ML20155K073
| ML20155K073 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1986 |
| From: | Sneider C MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20155K067 | List: |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8605270343 | |
| Download: ML20155K073 (81) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA '<
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION x&.
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Before Administrative Judges: j Helen F. Hoyt, Chairperson ; f,gy g .) g3ge> {- .
Emmeth A. Luebke t -
Jerry Harbour i 'l l
~ ' 1, Q
'N In the Matter of )
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW ) Docket Nos.
HAMPSHIRE ET AL. ) 50-433/444-OL (Seabrook 5tatTon, Units 1 and 2) ) (Of f-Si te EP)
) May 15, 1986
)
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL FRANCIS X. BELLOTTI'S APPEAL OF LICENSING BOARD ORDER OF APRIL 29, 1986 Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti, pursuant to Section 2.714a of the Regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, submits this brief in support of his appeal of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Order of April 29, 1986 rejecting his single contention filed in this proceeding and thereby dismissing the Attorney General as a party.
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board by Order dated January 17, 1986 established a hearing schedule for New Hampshire off-site emergency planning contentions requiring that contentions relative to the State of New Har.:pshire 8605270343 860515 PDR G ADOCK 05000443 PDR
i Radiological Emergency Plans be filed with the Board by February 24, 1986. A prehearing' conference was scheduled for March.25-26, 1986.
On February'21, 1986, Attorney General Bellotti submitted a single contention in this proceeding [ attached hereto as
" Exhibit A"] relating to the emergency plans for the coastal communities within the Seabrook Emergency Planning Zone. That contention states:
The draft radiological emergency response plans for the Towns of Seabrook, Hampton, North Hampton, and Rye do not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the Seabrook Station, as required by 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(a)(1), because in the event of a severe accident on a summer weekend some or all of the beach area transient populations within those communities cannot under many plausible meteorological conditions be protected by means of evacuation even from early death and because there are not adequate plans or provisions for sheltering the beach area transients within those communi ties.
As part of the basis for his contention the Attorney General cites a preliminary site-specific consequence study performed for his office by a nuclear physicist, Dr. Jan Beyea. See Contention of Attorney General Bellotti, Exhibit A, at 3-12.
On March 5, March 6 and March 14, respectively, the Applicants, State of New Hampshire and the Staff filed their responses to the Attorney General's contention. See Applicants' Response to Of f-Si te EP Contentions Submi tted by Massachusetts Attorney General, dated. March 5, 1986; State of t
T e
New Hampshire's Response to Contentions of NECNP, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Towns of Rye, Hampton, South Hampton, Kensington and Hampton Falls on the New Hampshire Radiological Response Plan, dated March 6, 1985; NRC Staff's Response to Contention Filed By State of Massachusetts Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti, dated March 14, 1986. The Attorney General filed an Answer to those responses [ attached hereto as " Exhibit B"] on March 24, 1986. See Answer of Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti to Staffs', Applicants' and State of New Hampshire's Responses to His Contention Relative to Emergency Planning for the New Hampshire Beach Communities, dated March 24, 1986 [ hereinafter " Answer of Attorney General Bellotti"). At the prehearing conference held on March 25-26, 1986, oral argument was heard on the Attorney General's contention. After argument, the Licensing Board requested additional briefs on the admissibility of the Commonwealth's contention. Applicants filed their brief on April 11, 1986 and the Attorney General filed a brief on the admissibility of his contention [ attached hereto as " Exhibit C"] on April 16, 1986. See Brief of Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti in Support of Admitting his Contention Relative to Emergency Planning for the New Hampshire Beach Communities, dated April 16, 1986 [ hereinafter "Brief of Attorney General Bellotti]. The Staff elected not to file an additional brief.
On April 29, 1986, the Licensing Board issued a Memorandum and Order (served on the parties by m.lil on April 30, 1986) t.
I ruling on the admissibility of contentions filed in this proceeding. See Memorandum and Order of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, dated April 29, 1986 (hereinafter " Memorandum of ASLB"). The Licensing Board rejected the Attorney General's sole contention on the gr^und that it lacks a regulatory basis. See Memorandum of ASLB at 40-46. The Attorney General hereby appeals the Licensing Board's Order rejecting his single contention and thereby dismissing the Attorney General as a party to this proceeding.
ARGUMENT I. The Attorney General Has a Right of Appeal Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S 2.714a Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti has sought intervenor status in this proceeding to protect the interests of the many citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts who use New Hampshire beaches within the Seabrook emergency planning zone.
In that vein, the Attorney General filed a single contention in this proceeding relative to the adequacy of emergency planning l for the transient summer beach population within the New Hampshire EPZ. The Licensing Board rejected Attorney General Bellotti's single contention from this proceeding and he now j claims a right of immediate appeal pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
l 5 2.714a.
l P
f .
The regulatory bases for Attorney General Bellotti's right to immediate appeal are 10 C.F.R. SS 2.714a and 2.714. Section 2.714a provides that "[a]n order wholly denying a petition for leave to intervene" may be appealed "within ten days after service of the order." 10 C.F.R. S 2.714(a) and (b). Section 2.714(b) provides, in relevant part:
(b) not later than fi f teen (15) days prior to the holding of the special prehearing conference
. . . the petitioner shall file a supplement to his petition to intervene which must include a list of contentions which petitioner seeks to have litigated in this matter, . . . . A petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies the requirements of this paragraph with respect to at least one contention Will not be permitted to participate as a party.
10 C.F.R. S 2.714(b). Thus the effect of the Board's Order of April 29, 1986, rejecting Attorney General Bellotti's single contention from this proceeding, is that the Attorney General's right to participate as a party is terminated.
Attorney General Bellotti has no other contentions before the Board and has not joined in the contentions of any other party to this proceeding. Therefore, the Attorney General has a right pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714a to immediate appeal of
{ the Licensing Board Order of April 29, 1986 rejecting his contention. See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power = Station, Uni t 1), ALAB-787, 20 NRC 1097, 1098
- n. 9, citing Kansas Gas and Electric Co. (Holf Creek Generating L
Station, Unit 1), AL B-784, 20 URC 845 (1984),for the l . _ -- -
r proposition that " dismissal of an intervenor's sole contention ha[s] the necessary effect of bringing to an end the participation of that party in the proceeding.". Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
ALAB-731, 17 NRC 1073-1075 (1983). ("As a general matter, a Licensing Board's action is final for appellate purposes where it either disposes of at least a major segment of the case or terminates a party's right to participate.") (citations omitted).
II. The Licensing Board Erred in Refusing to Admit Attorney General Bellotti's Contention Relative to the Adequacy of the Protective Response Actions for the Summer Beach Population Near the Seabrook Plant.
The Licensing Board rejected Attorney General Bellotti's
-contention from this proceeding "on grounds that it does not state a violation of a regulatory basis." Memorandum of ASLB at 45. The regulatory bases for Attorney General Bellotti 's contention are 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(a)(1) and 10 C.F.R. S 50.47 (b)(10).
Regulation 50.47(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that "no operating license for a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless a finding is made by NRC that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(a)(1) (emphasis added).
Regulation 50.47(b)(1) requires as a precondition of license issuance that "[a] range of protective actions have been t
m
-developed for the plume exposure pathway for emergency workers and the public (and that].[g]uidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place . . . .
10 C.F.R.
S 50.47(b)(10). Attorney General Bellotti maintains'that his contention, which states, in essence, that the " range" of protective actions provided in the New Hampshire emergency response plan does not provide any assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken with respect to the summer beach population near the Seabrook plant in the event of a severe accident on a summer weekend, asserts a violation of regulatory basis and is therefore admissible.
A. Tne Licensing Board's Interpretation of the Commission's Emergency Planning Regulations Is Plainly Inconsistent With the Regulatory Language Requiring " Reasonable Assurance That Adequate Protective Measures Can and Will Be Taken."
The Licensing Board, in rejecting Attorney General Bellotti's contention, has misinterpreted the Commission's regulations so as to preclude any consideration of the adequacy-of protective response actions. Indeed, to justify its decision, the Board throughout its opinion literally rewrites the Commission's standard so as to omit almost all reference to the word " adequate."
Thus the Board miscites the Commission's regulatory standard when i t states: "We believe that the Commission's intent for emergency. planning is to . . . provide reasonable O
assurance that protective measures can and will be taken."
Memorandum of ASLB at 44. And in another part of its decision, explaining that the Commonwealth's interpretation of emergency planning -- requiring reasonable assurance of adequate protective measures -- is not in accord with the Commission's, it actually misquotes the Commission, deleting the word
" adequate," when it states:
It was the Commission's intent, as this Board understands these regulations, . . . to ensure that the means and procedures will be in place or will be within a reasonable time, to assess the course of an accident and its potential severity, '. . . that appropriate authorities will be notified promptly and protective actions in response to actual or anticipated condition (sic] can and will be taken.'
Memorandum of ASLB at 43 (emphasis added), citing Statement of Consideration, Emergency Planning, 45 Fed. Reg. 55402 (August 19, 1980).1/
The Licensing Board expressly uses the wrong standard, then, in rejecting Attorney General Bellotti's preferred contention relative to the adequacy of the New Hampshire plan's 1/ The actual Commission statement reads:
In order to discharge effectively its statutory responsibilities, the Commission must know that proper means and procedures will be in place to assess the course of an accident and its potential severity, that NRC and other appropriate authorities and the public will be notified promptly, and that adequate protective actions in response to actual or anticipated conditions can and will oe taken." Statement of Consideration, Emergency Planning, 45 Fed. Reg.
- 55402, 55403 (August 19, 1980) (emphasis added).
protective response actions for the summer beach population.
The standard the Licensing Board employs is one requiring only
" reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be taken."
Moreover, this is not a case where the Licensing Board has simply forgotten an occasional reference to the word
" adequate." Rather, the Board's entire decision is structured to effectively preclude any consideration of the adequacy of the New Hampshire plan's emergency response actions.
Under the Board's interpretation of the Commission's regulations, as long as an emergency response plan provides reasonable assurance that either one of the protective response actions, evacuation or sheltering, or a combination of the two can or will be implemented, any further inquiry ends.
Memorandum of ASLB at 43-44. This is so regardless of the ability of those response actions to protect people in the event of an emergency. Under such a standard any emergency response plan would be found adequate as long as it contained an evacuation plan capable of implementation -- even if it could be shown that the evacuation response contained in the plan would never afford any level of protection.2/
2/ Notably, the Board's decision does not even require that a plan contain a sheltering response capable of being implemented, as long as there is an evacuation response capable of implementation. See also, Memorandum of ASLB at 36-37.
Attorney General Bellotti maintains that the Commission's reg 11ations require there be in place a range of protective response actions generally capable of implementation such that there is reasonable assurance that in response to an accident (footnote continued)
L
It is just such an interpretation of the Commission's regulations that the circuit court in Guard v. NRC, 753 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1985), refused to accept. The court in Guard held that the Commission could not reasonably interpret the requirement of Regulation 50.47(b)(12), that " arrangements [be]
made for medical services for contaminated injured individuals," to be met by a mere listing of medical facilities capable of treating radiation exposure. Id. at 1146. Under the Commission's interpretation of the regulation, the court i
pointed out, no inquiry would be allowed into the " adequacy" of the listed medical facilities, id at 1149, the effect of this being that the regulatory " standard" would be " met automatically i n every case. " Id. at 1150. Yet the court held that this apparent assumption on the part of the Commission, that medical facilities would in every case be adequate, "is not an assumption properly indulged in an emergency planning regulation." Id.
Li kewi se , in the present case, it is not acceptable for the Licensing Board, in evaluating the New Hampshire emergency i
response plans, to merely assess whether an evacuation, or sheltering, plan capable of implementation is in place. The word " adequate" in the Commission's regulations is not just superfluous as this Licensing Board would have it. As the (footnote continued) 4 within the Commission's planning basis one of those response actions, or a combination of such actions, will be capable of providing adequate protection. See Brief of Attorney General
- Bellotti at 6-7.
O court in Guard noted, the Licensing Board may not simply
" disregard the word [] used in the regulation to describe the I required protection." Guard v. NRC, supra, 753 F.2d at 1149.
If the word " adequate" is to have any effect, then, this Board must make some inquiry into the adequacy of the New Hampshire RERP's protective response actions.
This interpretation of the Commission's regulations, which
- would require the Licensing Board in making its " reasonable assurance" finding to look beyond the mere fact of whether an evacuation plan exists, is in keeping with the way other NRC licensing boards have treated this issue. See, e.g., Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Plant), LBP-84-32, 20 NRC 601, 695 (1984) (Licensing Board considers impediments to evacuation in evaluating adequacy of that response action and requires consideration of remedies such as construction of new exit roads for problem of serious traffic congestion resulting from summer rock concerts); Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point, Units 2 and 3) LBP-83-68, 18 NRC 811, 989-90 (1983) (Licensing Board examines whether evacuation would be an ineffective protective response); The Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2) LBP-82-96, 16 NRC 1408, 1422-29 (1982) (Board examines whether use of particular evacuation route toward plant would provide adequate protection) . See also, The Detroit Edison Co., supra, DD-84-ll, 19 NRC 1108, 1120-21 (1984) (Director considers whether adverse weather i
i evacuation times are unreasonable to the extent evacuation would be ineffective as a protective response).
Nevertheless, the Licensing Board in this case appears to be constrained from inquiring into the adequacy of protective response actions, that is, the ability of such responses to protect people in the event of an emergency, based on a misconception that no standard of protection is imposed by the Commission's regulations. See Memorandum of ASLB at 41, 43-45. While the Attorney General agrees that the Commission has not set a precise level of protection that must be achieved by emergency response actions, it simply does not follow from this that no level of protection need be afforded by emergency response actions, or that inquiry into the level of protection provided by a response plan should be foreclosed.3/
The Commission has set a standard, one which requires
" reasonable assurance [of] adequate protective measures."
3/ As the Attorney General previously stated in his brief filed with the Licensing Board:
The fact that the Commission has failed to quantify or further define what cons ti tutes adequate protection can only be viewed as a reflection of the fact that this cannot be done on a generic basis . . . . 'Many aspects of emergency plans . . . are by their very nature site speci fic. We doubt whether the Commission could prescrine by rule a generic emergency plan suitable for all reactor sites, as the Staff's l argument seems to suggest. In any event the Commission did not do that, . . . '
Brief of Attorney General at 9, citing Southern California l Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Stations, Units 2 and 3), LBP-81-36, 14 NRC 691, 698-99 (1981).
l l
O' 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(a)(1) (emphasis added). And as the circuit court in Guard stated, the Licensing Board may not interpret the words of that regulation "as meaning something other than what those words in the context of a nuclear plant emergency planning standard may rationally convey." Guard v. NRC, supra, 753 F.2d at 1146. The very term " protective response" means a response that can " cover or shield from injury or destruction." Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 685 (1965). Thus, the " plain meaning" of the Commission's regulation requires that there be reasonable assurance that some " adequate" level of protection can and will be provided by such response actions. The Licensing Board can not just assume that all evacuation or sheltering plans capable of implementation will be adequate in this regard. It therefore may not foreclose inquiry into the capability of such response actions to provide the requisite protection.
B. The Licensing Board Mischaracterizes the Attorney General's Contention as Seeking to Impose a Standard of Absolute Protection Under All Conditions.
The Licensing Board further stretches to exclude Attorney General Bellotti's contention from this proceeding when it states " Massachusetts would have each of the responses within the range of protective responses provide absolute assurance that protective measures can and will be taken." Memorandum of ASLB at 44 (emphasis in original) . It appears, then, to adopt t
the Applicants' characterization of the Attorney General's contention as one requiring " absolute protection . . . against all radiation doses . . . for all possible accident scenarios." Id. at 41 (emphasis added). Yet the Attorney General has expressly stated, both in his Answer and Brief filed with the Board, that he is not contending that the New Hampshire plans must provide absolute assurance that the public can be protected in the event of an emergency or that any absolute level of protection must be ensured. See Answer of Attorney General Bellotti at 2; Brief of Attorney General Bellotti at 9.$! Moreover, the Attorney General submits that his contention, which asserts that in the event of a severe accident on a summer weekend the emergency response actions contained in the New Hampshire plans will not, even under typical meteorological conditions, prevent thousands of beachgoers from being exposed to radiation doses that can lead to death in a matter of days, does not raise an issue of aosolute protection at all, but rather an issue of whether the New Hampshire plans provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection.
4/ The Attorney General has also expressly stated that it is precisely because no one protective response can provide reasonable assurance of an adequate protective response to a spectrum of radiological emergencies that one cannot isolate such protective responses when examining the adequacy of a radiological response plan, but must rather look to whether the range of protective actions, viewed together, provides the requisite "reasonaale assurance of adequate protective ~
l measures." See Brief of Attorney General at 6-7.
Furthermore, the Attorney General does not maintain, as stated by the Board, "that protective actions must be developed which assure that any particular level of radiological dose consequences do not occur in the event of an accident."
As the Attorney General previously Memorandum of ASLB at 45.
stated in his brief filed with the Board, It would simply not be reasonable for the Commission to set a precise level of dose which, in order for a plant to become licensed, no one
'could ever receive under any circumstances. And Attorney General Bellotti does not contend that any plan wherein some people might under some circumstances receive death-level doses would be inadequate. Under that standard it is doubtful that any nuclear power plant could ever be licensed.
Brief of Attorney General Bellotti at 9.
What the Attorney General does contend is that evidence of dose consequence goes to the " adequacy" of an emergency response plan's range of protective actions. Such evidence is relevant to a response action's ability to provide protection, or meaningful dose-savings, in the event of an emergency and has bearing on whether the range of protective actions can provide adequate response to the spectrum of accidents within the Commission's planning basis. While evidence of dose consequences would not necessarily be determinative of the issue of adequacy, a Licensing Board presented with such evidence may not simply choose to ignore it and then " assume" that the protective response actions contained in the plan are adequate. Cf. Guarddv. NRC, supra, 753 F.2d at 1149-50.
t
O Rather the Board must consider such evidence as one factor that must be weighed in determining whether there is " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken." See Brief of Attorney General Bellotti at 9-10. Thus Licensing Boards in other proceedings have considered evidence I
of dose consequences in determining the adequacy of emergency response plans. See, e.g., The Detroit Edison Co., supra, 16 NRC at 1424-29; Southern Cali fornia Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-83-8D, 17 NRC 306, 310 (1982); consolidated Edison Co., supra, 18 NRC at 989-90.
The Licensing Board also suggests that the Attorney General is maintaining that absolute protection must be provided in response to all possible accident scenarios and goes on to posi t as basis for rejecting Attorney General Bellotti 's contention that "particular postulated accidents are inappropriate for litigation under [NRC] regulations."
Memorandum of ASLB at 46. While the Attorney General agrees that "no single speci fic accident sequence should be isolated as the one for which to plan," Memorandum of ASLB at 44, the Commission does require that " emergency plans must be developed that will have the flexibility to ensure response to a wide spectrum of accidents." Statement of Consideration, " Emergency Planning," 45 Fed. Reg. 55402 (August 19, 1980). And, as the Atolaic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board recently noted:
The Commission's emergency planning regulations are premised on the assumption that a serious accident might occur and that evacuation of the EPZ might well be necessary.
The adequacy of a given emergency plan must be judged therefore with this underlying assumption in mind.
Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 713 (1985), citing Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528, 533 (1983) (emphasis added). Thus Attorney General Bellotti maintains that his contention, which relates to che ability of the New Hampshire plan's protective response actions to provide protection for the summer beach population in the event of a serious accident on a summer weekend, goes to the very issue of whether these plans do have the requisite flexibility to ensure an adequate response to a particular spectrum of accidents within the Commission's planning basis, and must therefore be admissible.
A review of NRC case law in fact shows that other Licensing Boards, in making their " reasonable assurance" findings, have consistently looked to whether plans will work in the event of particular serious accidents involving substantial off-site radiation releases. See, e.g., Detroit Edison Co., supra, 16 URC at 1424-29; Southern California Edison Co., supra, 15 NRC
. 1163, 1195 (1982); consolidated Edison Co., supra, 18 NRC at 989; Philadelphia Electric Co., supra, 22 NRC at 713.
--- =. .. .
Moreover, the Attorney General's contention does not even raise an issue of some remotely occurring worst-case accident scenario, such as a severe accident happening coincidentally
'T with a severe flood or blizzard, scenarios that notably have been considered by other Licensing Boards in evaluating emergency plans.
See e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Uni t 1) LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, 815 (1985); Consolidated Edison Co., supra, 18 NRC at 989-90; Cf Paci fic Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-84-12, 20 NRC 249 (1984)
(Probability of contemporaneous occurrence of an earthquake and an independently occurring serious radiological accident is too e ' remote a possibility to consider).
Indeed, the Attorney General's contention raises only an issue of a severe accident within the Commission's planning basis occurring on any typical summer weekend. See Contention of Attorney Bellotti, Exhibit A at 5.E! Attorney General Bellotti is thus not seeking to impose any "zero risk" standard on emergency planning, as the Licensing Board has-stated. See Memorandum of ASLB at 44. And there can be no grounds for rejecting Attorney General Bellotti's Contention simply 5/ In the basis for his contention the Attorney General sets forth evidence based on a preliminary study involving only the consequences of a PWR-2 release. If his contention is admitted to this proceeding, he will seek to introduce further evidence relative to the site-specific consequences of a number of other representative release categories of varying severity.
t 4
4 because he raises an issue of whether the New Hampshire plans have the requisite flexibility to respond adequately in the event of a serious accident occurring at the Seabrook plant on a summer weekend.
'l C. Attorney General Bellotti's Contention Raises an d
Important Safety Issue Which Must Be Considered By the Licensing Board Before It Can Make Any Finding That There Exists " Reasonable Assurance That Adequate Protective Measures Can and Will Be Taken."
The Attorney General, as part of the basis for his contention, has presented evidence that the evacuation response 2.
provided in the New Hampshire plan will, under typical meteorological conditions, subject thousands of beachgoers to doses that can lead to death in a matter of days. It is Attorney General Bellotti's contention that an emergency plan that relies solely on evacuation and sheltering as the two possible protective options, that cannot at present prevent as many as fifteen thousand beachgoers from being exposed to early death doses by means of evacuation even under typical meteorogolical conditions, and that contains no plans or provisions for sheltering the beach population, does not provide adequate protection for that population, and therefore
! raises a serious safety issue that must be addressed by the
! Licensing Board i f it is ever to make a finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and
! will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the l
Seabrook plant.
l i
_ 19 _
As has been pointed out to the Licensing Board, the emergency planning considerations posed by the Seabrook power plant are unique. See Brief of Attorney General Bellotti at 12, 13 n. 6; Answer of Attorney General Bellotti at 5-6. Not only is one faced here with an extremely dense beach population within several miles of the plant, but also with long evacuation times, and virtually no provision for sheltering that summer beach population. See contention of Attorney General Bellotti, Exhibit A, Table 5, at 11, which shows a transient beach population of 100,000 people within 10 miles of the Seabrook plant, more than a third of whom are situated within two miles of the plant.5/ See also, id. at 2; id.,
. Exhibit A, Table 5, at 8; and id., Exhibit A, at 12-13. In addition, this summer beach population will typically not be wearing even the clothing, which would serve as some protection, that a resident around the average nuclear power plant would wear. Id. at Exhibit A, p. 3. Thus the Attorney General seeks to introduce expert testimony in this proceeding that would show that for a typical summer weekend the average radiation dose that would be received by a New Hampshire beachgoer is four times that which would be received by 6/ According to population figures contained in the New Hampshire plans, the total peak summer population figures for the area surrounding-the plant are: 44,354 for the area within two miles of the plant; 131,911 for the entire area within five miles of the plant; a,nd 241,983 for the entire ten mile radius. See State of New Hampshire Radiological Response Plan, Vol. 18, Hampton RERP (NHRSRP 6.23) at I-15.
persons within the same distance of the average nuclear power plant. The Attorney General's evidence will show that even in the event of certain radiological releases that would typically result in no early fatalities at the average nuclear plant site, there will be a number of early fatalities at the Seabrook site given the protective response actions currently in the New Hampshire plans.
Attorney General Bellotti therefore contends that even if one could generally assume the adequacy of evacuation or sheltering plans capable of implementation, the Licensing Board may not do so in the present case. The Attorney General has presented in the bases for his contention relevant evidence that shows that the response actions contained in the New Hampshire RERP will not work, that is, will not adequately protect the transient beach population in the event of a serious accident (within the Commission's planning bases) on a summer weekend. The Board cannot refuse to hear such evidence relevant to the adequacy of the emergency response actions and still be aole to make a finding that the New Hampshire plan provides " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(a)(1).
y CONCLUSION For all the foregoing reasons, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board should reverse the decision of the Licensing Board and admit Attorney General Bellotti's contention to this proceeding.
Respectfully submitted, 3-L C JL Carol S. Sneider Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division' Department of the Attorney General One Ashburton Place, Room 1902 Boston, MA 02108 (617) 727-2265 Dated: May 15, 1986 i
- f. .
X / /
-t UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION C h2
/
ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD g MAY 2 01986*T-
~a s y Before Administrative Judges: ?CH Helen F. Hoyt, Chairperson gjh Emmeth A. Luebke ,ji\
Jerry Harbour
)
In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL
) 50-444-OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF )
NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al. )
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 )
and 2) ) February 21, 1986
)
CONTENTION OF ATTORNEY GENERAL FRANCIS X. BELLOTTI RELATIVE TO EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR THE NEW HAMPSHIRE BEACH COMMUNITIES By Order dated January 17, 1986, the Board providea all parties an opportunity to file new contentions on redrafted emergency plans submitted to FEMA by the State of New Hampshire. We have reviewed the new plans and find that they I
in no way address or alleviate the concerns which prompted our earlier contention (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A) regarding the adequacy of emergency planning for Massachusetts citizens present in the New Hampshire beach communities within the EPZ at the time of an emergency. Thus,
e 4
the new plans continue to rely on evacuation and sheltering as the two possible protective actions in the event of a serious accident. See N.H. RERP, at 2.6-5. However, the plans have in no way developed the option of sheltering for the beach populations despite the severe limitations, discussed in Exhibit A heretow.on evacuation as a protective response for.
those persons.1!
While the Board's Order did not appear to require this we are, in an excess of caution, hereby refiling our' earlier contention. Developments since our earlier filing provide additional bases for our contention and will be thoroughly addressed in our testimony. For example, the Applicants' own Probabilistic Safety Assessment contains release sequences which support the need for additional protective measures for the beach area populations. And, as FEMA personnel have 1/ The New Hampshire plan is hopelessly confusing on the question of sheltering for the beach populations, indicating on the one hand that "(s]heltering may not be consicered as a protective action on the seacoast beaches during the summer" and on the other hand that "[t]ransients witnout access to if possible. to seek suitable shelters will be directec . . .,
directions to a nearby public builcing from local emergency workers." See N.H. RERP, at 2.6-8. Suffice it to say it remains the case, as we stated in the bases for our contention, that Neither the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response plan nor the local community plans contain any analysis of available public sheltering, or its capacity to accomodate the beach population. or to provide sheltering from radionuclides, or any plans In short, there is at for effecting such sheltering.
present no busis for (and has not been) any development of sheltering as a potential protective action for the beach population.
Exhibit A, at 12-13.
[
6 determined, the revised New Hampshire plans fail to demonstrate that the New Hampshire.EPZ communities have sufficient personnel and resources (including communicatione aquipment) to implement the plansS/ or that certain of the comm..nities (including Ryed! and Hampton,A! two of the coastal t>wns) even intend to iqplement the plans. See Exhibit C hereto- a.
document prepared by FEMA personnel in response to these latest New Hampshire plans and entitled " Planning Milestones.")5 /
In short, there continues to be no " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken" to protect Massachusetts citizens on New Hampshire beaches at the time of an accident, as required by 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(a)(1).
2/ The plans contain no letters of agreement assuring the provision of necessary resources.
3/ ~According to pleadings filed with this Board by the Town,of Rye, that Town has not even reviewed the plan submitted for it by the State of New Hampshire and is not committed at this time to implementing any such plan. For these reasons the Town of Rye has informed FEMA that it will not participate in an upcoming exercise of the plans and has thus far refused to authorize the installation of sirens necessary to alert the public, and particularly the beach population, in the event of an accident.
4/ On October 29, 1985, the Hampton Board of Selectmen wrote Governor Sununu (see Exhibit B hereto) indicating, inter alia, that all Town departments lack sufficient manpower to implement the plan.
5/ FEMA notes the need for contingency plans from the State of New Hampshire to cover any communities where the local governments are not committed to implementing plans and specifically criticizes the plans for their failure to address the beach populations.
4
..g.
For this reason we respectfully urge the Board's acceptance of our prior Contention attached hereto as Exhibit A.
ERespectfully submitted, ATTORNEY GENERAL FRANCIS X. BELLOTTI By: A ( g d ,_ 4 Jo Knn / Shotwell j' As/is ant Attorney General En ronmental Protection Division Department of the Attorney General one Ashburton Place, Room 1902 Boston, MA 02108 (617) 727-2265 DATED: February 21, 1986
_4 -
h -
EXHIBIT "A"
- ?
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges:
Helen F. Hoyt, Chairperson Emmeth A. Luebke Jerry Harbour
)
In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-4 4 3-OL
) 50-444-OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF )
NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al. )
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 )
September 9, 1983 and 2) )
)
CONTENTION OF ATTORNEY GENERAL FRANCIS X. BELLOTTI RELATIVE TO EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR THE NEW HAMPSHIRE BEACH COMMUNITIES On August 23, 1983, the Board ordered that contentions relating to off-site emergency planning for any or all of the l
fifteen New Hampshire communities for which draft emergency i
plans were recently submitted 1I be filed on or before this date. In accordance with that order, Attorney General Bellotti hereby submits a single contention which relates to off-site 1/ The fifteen communities are Hampton, Newton, Rye, Stratham, Exeter, New Castle, North Hampton, Seabrook, Brentwood, Kensington, Newfields, Portsmouth, South Hampton, East Kingston, and Kingston.
2-emergency action in the coastal beach areas of Seabrook, Hampton, North Hampton, and Rye which are frequented by Massachusetts citizens.
CONTENTION:
The draft radiological emergency response plans for the Towns of Seabrook, Hampton, North Hampton, and Rye do not provide reasonable assurance that_ adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the Seabrook Station,1aa required by 10 C.F.R. 550.47(a)(1),
because in the event af a severe accident on a summer weekend some or all of the beach area-transient populations within those communities cannot undcc many plausible meteorological conditions be protected by means of evacuation even from early death and because there are not adequate plans or provisions for sheltering the beach area transients within those communities.
BASES:
The draft emergency response plans for the Towns of Seabrook, Hampton, North Hampton, and Rye all rely on evacuation and sheltering as the two options for protecting perso'ns present in those communities at the time of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station which results in a radiological release to areas within those communities. See, e.g., Seabrook Plan, at II-I6 - II-I8; Rye Plan, at II-I6 -
II-I8; North Hampton Plan, at~II-I7 - II-20; and Hampton Plan, M
Ser 4
at II-I7 - II-20. However, a preliminary site-specific accident consequence analysis performed for the Massachusetts Attorney General has revealed that, given the unusual circumstances associated with dense beach populations, evacuation cannot protect the transient beach area populations in the vicinity of the Seabrook site from early death in the event of a PWR 2 release as defined in the NRC's Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) on a summer weekend.
A Seabrock-specific accident consequence analysis is being performed for the Department of the Attorney General by Dr. Jan Beyea, a nuclear physicist with extensive experience in accident consequence modelling and analysis. (A copy of Dr.
Beyea's resume is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference.) Dr. Beyea has advised the Department that there are unique considerations involved in the modelling and analysis of accident consequences for a site such as Seabrook having a large summer beach area population which have never before been taken into account in generic or site-specific consequence studies. In addition to the obvious effects on accident consequences of the increased population and evacuation times associated with summer beach areas and the absence of shielding normally provided by buildings, there are increased consequences due to material deposited directly on the skin and hair of beachgoers and on vehicles in the plume.
The former factor $as received no consideration in accident
consequence analyses in the past and the latter has received inadequate consideration.
In the work which Dr. Beyea and his assistant Brian Palenik, a graduate student at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, have performed for this Department to date they have investigated the conditions under which the nearest beach population to this site, at about two miles, might be exposed to doses at a threshold level for early death (200 rem) in the event of a PWR 2 release as defined in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400). Estimates of the time within which that population would receive a 200 rem dose have been calculated for various weather stability classes and wind speeds using two sets of assumptions. The first set assumes that all persons are inside automobiles when the release occurs and receive only a fraction of the doses they would receive if they were in the open, exposed directly to a plane of contaminated ground.
These results have been calculated using the assumptions which have heretofore been considered standard in accident consequence calculations. The second set of results goes beyond the standard assumptions, to account specifically for the Seabrook beach situation. Those results assume that some of the population will not have reached their vehicles before plume passage such that there will be a " skin deposition dose" and a " car deposition dose." For each of the two sets of results calculations have been performed separately for high l
and low energy release rates. This division was necessary given the large uncertainty in the height to which the radioactive plume will rise, a factor which is affected by energy release rates and which is an important determinant of the doses to a nearby population.
Tables 1 and 2, which follow hereafter, contain the results of Dr. Beyea's modelling and analysis as described above. The entries in the last column of each table result from a comparison between the time required to reach a 200 rem dose and current estimates of the time required to evacuate the population within two miles on a summer weekend. See Table 3.
The data set forth in these tables reveal that the summer weekend beach population within two miles of the Seabrook site cannot be protected from early death by means of evacuation under many weather conditions.
It should be noted that neither precipitation nor slow wind speeds have been considered in the analyses set forth in Tables 1 and 2. Both such conditions are more severe than those represented in the tables. The frequencies of the Pasquill stability classes reflected in Tables 1 and 2 as reported in the Applicants' ER-OL are given in Table 4. The frequencies of the A, B, and c stability classes increase during the summer months, with C the most frequent of the three. D and E are the dominant stability classes. The results discussed herein are not, therefore, based o,n infrequently occurring or worst-case weather conditions.
TABLE 1 PROTECTION OF CLOSEFT BEACH POPULATIONa)
FROM EARLY DEATH ON A SUMMER WEEKEND DAY DI HIGH ENERGY RELEASE RATE Dose Stability C) Wind Speed Scaling d) Time to Reach Protection *I Class Factor 200 rem _ of Population (m[sec)
A 2 .53 78 14.5-20.9 Yes 2 1.0-1.3 9.0-11.5 Yes A
4 .53 .78 ) 24 Yes A
4 1.0-1.3 19.2-25.0 Yes A
.53 .78 4.6-6.4 No B 2 2 1.0-1.3 3.2-3.8 No B
4 .53 .78 12.2-17.8 Yes B
B 4 1.0-1.3 7.6-9.6 Yes
.53 .78 2.6-3.4 No C 2 1.0-1.3 1.9-2.2 No C 2
.53 .78 8-11.5 Yes C 4 1.0-1.3 5.1-6.4 No C 4 Yes D 2 .53 .78 ) 24 Yes D 2 1.0-1.3 )24
.53 .78 6.5-9.2 Yes D 4 4.2-5.3 No D 4 1.0-1.3 a) The population two miles from tne plant. 6 b) Assumes an energy release rate of 176 x 10 Stu/ hour.
c) Pasquill stability class.
d) The dose scaling factor range of .53 .78 assumes an individual is in a car within ene plume. The dose scaling factor range of 1.0-1.3 assumes an individual is in a car within the plume, with a dose component from radioactive material deposited on the car and directly on the individual e) Protection of the population from a 200 rem dose or higher. This If the -
assumes an evacuation time of about five and a half hours.
evacuation time is longer, the population is not necessarily protected.
I TABLE 2 PROTECTION OF CLOSEST BEACH POPULATION ^}
PROM EARLY DEATH ON A SUMMER WEEKEND DAY LOW ENERGY RELEASE RATE D)
Dose Stability c) Wind Speed Scaling d) Time to Reach Protection e)
Class (m/sec) Factor 200 rem of Population; t
A 2 .53 .78 13.8-19.9 Yes A -
2 1.0-1.3 8.6-10.9 Yes A 4 .53 .78 Yes
)> 2 4 A 4 1.0-1.3 18.4-23.7 Yes a 2 .53 .78 3.7-4.9 No B 2 1.0-1.3 2.5-3.0 No B 4 .53 .78 9.9-14.2 Yes B 4 1.0-1.3 6.2-7.8 Yes C 2 .53 .78 ZL1 No 2 1.0-1.3 No C <[1 C 4 .53 .78 1.7-2.2 No C 4 1.0-1.3 1.3-1.5 No D 2 .53 .78 <( l No D 2 1.0-1.3 (l No D 4 .53 .78 <(l No No D 4 1.0-1.3 <[ l a) The population two miles from the plant.
b) Assumes an energy release rate of 20 x 10 6 Btu / hour, or an equivalently low plume for reasons unrelated to the energy release rate.
c) Pasquill stability class.
d) The dose scaling factor range of .53 .78 assumes an individual is in a car within the plume. The dose scaling factor range of 1.0-1.3 assumes an individual is in a car within the plume, with a dose component from radioactive material deposited on the car and directly on the individual.~
e) Protection of the population from a 200 rem dose or higher. This assumes an evacuation time of about five and a half hours. If the evacuation time is longer, the population is not necessarily protected. _
e TABLE 3 SEABROOK EVACUATION CLEAR TIME ESTIMATES a)
SUMMER WEEKEND / FAIR WEATHER SCENARIO Radius Degrees HMMD) Vorheesc) Maguired) NRCe) 0-2 360* 4:50 5:10 5:40 ---
0-3 180* E 5:20 --- --- ---
0-5 360* 5:50 5:10-5:40 --- ---
0-10 360* 6:05 5:10-6:10 5:50 11:25 a) Time (hours: minutes) for the population to clear the indicated area after notification.
b) Preliminary Evacuation Clear Time Estimates for Areas Near Seabrook Station, HMM Document No. C-80-024A, HMM Associates, Inc., May 20, 1980.
c) Final Report, Estimate of Evacuation Times, Alan M. Vorhees & Associates, July 1980.
d) Emergency Planning Zone Evacuation Clear Time Estimates, C.E. $kguire, Inc., February 1983.
e) An Independent Assessment of Evacuation Time Estimates for a Peak Population Scenario in the Emergency Planning Zone of the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station, M.P. Mueller, et al., Pacific Northwest Laboratory NUREG/CR-2903, PNL-4290.
4
. TABLE 4 FREQUENCY OF PASQUILL STABILITY CLASSES AT SEABROOK a)
(Values in % of Time)
Month A B C D E F G Apr 1979 1.27 2.11 3.80 49.65 29.40 7.88 5.91 May 1.20 2.86 4.82 52.86 26.51 5.27 6.48 June 2.92 6.69 12.26 39.83 25.49 6.13 6.69 July 4.90 6.94 11.56 29.12 28.84 12.65 5.99 Aug 2.91 4.71 9.97 43.07 26.59 7.34 5.40 Sep 1.25 7.64 11.81 30.69 27.36 10.83 10.42 Oct 0.81 2.96 5.79 39.30 34.05 10.09 7.00 Nov 0.00 0.56 4.76 43.92 34.83 9.37 6.57 Dec 0.00 0.41 2.70 47.03 41.35 5.81 2.70 Jan 1980 0.13 1.88 6.59 51.88 30.38 5.78 3.36 Feb 0.44 2.03 5.37 50.36 34.69 5.66 1.45 Mar 10.68 1.64 5.34 43.15 24.66 6.03 8.49 Yearly 2.22 3.37 7.08 43.31 30.38 7.76 5.87 a) Period of Record: April 1979 - March 1980. Stability class calculated using 43'-209' delta temperature. Source: SB 1&2, ER-OLS, Table 2.3-24.
J m- ----.,_.--y_
-a . . - - - * , -_ .
The size of the beach area population around Seabrook is uncertain. One estimate of this population for 1980 has been made by Public Service Company of New Hampshire and is found in Table 5. Although its accuracy is uncertain, this estimate does indicate that a substantial number of people are located withintwomi[esoftheplant. The number of persons that would be located within a plume obviously varies with wind direction, but it also varies with stability class and distance from the plant. At two miles the plume could be viewed as being between a 29' wedge (A stability class) and a 13' wedge (D stability class) ! compared to the 22.5* population wedges in the table.
In addition to investigating the conditions under which the beach population within two miles of the Seabrook site might be exposed to early death doses, Dr. Beyea and Mr. Palenik have commenced work designed to determine the radius within which early deaths might result in the vicinity of this site assuming an accidental release on a summer weekend. Dr. Beyea has found early death radii ranging f rom <2 to 4.3 miles assuming a PWR 2 release a's defined in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400), C stability class weather conditions, an evacuation time of 5-1/2 hours, and the two sets of dose scaling factors discusced
! previously. For weather conditions with overcast skies (D 2/ Wedges are assumed to have plume widths equal to three times the horizontal dispersion coefficient.
4-e- --"me -+ -w- m m -, -w n- w
TABLE 5 1980 BRACH AREA TRANSIENT POPULATION ESTI!! ATE a) BY SECTOR DI Ring dadii (miles) NE ENE E ESE SE SSE 0-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1-2 464 14,647 12,780 5,842 129' 23 2-3 1,104 8,882 0 0 3,905 654 3-4 8,710 608 0 0 0 6,198 4-5 4,344 0 0 0 0 8,880 5-10 5,660 0 0 0 0 16,597 Source: Public Service of New lfampshire, Seabrook Station - Units 1 & 2, Environmental Report, Operating License Stage, Figure 2.1-19.
a) Estimate of peak transient population found by multiplying the capacity of beach area parking lots (less leased space) by 3.2 persons per vehicle, and contributions from off-street parking users, seasonal residents, and overnight visitors, b) Each direction in the table is the centerline of a 22.5 degree wedge.
~
stability class), or longer evacuation times,3/ the early death radii will be larger. And the time before doses reach 200 rem, assuming.a PWR 2 release on a summer weekend evening and a low energy release rate such as that assumed in the draft Seabrook Probabilistic Risk Assessment, is less than four hours out to 6-7 mibes from the site. Thus, the beach area population within 6-7 miles exposed to the plume would not be protected from early death even if there were a 20-30 percent reduction in evacuation times from daytime to evening. It should be noted in this connection that at least the Hampton Beach area has a very substantial nighttime population.
Thus, primary accident consequence data developed for this Department reveal that evacuation cannot under a number of plausible weather conditions protect the summer weekend beach area populations in the vicinity of this site from even early death. The results described herein do not account for the less severe consequences of radiation illness and delayed fatalities due to latent cancers. Despite the severe limitations on the utility of evacuation as a protective option for the transient beach population, however, there are
! currently no pec/isions for sheltering that population within the EPZ. Neither the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency l 3/ The Applicants have now provided a 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 5 minutes t estimate for summer weekend simultaneous beach Direct See Applicants' evacuation Testimony within ten miles of the site.
No. 1, filed July 15, 1983, at 19-20.
w
13 -
Response Plan nor the local community plans contain any analysis of available public sheltering, or its capacity to accommodate the beach populations or to provide shielding from radionuclides, or any plans for effecting such sheltering. In short, there is at present no basis for (and has not been) any development of sheltering as a potential protective action for the beach population.
Respectfully submitted, FRANCIS X. BELLOTTI ATTORNEY GENERAL By: - _
JO SHOTWELL As ant Attorney General En conmental Protection Division One Ashburton Place Boston,:tA 02108 (617) 727-2265
,,-_..- 9m ,___ -.,._ _-- , - . _ -,-9 .-.c --_--..p- -,p -- -.- -. - , .- m - . - - -
" EXHIBIT A" April 1983 EDUCATION:
Ph.D., Columbia University, 1968 (iluclear Physics)
- B. A. , Amherst College,1962 EMPLOYMENT HISTORY:
1980 to date, Senior Energy Scientist, flational Audubon Society, 950 Third Avenue, tiew York, New York 10022.
1976 to 1980, Research Staff, Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University.
1970 to 1976,nAssistant Professor of Physics, rioly Cross College, 1968 to 1970, Research Associate Columbia University Pnysics Cepartment.
C0:15ULTING WORK:
Consultant on nuclear energy to tne Office of Technology Assessment, the flew Jersey Department of Environn. ental Protection; the Of fices of the Attorney General in New fork State and the Correnwealth of Massachusetts; the state of lower Saxony in West Germany; the Swedish Energy Commission; anc various citizens' groups in the United States.
PUBLICATIONS CONCERNING E*!ERGY CONSERVATION AfiD ENERGY POLICY:
" Comments en Energy Forecasting," material sub :itted for the record at the He3 rings before the Subccreittee on Investigatiens and Oversights of the Ceemittee on Science and Tecnnology, b. S. House of :epresentatives; Cormittee Print, June 1, 2, 1981 /_:.o. 14 _f.
- The Audubon Energj Flan Tecnnical Report," Ps:erson, Seyea, Paulson and Cutler, 'oational Audubon Society, April 1981.
" Locating and Eliminating Obscure t'ut Pajor Ener;j Losses in Residential housina," Harrje, Dutt and Beyea, ASRt.E Transacticos , 85, Fart II (1979).
Winner of ASHRAE outstanding paper award.)
"J.ttic Feat Less and Ccnservation Policy,' Cutt . Ee:.ea , Sirden. ASME Tecnnology and Society Divisicn paper 78-T5-5, Hoss:3r.. Te es, 1978.
" Comments en the proposed FTC trade regulation role on lateling and adver-tising of thermal insulation," Jan Beyes and Gautan Outt, testimony before the Federal Trade Commission, January 1978.
" Critical Significance of Attics and Baserent( in the Energy Balance of Twin Rivers Townhouses ," Se,ea, Dutt, hnteki, Enecce a-d Guildings, Volume I (1977), Page 261. Also Cna::ter 3 of Saving Energy in :neJo~e, Gallinger,1978.
"The Two-Resistance Model for Attic Heat Ficw: P olications for Conservation Policy " Woteki, Outt, Beyea, Energy--the International Journal, _3_, 657 (1978).
" Energy Conservation in an Old 3-Story Apartrient Complex," Beyea Harrje, Sinden Energy Use Manager"ent, Fazzolare and Smith, Pergamon 1977, Volunie I, Page 373.
" Load Shif ting Techniques Using Ho're Appliances , Jan Beyea, Rotiert Weatherwax, Energy Use Managen'ent, Fazzolare and Smith, Perganion 1978, Volume Ill/lV, _
Page 121.
a
l
- PU8LICATIONS CONCERNING ENERGY RISKS:
. Articles:
" Containment of a R4 actor Heltdown," (with Frank von Hippel),
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 38,, Page 52, December 1982.
"Second Thoughts (about Nuclear Safety)," in Nuclear Power: Both Sides, W. W. Norton and Co. (New York, 1982).
" Indoor Air Pollution," Commentary in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 37_, Page 63, February 1981.
"Energency Planning for Reactor Accidents," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 36 Page 40, December 1980. (An earlier version of this article appeared in Grman as Chapter 3 in Im Ernstfall hilflos?, E. R. Koch, Fritz Vahrenholt, editors, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, Cologne,1980.)
" Dispute at Indian Point," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 36. Page 63.
I May 1980.
I Published Debates:
8
. Tne Crisis of Nuclear Enercy, Subject No. 367 on William Buckley's Firing Line, P.B.S. Television. Transcript prirted by Southern Educational Comn'unications Association, 928 Woodrow Street, P. O. Box 5966. Columbia, South Carolina,1979.
d
,uclear Reactors: Hoa Safe Are They?, canel d iscussien sponsored by the
_u Acaderj Forum of The National Academy of 5ciences, 2'.01 Constitution Avenue, Wasnington, 3. C. 20418, May 5, 1980.
Reports:
"I p'ic 'vs for Mortality of Weakening tne Clean Air Act," (with G. Steve Jcrt , National t,adubon Societ/, Envirorrental Policy Analysis Cepartn ent Feart No.18, May 1982.
"Sa e Lon.-Term Consecuences of Pycothetical P3jor Releases of Radicactivity to the Atmospnere frca Three Mile Island," Report to the Presicent's Council cn l Environmental Qualit/, Decerter 1980.
! " Decontamination cf Krypton 85 from Three File Island Nuclear Plant," (with
. Eendall, et.al.), Report of tne Union of Concerned Scientists to the Governor of Pennsylvania, Ma/ 15, 1960.
"Some Comrents on Consequences of evcothetical Peactor Accidents at I the Philippines f.aclear Power Plant" (with Gcrdon Thompson), National Audubon Societ:
) Envirenrental Policy Analysis Department Report No. 3 April 1980.
" Nuclear Reactor Accidents: The Value of Improved Containment," (with Frank von Hippel) Center for Energy and Environmental Studies Report PU/ CEES 94, Princeton University, January 1980.
"The Effects of Releases to the Atmosphere of Radioactivity from Hypothetical Large-Scale Accidents at the Proposed Gorleben Waste Treatment Facility " report -
to the Government of lower Saxony, Federal Republic of Gennany, as part of the "Gorleben International Review," February 1979.
3-I Reports (Cont'd. ):
" Reactor Safety Research at the Large Consequence End of the Risk Spectrum,"
presented to the Experts' Meeting on Reactor Safety Research in the Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn, September 1, 1978.
w.e A Study of Some of the Consequences of Hypothetical Reactor Accidents at Barseback_, report to tne Swedish Energy Commission Stockholm, 05 1 1978:5, January 1978.
II I Testimony:
"Some Consequences of Catastrophic Accidents at Indian Point and Their
- Implications for Emergency Planning," testimony and cross-e<aniination before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, on behalf of i the'New York State Attorney General and others, July 1982.
3 "In the Matter of Application of Orange and Rockland Counties, Inc. for Conversion to Coal of Lovett Units 4 and 5," testimony and cross-examination on tne health impacts of eliminating scrubbers as a recuirerent for conversion to
- coal; Department of Environmental Resources State of New York, November 5,1981.
'. " Future Prospects for Corrercial Nuclear Power in the United States," before the Subconr.ittee on Oversight and investigations, CoMittee on Interior and >
Insular Aff airs, U. 5. House of Representatives, October 23, 1981.
' "ctockpiling of Potassiu- Iodide for the Geneal Futlic as a Condition for Res tart of TM1 Uni t o.1,' testimony and cross-exa inatica before the Atomic
- *,2 clear Group Representing l
Safety and Licensir.g Board on tehalf of the Anti i York , April 1931.
I
" Advice and Recorrencations Concerning Changes in Reactor Design and Safety l Analysis which snould be Recuired in Lig-t of the Ac:ident at Three Mile Island,"
statec ent to the Nuclear Regulatory CorHssion ccncerning ta.e proposed rulemaking l
nearin) on degraced cores, Decetter 29, 19 D.
I j ' Altermt? ves to tne Indian Point huclear Reactrs, 5:3teTent before the Environ ental Protection Co---ittee of the ! ew ork C i t;. :cuncil, Cecenter 14, 1979.
'. Also before tne Cor.m ttee, "The Impact on ',ew Ycrk City of reactor Accidents at
- Indian Point," June 11, 1979 Also "Ccnsequerces of a C3:astrc;:nic Reactor
)
Accident," statement to the New York City Board cf Healto, 2uoust 12,1976 (with Frank von Hippel).
ac c i de n t ,' Testimony before
" Emergency Planning for a Catastrornic Reactor
- the California Energy Resources and Develo:: rent Comission. E ergency Response and Evacuation Plans Pearings, November 4, 1973, Page 171.
j t
' "Short-Tern Effects of Catastrophic Accidents on Cynun1ttes Surrounding the Sundesert Nuclear Installation " testimony before the California Energy Resources and Development Commission, December 3,1976.
" Consequences of Catastrophic Accidents at Je escort." Tes timony before the New York State Board on Electric Generation Sitinc and the Environrent in the Matter of Long Island Lighting Comoany (Jamesport Nuciear Power Station, Units I and 2), May 1977. _
4 Miscellaneous:
" Comments on WASH-1400," Statement to the Subconsnittee on Energy and the Environment, Oversight Hearings on Reactor Safety, June 11, 1976 Serial No. 94-61, Page 210. g
" Upper Limit Calculations of Deaths from Nuclear Reactors," Bull. Am. Phys.
Soc. 21, III (1976).
S
,__-_A
- EXHIBIT "B" PLANNING MILESTONES E55EEBE333333332333 New Hampshire
- 1. We have not received a complete submission of New Hampshire Plans. We understand that work is being completed on these sections:
- Letters of Agreement, including those referenced in appendix C of the local plans.' These letters, particularly for transportation, ^
are necessary so we will know what f acilities we will visit as part of the exercise. We need your proposal as to how you propose to demonstrate your exercise objectives so we can formul ate our observer strategy.
- Evacuation Time Estimate. We understand from reading the progress reports the updated ETE will require greatly increase personnel resources to staf f traf fic control posts.
-A & N Design Report, as referenced in state and local pl ans .
- needed to determine if local resources and training are sufficient to carry out all functions which may be assigned.
- 2. The plans do not show sufficient personnel resources at the 1ocal l evel s:
- personnel for emergency positions.
- provide for transit dependent popul ations as stated in the plan.
- proper number of dosimeters for the emergency workers.
- 3. Contingency P1ans l
l
- With respect to an exercise, we were informed that the following communities are not going to participate:
l - Rye
- South Hampton
- Hampton Fall s
- Hampton (possibly)
- We do not have contingency plans from the State of New Hampshire I which show what they plan to do in the event that local government (s) l does not perform the required emergency functions in the event of l
an accident at Seabrook l
l 4. The plans for those todhs with a beach popul ation and some state l
agencies procedures need to be revised to reflect their responsibil-t ities to assist in protecting that population in the event of an accident.
- 5. Local Plans are not specific as to how they will meet the needs of the transit dependent population, including mobility-impaired and institu-tional populations, such as hospitals and nursing homes. We, therefore, cannot evaluate the plans. We are also concerned that the local plans are excessively cumbersome as designed.
- 6. Actual install ation of at least minimum communications equipment.
- 1. Formal submission of p1ans from Massachusetts.
l l
, .-----e- - - - .,-,r-.
EXHIBIT "C"
,, ]own ofNamplon 9
350/S ]nniversary 1638 - 1988 January 16, 1986 U{5 QED
'86 J?N 21 pg:;9
'g~'
( .. .... .
i .7 h.i',Y. [B. . ...W. 3 0 L 50 - W Y dL Henry G. Vickers, Regional Director Federal Emergency Management Agency Region 1, J. W. McCormack Post Office
& Court House
.Ai C @6 Boston, MA. 02109
Dear Mr. Vickers:
The Hampton Board of Selectmen has requested in a separate letter that any public hearings held by your agency be held in the Seacoast area.
The Emergency Evacuation Plans for the Seabrook Power Station were forwaraea u ucur acency uilthout the aconoval of the Hampton 8 card.
On a 3-T \ \ absent) vote, a letter pointing cut utalcnesses <n Ute plans aus sent to Governor Sununu and Richatd Streme, the State Civil Defense Director, on October 29, f985. No response uns received until December 2nd and no changes in the plans were made then; the reply uns simply that our concerns were not valid. We understand that the plans were forwarded to FEMA on December 9th, hardly leaving your board time for further response.
We also understand that the plans were forwarded by FEMA to the HRC on January 8th, as reviewed but not approved. The Tcwn is very concerned as to what this transmittat means in terms of our being able to re-port to our citizens that ac have worked to get the best evacuation plan possible.
As the plans were sent without local board's approval, we feel that they should be returned for further work and not submitted until local comunities think that they are workable.
Sincerely,
! ,./FyRTHEBOAR0OFSELECTMEN I / p/V
/,iJohnR. Walker Chairman DRJlcb overnot Sununu; letter from Governor Sununu; and _
Encs: Copies of letter t
letter from Director Strome 136 Idinnacunnel Toad ]{amn/on, % ]ission[ amps $ ire 03H2 'lef 603-926 6M6 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm CC:
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1636 - 1966 October 29, 1985
'. Q h,3- --0L Honorable John Sununu
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Governor's Office
- State House Concord, New Hampshire 03301
Dear Governor Sununu:
The undersigned members of the Hampton Board of Selectmen wish to state their reservations about the adequacy of he Radiological Emergency Response Plan. Then reservations were publicly presented at a meeting of the Board on October 3,1985, a meeting scheduled between new members of *6e Board and local department heads, but which was attended by officials from New Hampshire Civil Defense.
Our original questions about the plan concerned population estimates.
We understand that the figure of 85,000 peak population has been revised to 110,000, a move in the right direction but still lower than traffic counts and local business figures indicate. Perhaps our best comment on the population figures is Gat they can only be an estimate and they will vary widely from day to day, especially on sumer mekends.
Other problems remain. Very serious are the estinates of the number of personnel required to ef feet an orderly
- evacuation. Each of our deurtment Leads annood that he tach snificient unp~d in _ennu cut the plan, but each has been infd in ROMW At ndditionat hety {ron thQ $ tate, Such advice appears to have been given to each town in de zone; obviously there will not be enough workers to go around. As a collary to the numbers required, there are no provisions for securitu lor workers' homes and families nor does here seem to be provision for specialized equipment other than dosimeters. It is unclear if de count on dosimeters is a State total or a town by tcw. total, as our radiological of ficer said that he could obtain all the equipment needed in a matter of a few hours. Is more protective apparatus, mch as suits or gicves or breathing apparatus, needed?
Another serious consideration is the lack of communication and coordination in moving school children out of de area. On October 3 the statement was made that Civil Defense is working wiu school officials; f ,$f $ f f l
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' October 29, 1985 Honorable John Sununu .
Page Two .
our 'leaal superintendent had received a copy of the plan the previous day.
There een many problems; number of buses available (for 16 towns!,
availability af suf ficient bhs drivers, traffic problems caused by
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parents trying to get to schools to pick up their own children, formal signed agreements with bus companies. An added problein with buses is -
de number of non-auto owning residents sdto would need transportation, and vacationers who are at the beach without automobiles.
There seem to be severe h consistencies in de amount of warning time available'to accomplish evacuation. Can consnanities rely on the 18-hour figure that was presented in August as the time we would have to act? The maximum figure given to move de population out (7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />
'and 40 minutes) is given for a summer population on a bad weather day; may we suggest that a sunner population on a very hot Sunday is likely to be larger and pose potentially more traffic problems, both with overheated cars and tempers?
We are not qualified to comment on the adequacy of most buildings on Hampton Beach for sheltering, if that should be d e preferred action.
Howver, the. plan completely ignores dat there may be thousands of beach goers clad only in bathing suits during a radiological accident.'
l.ast and vitally important is the problem of roads leading out of Hampton. The Church Street access to Route 51 and thence to Route 101 is hadequate for the " normal" non-panicked population. Route I is already over-loaded with daily winter traffic. All towns in the area will rely on these routes to get to 1-95; it shply cannot be done safetyorquickly. Nuclear plant owners and regulators have known for over six years that evacuation plans would be necessary; darkg that time no seriouswork has been done on Seacoast roads nor do there seem to be plans to improve these roads significantly.
In conclusion, this plan seems to be written primarily to justify the requirement that a plan exist rather than to make a serious attempt to evacuate an endangered citizenery. We have touched on what seem to us to be. ptimary and basic weaknesses. Added to these is Ge general distrust of our citizens towards de owners of the plant, occasioned by bconsistencies between promises mtde aetd results delivered during the construction process.
Ne would respectfully urge that you consider not approving this plan; but U ynn => st, that yqu do with the understanding that you are opposhg the recommendation of the maioritu of the Hamoton Ronnd n f-Selectmse Thank you for your consideration.
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cc: Richard Strome Gerarld Coogan [prysincerely, I ,
William Cahill , . . 2 A. 6- < -
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Robert Preston G JoTtn R. Walker State Representatives Area Towns
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -
110 CLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOPI N g g jggg>= 'g ATOMIC SAFETY A!!D LICENSI!!G BOARD 'G &
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Helen F. Hoyt, Chairman 'N ,ji Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Dr. Jerry Harbour
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In the matter of ) Docket Nos.
) 50-443-OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) 50-444-OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al. )
) (Off-Site EP)
.(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) __ N ) March 24, 1986 N
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[ N ANSWER OF ATTORNEY' GENERAL FRAriCIS X. BELLOTTI TO THE STAFFS', APPLICANTS' AND STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE'S RESPONSES TO 'iIS / CONTENTION RELATIVE TO EMERGENCY PLAtitlING FOR THE NSU HAMPSHIRE BEAC9 COMMUNITIES On February 21, 1986, Attorney General Bellotti submitted a single contention relating to the local emergency plans for the coastal New Hampshire communities within the Seabrook Emergency Planning Zone. On March 5, March 5 and March 14, respectively, the Applicants, State of New Hampshire and the Staff filed their responses to that contention. Attorney General Bellotti hereby responds to the Applicants, State of !!ew Hampshire, and Staff positions as set forth in those pleadings.
The State of Nes 3ampshire objects to the adnission of Attorney General Bellotti's contention "to the extent that (the] contention a[3erts that the protective actions of
't evacuation and sheltering must ensure complete protection to
-the transient beach population under all circumstances. . . ."
See, the State of new Hampshire's Response to contentions Filed by NECUP, the Commonwealth of Massachusets, the Townsaof Rye, Hampton, South Hampton, Kensington and Hampton Falls on the New Itampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan, dated March 6, 1986, at 5. The Applicants and Staf f similarly posit as their major basis for either limiting or not admitting the Attorney General's sole contention that, "neither the Commission's regulations not NUREG-0654 requires that absolute assurance of radiological safety be provided in the event of an emergency or that evacuations be completed in any particular time frame."
See, NRC Staff's Response to Contentions Filed By State of Massachusetts Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti, dated March 14, 1986, [ hereinafter " Staff's' Response"], at 3. See also, Applicants' Response to Of f-Si te EP Contentions Submi tted by Massachusetts Attorney General, dated March 5, 1986
[ hereinafter " Applicants' Response"), at 14. The short answer to these objections is that the Massachusetts Attorney General is not contending that emergency plans must assure absolute protection ander all circumstances or even that the protective action of evacuation must be complated sithin any particular amount at t i le . dor is the Attorney General contending, as the Applicants' response to our contention suggests, that one nust plan only for a worst case accident. Joe Applicants' 2esponse at 2-3.
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Unat tne Attorney General does contend is that, pursuant to the Commission's regulations, emergency response plans must provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and sill ce taken in response to a full spectrum of possible accident sequences, and that the tiew yampshire plans fail to neet this standard because they provide virtually no assurance that adequate protective measures can or will be taken in the event of a severe accident at the Seabrook power plant on a summer weekend. There can be no basis, then, for not admi tting Attorney General Bellotti's contention to this
. proceeding. The relevant inquiry at this stage is simply whether the contention states a violation of a regulatory requirement with reasonable specificity and this it clearly does.
The Staff and Applicant dould nevertheless argue that the contention is not ad.aissiale, as is, for the simple reason that
'the Commission has never established a precise level of protection wnich emergency plans .1ust meet. It does not
[ follow, however, that just because there is no absollte level of protaction required for emergency plans, that no standard at 1
I all exists against which protective response actions must be i
l j judged. See Applicants' Response at 15; Staff'a Response at 3-4. Commi ssion regulations require that there be " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be i
l i taken in the avent of a-radiological emergency." 10 C.?.R.
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S~50.47(2)(1). Thus, there is a standard, a level of protection, which nust ce satisfied. To say otherwise, would ue to disregard the plain meaning of the regulation which requires " adequate protection." Cf. Guard v. NRC, 753 F.2d 1144, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The fact that the Commission has not particularized that standard by establishing a " th r esha l l nu nber of unacceptable deaths or injuries" or otherwise further defined what constitutes " adequate protection," does not mean that a contention challenging the level of protection accorded
-in a'given instance is inadmissible. It means, rather, that dny such contention is admissible and it is then up to the Board to determine whether the level of protection provided is adequate, thus meeting the regulatory standard.
In the basis to our contention, we present evidence that evacuation within tne times currently estimated will, under typical meteorological conditions, subject thousands of beachgoers to doses which can lead to death in a natter of days. It is Attorney General Bellotti's contention that an emergency plan which relies solely on evacuation and aheltering as tne two posalble protective options, which cannot at oresent prevent thousands of beachgoers from being expose 1 to earl /
death doses by means of evacuation even under typical meteorological conditions, and which contains ao plans or provisions for aheltering the beach population does not provide adequate protection for that population.
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'laile tne Staff concedes that Attorney General Bellotti 's contention should be admitted to this proceeding, they seek to limit that contention by limi ting the evidence which t te Attorney General may introduce in support of i ts contention.
See Staff's Response at 2. Yet, fear that certain evidence or arguments might ce proferred in support of a contention is not a proper basis for limiting the admissibility of a contention.
The issue of what evidence may be introduced is just not a relevant inquiry at this stage in the proceedings. Moreover, the fact that the Commission has not further defined what constitutes " adequate protection" neans that the Board should not be able to limi t the type of evidence admissible on this point.
While it may oe the case that in a typical licensing proceeding it uoald oe unnecessary to look $t dose consequences of particular accidents to determine the adequacy of the provided protective response actions, Attorney General Bellotti intends to introduce evidence in support of i ts contention w1ich will ahow tnat, primarily due to the large 3unner beach popalati n , the si tuation at the Seabrook plint is unique; that emer genc/ response measures which :"ight be perfectly adequate to protect the populatians surrounding the average nuclear power plant are slaply not aJejuate to protact the sunner beach populatian ne)r the Seibrook plant. Tne Attorney General thus aceka to introduce r? levant evidence on this /ery serinus isfue 5_
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concerning tne ability of the New Hampshire Plan's energency response measures to provide adequate protection for the beach population. The admissibility of such relevant evidence should certainly not ce limited at this stage.
The staff also attempts to inappropriately narrow .\ttorney General Bellotti's contention to the sole issue of whether the New Hampshire Plan makes adequate provisi'on for sheltering the o
summer 'each population. Our contention, however, is intended to address the broader requirement that the plan provide
" reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken" to protect the beach population. Since there has, to date, been no examination of the availability of adequate sheltering for the beach population, the contention cannot be so limited with respect to the possible means for providing adequate protection. Other potential neans for assuring adequate protection include improvements in t ra f fi c management or control or improvements in the evacuation network to decrease avacuation times, examination of alternative protective options such as evacuation by foot, and inposition of a li cen.H condi tion pronibi ting operation of the f acili ty during tne sunner nonths. Agai n , the commission's regulation is not restrictive in terms of the .neans by which adequate protecti)n .u s t ce provided and the Board and ,oacties to t'w proceeding einnot, therefora, be restricted to sheltering as the sole meana for provi ding tne necessary protection.
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4 The oni/ remaining objection to our contention, not yet addressed, is the Applicants' objection, that the issues raised by our contention should have been litigated at the si ting stage. We agree wi th the Appli cants, in part. Unfortunately tnis sas not possiole to do. Tne Appli cants received their construction permit uefore the Commission's current emergency planning regulations, requiring evacuation planning for the area within ten miles around a nuclear power plant, were in effect. When taese emergency planning regulations did become ef fecti ve, Attorney General Bellotti supported the Seacoast Anti-pollution League ["SAPL"] in seeking an Order to Show Cause why the construction permit for the Seabrook nuclear power plant snould not be suspended or revoked. See, demorandum of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in Support of Seacoast Anti-Pollution Leagae's Request for an Order to Show Cause dated June 30, 1990, dated March 13, 1981. In that proceeding, we soaght to have determined the feasibility of evacuating the population within ten miles around the Sea 5 rook plant. The Applicants argaed, hosever, and the Canaission ruled, tnat the issue of evacuability was one to oe decided at tne licensing stage. See SAPL v. ?!RC , 690 F.2d 1025 (9.C. Cir.
1980). The Applicants, then, would place the Attorney General in a "Caten-22" type of situation, in which this inportant issue aver the adequacy of the *!ew lampshire plans' protective responses may naver ce heard. That position is sinply
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- untenaole. As the court affirmed in _SAPL, the issue of whether adequate protection responses can irid will ce implemented wi th resp'ect to the summer beach popula. tion tiear the Seabrook
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. n'uclear power plant is an issue of emergency planning properly before the Licensing Board at this time. SAPL v. FIRC, suora at i 1030. '
Respectfully submitted, FRAT 1CIS X. BELLOTTI '
4,TTORt!EY GErlERAL '
,4 By: O-b - < la .E Carol S. Sneidet Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division Department of the. Attorney General One Ashburton Place, Room 1902 Boston, f4A 'J 210 8 tiarch 24, 1986 b
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA N NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,
q g3p,rfp Before Administrative Judges': :Q, /'s /,f Helen F. Hoyt, Chairperson s' '" -V f;?
Emmeth A. Luebke Jerry Harbour ., ,j/
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In the Matter of )
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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW ) Docket Nos.
HAMPSHIAE, ET AL. ) 50-433/444-OL (Seaocook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) (Off-Site EP)
) April 16, 1986
)
BRIEF OF ATTORNEY GENERAL FRANCIS X. BELLtTTI IN SUPPORT OF ADMITTING HIS CONTENTION RELATIVE TO EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR THE NEN HAMPSHIRE BEACH COMMUNITIES On February 21, 1986, Attorney General Francis X. Sellotti suomitted a single contention in this proceeding (attached hereto as " Exhibit A'] relating to the emergency plans for the coastal New Hampshire communities within the Seabrook Emergency Planning Ione. That contention states :
The draft radiological emergency response plans for the Towns of Seabrook, Hampton, North Hampton, and Rye do not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the Seabrook Station, as required by 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(a)(1), because in the event of a severe accident on a summer weekend some or all of the beach area transient populations within enose communities cannot under many plausicle
.neteorologic 1 conditions be protected by means l
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of evacuation even from early death and because there are not adequate plans or provisions for sheltering the beach area transients within those communities.
On Maren 5, 1986, the Applicants filed a response to Attorney General Sellotti's contention seeking to exclude it from this proceeding. See .*.pplicants ' Response to Off-Site Ep Contentions Submitted oy Masnacnusetts Attorney General, dated March 5,1986 (hereinaf ter " Applicants ' Response'] . Or.
March 14, 1996, the Staf f filed a response seeking to limit Attorney General Bellotti's contention. See NRC Staff's Response to Contentions Filed by State of Massachusetts Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti, dated March 14, 1986.
Attorney General Bellotti hereby files this brief in support of adiaitting his contention. # ,
I. The Contention States a violation of a Regulatory Standard wi th Reasonaole Speci ficity.
The Commission regulations which form the basis for Attorney General Bellotti's contention are 10 C.F.R.
Regulation S 50.47(a)(1) and 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b ) (10 ) .
50.47(a)(1) provides, in relevant part , that "no operating 1/ On March 24, 1986, the Attorney General filed a written Answer to the Sta f f's , Applicants ' and State o f New Hampshire 's Responses to his contention. See Answer of Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti to the Staf f 's, Applicants ' and State of New Hampsnire's Responses to His Contention Relative to Emergency planning for tne New Hampshire Beach Communities '
dated March 24, 1986 [hereinaf ter " Answer of Attorney General Bellotti"). This brief, requested by the Licensing Board at the pre-hearing conference on March 26, 1986, is intended as a supple men t to that An swe r .
License for a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless a finding is made by NRC that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(a)(1).
Regula tion 50.4 7( b ) (10 ) requires for a license to issue that
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- (al range of protective actions have been developed for the plume exposure patnway EPZ for emergency workers and the public (and that] (g]uidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent Eith Federal guidance, are developed and in place . . . " 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(10).
The regulatory standards for omergency plans set forth at 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b) can only be viewed in conjunction with the ultima te standard o f 10 C. F.R. S 50.47(a)(1)
- that there be reasonaole assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken. " See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) ALA3-818-22, NRC 651, 676-77 (1985) (Although Appeal Board agrees tnat an evacuation can be accomplisned without traffic management and, further, that there is no' requirement in the regulations for traf fic control not any requirement that an evacuation be accomplished within any specified amount o f time , the Board nonetheless finds that the emergency plans must still satisfy the reasonable assurance of adequate protection. standard set forth at 10 C.F.R.
S 50.47(a)(1) and'that Lilco's evacuation plans do not.);
Commonwealth Edison Co. (3fron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1
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and 2), LBP-84-2, 19 NRC 36, 252-3 (1984) ("The (applicable]
law is drawn from the general standards in 10 C.F.R. 50.47(b) and the more specific evaluation Criteria of NUREG-0654, FE;iA-REP-1, . . . .
But there is one rule which applies to all the (emergency planning issues] . . . : No operating
' license will be issued unless 'there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.' 10 C.F.R. 50.47(a)(1).");
Consolidated Edison Co. of New lork (Indian Point, , Units 2 and
- 3) LBP-83-68, 18 NRC all, 989 (1983) ("The adequacy of the roads can only be judged by determining whether or not there is reasonaole assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(a)(1).").
Thus, the mere f act that an emergency plan provides for a range of protective responses in satisf action of the super ficial requi rements o f 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(10) does not necessarily mean that ene range of protective responses would ce sufficient to satisfy the adequate protection standard of Section 50. 47 (4 )( 1) . See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. ,
suora. What the Commission's regulations require, then, is not a
just the provision of a range of protective responses, but range of protective responses which will provide " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken . . .
C.F.R. S 50.47(a)(1) ( emphasis added) .
4 Applicants , thus , miss the point when they claim our I contention should oe excluded because there is "no NRC requirement that any particular level of safety be demonstrated, either in general or given any particular accident scenario. " See Applicants ' Response at 15. While i t is true that there is no requirement that evacuations be complated within any set amount of time and also true that there is no particularized level of protection which must be af forded by evacuation, or by any other protective response, there is still a standard -- requiring reasonable assurance of
" adequate" protection -- that must be met. If the Applicants' view of the Commission standards were taken literally that would mean that the Commission's regulations could always be satisfied simply by having an evacuation plan in place, regardless of the eff ectiveness of such plan.1# According to
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J this reading of the regulations, the Commission's standards
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'would be met even in a case where it could be shown that the response of evacuation could never work, that is never protact people from radia tion injury. Yet the ver y term " pro *.ective response" means a response which will " cover or shield from in]ury or destruction." See Webster's Seventh New 2/ Licensing Boards, however, have consistently looked to the ef fectiveness of an evacuation response in assessing the adequacy of emergency response plans. See e.g., Long Island Lign ti ng Co . , sup ra , 22 URC at 676-77; Consolidated Edison Co.,
supra, 13 NRC at 939-90; The Detroit Edison Co. (Errico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LSP-82-96, 16 NRC 1403, 1422-23 (1982).
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Collegiate Dictionary 68 5 (1965). Thus, inherent in the very requirement of protective responses is a requirement that there be some adequate level of safety afforded by that response. To say otherwise would be to disregard the plain meaning of the Commis sion 's regu la ti ons . Cf . Guard v . iiRC , 753 F.2d 1144, 1149 ( D.C. Ci r . 19 35 ) .
Moreover, it simply does not follow f rom the f act that there is no specified amount of time within which an evacuation must be accomplished, that there is no standard of protection wnich must be provided by the proposed emergency response -
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actions. What does follow is that one cannot look at any one particular protective response and require that it, alone, ,
provide a certain level of protection. Rather, one must look at the range of protective responses provided in an emergency plan to determine wnether, together, they provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken. Thus, repeatedly, when f aced with the issue of whether a particular protective response, such as evacuation, is adequate licensing ooards have only been able to answer by determining whether there is another prote'ctive response, such as sheltering, which would provide adequate protection in those instances when the evacuation response would not. E.g.,
Consolidated Edison Co., supra, 18 NRC at 990-91 (1983);
Southern California Edison Co. (San Onof re Nuclear Generating i
Station, Units 2 and 3) LBP-82-39, 15 NRC 1163, 1184-86 (1482);
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Kansas Gas & Electric Co . (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Uni t 1), LSP-84-26, 20 NRC 53, 90 (1984).1#
Thus, it is clear, that Attorney General Bellotti's contention which asserts, in essence, that the " range" of protective responses provided in the New Hampshire pland/
cannot, under many plausible meteorological conditions, prevent thousands of beachgoers from even early death, and hence does not provide the requisite reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken for the summer beach population near Seabrook, asserts a violation' of a regulatory basis with reasonable specificity and is therefore admissible.
The NRC Staff nonetheless seeks to limit the admission of the Attorney General's cont'ention to the extent ic seeks to litigate:
(a) the dose consequences of radiological accidents or of any specific accident sequences (including the " site-specific accident consequence analysis" referred to in the 3/ It is in large part for this reason, that protective responses must be viewed togetner in order to determine their adequacy, that Attorney General Bellot ti objects to the Staff's attecpt to limit its contention to the sole issue of whether there exi'st adequate sheltering f or the beach populati6n. The adequacy of sheltering cannot be viewed in a vacuum, but can only be determined when viewed in context with the other protective response options provided in the New Hampshire plans.
4/ In fact, as our contention and its bases point out, insofar as the transient oeach population is concerned, the New
- dampshire Plan does not provide a " range" of protective responses at all; it provides only one protective response --
evacuation. And evacuation, our contention asserts, will not under many circumstances provide adequate protection.
contention's " basis" ; (b ) the assertion that emergency planning must assure any particular level of dose protection for the general public; or (c) accident sequences contained in the
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Applicants' probabilistic safety assessment.
Staff's Response at 2. Yet as the Attorney General has stated previously, fear that certain evidence or arguments might be' prof fered in support of a contention is not a proper basis for limiting the admissibility of a contention. The only relevant issue at this point in these proceedings is whether our .
contention states a violation of a regulatory basis, and this it clearly does. The issue of what evidence may be introduced Moreover, the fact that is just not relevant at this ' stage.
the Commission has not seen fit to further define the term
" adequate protection" by estaolishing "a threshold number of unacceptable deaths or injuries," see Staf f's Response at 4, does not mean that a contention cnallenging the level of protection accorded in a given instance is inadmissible or that the Board should be acle to limit the Egge of evidence admissiole on this point. It means, r ather, that any such contention is admissiole , and it is then up to the Board to determine the adequacy of the protective reponse based on all
'the relevant evidence offered on that issue.
Moreover, the fact that the Commis sion has f ailed to quanti fy or further define what constitutes " adequate" that protection can only be viewed as a reflection of the f act tni s c annot be done on a generic basis . Rather, contrary to
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the Staff's asser tion , i t is only by engaging in site-specific analysis that one can determine the adequacy of a specific emergency plan. As one licensing board so aptly noted:
(M]any aspects of emergency plans . . . are oy their very nature site specific. We doubt whether the Commission could prescribe, by rule, a generic emergency plan suitable for all reactor sites, as the Staff's argument seems to suggest. In any event, the Commission did not try to do that, . . . . Except for the specific 10 mile EPZ, the rule speaks in general terms, such as " adequate" emergency f acilities,
-- equ ipment , methods , systems. 5 50.47(b)(8),
(9). A Board can only judge " adequacy" with respect to levels of risn, some of which vary from site to site.
Southern California Edison comoany (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-81-36, 14 NRC 691, 698-99'(1981).
It would simply not be reasonable for the Commission to set a precise level o f dose which, in order for a plant to become licensed, no one could ever receive under any circumstance.
And At torney Gene ral Bellotti does not contend that any plan wherein some people might under some circumstances receive deata-level doses would be inadequate. Under that standard, it is doubtful that any nuclear power plan could ever be licensed. What the Commission's regulations do require, then, is that any determination of adequacy be made on a case-by-case basis. Thus tne Commission has lef t it up to the licensing
'coards, snen presented with evidence o f inadequacy, to weigh all the relevant ev ,id ence , including levels of doses, numbers I
O of people who might be af fected by those doses, and the probabilities of such accidents occurring, in order that they may properly assess whether a plan provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be e.g., The Detroit Edison Co. , supra,16 NRC at taken.. See, 1424-29; Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBp-83-8D, 17 NRC 306, 310 (1982) Consolidated Edison Co., supra t 18 NRC at 989-90.
The Staf f seems to argue, however, that any litigation involving site-specific consequence analyses is inappropriate simply because NUREG-065 4 provides that *(n]o single specific accident sequence should be isolated as the one for which to plan . . .". See Sta ff's Response at 3.1/ Although the
- Staff is correct enat emergency plans should not be developed with one specific or worst-case accident in mind, the Commission's regulations do require, as noted by the Staf f, that emergency plans "have the flexibility to ensure response to a wide spectrum of accidents." sta tenent of Consideration, "Eme rgency Planning," 4 5 Fed. Reg. 5540 2 *( August 19, 1980).
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S/ The Applicants' argument, that our contention should be excluded for the mere reason that if we were to present evidence on site-specific consequences they would present evidence contrary to ours , see Applicants ' Response at 15-16, is absurd. The very purpose of an evidentiary hearing is for presentation of evidence on both sides of an issue so that the true facts may come to light. That the Applicants may have evidence to counter ours is certainly no basis for excluding our contention. -Cf. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche
' Peak Stream Elec. Sta. , Unles 1 and 2) LSP-82-37, 16 NRC 1195, i 1199 (1982) ( *(The Board] has the righ t and duty to develop a full record for decision-making in the puolic interest.") .
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And, if a contention asserts, as does the Attorney General's, that with respect to a portion of that planning spectrum, the plans provide virtually no assurance that for large numbers of people adequate protective measures can and will be taken, that is something the Board must look at in determining the adequacy of that emergenc' plan. See, e.g., Philadelphia Electric Co.
(Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2) ALAS-819, 22 NRC 681, 713 (1985); consolidated Edison Co., supra, 18 NRC at 989.
The Attorney General, as part of the bases for his contention, has presented evidence that the evacuation resp:nse provided in the New Hampshire plans will, under typical meteorological conditions, subject thousands of beachgoers to
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doses which can lead to death in a matter of days." It is Attorney General Bellotti's contention that an emergency plan which relies solely on evacuation and sheltering as the two possible protective options, which cannot at present prevent as many as fifteen thousand beachgoers from being exposed to early death doses by means of evacuacien even under typical meteorological conditions, and which contains no plans or provisions for sheltering the beach population, does not provide adequate protection for that population.
In light of such evidence, the Board must do more than just simply assess whether an evacuation or sheltering plan is in place, or whether all the superficial requirements of 10 C.F.R.
S 50.47(b) have been met, for it to determine the adequacy of 4
the New Hampshire plans. See, e.g., Southern California Edison Co., supra, 14 NRC at 699 (" Licensing Boards are required to make an overall general finding of ' reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.' 5 50.47(a). Such a finding.goes beyond a check-list determination of whether a plan meets the standards of 10 C.F.R. 50.47."). Although it may be the case that in a typical licensing proceeding, it would be unnecessary to look at dose consequences of particular accidents to determine the adequacy of protective responses, Attorney General Bellotti intends to introduce evidence in support of his contention (some of which has already been set forth in the basis for his contention) which will show that, primarily due to the large summer beach population which exists within close proximity to the Seabrook plant, the situation for the Seabrook nuclear power plant is unique that emergency response measures which might be perfectly adequate to protect the populaticns adequate to surrounding the average power plant are simply not The Board, protect the summer beach population near Seabrook.
then, has an obligation when confronted with this important safety issue to look beyond the me're fact of an eva.cuation plan, and to examine all the relevant evidence on this issue if it is ever to properly assess whether this New Hampshire emergency response plan does in fact provide " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be l
taken." 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(a)(1) (emphasis added). Cf., )
Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CL1-84-811, 20 NRC 1, 9 (1984).b II. Attorney General Bellotti's Contention Relative to the Summet Beach population Raises an Important Issue of Emergency planning that is Properly before this Licensing Board. .
Applicants proffer as their prime argument for excluding Attorney General Bellotti's contention from this proceeding that the Attorney General's contention is not properly before this Board now,because the issue of whether the beach
- i population can be adequately protected is really an issue to be litigated at the siting, not the emergency planning, stage.
The Applicants are simply wrong on this score. The issues raised by Attorney General Bellotti's concention are indeed emergency planning issues properly before this Board. .See SAPL
- v. NRC, 690 F.2d 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
- The Applicants received their construction permit to build the plant at Seabrook in 1976, well before the accident at Three Mile Island and well before the Commission's emergency 1/ If indeed the Board perceives this as a situation involving a " regulatory gap," then the unique safety issues presented by this case should warrant sufficient concern for the Board to nevertheless admit this contention for hearing. Cf., Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2),
LBP-82-106, 16 NRC 1649, 1655 (1982); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Sta.) Units 1 and 2, LBP-8 2-16, 16 NRC 1937, 1946 (1982).
planning regulations , requiring evacuation planning for the area within ten miles around a nuclear power plant, were in effect or even contemplated. Nevertheless, the Attorney General did seek to have heard at that stage in the proceeding the issue of wnether the beach population near Seabrook could feasinly be evacuated in the event of an emergency. See Public Service Co. of New Macpshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-390, 5 NRC 733 (1977). The Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board decided, however, that although there was a sizable beach population as close as 1.6 miles to the proposed .
plant, there was no need to determine the feasibility of safely evacuating that population since it was outside the LPZ. Id.;
Public Se'evice Company o f New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAS-422, 6 NRC 33 (1977); aff 'd NECNP v. NRC ,
582 F.2d 87 (1st Cir. 1979). Af ter the Commission's new emergency planning regulations went into effect, Attorney General Bellotti joined Seacoast Anti-Pollution League in seeking to again have heard the issue of the feasibility of evacuating the summer beach population . See puolic Service Co.
- of New 3ampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), DD-91-14, 14 NRC 27 9 (1981) . In that case, the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation decided that cased on current information it was not inf easible to develop an emergency plan f or the area surrounding Seabr ook , and that continuation of the plant's construction did not pose such an imminent threat as to warrant A
A the extraordinary measure of suspending the construction permit. Id. at 285-86. tievertheless the Director emphasized that "this decision does not presume to decide the adequacy of emergency preparedness f or the Seabrook Station," id. at 285, and "that in order to receive an operating license, the applicant must do all things necessary to ensure safe operations of the f acility.' Id,. at 286 (emphasis added). See also SAPL v. NRC, supra. .
Yet, the Applicants seek to exclude our contention from this proceeding, ar gu ing , in effect, that just because they were able to satisfy all the Commission's criteria for a construction permit in 1976, that they have some automatic right, ten years later, to receive an operating license regardless of their ability to satisfy all the standards
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imposed by the Commission's emergency planning regulations.
See Applicants ' Response at 16. This is simply not the case.
See Power Reactor v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 411 (1960).
Innerent in the Commissions two-stage licensing process is the concept enat the Commission's regulations and safety standards are not s ta tic . There can be no guarantee in this rapidly developing field of nuclear safety that a proposed nuclear power plant , able to satisfy all the criteria for issuance of a construction permit, will later be able to satisfy all the newly imposed safety standards for issuance o f an operating license. See, e.g., Powe r Reactor , supra.
6 Indeed, even once an operating license is issued, the process does not stop and the Commission may revoka the license of any plant unable to satisfy new safety or emergency planning standards. See, e .g. , Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Units No. 2 and No. 3 ), CLI-83-16,17 NRC 1006 (1983) . Thus, regardless of the fact that the Seabrook plant in 1976 satisfied all the siting criteria necessary to receive a construction permit, it must still satisfy all the Commission's emergency planning standards before it can receive its license to operate. See, e .g. , Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, supra, 14 thRC at 279.
Furthermore, Attorney General Bellotti does n,o,t contend herein that no energency plan could ever be devised for the Seabrook plant which would satisfy the Commission's standards.
What the Attorney General does contend is that the current New Hampshire plan does not satisfy those standards. The Applicants are incorrect, however, when they say that all the Commission ever requires by way of emergency planning is to do the best possible with the facilities at hand. See Applicants '
Response at 2. With respect to certain other of the Commission's emergency planning regulations applicants have certainly recognized that they would have to do more than simply the oest with what is at hand. 9ence, the Applicants have erected sirens throughout the EPZ to satisfy the noti fication stand,ards o f Regulation 50.57 (b )( 5 ) , and have
installed elaborate equipment, bought supplies , and even built f acilities to satisfy the emergency f acility and resource requir ements of Regulations 50.47(b )( 6 ) ,(8 ) , (9) and (11).
Thus it is that licensing boards in considering the adequacy of emergency response measures, when conf ronted with the possibility that adequate protection may not be feasible at a particular site, have in fact considered the necessity of requiring what the Applicant would term " extraordinary measures." See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co., suora, 18 NRC at 991 (Board considers the necessity of widening roads); ,
Consumer Powers Co. ( Big Rock Point Plant), LSP-94-32, 20 NRC 601, 695-96 (1984) (Board requires Applicant to consider remedies, including new roads and road improvements, to alleviate problem of serious traffic congestion f rom occasional summer rock conce rts. ); The Detroit Edison Co., supra, 16 NRC at 1428 (Board considers, and rejects as unjustified under the circumstances, the building of a new evacuation route for a small portion of the population near the plant); Consumers Powe r Co. (Big Rock Point Plant), LBP-82-77-16 NRC 1096, 1100 (1982) (If no means for relocating the public transit-dependent portion of the population exists, then Applicant may need to supply the resources "out of its own pocket.") .
Wnile Attorney General 3ellotti is not suggesting that
" extraordinary measures" will* necessarily be required at the Seaurook site, the Attorney General does contend that whatever L7 -
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is necessary to satisfy the commission's standards of reasonable assurance of adequate protection must be met before this plant can ever receive its license to operate. The safety of the beach population cannot be igno red. If this means, as
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the Applicants suggest, that this plant may never receive a license to operate because, being sited so close 'to populous beaches, the conmission's emergency planning standards could never be satisfied, see Applicants' Response at 16, then that mus t be the case. Under the present emergency response plans there is no reasonable assurance that the summer beach population can be adequately protected, and if it requires, then, that the Applicants must take some " extraordinary measures" to achieve that requisite assurance of adequate protection, then the Applicants must take those necessary measures. There can be no basis, however, for excluding Attorney General Bellotti's contention f rom this proceeding f or the reason Applicants posit, that if the facts supporting his contention are proven true extraordinary measures might be required to provide reasonaole assurance o f adequate protection.
e 1 -
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D CONCLUSION For all the foregoing reasons, the contention of Attorney General Francis X. Be llo tt i should be admitted to this proceeding.
Respectfully submitted, FRANCIS X. BELLOTTI
, By:
Carol S. Sneider .
Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division Department of the Attorney General One Ashburton Place, Room 190 2 Boston, MA 02108 (617) 727-2265 Da ted: April 16, 1986 i
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION MAY 20198P T mas $?
ncu A In the Matter.of )
.C
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PUBLIC. SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW ) Docket No.(s) 50-433/444-OL HAMPSHIRE, ET AL. )
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) )
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t CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Carol S. Sneider, hereby certify that on May 15, 1986 I made service of the within document by mailing copies thereof, postage prepaid, by first class mail, or as indicated by an asterisk by express mail, or as indicated by a double asterisk by hand delivery to:
- Helen Hoyt, Chairperson *Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Atomic Safety & Licens'.ng Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulator,' Commission Commission East West Towers Build.ng East West Towers Building 4350 East West Highway 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814 Bethesda, MD 20814
- Dr. Jerry Harbour *Sherwin E. Turk, Esq.
Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Office of the Executive Legal U.S. Nuclear Regulatory. Director Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East West Towers Building East West Towers Building 4350 East West Highway 4350 East West Highway i Bethesda, MD 20814 Bethesda, MD 20814 H. Joseph Flynn, Esq. Stephen E. Merrill, Esq.
Assistant General Counsel Attorney General Office of General Counsel George Dana Bisbee, Esq.
l Federal Emergency Management Assistant Attorney General Agency Office of the Attorney General 500 C Street, S.U. 25 Capitol Street
- j. ,
Washington, DC 20472 Concord, NH 03301 l
l 1
4 Docketing and Service Paul A. Fritzsche, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Office of the Public Advocate Commission State House Station 112 Washington, DC. 20'55 Augusta, ME 04333 Roberta C. Pevear Ms. Diana P. Randall State Representative 70 Collins Street Town of Hampton Falls Seabrook, NH 03874 Drinkwater Road Hampton Falls, NH 03844
- Atomic Safety & Licensing Robert A. Backus, Esq.
Appeal Board Panel Backus, Meyer & Solomon U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 116 Lowell Street Commission P.O. Box 516 Washington, DC 20555 Manchester, NH 03106 Atomic Safety & Licensing Jane Doughty Board Panel Seacoast Anti-Pollution League U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 5 Market Street Commission Portsmouth, NH 03801 Washington, DC 20555 Paul McEachern, Esq. J. P. Nadeau Matthew T. Brock, Esq. Board of Selectmen Shaines & McEachern 10 Central Road 25 Maplewood Avenue Rye, NH 03870 P.O. Box 360 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Ms. Sandra Gavutis, Chairperson Mr. Calvin A. Canney Board of Selectmen City Manager RFD 1, Box 1154 City Hall Rte. 107 126 Daniel Street E. Kingston, NH 03827 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Mr. Angelo Machiros, Chairman U.S. Senate Board of Selectmen Washington, DC 20510 25 High Road (Attn: Tom Burack) Newbury, MA 10950 Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Mr. Peter J. Matthews 1 Pillsbury Street Mayor Concord, NH 03301 City Hall (Attn: Herb Boyntca) Newburyport, MA 01950 Mr. Donald E. Chick William Lord Town Manager Board of Selectmen Town of Exeter Town Hall 10 Front Street Friend Street Exeter, NH 03833 Amesbury, MA 01913
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Brentwood Board of Selectmen Gary W. Holmes, Esq.
RFD Dalton Road Holmes & Ellis Brentwood, NH 03833 47 Winnacunnet Road Hampton, NH 03841 Philip Ahrens, Esq. Diane Curran, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General Harmon & Weiss Department of the Attorney suite 430 General 2001 S Street, N.W.
State House Station #6 Washington, DC 20009 Augusta, ME 04333 Thomas G. Dignan, Esq. Richard A. Hampe, Esq.
R.K. Gad III, Esq. Hampe & McNicholas Ropes & Gray 35 Pleasant Street 225 Franklin Street Concord, NH 03301 Boston, MA 02110 Beverly Hollingworth Edward A. Thomas 209 Winnacunnet Road Federal Emergency Management Hampton, NH 03842 Agency 442 J.W. McCormack (POCH)
Boston, MA 02109 William Armstrong Michael Santosuosso, Chairman Civil Defense Director Board of Selectmen Town of Exeter Jewell Street, RFD 2 10 Front Street South Hampton, NH 03827 Exeter, NH 03833 Stanley W. Knowles, Chairman Mrs. Anne E. Goodman, Chairperson Board of Selectmen Board of Selectmen P.O. Box 710 13-15 Newmarket Road North Hampton, NH 03862 Durham, NH 03824 Allen Lampert Administrative Judge Sheldon Civil Defense Director J. Wolfe, Chairnan Town of Brentwood Atomic Safety and Licensing 20 Franklin Street Board Panel Exeter, NH 03833 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Jerard A. Croteau, Constable 82 Beach Road, P.O. Box 5501 Salisbury, MA 01950 f [wb5 0
- M C Carol S. Sneider G
4 Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division May 15, 1986