ML20140D570

Response to Util Motion for Summary Disposition of Ctr for Nuclear Responsibility Contention 8 Re Spent Fuel Pool.Proof on Contention 8 Not Met.Motion Should Be Denied on Safety Grounds

ML20140D570
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	03/19/1986
From:	Lorion J CENTER FOR NUCLEAR RESPONSIBILITY
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
CON-#186-526 OLA-2, NUDOCS 8603260365
Download: ML20140D570 (5)

Text

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4 March 19, 1986 d(p , \'ll .N g y @

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA / ,' I '

t' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '/ i f'- is,,

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD i-

\

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-250-OLA-2.

) N,50.251-OLA-2 FLDRIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ) "-- ~'

(Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 and 4) )

) (Spent Fuel Pool Expansion)

INTERVENORS' RESPONSE TO LICENSEE'S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY

DISPOSITION OF INTERVENORS' CONTENTION 6 I. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR

SUMMARY

DISPOSITION Under both the Commission's and Federal Court Rules of Practice, "the burden of proof lies upon the movant for summary disposition, who must demonstrate the absence of any issue of material fact."

A_dickes v. Kress and Co., 398, U.S.

144, 157, Ferry ALAB-443, suora, 6 NRC at 753. Again under both NRC and Federal Rules, "the record is to be reviewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion."

Dairvland Power Coooerative, 16 NRC 512, 519 (1962) citing: Poller v.

Columbia Broadcastine Svstem Inc. , 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962): Crest Auto Sucolies Inc. v. Ero Manufacturino Cc.,360 F.

2d, 896, 899 (7th Cir. 1966); United Mineworkers of America, Dist.

22 v. Ronoco, 314 F.

2d 186, 188 (10th Cir. 1963); Pennsvivania Power

& Licht Co. and Allechenv Electric Co-ocerative Inc. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2) LEP 81-8, 13 NRC 335, 337 (1981); Seabrook, LSP-74-36, suora, 6 NRC, suora, 7 AEC at 879.

" Because the proponent of a motion for summary disposition has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of geg22ggggggtgagjgO < <5, (7 G

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material fact, it does not necessarily follow that a motion supported by affidavits will automatically prevail over an opposition not supported by affidavits. The Board must scrutinize the motion to determine whether the movant's burden has been met." Carolina Power

& Licht Comoany and North Carolina Eastern Municioal Power Acencv (Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2) LBP-84-7, ASLBP No.

82-468-01-OL, 19NRC 432 (1984).

Finally, for a contention to remain litigable, the Intervenors must present to the Board a sufficient factual basis "to require reasonable minds to inquire further." Pennsvlvania Power and Licht Comoanv and Allechenv Electric Coonerative Inc., (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1 and 2) ALAB 613, 12 NRC 317, 340 (1980).

The issues of material fact raised in the Intervenors' Response to Florida Power & Light's Motion for Summary Disposition of the foregoing contention demonstrate that a sufficient material basis on the contention has been raised; and that the Licensee's motion for summary disposition of this contention must fail.

II. INTERVENORS' CONTENTION 8 The purpose of this response is to address Intervenors' Contention 8 which states:

CONTENTION 8: That the high density des'ign of fuel racks will cause higher heat loads and increase in water temperature which could cause a loss-of-cooling accident in the spent fuel pool, which could in turn cause a major release of radioactivity to the environment. And, that the decrease in the time that it takes the spent fuel to reach its boiling point in such an accident, both increases the probability of accidents previously evaluated and increases the chances of accidents not previously evaluated.

BASES FOR CONTENTION: (a) the NRC has stated in numerous documents that the water in spent fuel pools should normally be kept below 122* F. The present temperature of the water

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at Turkey Point is estimated to be 127' F. After the reracking, the temperature of the water could rise to 141 degrees on a normal basis, and could reach 180 degrees F. with a full core offload. In addition, the the time for the spent fuel boiling point to be reached in a loss of cooling accident will go from 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Four hours is clearly not enough time to action to prevent a major accident in the spent fuel pool trom occurring. Thus, the increase in heat and radioactivity resulting from increased density will result in an increase in the probability'cf a major spent fuel pool meltdown occurring.

(b) There is also the possibility that delay.in the make up emergency water, could cause the zirconium cladding on the fuel rods to heat up to such higher temperatures that any attempt at later cooling by injecting water back into the pool could hasten the heat up, because water reacts chemically with heated zirconium to produce heat and possible explosions. Thus, the zircomium cladding could catch fire, especially in high density design, and create an accident not previously evaluated.

1. This contention is concerned that the increased spent fuel storage density causes a reduction in the margin of safety from a thermal-hydraulic and spent fuel pool cooling system safety concern.

2. According to the Licensee, the increased storage density will cause an increase for mas:imum bulk pool temperature to 143*.

This temperature does not meet the requirements of the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800) Section 9.1.3 which states that the spent fuel pool temperature should be limited to 140' F. for the normal maximum spent fuel heat load conditions.

3. The Ridgley affidavit, page 2 states that , "the pool temperature of 140 F. represents the maximum design temperature at which the spent fuel pool clean-up system can normally operate without degredation."

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4. Because the resin filters in the demineralizer are sensitive to water temperatures over 140*, it is possible that damage to the clean up system could cause excessive radiation doses to workers

5. The increased heat in the spent fuel storage system is amplified by the reduction in time that it takes for the spent fuel pool to reach boiling in a loss of cooling accident. The time for boiling has been reduced to 7.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for a normal load and 1.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for a full core offload.

6. The reduction in safety margin for the boiling point is especially significant in light of the fact that the Turkey Point spent fuel pool cooling system does not comply with the Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 9.1.3, Par. I.1 and III 1. b.;

nor does it comply with the requirements of Gmedal Design Criteria 2 of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, because the cooling system is not designed to provide adequate cooling in a seismic event.

7. According to the Patton affidavit, page6, FPL has committed to upgrade the spent fuel pool cooling loop by the end of the second outage after issuance of the amendment. Intervenors do not agree that the Staff should have issued the amendment before this upgrade.was completed because as it stands now, the existing cooling syste.t pipe-up and make-up supply lines for the spent fuel pool are not seismic category as the NRC regulations require them to be. Prevention of a spent fuel pool boiling event or meltdown cannet be left to auxiliary systems or fire departments. The equipment should be earthquake proof.

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8.

Intervenors continue to contend that since neither the j

Licensee nor the Staff have proven that adequate make-up water l

l can be supplied in a loss of cooling accident; it is still possible that a rirconium water reaction and possible fire or l

explosion could occur from a delay in cooling the spent fuel pool.

9. For all the above reasons, Intervenors contend that the Licensee has not met its burden of proof on contention 8, because it has not adequately demonstrated that increased storage density and storage of more highly enriched spent fuel with a higher burn-up will not increase both the possibility and consequences of a cpont fuel pool loss of cooling accident.

Intervenors further contend that the fact that the Licensee is operating outside of NRC requirements by allowing a maximum bulk temperature of 143* and allowing the spent fuel pool cooling system to operate outside of Seismic Category 1 requirements should cause this motion for summary disposition to be denied on safety grounds.

Respectfully submitted, D bk v Joette Lorion Director, Center for Nuclear Responsibility 7210 Red Rd. #208 Miami, F1. 33143 March 19, 1986

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