ML20153C301

Proposed Tech Specs Re Primary Sys Leakage

ML20153C301
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	01/31/1986
From:	CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20153C284	List: 05000213/LER-1985-017, Application for Amend to License DPR-61,changing Tech Specs Re Primary Sys Leakage,As Part of Corrective Actions for 850814 LER 85-017 Concerning post-LOCA Release Paths Outside Containment.Fee Paid ML20153C301
References
NUDOCS 8602190121
Download: ML20153C301 (4)

Text

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Docket No. 50-213 Haddam Neck Plant Proposed Revisions to Technical Specifications Primary System Leakage January,1986 8602190121 DR 860130 p ADOCK 05000213 PDR

4 3,14 Primary System Leakage APPLICABILITY: Applies to limiting operation of the plant under varying rates and conditions of primary plant leakage.

OBJECTIVE: To specify primary plant operability based upon primary plant leakage.

SPECIFICATIONS: A. Operation of the reactor coolant system shall be permitted by the following leakage criteria.

1. One GPM unidentified and uncontained leakage in the reactor coolant system.

2. Ten GPM in the reactor. coolant system.

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3. Three liters per hour combined lenkage (outside containment) from:

(a). the normal makeup, seal injection, seal return, and loop fill portions of the chemical and volume control (CVCS)' system and, (b). the residual heat removal (RHR) system.

This includes thru-wall, mechanical seal, valve

packing, and gasket leakage.

4. No' pressure boundary leakage allowed in the reactor coolant system.

5. Primary - to - secondary leakage through the steam generator tubes shall be limited to 0.4 GPM total for all steam generators not isolated from the reactor coolant system and 150 gallons per day ,

through any one steam generator not isolated from the reactor coolant system.

6. Leakage through each of the following ECCS valves shall not exceed one GPM: SI-CV-862A - SI-CV-862B -

SI-CV-862C - SI-CV-862D - SI-CV-872A - SI-CV-872B.

B. ACTION IS REQUIRED UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

1. With any PR5SSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 36. hours.

2. With any Reactor Coolant System leakage greater than any one of the above limits, excluding PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, reduce the leakage rate within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

3. If primary to secondary tube leakage (not including leaks originating from tube to tube sheet welds) in

,' excess of specification 3.14.A.5 above, results in a cold shutdown, inservice inspections shall be per-formed in accordance with the first sample inspection in Table 4.10.1-2 during that cold'shutdow'n.

BASIS: Uncontained leakage is flow to any open system. This includes leakage to the containment and primary auxiliary building sumps. Leakage which is attributed to a specific component is considered to be identified. Unidentified leakage would be that flow whose path is not known.

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t Leakage from the primary plant can be detected in a number of ways including containment sump level, containment humidity and air particulate measurements, maintenance of water volume inventories and routine surveillance of charging header flow. Leakage that is both uncontained and unidentified is undesirable from the point of safety. A leak rate of one GPM can be determined within a number of hours and without cause or definition the plant should be shutdown.

Uncontained but identified leakage does not constitute a safety hazard if it can be determined that operations can safely continue. Knowledge of the source and path of the leak permits a sound judgement to be made regard-ing continued plant operation. Ten GPM is well within the minimum make-up capabilities but it is desirable to initiate plant shutdown.

Leakage that is both contained and identified does not constitute a safety hazard if it can be determined that plant. operations can be safely continued. 10 GPM leakage is well within the capacity of one charging pump (360 GPM) and makeup would be available even under the coincident loss of offsite power condition. Containing the leak within other auxiliary systems permits control over disposition of the water volume and activity emanating from the primary system.

The plant is expected to be operated in a manner such that the secondary coolant will be maintained within those chemistry limits found to result in negligible corrosion of the steam generator tubes. If the secondary coolant chemistry is not maintained within these limits, localized corrosion may likely result in stress corrosion cracking. The extent of cracking during plant operation would be limited by the limitation of steam generator tube leakage between the primary coolant system and the secondary coolant system (primary-to-secondary leakage = 150 gallons per day per steam generator). Cracks having a primary-to-secondary leakage less than this limit during operation will have an adequate margin of safety to withstand the loads imposed during normal operation and by postulated accidents. Operating plants have demonstrated primary-to-secondary leakage of 150 gallons per day per steam generator can readily be detected by radiation monitoring of steam generator blowdown. Leakage in excess of this limit will require plant shutdown during which the leaking tubes will be located and plugged.

Three liters per hour is the amount of primary coolant I assumed in the offsite dose calculation to be released from systems outside of containment. The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System and the listed portions of the Chemical-and Volume Control (CVCS) System are likely 3-26

to be used in accident mitigation or recovery.

As such, the combined leakage from these systems, outside of containment must be maintained less than that assumed in the'offsite dose calculation.

Excessive leakage through certain ECCS check valves could indicate that the valves.are not performing their function of preventing reverse flow. The configuration of these valves is such that their failure to function could result in an intersystem loss-of-coolant accident.

Reference:

FDSA; Section 5.2.1 FDSA; Section 10.4.4 3-27

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