ML20153D082
| ML20153D082 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 02/18/1986 |
| From: | Finkelstein L, Wagner M, Matt Young NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17342A383 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#186-144 OLA-2, NUDOCS 8602240021 | |
| Download: ML20153D082 (19) | |
Text
- .
bi .c Ci
,ObCNSTSO18. 1986 USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA . . . . .
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '86 FEB 20 P1 :53 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BQAR,D y Yi0'CENIsY; 'N:7.__.,
In the Matter of ) BRANC4
) Docket Nos. 50-250 OLA-2 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) 50-251 OLA-2
)
(Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 and 4) ) (SFP Expansion)
NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO LICENSEE MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION OF CONTENTIONS I. INTRODUCTION On June 7, 1984, the NRC published in the Federal Register a notice of consideration of the issuance of amendments to the facility licen ses for the Turkey Point Plant and offered an opportunity for a hearing on the amendments. 49 Fed. Reg. 23712. The amendments allow the expansion of the spent fuel pool stcrage capacity. By Order of September 16, 1984, the Licensing Board admitted the Center for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. and Joette Lorion (Intervenors) and seven of their proffered contentions (Contenflons 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10) .
On January 23, 1986, Florida Power & Light Company (Licensee) filed a motion for summary disposition of each contention raised by i Intervenors. The motion is accompanied by a statement of material facts as to which it is asserted there is no genuine issue to be heard and affidavits concerning each contention. For the reasons set forth below, the Staff supports the Licensee's motion for summary disposition of' each contention except Contention 4.
~
' . ~ . . .
l 8602240021e602$50 ADOCK PDR PDR C -
l l
Go ,
p
= -
2.-
II. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standards for Summary Disposition The Commission's Rules of Practice provide that summary dispcsition of any matter involved in a licensing proceeding shall be granted if the moving papers, together with the other papers fi. ed in the proceeding,-
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party -is entitled to a decision as a matter of law. 10 C.F.R.
I 2.749(d). The use of summary disposition has been encouraged by the Commission and the Appeal Board to avoid unnecessary . hearings on contentions for which an intervenor has failed to establish the existence
~
of a genuine issue of material fact. Eg , Statement of Policy on l
Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452, 457- (1981);
Houston Lighting and Power Company (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating-Station , Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542, 550-551- (1980); Northern States Power Company (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 ,
and 2), ALAB-107, 6 AEC 138,194 (1973), aff'd, CLI-73-12, 6 AEC 241, 242 (1973), aff'd sub nom, BPI v. AEC, 502 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir.1974).
A material fact is one that may affect the outcome of the litigation.
Mutual Fund Investors Inc. v. Putnam hianagement Co. , 553 F.2d 620, 624 (9th Cir.1977).
When a motion for summary disposition is made and supported by affidavit, a party opposing the motion may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his answer but must set forth. specific facts A such as would be admissible in evidence that show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. 10 C.F.R. I 2.749(b). All material facts set forth in the statement of material facts required to be served by the f
N
- , - . . , - - - ,- - - - . . - - . . , , . .v-
i..
g
. moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement of material facts required to be served by the opposing party.
10 C.F.R. I 2.749(a). Any answers supporting or opposing a motion for summary disposition must be served within twenty (20) days after service of motion. d. If no answer properly showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact is filed, the decision sought by the moving party, if properly supported, shall be rendered. 10 C.F.R.
I 2.749(b).
B. The Staff's Affidavits Support Licensee's Motion for Summary Disposition of Contentions 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10 but Summary Dismissal of Contention 4 is Not Justified
- 1. Contention 3 Contention 3 states:
That the calculation of radiological consequences resulting from a cask drop accident are not conservative, and the radiation releases in such an accident will not be ALARA, and will not meet with the 10 CFP [ sic] Part 100 criteria.
Contention 3, as admitted by the Licensing Board and in view of the bases presented, alleges that the calculation of radiological consequences of a cask drop accident does not comply with the NRC's Standard Review Plan (SRP), NUREG-0800, Regulatory Guide 1.25, and the release limits in 10 C.F.R. Parts 20, 50 and 100 because the radial peaking factor used in the analysis is not adequately conservative. The Licensing Board, however, ruled that " reference to the ALARA principle is inappropriate because ALARA generally applies to routine operation, not accidents." Memorandum and Order of September 16, 1985, at 12.
The Staff has read the Licensee's statement of material facts and agrees that those facts demonstrate that there are no genuine factual issues to
- . - .- ~ . . .
Y
. _ 4:-
i be litigated as to ' Contention 3. See - Affidevit of ' Millard Wohl on Contention 3 ("Wohl Affidavit-3") (attached) . The Staff further believes that Licensee's statement of material facts is supported by the : Staff's Safety Evaluation (SE), dated November 21, 1984, which was prepared in 3
connection with the issuance of the amendments. Wohl Affidavit-3 at i 2.
$ Title 10 of the Code of: Federal Regulations _ sets forth three different sets of guidelines that govern radioactive materials and radiation doses. Their respective scopes and purposes have been briefly 4-summarized as follows:
10 C.F.R. Part 20 (including Appendices) servea as a guide
~
to the packaging and handling of radioactive materials and lists the allowable concentrations of radioactive materials that
- may be tolerated in air and in water in ; restricted access
- areas as well as in nonrestricted access areas.
10 C.F.R. Part 50. Appendix I provides, for LWRs, guidance regarding plant design and operation such that the resultant -
radiological doses from plant effluents are acceptably low in i
restricted and unrestricted access areas. Numerical dose guideline values are given for normal operation and for expected operational occurrences such as DBAs.
- 10 C.F.R. Part 100 deals with reactor site criteria. The dose guidelines provided therein are not offered as biologically
~
acceptable values. Rather, they. deal with severe accident doses that must not be exceeded for 'any specific proposed reactor (not limited to _ LWRs) at any specific proposed site.
As such, they offer guidance only with respect to site suitability.
4 United States Department of Energy 1 (Clinch River - Breeder Reactor Plant), LBP-84-4, 7 288, 355, vacated in part on other grounds,;
- ALAB-761, 19 NRC 487 (1984). Dose guidelines for specific LWR accidents are specified in -the Standard Review Plan , NUREG-0800,
[ typically as fractions of the site suitability guidelines of : 10 C.F.R.
, i 100.11. 19 NRC at 346; see Wohl Affidavit-3 at i 5. - #~
e -- --erre,e <n=-,,e <c - -e re,-- , ,e , ,w - .,.w- m -wn,,,, , -, e. , , e
v The limits on releases of radioactivity in 10 C.F.R. Part 50 - are contained in Appendix I. The 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix I limits provide guidance for design objectives and limiting conditions of operation to maintain control of radioactive materials and such materials in gaseous and liquid effluents produced during normal reactor operation and expected operational - occurrences and transported to unrestricted areas. Appendix I, Section I; 10 C.F.R. I 50.34a. These design objective limits in Part 50 are intended to assure that radioactive releases to unrestricted areas are as low as is reasonably achievable II (ALARA). - Appendix I,Section I. The more appropriate guidelines for determining the effect of releases on the public are set forth in 10 C.F.R. Part 100, the siting criteria for power reactors, which sets forth the doses at the exclusion area boundary. The Staff routinely evaluates postulated - design basis accident releases using the dose guidelines specified in 10 C.F.R. Part 100. Indeed, for analysis of a cask drop accident, the acceptance criterion is "well within" the Part 100 guidelines as identified in SRP 15.7.5. 2,/
Similarly, the limits of 10 C.F.R. Part 20 "are applicable to normal reactor operation , rather than accident conditions." Florida Power
- 1/ This Licensing Board ruled that ALARA applies to routine opera-tions, not accidents. Order, September 16, 1985, at 12. See also United States Department of Energy (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), LBP-82-31,15 PPC 855, 861 (1982).
2/ 10 CFR Part 100 has been used by licensing boards in evaluating the consequences of a substantial release of radioactive material from the spent fuel pool. See, g.
e . , Consumers Power Company (Big Rock Point Plant), LBT84-32, 20 NRC 601, 637-38 (1984)
-(FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
+
and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 3 and -
4), LB P-81-14, 13 NRC 677, 702-03, . aff'd, ALAB-660, 14 NRC 987 (1981). The Part 20 standards refer generally to dose limits applying to
" ~
a - licensee's possession,- use or transfer of radioactive materials, 10-C.F.R. I 20.101(a); cf. 10 C.F.R. I-20.105(a). On their - face, the.
regulations are clearly intended to apply to routine ' operation and no mention is made of accident conditions.
Since Part 50 and Part 20 limits and guidelines are generally applied to normal reactor operation and not to accidents,- Intervenors' allegations '
that the release limits in Parts 50 and 20 will be exceeded in the event
- of an accident is of no moment.
l The Staff has performed a conservative, independent accident radiological consequences analysis to determine the offsite radiological consequences of a postulated cask drcp accident at Turkey Point. The results of this analysis indicate that the offsite doses for. such an accident are 26 rem to the thyroid and less than 0.1 rem to the whole body at the Exclusion Area Boundary. These doses are well within the
- offsite radiological guideline values specified in 10 C.F.R. Part 100, l which are 300 rem thyroid or 25 rem whole body. Wohl Affidavit-3 at I I
T 6.
In its analysis, the Staff used conservative assumptions, including:
- 1) a radial power peaking factor of 1.2, as recommended for use in acci-J (FOOTNOTE. CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE)
(spent fuel assembly drop); Dairyland Power Cooperative (Lacrosse !
Boiling Water Reactor), LBP-80-2, 11 NRC 44, 60-61, aff'd. , l ALAB-617,12 NRC 430 (1980) (spent fuel cask drop).
1 1 I- , w -, ,w- w , .--r-,,-- ,,:w,-a, , , , , r , . - - - . ,,_g, , , , . , , - - - , , - .. -
y,,-,-v g - , - ,,
O
~
dent evaluations involving damage to multiple assemblies (NUREG-0612
" Control of Heavy Loads. at Nuclear Power Plants");- 2) an iodine decontamination factor of 100, as recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.25;
- 3) a cooldown time for impacted spent fuel. assemblies of 1525 hours0.0177 days <br />0.424 hours <br />0.00252 weeks <br />5.802625e-4 months <br />; and
- 4) an estimated 91 impacted stored spent fuel assemblies. - Wohl .
l Affidavit-3 at i 7.
1 1he Standard Review Plan, Regulatory Guide 1.25, and ,
NUREG-0612 specify assumptions regarding radial peaking factors which j are acceptable to the Staff for use in analysis of cask drop accidents.
i SRP Section 15.7.5 states in paragraph II.3 that the NRC Staff will accept a model for calculating the consequences of a cask drop accident "if it incorporates the appropriate conservative assumptions in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.25." While Regulatory Guide 1.25 states. that the minimum acceptable radial peaking factor ' for a single assembly fuel handling accident in a pressurized water reactor is 1.65, it does not recommend a specific numerical value for accidents involving multiple fuel 4
assemblies. Regulatory Guide 1.25 also does not specify the number of fuel assemblies which should be assumed to be damaged. Accordingly, an analysis may be done assuming damage to a single assembly or damage to multiple fuel assemblies. Wohl Affidavit-3 at T 4.
The Staff's analysis assumed damage to. multiple fuel assemblies. In NUREG-0612, the Staff recommended a radial peaking factor of 1.2 as a j- conservative value in accident evaluations ir.volving damage to multiple
- fuel assemblies, and the Staff's analysis of a cask drop accident at Turkey Point appropriately anolied this peaking factor. Wohl Affidavit-3 at i 8. Therefore, while a factor of 1.65 is not inappropriate for
, , - - . .--,.-..--<sm, . , . - . .. , , - . ..--,.~...-,-,,.r, -w y --,.,--,,-,--,,.-,,w, -- , ,,.--3...%. w,,,m.t-
- er = r
6
.._ evaluating the consequences of a cask drop accident, a factor of 1.2 is also appropriate for such an analysis if one is to assume, as; the Staff has done, damage to multiple fuel assemblies. Wohl Affidavit-3 at T 4.
In addition, the assumption-. of an iodine decontamination factor of 100, as recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.25, is conservative to the point that it would easily outweigh the difference produced in radiological consequence estimates made with a radial peaking factor of 1.0 or 1.2 versus the 1.65 value Intervenors contend should be applied.
Wohl Affidavit-3 at T 8.
In sum, the Licensee's and Staff's analyses are consistent with Staff guidance. The Staff's independent analysis of the potential offsite doses resulting from a postulated cask drop accident demonstrates that the doses are well within the cuidelines of 10 C.F.R. Part 100. Wohl Affidavit-3 at i 10. Thus, the Staff supports summary dismissal of this contention.
- 2. Contention 4 Contention 4 asserts:
That FPL has not provided a site specific radiological analysis of a spent fuel boiling event that proves that offsite dose limits and personal (sic) exposure limits will not be exceeded in allowing the pool to boil with makeup water from only seismic Category 1 sources.
~
Contention 4, as admitted by the Licensing Board and in view of the bases provided, alleges that Licensee has not provided a site-specific analysis of a spent fuel boiling event which demonstrates that onsite and offsite exposure limits in 10 C.F.R. Parts 20 and 100 will not be exceeded because Licensee extrapolated from an analysis done for the Limerick plant. The Staff has read Licensee's statement of material facts
O O
concerning Contention 4 and agrees that those facts demonstrate that there are no genuine issues to be litigated as to Contention 4. with respect to whether the doses meet Part 100 guidelines. See Affidavit of -
Millard Wohl on Contention 4 ("Wohl Affidavit-4") (attached).
Analyses of spent fuel storage accidents such as a spent fuel pool boiling event arc evaluated against ~ 10 C.F.R. Part 100 guidelines for -
dose limits at the exclusion boundary and may be performed using the -
assumptions in Regulatory Guide 1.25, ~ " Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Handling and Storage Facility for Boiling and Pressurized Water Reactors." Wohl Affidavit-4 at i 7.
The Staff concludes based on its independent confirmatory analysis that Licensee's analysis of spent fuel pool boiling is consistent -. with i ~
l Regulatory Guide 1.25. Licensee assumed the one percent fuel failure would result in 0.28 rem to the thyroid and 0.00018 rem to the whole body for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Licensee's analysis was not an extrapolation from another study but was performed using a methodology similar to 4 that employed for the Limerick plant and appropriate site-specific and generic assumptions. Wohl Affidavit-4 at 11 5-6,10.
The Staff's independent analysis assumed one percent fuel failure, that spent fuel assemblies had 22 percent gap iodine activity corresponding to a burnup of 50,000 mwd /MTU, and that each assembly-operated at the maximum allowable linear heat generation rate over its I
entire lifetime. The result was a 0 to 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> thyroid dose of 0.85 rem 9
which is a small fraction of the 300 rem for thyroid dose guideline set forth in 10 C.F.R. Part 100. Wohl Affidavit-4 at i 11. Accordingly, i
o summary disposition ' of that part of the contention which alleges that -
Part 100 guidelines will be exceeded is appropriate.
Unlike Contention 3, a basic concern stated in Contention 4 is that
- plant personnel cannot be protected from the radiation releases associated with a spent fuel boiling event. The Licensee's motion has -
not addressed this issue nor is - the Staff at present prepared to -
demonstrate on its own motion that summary disposition of this portion of
~
Contention 4 is appropriate. Summary disposition should be denied with
- j. respect to this aspect of Contention 4.
- 3. Contention 5 Contention 5 states:
That the main safety function of the spent fuel pool which is to maintain the spent fuel assemblies in a safe configuration through all environmental and abnormal loadings, may not be met as a result of a recently brought to light unreviewed safety question involved in the ~ current rcrack design that -
allows racks whose outer rows overhang the support pads in.
the spent fuel pool. Thus, the amendments should be revoked.
- Contention 5 alleges that the fuel may not be safely stored in the spent fuel pool because of the potential for racks to lift off from the pool floor during seismic events. The Staff has read the Licensee's
- statement of material facts concerning Contention 5 and agrees that those facts demonstrate that there no factual issues to be litigated as to Contention 5. 3/ See Affidavit of Sang Bo Kim Regarding Contention 5
("Kim Affidavit") (attached).
-3/ The Staff offers no opinion on Licensee's conclusions as to the amount of lift-off without admirtistrative controls (Material Fact No. 15) . Kim Affidavit at 1 . ". . In the opinion of the Staff, i i
(FOOTNOTE CONTINUED OF. MEXT PAGE)
-, - ,,-- . , ~ , . , , , , , , g--,,,,,w ,m e ,-g ,e y ,- -y .
n
In Section 2.3.6 of the SE supporting the- amendments, the - Staff concluded that the de' sign of the racks satisfied the structural: and seismic requirements of General Design Criteria 2, 4, 61 and 62 of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A. Kim Affidavit at 1 7. The Staff agrees that the administrative controls which prohibit the loading of the overhanging rows while the remaining portions of the racks are empty, would preclude rack lift-off during a seismic event, thus the conclusion in the SE remains valid. Id. at 11 6, 8. Accordingly, the Staff J
j supports Licensee's motion for summary disposition of Contention 5.
- )
- 4. Contention 6 Contention 6 states that:
. The Licensee and Staff have not adequately considered .or analyzed materials deterioration or failure in materials integrity resulting from the increased generatien and heat and
, radioactivity, as a result of increased capacity and long term storage, in the spent fuel pool. ,
Contention 6 asserts that the impact of increased capacity and long term storage authorized by the amendments on spent fuel pool materials l has not been adequately evaluated with respect to the fuel cladding, pool liner, storage rack and concrete pool structure. The Staff has read j- Licensee's statement of material facts concerning Contention 6 and agrees that those facts demonstrate that there are no genuine issues to be
- litigated as to Contention 6. See - Affidavit of Bernard Turovlin .on Contention 6 ("Turovlin Affidavit") (attached).
(FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE) however,'since administrative controls are in effect, the balance of l the Licensee's - material facts support summary dismissal of the- l contention. 1 4
v.. - ,, ..v..,- - - . . -.
. - , , - . , .,..,yn , , . . . , _ , , ,,~.,c_---, .,,-..,-.-y,_m ,r.,, , , ,,,....,,y,,,r_, _ , ,y. , , , , . - . _.
i The materials that can be affected by increased fuel storage capacity and the longer term storage of fuel .are the fuel rod cladding, fuel _ element materials other than cladding, storage rack material, storage pool liner, and storage pool structure. The extended storage of aged elements in the pool due to reracking does not contribute significantly to the heat load in the spent fuel pool. Turovlin Affidavit at if 3, 5.
Each of the Turkey Point spent fuel pools consists of a reinforced concrete pool with a stainless steel liner and racks constructed of stainless steel. The new spent fuel storage racks approved by the amendments are also constructed of stainless steel, but contain sheets of
- Boraflex , a neutron absorbing material on the outer surface of the storage cells and between the cells , which are held in place by a thin-walled stainless steel wrapper. The other metallic materials in the pool are the Inconel and Zircaloy parts of the fuel- element assemblies.
Turovlin Affidavit at 17.
As stated in Section 2.2.2 of the SE, the Staff concludes that the pools comply with GDC 61 and 62 of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A.
The environmental compatibility and stability of the materials in the spent fuel pools is adequate based upon test data and actual operating experience and the Licensee's materials surveillance program to assure that no unexpected corrosion or degradation will compromise rack integrity is acceptable. The Staff previously approved the use of Stainless steel and concrete in the spent fuel pools through the end of the plant's life. Experiments have shown that stainless steel, as well as the Inconel and Zircaloy, can be exposed to radiation much greater than can be reasonably expected at the rack structure without significant degradation. There is - no evidence of storage pool liner or concrete
,~ _, . - . _ -
structure degradation due to radiation in spent fuel pools _ worldwide. _ In addition; the materials in the pools can be exposed to temperatures up to 180oF for extended periods without detectable degradation. Finally, tests show that the Boraflex, the neutron absorbing material, will not undergo significant degradation during its expected service life.
Turovlin Affidavit at if 10-14.
In short , the materials in the spent fuel pools will not degrade -
significantly as a result of the expanded storage capacity and extended storage. Id.at i 14. Thus, the Staff supports Licensee's motion for summary disposition of Contention 6.
! 5. Contention 7 Contention 7 states:
That there is no assurance that the health and safety of the workers will be protected during spent fuel pool expansion, and that the NRC estimates of between 80-130 pers>n rem will meet ALARA requirements, in particular those in 10 C.F.R. Part 20.
Contention 7 asserts that there is no assurance that the Licensee's spent fuel pool modifications can be performed in a manner that will ensure that doses to personnel will be maintained within the limits of 10 C.F.R. Part 20 and as low as is reasonably achievable. The Staff has read the Licensee's statement of material facts and agrees that those facts demonstrate that there are no genuine faca:6 issues to be litigated as to this contention. See Affidavit of John L. Minns Regarding Contention 7 ("Minns Affidavit") (attached) . The Staff further believes that the Licensee's statement of material facts is consistent with the Stafz's Safety Evaluation, dated November 21, 1984, which was prepared in connection with the _ issuance of the spent fuel pool amendments.
Minns Affidavit at i 3.
I a.
c .
While Part 20 does not impose quantitative limits on collective radiation dose exposures, licensees, 'in addition to complying with the requirements of Part 20, must make "every reasonable effort to maintain radiation exposures ... as low as is reasonably achievable."
10 C.F.R. I 20.1(c) . Section 20.1(c) defines this term as "as low as is -
reasonably achievable taking into account the state of technology, and -
the econcmics of improvements in relation to benefits to the public health j and safety, and other societal and socioeconomic ' considerations, and in relation to the utilization of atomic energy in the public interest." d.
The ultimate responsibility rests with licensees to consider conditions and situations expe::ted , or known to be present, in a particular licensed activity, and to take appropriate dose reducing actions. Minns Affidavit at i 4.
In addition to operating in accordance with the radiation protection -
standards set forth in Part 20, the Licensee has committed (1) to provide personal dose monitoring instrumentation in accordance with 10 C.F.R. II 20.202(3)(b)(1) and 20.103; (2) to use radiation protection equipment which meets the criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.97; (3) to follow Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10; and (4) to design, construct and i operate the " Spent Fuel Expansion Program" consistent with Regulatory i
Guide 8.8 in order to ensure that occupational doses will be kept as low as is reasonably achievable. Minns Affidavit at if 6, 7.
1 The Licensee's original estimate of the total occupational exposure
! required to complete the spent fuel expansion was 109.3 person-rem. In response to a Staff request for additional information regarding the collective dose equivalent for . these modifications, the Licensee revised its estimate to - 59 person-rem. _ Id. at i 8. This represents about a i
. seven percent increase in the average annual dose from routine occupa-tional exposure at the plant which was about 870 person-rem / year / unit over the five year period 1978-1982. Id. Taking into account plant-specific information prodded in support of the Licensee's proposed spent fuel pool modifications, the Staff approved the 59 person-rem exposure estimate as satisfying the "as low as is reasonably achievable" standard. M . at T 9.
Based on the manner in which the Licensee will perform the spent fuel pool modifications, the Licensee's radiation protection program, the radiation protection measures proposed for the modification task, including air and airborne radioactivity monitoring, and experience gained from operating nuclear power plants, the Staff concludes that adequate radiation protection measures will be taken to assure worker protection and that the spent fuel pool expansion can be performed in a manner which will ensure that doses to workers will be maintained within the limits of Part 20 of the Commission's regulations and as low as is reasonably achievable. Minns Affidavit at 11 5, 6, 7, 12. Accordingly, the Staff supports Licensee's motion for summary disposition of this contention.
- 6. Contention 8 Contention 8 states:
That the high density design of the fuel racks will cause higher heat loads and increase in water temperature which could cause a loss-of-cooling accident in the spent fuel pool, which could in turn cause a major release of radioactivity to the environment. And, that the decrease in the time that it takes the spent fuel to reach its boiling point in such an accident , both increases the probability of accidents previously evaluated and increase [ sic] the chances accidents not previously evaluated.
Contention 8, as admitted by the Licensing Board and in view of the bases presented, alleges that the high density design of the fuel
racks will cause -heat loads and water temperatures (in excess of NRC guidelines) which, due to the reduction in time to boiling for the . pool water, could cause a loss of cooling accident in the fuel pool and major
[ radiological releases. . The Staff has read Licensee's statement of material facts and agrees that those facts demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated as to Contention 8. O See Affidavit of John Ridgely Regarding Contention 8 ("Ridgely Affidavit")
(attached) .
The Licensee examined two cases to detormine whether spent fuel pool cooling and makeup systems have sufficient capacity to maintain pool
, water level and temperatures within the Staff acceptance criteria set forth in SRP Section 9.1.3 and the Branch Technical Position ASB 9-2.
Consistent with SRP Section 9.1.3, the results of the analysis show that the maximum temperature of the pool water assuming half-core discharges would be 143eF and, for a full core discharge into the pool, the maximum l
temperature is 183*F. The Staff guidance temperatures for normal and abnormal maximum heat load conditions are 1400 F and 2120 F. The Staff concludes that Licensee's temperatures are acceptable with respect to NRC guidance because the 'icensee's 1430 F estimate is based on - a conservative analysis and is expected to exceed the SRP criteria for only a short period of time and the 183o F is less than boiling as specified in the SRP. Ridgely Affidavit at if 4, 6-7,14.
-4/ The. Staff does not agree with Licensee's statement that no zirconium-water - reaction would occur at temperatures less than 1000cF (Material Fact No.12), but agrees that reactions below this temperature are not significant with - respect to the contention.
Ridgely Affidavit at i 2.
l l
- _ _ _ . __ -. .~. , . .
t Because the cooling system is not presently seismic Category I .the.
Licensee' committed to upgrade the system such. that it will remain '
functional after a safe shutdown earthquake and meet GDC 2 of:
l 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A. Assuming that the spent fuel pool cooling system would not remain. functional after a safe shutdown ,
earthquake, the Licensee's analysis shows a time - to boiling of 7.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />
~
for normal heat load conditions in the pool and 1.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for a full core discharge. As stated in Section 2.7 of the SE, the Staff concludes that
( adequate makeup water from various sources would. 'be available ;in I sufficient time to prevent spent' fuel pool boiling. In addition, the Staff
. concludes that temperatures in the spent fuel pool during .a loss ' of cooling will not increase to a level sufficient- for a significant amount of zirconium-water reaction to occur. Ridgely Affidavit at if 9-14.
Accordingly, the Staff supports Licensee's . motion for summary disposition of Contention 8.
- i
- 7. Contention 10 Contention 10 states:
That the increase of the spent fuel pool -capacity, . which includes fuel rods that are more highly enriched, will cause the requirements of ANSI NI6-1975 [ sic] not to be met and will increase the probability that a criticality accident will occur- in the spent fuel pool and will exceed 10 C.F.R.
Part 50, A62 Criterion.
Contention 10 and its bases allege that. a criticality accident may l
occur in tiie spent fuel pool because of the increased storage' of more highly enriched fuel - and that such storage will not meet the i requirements of GDC 62 of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A, and may I i
! result Lin releases in excess of 10 C.F.R. Part 100 criteria. The Staff
- i has read Licensee's statement of material facts concerning Contention 10.
- d- . .. . ..._n -__.._ tut *'M r -* vr e- v v-t 11v**e mv m' T g- *-r---w-r**-7-- w --M+- - - vr - - - -
tf -+t e
. and agrees that those facts demonstrate that there are no genuine issues to be litigated as to Contention 10. See Affidavit of Laurence I. Kopp Regarding Contention 10 ("Kopp Affidavit").
General Design Criterion 62, " Prevention of criticality in fuel storage and handling," provides that criticality in fuel storage shall be prevented by physical systems or processes, preferably by use of geometrically safe configurations. The Staff guidance for assuring compliance with GDC 62 is found in SRP Section 9.1.2, which requires that the neutron multiplication factors (k-effective) be maintained at less then 0.95 for the storage array in the spent fuel pool during normal and accident conditions. Analyses of the k-effective value for a given spent fuel pool should use certain conservative assumptions and consider calculational, mechanical and materials uncertainties. Kopp Affidavit at 15 4-5.
The Turkey Point spent fuel pool is divided into two regions. The Licensee performed two criticality analyses to evaluate both regions in the pool. Region I will have a 10.6 inch center-to-center spacing and can be used to store fresh or spent fuel with an enrichment up to 4.5 weight percent uranium-235. Region II will have a 9.0 inch center-to-center spacing and will be used only to store fuel assemblies which meet certain burnup considerations. The Licensee also considered the effect of the addition of Boraflex, a strong neutron' absorber around the fuel storage cells. The results of the Licensee's analysis using calculational uncertainties, conservative assumptions and worst case design basis accidents predict a k-effective of 0.9403 for Region I and 0.9304 for Region II. Kopp Affidavit at 118-10.
5
. _ ig _
The . Staff reviewed the Licensee's criticality calculations and concluded that acceptable calculational methods were used and were verified by comparisons against empirical data .and that the assumptions and uncertainties were treated appropriately censistent with NRC guidance. In addition, the results of the analysis for both Regions I and II meet the acceptance criterion of k-effective ~ less than 0.95, including all uncertainties at a 95/95 probability / confidence level. Kopp Affidavit at if 11-15. Accordingly, the Staff supports Licensee's motion for summary disposition of Contention 10.
III. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing and for the reasons set forth in the attached Staff affidavits, the Staff supports the Licensee's motion for summary disposition of Contentions 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10. Summary dismissal of all of Contention 4, however, is not justified.
Respectfully submitted, Mit . Young l Counsel for NRC Staff
- 1
- 7 Y )
ary E. Wagner V 1 Counsel for NRC Staff 1
Lois R. Finkelstein Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Bethesda, Maryland I this 18th day of February,1986. I l
< l I
l
, _ _ _ . . _ .