3F0999-05, Comment Supporting Proposed Rules 10CFR50 & 72 Re Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors & Draft NUREG-1022, Rev 2, Event Reporting Guidelines

Comment Supporting Proposed Rules 10CFR50 & 72 Re Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors & Draft NUREG-1022, Rev 2, Event Reporting Guidelines

ML20216F681
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	09/14/1999
From:	Bernhoft S FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
References
FRN-64FR36291, RTR-NUREG-1022, RULE-PR-50, RULE-PR-72 3F0999-05, 64FR36291-00008, NUDOCS 9909220251
Download: ML20216F681 (6)

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11 i September 14,1999 AD1 3F0999-05 The Secretary of the Cornmission Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudication Staff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject:

Comments on Proposed Rule 10 CFR Parts 50 and 72, " Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors," and Draft NUREG-1022, Rev. 2,

" Event Reporting Guidelines - 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73"

Reference:

Federal Register Volume 64, Number 128, Pages 36291 through 36307, dated July 6,1999

Dear Secretary:

This letter provides Florida Power Corporation's (FPC's) comments in response to the Federal Register notice concerning proposed rulemaking on Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors (64 Federal Register 36291, dated July 6,1999). FPC appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule. FPC commends the NRC's initiative to revise the current reporting requirements of 10CFR50.72/50.73 and the guidance contained in NUREG-1022. FPC also supports the NRC's effort to: reduce or eliminate the reporting burden associated with events of little or no safety significance; revise reporting requirements based on importance to risk; and, extend the required reporting times.

In general, FPC believes that the proposed change meets the stated objectives to align reporting with needs, reduce burden where there is no safety significance and provide clarity to reporting. Extensive use of workshops and tabletop exercises during the 1 rulemaking process have provided a valuable testing ground for proposed revisions.

However, FPC has two areas of concern:

1. The last minute addition of a requirement to report significantly degraded components,10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(C), does not meet the stated objectives of the rule change and should be deleted. There are no current requirements to report component failures or degradations that do not impact system train / channel operability. This new criterion represents a reporting threshold far below that currently required. The requirement to report component degradations that are not safety significant (the component is operable and does not render a system train / channel inoperable) is a data collection effort that runs counter to the intent of the event reporting rule.

'; g CRYSTAL RIVER ENERGY COMPLEX: 15760 W. Power Line Street a Crystal River, Florida 34428-6708 * (352) 795-6486 9909220251 990914 PDR PR lh 50 64FR36291 PDR j

. . l U.S. Nuclerr Regul tory Commission 3F0999-05 Pag) 2 of 6 The attempt to capture components which are seriously degraded, but not enough so as to render a system train / channel inoperable, is subject to widely varying levels of interpretation. Such a great degree of uncertainty and lack of clarity exists in this newly proposed requirement, that the potential exists to increase the number of required Licensee Event Reports (LERs) far beyond those that were submitted due to being "outside the design bases." One of the reasons that the "Outside the Design Basis" criterion is proposed to be deleted is the confusion and controversy over the l meaning of the requirement.

2. Second, the proposed rule contains a detailed list of Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems for reporting. To support the time frame of this rulemaking initiative, FPC recommends each facility define ESF systems based on their current Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). This is Option 3 in the rulemaking package. Ultimately, as part of the initiative to risk-inform 10 CFR Part 50, a plant-specific, a risk-informed list should be used. This would include only those systems that were significant to safety. Additional effort and discussion in that area is needed. In the shcrt-term, the NRC should continue with the longstanding practice of relying on each facility's FSAR, shifting to a risk-informed approach when criteria are fully developed.

In addition to the above and attached comments, FPC has reviewed and endorses the comments contained in a proposed draft Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Event Reporting l Task Force (ERTF) response to the Federal Register notice (64 Federal Register 36291, I dated July 6,1999). No comments are being made against the proposed changes to, 10CFR72. -

This letter contains no new commitments. FPC appreciates the opportunity to comment on these important NRC proposed rules and would be willing to meet with you or your staff to ,

discuss these comments further.

Sincerely, '

4(bnhgt Sherry L. Ber oft Director, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs SLB/dwh Attachment xc: NRC Document Control Desk l

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.' U.S. Nucle:r Regulatory Commission 3F0999-05 Page 3 of 6 ATTACHMENT COMMENTS ON PROPOSED CHANGES These comments are in response to the Federal Register notice concerning proposed rulemaking on Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors (64 Federal Register 36291, dated July 6,1999).

Reporting of Component Level Failures FPC supports the NEl position that strongly objects to the new requirements added by 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(C) to report a component being in a degraded condition. This last minute addition does not meet any of the NRC's stated objectives to align reporting to needs, reduce the burden of reporting items of little safety significance, and clarity in reporting. It is clearly a data collection effort that does not relate to event reporting. The need for this component level information should be addressed through other, existing, material reporting systems, The proposed change adds a new requirement to report a component degradation or non-conforming condition, if: (a) the ability of the component to perform its specified safety function is significantly degraded; and (b) the condition could reasonably be expected to apply to other similar components in the plant. This newly proposed criterion was neither included in the advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) published in July 1998 nor included for discussion in the public meeting on November 13, 1998. This attempt to capture components which are degraded, but do not render a system inoperable, is a proposed addition that lacks clarity and is subject to varying levels of interpretation.

Some propose that this information is already being submitted under the current "outside the design bases" (ODB) criterion, but this is not so. As stated in the ANPR, one of the reasons for deleting the ODB criterion is the confusion and controversy over the meaning of the requirement. Even with the deletion of the ODB criterion, conditions will continue to be reported if they result in a loss or partial loss of capability to perform a safety function.

Such a great degree of uncertainty and lack of clarity exists in this newly proposed requirement, that the potential exists to greatly increase the number of required LERs.

In addition, the nawly proposed criterion is contrary to the stated objectives and diverges from the intent of the proposed rule change:

The rule change is intended to obtain reporting that is more consistent with the risk significance of the systems involved, yet the proposed section is focused on the component level as opposed to the stated objective of' risk significance of the systems.

The rule change is intended to reduce reporting burden, yet many increases in burden can be identified:

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U.S. Nuclear Regulitory Comrnission 3F0999-05

- P ge 4 of 6 This would impact the Control Room Operators. Since the Nuclear Shift Manager or Shift Technical Advisor typically reviews all corrective action documents for reportability, every component failure would have to be scrutinized in much more detail.

This would impact the Engineering Staff. Each component failure would need to be evaluated for " significance" of the " degradation" even though the system remained operable. Also, since this rule will likely require more LERs to be written, the engineering personnel would be involved in a greater number of root cause evaluations. In addition, an increased number of root cause evaluations and LERs would require increased senior management review.

Due to the lack of clarity in the criterion, varying interpretations would require LERs to be written for non-safety significant events. These include writing LERs for maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFFs), minor differences in equipment qualification (EQ) life span, and trivial differences in seismic qualification that do not render the system inoperable.

The rule change is intended to clarify the reporting requirements, yet as written the proposed criteria is not clear and is subject to varying interpretation. Use of the terms "significantly degraded," "could reasonable be expected," and "similar components" contribute to this lack of clarity.

The stated " objective" of the criterion is to " allow" continued reporting of design basis or other discrepancies on a (component level), yet current criterion do not require this. There are no current requirements to report component failures or degradations that do not impact operability. Previously established guidance in Generic Letter 91-18 and Generic Letter 91-18, Revision 1, provide for determining the operability of structures, systems or components (SSCs). By using these guidelines, SSCs may be determined to be operable, but not fully qualified (degraded). Because these SSCs categorizations do not affect system or train operability, no reporting in accordance with 10CFR50.72/50.73 has been previously required, except for conditions identified as being pronibited by Technical Specifications. The new criterion to report degraded SSCs that have generic implications represents a reporting threshold far below that previously required.

It is important to note that the newly proposed criterion is somewhat redundant with existing reporting guidance. The discussion in NUREG 1022, Revision 1, pertaining to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vii), states: "In addition, if the cause or condition caused components in Train A of one system and in Train B of another system (i.e., train that is assumed in the safety analysis to be independent) to become inoperable, the event must be reported."

Significant component defects are also covered under 10CFR21 and additional discussion on component failures is also provided under conditions prohibited by Technical Specifications.

[ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3F0999-05

• Page 5 of 6 If component data is needed, it is currently available through other sources. Efforts should be made to obtain data from the Equipment Performance information Exchange (EPlX) and Maintenance Rule reports. Component failure data is also available to the industry via the Nuclear Network. The licensee's use of industry information is routinely inspected by the NRC. In addition, the Resident inspector Program closely monitors operational status and communicates it to Regional and NRR personnel. This information is reviewed for generic implications. ,

Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Actuations There is a separate initiative to risk inform 10CFR50. As part of that initiative, reporting of ESF actuations should be based on risk significance. This is Option 2 in the proposed rule.

FPC supports the NEl position that the necessary criteria have not been adequately established to make the shift as part of this rulemaking. The optimum approach is to return to the longstanding practice that uses the licensees FSAR to define the ESF systems. As part of the rule change to risk inform 10CFR50, this section should be changed to include a risk informed list.

In the proposed rule, the term "any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)," which currently defines the systems for which actuation must be reported in 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv), would be replaced by a specific , list of systems. In addition to this proposed list of systems, three principal alternatives to the proposed rule have been identified for comment. These include: (Option

1) maintaining the status quo; (Option 2) requiring use of a plant-specific, risk-informed list; or, (Option 3) returning to the pre-1998 situation before publication of the event reporting guidelines in NUREG-1022, Revision 1.

FPC supports the NEl position that Option 3 best meets the near term goal of clarity and simplicity. This returns to the pre-1998 situation whereby reporting would be required for the actuation of "any ESF" as is defined in each facility's FSAR. It would however be irnportant to include examples of non-reportable exceptions in the implementing guidance for systems that are considered to be ESFs, yet have lower levels of risk significance (control room ventilation systems, reactor building ventilation systems, fuel building I ventilation systems, auxiliary building ventilation systems, etc.).

Reporting of Historical Events FPC supports the NEl position that two years is the appropriate time period for reporting historical events. Although three years is consistent with the time period that performance indicators are tracked under the new oversight process, FPC asserts that no safety '

significance exists for 10CFR50.73 reporting of historical events which occurred more than two years ago. Two years encompasses one refueling cycle of operation. Significant effort I can be expended searching back in history for historical events. Reporting historical events more than two years old provides a low safety benefit and unnecessarily increases the j reporting burden.

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[ U.S. Nucle:r Regulatory Commission I 3F0999-05 I e Page 6 of 6 The proposed amendments would add provisions to sections 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v) to eliminate reporting of a condition or event that did not occur within three years of the date of discovery. This exclusion of such historical events and conditions should be extended to all written reports required by Section 50.73(a).

No safety significance exists for 10CFR50.72 reporting of historical events. FPC therefore l believes that 10CFR50.72 should clearly indicate that this is for current conditions and not require reporting of historical events.

Required initial Reporting Times in the interest of sirnplicity, the proposed amendmcats should maintain only three basic levels of required reporting times in 10CFR50.72 (1 hour and 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />), and 10CFR50.73 (60 days).

FPC agrees with the revised reporting times based on importance to risk and extending the required reporting times consistent with the need for prompt NRC action. Additionally, the increased time for submittal of LERs will allow for completion of required engineering evaluations after event discovery, provide for more complete and accurate LERs, and result in fewer LER supplemental reports. FPC does not believe that additional levels of reporting are required.

Comment 7 and Response (FR Page 36293)

In response to recommendations to stop reporting invalid ESF actuations, the proposal stated: "The comments are partially accepted. The proposed amendments would eliminate the requirement for telephone notification of an invalid actuation under 10CFR50.72.

Invalid actuations are generally less significant than valid actuations because they do not involve plant conditions (e.g., low Reactor Coolant System pressure) conditions that would warrant system actuation. Instead, they result from other causes such as a dropped electricallead during testing. However, the proposed amendments would not eliminate the requirement for a written report of an invalid actuation under 10CFR50.73."

FPC supports the NEl position that no significance is associated with reporting invalid ESF actuations and believes that the above response supports the contention that they are not significant. Invalid ESF actuations should not be reported.

Reporting only valid ESF actuations that address the response of the plant to actual challenges would accomplish the intended change. Contrary to the NRC's expectations, reporting of invalid actuations will not provide the information needed to estimate equipment reliability parameters. This information should be collected through less burdensome mechanisms, such as Equipment Performance Information Exchange (EPIX) and Maintenance Rule reports.