IR 05000354/1985027
| ML20137C416 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 08/09/1985 |
| From: | Blough A, Chaudhary S, Kortas A, Lyash J, Strosnider J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137C388 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-2.K.3.15, TASK-2.K.3.22, TASK-TM 50-354-85-27, IEB-76-01, IEB-76-04, IEB-76-1, IEB-76-4, IEB-78-01, IEB-78-1, NUDOCS 8508220259 | |
| Download: ML20137C416 (15) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-354/85-27 Docket No.
50-354 License No.
CPPR-120 Licensee: Public Service Electric & Gas Company 80 Park Plaza - 17C Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Hope Creek Generating Station Inspection At:
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted: May 28 - July 7, 1985 8/////f Inspectors:
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hrs.0. hau hary -Senior Resident Inspector date ( kJ ansc frJ.
. Lyas Reactor Engineer date S/9ffT
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tas, eactor Engineer date Approved by:
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rosnider, Chief, Projects Section 18 date Inspection Summary: May 28 - July 7,1985 (Report No. 50-354/85-27):
A routine onsite resident inspection (307 hours0.00355 days <br />0.0853 hours <br />5.076058e-4 weeks <br />1.168135e-4 months <br />) of work in. progress and preoperational testing was conducted.
The inspector also made tours of the site; reviewed licensee action on previous inspection findings, IE Bulletins, IE Circulars, and TMI Action Plan Items; and made independent pipe and weld thickness measurements.
One violation was noted involving several examples of failure to follow procedures for implementing preoperational tests (Detail 6). Also, the adequacy of cable raceway design is unresolved relative to unsupported cable spans at one plant location (Detail 6.1).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Public Service Electric and Gas Company
- A. Barnabei, Principal QA Engineer
- J. Carter, Startup Manager G. Daves, Senior Engineer, Operations R. Donges, QA Engineer J. Hagan, Operating Engineer
- A. E. Giardino, Manager, QA Engineering and Construction
- R. Griffith, Principal Staff Engineer P. Kudless, Maintenance Manager
- C. Lambert, Site Engineering R. Lovell, Radiation Protection Manager P. Landrieu, Project Manager e. Logan, Site Manager
- M. Metcalf, Principal Startup QA Engineer J. A. Nichols, Technical Engineer J. M. Rucki, Maintenance Engineer
- R. S. Salvesen, General Manager,' Hope Creek Operations.
Bechtel
- W. Goebel, QA Engineer
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- C. Jaffee,~Startup Engineer
- D. Long, Field Construction Manager
- W. Mourer, Construction Manager
- G. Moulton, Construction Manager J. Zeruca, Startup Director 2.
IE Bulletin Follow-up 2.1 (Closed) IE Bulletin 76-01 (76-BU-01), Isolation Condenser Tube Failure. This bulletin is not applicable to Hope Creek which has no isolation condenser.
2.2 (Closed)IEBulletin 76-04 (76-BU-04), cracks in cold worked piping. This bulletin applied only to plants operating at the time.
For Hope Creek, the issue IGSCC is covered by an SER open item and by IE Bulletin 83-02.
2.3 (Closed) IE Bul.letin 78-01 (78-80-01, flammable contact arms in GE CR120A Relays. Bechtel added provisions in applicable specifications to prevent use of flammable contact arms.
For GE-supplied systems, GE performed a review and verified no such relays were provided.
After reviewing a sampling of Bechtel electrical specifications, the inspector had no further question "
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3.
IE Circular Follow-up i
3.1 (Closed) IE Circular 81-03 (81-CI-03), inoperable seismic monitoring instrumentation.
Bechtel and the seismic monitoring system vendor reviewed this circular and determined that only one of the failure modes described is potentially applicable to Hope Creek
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equipment--design improvements had already been made by the vendor to preclude the problem. Draft Technical Specifications include operability and testing requirements for the seismic monitors.
i 3.2 (Closed) IE Circular 76-03 (76-CI-03), exposure in reactor cavities. The inspector reviewed administrative procedure SA-AP-0460, Revision 0, Radiological Access Control Program, and determined that it contains an extensive key control and RWP authorization system.
4.
Construction Deficiency Reports (CDR's)
4.1 (Closed) CDR (85-00-07), air baffle weld cracks on diesel generators. The applicant repaired the stitch weld with a continuous fillet weld. After reviewing the associated Startup Deficiency Reports (SDR's) and QC reports, the inspector had no further questions.
4.2 (Closed) CDR (84-00-01), disassembly of Jacket cooling water check valves. The inspector reviewed the rework purchase order, the NCR, and the Material Receiving Reports. He also observed the in plant equipment.
4.3 The below three construction deficiencies'were initially reported verbally and later withdrawn as being not reportable. The inspector reviewed the applicant's written justification for withdrawing the items; no inconsistencies or unacceptable conditions were noted:
(Closed) CDR (84-00-15), Topaz inverter low voltage. trip setpoint; (Closed) CDR (84-00-08), diesel annunciator relays; and (Closed) CDR (84-00-06), Bettis HVAC damper actuators.
5.
TMI Action Plan Items (TAP)
The inspector reviewed the following TAP items to verify that the applicant is implementing adequate measures to meet his commitments.
5.1 (Closed) TAP Item II.K.3.15, Prevention of Spurious Isolations of HPCI and RCI.
The applicant's commitment to install time delay relays for high steam flow isolations was accepted in the SER.
The inspector interviewed applicant engineers, reviewed various drawings
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l and observed in plant equipment to verify implementation.
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inspector reviewed draft Technical Specifications to verify the timers will be subject to requirements for operability and periodic calibration. During the plant walk-through the inspector noted that the component identification on trip unit slave #660D differed from the drawing identification.
The applicant investigated and found
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I that the. unit had been moved temporarily (i.e., less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />)
during troubleshooting as permitted by Startup Procedure SAP-13.
Later, the inspector verified that' the proper unit had been re-inserted.
5.2 (0 pen) TAP II. K.3.22, Automatic Switchover of RCIC Suction.
The applicant committed to providing automatic switching of RCIC suction to the torus on low-level in the condensate storage tank. The inspector reviewed drawings and draft Technical Specifications and discussed the item with applicant engineers.
No problems were noted. Because of limitations on applicant staff availability not l
all of the plant walk-through was completed; therefore, the item remains open.
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Preoperational Phase Activities 6.1' Plant Tour The inspector toured the control room on regular and backshif ts.
He interviewed operations personnel regarding testing scheduled or in progress, reviewed logs and night orders, and observed alignment and indications of systems undergoing tests. Operators and supervisors were knowledgeable regarding plant status and test plans.
The inspector toured areas of the plant, including drywell, reactor building, and the control building. He checked on tests and opera-tions in progress, observed equipment and housekeeping conditions, and interviewed personnel involved in ongoing activities.
The inspector followed up on the following observations:
6.1.1 During a plant tour on June 5 the inspector noticed that Fuel Pool Cooling System hanger 1-P-EC-051-H02 base plate contained only 2 anchor bolts vice 4 bolts as indicated by 4 holes drilled in the base plate. The hanger was tagged " complete" and was the first hanger upstream of rotating equipment under test. The inspector verified by review of design drawings and FCR numbers H-527, HF-6049 and H-1268 that the design and installation were acceptable.
6.1.2 The inspector also noted that several Rosemont pressure transmitters on the reactor pressure / level instrument racks were disconnected from their mounting plates and were hanging by flexible conduit. The instruments had Release For Test stickers applied and had been calibrated.
The inspector investigated to ensure that the
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work was properly authorized, and that a mechanism was in place to require recalibrationof the instruments. The instruments had been turned back to Bechtel for replacement.
The work was being accomplished under an approved SDR, and the SDR required calibration of the new pressure transmitters.
In response to the inspector's concerns the applicant instructed the craft to properly support the instruments.
6.1.3 While touring elevation 102' of the Reactor Building the inspector observed that Bisco penetration sealing material was leaking from a penetration form.
The material flowed down a non-IE cable tray and onto the north Scram Discharge Volume level instruments, level instrument isolation valves and piping, and numerous lengths of IE conduit.
The inspector located the Bisco personnel pouring the seal and questioned them regarding the leak and in process inspection requirements.
The inspetor was told that inspection of the form or the in process pour is not required.
The inspector notified the Startup Test Engineer and SDR BF-0154 was initiated to clean up the spill.
Initial testing of the instruments and valves had not yet been conducted, so no retest was required.
In the same area it was noted that a penetration form had been clamped to, and shimmed against, three Class 1E cable trays.
This situation created the possibility for damage to the tray and/or the cable. When informed, the applicant removed the form.
The applicant, in response to these concerns, provided training on proper damming and supporting of dams for penetrations.
In future routine tours the inspectors will evaluate the effectivenss of these measures.
6.1.4 During a tour of elevation 54' of the Reactor Building, the inspector noted three horizontally mounted Class IE raceways which had been interrupted for a length of approximately 40 inches.
The cable routed in each raceway was unsupported across the 40 inches between the end of the one tray section and the start of the next tray section.
This length appeared to be excessive.
The inspector reviewed Bechtel Drawing No. E-1408-0, Rev 7, which states that a
" maximum exposed cable length of 18 inches horizontal...unless otherwise noted on the drawing..." is acceptable.
The applicant informed the inspector that this criteria did not apply since a longer unsupported length had been specified on the raceway drawing for the trays in question.
The insepctor questioned the adequacy of the design, and requested to see an engineering analysis and a description of the limits which apply to the design.
In the same area described above, the inspector noted a similar raceway to which an extension had been added, substantially reducing the length of unsupported cable.
This extension was not shown on the i
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corresponding raceway drawing.
The inspector requested the authoriz-ing documents used to make this apparent change.
These items, collectively, are unresolved pending supply of additional information (85-27-01).
6.2 PTP Observations 6.2.1 Torus Water Clean-Up The inspector observed portions of EE-1, Revision 0, Torus Water Clean-up System pre-op in progress on June 3 and 4,1985. On June 4 the inspector noted that Section 2, References, listed FSAR Table 6.2-16 Amendment 5.
The current FSAR amendment was actually Amend-ment 10..
The page of Table 6.2-16 containing Torus Water Cleanup system containment isolation valves was Amendment 9, and listed a closure time of 30 seconds for valves EE-003 and EE-004.
This apparently had been changed from 39 seconds in Amendment 6.
The preoperational test acceptance criterion still listed 39 seconds for the valves (i.e. nonconservative relative to FSAR).
Test pre-requisite 3.1, which had been signed off, requires:
(1) review of reference document revision numbers, (2) pen and ink update of revision numbers, and (3) a review of updated documents for deter-mination of necessary procedure changes. These actions had not been performed properly.
10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V requires activities affecting quality to be accomplished in accordance with documented procedures.
Failure to follow the Torus Water Cleanup System test procedure is an example of violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B (85-27-020.
The applicant acknowledged this failure to follow procedures and took the following corrective actions,
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documented in a Startup Manager Memo of 06/11/85:
o changed the procedure;
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counselled responsible personnel; and
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conducted a training class for all test engineers.
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Af ter reviewing associated PORC meeting minutes and listening to a tape of the training session, the inspector had no further questions on these corrective actions.
6.2.2 Core Spray System On July 3 the inspector observed portions of the following test:
PTP-BE-1, Revision 0, Reactor Core Spray
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During performance of the test'the inspector noted that On-The-Spot Change 3 effected significant changes to the initial valve line-up given in Appendix C to the procedure.
The test cngineer had signed off test step 8.1.1(a) verifying that valve line up per Appendix C was complete, and had begun motor-operated valve component tests.
The inspector further noted that neither the Startup Manager (or designee) authorization signature nor the shift supervisor notifica-tion signature were on OTS-3.
The inspector determined that the change had been verbally approved by a proper startup manager designee and that the Nuclear Shift Supervisor had been notified.
Thus, that missing signature was only an administrative over-sight.
6.2.3 The inspector also witnessed vendor testing of the B Emergency Olesel Generator, and verified adequacy of the Tag out and test instrumentation for the Safety Auxiliary Cooling System Flush.
6.3 Preoperational Test Procedure and Results Review 6.3.1 Emergency Diesel Generator Test The inspector reviewed the following test procedure and discussed his observations with licensee startup personnel:
KJ-3, Revision 1, Emergency Diesel Generators.
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The test was reviewed to verify incorporation of comments made on a previous test revision and to ensure that various alarms and indications associated with the system were adequately tested.
The inspector noted a lack of testing of control room annunciators.
Each diesel has associated with it three general trouble alarms.
Each alarm has multiple inputs monitoring engine and generator
parameters.
The procedure, as written, test each alarm once, using only one input.
The remaining inputs are simulated and verified to alarm at the local panels, not in the control room.
Through discussions with start-up and examination of Bechtel, Bailey Control Systems and Beloit Power Systems electrical schenatics the inspector determined that this test method is acceptable.
The control room and local annuciators share common actuation circuitry, so that single test of the control room alarms, and subsequent verification of the remaining inputs at the local alarm panels is sufficient.
The inspector also observed that the Automatic Start Permissive indication on the diesel engine bezel at panel 10C651, Section E, in the control room was not tested. This omission was identified to the applicant and an "On The Spot Change" was issued to include testing of this featur _
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In response to the above finding the Startup Test Engineer conducted a thorough review of the procedure to ensure its adequacy.
No additional problems were identified 6.3.2 480 Volt Class 1E Unit Substations The inspector reviewed the results of the following test:
PG-1, Revision 0, 480 Volt Class IE Unit Substations
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The results were examined to verify that proper results review was conducted, test exceptions were identified and test changes were made
'in accordance with approved procedures, acceptance criteria were satisfied, and independent verification of critical steps was per-formed.
The inspector identified several examples of improper use and implementation of On-The-Spot Changes to this procedures as follows:
(1) During the PG-1 review the inspector noted that On-The-Spot Change (OTS)-1 was not properly implemented, Startup Adminis-trative Procedure 24, Revision 6, Section 7.5.3.1 requires the Test Engineer to clearly mark up the Master Test Copy of the procedure delineating the change, and to enter a reference to the change number adjacent to the affected test instruction.
contrary to the above, on March 26, 1985, requirement OTS-1, part 3, was not made to the body of the procedure. The change involved use of the Fluke Counter, rather than an oscilloscope, to measure bus frequency.
Discussion with Startup personnel indicated that the proper instrument was, in fact, used during conduct of the test. The applicant also indicated that training regarding proper implementation of On-The-Spot Changes would be scheduled.
(2) The inspector also noted that changes made by OTS-5 constituted an intent change to the procedure, and therefore should have
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been made by a Change Notice, vice an OTS. The test sections in question simulate loss of 125V DC control power to each of the 480V AC Unit Substations. As originally written, the Test Engineer verified the local OC Bus Energized Light out, a Main Control Room annunciator window flashing, and a computer alarm point annuciated.
These items are also listed as acceptance criteria in Section 5.3 of the test. On-The-Spot Change 5 deleted verification of the annuciator window flashing and the computer point annunciated from the body of the procedure.
It did not delete the associated acceptance criteria which were subsequently signed off as complet.
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Startup Administrative Procedure 24, Revision 6, Section 7.5.3.2(a) limits OTS's to " procedure modifications that do not change acceptance criteria...".
Section 7.5.3.2(b) further i
states Change Notices (CN) will be used for procedure modifi-cations that alter the acceptance criteria and that the CN will
be reviewed and approved by QA and the Preoperational Review Committee prior to performance of the associated testing.
Contrary to these requirements, on March 26, 1985, the above-described changes were implemented using an OTS, (3) Prerequisite 3.1.3 of test PG-1 requires Test Engineer to verify that all test packages (TPR's) have been reviewed by Public Service Startup Group.
Startup Administrative Procedure 24, Revision 6, states that each test prerequisite is completed and properly documented prior to signoff in the Master Test Copy of the procedure. This document also states that if a prerequisite cannot be satisfied, the Test Engineer will institute a test exception to the preoperational test. Contrary to the above, on March 11, 1985, TPR-PGC-153 had not received the required results review and was not included on the test exceptions list.
The inspector informed the applicant that the above three failures to follow procedures are examples of a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, which requires that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented procedures and shall be accomplished in accordance with these procedures.
(354/85-27-04). The inspector pointed out that these items had not been identified by his QC coverage of the test or his results review process.
In reviewing the implementation of OTS-5 as described above the inspector noted that 125V DC control power to the 1E 480V AC Unit Substations could be lost with no alarm or indication in
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the control room.
The inspector identified this concern to the site engineering group. This item is unresolved pending applicant justification of this design (85-27-05).
6.3.3 The inspector reviewed the following preoperational test procedures for verification that planned testing fully demonstrates that system operation and response meet regulatory requirements and applicant commitments. The review also verified proper format and content, and applicant review and approval of the subject procedures:
PN-1, Revision 1, Class 1E 120 V AC Power and Non-Class IE; and
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SF-18, Revision 0, Rod Sequence Control System
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The inspector also witnessed vendor testing of the B Emergency Diesel Generator, and verified adequacy of the Tag out and test instrument-ation for the Safety Auxiliary Cooling System Flush.
Within the scope of the review no unacceptable items were identified.
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6.4 Preoperational~ Phase Maintenance Activities The' inspector discussed MSIV seat leakage repair work with main-tenance supervisors and briefly observed rigging of valve components and valve disc lapping.
The inspector observed maintenance activities on Limitorque Valve
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Operators. The inspector witnessed disassembly, cleaning, greasing, l
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and reassembly of Types SMB-00 and SMB-1 valve operators.
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No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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Construction Activities 7.1 Plant Tour The inspectors periodically toured the plant and performed walk-through inspections during this inspection period.
In the walk-through inspections, special emphasis was placed in the areas of drywell, Reactor Building, torus /wetwell, and diesel generator enclosures. These inspections were carried out to assess the acceptability of finished work, housekeeping practices in the work area, and work in progress.
The inspectors also verified the availability of approved procedures, current design and construction information, craft supervision, and quality control personnel in the work area. The completed works were examined to verify their conformance to approve project procedures, specifications, approved design drawing, and acceptable workmanship. The works in progress were reviewed for proper tools, equipment, work procedure, and knowledge and understanding of craftsmen regarding the quality of the
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job they were performing.
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On June 17, the inspector observed torquing and application of torque paint to base plate anchor bolts on Reactor Building exterior i
132-foot elevation.
He also interviewed the craftsmen and QC inspector. No problems were noted.
7.2 Code Hydrostatic Test Results Evaluation The inspector reviewed the completed documentation package for the code hydrostatic test (code hydro) to verify that (1) the applicant had performed an adequate evaluation, (2) test acceptance criteria
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were 'et and deviations were properly dispositioned, (3) test m
procedure changes had been properly handled, and (4) adequate, auditable records are being maintained.
The inspector discussed the test results with the lead QC inspector,
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reviewed the "as run" copy of the test, reviewed all test changes, and reviewed the QC inspection records.
completed documents reviewed included the following:
SWP/P-P-116, Revision 0, 2/15/85, Reactor Vessel and Associated
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Piping Hydrostatic Test Procedures (completed copy).
Procedure Deviation Sheets
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l-Signature sheets
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Temperature and pressure logs
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Valve line-up sheets
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Instrument Calibration Sheets
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Post-test pressure gage calibration check records Water Quality
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Data Sheets Field Change Requests and NCR (sampling)
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QA Work Procedure Plan / Record WPPR-P-1000-1-BB-98
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Walkdown and Inspection Team Reports (sampling)
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QC Instruction QCI T-1.10, 2/22/85
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Annotated inspection drawings (sampling)
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l The inspector noted that pre-hydro blending of several damaged areas i
(e.g. arc strikes) resulted in slight violations of original minimum l
wall thickness. Associated FCR's had been dispositioned "use as-is"
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based on " existing wall thickness exceeds actual design requirements."
The inspector verified that the applicant had performed, and is maintaining record of, supporting stress calculations.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
7.3 Electrical System Walkdowns The inspector walked down portions of the Class 1E power system, Channel B.
The areas inspected included the 4160V Class 1E Bus
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10A402, the 480V Class 1E unit substation 108420, the Reactor Area Class 1E Mctor Control Center 108222, The Reactor Core Spray Pump Class IE Motor Control Center 10B222, The Reactor Core Spray Pump
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the RHR pump "B" and the Core Spray Suction Valve IBE-HV-F0018.
The inspector verified the as-built configurations with the drawings listed below:
E-0001-0, Revision 5, Single Line Diagram Station
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E-0006-0, Revision 3, Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram
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4.16KV Class 1E Power System E-0018-1, Revision 5, Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram 480V
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Class 1E Unit Substation 10B410, 10B420, 108430, 108440, 108450, 108460, 108470, 108480 E-0021-1, Revision 5, Tabulation Class IE MCC Reactor Area
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108212, 108222, 108232, 108242.
The associated raceways and cables were inspected to verify proper load, percent fill, color coding, separation, strapping requirements inside the raceways, and general housekeeping.
The inspector also reviewed calculations performed by the licensee for the load applied to raceway 12BTMB45, which appeared heavily loaded. The calculated load was 30.911 lbs/ft which is within the raceway design load of 50 lbs/ft.
The inspector reviewed licensee drawing E-1408-0, Wire and Cable Notes and Details (Section 1.18).
This requires for vertical tray runs that a strap shall be used to strap all cable bundles directly to the tray rung at maximum intervals of 10 feet for control and instrument tray risers greater than 8 feet'in length and more than 407. full.
The inspector observed that cables in raceway 12BTMB49 were not all tied to the tray rung.
The inspector reviewed licensee calculations and verified the raceway was 33.2*.' full.
Therefore, the requirement did not apply.
No violations were identified.
7.4 Independent Thickness Measurements The inspector selected various welds and ground areas in the following sections of piping and independently measured wall thickness using a Nova 1000-0 instrument.
Test valves were compared with minimum wall thickness valves recorded in Bechtel Specification No. 10855-P-0500, Revision 7, Piping Class Sheet c-
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Scope Reference Drawing AE-8"-DDB-037 HPCI System tie-in P&ID M-41-1 Sh.1 of to Feedwater. System 2 Nuclear Boiler 26"-V(0)LA-032 Main Steam line "C" P&ID M-41-1 Sh. I from reactor vessel Nuclear Boiler to outboard MSIV
l The below-listed areas required additional information, justifica-tion, or action by the applicant:
The inspector identified a potential excessively ground area on
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t HPCI system spool piece 1-AE-037-S14.
The licensee provided the nonconformance report package for the repair work performed on the spool piece. The report confirmed an ultrasonic exam-ination had been completed to verify design minimum wall is not violated.
The licensee thickness inspection report results l
agreed with the inspector's independent test measurements.
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Thickness measurements results on Bechtel weld No. 26"-AB-032-11
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l (Main Steam line "C") did not meet the minimum wall thickness
criteria on the Bechtel piping class sheets. At the request of the inspector, the licensee performed an "information only" ultrasonic thickness measurement of the weld area in question, The licensee examination results agreed with the inspector's i
independent measurements.
Through further investigation, the licensee provided General Electric Primary Steam Piping Drawings 761E468 Sheet I and 2 and General Electric'FDDR No. K-T1-011k Revision 0, and Revision 1.
These drawings identified a lower i
value for the pipe design minimum wall than the value identified
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in the Bechtel Piping Class Sheets.
The FDDR provided the design calculations to determine the minimum wall thickness required to meet the applicable ASME Code Edition. The inspector reviewed the calculation for design minimum wall thickness and the "Information Only" thickness data with ASME Code requirements. The inspector performed additional thickness measurements on welds of similar type and configuration.
The examination results were within the calculated code limits.
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The inspector identified weld spatter on main steam line "A"
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spool No.1-AB-030-5003/PS-1-A7 (GE) at the vendor weld. The weld spatter was not easily removable.
The weld had previously met surface condition requirements and had received the PS!
ultrasonic examination.
The inspector expressed concerr for the ultrasonic inseparability of the weld during inservice inspection.
The licensee representative stated the spatter would be identified in future startup system walkdowns. At the request
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of the inspector, the licensee issued Startup Deviation Report No. AB-0227 to assure the rework to remove the weld spatter is completed. The licensee's representative stated that it is
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common practice to cover components in nearby areas while performing work that may leave weld spatter and thus detract from inservice inseparability.
No violations were identified.
7.5 Multi plant Allegations NRC Region I letter, June 10, 1985, transmitted to PSE&G a copy of inspection Report 352/84-48 for Limerick Generating Station.
The inspection evaluated multi plant allegations, and none of the allegations pertaining to Hope Creek were substantiated. However, one item, pertaining to the safety relief valve discharge line analyses in the Hope Creek Mark I Containment Plant Unique Analysis Report, is still under review by NRC/NRR.
The inspector will review the results of the NRR evaluation (354/85-27-06).
8.
Project Management 8.1 Fuel Load Schedule The applicant has advanced his fuel load schedule from January 1986 to December 1985. On June 26-27, the inspector participated in NRC:NRR Caseload forcast meeti<ig. At the conclusion, the inspector discussed with applicant project management the level of applicant support and cooperation needed by NRC Region I to complete routine inspections and evaluation of open items before licensing.
8.2 Fuel Receipt Schedule The applicant is scheduled to receive fuel beginning September 1.
Through attendance at applicant planning meetings the inspector determined that the applicant has a good understanding of the hard-ware, procedural and training considerations in readiness for fuel receipt.
The inspector stated that all functional areas involved will be inspected prior to fuel receipt.
The schedule may necess-itate significant NRC inspection effort during the INPO audit August 5-16.
8.3 Facility Turnover During this inspection period the applicant made a conscious effort to reduce the number of deficiencies and amount of remaining equip-ment work in each room at time of turnover. As a result several facility turnovers were delayed. The applicant's revised philosophy
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should reduce the potential for unnoticed damage to previously tested equipment.
8.4 Hope Creek Safeteam i
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The inspector discussed the Safeteam program with the applicant's supervisor and one interviewer.
This program is designed to provide workers an opportunity to confidentially express any concerns
regarding plant quality, contracts include routine briefings, exit
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briefings, and mailings to former employees. A written response is provided to each concern. Auditable records of Safeteam activities are maintained.
The applicant stated that, so far, about 4 percent of the craftsmen and 20 percent of the non-manual employees briefed
had expressed some sort of concern.
The applicant is currently
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working to reduce his investigation backlog, which is about 100 items.
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Safeteam activities will be reviewed in future NRC inspections.
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No violations were identified.
9.
Unresolved Items (
t Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
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l order to ascertain whether they are acceptable, violations or deviations, Unresolved items are discussed in paragraphs 6.1 and 6.3.
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Exit Interview
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r The inspectors met with applicant and contractor personnel periodically
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findings o' their inspection activities. Written material was not i
l provided to the applicant.
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Based on Region I review and discussions with the Itcensee, it was
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determined that this report does not contain information subject to i
10 CFR 50 restrictions.
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I
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