ML20141D013

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Forwards RAI to Complete Review of Summary Rept Related to GL 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors,Usi A-46, at Plant,Unit 1.Requests Info within 90 Days of Receipt of Ltr
ML20141D013
Person / Time
Site: Farley Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 05/15/1997
From: Jacob Zimmerman
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To: Dennis Morey
SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.
References
REF-GTECI-A-46, REF-GTECI-SC, TASK-A-46, TASK-OR GL-87-02, GL-87-2, TAC-M69445, NUDOCS 9705190297
Download: ML20141D013 (6)


Text

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May 15, 1997 i

l li Mr. D. N. Morey  ;

Vice President - Farley Project  :

Southern Nuclear Operating l Company, Inc.
Post Office Box 1295 1 i Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295  !

2 i

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATED TO UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUE A JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

(TAC NO. M69445)

f

Dear Mr. Morey:

i i i By letter dated May 18, 1995, you provided the plant-specific ~ summary report j

' in accordance with your commitment related to Generic Letter (GL) 87-02,

" Verification of Seismic Acequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in  ;

i Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46" on the resolution of i l USI A-46 program at the Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 1.

l On September 5,1995, the staff issued a request for additional information  ;

3 (RAI) regarding operator actions specified in the May 18, 1995, Teport. The

staff has reviewed your response dated October 11, 1995, to this RAI and L determined that additional information is required. In addition, on
August 29, 1996, the staff issued an RAI regarding the plant-specific summary l 1 report. The staff has rev hwed your response dated October 28, 1996, to this .

i RAI and determined that a:iditional information is required. The enclosure i

! identifies the requested ad.11tional information needed.  !

{ It is requested that the information be provided within 90 days of receipt of  ;

this letter. If you require any clarification regarding this request, please '

call me at (301) .415-2426.

i l Sincerely, l

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

j Jacob.I. Zimmerman, Project Manager ,

i Project Directorate II-2 1

! Division of Reactor Projects - I/II

[ Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-348 190029 D

Enclosure:

Request for Additional Information \I cc w/ enc 1: See next page Distribution Docket File HBerkow OGC PUBLIC LBerry ACRS PD II-2 Rdg. JZimmerman JJohnson, RII SVarga PYChen PSkinner, RII To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = copy without attachment / enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment / enclosure "N" = No copy 0FFICE PM:PDJfR2 l LA:PDI A D:f/DMt4 l l l l NAME- JZM9JIWJMAN:cn LBERRY M HB&RW DATE (T/8 /97 6/ i'h7  % / '/5 /97_ / /97 / /97 / /97 JOCUMENT NAME: G:\ FARI FY\MM440 RAI MFICIAL RECORD COPY 9705190297 970515 PDR ADOCK 05000348

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, ,.. g i g UNITED STATES g

j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

]

6' \SHINGTON, D.C. 20066-0001 May 15, 1997 Mr. D. N. Morey Vice President - Farley Project Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Post Office Box 1295 4 Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATED TO UNRESOLVED SAFETY j ISSUE A JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 i (TAC NO. M69445) )

i

Dear Mr. Morey:

By letter dated May 18, 1995, you provided the plant-specific sumary report in accordance with your commitment related to Generic Letter (GL) 87-02,

" Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in 4

Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46" on the resolution of

USI A-46 program at the Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 1.

On September 5, 1995, the staff issued a request for additional information (RAI) regarding operator actions specif.ied in the May 18, 1995, report. The staff has reviewed your response dated October 11, 1995, to this RAI and

, determined that additional information is required. In addition, on August 29, 1996, the staff issued an RAI regarding the plant-specific su' mary j report. The staff has reviewed your response dated October 28, 1996, to this 4

RAI and determined that additional information is required. The enclosure

, identifies the requested additional information needed, i It is requested that the information be provided within 90 days of receipt of this letter. If you require any clarification regarding this request, please

call me at (301) 415-2426.

Sincerely,

))  ;

acob I. c..unerman, Project Manager

. Project Directorate 11-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 4

Docket No. 50-348 j

Enclosure:

Request for Additional Information cc w/ encl: See next page i

4

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 cc:

4 Mr. R. D.' Hill, Jr.

! General Manager -

1 Southern h'Jclear Operating Company Post Office Box 470 Ashforc', vastas: 36312 1

4 Mr. Mark Aj1 uni, Licensing Manager

Southern Nuclear Operating Company
Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295 Mr. M. Stanford Blanton

! Balch and Bingham Law Firm

. Post Office Box 306 1710 Sixth Avenue North Birmingham, Alabama 35201 Mr. J. D. Woodard Executive Vice President Southern Nuclear Operating Company Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 State Health Officer Alabama Department of Public Health 434 Monroe Street -

Montgomery, Alabama 36130-1701 Chairman Houston County Commission Post Office Box 6406 Dothan, Alabama 36302 Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, S.W., Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7388 N. State Highway 95 Columbia, Alabama 36319

f I

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REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION i DN THE RESOLUTION OF UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUE (USI) A-46 ,

j '

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT. UNIT 1 l

j -

References:

1. Letter, with enclosures, from Dave Morey (SNC) to NRC,  !

" Unresolved Safety Issue A-46 Summary Report for Farley '

Nuclear Plant - Unit 1," dated Nay 18, 1995.

7 2. Letter, with attachments, from Dave Morey (SNC) to NRC, Response to NRC USI A-46 Request for Additional Information for Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1, dated October 11, 1995.

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3. Letter, with enclosures, from Dave Morey (SNC) to NRC, i

" Response to NRC USI A-46 Request for Additional Information J

{ for Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1," dated October 28, 1996. i

! 1. In your Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), you have committed to Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100, which requires, in part, that, "Where the 1

{ maximum vibratory acceleration of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake at the j- foundations of the nuclear power plant structures are determined to be less than one-tenth the acceleration of gravity (0.1 g)..., it shall be i j assumed that the maximum vibratory accelerations of the Safe Shutdown

Earthquake at these foundations are at least 0.1 g." Based on the

! CLASSI/ SHAKE analysis referred to,in your response to question 6 of the August 29, 1996, staff request for additional information (RAI), did'the

computed maximum ground accelerations at the foundation levels of the i diesel generator building (DGB) and service water intake structure 1

(SWIS), as well as at grade elevation 155 feet, comply with the above quoted regulatory requirement? If the requirement in 10 CFR Part 100 was not met, justify your deviation from your FSAR commitment.

j 2. With respect to your response to question 6 of the August 29, 1996, j staff's RAI, discuss the significance of changes in the amplitudes in

the newly generated in-structure response spectra (IRS) for the DGB and i

SWIS as a result of using the CLASSI/ SHAKE codes, which may have used a 4

soil damping value different from the FSAR-specified limit of 7%. If a soil damping greater than the 7% value was used in the CLASSI/ SHAKE-4 based analysis, provide justification for exceeding the FSAR value.  ;

{- Additionally, since you elected to employ the-soil structure interactive j i approach, which is not referenced in your FSAR for performing the  ;

i seismic analysis, discuss in detail how the following three provisions  !

i of Section 3.7.2 of the Standard Review Plan are incorporated in your I i

)

i l i Enclosure i t.

i 1

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l l I analysis for generating the new IRS: (1) limitation of the extent of reduction in foundation motion; (2) accounting of increased foundation rocking due to wave scattering; and (3) consideration of soil layering  !

effects and frequency dependency of the foundation impedances. Also,

, discuss how the debonding of the top 20 feet of soil or half the l l embedment, whichever is less, was implemented in the embedded SWIS i foundation analysis. Lastly, provide a brief summary of the code

! verification process that validates the applicability of the CLASSI code for the IRS generation.

3. Discuss the basis for using the Compact Overburden layer that exists at 24.5 feet below grade at the main plant area as control point for the diesel building analysis. What is the shear wave velocity of the compact overburden layer? Also discuss the rationale for adopting the 85-feet below grade Lisbon formation as control point for the SWIS.
4. With respect to the comparison of equipment seismic capacity and seismic demand, for those equipment located on floors within 40 feet above the effective grade and where the IRS exceeded the Reference Spectra
(RS or 1.5 times Bounding Spectra) in the structures identified in Attachment 1 of the enclosure to Reference 3, you have elected to use Method A in Table 4-1 of the GIP-2. Identify, in Appendix A (composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List) of Reference 1, the list of equipment installed at floor elevations where the IRS exceeded the RS and Method A in Table 4-1 of the GIP-2 was used. Provide a technical justification for not using the IRS provided in your 120-day response as the seismic demand for those equipment. It appears that some A-46 licensees are making an incorrect comparison between their plants' safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) ground motion response spectrum and the Seismic Qualification Utilities Group (SQUG) Bounding Spectrum. The SSE ground motion response spectrum for most nuclear power plants is defined at the plant foundation level. The SQUG Bounding Spectrum is defined at the free field ground surface. For plants located at deep soil or rock sites, there may not be a significant difference between the ground motion amplitudes at the foundation level and those at the ground surface. However, for sites where a structure is founded on shallow soil, the amplification of the ground motion from the foundation level to the ground surface may be significant.
5. In Reference 1, you indicated that you intended to revise the licensing basis for Unit I to allow application of earthquake experience data as acceptable alternative for seismic qualification of safety-related mechanical and electrical equipment through 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations.

! If you have done so, we request that you submit for the staff's review the complete documentation associated with your evaluation of the unreviewed safety question associated with 10 CFR 50.59 for carrying out the FSAR changes for seismic qualification of equipment.

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j 6. In Reference 3, the response to NRC question 5 stated that evaluations

of bolt performance for LC Transformer in DGB, MCC IK in Service Water i Intake, and 125-V-dc Service Water Building Battery No. I, followed the
l. procedure for anchors with excessive gaps provided in EPRI TR-10396, j ' dated June 1994. This EPRI report has not been reviewed or endorsed by

) the staff. We request that you submit this report for staff's review.

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. 7. Referring to'your response to question 7 (Reference 3) with regard to i cable and conduit raceways, provide two limited analytical review (LAR) evaluations that contain the least safety margins selected from the p containment internal structure and auxiliary buildings, respectively.

8. Referring to your ressponse to question 11 (Reference 3), provide a summary calculation of the refueling water storage tank that shows a 5%

less capacity in over-tuning moment when comparing with the SSE-induced over-turning moment. Al u , provide a summary of the calculations for the refueling water storage tank based on the seismic margin methodology that indicates a margin of 1.5 against the new ground spectra at elevation 154.5 feet.

9. With respect to your response to question 12 (Reference 3), discuss in more detail the basis for screening out the 40,000-gallon buried tank in the outlier screening evaluation.
10. Question 1 of your response dated October 11, 1995 (Reference 2) included a memorandum which stated, in part, that the operations department had reviewed the lists and assumptions regarding the plant safe shutdown equipment list (SSEL). The operations department agreed that procedures exist that would allow safe shutdown of the plant assuming the SSEL equipment was available, and that operators were trained on the use of the procedures. The review was conducted using the " Desk top" method.

As part of this. Desk top review, were any in-plant actions that need to be performed by the operators identified? Describe what, if any, barriers to successful operator performance of these actions were considered and dispositioned as part of the seismic and relay evaluation? How were factors such as ambient lighting and other

, potential hazards or environmental factors such as temperature, humidity, debris, or damaged structures, which could inhibit an operator from accomplishing procedural actions, evaluated?

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