ML20151T478
| ML20151T478 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 12/09/1985 |
| From: | Terc N, Yandell L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151T441 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-445-85-15, 50-446-85-12, NUDOCS 8602100278 | |
| Download: ML20151T478 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000445/1985015
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APPENDIX
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Reports: 50-445/85-15
Construction Permits: CPPR-126
50-446/85-12
CPPR-127
Dockets:
50-445
50-446
Licensee:
Texas Utilities Generating Company
Skyway Tower, 400 North Olive Street
Dallas, Texas 75201
Facility Name: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station
Inspection At: Glen' Rose, Texas
Inspection Conducted: October 29-through November 1, 1985
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Inspector:
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Nemen M. Terc, Exercise NRC Team Lead (r
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Accompanying personnel:
Matthew P. Moeller, PNL
Gordon R. Bryan, Jr. , PNL (Comex)
A. Kenneth Loposer, PNL (Comex)
A. Lyle Smith, PNL
Elton A. King, PNL
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Approved:
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L. A. Y'andell, Chief, Emergency Preparedness
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and Safeguards Programs Section
. Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted October 29 through Novemt er 1,1985, (Report 50-445/85-15
and 50-446/85-12)
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-Areas Inspected: Routine, announced emergency preparedness exercise
. observations, evaluation and inspection. The inspection involved
238 inspector-hours onsite by 6 NRC and contractor inspectors.
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Results: Within the emergency response areas inspected, no violations or
deviations were identified. There were nine deficiencies identified by NRC and
contractor inspectors.
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Texas Utilities Generating Company
- J. R. Gallman, Lead Engineer-
- T. L. Gosdin, Support Services Superintendent
- R. .W. Haskover, Nuclear Licensing Engineer
- R. A. Jones, Manager, Plant Operations
- R. T.' Jenkins, Operations Support Superintendent
- J.
C. Kuykendall, Vice President
- G. J. Laughlin, Emergency Planning Supervisor
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
The NRC in'spectors also contacted other licensee employees during the
course of the emergency exercise. They included chemistry and health
physics technicians, reactor and auxiliary operators,. members of the
security force, and other members of their emergency response
organization.
2.
Exercise Scenario
The exercise scenario was reviewed to determine if provisions had been
made for the required level of participation by state and local agencies,
and that all the major elements of emergency response would be exercised
in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 and the guidance in
NUREG 0654, Section 11.n.
The review included the evaluation of the
technical adequacy of both operational and radiological aspects of the
scenario.
In addition, a review of the internal consistency and
thoroughness of information provided to participants, observers,
controllers and evaluators was made. The licensee provided the scenario
to the-NRC on a timely basis and results of the NRC review were
incorporated in the scenario.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Control Room
Initial conditions were provided to the control room staff assigned to
respond to the simulated emergency at 8:00 a..m.
Among significant
initial conditions were the following:
1.
The reactor was operating at full power in its first fuel cycle with
250 Effective Full Power Days utilization of core.
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Several plant components were out of service for maintenance
including one Startup Transformer.
The scenario was based upon two independent accident events.
The
initiating event for the scenario was a failure of the seal in a gas
decay tank valve, which forced the contents into a valve room in the
auxiliary building. When an operator was sent to investigate a " hissing"
sound coming from the valve room, he suffered a personal injury and became
contaminated. The radioactive gases in the decay tank were exhausted to
the environment via the plant vent stacks.
This release caused the plant
ventilation stack monitors to alarm. A raise in radiation levels in
excess of 10 times alarm set point required an ALERT classification.
Eventually, the contents of the decay gas tank were' dissipated into the
environment.
Forty-five minutes later, a steam generator primary to
secondary leak had increased to 400 gpm, and in addition, a loss of
offsite power resulted from the failure of a breaker.
The emergency was
upgraded to a Site Area classification.
Releases of radioactivity due to
the accident scenario were moderate and never in excess of EPA Protective
Action Guides.
The NRC inspectors in the control room observed the appropriate use 'of
critical safety function status trees, emergency operating procedures and
emergency implementing procedures. With isolated exceptions, the control
room staff was well directed and functioned as an integrated team.
The NRC inspectors observed the following deficiencies:
The licensee did not comply with 10 CFR 50.72(a)(3) which requires
tnat notification of the NRC should follow immediately after notification
of states and local authorities. After the first Alert classification
was declared from the control room, 28 minutes elapsed before NRC was
notified. ~A similar situation occurred in the Technical Support Center
after the declaration of a Site Area emergency (445/8515-01; 446/8512-01).
The transfer of data from the control room to other emergency response
facilities duri.ng the loss of power event did not contain a collection
time-tag. As a result, it was not always clear which set of data
-corresponded to specific times.
In addition, responsibility for manual
data collection was not assigned (445/8515-02; 446/8512-02).
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
The NRC inspectors observed that the manning and activation of the TSC
took place in a prompt and orderly manner.
Briefings made by the TSC
manager to his staff.were frequent and informative. Space limitations in
the TSC were compensated by well controlled noise levels.
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The transfer of emergency direction and coordination responsibilities
and authorities from the shift supervisor to the TSC manager and to
the Manager, Nuclear Operations in the Emergency Operations Facility
were formal, positive and clearly announced. TSC. personnel kept neat
and comprehensive records of activities as required by procedures.
The NRC inspectors observed-the following deficiencies:
The TSC. manager failed to relieve the shift supervisor as emergency-
coordinator until 53 minutes after the Alert classification
(445/8515-03; 446/8512-03).
The licensee did not include the town of Glen Rose in the sheltering
recommendation to 5 miles, although Glen Rose had the greatest
population density in_the geographical sector affected by the
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radioactive plume in the scenario. This omission was not corrected
until.one hour later (445/8515-04; 446/8512-04).
There were no steam suits available to allow operators to closely
diagnose and take remedial actions on incidents involving steam
hazards (445/8515-05; 446/8512-05).
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
-Search, Rescue and Medical Scenario
The NRC inspectors noted that during the medical scenario,. players
were proficient in radiological control procedures.
The NRC inspectors observed the following deficiency:
The techniques used for medical attention, handling and transportation of
the injured person were inadequate, e.g., the rescue team dragged the
victim by lifting his feet disregarding a potential neck injury and deep
laceration on the head; they failed to provide oxygen to the-patient;
failed to check vital signs; ignored the possibility of the victim
' suffering from potential shock; failed to stabilize the head on the
stretcher; and failed to recognize that the stretcher could be folded into
a chair to facilitate transportation of the victim down the stairs
(445/8515-06; 446/8512-06).
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
' Radiological Controls
The NRC inspectors observed the following deficiency:
Onsite monitoring teams took air samples near building walls, and
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failed to properly label and retain samples.
In addition, the NRC
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inspectors noted that both access control and contamination control
of personnel returning from potentially contaminated areas to the .
Operations Support Center were inadequate (445/8515-07; 446/8512-07).
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Communications Hardware
The NRC inspectors observed the following deficiency:
Radio communications with offsite monitoring teams was on occasion
garbled and intermittent.
In addition, during the loss of offsite
power, radio communications between the teams and the EOF were
inadequate (445/8515-08; 446/8512-08).
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Exercise Critique
The NRC inspectors attended the post-exercise critique conducted by the
licensee staff on October 31, 1985, to evaluate the licensee's
identification of deficiencies.and weaknesses as required by
10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and Appendix E of Part 50, paragraph IV.F.5.
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licensee staff identified and properly characterized the deficiencies
listed below:
The TSC staff failed to inform control room personnel that the
release of radioactivity to the environment was caused by a relief
valve which. failed in the open position.
The staff of the TSC continuously monitored the failed fuel monitor
throughout the exercise. This was inappropriate since this monitor
was isolated once safety injection was initiated.
An offsite survey team was not sent to measure the radiological
consequences of; gas decay tank release after the vent monitor alarmed
due to high radiation.
The controller coached the main steam safety valve repair team by
informing them that the power operated relief valve was leaking.
Procedure EPP-203 was found not to be consistent with the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(a)(3).
The NRC inspectors observed the following deficiency:
The licensee's critique did not identify and properly characterize
several deficiencies.
The critique emphasized positive findings while
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attempting to minimize the importance of negative ones. 'The NRC
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inspection team concluded that the. licensee-did not demonstrate the
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ability to adequately portray important findings, such as the inadequacy
of the medical procedures used by the. rescue team, and the failure to
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include.the population of' Glen Rose in their protective actions
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(445/8515-09; 446/8512-09).
No violations or deviations were identified.
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9.
Exit-Interview and NRC Critique
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The NRC team met with licensee representatives identified in paragraph 1
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above. The NRC team leader summarized the deficiencies observed.during
the exercise and stated-that the licensee's corrective actions to these-
deficiencies will be reviewed-in the near future.
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