ML20151V790

Proposed Tech Specs,Clarifying That RHR Cold Leg Injection Valves HV-8809A & HV8809B May Be Temporarily Closed in Mode 3 During Leakage Testing of RCS Pressure Isolation Check Valves

ML20151V790
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	08/12/1988
From:	GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20151V789	List: ML20151V786 ML20151V790
References
NUDOCS 8808230006
Download: ML20151V790 (2)

Text

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. . .. EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

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SURVEllLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.2 Each ECCS subsysted shall be' demonstrated OPERA 8LE:

a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the following valves are in the indicated positions with power lockout switches iti the "

lockout position:

Valve Number Valve F0nction Valve Position HV-8835 St Pump Cold Lec. Inj.- OPEN HV-8840 RHR Pun.p Hot Leg. Inj. ' CLOSED HV-8813 St Pump Mini, Flow Isol. OPEN HV-8806 SI Pump Suction from RWST . OPEN HV-8802A, 8 St Pump Hot Leg Inj. CLOSE0 HV-880gA, 8 RHR Pump Cold Leg Inj. OPEN* .l

b. At least once per 31 days by:

1) Verifying that the ECCS piping is full of water by venting the ECCS pump casings and accessible discharge piping high points, and

2) Verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

c. By a visual inspection which verifles that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the Containment Emergency Sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed:

1) For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establish-ing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and

2) Of the areas af facted within containment at the completion of each containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established,

d. At least once per 18 months by:

1) Verifying automatic isolation and interlock action of the RHR system from the Reactor Coolant System by ensuring that:

a) With a simulated or actual Reactor Coolant System pressure signal greater than or equal to 377 psig the interlocks prevent the valves from being opened, and elo b) With a simulated or actual Reactor Coolant System pressure signal less than or equal to 750 psig the interlocks will 7

08{ cause the valves to automatically close.

@@ 2) A visual inspection of the Containment Emergency Sump and verify-o>o g,

ing that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris ou and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or abnonr.al corrosion, 88 c -

@m ocr *Either valve may be realigned in MODE 3 for testing pursuant to Specification 4.4.6.2.2 k $80.

V0GTLE - UNIT 1 3/45-4 Proposed TS/0242q/216

JMERGENCYCORECOOLING' SYSTEMS

. BASES ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

The limitation for all safety injection pumps to be inoperable below 350'F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the. operation of a single PORV.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety anah;ses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. Surveills.:e Requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.

Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system.is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses and (4) to ensure that centrifugal charging pump injection flow which is directed through the seal injection path is less than or equal to the amount assumed in the safety analysis. The surveillence requirements for leakage testing of ECCS check valves ensure that a failure of one valve will not cause an intersystem LOCA. In MODE 3, with either HV-8809 A or B closed for ECCS check valve leak testing, adequate ECCS flow for core cooling in the event of a LOCA is assured.

3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK The OPERABILITY of the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) as part of the ECCS ensures that sufficient negative reactivity is injected into the core to counteract any positive increase in reactivity caused by RCS cooldown. RCS cooldown can be caused by inadvertent depressurization, a loss-of-coolant accident, or a steam line rupture.

The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that

1) suf ficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, 2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following a small LOCA or steamline break, assuming complete mixing 1 of the RWST, RCS, and ECCS water volumes with all control rods inserted exceDY the most reactive control assembly (ARI-1), and 3) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following a large break LOCA (break flow

> 3.0 ft:) assuming complete mixing of the RWST, RCS, ECCS water and other sources of water that may eventually reside in the sump, post-LOCA with all control rods assumed to be cut.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 10.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effact of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

V0GTLE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2 Proposed TS/0241q/216

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