ML20148P846

Memorandum & Order (Determination of Remand Question).* Concludes That Presiding Officer Reaffirms Determination That Response of Rl Tetrick to Question 63 of Exam to Be SRO Was Incorrect.W/Certificate of Svc.Served on 970626

ML20148P846
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point, 05520726
Issue date:	06/25/1997
From:	Bloch P Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
To:
References
CON-#397-18376 97-727-01-SP-R, 97-727-1-SP-R, LBP-97-11, SP, NUDOCS 9707030080
Download: ML20148P846 (13)

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$7-11 1 June 25, 1997 1

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NUCLEAA REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCMEilNG & SFRvIcg' BRhMCH

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ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD PANEL 4

Before Administrative ,7udges: SERVED JUN 261997 ,

Peter B. Bloch,~ Presiding Officer j j Dr. Peter S. Lam, Special Assistant j l

t In the matter of Docket No. 55-20726-SP l

RALPH L. TETRICK Re: Senior Reactcr i Operator License j (Denial of Application l f;

for Reactor Operator License) j j ASLBP No. 97-727-01-SP-R i MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (Determination of Remand Question) l I

s MEMORANDUM The purpose of this memorandum i.s to determine the question i

i' remanded to me by the Commission, in light of the additional  ;

l evidence provided to the Commission on appeal and then to me  :

1 in response to questions asked of the parties.

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9707030000 970625 PDR ADOCK 05000250 G PDR 3)S on

p I. Procedural History On May 20, 1997,'the Commission issued CLI-97-5, 44 NRC (1997). concerning an appeal of my initial decision, LBP-97-21, 45 NRC 51, 53 (1997). In.that decision, the Commission

- charged me with re-determining the correctness of Mr. Tetrick's answer to Question 63 on his examination, in light of a letter of May 1, 1997 from R.J. Hovey, Vice Proeident of the Turkey Point Plant (Hovey letter).1 The Hovey letter was submitted by the hTC Staff'to the Commission as an attachment to a Staff l brief filed on May 2, 1997.

On May 27, 1997, I issued an unpublished Memorandum and order in which I asked the parties a series of questions designed to elicit information helpful in determining this remand. In response, the parties filed: (1) Memoranda from Ralph L. Tetrick, with attachments (including plant procedures, a letter from R.J. Hovey of May 1, 1997, and a Memorandum from-l 1 Unless there is a showing of " compelling cause," matters i- raised for the first time on appeal generally will not be considered, especially when they involve factual matters that could have'been raised before the presiding officer. Puerto

Rico Power Authority (North Coast Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) l ALAB-648, 14 NRC 34, 37-38 (1981). In accordance with the

! Commission's directions in this remanded case, the parties'

' filings before the Commission are considered to be a part of the decisional record.

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' Brian J. Stamp, undated) dated June 6, 1997 (Tetrick Answers);

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(2)- "NRC Staff's Response . to the Presiding Officer's Memorandum and Order (Questions Relevant to Remand), June 13, i

1997 (Staff Answers) and " Supplemental Affidavit of Brian Hughes and Thomas A. Peebles, June 13, 1997 (Staff Supplemental 1

Affidavit).

' i l II. Question 63 :l i

y Examination Question 63, which is the subject of this c remand, stated as follows: l Plant conditions:

Preparations are being made for-refueling operations.

The refueling cavity is filled with the transfer tube j gate valve open.

Alarm annunciators H-1/1, SFP LO LEVEL and G=9/5, J CNTMT SUMP HI. LEVEL are in alarm.

Which ONE o f, the following is the requ. ired IMMEDIATE ACTION-in response to these conditions?

a. Verify alarms by checking containment sump level recorder and spent fuel level-indication. I

[ b. Sound the containment evacuation alarm. j

c. Initiate containment ventilation isolation. j

d. Initiate control room ventilation isolation. l l

III. The Initial Decision 1

i .. In my Initial Decision, LBP-97-2, I decided, based on the i

i record then before me, that: l l  !

f -p . - , - - , y y.. , . , . , .,-m-

The Staff has persuaded me that when two concurrent annunciators sound, indicating that there is an off-normal event that could cause harmful radiation within the containment, that the operator should take the required IMMEDIATE ACTION. Given the important safety problem that is being indicated by two different annunciators, there is not time- to verify that each of the annunciators is working properly. That they sound together is enough corroboration to act immediately to prevent injury to t.he health of plant employees.

45 NRC at 55. Thus, I concluded that e.he correct response to this questior. was "b" rather than "a,' which was Mr. Tetrick's answer.

IV. Additional Information A. Applicable Plant Procedures Mr. Tetrick has demonstrated, in his memorandum of June 6, 1997, that 3-ONOP 2 -033.2 - Refueling Cavity Seal Failure is not the only plant procedure that requires an immediate action. The phrase "immediate action" also occurs in 2-ARP 3 -097.CR - Control Room Annunciator Response and in 3-ONOP-033.1 - Spent Fuel Pit (SFP) Cooling System Malfunction.

2 ONOP stands for "off normal operating procedure."

3 ARP stands for " annunciator response procedure" and also is referred to as " annunciator response guidelines."

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3 B . _. Important " Note" Contained in Procedure In the attachments. filed with me by Mr. Tetrick, on page 7 of 3 - AR P- 0 9 7 . CR , there is a box which sets forth a' general principle that the indicated actions are "a guide for operators j in responding to single annunciators." Note that they are "a l

guide." Note also that they. apply to single annunciators and i

! not to multiple' annunciators, where understanding the pattern s-or the root cause becomes more important and where " applicable 4

I off-normal and emergency procedures" come into play. The

} relevant section of 3-ARP-097.CR, called NOTES, states:

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1. The annunciator panel attachments indicate appropriate operator action for Control Room panel annunciators. The actions listed are intended to be a guide for operators in responding to single annunciators and not intended to be j for good judgment based on thorough r a substitute understanding of plant conditions and equipment.  !

2. Many .off-normal plant conditions will result in several annunciators lighting almost simultaneously. In such a case, operators are expected to respond to the root cause of the problem and maintain the unit in a safe condition IAW [in accordance with) applicable off-normal

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and emergency procedures. This action may not necessarily correspond to that of the attachments.

C. Staff Argument The Staf f has discussed extensively the root cause of the signals postulated to be present in Question 63. It bases its

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answer to the question on this understanding of root cause. It i ,

states (Staff Supplemental Affidavit at 9-11):

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We have carefully considered Mr. Tetrick's answer to this question. In our view, it reflects a fundamental . mis-

! understand'ing of the importance and significance of an ,

ONOP, in contrast to a nuclear f acility's many'other plant procedures. Further, Mr. Tetrick's answer ignores the significance of the specific plant conditions described in i the stem of Question 63, which must be considered in an SRO applicant's selection of the proper answer to this question. Question 63 explicitly posited the-following specific plant conditions:

i Plant conditions:

Preparations are being made for refueling operations.

The refueling cavity is filled with the transfer tube gate valve open.

- Alarm annunciators H-1/1, SFP LO LEVEL and G-9/5, CNTMT SUMP HI LEVEL are in alarm.

Under these plant conditions, where these two mutually supportive and confirmatory annunciators (spent fuel pool low level and containment sump high level) are sounding together, a competent applicant for a senicr reactor operator license should have recognized, unequivocally, that the operator is recuired to sound the containment evacuaticn alarm, in accordance with 3-ONOP-033.2. We note ths.c although Mr. Tetrick's July 1996 submittal did not discuss this ONOP, in his filings before the Presiding Officer in Faptember and December 1996 he agreed.the two annunciators -specified in Question 63 are " mutually supportive and suf ficient to enter 3-ONOP-033.2 " REFUELING CAVITY SEAL FAILURE."

. . . Question 63 does not constitute an abstract question of only theoretical interest. Rather, the question seeks to test applicants on their fundamental competence to

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respond to actual plant conditions, specified therein.

4 Question 63 describes a potential refueling cavity seal failure, during refteling operations. The initial plant conditions provided in the stem of the question state that "the refueling cavity is filled with the transfer tube gate valve - open. " This condition means that the Spent

-Fuel Pool is connected (through the transfer tube) to'the refueling cavity in'the Containment Building. Another

! initial condition states " Alarm annunciators H-1/1, SFP'LO-LEVEL and G-9/5, CNTMT SUMP HI LEVEL are in alarm." The concurrent sounding of these two alarms would indicate that the water level has decreased in the Spent Fuel Pool 4

and has increased in the Containment Building sump.

Because the Spent Fuel Pool is connected to the Refueling Cavity (inside the Containment Building) through the transfer canal, the actuation of these two alarms at the

, same time would confirm leakage from the Refueling Cavity i to the Containment . Building sump. This leakage would most probably be due to the refueling cavity seal leaking or

failing. Under the conditions described in Question 63, l prompt notification to plant personnel of the nature of the emergency by sounding the containment evacuation alarm

l. is the only appropriate IMMEDIATE ACTION.

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. . . Question 63 is based upon a real-life incident that

- occurred at the Haddam Neck plant, where a refueling cavity seal failure resulted in a substantial-drainage of j the water in the refueling cavity within a matter of minutes -- an event which could have potentially resulted

. in lethal radiation doses to plant personnel. This event led to the issuance of IE Bulletin 84-03 on August 24,

, 1984. At the time of the event, the refueling cavity was filled in preparation for refueling and, fortuitously, the i transfer tube gate valve (which connects the spent fuel pool to the refueling cavity) was closed. The Staff evaluated this event as Generic Issue 82, and determined that it has significant safety implications for all water-cooled nuclear power plants in the United States, -- and each such facility, including Turkey Point, was required to address this problem. See NUREG/CR-4525, "Closecut of IE Bulletin 84-03: Refueling Cavity Water Seal" (June 1990) (portions of which are provided as Attachment 1 hereto).

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J It should be further noted that Question 63 posits a '

situation in which "the refueling cavity is filled with the transfer tube gate valve open" -- unlike the event at Haddam Neck, where the gate was closed. While significant radiation doses may have been avoided at Haddam Neck due to the transfer tube gate being closed, a different result l might have occurred at Turkey Point, under the conditions l stated in Question 63, if the plant operators decided, like Mr. Tetrick, to verify alarms before taking the required "IMMEDIATE ACTION" of sounding the containment evacuation alarm. l V. Analysis and Conclusions I am persuaded by the Staff that I should uphold my initial 1

determination. An operator must act on an understanding of the root cause of an event, trusting the plant's instruments to deduce what is happening. Turkey Point does have procedures for

" responding to single annunciators." Note from 3-ARP-097.CR, discussed above at page 5. As also discussed above, at page ?,

these procedures specifically state that they are "not intended to be a substitute for good judgment based on thorough understanding of plant conditions and equipment."4 I asked several questions in my order of May 27. Among those questions were the following:

43-ONOP-033.1 requires an "immediate action" consisting of:

" verify annunciated alarm is valid." However, with the simultaneous indications postulated in Question 63, the two alarms verify the validity of one another. Thus, there is no further need to verify these alarms.

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What precisely would he (Mr. Tetrick] do during these 20 seconds [that he says he would use to verify the validity

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of instrument readings]? What evidence might he find that j would persuade him n o t _' t o take - the required IMMEDIATE

] ACTION after_he took steps to verify the_ alarm?

The answers to these questions were very important because they 1

j would show whether there was any legitimate reason to hesitate

in taking the immediate action required by the ONOP. For i .

! example, is there some instrument reading that could be easily taken and that would give an operator confidence that the instruments were wrong? If so, then the decision to check' i

l further could be based on an understanding of what was happening i in the reactor and not based solely on a mechanical reading of a tangential provision that relates to single annunciators.

However, Mr. Tetrick did not respond directly to my question.

In'particular, he gave no indication of any instrument reading or set of readings that would persuade him not to take the required immediate action in the 3-ONOP-033.2. Tetrick Answers,  !

bottom of page 1 (responding to Question #2).

I conclude that Mr. Tetrick should _ have acted from an understanding of the root cause of the event . portrayed in Question 63. Had he done so, then only answer "b." would be correct. His failure to understand that failed to mitigate the risks described by Staff and quoted at page 7, above.

I am unpersuaded by Mr. Tetrick's attempt to rely on the l Turkey Point training program and " management expectations." See i Tetrick Answers, page 1, second paragraph from the bottom. He is responsible for knowing the correct, safe action to take in response to plant conditions. The NRC cannot be expected to i

certify an operator based on his reliance on an incorrect response allegedly taught to him. NRC licenses only those operators who demonst rate that they will respond correctly and safely to plant conditions.

I am not convinced by the letter from R.J. Hovey of Florida i

Power and Light to Mr. Stuart A. Richards of the liRC. (Tetrick Reply, unnumbered Attachment . ) Mr. Hovey states. in one key sentence, "If the question is interpreted to be asking for an immediate action for the receipt of an annunciator, response (a) is correct." I do not interpret the question as Mr. Hovey suggests. There is not one annunciator, but two. What is called for by the question is an understanding of plant conditions and how to respond to two consistent, simultaneous annunciators. Moreover, the Annunciator Response Procedure (ARP) contains a note that makes it clear that it cannot be mechanically applied under these circumstances. (See 5 ff.,

above.)

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i 1 Similarly, I am not persuaded by the memorandum of Brian

' J. Stamp, Acting Operations Supervisor, because I consider his ,

'l p understanding of Question 63 to be the same : as that. of

{ Mr. Tetrick and thus incorrect. (Tetrick Reply, unnumbered

. Attachment),

! I-conclude, after considering all the.information before i

me', that Mr. Tetrick answered Question 63 incorrectly.

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j VI. Procedural Implications 1

In this remand, I have addressed information _ filed by b '

Mr. Tetrick that was not filed in a' timely manner prior to my  !

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j. Initial Decision. I would note that the Staff's appeal als (

- seems to be based on new information. I am confident that in deciding this case the Commission will be aware that motions for i reconsideration are frequently filed before presiding of ficers,

both at the end of cases and after interim orders. It is 4

e important for the ef ficiency of licensing procedures that there be a clear principle that requires parties to file information prior to the decisions of judges rather than waiting for an opinion before-adding.new information to the record.

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ORDER For all the foregoing reasons and upon consideration of the entire record in this matter, it is this 25th day of June, 1997, ORDERED, that:

i In response to CLI-97-5, 44 NRC (1997), May 20, 1997, the Presiding Officer reaffirms his determination that ' the response of Ralph L. Tetrick to Question 63 of his Exam 1 nation i

to L9 a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) was incorrect.

I gi VbsL Peter B. Bloch, Presiding Officer Administrative Judge Rock'<111e, Maryland 4

e UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of RALPH L. TETRICK Docket No.(s) 55-20726-SP (Denial of Senior Reactor Operator's License)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing LB M&O RE REMAND QUESTION have been served upon the following persons by U.S. mail, first class, except as otherwise noted and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Sec. 2.712.

Administrative Judge Office of Commission Appellate Peter B. Bloch, Presid'g Ofer Adjudication Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop - T-3 F23 Washington, DC 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

( Washington, DC 20555 Administrative Judge Mitzi A. Young, Esq. ,

Peter S. Lam Sherwin E. Turk, Esq.

Special Assistant Office of the General Counsel Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Mail Stop 15 B18 Mail Stop - T-3 F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555

• Ralph L. Tetrick 18990 SW 270 Street Homestead, FL 33031 Dated at Rockville, Md. this 26 day of June 1997 Office of the Secretilry of tHb Commission

• Express Mail