E 0 25 50 75 w 100 125 " 150 - TIME (SECONDS) S C E Figure 15.4-14b. Accumulator Flows - DECLG (CD = 0.6), Per Mix k 4 7 C E ' a
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 13.5?i-S/ 7000 6000 - 5000 - U Ui ( 2 4000 - ' d. UHi O)
'v h o 3000 -
l d d COLD LEG 2000 I 1000 - - 0 J l - l l 0 25 50 75 100 TIME (SECONDS) r ( Figure 15.414c. Accumulator Flows - DECLG (C 0.6), imp Mix D 1
t' , i l Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 l .. I j I3.521-52 i O l. 4 i i i I e j 7000 i i l j 6000 - i , 5000 - li - v> i 4000 - J < i ~ \ 4 N
<r '
N UNI ACC i i 3 _a 3000 -
)
/ )
CL ACC 2000 - i I i i l f 1000 - s i h i 0 d I I l 4 0 25
- 50 75 100 TIME (SECONDS)
- I 6 e' { + E
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 I 3.52 i -S 3 (s I 50 t 14 0 l - l 0 M C 2 30 - 1 S u. 8 !O d 5 _k 20 - l 8
+
G l0 - 0 I I 1 0 100 200 ' 300 TlHE(SECONDS) l O'- Figure 15.415a. SI + Accumulator Flow -- DECLG (C 1.0) D
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 IJ.521-54 50 I 14 0 - 1 U M
) I r'lZ
~x 30 -
I S
' l 1
5
, 20 -
U l l
+ \
G l0 - 0 l l 0 100 200 300 TINE (SECONOS) O Figure 15.415b. SI + Accumulator Flow - DECLG (CD = 0.6). Per Mix
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 i \ v 13.52i-55 1 l l i 1 50 l 1 1 40 - a
" l 30 -
o" ' n 1 3 l 9 i % O U E 20 - ! r G 10 - 0 ! ! O I00 200 300 TlHE(SECONDS) G'%.) Figure 15.4- 15c. SI + Accumulator Flow - DECLG (C D = 0.6), imp Mix
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 ( 3,6214th O ,I ( t 50 1 4 (40 - 1 Em R i %
- $ l w 30 -
o i d j 8 O 12 1
- (O V)
- )
o 20 - W 4 en 4 4 10 - l O I l 0 100 4 200 300 . TIME (SECONDS) J i d ! ; (m Figure 15.4- 15d. SI + Accumulator Flow DECLG(C D 0.4) l i i
O O O 15.0 . 12 S - 10.0 - MASS INJ TO EOS 9 x / g 7.5 - a DEF!Cli 52 _ _ INVENIORY 2 MASS OU T BRE AK C' 2.5 - E F a t 0 ' k 0 20 40 60 80 100 3 TIME (SECONDS) ', e e
? ?r Figure 15.416o. Mass Flows - DECLG (CD = 1.0) T q s
O O O 15.0 12.5 - tuss out BREAK 10.0 - x MASS INJ TO EOS 2 7.5 - d m INVENIORY 2 5.0 W 1 E DEF!Cli . 2.5
- 2. I 1
k N 0 ' f I I 0 25 50 a 75 100 125 150 175 200 2 n TIME (SECONDS) , c .
~
Figure 15.416b. Mass Flows - DECLG (CD = 0.6), Per Mix { m 3
.C M
O O O 15.0 12.5 - 10.0 - C) MASS INJ TO EOS 7.5 - e f g I N VE N IOR Y 5.0 - M [ DEFlCli f f FOSS OUT BREAR
\/ / -
2.5 - E' E. 4 l I O ' l
' l
- E 0 g 20 14 0 60 80 100 i TIME (SECONDS) k m
Figu re 15.4- 16c. Mass Flows - DECLG (CD = 0.6), imp Mix f:i z S Ef 4
. _. . -...._......_.._.._..__..............._._.__m...... ...~....._,m... ..__. ~ _... _ . . _ ..... . _. - ._.... . .. . . .
o 15.0 o o
-12.5 -
10.0 -
- MASS INJ O TO E08 x
m
~
7.5- - a v m-m !' y DEFICtT 5.0' - f . MASS CUT
/ / BRE A K x ,
O 2.5 - e. o. i. E f I N VE N TOR Y o I . l l ! 0 20 1 40 60 80 100 S i :s ' TIME (SECONDS) v. y I 4 w -z O w < Figure 15.4-16d. Mass Flows - DECLG (CD = 0.4) Y $
- a. w l o O
!. M t M
- j.
- e 4
- t. e a w C3 i
. _ . . . - . . _ . . . . . _ . ~ , _ . . . . . . _ . _ ._._ _. . . _ . _
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 4 13,521 -bl L . 8.0 4 s 7.0 - i.- 6.0 - I l l 5.0 - 1 9 l . W l g 4.0 -
-O !
E < 3.0 - I J 2.0 - 1.0 - 0 l l 0 100 200 300 TIME (SECONOS) 1 Figure 15.417. Containment Pressure .- 'DEC L G lCD = 0.6), imp Mix ' (
+ - ,. - . -, .-e... ._,.s. , - , . _ , - . . . , , , , . . . -
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978
, 13,521-62 O
l07 z rm 5 - 2 - 106
.- 5 g -
R - E m, 2 - W e 5 10 __ d Z [\ 9 5 - g - L r - 2 10" ___ z 5 2 103 l I 0 100 200 300 TIME (SEC00S) p Figure 15,410. Lower Compartment Structural Heat Removal Rate - d DECLG (CD = 0.6), imp Mix
._. . . . . . . . . _ _ _ . _... _ .. ...__ _ . __ _ _ . . .. . _ _ _ m. _ _ _ ..__._._. _ _ . . . . . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . . . . . . . . . _ . . . . . . . . . . -
^
)J l0 -
I . 8. - 6 - 1 m i o_ . x O, u u> N m
' 4 -
l ' x a
=
0
- c. .
er 2 - x E m 3 i O. s m i i i t 3
.0 l- l i i i .
vi 0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 ? F g:
- TIME (SECONDS) m <
~ m
- 7 Figure 15.419. Ice rnocenser Drain Flow versus Time - cn
- cr a
" m DECLG (CD = 0.6), tmp Mix l N
~
u $ CD 1 ) i _ _ _ _-
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 13.b21-64 V(~\ 300 200 - C L E' a O E \, / y 100 -
\ N s
0 ! I 0 100 200 300 TlHE(SECONDS) O < < ec , > e.4 o. ccm"e,tmemt rem" <e,",e - oec'c <c = o e> Imp Mix o
Revised by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978
- 13. 521 -e5
\ 2.0 o.
(
- l,9 $ i s G M
E W
~ d>
3 d
$c 0 l
l
-1.0 0 100 200 300 TIME (SECONDS) 9 O Figure 15.4 21. Heat Removal t>y Sump - DECLG (CD = 0.6), imp Mix
( Accumulated Melted Ice and Spilled Water)
Revised by Amendment .57, November 17, 1978 13.521-66 l l 6 10 5 2 - 5 g 10 _ E s E - 2 5 - W E - g 2 - W s O
- 104
_- N 5 - 2 - 103 !
- I 0 100 200 300 l l
TlHE(SECONDS) l OL Figure 15.4 22. Heat Removal by LC Drain - DECLG (C D 0.6), imp Mix
.-- - - - . . _ . ~ . __ . ._ _ _ . _. ._ . . _ . i d + l
)
I l Chapter 16 1 DRAFT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR l SEQ 0UYAH NUCLEAR PLANT ' HAMILTON COUNTY, TENNESSEE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY l l l l l l l 16-i O
1 SNP-57 ; 16.0 TECilNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2 The draft technical specifications for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant are issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The latest draft . Standard Technical Specifications for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit I was
- issued by NRC on August 18, 1976.
i i i 4 57 l i ? l
. 1 l !
s 1 1 l l g l 3 1 p
.. . . . . .~. - _- .-. -- - -
- SNP-57 j 15.17 Provide the following plant parameters used in the LOCA analy-ses and indicate whether the parameters used are nominal, mini- ]g mum or maximum values. l (1) Cold Leg Accumulator i water volume temperature ! line resistance t ) f (2) UHI 1 l temperature j line resistance $ volume of water i ! (3) Initial Core flow rate f! temperatures ! pressures b. l Provide the range of these variables that should be considered i in the Technical Specifications or preoperational tests. Dis-cuss why the value chosen for each of these parameters is con-servative or appropriate. l
Response
! See Revised Section 15.4.1, l 1 l l 1 i i i l k , 1 l ! l 4 h 1 I A i Q15.17-1 November 17, 1978 O s- - y - y w ,, -<w -
l t SNP-57 1 15.18 Reference a generic large break spectrum study that is appli-cable to Sequoyah or provide such a study.for the Sequoyah 4 04 plants. Justify why the referenced study is appropriate for 1 Sequoyah. l 1 Response i l The analysis performed for the Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) and the ; McGuire UHI plants provide a-set of cases that constitute an extensive + background for consideration of break spectrum results. The general i trends. indicated for both these plants are consistent. The break spec- i i trum results obtained for the FNP and McGuire plants support the follow- l l ing observations: l
- 1. A break in the cold leg is clearly the most limiting break location.
- 2. For cold leg breaks, large breaks are much more limiting than small l breaks. ;
I 3. For large cold leg breaks, guillotine type breaks are more limiting than split type breaks. i Since the results obtained for FNP and McGuire exhibit consistent trends j j and since the FNP, McGuire and Sequoyah plants are all generally simi- , lar; the above conclusions are also applicable to the Sequoyah plant. I Thus a limited break spectrum need only be considered for Sequoyah to : insure that the worst case break has been identified. ! ( 1 e Q15.18-1 November 17, 1978
SNP-57 i, 5 4
- 15.19 Provide a sensitivity analysis that demonstrates that maximum
, UllI delivery is conservative for perfect mixing evaluation and j- - the that the minimum delivery is conservative for -the imperfect
- mixing' evaluation. Similarly, demonstrate the e f fect of maxi-
! mum'and minimum UHI set pressures on PCTs by providing appro- , priate sensitivity analyses. l' i Response i t i A sensitivity analysis.to study the effect of UHI set pressure and water i volume delivery or peak clad temperature has been performed for a refer-l ence UHI plant. The analysis considered all possible combinations of j these two UHI parameters for both the perfect and inmperfect mixing
- cases. The peak clad temp results from the set of cases generated j indicated definite trend with regard to the conservatism associated with l UHI parameters. The perfect mixing transient' demonstrated the most
- j. severe peak clad temperature result for the UHI performance with maximum URI water delivery and with minimum UHI set pressure. The imperfect
~
mixing result was most severe for minimum UHI water delivery and maximum , l set pressure. i j Based upon the results of the reference plant sensitivity study, the j Sequoyah UHI parameters were selected. The perfect mixing analysis is performed for maximum water delivery and minimum set pressure and the ! imperfect mixing case at. minimum volume and maximum set pressure. The i reference plant is sufficiently similarly to the Sequoyah plant so that i the trends observed'in the reference plant sensitivity study may be l considered as indicative of the Sequoyah senritivity. , j ' l l i ) i i 1 i i ? i i I i I 4 i 015,19-1 November 17, 1978 i
'I .
i s.
. SNP-57 i
i 15.20 Confirm that the modifications approved in the October 1975 version of the evaluation model were used in the LOCA/UHI analysca.
Response
The evaluation model used to perform the Segaoyah ECCS analysis reported in the FSAR conforms to the staff requirements and under .andings des-cribed in the SER of April 1978. t i i i i 1 l l l i i Ql5.20-1 Novembe r 17, 1978 e+---- ____---4m- d-^_m.- __m--_ - m __eam__metv-'=zmmeemur-ew -m s--sie ww u. -y - --m. A b wwe r e swt-_a*we.-w.yeeste-_ -we'eiwe s m*-mew-- ad w w eemium e e*mpmer a w- e e +simmp m w e se?m m er m* Te *Ps ar W rmp' dw Ms _ t N B-W
i SNP-57 15.21 Provide a sensitivity analysis showing the e f fect of inlot j _ temperature (or Tavg) on calculated peak clad temperatures.
Response
A sensitivity analysis showing the-ef'ect of inlet temperature on peak < clad temperature was performed for a reference plant that is nimilar to ! the Sequoyah plant. The' analysis indicated that the most severe peak l clad temperature result was calculated for the highest inlet temper- i
- j. ature. The Sequoyah plant is sufficiently.similar to the. reference j plant so that the same sensitivity to inlet temperature is expected. Of 4
) the differences that exist between the two plants, no dif ference that would affect the sensitivity to inlet temperature could be identified. Based upon the results of the reference plant sensitivity study, an ; appropriately high value of inlet temperature was selected for the . Sequoyah ECCS Analysis. This insures the most severe e f fect of inlet temperature on calculated peak clad temperature. l l l l e 4 4 l i 3 J l t l Q15.21-1 November 17, 1978
- l. '
a.---.--,_....__m._ , _ , . , , , ,
SNP-5/
-15.22 : Provide an analysis showing that loss of an ESF train is not a more limiting single failure than lo9s.of an RHR pump.
\
Response
-Examination of the SI flows with various f ailure assumptions shows that there is little difference in delivered flow between the assumption of loss of an ESF train and loss of a RHR pump. The variation in SI flows could affect the calculated PCT by two mechanisms. I
- 1. Changes in containment pressure since loss of an ESF train would also result in loss of half of the containment safeguards systems, and
- 2. Changes in flooding rate due to insufficient water to maintain a full downcomer while supporting the flooding rate.
The effect of the variation in containment safeguards reduced from full capsbility to that corresponding to the loss of an ESF train has been estimated as.an increase of about 0.2 psi in containment pressure. The sensitivity of PCT to containment pressure has been established to result in lower clad temperature for higher containment back pressure. Hence, the assumed failure of sn ESF would result in a lower calculated peak-clad temperature based on containment pressure censiderations than would be calculated assuming loss of one RHR pump. Examination of the flooding rate for the Sequoyah ECCS worst break O analysis (DECLG, DC = 0.6, Imperfect Mixing) shows that a safety inj ec tion flow rate or less than 500 lbm/sec is needed to support the calculated flooding rate without removing inventory from the vessel downc omer . Any safety injection flow supplied in excess of this amount would only be spilled through the vessel side of the assumed break, and would not contribute to an increased flooding rate. Since this value is less than that safety injection flow resulting from the assumption of loss-of one RHR pump, no improvement in flooding rate would result from the additional SI flow provided by the high head and charging pumps. In summary then, the additional containment' safeguards resulting from ; the assumed loss of one RHR as the single active failure results in an i increase of calculated peak clad teperature while there is no associated decrease in calculated PCT from the additional flow which may be assumed from the high head SI and chatging pumps for this case. Hence, the maximum calculated PCT would occur assuming the loss of one RHR pump as
.the single active failure as opposed to the assumed loss of an ESF train.
l Q15.22-1 November 17, 1978 l 1 l Wg A%weM w'alme.yMe- m P4 -% - Fh TM +?-ee%g-+ e
SNP-57 1 15.23 Provide.a large break analysis for Sequoyah usi.ng the approved UllI/LOCA evaluation model. ( Response l The analysis requested is provided in revised Section 15.4.1. l I L l t i i if f l 1 t (
- l. -
i l l I i i 1 I l l l l i i l I I I I f. a 4-1 Q15.23-1 November 17, 1978 l b _ ~ . _ _ _ . _ . .
SNP-57 15.24 Provide a small break analysis for 0.5 ft2 break to i i 3 demonstrate that the most limiting small break has been analyzed.
Response
A small break analysis for a 0.5 ft2 break for the Sequo/ah plant has been completed. The setpoints and assumptions used in this case are the same 'as used in the small break cases reported in FSAR Section 15.3.1. The maximum peak clad calculated for 0.5 f t2 transient is 1240.80F. This is well below the worst case (8 inch) break result reported in the small break analysis and verifies that the worst peak clad temperature l results had been obtained in the earlier analysis. l The sequence of events for the 0.5 ft2 transient is given in Table 2. The significant hot rod results are given in Table 2. The following figures are also provided: RCS Pressure Transient Figure 1 Core Mixture Height Figure 2 peak Clad Temperature Transient Figure 3 15.24-1
l 4 Added by Amendment 57, November- 17,.1978 l TABLE 15.24-1 j-TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 2 SEQUOYAH 0.5 ft BREAK' l l
- Case Analysis l'
i i ' Start 0.0 Reactor Trip Signal Scram Time 9.16 Top of Core Uncovered 102.0 l UHI Accumulator Injection Begins 17.4 Cold Leg Accumulator Injec tion Begins 146. PCT Occurs 166. Top of Core Covered 244. !O 4 1 I i i 4 i l i I 1 15.24-2 l= 1
Added by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 TABLE'l5.24-2 O 2 SEQUOYAH 0.5.ft BREAK i l Case Analysis l Results Peak Clad Temp.'(F) 1240.8 Peak Clad Location (Ft.) 10.75 Local Zr/H O2 Rxn(max)% .374 Local Zr/H2 O Location (Ft.) 10.75 Total Zr/H O2 Rxn % <0.3 Hot Rod Burnt Time (sec) 166.0 Hot Rod Burst Location (Ft.) 10.75 0 l l l (v3
, 15.24-3 3
4 Added by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 4 i l 3 13,585-1 (d d 4 4 ( i 3000 1 1 I.
- 2500 -
l i 5 2000 - E d g 1500 g i x : l V U 1000 - l l r
\
500 - 0 ! l 0 100 200 300 400 TIME (SECONDS) ( Figure 15.4.241 Small Break 0.5 Ft2 Cold Leg Break RCS Pressure (PSIA)
. - . , , - , m -,.
Added by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 l 13.585-2 l 17.5 l 15.0 -
\
12.5
) l
[ C m
~
10.0 - e w O
- m 8
7.5 - v 5.0 - l 1 l l l 2.5 - 0.0 I l 0 100 200 300 , TlHE(SECONDS) Figure 15.4.242 Small Break 0.5 Ft2 Cold Leg Break Core Height (Ft)
Added by Amendment 57, November 17, 1978 13,585-3
, 3000 E
g 2500 -
- c w
% 2000 -
2 EC - 3 r o_ 1500 w-O 3 5 1000 - 4 o 500 - - 3 - 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 TlHE(SECONDS) J , g Figure 15.4.24-0 Small Break 0.5 Ft2 Cold Leg Break ) Clad Average Temperature Hot Rod}}