ML20138J227
| ML20138J227 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point, 05520726  |
| Issue date: | 05/02/1997 |
| From: | Sherwin Turk NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138J229 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#297-18294 LBP-97-02, LBP-97-06, LBP-97-2, LBP-97-6, SP, NUDOCS 9705080097 | |
| Download: ML20138J227 (21) | |
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f$2Vf DOCKETED I USNRC l
W MAY -2 PS :21 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF SECRETARY DOCKETING & SERVICE BEFORE THE COMMISSION 3 RANCH :
i 1
l in the Matter of )
) 1 RALPH L. TETRICK ) Docket No. 55-20726-SP )
) )
(Denial of Application for Senicr ) l
! Reactor Operator License) ) l 2
l
. i 1
NRC STAFF'S RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS POSED IN TIfE COMMISSION'S ORDER OF APRIL 25,1997 l
I l
Sherwin E. Turk Counsel for NRC Staff May 2,1997 A
9703080097 970502 /
D, PDR ADOCK 05000250 G FDR
o May 2,1997 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION In the Matter of )
)
RALPil L. TETRICK ) Docket No. 55-20726-SP
)
(Denial of Application for Senior )
Reactor Operator License) )
NRC STAFF'S RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS POSED IN TIIE COMMISSION'S ORDER OF APRIL 25.1997 INTRODUCTION On April 25, 1997, the Commission issued a " Scheduling Order" in which it requested that the NRC Staff (" Staff") file "a response to Mr. Tetrick's argument regarding Question 63, and a discussion of the legal significance (if any) of a consistent staff practice, such as not " rounding up" written examination scores of RO and SRO licent .ipplicants." Id. The Staff hereby files its response to these matters in accordance with the Commission's Order.
DISCUSSION A. Mr. Tetrick's Argument Concernine Ouestion 63.
In his response to the Staff's petition for Commission review,2 Mr. Tetrick requested that, if the Commission undenakes review of the Presiding Officer's decisions, 2 See "NRC Staff's Petition for Commission Review of the Presiding Officer's
! Decisions in This Proceeding" (" Petition"), dated April 16, 1997.
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it should also review the Presiding Officer's decision on Question 63.2 Id. In this 4
regard, Mr. Tetrick disputed the Staff's determination that the correct answer is "b." He stated:
1 3-ONOP-033.2 states: With an irradiated assembly full up in the manipulation crane and maximum refueling
! cavity seal leakage, the refueling bridge radiation levels will reach 10 rem /hr in about 22 minutes (see attached
- procedure).
4 At Turkey Point there are two Spent Fuel Pool level
, indications and five sump level indications in the control room. I contend that the 10 to 20 seconds it takes to verify the alarm would not expose personnel inside containment to high levels of radiation, also, this brief ,
period of time to verify the alanus is preferable to causing panic and possible hard [ sic] to personnel evacuating containment if the alann is invalid.
, With regard to the above, I respectfully request the
. presiding Office [ sic] to reverse his decision on question
}
- 63, I am also including a letter written by Brian J.
Stamp, Acting Operations Supervisor at Turkey Point Nuclear Facility regarding question number 63.
Id.3 These assenions should be rejected, for the following reasons.
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2 Ralph L. Tetrick (Denial of Application for Reactor Operator License), LBP-97-2, 45 N.R.C. ___ (Feb. 28, 1997), slip op. at 4-8 (Initial Decision).
3 Mr. Stamp's letter nowhere indicates whether the views expressed therein are his own or those of Florida Power and Light Company ("FP&L"), the nuclear reactor licensee for Turkey Point. In light of these considerations, the Staff requested that FP&L provide a written statement clarifying its position with respect to Question 63 and the statements contained in Mr. Stamp's letter. By letter dated May 1,1997, R. J. Hovey, Vice President, Turkey Point Plant, provided FP&L's position with respect to these matters. See Attachment "A" hereto. FP&L's statement is discussed infra at 11-12.
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l Question 63 stated as follows:
Plant conditions:
Preparations are being made for refueling operations.
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The refueling cavity is filled with the transfer tube gate valve open.
- Alarm annunciators H-1/1, SFP LO LEVEL and l
G-9/5, CNTbfT SUbfP HI LEVEL are in alarm.
Which ONE of thefollowing is the requiredIbibiEDIATE ACTIONin response to these conditions?
- a. Venfv alarms by checking containment sump level recorder and spent fuel level indication.
- b. Sound the containment evacuation alarm.
- c. Initiate containment ventilation isolation.
- d. Initiate control room ventilation isolation.
Mr. Tetrick, in his written presentation of Decemb D,1995 resubmitted his filing of September 25,1996, which stated as follows concerning Question 63:
The NRC analysis and conclusion contends that reactor operators and senior reactor operators are expected to analyze alarms and determine the appropriate course of action based upon specific plant conditions and indications.
Applicant contends that performing an action based solely on annunciation alone is not a proper way to operate. Even though SFP LOW LEVEL and l CONTAINMENT SUMP HIGH LEVEL are mutuall_v l sunnortive and sufficient to enter 3-ONOP-033.2 l " REFUELING CAVITY SEAL FAILURE" [t]he l
annunciators should be verified by additional supponive j information to preclude the possibility of annunciator
failure. Additionally CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE procedure 3-ARP-097.CR
! states that for all alarms the ARP shall be consulted.
Applicant therefore contends that Answer "A" verify alarms is also a correct answer.
Id., Enclosure at [ unnumbered] 1, emphasis added. In addition, Mr. Tetrick resubmitted 4
his filing of July 30,1996, in which he stated as follows concerning Question 63:
i 1 :
Annunciator H-1/1 is a [ sic] entry condition for 3-ONOP-033.1. . . The Immediate actions for 3-ONOP-033.1 is to verify the alarm is valid.
Additionally, the RCO [ reactor control operator] is l required to respond to alarms per 0-ADM-219
[" Annunciator Response Procedure [ARP] Usage"]. . .
Alarms H-1/1 and G-9/5 are classified as priority 3 (BLUE) alanns requiring prompt (not immediate) action.
The specified operator actions for both alarms per ARP-097.CR is to verify the alarms (ie containment sump level recorder and spent fuel pit level indication). .
In sum, although Mr. Tetrick's July 30, 1996 filing failed to recognize the significance of the concurrent actuation of these two annunciators (and failed to discuss i
the correct ONOP -- discussing, instead, 3-ONOP-033.1), in his filing of September 30, ;
I 1996, he recognized that the initial plant conditions stated in Question 63 "are mutually j i
suonortive and sufficient to enter 3-ONOP-033.2." However, based on his analysis of the ADM and ARP requirements, he made the unsupported assertion that " performing an action based solely on annunciation alone is not the proper way to operate," and that i
" annunciators should be verified by additional supporting information." Accordingly, Mr. Tetrick asserted that answer "a" (" Verify alarms by checking containment sump level recorder and spent fuel level indication") constitutes "an additional correct answer."
The Staff responded to Mr. Tetrick's written presentation on January 23,1997
- Therein, the Staff stated that answer "b" (" Sound the containment evacuation alarm") is the caly correct answer to this question, and explained, imer alia, as follows:
(a) Reactor operators and senior reactor operators are expected to analyze alanns and determine the appropriate course of action based upon the specific plant conditions ,
and indications. This expectation is reflected in step 3.4.1 of procedure 0-ADM-219 I
(Hearing File (HF) Item 20), which directs the operator to respond to alarms based on color code priority and plant conditions. Affidavit i 20.
(b) The plant conditions and indications specilled in this question (i.e., the refueling cavity filled and the transfer tube gate valve open with coincident SFP LOW LEVEL and CONTAINMENT SUMP HIGH LEVEL alarms) are mutually supportive and confirmatory, and require entry into Off-Normal Operating Procedure 3-ONOP-033.2, " Refueling Cavity Seal Failure" (HF Item 24). Affidavit i 21.5 (c) The stem of the question asks for the IMMEDIATE ACTION in response to the stated conditions. Operating Procedure 3-ONOP-033.2 has one, and only one '
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4 See " Written Presentation of NRC Staff," dated January 23,1997, at 10-11, and the attached " Affidavit of Brian Hughes and Thomas A. Peebles" (" Affidavit"), at 7-11.
5 As noted above, Mr. Tetrick's submittal of September 25,1996, filed as part of his written presentation of December 30,1996, recognized that these two annunciators are " mutually supportive and sufficient to enter 3-ONO.P-033.2 " REFUELING CAVITY SEAL FAILURE." See discussion supra, at 5.
__ m
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l defined "IMMEDIATE ACTION" -- sound the containment evacuation alarm. . Affidavit !
i 21.6 l
(d) Step 5.2.1 of O-ADM-211 " Emergency and Off-Normal Operating l Procedure Usage" (HF Item 25), states that " Operators shall be capable of performing i
steps identitled as IMMEDIATE ACTION steps from memory." In addition, Step 3.5.1
, of 0-ADM-21I states that operators are to ensure that all immediate operator actions of the procedure in effect are performed, and Step 5.31 states, "When the immediate ,
I actions have been completed, the operator shall begin readir.g the procedure." (HF i
j Item 25). Afficlavit ji 21, 24. !
l (e) Step 5.13 (" Priority of Procedures") of 0 ADM-211 states that plant '
operating procedures have the following order of priority: Functional Restoration Procedures (FRPs), Optimal Recovery Procedures (ORPs), and Off-Normal Operating j Procedures (ONOPs) (Item 25). In other words, operators are initially directed to follow l
these procedures, including the Off-Normal Operating Procedures -- rather than the Alarm Response Procedures (ARPs) -- conttary to Mr. Tetrick's understanding.
Affidavit i 22.
(f) Procedure 0-ADM-201, Operations Procedure Usage, Section 5.1.4.1.a.,
states.
- Procedures for which actions should be committed to memory are Immediate 6 The Staff also indicated that the need for such immediate action results from the fact that under the stated conditions, personnel located in the containment would quickly be exposed to high levels of radiation (due to the loss of water which normally acts as a radiation shield) unless they are promptly notified by a containment alarm to evacuate the area. Mr. Tetrick's argument that only 10-20 seconds is required to verify the
. annunciators and that this would result in relatively insignificant harm to personnel in contaimnent appears to be. directed to this statement.
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1 At.tions in Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and Off-Normal Operating ;
1 Procedures (ONOPs)." Neither Control Room Annunciator Response Procedure (ARP) for H-1/1 SFP LO LEVEL nor the ARP for G-9/5 CNTMT SUMP III LEVEL contain "Immediate Actions" that would be required to be conducted by an operator from memory.7 Therefore, the only correct arewer would be immediate actions required by ]
EOPs or ONOPs that would be entered based on the initial plant conditions provided in
, the stem of the question. Given the initial plant conditions stated in Question 63, only )
1 one ONOP could be entered -- 3-ONOP-033.2, Refueling Cavity Seal Failure. The only ;
"IMMEDIATE ACTION" in 3-ONOP-033.2 is " Sound centainment evacuation alarm." l l
Affidavit 124.
(g) Mr. Tetrick is correct that, eventually, the annunciators should be verified to be correct in accordance with the ARP. Nonetheless, a defined "lMMEDIATE ACTION" must be taken, in accordance with 3-ONOP-033.2. Affidavit i 24.
For the reasons stated above, the Staff reiterates its view that answer "b" (" Sound the containment evacua::on alarm") is the only correct answer to Question 63. In addition, in response to Mr. Tetrick's argument to the Commission, the Staff further states as follows.
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Significantly, if only one of these annunciators had actuated, entry into the ONOP would not have been required, and it would have been proper to go to the ARP for the alarm which had actuated -- i.e., under those conditions (in contrast to the initial plant conditiens speciGed in Question 63, whereby the sounding of two annunciators provided confirmation), the ONOP would not have been triggered and it would have been proper for the operators to verify the alarm in accordance with the ARP.
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I.
The initial plant conditions provided in the stem of the question state that "the refueling cavity is filled with the transfer tube gate valve open." This condition means that the Spent Fuel Pool is connected (through the transfer tube) to the refueling cavity in the Containment Building. Another initial condition states " Alarm annunciators H-1/1, SFP LO LEVE.L and G-9/5, CNTMT SUMP HI LEVEL are in alarm." The concurrent l t
sounding of these two alarms would indicate that the water level has decreased in the 4
Spent Fuel Pool and has increased in the Containment Building sump. Because the Spent Fuel Pool is connected to the Refueling Cavity (inside the Containment Building) through j the transfer canal, the actuation of these two alarms at the same time would confirm )
leakage from the Refueling Cavity to the Containment Building sump. This leakage would most probably be due to the refueling cavity seal leaking or failing.
The stem of the question asks for the "IMMEDIATE ACTION" to be taken in !
response to these conditions.8 The phrase "IMMEDIATE ACTION
- is a recognized term, used in the Off-Nonnal Operating Procedures (ONOPs) -- and should be wel!
known to Mr. Tetrick, who is a licensed reactor operator at Turkey Point. This "Immediate Action" required by the ONOP has a higher priority than, and takes 1
8 Question 63 was a new question developed from the facility reference material.
f' The origin of the question stem (the " Stem Reference" or basis), was (1) Administrative Procedure 0-ADM-201, Operations Procedure Usage, section 5.1, and (2) Off-Normal Operating (ONO) Procedure 3-ONOP-033.2, Refueling Cavity Seal Failure, section 4.0.
The reference (basis) for correct answer "b" was ONO Procedure 3-ONOP-033.2, Refueling Cavity Seal Failure, section 4.1: " Sound the containment evacuation alarm."
The correct answer is a direct quote from this reference procedure. The reference (basis) for distractor "a," selected by Mr. Tetrick, was the Annunciator Response Procedure (ARP). Verification of the alarm is the first OPERATOR ACTION listed in the ARP, but is not defined as an "Immediate Action."
precedence over, the non-immediate " verify alann" action specified in the ARP. Further, Procedure 0-ADM-200, " Conduct of Operations", Section 5.6.8, Operation During Abnormal or Emergency Conditions, states: "On-shift licensed operators shall believe
- instrument indication until the indications are proven to be false." Accordingly, verification of the annunciators, prior to taking the "Immediate Action" of sounding the i
containment evacuation alarm, is not directed by the plant's procedures.
Question 63 asks the applicant to identify the appropriate "IMMEDIATE I ACTION" stated in one of four possible answers. The Refueling Cavity Seal Failure procedure has only one "IMMEDIATE ACTION" -- which Mr. Tetrick does not dispute.
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, Further, this "IMMEDIATE ACTION" is required to be conunitted to memory by the i operator -- which Mr Tetrick again does not dispute. Any other action, such as
', verifying the annunciator alanns pursuant.to the ARP relied upon by Mr. Tetrick, is )
i l j n: quired, by the hierarchy of the plant's written procedures, to be performed after this i l
"IMMEDIATE ACTION" has been performed.
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- Reactor operators are instructed to meet certain standards promulgated by the !
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and endorsed by the Commission in !
1
- Reg. Guide 1.33, " Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation)" (Rev. 2, 1 Feb.1978). In particular, ANSI N18.7-19'76 ("Admmistrative Controls and Quality Assurance for the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants"), section 5.3.9 requires procedures to be " written so that a trained operator will know in advance the expected course of events that will identify an emergency and the immediate action he should l take." In accordance with this ANSI standard, Mr. Tetrick should have recognized the i
1
, stated plant conditions as establishing an emergency, and he should have known the "Immediate Action" required to be taken under the stated conditions.
Mr. Tetrick asserts that a " preferable" course of action, in lieu of following the i ONOP IMMEDIATE ACTION, would be to verify the alarms first, since "the 10 to 20 4
- seconds it takes to verify the alarm would not expose personnel inside containment to I
high levels of radiation," and "this brief period of time to verify the alarms is preferable to causing panic and possible har[m] to personnel evacuating containment if the alarm is invalid." This assertion misses the point. The issue of whether a preferable course of action may exist, raised by Mr. Tetrick, is not presented by his written examination and is beyond the proper scope of this proceeding. SRO written examinations, such as the examination taken by Mr. Tetrick, test applicants (in part) upon their knowledge of the facility's approved procedures in effect at the time of the examination. "Immediate actions," in particular, are rnatters which operator applicants are required to know. The examinations do not question applicants as to whether they consider those procedures to be proper, or whether they can identify a preferable way to operate the plant other than as directed in the plant's written procedures. Accordingly, Mr. Tetrick's views as to whether, under the postulated circumstances, annunciators "should" be verified prior to sounding the containment evacuation alarm, should be disregarded for present purposes.'
This is not to say that Mr. Tetrick should not be permitted to ask FP&~L to consider revising its Off Normal Operating Procedures, to specify that under the plant conditions specified in Question 63, operators should verify the annunciators before sounding the containment evacuation alarm. Any such revision to plant procedures, however, should be effectuated in accordance with the plant's established procedure change process.
Similarly, the personal views expressed in Mr. Stamp's undated letter (that operators are " expected" to verify plant conditions prior to taking the required immediate 4
actions, and this could avert other safety risks) do not warrant a different outcome. In a
view of the fact that Question 63 examined applicants on their knowledge of the IMMEDIATE ACTION required to be taken under the stated plant conditions, these considerations are beyond the scope of the question.
FP&L's letter of May 1,1997, does not alter this conclusion. FP&L argues that both answers "a" and "b" could be viewed as correct, depending on-whether one interprets the question as examining upon the ONOP procedures or upon more general, standard operating procedures.* While FP&L's letter raises a question as to whether the term "IMMEDIATE ACTION" in Question 63 should be interpreted to signify the ONOP-required IMMEDIATE ACTION, or "an immediate action for the receipt of a.D annunciator" (Id. at 1, emphasis added), no such concern is fairly presented by Question 63." The stem of Question 63 clearly states that two -- not one -- specific annunciators have actuated; under those conditions, an SRO applicant should have known that an "immediate action" under the ONOP was required. In contrast, no "immediate action" is required if only one annunciator had actuated, as postulated by FP&L. See
- It should be noted that FP&L had prior opportunities to comment upon this question, both prior to and following the examination, but did not do so.
" If Mr. Tetrick did not understand whether the question saught to examine applicants on their knowledge of the ONOPs, as distinct from other matters (as theorized by FP&L), he could have requested clarification of this matter in the course of the examination. See Examination Instruction No.13 ("If the intent of a question is unclear, ask questions of the examiner only") (Hearing File Item 9, at 6). No such clarification as to the intent of the question was requested.
- n. 7, supra. FP&L's comment that it expects and trains its operators to verify alarms (Id. at 3) does not alter the fact that its written procedures, reviewed and approved in accordance with the facility's fonnal process for procedure development, reouire operators to take the specified "immediate action." Accordingly, answer "b" is the only correct answer to Question 63. 2 B. The Ixcal Signifigance of a Consistent Staff Practice. l The second question posed by the Commission asks the Staff to discuss the legal significance (if any) of a consistent Staff practice, such as not " rounding up" the written examination scores of RO and SRO license applicants. This question appears to have been prompted by the Staff's observation, in its petition for Commission review, that the Presiding Officer's Initial Decision is contrary to the Staff's established practice of denying RO and SRO license applications where applicants receive examination scores of between 79.5% and 80%. Petition, at 5-8.
]
Legally binding requirements are established by statute or regulation, as may be l
construed in adjudicatory decisions, or by license or order. Where such requirements !
I In the event that the Commission disagrees with the Staff's views of this matter, and determines that Question 63 has two correct answers, Mr. Tetrick's examination grade would be revised to a passing grade of 80.41% (78 of 97 correct answers). In that event, Mr. Tetrick would be issued an SRO license, and the Presiding Officer's Initial Decision (determining to "round up" bis grade of 79.59% to 80%) will have been rendered moot. Accordingly, if the Commission should determine to strike Question 63 and award an SRO license to Mr. Tetrick, for the reasons stated in the Staff's petition for review, the Staff requests that the Commission also vacate as moot the Presiding Officer's decisions (rounding up to 80% and denying the Staff's motion for l reconsideration). See generally, Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), CLI-96-2,43 NRC 13 (1996); Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), CLI-95-10, 42 NRC 1 (1995), l 1
- 13 -
f have been only generally defined, the legislative history or regulatory history and guidance documents may be utilized to interpret the requirements. A Staff practice, in and of itself -- whether consistent or inconsistent -- does not establish legal requirements.
However, Staff practice may be referred to, along with other indicia of custom and usage, to indicate the manner in which the agency has interpreted its own regulatory requirements. See generally, Independent Petroleum Ass'n of America v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248,1257 (D.C. Cir.1996); Florida Manufactured Housing Ass'n v. Cisneros, j 53 F.3d 1565,1574 (11th Cir.1995); American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, i
! 688 F.2d 1337,1348 (11th Cir.1982)."
In this case, Section 107 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, requires the Commission to "prescri'oe uniform conditions for licensing individuals as operators."
l 42 U.S.C. f 2137(a). In implementing this requirement, the Commission adopted the i
regulations set forth in 10 C.F.R. Part 55, wh;ch specify that RO and SRO applicants 4
must take an operating test and written examination. The regulation, however, does not
- specify the minimum grade required to pass the written examination.
The Commission has published relevant regulatory guidance as to the minimum passing grade, in NUREG-1021, " Operator Licensing Examiner Standards." This guidance document states that applicants must achieve a " cut score" or minimum grade i of "80 percent or greater" - but the guidance is silent as to whether the "80%" standard i
" It has also been held, with respect to an agency's statutory interpretations, that the consistency with which an interpretation has been applied may be considered in determining the reasonableness of the agency's statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 869 F.2d 1526,1540 (D.C. Cir.1989).
1 l
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l permits examination scores to be rounded up to the next highest integer. ' Accordingly, the question c.f whether " rounding up" is appropriate under the Commission's regulations must be answered by reasonable interpretation of Commission regulations and guidance.
The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) has been delegated the task of l implementing the Commission's operator licensing program. In particular, that Office i
"{i]mplements regulations and develops and implements policies, programs, and procedures for all aspects of licensing, inspection, and safeguarding of . [o]perators of [ production and utilization] facilities." 10 C.F.R. f 1.43(a)(3). In performing this function, the Staff has administered, reviewed, and graded written examinations to l
numerous RO and SRO license applicants over the years. In performing these duties, the Staff has been required to determine, in particular cases, whether fractional scores of more than 79.5% but less than 80%, constitute a passing grade under the Commission's guidance. As set forth in the Staff's petition for review (at 6-7), given the Commission's specification that a " cut score" of "80% or greater" is required, the Staff has interpreted this guidance as requiring a cut-off or minimum score of at least 80%. For this reason, the Staff's consistent practice has been to deny license applications where fractional scores of less than 80% were achieved. Id.is
' SeeId., ES-402, page 5 of 6; Id., ES-401, page 6 of 7; Id., ES-501, page 3 of 24 (Motion for Reconsideration, Attachment 2: Supp. Aff.16). See also Motion for Reconsideration, Attachment 1; NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements (Nov.1980), Enclosure 1 at 1-3; Regulatory Guide 1.8, " Qualification and Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants," (Rev. 2, April 1987), at 1.8-2.
5 See Motion for Reconsideration, Attachment 4, and Supp. Aff.19 (providing specific examples in which the Staff denied operator license applications where scores of 79.6%, 79.7% and 79.8% were attained).
The Staff's practice of denying such license applications does not establish a legal
, requirement. It does, however, demonstrate the manner in which the Staff has interpreted the Commission's regulatory guidance Inasmuch as the Staff constitutes the
. particular arm of the Commission that has been designated to (and does) implement the Commission's operator licensing program, this interpretation is entitled to significant ;
i weight.
Finally, consideration must be given to the Commission's statutory mandate, under Section 107 of the Act, to " prescribe uniform conditions for licensing individuals as operators." The fact that the Staff has developed a consistent practice and l
interpretation of the Commission's specifications satisfies the statute's mandate for I
uniformity. The Presiding Officer's determination to disregard the Staff's consistent practice and interpretation in this proceeding, as stated in LBP-97-6,6 would result in non-uniform treatment of operator license applicants, contrary to this statutory requirement.
'6 See " Corrected Copy of Memorandum and Order (Denial of Reconsideration, Stay)." LBP-97-6,45 NRC __ (March 27, 1997).
CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above and in the Staff's petition for review, the Staff respectfully submits that the Commission should undertake review of the Presiding Officer's decisions in this proceeding, LBP-97-2 and LBP-97-6.
Respectfully submitted, ,
I Sherwin E. Turk ;
Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 2nd day of May,1997 .
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1 i
MAY 1 1997 L-97-126 E
Stuart A. Richards Chief, Operator Licensing Branch, NRR U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 ;
Dear Mr. Richards:
Re: Ralnh Tetrick Fram Anneal In reference to information requested by Mr. R. Croteau related to Ralph Tetrick's NRC Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) License Exam '
administered June 1996, Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) has the following positions:
- 1. A personal letter was sent by our en.ployee Mr. Brian Stamp l representing his personal opinion about Question 063 of the l NRC SRO Exam. Since this was a personal letter, not on a I company letterhead nor signed by an officer of the company, it does not represent the position of FPL.
- 2. Tf the question is interpreted to be asking for an Off Normal Operating Procedure (ONOP) immediate action, response (b) is correct. Quant:.on 063 however, asks for an IMMEDIATE ACTION without specifying that it is looking for the ONOP IMMEDIATE l ACTION. The only way this is implied in the question is by the words 'IMMEDIATE ACTION" being capitalized, which is the format used in the ONOPs.
If the question is interpreted to be asking for an immediate action for the receipt of an annunciator, response (a) is correct. Management's policy and expectation of operators is to validate all alarms by checking appropriate inotrumentation prior to taking action. Additionally, the Annunciator Response Procedure (ARP) instructs the operator to verify the alarm with the indications contained in response (a) . See the attached ARPs for the two annunciators listed in Qucation 063.
It is FPL's position that the best answer to the questien is response (b), but that the question could be interpreted such that response (a) is also correct. As a result, Question 063 as written, has two possible correct answers.
an FPL Group company
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L-97-126 Page 2
- 3. Management's policy and expectation of operators to validate all alarms by checking appropriate instrumentation prior to i taking action has been reinforced in the simulator training program. This policy provides assurance that the appropriate actions are being taken for valid plant conditions and does not result in an operator failing to follow an appropriate procedure.
] Very truly yours, I L- ---
R. J. Hove l
- Vice President Turkey Point Plant j OIH cc: T. A. Peebles, Chief, Operations Branch, Region II, USNRC j 2
L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC ]
j Document Control Desk, USNRC 1 l T. P. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point ]
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A Proc x urs No.; troteoves Tme- l Apprcye6 Date; j Control Room nnunciator Response 8/6/92 i l 3-ARP-097.CR INVESTMENTPROTECHON ' G 9/5 l
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! Page 53 of 54
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DEVICES: SETPOINTS:
R-1418 30" (unit 4 VPA) , l 1
OPERATOR ACTIONS:
- 1. Verify alarm by checking the following:
- a. CNTMT sump recorders R-1418 (unit 4 VPA), R 6308A/B, and DDPS point ;
' DDPSA102-3.
- 2. Corrective actions:
- a. Verify proper operation of the containment sump pumps.
- b. Pump cown the sump as required.
- c. Monitor RCS parameters for indications ofleak, if applicable,
- d. Perform 3-OSP-041.1 to determine the RCS leak rate. if applicable.
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If annunciator k $OS, refer to 0 ADM 214.
l L.._._..._........._._._,.._._,_._..._.J CAUSES: *
- 1. RCSleak. -
- 2. Instrument malfunction. .
REFERENCES:
- 1. FPL DWG 5610-M 12
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w.eue w.. em mime: ,,,,; 393 l
Control Room Annunciator Response *T$0Ih*3
- 3. ARP.097'.C R
/
INVESTMENT PROTECTION H 1/1
^
BLUE El ATTACHMENT 8
- - ~ - - -"""
7 Page l of 54 1
PanelH SFP 2
3Fl . L0 LEVEL l Al I -
- sl l t 6l l .
, 1 234 56789 DEVICES: SETPOINTS: i
! 56'10"
)
Level actuator at north end oiSFP ..
l LT 3-651-OPERATOR ACTIONS:
i 1. Verify alarm by checking the following:
- a. LI.3 651(VPB) i
- 2. Corrective actions:
- a. Dispatch o erator to check:
(1) Spent ellevelindication LY-3 651(behind VPB)
- b. (2) Locallevel at the SFP.
(S) Power to LT.3 651 (LP 50. Bkr 19. east wall of cabl.s spreading room.
- b. Refer to 3-ONOP 033.1, SPENT FUEL PIT (SFP) COOLING.
operations and refer to 3-ONOP 033.2, lefueling Cav Seal Failure System Malfunction for cavity seal failure ,
required actions.
$ d. Refer to TS 3.9 for additional actions.
1
- ,...-...-..-.................9
- NOTE 5 i
- I
' of SFP cooling has to be secured, monitor 5FP temperature per Attachm le
. 3-OP 033, nottfy Reactor Enginetting.
I I
4 If annunciatoris 005 refer t00 ADM 3td.
l.
le
. ... ... . . . 4
- a. . . ... .
CAUSES:
1.
Actual low level in SFP (Evaporation, leakage, or SFP system valve misa
- 2. Loss of power to LT.3 651
/ 3. Instrumentation failure l N'
REFERENCES:
(
- 1. FPL DWG 5613-M.3033 Sh 1
- 2. Tech. Spec. Section 3.9
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