Text

Insp Repts 50-445/85-15 & 50-446/85-12 on 851029-1101.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Emergency Preparedness Observations,Evaluation & Insp.Nine Deficiencies Identified
	ML20151T478
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	12/09/1985
From:	Terc N, Yandell L; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20151T441	List: ML20151T438; ML20151T478;
References
	50-445-85-15, 50-446-85-12, NUDOCS 8602100278
	Download: ML20151T478 (7)
	v • d • e

. _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _

., ,

L APPENDIX

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Reports: 50-445/85-15 Construction Permits: CPPR-126

50-446/85-12 CPPR-127

Dockets: 50-445

50-446

Licensee: Texas Utilities Generating Company

Skyway Tower, 400 North Olive Street

Dallas, Texas 75201

Facility Name: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station

Inspection At: Glen' Rose, Texas

Inspection Conducted: October 29-through November 1, 1985

1

,

'

Inspector: '

~

'/ 'O

Nemen M. Terc, Exercise NRC Team Lead (r Date

Accompanying personnel:

Matthew P. Moeller, PNL

Gordon R. Bryan, Jr. , PNL (Comex)

A. Kenneth Loposer, PNL (Comex)

A. Lyle Smith, PNL

Elton A. King, PNL

Approved: 1A I2 /9!W

L. A. Y'andell, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Date ' -

and Safeguards Programs Section

. Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted October 29 through Novemt er 1,1985, (Report 50-445/85-15

and 50-446/85-12)

.

-Areas Inspected: Routine, announced emergency preparedness exercise

. observations, evaluation and inspection. The inspection involved

238 inspector-hours onsite by 6 NRC and contractor inspectors.

860210027BBg8$$$43

PDR ADOCK O PDR

G

_ _ - _ _ - ___ - - __-_ -. - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ - _ _ - -

a - .

2

Results: Within the emergency response areas inspected, no violations or

deviations were identified. There were nine deficiencies identified by NRC and

contractor inspectors.

.

I'

. . . .

3'

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Texas Utilities Generating Company

J. R. Gallman, Lead Engineer-

T. L. Gosdin, Support Services Superintendent

R. .W. Haskover, Nuclear Licensing Engineer

R. A. Jones, Manager, Plant Operations

R. T.' Jenkins, Operations Support Superintendent

J. C. Kuykendall, Vice President

G. J. Laughlin, Emergency Planning Supervisor

Denotes those present at the exit interview.

The NRC in'spectors also contacted other licensee employees during the

course of the emergency exercise. They included chemistry and health

physics technicians, reactor and auxiliary operators,. members of the

security force, and other members of their emergency response

organization.

2. Exercise Scenario

The exercise scenario was reviewed to determine if provisions had been

made for the required level of participation by state and local agencies,

and that all the major elements of emergency response would be exercised

in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 and the guidance in

NUREG 0654, Section 11.n. The review included the evaluation of the

technical adequacy of both operational and radiological aspects of the

scenario. In addition, a review of the internal consistency and

thoroughness of information provided to participants, observers,

controllers and evaluators was made. The licensee provided the scenario

to the-NRC on a timely basis and results of the NRC review were

incorporated in the scenario.

No violations or deviations were identified.

3. Control Room

Initial conditions were provided to the control room staff assigned to

respond to the simulated emergency at 8:00 a..m. Among significant

initial conditions were the following:

1. The reactor was operating at full power in its first fuel cycle with

250 Effective Full Power Days utilization of core.

--

.- , .

4

2. Several plant components were out of service for maintenance

including one Startup Transformer.

The scenario was based upon two independent accident events. The

initiating event for the scenario was a failure of the seal in a gas

decay tank valve, which forced the contents into a valve room in the

auxiliary building. When an operator was sent to investigate a " hissing"

sound coming from the valve room, he suffered a personal injury and became

contaminated. The radioactive gases in the decay tank were exhausted to

the environment via the plant vent stacks. This release caused the plant

ventilation stack monitors to alarm. A raise in radiation levels in

excess of 10 times alarm set point required an ALERT classification.

Eventually, the contents of the decay gas tank were' dissipated into the

environment. Forty-five minutes later, a steam generator primary to

secondary leak had increased to 400 gpm, and in addition, a loss of

offsite power resulted from the failure of a breaker. The emergency was

upgraded to a Site Area classification. Releases of radioactivity due to

the accident scenario were moderate and never in excess of EPA Protective

Action Guides.

The NRC inspectors in the control room observed the appropriate use 'of

critical safety function status trees, emergency operating procedures and

emergency implementing procedures. With isolated exceptions, the control

room staff was well directed and functioned as an integrated team.

The NRC inspectors observed the following deficiencies:

The licensee did not comply with 10 CFR 50.72(a)(3) which requires

tnat notification of the NRC should follow immediately after notification

of states and local authorities. After the first Alert classification

was declared from the control room, 28 minutes elapsed before NRC was

notified. ~A similar situation occurred in the Technical Support Center

after the declaration of a Site Area emergency (445/8515-01; 446/8512-01).

The transfer of data from the control room to other emergency response

facilities duri.ng the loss of power event did not contain a collection

time-tag. As a result, it was not always clear which set of data

-corresponded to specific times. In addition, responsibility for manual

data collection was not assigned (445/8515-02; 446/8512-02).

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Technical Support Center (TSC)

The NRC inspectors observed that the manning and activation of the TSC

took place in a prompt and orderly manner. Briefings made by the TSC

manager to his staff.were frequent and informative. Space limitations in

the TSC were compensated by well controlled noise levels.

..

e *e , b-

5

The transfer of emergency direction and coordination responsibilities

and authorities from the shift supervisor to the TSC manager and to

the Manager, Nuclear Operations in the Emergency Operations Facility

were formal, positive and clearly announced. TSC. personnel kept neat

and comprehensive records of activities as required by procedures.

The NRC inspectors observed-the following deficiencies:

The TSC. manager failed to relieve the shift supervisor as emergency-

coordinator until 53 minutes after the Alert classification

(445/8515-03; 446/8512-03).

The licensee did not include the town of Glen Rose in the sheltering

recommendation to 5 miles, although Glen Rose had the greatest

population density in_the geographical sector affected by the r

radioactive plume in the scenario. This omission was not corrected

until.one hour later (445/8515-04; 446/8512-04).

There were no steam suits available to allow operators to closely

diagnose and take remedial actions on incidents involving steam

hazards (445/8515-05; 446/8512-05).

,

No violations or deviations were identified.

.

5. -Search, Rescue and Medical Scenario

The NRC inspectors noted that during the medical scenario,. players

were proficient in radiological control procedures.

The NRC inspectors observed the following deficiency:

The techniques used for medical attention, handling and transportation of

the injured person were inadequate, e.g., the rescue team dragged the

victim by lifting his feet disregarding a potential neck injury and deep

laceration on the head; they failed to provide oxygen to the-patient;

failed to check vital signs; ignored the possibility of the victim

' suffering from potential shock; failed to stabilize the head on the

stretcher; and failed to recognize that the stretcher could be folded into

a chair to facilitate transportation of the victim down the stairs

(445/8515-06; 446/8512-06).

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. ' Radiological Controls

The NRC inspectors observed the following deficiency:

,

Onsite monitoring teams took air samples near building walls, and

failed to properly label and retain samples. In addition, the NRC

. - - , - - - _ - . _ - - - . . -. - .- .-- -- - _ . ,. . - - . - -

w

. 4 .

6

inspectors noted that both access control and contamination control

of personnel returning from potentially contaminated areas to the .

Operations Support Center were inadequate (445/8515-07; 446/8512-07).

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Communications Hardware

The NRC inspectors observed the following deficiency:

Radio communications with offsite monitoring teams was on occasion

garbled and intermittent. In addition, during the loss of offsite

power, radio communications between the teams and the EOF were

inadequate (445/8515-08; 446/8512-08).

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Exercise Critique

The NRC inspectors attended the post-exercise critique conducted by the

licensee staff on October 31, 1985, to evaluate the licensee's

identification of deficiencies.and weaknesses as required by

10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and Appendix E of Part 50, paragraph IV.F.5. The

.

licensee staff identified and properly characterized the deficiencies

listed below:

The TSC staff failed to inform control room personnel that the

release of radioactivity to the environment was caused by a relief

valve which. failed in the open position.

The staff of the TSC continuously monitored the failed fuel monitor

throughout the exercise. This was inappropriate since this monitor

was isolated once safety injection was initiated.

An offsite survey team was not sent to measure the radiological

consequences of; gas decay tank release after the vent monitor alarmed

due to high radiation.

The controller coached the main steam safety valve repair team by

informing them that the power operated relief valve was leaking.

Procedure EPP-203 was found not to be consistent with the

requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(a)(3).

The NRC inspectors observed the following deficiency:

The licensee's critique did not identify and properly characterize

several deficiencies. The critique emphasized positive findings while

... . - . - ... - -. - - - - . .

.

t . ..: .

7

.

~

I attempting to minimize the importance of negative ones. 'The NRC

l' inspection team concluded that the. licensee-did not demonstrate the

ability to adequately portray important findings, such as the inadequacy

!_

of the medical procedures used by the. rescue team, and the failure to '

3.

'

include.the population of' Glen Rose in their protective actions

(445/8515-09; 446/8512-09).

No violations or deviations were identified.

,

9. Exit-Interview and NRC Critique

, The NRC team met with licensee representatives identified in paragraph 1

above. The NRC team leader summarized the deficiencies observed.during

the exercise and stated-that the licensee's corrective actions to these-

deficiencies will be reviewed-in the near future.

4

T

l

.

4

?

2

O

f

- - . , ..' p, .. , .,-y y,_ ,, , , , , .-, --

.y 4-,b --

ML20151T478

Text

Navigation menu

Search